Since 2014 with Russia seizing the Crimea, it is clear that President Putin has an agenda to expand Russia. The current Ukrainian-Russian war is in the next step. How can Europe and NATO best meet this challenge?

BG (Retired) Preziosa ended our conversation by discussing the nature of the challenges facing the democracies and some key elements of how to meet those challenges.

Preziosa went back to the early 1990s and underscored that the nuclear deal made in that period of time laid the foundation for the current crisis. This is how he put it: “John J. Mearsheimer in a Foreign Affairs article one year before the Budapest argued that a denuclearized Ukraine, was not positive either for Kiev or for the stability of the Central and Eastern European quadrant. Mearsheimer added that the widespread belief of the time, also promoted by then U.. S President Bill Clinton, was wrong with regard to the benefits of denuclearizing Ukraine.”

Preziosa then cited the perspective of President Macron with regard to the new situation facing Europe and the United States.

“President Macron in an interview to Étien Gernelle affirmed that we are at the beginning of new era and war is back in Europe since Yugoslavia disorders. A nuclear armed power is threatening a nuclear attack for territorial aggrandizement reasons and this is a big change in the grammar of deterrence.”

Preziosa argued that the current Russian aggression against Ukraine is different from Crimea in a fundamental way. “If in 2008 in Georgia and in 2014 in Ukraine, Russia had intervened in reaction to other events, this time it deliberately chose war, and this is a great rupture with the past. The rupture comes by progressive tendency of Vladimir Putin starting in 2008 in Georgia with the perception of possible NATO enlargement followed by the Western weakness in Syria in 2013 when chemical weapons were used.

“Putin has convinced himself of, about a betrayal of the 1990 agreements, an expansion of NATO with a willingness to annihilate his country, to have been abandoned by the West in the Caucasian crisis, essential for Moscow above all because they are lined to Islamic terrorism. Western countries did not understand the consequences in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and secession of Donbass.”

He added: “Putin has launched an offensive operation based on the perceived weakness of the West. and deduced that the Western democracies were weak.”

He quoted Macron: “All this does not happen in a day. But today the bill has arrived.”

He noted that there are significant spillover effects globally from the war in Ukraine and certainly in Europe. “The events in Ukraine are destabilizing for the Western Balkans which are subject to Turkish, Russian and Chinese influences. The hot spot in the Balkans is Kosovo that never reached political stability with Serbia.”

In addition to the Russian challenge, China is ramping up its global reach and capabilities as well. As Preziosa put it: China is challenging America’s role as the world’s sole superpower.

As a result of the China’s widening influence, spheres of global dominance are projected for the future between the authoritarian and democratic powers.

“Since market liberalizations in 1978, China’s economy has doubled every eight years. Four of the largest banks in the world (by asset) are in China, in the age of easy money, and it is the largest creditors in the world.

“The era of America’s singular dominance is being challenged across multiple strategic domains, with several second-order outcomes. Recent trade wars have caused fractures between the two nations’ trade relationship. Cross border trade settlement in renminbi instead of US dollars has risen exponentially since 2010.China’s Belt & Road initiative has signed agreements with 138 countries. Globally, there are over 3485 megaprojects backed by China’s government.

“The competition between great powers with a clear distinction between the objectives of the democracies and the authoritarian powers.”

But the democracies themselves face divisions not just among themselves but internally within each democratic state. Finding cohesion where possible is crucial to shape a way ahead to deal with the authoritarian challenges globally.

Preziosa underscored that “In the U.S. and in Europe much remain to be done to put their political systems in order and preserve the political and economic strength of the world’s major democracies.”

And his own country, Italy, certainly faces core security challenges along with political ones which need to be met as part of an overall response to the defense challenges posed by the authoritarian powers.

As he concluded: “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has brought out the extremely risky character of Europe’s energy dependence on Moscow. The side effect of the Ukrainian crisis affects the Middle East and North Africa in terms of the energy issues and food security.

“The fear is that discontent will generate new waves of instability and migratory flows to Italy and Europe. Italy is one of the European country most dependent on Russian energy supplies, and the energy issue can only assert itself as the first point to be addressed. The first step taken by Italy has been to turn to third countries that produce and export energy, to diversify our sources of supply and pursue our energy security. This strategy has involved both African countries and North African countries such as Egypt, Algeria, and Egypt.

“Italy needs to find an internal political stability as well to shape not only its way ahead but to play the kind of role which is needed for expanded European influence and cohesion in dealing with the 21^st century authoritarian challenges.”

For the first two pieces in this series, see the following:

The War in Ukraine and the Challenge of Reshaping European Direct Defense

Airpower in Shaping a Way Ahead in European Defense

And for our book addressing the authoritarian challenges to European direct defense, see the following:

By Thomas Wilkins

On 8 July, the world was stunned by the assassination of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe during a campaigning speech in the city of Nara two days before elections were to take place. While domestic debates about improved security for politicians continue in Japan, it’s also timely to reflect on the legacy of Abe’s achievements in terms of not only his foreign policy legacy, but, especially for Australians, the contribution he made towards strengthening Japan–Australia ties.

It was during his first term in office (2006–07) that Abe signed the foundational Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with Australian PM John Howard—a moment that redefined the whole nature of bilateral ties by extending economic and diplomatic cooperation to the security and defence spheres.

When Abe returned to office for his second term in 2012, he lost no time in further consolidating that earlier achievement. When he again visited Australia to address parliament in July 2014, he jointly launched the so-called special strategic partnership with then PM Tony Abbott. Both Abe and Abbott concurred at the time that a ‘special relationship’ was born that day. This was very specific qualitative language, reserved only for the closest of partnerships, and most commonly associated with descriptions of US–UK or US–Israel ties. Prior to this, in 2013, Abbott had already described Japan, not without controversy, as Australia’s ‘best friend in Asia’.

But the 2014 special strategic partnership announcement was more than simply effusive rhetoric and public diplomacy optics. It was accompanied by the launch of the Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement, the most significant step forward in bilateral economic relations since Abe’s grandfather PM Nobusuke Kishi signed the Australia–Japan Agreement on Commerce in 1957. The 2014 agreement has since overseen increased economic cooperation; an uptick of more than 30% in two-way trade; and the development of infrastructure projects, such as the Ichthys LNG facility in northern Australia, supported by Japanese company INPEX, which is vital to the export of energy supplies to Japan.

The 2014 visit also resulted in the signing of an agreement for transfers of defence equipment and technology, designed to facilitate closer defence-technological collaboration. Though Canberra did not pursue cooperation on submarines with Japan as originally envisaged, it’s likely that this agreement will be the basis for plans to explore other high-technology projects such as, potentially, joint missile procurement.

Under Abe, Japan and Australia worked hand in glove to coordinate efforts to strengthen the regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific with the shared aim of building a stable, prosperous and rules-based order. During the turbulent presidency of Donald Trump in the US, they worked together to rescue the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which now lives on as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership under their combined leadership. Abe was also pivotal in reviving the Japan–Australia–US–India Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which has since gone from strength to strength and forms a major platform for combined regional engagement.

Japan’s move towards a more prominent role as a regional security actor under Abe’s banner of a ‘proactive contribution to peace’ and the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ vision, launched by Abe in 2016, were also well received in Canberra. Indeed, Australia has effectively adopted the latter concept, alongside others including the United States, to frame much of its regional engagement and to uphold a rules-based order.

Under Abe, real practical cooperation in the security and defence sphere progressed. Upgrades to logistical arrangements under the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement were put in place, followed shortly after Abe’s departure from office by the long-awaited reciprocal access agreement, which allows for smoother operational cooperation between the Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces to train and exercise in one another’s countries, something he paved the way for. Even more significantly, it was Abe who pushed through ground-breaking domestic legislation in a package of peace and security laws in 2015, which created provisions for the right to ‘collective defence’ and now allows the Japan Self-Defense Forces to protect Australian deployments in the event of a survival-threatening situation.

Abe was also a champion of historical reconciliation with Australia, making an unprecedented prime ministerial visit in 2018 to Darwin, the site of sustained aerial attacks by the Empire of Japan during the Pacific War in 1942 and 1943. The visit was a part of his bid to move beyond past animosities and form the basis for a future-focused relationship—at the time, he declaimed: ‘We in Japan will never forget your openminded spirit nor the past history between us.’

There were frictions and disappointments in bilateral ties during Abe’s terms of office, such as the Australian case against Japan over whaling in the International Court of Justice, and Tokyo’s surprise at being eliminated from the tender for Australia’s future submarine program in 2016 (in favour of the French contract, since annulled and replaced by AUKUS). Yet, these setbacks were successfully absorbed and have not had a significant lasting impact on the relationship.

The tragic loss of Abe has been deeply felt in Canberra and elsewhere. After Abe’s death, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese praised him as a ‘true leader and true friend’ to Australia, a sentiment echoed by Abbott, who called Abe a ‘best friend of Australia’.

Abe’s determined leadership played a crucial role not only in charting a new path for Japan but also in building the strategic partnership with Australia. Thanks to the special strategic partnership bequeathed to us by Abe, a recent study by the Australian National University concluded that ‘Australia’s relationship with Japan has never been more close.’  Under the partnership, Japan and Australia now cooperate across a wide spectrum of diplomatic, security, defence, military, economic and scientific areas on a scale and at a pace never seen before. This in large part can be credited to the far-sighted leadership of Abe, in tandem with his Australian counterparts.

As Abe himself exhorted the Australian parliament back in 2014 in one of his many colourful evocations: ‘Let us walk forward together, Australia and Japan, with no limits.’ His successors in Tokyo and Canberra appear to have every intention of continuing on the path of bilateral friendship and cooperation that Abe did so much to pioneer.

Thomas Wilkins is a senior fellow at ASPI.

This article was published by ASPI on July 26,2022.

Also see the following:

China Drives Significant Change in Japanese Strategic Thinking

Featured Image: Jason Reed/Pool/Getty Images.