Osprey Training in Support of the Maneuver Force: WTI-2-22

07/22/2022

U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) conduct flight maneuvers in an MV-22B Osprey, during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, near Big Bear Lake, California, March 25, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.25.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

VMFAC-121 onboard USS Tripoli F-35

07/18/2022

The video shows F-35B Lightning II aircraft assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 121 conducting flight operations from amphibious assault carrier USS Tripoli (LHA 7), May 23, 2022. Tripoli is conducting routine operations in U.S. 7th Fleet. (U.S. Navy video by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter Burghart)

05.23.2022

Video by Petty Officer 1st Class Peter Burghart USS Tripoli (LHA 7)

Perspectives from the French Navy: July 2022

07/16/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The U.S. navy is seeking to forge closer operational ties with the French navy, with the French service invited to plug sensors and data into the U.S. Overmatch project for an extended information network, a French navy officer said July 11.

The offer of greater interoperability was one of the priorities of a visit to the U.S. by French navy chief of staff, admiral Pierre Vandier, who was there June 18-25, the officer said.

That was Vandier’s third and longest visit to the U.S., marking a reset in relations after ties were strained by the September 16 announcement of the AUKUS partnership, with Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. looking to supply the Australian navy with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines.

The AUKUS plan scuppered a project led by French shipbuilder Naval Group (NG) to build 12 Shortfin Barracuda diesel-electric submarines in Adelaide, southern Australia, in a deal worth an estimated €30 billion (US $30 billion).

Vandier flew to the U.S. a week after Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese said June 11 Canberra would pay NG €555 million for cancelling the Barracuda project, and pointed up the need to rebuild close ties with France.

That financial and political settlement renewed relations, with  French president Emmanuel Macron giving Albanese a warm welcome when the Australian leader came July 1 to the Elysée office for their first meeting.

Australia has also changed its navy chief of staff, the officer said, and there are plans for French exercises with the Australian service.

Vice Admiral Mark Hammond took up July 6 the post of chief of the Australian navy, with vice admiral Michael Noonan stepping down after four years in the top job.

There has also been a change at the top in the U.K., with admiral Ben Key promoted to first sea lord, with his predecessor, admiral Tony Radakin, taking up the post of chief of the defense staff.

Vandier spoke to the then French armed forces minister, Florence Parly, before his visit to the U.S. last month, such was the perceived importance of the trip, and the minister spoke to her American counterpart.

The French navy chief met Kurt Campbell when he flew to the U.S. in January, the officer said. Campbell, who reportedly played a key role in setting up the AUKUS submarine deal, is coordinator for the Indo-Pacific on the U.S. National Security Council.

Overmatch is the U.S. navy’s project, along with the air force and army, to set up a network for joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), with the navy’s Overmatch budget second only to the Columbia ballistic missile submarine program, monthly magazine National Defense reported.

The Overmatch project includes cloud computing power, with the U.S. navy partnering with Amazon Web Services to store the vast amount of data, and drawing on artificial intelligence as a tool to sift through the pooled information. A U.S. warship would effectively have two computers onboard, one to fight the war, the other to hold the data, the officer said.

A French team is due to go to the U.S. in September for further discussion on Overmatch, the officer said. It is still early days but it is important to get a head start rather than be left behind, and be out of step.

The French navy is setting up its Polaris project, in Toulon naval base, southern France, forming a center for training and studies for high level naval doctrine, drawing on highly capable combat management systems, the officer said. Overmatch calls for an exchange of information.

The U.S. Navy briefed Vandier on its Pacific strategy on his visit to the west coast, which included the San Diego Naval Information Warfare Center, and going to San Francisco, to visit high tech centers in Silicon Valley. There is an impressive breadth and production of software  in the U.S., the officer said. It is unlikely the French navy would strike a deal with Amazon.

On the east coast, Vandier visited Norfolk naval base and Washington, where he met his U.S. navy counterpart.

Vandier’s latest visit follows the French and the U.S. navy signing in December the strategic interoperability framework agreement, aimed at boosting operational cooperation between the two services.

What is being considered is the right level of cooperation and “synchronization” with the U.S., with the possibility of a dual carrier operation in 2025, sailing west of Singapore, with fourth generation fighters such as the Rafale fighter flying with the fifth generation F-35, the officer said.

In general, there is a need to set priorities as the French navy lacks resources to take on all missions at the same level of urgency — “If everything is important, nothing is important,” the officer said. The main theaters of operations are the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific.

That calls for the joint chiefs of staff to take a strategic view, the officer said. There is perception of average yield for the French contribution to NATO, with strategic yield from operating in the Indian Ocean, making the latter something of the center of gravity for the French navy.

The annual Jeanne d’Arc naval training mission sailed through the Indian-Pacific this year, and the Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will sail in the Indo-Pacific later this year, the officer said. On Sept. 16, the day the AUKUS partners announced the Australian submarine project, the European Union published its report on the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific.

In India, where the navy is holding a competition for carrier-borne fighters, France has offered to supply two to four French navy Rafales, if the fighter were chosen, the officer said. If India took up that option, that would lead to a 10 percent cut in the French fleet air arm, which consists of 42 Rafales.

India has not asked for that option, which was offered by the French authorities.

The U.S. has pitched the F/A 18 E/F Super Hornet.

The French presence in the Indian Ocean is seen as taking some pressure off the U.S. Pacific command, which faces growing strength of the Chinese navy.

The U.S. navy is concerned that at the rate China is building warships, the People’s Liberation Army Navy will be 2-1/2 times larger than the U.S. navy by 2030, the officer said. The U.S. navy may be modernizing its fleet, but warships and submarines are simply being replaced rather than being increased in number.

Meanwhile in Europe, there is concern in the Norwegian navy of the prospective Chinese naval reach into the region, the officer said.

That U.S. sense of urgency from the perceived growing threat from China and the need for Australia as a strong ally, led to a “strategic shift,” with Canberra last year sinking the Barracuda project and seeking nuclear-powered boats.

There are talks going on, the officer said, and one of the options is for the U.S. to send the two Virginia class attack boats built each year to the Australian navy.

That would mean the U.S. navy waiting four years before receiving its submarine, as Australia seeks to sail eight nuclear powered boats.

In view of the training, infrastructure, and need to build up an industrial base, it is hard to see an Australian boat sailing under an Australian flag before 2040, the officer said. That calls for a “political decision.”

The Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank, published July 14 its note, The Interpreter, which explored three options for the Labor government, which stands to breach the non-nuclear proliferation regime with  the AUKUS submarine plan. The U.K. and U.S. use highly enriched uranium to power their boats, so that weapons grade material stood to be sent to the Australian navy.

The options include Australia switching back to a conventional submarine fleet, asking the U.S. to supply boats powered by low enriched uranium (LEU) – which is unsuitable for nuclear weapons, or ask France to supply LEU powered submarines, as French boats use that form of atomic power.

There would be “political, bureaucratic, legal, and financial” hurdles to the latter option but such a deal would allow Albanese to avoid proliferation of weapons grade uranium and equip the Australian navy, and perhaps create “AUKUS+1,” the note said.

Featured Photo: An MV-22 Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 163 (Reinforced), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), lands aboard the flight deck of the French aircraft carrier FS Charles de Gaulle (R 91).

ANDAMAN SEA

06.07.2019

Photo by Lance Cpl. Dalton Swanbeck 

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Disruptive Change in European and Trans-Atlantic Defense and the Nordic Opportunity

By Robbin Laird

The coming of Sweden and Finland into NATO is not simply an additive event.

But the prospect of Nordic defense integratability provides for an opportunity for disruptive change to reset and recast how North Atlantic defense can be done.

When combined with the significant fleet redesign for the U.S. and allied navies associated with the 2018 re-establishment of Second Fleet and the establishment of Joint Force Command—Norfolk, there is a very significant opportunity to focus on how the United States and Canada could rework how they re-enforce Nordic defense while the Nordics themselves shape greater defense capacities to defend themselves against the Russians.

In other words, with the right recalibration of the United States contribution, Canada stepping up its contribution and the Nordics working new ways to integrate their forces, both the warfighting and deterrent functions of North Atlantic defense can be enhanced cost effectively and intelligently, truly embodying what some analysts referred to as “smart defense” in earlier times.

But the opportunity needs to be recognized, worked and creativity in reshaping the concepts of operations, and force development.

In an earlier piece, I highlighted this possibility in an interview with the former head of the Danish Navy, Rear Admiral (Retired) Nils Wang.

In that piece, I underscored: “the prospect of shaping really for the first time a Northern Europe integrated defense force able to operate throughout the area in a distributed manner shapes significant opportunities for innovations and rethinking. How to best shape capabilities going forward and how best to connect diverse platforms in a multi-domain manner across the defense space up to and including projecting power into Russia itself in case of conflict?”

I then added: “The opportunity for much better Nordic defense coordination and working integrated concepts of operations provides a significant challenge for the Nordic nations.

“The ability to respond to the opportunity would be attenuated in Wang’s view by “legacy” military thinking that is focused simply on “more of the same” building out traditional platforms, rather than focusing on force integrability or in my terms how to do the core missions with the required payloads through the kinds of platforms which can accelerate force integration.”

Ed Timperlake and I in our very recently published book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century, highlighted how important we saw the Norfolk innovations begun in 2018 by the U.S. and allied navies.

We have provided an excerpt from chapter eight where we describe the innovations launched from 2018 on Second Line of Defense.

That excerpt starts: The U.S. Navy is shaping an integrated distributed force. Working connectivity throughout the force and working new ways to shape modular task forces provides the capability for the U.S. Navy to be more lethal, survivable, and effective and lays down the foundation for working new technologies into the fleet along the lines of the payload/utility kill web approach which we discuss in the next chapter.

The standup of new fleets in Norfolk to deal with the Russian threat starting in 2018 provides a case study of such change. We spent time with the command as well as with the North Carolina-based Marines to understand how the relaunch of Second Fleet and the standup of a new NATO command in the United States drive and reflect the changes in fleet operations shaping a way ahead for a distributed force within integratable kill webs.

Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk were placed under the command of Vice Adm. Lewis to launch the new approach and to shape the initial way ahead. According to his original deputy, Vice Adm. Mustin, who is now head of the Naval Reserves, “What made us successful over the last 20 years, post 9/11, is not what’s going to make us successful into the next few decades.

Working with Vice Adm. Lewis has been important as well. As Second Fleet Commander, he clearly understands that we need to shape a new approach. When I was in High School in the 80’s, my father was Second Fleet Commander, so I can legitimately say that “The new Second Fleet is not your father’s Second Fleet.” He went on to add that “What Vice Adm. Lewis wants and what we are offering started with a clean sheet of paper as it relates to the design of the reserve force for C2F.”

The opportunity which the U.S. Navy has had to standup a new fleet in Norfolk to deal with North Atlantic defense as well as to work interactively with the standup of the only NATO operational command on U.S. territory has clearly allowed for shaping an innovative way ahead for fleet operations, and joint and allied integration to deal with the Russian, not the Soviet threat.”

Recently, I had a chance to discuss with Vice Admiral (Retired) Lewis the potential synergy between Nordic defense developments and the standup and now operations of C2F and Joint Force Command – Norfolk.

This is what he had to say: “With the changes in the Nordic region, there will be an opportunity, for JFC Norfolk to become a four-star command on an equivalent level with JFC Brunssum and Naples from a rank standpoint.

“We could also have a subordinate command physically stationed in the Nordic nations, that would have the effect of pulling the continents together whereas JFC Norfolk is stationed obviously in the continental United States.

“This would allow for significant innovation in thinking through how, in a practical sense, operations from east to west and west to east in the North Atlantic battlespace.”

The Nordics are thinking about establishing a Nordic command that is fully integrated with NATO.

As Lewis noted: “If such a change happens, they would enhance their ability to defend themselves (Article III NATO) , but also to be able to contribute to the common defense of NATO and throughout the Arctic, into the Atlantic (Article V NATO).”

From VADM (Retired) Lewis’s perspective, working more innovative ways to integrate Nordic with the North Atlantic continent operations is a key aspect of agility.

As he noted: “I see agility as in three aspects. First, there is physical agility. In the case of Second Fleet this means being able to move across the Atlantic and the Arctic, in the physical domain and also in the electromagnetic spectrum.

“The second aspect of agility is being able to operate throughout the spectrum of warfare. That means being able day one to be operate from peace-time operations through full-out war, and maritime forces are particularly suited to being able to do so.

“Third, is agility of thought which equates to shaping effective disruptive change which positions the force to be more effective in changing conditions.

“The third aspect challenges traditional military thinking. There’s never an appetite, particularly in a bureaucratic organization, which all militaries are by definition, and particularly peace-time militaries for disruptive, innovative-type thinking. But we clearly have an opportunity being opened up by change in the Nordic region.”

Featured Graphic: Credit: https://www.mappr.co/thematic-maps/nordic-countries/

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making

Airlifting the CH-53K to Germany

07/14/2022

U.S. Air Force aircrew members from the 16th Airlift Squadron and U.S. Marines from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron-1, airlift a CH-53K King Stallion via a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III from U.S. Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C., to Berlin, June 14, 2022.

JOINT BASE CHARLESTON, SC

06.14.2022

Video by Tech. Sgt. Daniel Asselta

1st Combat Camera Squadron

And for a video which is not crafted as a time-lapse video, see the following:

 

“It is Not My Father’s Second Fleet”: Excerpts from Chapter Eight of “A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making”

With the strategic opportunity for rebuilding Nordic defense, the project begun in 2018 in Norfolk in reshaping the U.S. and allied navy’s command structures and force design can find its real impact and meaning. The Nordic defense renaissance provides an opportunity for disruptive change and strategic redesign to deal with the challenges facing both European direct defense and North American defense.

Whether the United States fully embraces this opportunity rests in part on whether the strategic shift launched in 2018 can be maintained and leveraged over the next few years.

In our just published book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century,  we have provided analysis of how the maritime forces can work together to deliver the kind of defense capabilities appropriate to 21st century threats from the authoritarian powers.

When one combines this book with our earlier book,The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Challenge of XXIst Century Authoritarian Powers, one can see how we have been focusing on both strategic changes, and the changes in both the art of warfare and the art of warfighting required as we move beyond the land wars of the past twenty years. We have argued that this is not only a strategic shift but a strategic shock, and Russian actions in Ukraine certainly have underscored those key points.

What follows is an excerpt from chapter eight in our new book:

The U.S. Navy is shaping an integrated distributed force. Working connectivity throughout the force and working new ways to shape modular task forces provides the capability for the U.S. Navy to be more lethal, survivable, and effective and lays down the foundation for working new technologies into the fleet along the lines of the payload/utility kill web approach which we discuss in the next chapter.

The standup of new fleets in Norfolk to deal with the Russian threat starting in 2018 provides a case study of such change. We spent time with the command as well as with the North Carolina-based Marines to understand how the relaunch of Second Fleet and the standup of a new NATO command in the United States drive and reflect the changes in fleet operations shaping a way ahead for a distributed force within integratable kill webs.

Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk were placed under the command of Vice Adm. Lewis to launch the new approach and to shape the initial way ahead. According to his original deputy, Vice Adm. Mustin, who is now head of the Naval Reserves, “What made us successful over the last 20 years, post 9/11, is not what’s going to make us successful into the next few decades.

Working with Vice Adm. Lewis has been important as well. As Second Fleet Commander, he clearly understands that we need to shape a new approach. When I was in High School in the 80’s, my father was Second Fleet Commander, so I can legitimately say that “The new Second Fleet is not your father’s Second Fleet.” He went on to add that “What Vice Adm. Lewis wants and what we are offering started with a clean sheet of paper as it relates to the design of the reserve force for C2F.”

The opportunity which the U.S. Navy has had to standup a new fleet in Norfolk to deal with North Atlantic defense as well as to work interactively with the standup of the only NATO operational command on U.S. territory has clearly allowed for shaping an innovative way ahead for fleet operations, and joint and allied integration to deal with the Russian, not the Soviet threat.

We have discussed the standup of the commands and their interaction in crafting a fully operational fleet with the leadership of both commands as well as with the Marines who are working with them. It is clear that from the outset, the approach has been to work from the ground up to have a distributed integrated force.

As Vice. Adm. Lewis put it to us: “We had a charter to re-establish the fleet. Using the newly published national defense strategy and national security strategy as the prevailing guidance, we spent a good amount of time defining the problem. My team put together an offsite with the Naval Post-Graduate school to think about the way ahead, to take time to define the problem we were established to solve and determine how best to organize ourselves to solve those challenges.

“We used the Einstein approach: we spent 55 minutes of the hour defining the problem and five minutes in solving it. Similarly, we spent the first two and a half months of our three-month pre-launch period working to develop our mission statement along with the functions and tasks associated with those missions. From the beginning our focus was in developing an all-domain and all-function command.

“To date, we clearly have focused on the high-end warfighting, but in a way that we can encompass all aspects of warfare from seabed to space as well.”

In a speech in early 2021 to DSI’s Fifth Annual Joint Networks Conference, Vice. Adm. Lewis underscored how he viewed the central role of allied and joint integration in shaping a way ahead for the commands.

“At C2F, we have integrated officers from multiple allied nations directly into the fleet staff. The U.S. Marines, reserve component officers, and foreign exchange officers are fully functioning staff members—not just liaison officers—and they include a two-star Royal Canadian Navy officer as the vice commander of C2F.

“At JFCNF, an initial team of fewer than ten individuals stood up the command with the help of reserve, joint, and international officers—a testament to integration from its inception. We are also integrating the staff by functional codes (C2F N-codes in the same building with their JFCNF J-codes), and we aspire to use NATO standards for everything from classification to mission orders and associated command-and-control systems to realize our full potential.”

In that speech, Vice. Adm. Lewis highlighted the importance of interoperability and interchangeability in working fleet capabilities. “Interoperability is defined as ‘the ability to act together coherently and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objects,’ often involving the ability to exchange information or services by means of electronic communications. We must then be integrated—the ability of forces to not only work toward a similar mission, but to do so as one unit.

“An example of this is the Mendez Nunez, who deployed as part of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in 2019. The final step in the spectrum of relationships is interchangeability. That is the ability to accomplish the mission, regardless of which nation is executing a particular role.”

The launch of the C2F saw the addition of Lewis’s Vice Commander to be a Canadian Rear Admiral. One clearly important fact cannot be missed when visiting VADM Lewis, is that one finds his office flanked on one side by a Canadian Rear Adm. and on the other by a British Rear Adm. The first is his C2F deputy, and the second is his NATO deputy.

It is hard to miss the point: this is a command focused on integration of maritime capability across the North Atlantic. The importance of having a Canadian Rear Adm. within the American command cannot be overstated. Rear Adm. Waddell brings experience from commanding Canadian forces in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

According to Waddell: “We will not be as large a command as other numbered fleets. We are designed to max out at about 250 people and currently are around 200 now. We must be different and innovative in how we get after the missions. We need to make sure we’re using tools and alternative resources, because we don’t have that depth and capacity of people, so you have to find a different way.”

As a startup command that is FOC, they are not emulating other numbered commands in many ways. “We are not primarily focused on the business of force generation, but we focus on how to use assigned forces to shape a desired outcome. We don’t want to get in the space of those responsible for force generation: we just want to be able to advocate for timely, effective outputs that optimize the use of the fleet.”

He noted that the assumption that the Second Fleet was going to be the Second Fleet of old was misplaced. “The old Second Fleet was interested in sea lines of communication. But the new Second Fleet is focused on strategic lines of communication. This is an all-domain perspective, and not just the convoy missions of past battles of the Atlantic.” He referred to C2F as the maneuver arm in providing for defense, deterrence, and warfighting but as part of a whole of government approach to defending the United States, Canada, and NATO allies against threats.

He underscored that “we are flexible and unconcerned with regard to whom we will work for. Operationally, we work for NAVNORTH (Fleet Forces Command) for the Homeland Defense Mission, but we can seamlessly transfer and work for NAVEUR/ EUCOM to defend forward, or to work in the GIUK Gap for an Allied Joint Force Command.”

How did we end up with a Vice Commander who is Canadian?

As Rear Adm. Waddell tells it, “Vice. Adm. Lewis was asked to stand up Second Fleet and given much latitude to do so. He went to a senior Canadian official to ask for a Royal Canadian Navy officer to serve as his deputy.”

Waddell felt that bringing a Canadian officer into the force made a lot of sense for a number of reasons.

First, because of the partnership nature of operations in the area of interest.

Second, because the Canadians have experience in operating in the high north, which could be brought to the renewed efforts on the part of the United States side to do so.

Third, as Waddell himself works the C2F experience he can weave what he learns into Canadian approach to operations. “It’s not lost on me that we as a Canadian service honed our teeth in the battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War in the North Atlantic and then in the ASW fight through the Cold War. Those competencies, although we were collectively distracted a little bit from iterations to CENTCOM and in the Persian Gulf for some time, are crucial going forward. I think we’ve reinforced those capabilities and are investing in new capabilities at home in Canada, such as with the Type 26 surface combatant program, a very robust platform.”

He discussed various tools and approaches being used to understand how to scope the challenges and priorities, including hosting a Battle of the Atlantic tabletop exercise. The goal of efforts like these are to scope out the various interactions across an extended battlespace to understand how fights influence one another.

All of this leads to a very significant conclusion about the U.S. Navy and allies integrating across an extended battlespace and operating distributed forces. “For the web of capabilities, you need to be ready to fight tonight, you need to be able to seamlessly integrate together across the fleet, inclusive of U.S. and allied forces. You fight as a fleet.”

That means fundamental change from a cultural assumption that the U.S. Navy has run with for many years. “You need to understand and accept that a fighting force needs to be reconfigurable such that others can seamlessly bolt on, participate in, or integrate into that force. That might mean changes from the assumptions of how the Navy has operated in the past to successfully operate with allies.” Reconfigurable across a coalition is clearly enabled by kill web capabilities to operate as flexible modular task forces.

The standup of Allied Joint Forces Command occurred shortly after that of the new C2F. And the concept from the outset was that both commands would work together under the leadership of a single U.S. Admiral to find ways to shape more effective leveraging of U.S. and Allied capabilities and to be able to operate as a much more effective integrated force than in the past.

JFC Norfolk was created at the 2018 Brussels Summit as a new joint operational-level command for the Atlantic. It reached an important milestone in September 2020 when it declared Initial Operational Capability. JFC Norfolk is the only operational NATO command in North America and is closely integrated with the newly reactivated U.S. Second Fleet.

JFC reached its initial operating capability in September 2020. Royal Navy Rear Adm. Betton, who was the first commander of HMS Queen Elizabeth, is the Deputy Commander of Allied JFC.

According to a discussion we had with Betton in March 2021, “Coming here 18 months ago has been a really exciting professional opportunity, and genuinely a pleasure to have another run at setting up a team pretty much from scratch. The Second Fleet team was well on the way by the time I got here, but the NATO team was just about at conception, but not much beyond that.”63 The geography and three-dimensional operational space of the NATO zone of responsibility is very wide indeed.

As Betton put it: “SACEUR’s area of responsibility, goes all the way from the Yucatan peninsula in the Gulf of Mexico to the North Pole. I’ve always loved the phrase from Finnmark to Florida, or Florida to Finnmark. But it is also important to realize all domain challenges and threats that we face. It’s everything from seabed infrastructure, through the sub-sea water column, the surface, the airspace above it, and up into the satellite constellation above that.”

The allies are bringing new capabilities to the fight, such as P-8s, and F-35s, and new combat ships as well. Finding ways to integrate evolving allied capabilities by the “relevant nations” is crucial to shaping a more effective allied deterrent and warfighting strategy in the North Atlantic.

As Betton put it: “The U.S. is by far the dominant figure of NATO, but it’s not the only piece. And it’s not always just the heavy metal that is relevant. It’s the connectivity, it’s the infrastructure and the architecture that enables the 30 nations of NATO to get so much more than the sum of the parts out of their combined effort.

“But it’s particularly the relevant nations in the operational area and their ability to work together which is an important consideration.”

The Rear Adm. underscored the importance of the only operational NATO command on U.S. soil. “The idea of integrating it with the second fleet headquarters under a dual-hatted command was a fantastic move because it emphasizes bluntly to Europe that the U.S. is fully committed to NATO. It’s not NATO and the U.S. The U.S. is part of NATO. And having an operational headquarters here in CONUS really emphasizes that point in both directions.”

He noted that there are 16 nations at the command currently with three more arriving in the next few months, namely, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. And reworking how to create the most effective defense is also a work in progress.

As Rear Adm. Betton put it: “One of the key efforts we are pursuing in this integrated command is not just stitching together NATO and U.S. assets, but it’s also stitching together teams within teams. It could be the U.S. cooperating with Norway, Sweden, and Finland, with Admiral Lewis commanding a multinational command.

“And a crisis might grow and evolve into something that the North Atlantic Council agree to respond to and therefore activate the JFC to command in a NATO sense. But because the Commander has that flexibility to go from a unilateral U.S. only under second fleet, through a growing coalition, there’s the opportunity to coordinate activity with a whole diverse range of entities before it becomes a formal NATO response.”

It is clear that agility and scalability are a key part of the way ahead for 21st century full-spectrum crisis management. And the JFC working in an integrated manner with C2F certainly is working such capabilities. This is a case of startup fleets working core capabilities which are clearly needed across the combat force….

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making