The Three Ts: Training, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Driving Combat Innovation

10/13/2021

By Robbin Laird

Training is becoming an advanced weapon system.

So much so that the classic formulation of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures upon which training has been built is expanding to now be informed by advanced training that reshapes tactics, techniques, and procedures for the future fight.

Multi-domain training encompassing the synthetic environment with a full role for the digital warriors is becoming a key requirement in shaping a 21st century high-end fighting force able to operate in rapidly changing combat conditions.

In my recent visits to forces stationed in the East Coast of the United States and in the Pacific, finding ways to understand the evolving capabilities of the adversary and weaving those into blue side multi-domain warfighting techniques and approaches is increasingly challenging but also indispensable. Whether a Marine operating from an expeditionary base employing advanced sensors and needing to understand how the adversary operates and thinks, to pilots operating against highly integrated multi-domain systems, the challenge is the same: how to spoof, how to deflect, and how to defeat an evolving adversarial force fielded by a peer competitor.

To understand how to shape such a way ahead, I continued my discussions with Paul Averna of Cubic Corporation on the evolution of advanced training. According to Averna, we need to start with the ability to present a realistic threat environment to our Blue team. To do so requires a significant shift from how we have done training in the past two decades.

Averna: “Previously, we’ve been able to approximate red capabilities with fairly inexpensive or lower cost solutions. In other words, we haven’t had to fly our current blue aircraft against one another to get quality training. We could get by using earlier generation platforms because what we were focused on was training fundamentals of blocking and tackling in the air problem, or the air to surface problem on the physical ranges with the infrastructure that we’ve had.

“After executing a rollback phase, we were able to operate from a relatively static sanctuary to deliver effects in the battle space. We’re facing a paradigm shift. We have peer competitors that make it very difficult to establish a secure combat sanctuary and to hold that sanctuary for an uncontested period of time to dominate the battlespace.

“When you overlay the geographic challenges in the Pacific, it becomes a much more challenging problem. We can solve some of that by prepositioning. And we’re talking about the doctrinal concepts that the Marine Corps is espousing to get forward and to be able to deliver ISR and kinetic effects from a dynamic sanctuary. That’s the direction that we’re going.

“How do you bring a relevant threat emulation to the training environment so that we can be confident that the tactics, techniques, and procedures we are training to can deliver the right solution in a timely manner?”

I pointed out that with the kinds of mission data we are collecting with systems like the F-35, it is important to be able to translate that information into training usable simulated capabilities as well.

Averna underscored how important such an effort is to shape a more effective force. “We’re collecting some interesting information. But how does that translate into the emulation of the dynamic threat environment that we are facing?”

There is also the question of the evolution of software within both the Blue and Red systems and the challenge of then translating those changes into a simulated training environment as well.

Averna added: “The systems that we’re able to put into place have traditionally been singular emulators of a specific system without the ability to rapidly update those system’s capabilities. When software changes are made to the threat system, we don’t have that corresponding ability to rapidly update and emulate the new techniques which can leverage those software changes.”

The question of evolving technologies is one part of the equation.

But the other is understanding of how various peer adversaries use their equipment or how their TTPs are evolving as well.

Averna underscored how significant this challenge was and how the training environment needs to change to deal with this challenge.

“The way that we have built our emulation of the peer threat to date is not something that translates forward because of the rapid nature of the Red side’s ability to change their capabilities combined with the quantities of specific advanced systems that can be fielded.

“For example, if you have a software defined radio, I can operate a wide variety of waveforms within particular brands, and they will look different. Does our system recognize that it’s a different waveform? Those are the kinds of things that we are going to ultimately have to decide. That’s new. That requires a different response. We have to have a faster way of doing this for both the blue and red sides.

“Part of the benefit of an effects-based LVC training environment is that you can actually update the models that are used to emulate the threat very quickly. You don’t have to have that particular update feature tied to the longer development cycle of an OEM operational flight program that has traditionally had an embedded training capability built into it, which is tied to a longer OFP build cycle.

“We need to look at how do we update the red side threat presentation better, faster, cheaper than we have traditionally done.”

In my view, this is why there is a strategic shift in training required to shape dynamic advanced warfighting.

The third T needs to lead the traditional TTPs or perhaps it is AT or Advanced Training driven by integration of the simulated with the live environment with an expanded role for digital warriors within the training enterprise.

Averna: “I just want to revisit  that last point that you’re making before we talk about how we do the emulation of the red threat. And that is in the TTP definition, the classic acronym, is tactics, techniques, and procedures. But to your point, there should be a training front end highlighted because this actually changes the way that we fight.”

We then discussed how LVC can provide new ways to get to the AT led dynamic to shape a way ahead for warfighting. 

According to Averna: “When you have an LVC training capability where Live, Virtual, and Constructive entities interact in a common synthetic environment, you can actually exercise capabilities, not constrained by the physical ranges, to open up the aperture, and have actual operators evaluating or assessing the impacts of what they’re doing in real time, and then debrief what they have learned.

“I can get fidelity on my systems for the beyond visual range fight in an LVC environment. I can have virtual or other live players who are guising as the red threat show up on my systems as they would in combat. And that’s the real point where we need operate. We need to provide pro realism with regard to the red side threat to the operators so that they can actually assess in real time how well they’re executing their game plan.

“We will build game plans based on our best knowledge of the threat and our best knowledge of how to employ our systems. But being able to train to that game plan and understand when the game plan is working poorly or proceeding as we intended, that’s the essence of high-quality training.

“In terms of training, we need to be able to recognize multi-domain impacts. I don’t typically control multi-domain effects on a single 4th Gen tactical platform, although I might be able to, dependent on the classification and capability of a bespoke system.  The fifth-gen systems are much more in that multi-domain capability space. But traditionally, in fourth gen you are typically delivering in a singular lane of effect.

“How you recognize those other participants that are delivering multi-domain effects in concert with what you’re trying to do traditionally, has been about timing coordination / synchronization. At this point in time, this thing should be turned off, whether kinetically or non-kinetically. And therefore, I will have sanctuary to go in and do what I want to do.

“After a certain period of time, if I can expect them to bring that system back up, and then I’m back into a less than optimum sanctuary consideration, and I have to maneuver or do something different. Those are the type of events where we’ve driven predominantly onto a time-hack model.

“But when we talk about a dynamic sanctuary, it’s about maintaining operational advantage across a window of time. And being able to then assess and apply different techniques to achieve or sustain the desired effect. That’s what we want to be able train to.”

Another key aspect which LVC brings to advanced training is the ability to use guising as part of working the red side. 

As Averna explained it: “In the virtual world, there are different protocols of how we exchange data about the participants. We call them entities. An entity can be a platform. It can be a weapon. It can be a sensor. It can be an effect. And each entity has a whole slew of characteristics, or attributes, such as electromagnetic properties.

“And that drives the interaction between someone in a man in a loop simulator, and constructive participant. And we already do this in that we can generate a constructive participant to look like anything we need them to look like. And because of the way that they are built, they will appear across our systems in the virtual world as an intended threat.

“Let’s say hypothetically I am an F-15E aircrew in a Tactical Operational Flight Trainer (TOFT) working in a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) training event against a constructive F-16. As I am flying around in the virtual world, I see an F-16 out at range on my systems. Well, that F-16 doesn’t exist. It’s an entity. And that entity has a whole slew of attributes. And then correspondingly, on my systems I’m going to detect him at a certain range, and I’m going to be able to see him with a variety of sensors at a given range, target aspect, whether he’s in full afterburner, or at idle, whether his radar is emitting, etc.

“In my virtual representation of my actual platform, models of sensors, effects, and weapons approximate the real-world capabilities of my aircraft.  The radar cross section, as an example, of that F-16 in the real world against a real-world radar. I will see him in a certain range, assuming the atmospherics are nominal and that is when I expect to detect him in the TOFT during the training event.

“What I really want him to look like though is a SU-27. The radar cross section of a SU-27 is different from an F-16. And as a result, I would see him at a different range than I would the actual threat that I’m targeting. Why is that important? From a timeline perspective, the distance and the closing rate matters because it gives me a range of options that I have when I’m going to shoot and how many I’m going to shoot at him at that given range.

“If I can show on my Live blue platform’ systems an SU-27 coming at me, a couple things happen. First, I’m getting the realistic engagement, ranges, and profile with him. And that drives how I am going to be able to do tactics well. I have real-world physics being applied on me and my platform that impact my physiological and cognitive performance. There’s also that psychological element to it, which is I’m going up against a real bad guy as opposed to somebody that I see as a friendly F-16. That is a very important element of realism.

“The science behind how you change the physical characteristics, the IR properties, the other electro-magnetic emissions of all of the participants, whether they’re live, virtual, or constructive, and how you show those altered properties in your system displays for training is what the advanced guising capability is that we’ve figured out during the SLATE ATD and are improving upon during flight validation event here at Pax River at the end of September as we’re having this interview.  In essence, we now have the ability to overcome the physical limitations of our current training ranges and deliver the threat environment our operators need for realistic training.

In short, TTPs need to become TTTPs to get to where we need to go with regard to advanced warfighting.

In that shift, the training piece expands the role of the digital space and of the role of digital warriors in evolving the warfighting capabilities of a multi-domain blue force facing an evolving red multi-domain force, changing both in terms of technology and in terms of concepts of operations.

Training for the High End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s

USS Arlington Replenishment at Sea

CARIBBEAN SEA – (Sept. 3, 2021)

Sailors and Marines attached to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) conduct a replenishment-at-sea with the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ammunition ship USNS Medgar Evers (T-AKE 13), Sept. 3, 2021.

Arlington is deployed to U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts in Haiti following a 7.2-magnitude earthquake Aug. 14, 2021.

U.S. Navy video by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John Bellino/Released

The CH-53K and the Recovery of a MH-60 Navy Helicopter

10/12/2021

Marines in two CH-53K King Stallions from Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron, executed the recovery of a downed Navy MH-60 helicopter on 4-5 Sept. 2021 in Bishop, California.

The two day operation was the first official fleet mission for the CH-53K King Stallion, as it undergoes operational assessment while the Marine Corps modernizes and prepares to respond globally to emerging crisis and contingencies.

According to a NAVAIR press release on September 9, 2021:

The CH-53K King Stallion successfully recovered a Navy MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter from Mount Hogue in the White Mountains of California on Sunday, September 5.

The two-day operation was the first official fleet mission for the Marine Corps’ new heavy lift capability, which is in the midst of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Ca.

“VMX-1 received a request for assistance from the Naval Safety Center about an MH-60S Knighthawk that suffered a hard landing near Mt. Hogue, Ca., at an elevation of 12,000’ Mean Sea Level (MSL) in July,” said LtCol Luke Frank, CH-53K Detachment Officer in Charge for VMX-1.

The MH-60S Knighthawk was sitting on a high altitude ridge in very rugged terrain near the California-Nevada line on July 16 following a hard landing. The helicopter was supporting a search and rescue effort for a lost hiker. All four crewmembers survived without injury and were rescued the following day.

According to Frank, both the MH-60S unit and the Naval Safety Center had exhausted all other resources for recovery, including Army National Guard, Navy and Marine Corps fleet squadrons. “They all lacked the capability to lift the aircraft without an extensive disassembly,” he said.

VMX-1’s CH-53K detachment quickly examined the environmental conditions and conducted a quick feasibility assessment of support and determined that the CH-53K could conduct the lift. The CH-53K fulfills the heavy lift mission of the Marine Corps as it greatly expands the fleet’s ability to move equipment and personnel throughout its area of operations.

A Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion lowers a Navy MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter to the ground after recovering it from the nearby mountain ranges after it conducted a hard landing near, Bishop, California, Sept. 5, 2021. The two-day operation was the first official fleet mission for the CH-53K King Stallion, as it is currently undergoing an operational assessment while the Marine Corps modernizes and prepares to respond globally to emerging crises or contingencies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Colton Brownlee)

“After two weeks of exhaustive planning and assembling a team of more than 25 Marines and sailors from VMX-1 and 1st Landing Support Battalion from Camp Pendleton, Ca. we deployed two CH-53Ks to Bishop, Ca., and got to work,” he said.

The CH-53K was designed to lift nearly 14 tons (27,000 lbs) at a mission radius of 110 nautical miles in high and hot environments; a capability that expands the service’s range in supporting joint and coalition forces against potential adversaries.

The MH-60S weighed approximately 15,200 lbs. and was positioned in a tight ravine at nearly 12,000’ MSL and needed to be transported over 23 nautical miles to the Bishop, Ca. airport.

“After six months of flight operations with the CH-53K, the detachment had every confidence in the aircraft’s abilities to conduct the mission safely. Our main concern was the environmental factors ground support personnel would have to endure,” said Frank.

“This is exactly what the K is made to do,” he said.

“Heavy lift is a unique and invaluable mission for the Marine Corps. Horsepower is our weapon system and the CH-53K is armed to the teeth.

“The entire team of Marines at VMX-1, 1st Landing Support Battalion, and NAS Fallon Search and Rescue were extremely motivated to execute this mission and we are all very proud to have completed this one flawlessly.

“To be the first group of professionals to complete a real-world, heavy lift/high altitude mission in support of a unit who thought all options were off the table is extremely rewarding,” said Frank.

“This is sure to be the first of what will be many, many successful missions for this aircraft and for heavy lift squadrons.”

The video credit:

BISHOP, CA,

09.04.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Shane Beaubien and Lance Cpl. Colton Brownlee

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms

For an update on the progress of the CH-53K into the force, see the following:

 

The Australian Submarine Decision, 2021: A Special Report

In this special report, we bring together some initial assessments of the Morrison Administration’s decision to move on from conventional to nuclear submarines.

These articles were published in September 2021.

The recent announcement of the decision by the Australian government to cancel their diesel submarine contract and to acquire nuclear attack submarines is a significant one. There is much already written about the announcement and its consequences, but what can get lost in the noise is really the key point: this decision launches the next phase of Australian strategic development, but down a path which has been evolving for some time.

At the heart of the reason the Aussies have done so is clearly the Chinese behavior and virtual war with Australia. Australia as a continent is a key challenge for Chinese ambitions in the region. They are a continent which can stage long-range forces against Chinese military operations. The Chinese Communist leaders have done what they should not have: Awakening the quiet power in the Pacific to shaping a longer-range defense force, closely allied with the major competitors of China.

Only Australia really counts in terms of deterring China in a fundamental geographical way: they are a firmly liberal democratic country which rejects Chinese Communism. And as such, the Chinese economic and political engagements in Australia, coupled with the political and cyber warfare that the Chinese have engaged in with the clear desire to destabilize Australia has been met with firm resolve. And the Chinese have responded by escalation up to an including direct military threats against Australia.

This is the driver of the decision. Full stop. It is not about not loving the French, and an inability to work with France or ignoring their contractual obligations under the contracts signed earlier. When Australia made the decision to go with the French Naval Group and build a long ranger diesel submarine, the strategic context was very different than it is today.

The report can be read in PDF form below:

Aussie Submarine Decision 2021

It can be read in e-book form as well and that can be found below:

The featured photo: HMAS Rankin sails in company with Indian Navy Ship Kadmaat during AUSINDEX 21.

September 5, 2021. Credit: Australian Department of Defence

 

The Coming of the CH-53K: A Look Back at 2020 and 2021 Developments

By Robbin Laird

In this report, I have brought together my pieces (with one exception) on the CH-53K published since mid-2020. The one exception? II start the report with a NAVAIR press release about the event highlighted on the cover page photo.

All of these articles show steady progress towards the CH-53K coming into the fleet. The dates entered after the headline for the article are from when those articles were published either on defense information or second line of defense.

This new aircraft is part of the next phase of the transformation of the USMC, one which integrates sea bases, expeditionary bases, and land bases into a seamless logistical whole.

And such a capability is clearly necessary for shaping the way ahead. In a recent meeting and interview with logisticians in the Pacific, we discussed the core challenge facing the logistical system of the USMC in the Pacific.

IndoPacific MAGTF Exercise (2)

10/11/2021

U.S. Marines assigned to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, and Marine Wing Support Squadron 172, 1st Marine Air Wing conduct forward arming and refueling point operations during Indo-Pacific Warfighting Exercise in the Northern Training Area on Okinawa, Japan, August 31, 2021.

This force-on-force exercise demonstrated the ability to seize and defend key-maritime terrain and provided an opportunity to employ techniques to rapidly establish FARPs. 2/3 is currently attached to 4th Marines as a part of the Unit Deployment Program.

OKINAWA, JAPAN

08.31.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Jerry Edlin

3rd Marine Division

 

 

President Macron and Defense: En Même Temps

10/10/2021

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to France in the Fall of 2021, I had a chance to talk with my old friend and colleague, Jean-Louis Gergorin. Jean-Louis is a noted European strategist with many years of experience both in government and in the private sector. We first met in September 1980 when he was Director of Policy Planning in the French Foreign Ministry.

As I am in throes of finishing my reader of French defense policy under President Macron, I discussed with him how to understand and characterize this period of French history. We started by discussing the intellectual influences on Macron which shaped his policy framework. We then discussed his effective use of symbolism in placing France within the evolving strategic context. And finally, we discussed the various aspects of his policy initiatives which make up his legacy to date.

The Intellectual Framework

According to Gergorin, the intellectual framework for Macron is within European social democracy. “He was always convinced that the French economy has to be free market oriented.” But he had two significant left-wing influences.

The first was the socialist Michel Rocard. As Gergorin put it: “Rocard was in favor of a free market but wanted to adjust it so that greater equality of opportunity could be created.” Rocard is deceased so his influence is in terms of legacy, not current influence.

The second is a politician still rather influential, namely, Jean-Pierre Chevènement. As JLG underscored: “Chevènement is a socialist Gaullist. He is very much attached to national independence, is rather euro skeptical, and very much tempted to come back to some policy of balance between the West and the Russians. Indeed, this idea that it is possible to balance French Western alliances with a special dialogue with Russia is central to Macron’s thinking. But at the same time, Macron believes as have most French leaders in the Fifth Republic, that France’s relationship with Germany is very essential.”

We then discussed the Macron style as Gergorin sees it. “He often talks in terms of contradictory initiatives which have to be pursued at the same time.

“He likes to propose two contradictory policies, and say, “We should pursue both simultaneously. He does so in his speeches by using the French phrase “en même temps.”

In his 2017 campaign, he was the only strongly pro-European candidate. He started from the outset in terms of arguing for an expanded European agenda, including in defense and security policy.

Symbolism and Policy

Macron has been very sensitive to the use of symbolism in his Presidency to set in motion his policy agenda. A key example is hosting Putin at Versailles prior to the 2017 G-7 meeting. Russia had been tossed out of the G-8 thereby making it the G-7. Despite that, Macron hosted Putin prior to the meeting and notably at Versailles.

Gergorin outlined why Versailles was so important as a symbol for Putin. In short, when Peter the Great visited Europe in the time of Louis XIV, the king refused to host him at Versailles. When his successor was king, the regent convinced him to host Peter the Great at Versailles, in part because Russia had defeated Poland and Sweden and had become the dominant Eastern power. Versailles denied then granted to Peter the Great and the red carpet to come to Versailles for the man who sees himself in the tradition of great Russian leaders was not missed by Putin.

The Russian leaders have been preoccupied throughout Russian history for recognition by Western leaders as an equal power. The conscious effort by Macron to bring Putin to Versailles was a clear statement by him that he recognized Russia as an equal partner, but as Gergorin put it: “Whatever that would then mean in concrete terms.”

French First Lady Brigitte Macron, French President Emmanuel Macron, U.S. President Donald J. Trump, and First Lady Melania Trump walk through a colors cordon during the commemoration ceremony of the 75th anniversary of D-Day at the Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial, June 6, 2019.06.06.2019 Photo by Master Sgt. Andy Kin Regional Media Center AFN Europe

At the same time, the invitation to President Trump to come to the Bastille Day Parade in 2017. Trump was very appreciative of the opportunity and was a contributor to how Macron would work with Trump. Indeed, Trump was very helpful to Macron as the rhetoric used by Trump with regard to Europeans was useful to the European sovereignty agenda of Macron. At the same time, the practical efforts to shore up European defense provided significant opportunities for Macron to increase collaboration between American and French forces worldwide.

Policies Pursued by Macron

Symbolism aside, Macron has been very blunt with Putin over the years. Notably, there is increasing pressure on Russia with regard to cyber issues. According to Gergorin, “a hot line has been created between Moscow and Paris on such issues, but of limited success to date. There is a cyber security group which has been created of top officials which meets every year since it was established in 2018. The good news is that it has been useful for a better understanding on the cyber security policies of the two countries. The disappointing news is that neither the dissemination of malware in French infrastructures nor the continuous rise of ransomware attacks by Russian speaking groups has yet been impacted by this dialogue.”

But Macron understands that with Russia, what counts is the balance of power. According to Gergorin, “To do so, he has basically tried to accelerate European defense integration, to build the famous European pillar of NATO, not against NATO, but to build a strong European pillar, all the more because of the worries about America being less committed, which started with Obama, confirmed in a different manner from Trump, and but now with Biden.”

Gergorin also noted that “President Macron has committed his Administration to defense spending, and has focused on regular growth of the defense budget.”

Macron in his 2017 Sorbonne speech called for an accelerated effort to build enhanced European defense capabilities and sovereignty. But progress has been slow on this front but doing so is a key agenda item for Macron’s defense agenda. With the Biden Administration Blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy, and the collapse of the Australian submarine deal, caused in part by the Americans, this key element of Macron’s strategy is clearly reinforced. Whether it will meet with more success going forward is an open question.

The legal and political constraints on German defense are a key barrier seen from the French side. Gergorin mentioned the example of cyber defense. He underscored that “the legal limitations on German defense policy with regard to cyber-attacks are real and problematic. The position is that Germany can retaliate legally only if these attacks are above the threshold of open aggression as defined by NATO. But because all cyber attacks have been so far below this threshold (e.g. ransomware attacks), this means Germany will never complement resiliency by selective retaliation to have a deterrence component in its policy.”

This German position on cyber responses to intrusions may induce France to work with other Western partners to achieve anything realistic.

But he concluded: “In spite of the challenges, the relationship with Germany is better under Macron than before. And President Macron was extremely effective in convincing the Germans that it was necessary to take all necessary measures to support European nations to face the impact of the pandemic.”

And with regard to working with other allies, France under Macron has very active within NATO and working within the NATO Commands. Both at the NATO Transformation Command, in Norfolk, VA., headed by a French officer or at the NATO Joint Forces Command also in Norfolk, the French are heavily involved. They have expanded their engagement in defense efforts in Northern Europe and have spearheaded major efforts in fighting terrorism in North Africa. French special forces have worked closely with American ones in terms of supporting the Kurds in Syria and have engaged in military training assistance in Iraq.

What then is the legacy to date of Macron in defense?

My own view is that it Macron’s first term or perhaps only term is characterized by transition. The authoritarians are changing, the Americans are changing, and Europe is in significant flux.

What then is France’s role?

It cannot be settled in a world in strategic upheaval, and that is why in part Macron’s formula “en même temps” makes a great deal of sense for France.

The featured photo: During the Putin visit to Versailles, the two Presidents are seen at their podiums with paintings highlighting Charles VII’s entrance intoNapes in 1495 and the battle of Fleurus in June 26,1794. Credit: AFP

VMFA-232 Exercise Distributed Operations

10/08/2021

U.S. Marines with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232 deployed to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, June through September 2021.

They deployed to Guam as part of the Aviation Training Relocation program, designed to increase operational readiness while reducing the impacts of training activities.

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM

08.27.2021

Video by Cpl. Lennon Dregoiw

AFN Iwakuni