Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Defence 24 Conference on Polish Defence, September 2021

Posted on October 1, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/01/2021

By Robbin Laird

Warsaw

I am in Warsaw and have just attended the two-day conference held by Defence 24.

According to the organization: “Defence24 Group, the publisher of Defence24.pl portal, is organizing a third edition of Defence24 DAY & SOFEAST conference, focused on the major issues in the areas of defence, security and defence industry.

“This year, Defence24 DAY will take place in a two-day formula, combined with SOFEAST, a scientific conference dedicated to the Special Operations Forces as well as combat medicine.

“Defence24 Day is the leading defence and security sector conference, focused on the major issues of the sectors both in Poland and around the world.

“The event is a place where decision makers, senior administration & Armed Forces officials, defence industry representatives and experts may debate and share their experience.

“It is planned that Mariusz Błaszczak, the Polish Minister of National Defence, Paweł Soloch, the Head of National Security Bureau as well as numerous senior Polish Armed Forces commanders will take place in the conference.”

The agenda for the conference can be found on the Defence 24 website.

I will be reporting on the presentations and discussions which I attended at the conference as well as providing in depth interviews from Polish defence experts with regard to the challenges being faced by Poland and shaping a way ahead for Poland within the overall transition in direct defense in Europe.

In our book, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21^st Century Authoritarian Challenge, Murielle Delaporte and I focused on how the current phase of defense in Europe drew upon Cold War history but was very different in many ways as well. Notably, there is a broader challenge posed by both modern Russia and China in which shaping new joint defense capabilities across the European operational landscape needs to be combined with new approaches to security to deal with new infrastructure threats.

That clearly was the perspective provided by participants in the conference.

After 2014, Poland along with other states serious about defense, such as the Nordic states, shifted their focus from out-of-area forces, to reworking how to defend their own national territory against the authoritarian states and their challenges.

And in so doing, for the Poles, as a key state on the Eastern flank of Europe facing the unincorporated states in Europe, both Belarus and Ukraine, and the Putin driven Russian state revival, how to do so is an ongoing work in progress.

The conference provided a number of insights with regard to the agenda for the Poles in shaping a way ahead. I would note that Poland is certainly focused on the challenges of enhanced national security, akin to the concerns I have discussed while in Finland and in the Nordic region, and increasingly in Australia as well,

There is a core concern with dealing with what have been called hybrid threats, namely, the authoritarians working wedges within a society and within that society’s broader alliances by creating asymmetrical threats.

For Poland currently, the Belarusian use of migrants to breach the Polish border on their way into Europe more generally is such a case. This challenge was extensively discussed at the conference, and the Polish response in part has been to mobilize the territorial forces to provide a new brigade to support border security.

This has led to broader European concerns about how to secure European borders, with Poland receiving both criticism and support from a wider European community.

And the wider community aspect is a key one both discussed at the conference and in my interviews.

The Poles clearly see a Russian direct threat to them and to Europe. And they are closer to de Gaulle’s vision of Europe, one of nations cooperating on common interests than to the views of today’s European Commission which sees the way ahead as creating a single set of rules for the entire European community. Here Poland is on collision course with the Commission.

At the same time, there is growing concern among nations who believe that Russia and China pose direct threats to Europe and see the need for enhanced cooperation among like-minded states. Certainly, there is scope for enhanced cooperation with the Nordic states who have deepened their own cooperation as well.

There were references as well about the United States and the dramatic Biden Blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan and the AUKUS announcements. And the elephant in the room clearly is what the Biden Administration is going concretely to do going forward with regard to defense, both globally and in Europe.

The Polish government has raised its defence budget and is considering additional capabilities for its operational approach to direct defense. The challenge will be to build a more integrated joint force going forward and one which can work effectively with allies.

How will the territorial force be shaped going forward? How will it intersect with more mobile capabilities, such as with its F-35 force?

In a period of time in which the allies of Poland are reworking their own defense templates, it is fair to say that there is no model for Poland to apply to its own direct defense which is congruent with what allies are doing themselves.

The Nordics for example, are reworking how to shape a more integrated territorial defense but one in which air and missile power can expand the perimeter for their defense. The F-35 consortia is a key part of reworking how Europeans will deliver multi-domain capabilities to drive greater force integration, and Poland buying the F-35 will be able to participate in this ongoing development.

The United States is facing a significant change from its preoccupation on the land wars in the Middle East to shaping a new 21^st century force, kill web enabled, and crafted to provide for force distribution and integration.

But this is a work in progress, one which I have focused on for a number of years with my colleagues.

How does Poland then intersect with ongoing American and European allied warfighting developments, which are driving significant changes in the templates which will deliver relevant force capabilities against adversary forces, which themselves are undergoing fundamental change?

A notable challenge for Poland is how to both defend its national territory and to operate in its perimeter with mobile forces.

The opportunity to integrate more effectively with its Nordic partners and operate in the defense of the Nordic states is not a task for Abrams tanks.

How best to shape a realistic mobile force which can both operate in the perimeters and aid in the territorial defense?

This applies as well to working with the states in the Black Sea region and when necessary, in the Polish perspective being able to participate in the defense of Ukraine.

The challenge can be simply put: (1) Poland needs to combine credible territorial national defense, but (2) with an ability to participate with allies in breaking down the anti-access area denial approach of the Russians and (3) with credible mobile forces which can move to the point of attack by the Russians on the seams which they hope to open up by hybrid or direct warfare needs. The seam warfare piece of what is often called hybrid warfare is something I discussed recently with MARFORPAC in the Pacific.

In short, Poland is in the front lines of European defense.

How they work their own defense is a key part of the broader allied approach and will drive it as well.

When you are the front lines you tend to take the threat more seriously than when you are not, and that is one of the challenges clearly facing the vision of those like President Macron who champions “European Sovereignty” yet pursues his own vision of Russia in Europe.

Featured Photo: The panel held at the end of day one of the conference on “Technology Development in the Defence Sector: Key Success Factors for R and D and Technology Transfers.” Credit: Second Line of Defense

Talisman Sabre 2021: Support at Sea

Posted on October 1, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

Royal Australian Navy destroyer HMAS Brisbane and the United States Navy replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock rendezvoused in the Coral Sea to conduct a core navy-to-navy evolution – a Replenishment at Sea (RAS) during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (TS21).

Commissioned into service in 2018, it was the first time the Australian Hobart class warship conducted an international RAS. Held every two years,

TS21 is the largest bilateral training activity between Australia and the United States, aimed to test Australian interoperability with the United States and other participating forces in complex warfighting scenarios.

In addition to the United States, TS21 involves participating forces from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Australian Department of Defence

July 30, 2021

Shaping a Way Ahead for Force Design 2030 in the Pacific: The Perspective of the MARFORPAC G-9 Branch Head

Posted on September 30, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/30/2021

By Robbin Laird

Another change since my last visit to MARFORPAC in 2014-2015 was how the distributed laydown begun in that period was being reworked in terms of expanding basing flexibility and force distribution associated with the current Commandant’s Force Design 2030 effort.

I have had a chance both with the East Coast Marines and with the Commander of I MEF and with the Lt. General Rudder and his team in Honolulu to discuss the changes being worked as part of the Force Design 2030 effort.

A very helpful briefing and discussion on the overall effort during my visit was provided appropriately by the head of G-9 Capabilities and Requirements branch within the command, Col. Steve Fiscus. In a previous assignment, he was the commanding officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and his bio from that command is included at the end of the article.

I have had a chance certainly with the East Coast Marines to discuss and observe changes associated with Force Design 2030, and in my time with MARFORPAC have been given the ability to do so with regard to Marines in INDOPACOM.

Col. Fiscus provided really one of the best explanations of how the Force Design 2030 effort was helping shape the Marines after their very significant engagement for 20 years in the Middle Eastern land wars.

The Marines have been working a shift for some time, but it the ability to make a dramatic shift has been constrained by the Middle East land wars and the priority demands from CENTCOM. For the Marines to succeed more effectively in making the shift, it is crucial for them to be able to focus on reworking their forces in line with joint and coalition forces in both Europe and in the Pacific.

A key element of the Force Design effort clearly is to work with the Joint Force in reshaping how that force can work more effectively together against peer adversaries.

And as Col. Fiscus put it: “Within the joint force, someone has to be able to work within the Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) and to be able to identify mobile and fleeting targets for the joint force to engage.”

He put it this way: “The Marines are working towards becoming a light force focused on forward positioning and persistence inside the weapons engagement zone of the adversary to be able to conduct reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance and to be able to hold key capabilities of the adversary at risk.”

He noted that the Marines really do not currently have the kinds of sensors that they need for such a mission focus.

And a good deal of the experimentation and force redesign going forward is to identify, acquire and reshape a land-based force (agile in terms of expeditionary basing) which possess sensors for reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance and to have the kind of low-signature C2 which would allow them to use those sensors as part of a wider kill web.

Col. Fiscus made an extremely important point with regard to enhancing the role of sensor and C2-engaged Marines.

“We need to get much better in understanding the Red Side and how they operate.” And as I saw when visiting East Coast based Marines, there is a growing realization of the importance of ramping up Red Side understanding more akin to how the Marines operated in the Cold War.

These are what the Marines refer to as stand-in forces.

According to Headquarters Marine Corps, stand-in forces are defined as follows: “Stand-in Forces are designed to generate technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements that confront aggressor naval forces with an array of low-signature and affordable platforms and payloads. They must remain resilient under demanding conditions.

“When other elements of the Joint force are outside the weapons engagement zone, preparing for deliberate actions, our forward elements will remain operationally unpredictable, combining lethal and non-lethal capabilities with continued maneuver to facilitate denial activities and otherwise disrupt or deter adversary operations. They don’t have to get to the fight, they’re already there.

“Stand-in Forces will be supported from expeditionary advanced bases and will complement the low signature of the bases with an equally low signature force structure comprised largely of unmanned platforms that operate ashore, afloat, submerged, and aloft in close concert to overwhelm enemy platforms.”

This is an important part of the redesign effort.

But at the same time, the Marines are shaped around what their Marine Expeditionary Units as a standing force.

The MEUs operating off of the amphibious fleet play a key role in crisis response and contribute significantly to the joint force’s full spectrum crisis management capabilities.

We concluded by my posing the question of where one would look to see the focal point of changes unfolding for INDOPACOM Marines.

He responded that changes will most readily be apparent in the experimentation being undertaken at III MEF as well as the innovations being generated by the MEUs.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN V. FISCUS

LtCol Fiscus was raised in Florida and enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in May 1993. From 1993 to 1996, he served in 4th Amphibious Assault Battalion. In December 1996, he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology from the University of Central Florida. In January 1997, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant.

As a Company Grade Officer, LtCol Fiscus served as Platoon Commander, Weapons Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; Platoon Commander, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company; Assistant Operations Officer and Element Commander, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Detachment One (MCSOCOM Det-1); and Commanding Officer, Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

As a Field Grade Officer, LtCol Fiscus was assigned as the Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; completed USMC Command and Staff College; served as the Infantry Advocate and the Commandant’s Operations Briefer in HQMC, PP&O prior to his most recent assignment as a Non-DoD LNO in Marine Corps Augmentation and Training Support Unit (MCATSU).

LtCol Fiscus has completed 13 total deployments: two combat tours to Iraq (OIF-I and OIF-II) with 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and MCSOCOM Det-1 respectively, three WESTPAC deployments with the 11th MEU (SOC), one 31st MEU deployment, and seven combat deployments to Afghanistan (OEF) while serving as a Non-DoD LNO.

An example of the work being done to implement an aspect of the Force Design 2030 approach has been seen recently in the Navy-led Large Scale exercise. The photos in the slideshow below highlight some aspects of the USMC engagement in that exercise.

A Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher, a command and control vehicle and a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle are transported by a U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion from Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, out to U.S.S. San Diego, Aug. 16, 2021. The movement demonstrated the mobility of a Marine Corps fires expeditionary advanced base, a core concept in the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units came together from across 17 time zones as they participated in Large Scale Exercise 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

A U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion from Assault Craft Unit 5 delivers a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher, a command and control vehicle and a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to U.S.S. San Diego, Aug. 16, 2021.

A Naval Strike Missile streaks out to sea before striking a naval target ship, Aug. 15, 2021, aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii. The missile flew more than 100 nautical miles before finding its mark. The live-fire sinking exercise demonstrated a Marine fires expeditionary advanced base’s ability to sense, target and strike a target at sea, providing sea control or contributing to sea denial in fleet operations.

Artillery Marines from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines provide security as a Marine KC-130J loadmaster deploys a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 15, 2021. After its two Naval Strike Missiles flew 100 nautical miles to strike a naval target ship, 1/12 rehearsed tactical displacement and relocation. The training, part of Large Scale Exercise 2021, allowed Marines to refine support to distributed maritime operations by providing expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

U.S. Paratroopers Drop in on Talisman Sabre 2021

Posted on September 29, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/29/2021

United States Army troops from the 3rd Batallion, 509th Infantry Airbourne conducted an airborne assault dropping into ‘Kangaroo Dropzone’ near Charters Towers, Queensland for Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (TS21).

The paratroopers, based in Alaska, jumped from RAAF C-17A Globemaster aircraft, testing interoperability between Australia and the U.S.

Held every two years, TS21 is the largest bilateral training activity between Australia and the United States, aimed to test Australian interoperability with the United States and other participating forces in complex warfighting scenarios.

In addition to the United States, TS21 involves participating forces from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Greece Signs Agreement to Buy French Frigates, September 2021

Posted on September 29, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France and Greece signed Sept. 28 a memorandum of understanding for the sale of three French frigates for defense and intervention (FDI), with an option for a fourth unit, in a deal worth some €3 billion ($3.5 billion), the armed forces ministry said.

“This Tuesday September 28, in the presence of the minister of the armed forces, the Greek defense minister signed with the executive chairmen of Naval Group and MBDA a memorandum of understanding, which envisages the acquisition by the Greek navy three frigates for defense and intervention built in France, with an option for a fourth, as well as their service and related weapons,” the ministry said in a statement.

Announcement of the prospective sale to Greece came almost two weeks after Australia cancelled a project to build 12 French designed conventional attack submarines, and switching to nuclear-powered submarines in a partnership with the UK and US, dubbed AUKUS.

Hervé Grandjean, spokesman for the ministry, said that Australian cancellation was the “exceptional rather than the rule,” when asked in a press conference on the timing of the announcement of the Greek deal.

The defense and foreign ministers of France and Greece also signed a strategic partnership agreement, which included a pledge of mutual assistance, the spokesman said.

Tension between Greece and Turkey has risen in recent years, with conflicting claims over territorial rights in the eastern Mediterranean.

The warship sale to Greece was worth around €3 billion, shared between Naval Group (NG) and MBDA, and included three years of service, the spokesman said. The weapons included Aster 30 and Exocet missiles, and MU 90 torpedo. There will not be naval cruise missiles on the warship.

Talks on the deal were due to run for some three months to allow a contract to be signed.

The spokesman declined to say how the overall €3 billion amount would be shared between Naval Group, a shipbuilder, and missile maker MBDA. Those companies declined to give the value of their shares of the deal.

Asked about the absence of the corvettes in the expected order, the spokesman said the Gowind could meet the requirements of the Greek navy, and although there was no announcement today, that did not rule out talks with the Greek client.

French and Greek media reports had reported before the official announcement the naval deal would include the FDI frigates and Gowind corvettes, boosting the value to some €5 billion.

The FDI was designed for the export market, and Greece will be its first foreign client, if Athens signs the order contract.

There will be no change for delivery of the first FDI for the French navy, which will receive the first of class warship in 2024.

The French navy will then wait for the following two ships, as both will be redirected to the Greek navy in 2025, with the third vessel delivered to Greece in 2026.

The priority for delivering to Greece meant the second and third FDI for the French navy will be a few months late, with delivery respectively in early 2026 and late 2027, the spokesman said.

The fourth and fifth FDI for the French navy will be delivered as scheduled in 2028 and 2029.

Steel has already been cut for what could be the first FDI for Greece.

Talks will open with the French navy and the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office for the new delivery timetable, the spokesman said. A previously announced upgrade of the Lafayette stealth frigate will bridge the gap for the French navy until all the FDI are delivered.

The French navy is expected to sail 15 first rank warships by 2030.

All three FDI for the Greek navy would be built at Lorient, Brittany, northwest France, and Naval Group has held talks with Greek companies to act as local partners.

That shipbuilding in France differs from a previous plan NG set out in a May 28 statement with an Athens dateline. In that plan NG offered four FDI – with three of those built in Greece, two second hand French frigates as a gap filler, and modernization of the Greek navy’s fleet of Meko warships. Weapons offered on that batch of FDI included 21 rolling airframe missiles from the US. NG usually offers European missiles on its warships.

The offer of two used warships was later withdrawn as the French navy needed those vessels.

An upgrade of the Meko fleet would cost around €1 billion, while NG was offering the Gowind 2500 corvette at some €350 million per unit, Naval News website reported.

NG executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellett went to Athens last week to make the latest offer, Challenges business magazine reported Sept. 27.

The Greek quest for new warships drew rival offers from Babcock, Damen, Fincantieri, Lockheed Martin, and TKMS. Lockheed Martin pitched its HF2, based on the Littoral Combat Ship, and that offer was reported in French media as a serious contender.

The potential warship deal with Greece reflects the rising importance of French arms export within Europe, with sales to European allies accounting for 25 percent of all foreign sales of weapons last year, compared to 10 percent in 2017.

Greece has ordered 18 Rafale fighters, 12 of which are second hand from the French air force and six are new aircraft, in a deal worth €2.5 billion. Greece has also said it would order a further six Rafale.

Greece would receive a 4,500 ton warship with the Thales Sea Fire radar, and MBDA 32 Aster 30 B1, and Exocet MM40 Block 3C missiles. There will also be an anti-torpedo decoy.

The warships will be interoperable with European and Nato allies, NG said.

Featured Photo: Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (left) shakes hands with French president Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace. Photograph: Ludovic Marin/EPA

Source for Photo: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/28/greece-to-buy-french-warships-in-multi-billion-euro-defence-deal

And according to the source cited above:

“The Greek navy, which had overseen the deal, had taken stock of tenders from countries that included France, the US and UK. Although the French bid was costlier, it was subsequently improved in the aftermath of the collapse of the submarine sale to Australia, according to Greek media, which reported that under the accord France had also agreed to offer military assistance if necessary.”

Marine Corps Leadership Focuses on Ground-Based Ship-Killing Missiles

Posted on September 28, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/28/2021

By Ashley Calingo

Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va.—The Marine Corps’ top modernization priority is fulfilling the requirement for a ground-based anti-ship missile capability.

The operational requirement for this ship-killing capability is a relatively new development stemming from the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts.

“As the Marine Corps’ first Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile capability, the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System is a force modernization priority central to the Marine Corps’ contribution to the Naval expeditionary force’s anti-surface warfare campaign,” said Lt. Col. John Fraser, Fires branch head at Marine Corps Combat Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration.

When integrated into sensor and communication networks supporting a naval or maritime kill chain and synchronized with the employment of other missile systems, the Marine Corps’ medium-range missile battery will serve as a component of the Naval expeditionary force’s stand-in force in support of the naval sea control effort, said Fraser.

MCSC plays a critical role in equipping Marines with the next-generation, modernized capabilities needed to meet and defeat an evolving threat. In two years, the Long Range Fires program office at MCSC has acquired NMESIS, an anti-ship missile capability meeting the GBASM requirement. Medium-range missile batteries serving as part of Marine Littoral Regiments conducting expeditionary advanced base operations will employ NMESIS, said Fraser.

“In a nutshell, NEMSIS is the ground-based launcher that gives us the ability to fire the Navy’s latest anti-ship missile, the Naval Strike Missile, or NSM,” said Joe McPherson, program manager for Long Range Fires at MCSC. “While the GBASM requirement can encompass multiple materiel solutions and systems under the GBASM requirement, NMESIS is the first system for the Marine Corps providing that ground-based, anti-ship missile capability.”

While the Department of Defense possesses ships and aircraft with anti-ship missile capabilities, McPherson said that the NMESIS uniquely complements these efforts.

“Everything our adversaries have designed over the last 20-30 years are intended to counter [the DOD’s] ships and aircraft,” said McPherson. “The Marine Corps bringing a ground-based solution complicates [the adversary’s] ability to counter our anti-ship capabilities since ground-based launchers, as we’ve found in previous wars, are hard to find. This is what NMESIS brings to the fight—a launcher that is survivable inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone.”

A key element of the system’s survivability is its teleoperated transport vehicle, called the Remotely-Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires.

“By going with a teleoperated vehicle, we increase the survivability of the crews because they’re not co-located with the launcher, which tends to be what gets targeted,” said McPherson.

Marines can control the ROGUE-Fires with a gamelike remote controller or command multiple launchers to autonomously follow behind a leader vehicle. The ROGUE-Fires vehicle, built on a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle platform, provides the Corps with a robust expeditionary system capable of operating anywhere.

Maneuverability and mobility are critical components of NMESIS, and Marines’ ability to operate ROGUE-Fires in both autonomous and teleoperated modes provides the operational commander with strategic options in his battlespace. The ability to displace crews and vehicles in a remote manner apart from one another is a critical step in increasing the survivability of Marines.

McPherson made sure to point out that the NMESIS is not considered an autonomous launcher; Marines are required to directly interact with the fire control system in order to fire the missile.

“The actual fire control system that fires the missile is completely separate from all of the self-driving and autonomy,” said McPherson. “There’s always a Marine who does the mission plan and actually fires the missile.”

The program office selected the Navy’s NSM after extensive market research and analysis on options within industry and the DOD. McPherson noted that missile development is a costly and potentially risky endeavor. The program office used a proven missile solution to eliminate that extra cost and mitigate risk.

“[The program office has] made excellent progress by adopting the Navy’s missile,” said McPherson. “We’ve been able to focus on developing the launcher itself. We’ve built multiple prototypes, successfully conducted multiple firing tests, gone through our initial mobility tests, and we’re on a good path to transition into the next phase of the program.”

The Marine Corps successfully demonstrated NMESIS during Large Scale Exercise 21 in August. The system launched an NSM that flew a non-linear flight path covering over 100 nautical miles before successfully hitting two targets.

“We made it fly a [non-linear] route to simulate what Marines would experience in a real-world situation, where they may have to navigate around friendly and neutral shipping or any other impediments between the ground-based firing position and the target,” said McPherson. “The ability for us to provide waypoints and plan a complex route improves the survivability and utility of the system before impact.”

Though the NMESIS launch at LSE 21 was not an official test associated with MCSC’s acquisition of the system, it provided an opportunity for MCSC and CD&I to gain valuable user feedback from the Marine community who will use the system in the future.

“We hope to get this in the hands of more Marines so we can get that operational feedback, and so they can get more reps and experience on the system,” said Lt. Col. Ryan Collins, Rockets and Artillery Capabilities Integration Officer, Marine Corps Capabilities Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration. “Because this is a new operational concept, we think it’s very important for them to get involved early in the process.”

In October, the program office plans to send NMESIS assets to Marines in Camp Pendleton, California, so they have additional opportunities to familiarize themselves with the system.

“They’ll be exercising with the system continuously for the next two years, so we can gain user feedback and develop all of the technical techniques and procedures for this new operational concept,” said Collins.

“This will also give us the opportunity to tie in all of the [command and control] and higher-level capabilities that are going to be needed to fully implement the system. Ultimately, Marines are slowly transitioning into getting the system in their hands and getting an understanding of it.”

The program office anticipates deploying their initial set of launchers to a Marine Littoral Regiment by the end of 2023, achieving a significant milestone for Force Design.

This article was published by the Marine Corps Systems Command on September 14, 2021.

For a recent interview with Col. Miagany, G-3, MARFORPAC who discussed Working Integrated Fires in the Pacific, see the following:

Working Integrated Fires in the Pacific: Col. Miagany, G-3, MARFORPAC

An artillery Marine from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines maneuvers a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher across the beach aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 16, 2021. During Large Scale Exercise 2021, the Marines of 1/12 struck a naval target ship with two Naval Strike Missiles which flew more than 100 nautical miles before striking the ship. LSE 2021 allowed Marines to refine concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment in order to provide sea control or contribute to sea denial near key maritime terrain. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Artillery Marines from 1st Battalion, 12th Marines escort a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher vehicle ashore aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 16, 2021. The Marines of 1/12 struck a naval target ship Aug. 15, 2021, with two Naval Strike Missiles, which flew 100 nautical miles away before finding their mark. The live-fire sinking exercise was part of Large Scale Exercise 2021, which saw 25,000 Marines and sailors from five numbered fleets and all three Marine Expeditionary Forces working together in a global full-spectrum scenario. Marines refined concepts such as expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment in order to provide sea control or contribute to sea denial near key maritime terrain. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Pfc. Guerby Destine, 22, number two cannon cocker with 1st Battalion, 12th Marines and a Westbury, N.Y., native, drives a Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher aboard Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, Aug. 15, 2021. The Marines of 1/12 struck a naval target ship with two Naval Strike Missiles after sensing and targeting the vessel from their fires expeditionary advanced base while participating in Large Scale Exercise 2021. The exercise allowed Marines to support distributed maritime operations by providing expeditionary advanced base operations and littoral operations in a contested environment. More than 25,000 Marines and sailors took part in LSE 2021 from five numbered fleets and all three Marine Expeditionary Forces. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

Japan’s Minister of Defense Address to Vietnamese Defense Ministry

Posted on September 28, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

On September 12, 2021, Japanese Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo delivered an address at the Vietnamese defense ministry during his visit to the country. He referred to China’s new law, which authorizes its coast guard to use weapons. Kishi said Japan will never be able to accept the law, which he said is problematic in terms of its consistency with international law.

The defense minister also referred to Taiwan. He said Taiwan is located in a key position. He said the position links the East and South China seas, which have strategic importance for maritime security in the region. Kishi said that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are crucial for the region and the international community.

The defense minister highlighted the importance as well of redefining defense cooperation between Japan and Vietnam.

What follows is that address as published by the Japanese Ministry of Defence.

Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation Reaches “New Level”: A Globally-focused Partnership”

(Provisional Translation)

Xin chào. Nice to meet you, I am KISHI Nobuo, Minister of Defense of Japan.
It is a great honor to visit Vietnam on my first foreign visit as Minister of Defense. First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Vu Chien Thang, Director General of Foreign Relations Department, Ministry of National Defense, Vietnam, and all of today’s attendees for giving me this opportunity.

Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation is robust and has great potential to grow. Today, I am here to convey my thoughts on how we can further develop this partnership for the peace and stability of the region and the international community. For that reason, I would like to state my views candidly, including those points we, Vietnam and Japan, may not be on the same page.

Let me take this opportunity to talk about my special memories in Vietnam.My personal experience with Vietnam began nearly 20 years ago. Before becoming a member of the Diet, I traveled around the world while working for a trading company. I worked here in Vietnam for a year and a half from the summer of 2000. I ran around to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Can Tho in the Mekong River basin, Kamau at the southernmost tip, Phan Thiet by the sea, the Dalat Plateau, and the mountains near the border with China.

At the time when the “Doi Moi Policy” began to take off, I remember feeling that people and the city were booming and that the country was truly developing. And today, I am continuing to witness the development of Vietnam, which is a powerful leader in the region.

I distinctly remember an interaction with a generous and kind Vietnamese colleague. At the time, I had a dispute at work, and when I complained that “you said you could do it at that time,” he answered with big smile, “Mr. KISHI, if I said I couldn’t do it at that time, you would have been sad. I didn’t want to see your sad face”. I had no choice but to forgive him.

The fellow was not only easygoing and humorous, but also he worked hard. We were able to read each other and build a good relationship of trust, even if we were quarreled due to differences in thinking. Vietnam, where I worked hard with many people, is special to me. This is the reason why I made Vietnam the destination of my first foreign visit as Minister of Defense.

I am convinced that it is because of the people of Vietnam that we can further develop defense cooperation between our two countries. This belief hasn’t changed since I visited here as Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense in 2009.

“When in trouble, we help each other.” This is a virtue that the Japanese have long cherished. Friends help each other in times of trouble. In the unprecedented challenge of the pandemic, and in order to confront this difficulty together as a friend, Japan provided about 3 million doses of vaccine to the people of Vietnam, with whom we have a long and deep friendship.

If we recall, 10 years ago in March 2011, in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake – which was an unprecedented natural disaster – Japan received an extraordinarily large amount of donations and heartfelt condolences from many people in Vietnam. We received warm support in various forms such as letters, writings and drawings. Japan will never ever forget this.

“Gian nan mới biết bạn hiền”, how encouraging we Japanese are to be impressed and encouraged by the virtues of everyone expressed in this Vietnamese language. I would like to thank you again. And this was also an opportunity for us in Japan and Vietnam to realize once again that we share the virtue of helping our friends in trouble and how strong our “ties” are.Bilateral relations between Japan and Vietnam continue to develop. Since Japan-Vietnam relations were elevated to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2014, the two countries have been developing strongly in all fields.

This extends to the field of defense. Based on the cumulative achievements of the various cooperation and exchanges to date, when I met with Defense Minister GIANG in June this year, he proposed raising defense cooperation between the two countries to a “New Level”.

I would like to make this visit a milestone marking the beginning of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation moving to a “New Level”.

Earlier, I mentioned that we, Japan and Vietnam, share the virtue of a commitment to help our friends in the face of difficulties. And, like this virtue, we share other universal values that are essential to regulate international relations. One of them is the “rule of law” at sea.

What has connected Japan and Vietnam since ancient times was the vast and abundant sea. From the 16th to 17th centuries, Japanese merchants freely navigated from the East China Sea to the South China Sea on the “Goshuinsen”, Japanese merchant sailing ships, seeking widespread trade with Southeast Asian countries. The “Raienbashi”, also known as “Nihonbashi”, which still remains in the ancient city of Hoi An, the hometown of President Nguyen Xuan Phuc, is reminiscent of the lively exchanges between Japan and Vietnam at that time. Free and open seas have been the cornerstone of our prosperity since ancient times.

The precept that Japan continues to advocate for at sea is very simple and basic. Japan has consistently promoted the “rule of law” even at sea. Our prosperity would not be possible without the freedom of navigation and flight, and the safety of sea lanes.

Vietnam, which is geopolitically located at the overlap of Southeast Asia and East Asia, plays an important role in the region. We, Japan, highly appreciated Vietnam’s leadership in the region during its ADMM Plus while emphasizing the universal value of the “rule of law”. Those of us, who share values, have a common mission to protect the peace and stability of the region.

We are now facing an unprecedentedly severe reality, including in the security arena, in addition to the difficulties of dealing with COVID-19.

Especially in the sea and airspace of the East China Sea and the South China Sea, there are cases where actions are being taken, based on one-sided assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order.

Freedom of navigation and freedom of flight must not be unduly violated. To that end, it is important to repeatedly promote the importance of the “rule of law” and the basic principle of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and above all, to put it into practice.

In the East China Sea, attempts to change the status quo by coercion continue, including in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, which is an inherent territory of Japan. The situation is becoming more and more serious, with repeated cases of vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard that have intruded into territorial waters, approaching Japanese fishing vessels.

In the South China Sea, China has continued to militarize disputed terrain, frequently conducted military exercises, and is believed to have launched ballistic missiles, escalating its actions. Japan strongly opposes unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion and any activities that raise tensions, and shares concerns with Vietnam.

In February of this year, the Chinese Coast Guard Law came into effect. This law includes problematic stipulations in terms of consistency with international law, such as its application to ambiguous maritime areas and regarding the authority to use weapons. The justified rights of all relevant countries, including Japan and Vietnam, should never be undermined due to the Coast Guard Law, and we can never tolerate anything that could heighten tensions on the water, such as in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

Additionally, Taiwan is located at the nexus of the East China Sea and the South China Sea, which is a key point for regional maritime security. Peace and stability in the Straits of Taiwan are important to both the region and the international community. It has been a consistent position of Japan to expect that it will be peacefully resolved through direct dialogues by relevant parties.

Furthermore, it is a hard fact that there are various challenges to ensure the peace and stability of the the Indo-Pacific region.

First, the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea, regardless of their range, is a violation of the UN Security Council resolutions, which not only threatens regional peace and stability, but is also a serious issue for the international community as a whole. Japan is working with the countries concerned to fully implement the UN Security Council resolutions toward the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program – and cooperation with Vietnam is important.

Regarding the situation in Myanmar, Japan is strongly demanding the immediate suspension of violence towards civilians, the release of detained parties, and the early recovery of the democratic political system, in cooperation with the international community. Japan regards the “five consensuses” as the first step toward a breakthrough, and welcomes the appointment of H.E. Erywan, Minister of Foreign Affairs II of Brunei, as a special envoy to ASEAN. In the future, it will be important to achieve concrete results by implementing the initiative.

It is also necessary to respond to global issues such as cyber security and the spread of new coronavirus infections.

The Indo-Pacific region, where we live, is at the heart of the vitality of the world. And therefore, the peace and stability of the region is essential for the prosperity of the world.

The attempts to change the status quo by coercion that we facing, can affect not only this region but the entire international community, and should be seen as a global challenge that threatens the existing international order.

However, there are naturally limits to what we can do as a single country. It is important to utilize all partnerships to deal with this.

Above all, we need to work together to maintain and strengthen the rules-based, free and open international order, which is grounded in international law and has brought us prosperity. Under these circumstances, what we are witnessing now is that like-minded countries share this vision of what the Indo-Pacific region should be, and are concerned with and working toward regional peace and stability. It’s something we’re trying to strengthen like never before.

Countries that are key partners of Japan are also paying attention to Vietnam. From the United States, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin visited the region at the end of July and Vice President Kamala D. Harris visited the region in August. Both senior officials chose to stop in Vietnam as part of their travel. This clearly demonstrates that the United States recognizes the strategic importance of Vietnam.

And this year, of particular interest is the increased involvement of European countries in the region. UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace, who visited Japan in July, visited Hanoi for the first time as the British Defense Minister. The launch of the “Tilt to the Indo-Pacific” policy is groundbreaking for Britain.

In order to strongly promote Japan’s vision for the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, cooperation with European countries – that share the ambition to uphold the “rule of law” – is indispensable. Since taking office as Minister of Defense, I have been actively working to make Europe’s commitment to this region even stronger and permanent

In 2019, Vietnam together with all other ASEAN countries, announced the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)” as their own path. In it, the rule of law, openness, freedom, transparency, and inclusiveness are promoted as the principles of action. Japan fully supports AOIP, which shares essential principles with FOIP. Going forward, we will continue to encourage tangible, cooperative efforts to realize AOIP, while supporting the centrality and unity of ASEAN.

The expansion of partnerships in the Indo-Pacific will help ensure regional peace and stability.

What should the irreplaceable friends, Japan and Vietnam, do in the midst of this expansion of global partnerships?

My answer is to evolve Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation to a “New Level” that is suitable for the present era. And by doing so, I would like to walk together as comrades holding hands, to fulfill our obligation to protect the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

Until now, the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam have strengthened their ability to protect their homelands by continuous endeavors. Based on their respective abilities, we have promoted cooperation and exchanges in a wide range of fields between the two countries, and the results have brought great benefits to both Japan and Vietnam.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces are now contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, and the existence of the powerful Vietnamese People’s Army – which continues to further enhance its capabilities –has become essential to maintain peace and stability in the region. In light of the stark reality of the security environment surrounding us, our cooperation must aim for further heights.

In other words, in the spirit of “when in trouble, we help each other” and “Gian nan mới biết bạn hiền”, we are friends who give our hands to other friends facing difficulties in this region and in the international community. We should say that we have entered that stage.

Here today, I would like to “redefine” that Japan and Vietnam defense cooperation aims to contribute more positively to the peace and stability of, not just our two countries, but to the region and the international community. This is the intent of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation in the “new stage” I mentioned earlier.

Both Japan and Vietnam will cooperate to address various security issues in the region while emphasizing the “rule of law”. We will work closely not only bilaterally, but also with regional countries and ASEAN for the benefit of all countries. We would like to provide a lasting peace of mind to the local and international community. For Japan, it should be said that Vietnam is one of the important countries with whom we are sharing the same boat

With cooperation reaching this “new level,” let’s strengthen Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation even further while shifting our attention to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific and the world.

Now we have a new tool for that. It is the Japan-Vietnam Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement signed yesterday.

In the future, under this agreement, we will accelerate discussions toward the realization of tangible equipment transfers, such as cooperation in the field of vessels that contribute to regional maritime security.

And we will expand the scope of cooperation to unprecedented fields and new domains.

For example, responding to threats in cyberspace is an urgent global security challenge. Last December, I announced efforts to improve cyber security capabilities with ASEAN countries. We will work closely with Vietnam to improve cybersecurity in the region so that this initiative will serve as a model case for Japan-Vietnam ASEAN defense cooperation at the “new level.”

The global spread of coronavirus infections has also had a major impact on security. At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministers’ teleconference in November last year, we agreed to promote cooperation in the field of infectious disease control.

In light of these developments, the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam will continue to coordinate the signing of a memorandum of understanding in these two important fields, in order to promote cooperation in the fields of cyber security and military medicine.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are also a field in which Japan-Vietnam cooperation is remarkable. In order to improve the capacity of PKO personnel, Japan launched the United Nations Triangular Partnership Project (UNTPP) with the United Nations in 2015. So far, the Japan Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces have dispatched a total of about 230 instructors, and trained about 360 personnel – from 17 countries in Asia and Africa – for UN missions.

Since 2018, with the full cooperation of the People’s Army of Vietnam, Japan Self-Defense Forces instructors have been training personnel from Asian countries here in Hanoi, and under the banner of the United Nations. Such cooperation between Japan and Vietnam strongly supports UN peacekeeping operations.

In addition, Japan and Vietnam have been co-chairing the ADMM Plus Experts’ Working Group on PKO since this year, and held their first meeting in April. Over the next three years, we will lead constructive discussions between participating countries and PKO experts.

This kind of cooperation between our two countries shows the strong will we both share to actively contribute to the peace and stability of the international community. We will continue to promote further cooperation in the future.

Today, I have a grand and ambitious vision of Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation at a “new stage.” Some of you who have heard this aspiration may wonder, “Is it really possible?”

But I’m very convinced. With the steadfast Vietnamese people I know, I am sure that I will be able to overcome many challenges and achieve this immense and lofty goal.

Today, as partnerships that are stronger than ever expand in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan and Vietnam will work together to foster positive outcomes. Furthermore, in cooperation with associated countries, we will work together to address common issues, and to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the international community.

US Air Force Special Operations FARP

Posted on September 27, 2021 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/27/2021

U.S. Air Force Forward Area Refueling Point personnel assigned to the 18th Logistics Rediness Squadron refuel an MH-60 Blackhawk with U.S. Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 at Royal Australian Air Force Base Tindal, Northern Territory, Australia, July 18, 2021.

TINDAL, NT, AUSTRALIA

07.18.2021

Video by Lt. Travis Weger U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office