France, the EU and the Indo-Pacific

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on France, the EU and the Indo-Pacific
09/26/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The temperature in the Indo Pacific region has risen for the Western allies in general and for France in particular.

President Emmanuel Macron clearly sees a pressing need for a switch to a new principal partner after Australia cancelled a planned order for the French designed Barracuda conventional attack submarine, deemed by Canberra to be inadequate to meet a perceived rising threat from China.

A highly public sign came with Macron’s Sept. 21 phone call to the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, to discuss cooperation in the Indo Pacific.

Macron pointed up French commitment to a strengthened strategic autonomy for India, including its industrial and technology base, the Elysée office said in a statement.

The French geopolitical tie to the Indo China region will not be weakened by the loss of the Australian submarine contract, the armed forces minister said Sept. 24.

“We are a nation of the Indo-Pacific and breaking off a contract will not change anything,” Florence Parly told Le Monde afternoon daily. “We still have some two million French nationals in the region, 7,000 service personnel, and 93 percent of our exclusive economic zone.”

The European Union also sees the importance of the contested region, as could be seen in the publication on Sept. 16 of the EU strategy on the Indo-Pacific.

“The irony is that the Europeans had drafted a strategy on the Indo Pacific when this AUKUS partnership was announced,” Parly said. “That proves the Europeans are capable of deciding collectively where their interests lie.”

The minister was referring to the AUKAS alliance between Australia, the UK and US announced by US president Joe Biden on Sept. 15, with the center piece news that Canberra would acquire nuclear powered attack submarines in place of the French diesel-electric boats.

The EU Indo Pacific strategy showed member states saw the need to intervene outside the  borders of the European Union, she said, and this was part of building European defense.

That wider role of the EU will be set out in a white paper, dubbed strategic compass, due to be published next year when Macron takes up the rotating six-month presidency of the European Union on Jan. 1.

“We have to make a choice: either Europe stands up or Europe fades away,” the defense minister said.

It remains to be seen the extent to which EU member states will step up to deliver a European military presence, one that would project power into the Indo Pacific, where the threat from Beijing was seen as great enough to prompt Canberra’s opting to acquire nuclear powered submarines with US and UK backing.

“The German government understands the French anger on the submarine decision,” a German diplomat said. “The decision showed the need to intensify work on a European Union multilateral policy for the Indo Pacific.

Indo Pacific Poses Problems

There is the law of the sea, right of navigation, and there is also the risk of poking the bear with China and the People’s Liberation Army Navy.

The diplomatic and operational sensitivity can be seen by the German navy’s dispatch of a frigate to fly the flag in the South China Sea.

A German frigate, the Bayern, sailed out of Wilhelmshaven naval base, northwestern Germany, for deployment in the South China Sea, German broadcaster Deutsche Welle reported Aug. 2. That would be the first time in almost 20 years a German warship would sail in those contested waters, in which China claims vast stretches of open sea and islands.

However, the German frigate’s voyage to the far side risked sending an “unclear” message, a research note from Chatham House, a London-based think tank, said May 4.

“Due to internal differences within the German government, the original plans for the deployment appear to have changed to specifically avoid antagonizing Beijing,” the note said.

Germany said it would not sail the frigate within 12 nautical miles of any territory claimed by China, the note said, although “maintaining ambiguity” about the Bayern’s deployment would have made “strategic sense.”

Despite the German statement of maritime intent, the Chinese foreign ministry warned that the principle of freedom of navigation “should not be used as an excuse to endanger the sovereignty and security of littoral countries,” the note said.

The German defense ministry had appeared to change the frigate’s course, so the warship would sail anti-clockwise rather than clockwise as previously planned, the note said, and that ruled out the Bayern engaging a naval passing exercise – or passex – with the British carrier group led by the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier.

“So, rather than coordinating with European allies, let alone the United States, Germany is doing its own thing – a ‘missed opportunity’ according to one German official,” the note said. Berlin appeared to be sending the Bayern in response to pressure from France, the UK, US, and Japan, rather than standing up to China.

“It is therefore trying to square the circle of how to deploy a warship to the South China Sea without appearing to challenge China,” the note said.

China refused to allow the Bayern to call in at the port of Shanghai, the Agence-France Presse news agency reported, signalling displeasure at the German warship.

The German foreign ministry published last September its Indo Pacific guidelines, which pointed to increasing German naval activity in the region, including more liaison officers and sailing warships, South China Morning Post reported April 25.

China also issued a warning to the Royal Navy as the Queen Elizabeth carrier group prepared to sail into the South China Seas last month.

“The People’s Liberation Army Navy is at a high state of combat readiness,” reported the Global Times, a daily close to the Chinese communist party.

Reliving Trafalgar

The Australian submarine switch was a Trafalgar moment for France, showing Paris had perhaps overestimated its ability to “win partners in the Indo Pacific,” French website AeroDefenseNews reported. France was not a major power as it lacked the means, and therefore the influence over local actors in the region.

“Naval Group and France paid the price of being actors too small in the Indo Pacific, where there are two great rivals standing face to face – China and the United States,” the report said.

That Australian cancellation and the AUKUS alliance of the three English speaking nations sounded a wake up call for Europe, the report said, and it was up to the European Union to step up and play a full role, and make its voice heard, the report said.

Featured Photo: French President Emmanuel Macron and Indian PM Narendra Modi at a meeting in the Chateau of Chantilly, near Paris, on August 22, 2019.  © Pascal Rossignal, AFP

Source for Photo: https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20210921-macron-and-modi-vow-to-act-jointly-in-indo-pacific-as-submarine-row-intensifies

You Have Heard of AUKUS: But What About Wedgetail?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on You Have Heard of AUKUS: But What About Wedgetail?

By Robbin Laird

The news this past few days has been filled with discussions, arguments, “fake news,” and other desiderata about the Australian decision to enter the nuclear attack club.

But what can be missed is that the Australians have been driving innovations in the United States and the United Kingdom far before they sought to work with the nuclear attack submarine states.

A clear example of this is the E-7 or the Wedgetail.

During my years of visiting Australia, I had the chance to watch the RAAF bring a new air combat system into service and then maturity, namely, the E-7.

This was a trail blazing effort by the RAAF which has led the way in many respects with regard to a new generation of air battle management C2 aircraft, and one which enters into the world of tron warfare given the software evolution driven by the Commonwealth’s partnership with Northrup Grumman.

The author during a visit to RAAF Base Williamtown in August 2016 standing by an E-7.

The RAF became convinced of the E-7s capability to move out from a path of modernizing their AWACS to procuring the Wedgetail.

There is a clear desire for PACAF to do the same.

This is a case of the RAAF leading the way with the RAF and the USAF to follow, so to speak.

And an industrial partnership between the United States and the Commonwealth which has spearheaded this effort.

In a piece by Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, published on September 24, 2021, the interest of the USAF in the Wedgetail was highlighted.

“[The E-7 Wedgetail] is already a proven capability, and having seen it in action, I think it’s something we do want to use. And at the same time, if this becomes a (budget) line, we’ll probably start to replace some [E-3s].” – Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Charles Q. Brown Jr., 21 September 2021.

Yesterday at the Air Force Association gathering in Maryland, the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force put forward the top unfunded requirement of the Pacific Air Force for the Indo Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) – the E-7 Wedgetail.

The Wedgetail is the most effective in the world today as an airborne Command and Control center with radar capability to see low profile, low heat cruise missiles at extensive ranges, enabling cross-domain tracking to warn and effectors to negate. Australia, South Korea, and Turkey have them in service today. The United States Air Force had not chosen to invest in this capability, due to the promise of space-based capabilities to do a similar mission that have still yet to be developed and operationally deployed.

Further terrestrial-based over the horizon radars have also yet to be developed and operationally deployed for this specific mission.

The Wedgetail is a far more capable and reliable replacement for the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).  Besides upgrading to a new 737-based platform from the 1950’s era 707 platform, the E-7 replaces the E-3’s Cold War capability and age with a more powerful radar and the newest battle-management and communications technology, and it provides significantly longer detection range and vastly better target discrimination and combat identification.

Since the 1970s, the AWACS has been the US Air Force and NATO’s primary airborne battle management and aerial target tracking platform. The USAF has an inventory of 31 E-3s, operationally assigned at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, and overseas at Kadena Air Base, Japan and al-Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates.

In previous decades, the AWACS has been a capable command and control platform, seeing extensive combat use in engagements like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans, but its advanced age will require us to phase it out in the 2030s.

The markedly increased reliability of the 737 platform variant, with a global logistics system to support, will result in more consistent and frequent aircraft availability for operational and training missions.  The AWACS is also poorly equipped to detect cruise missiles, as the AN/APY-1/2 radar inside the E-3’s rotating radome is limited in its ability to detect hypersonic threats and those missile threats with a small radar cross-section.

Long range aircraft launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles from our near peers of China and Russia can range the territories of the United States, and these weapons are very difficult to track with ground-based radar due to their low radar profile and the curvature of the Earth obscuring their low trajectory.

This leads to these cruise missiles escaping detection by ground-based radar until they are at close range, with much less time for our effectors to engage and intercept the target. With hypersonic cruise missiles currently in development by both Russia and China, this is no longer viable, due to the target’s extreme speed; there is simply not enough margin of error with such a close, fast-flying hypersonic missile. In a rapidly evolving threat environment, our ability to defend the US homeland is degrading, with Guam and Alaska at the highest risk.

“[China has] missiles with very long range, low radar cross-section that can evade our legacy warning capabilities. Missiles with the range to launch from over Russian territory and strike all of Canada, all of Alaska and well into the United States of America without even leaving their home territory.” – Gen Glen D. VanHerck, Commander, US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

Over-the-Horizon radar, airborne early warning, and space-based sensors will be increasingly critical for missile defense in the coming years. OTH radar uses high frequency radio waves bounced off the ionosphere to increase detection range and provides persistent capability.

To maintain constant airborne early warning for the homeland would not be cost effective, as mentioned in this congressional research report, which means that effective long-range over-the-horizon capabilities or space based sensors and satellites must be the primary choice to defend the CONUS. Airborne early warning E-7s can fill the gap and most appropriately defend Guam, Alaska and our forward deployed assets along with our Allies.

The E-7 is a proven platform, on a standard, commercially available Boeing 737-700 airframe, in current production which will speed up procurement and cost efficiency  for the United States. Australia has participated in exercises in the Pacific with the United States using their Wedgetail with great success and exponentially advanced capability. The United Kingdom expressed its intent to retire its E-3s in 2021 and has ordered three E-7s. There is a warm production line that the United States will use, to further boost efficiency and lower costs.

In the interim, with the AWACS reliability running low, we need a capable airborne early warning and control platform. The Navy currently operates the carrier-capable E-2C and E-2D, the latter of which achieved initial operating capability (IOC) in 2014, and the platform is expected to be sustained for another 30 years. The E-2 can be used in the defense of carriers and other naval assets against incoming stealthy cruise missiles.

Guam is currently inadequately defended and air and missile defense of the island is Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander Admiral John Aquilino’s #1 priority. While we wait for the E-7 to be procured and become operational, E-2 wings on shore could be detailed to Guam for overhead cruise missile defense detection.

In effect, AUKUS existed many years before the recent variant was announced.

The featured photo: Airmen from RAAF No.2 Squadron designed and painted ‘nose- art’ on an E-7A Wedgetail whilst deployed on Operation OKRA in the Middle East. The art commemorated the 50th anniversary of the downing of the No. 2 Squadron Canberra bomber, ‘Magpie 91’, on 3 November 1970 in jungle on the Laotian-Vietnamese boarder during the Vietnam War.

Vice Admiral Mike Noonan Explains the Australian Nuclear Submarine Decision

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Vice Admiral Mike Noonan Explains the Australian Nuclear Submarine Decision

Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mike Noonan said the announcement was the single most consequential decision made in relation to the navy in his lifetime. In this video, he explains why.

We have published a four part series on defense.info focused on the shift from the new conventionally powered attack submarine to a new nuclear powered attack submarine.

In the first piece in that series, the logic and context of the decision was the focus of attention.

The recent announcement of the decision by the Australian government to cancel their diesel submarine contract and to acquire nuclear attack submarines is a significant one.

There is much already written about the announcement and its consequences, but what can get lost in the noise is really the key point: this decision launches the next phase of Australian strategic development, but down a path which as been evolving for some time.

At the heart of the reason the Aussies have done so is clearly the Chinese behavior and virtual war with Australia. Australia as a continent is a key challenge for Chinese ambitions in the region. They are a continent which can stage long-range forces against Chinese military operations. The Chinese Communist leaders have done what they should not have: Awakening the quiet power in the Pacific to shaping a longer range defense force, closely allied with the major competitors of China.

Only Australia really counts in terms of deterring China in a fundamental geographical way: they are a firmly liberal democratic country which rejects Chinese Communism. And as such, the Chinese economic and political engagements in Australia, coupled with the political and cyber warfare that the Chinese have engaged in with the clear desire to destabilize Australia has been met with firm resolve. And the Chinese have responded by escalation up to an including direct military threats against Australia.

This is the driver of the decision. Full stop. It is not about not loving the French, and an inability to work with France or ignoring their contractual obligations under the contracts signed earlier. When Australia made the decision to go with the French Naval Group and build a long ranger diesel submarine, the strategic context was very different than it is today. I will deal with the French and other issues in aa later article, but here I am focusing on the core issue which is the strategic context in which Australia sought to acquire nuclear attack submarines.

When the premise of your decision changes, it is important to recognize that and to re-calibrate, re-load and rethink what you are doing and why. For the Australian government, the expensive effort to build a new class of diesel submarines was a key part of dealing with the regional dynamics changing in their region. But in only five years, the Xi government has pursued a course which is changing the course of Pacific defense by the liberal democracies and their allies.

I am writing this article while in my digs in Paris, France. But I have spent the last few days talking with a number of my Australian and French colleagues. This is a strategic event which in the words of one Australian colleague: “This is the most significant defense acquisition in my lifetime by the Australian government.”

But it also is a launch point for the next phase of Australian strategic development which is itself part of a trajectory which was launched earlier.

During my visits to Australia since 2014, I had a chance to work with the Williams Foundation and then became a Fellow with the Foundation. I have published a book which lays out what I learned during my visits in terms of shaping a narrative built around the seminars held twice a year by the Foundation. Those seminars and my book provide a very clear record of how the ADF has rethought its place in the world and how to operate more effectively.

The F-35 acquisition decision at the beginning of my visits was more than a platform choice; it was the next step in RAAF modernization but one which reached out to the joint force and has driven the ADF voyage on building a fifth-generation force. Now the nuclear submarine decision is the keystone to the next phase of this journey, one which is about extending the reach of the ADF throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region.

The precursor for this decision lies not in submarines but a growing concern with the need for the ADF to have longer-range strike capability.

In 2018, one of our seminars dealt directly with the long-range strike requirement.

In the terms of reference for the seminar held on August 22, 2018 this key point was made: “The ability to strike at range brings a new dimension into any unfolding strategic scenario which, in itself, may often deter escalation into armed conflict. While in the event of escalation occurring, the absence of a long-range strike capability both limits Australia’s options for strategic maneuver and concedes to an adversary the ability to dictate the terms of engagement.

“An independent strike capability expands the range of options to achieve Australia’s strategic ends; signals a serious intent and commitment about Australia’s national security; and has the capacity to influence strategic outcomes short of resorting to armed conflict.”

The Morrison government announced its defense strategy in July 2020 and that announcement is where I started my book and then looked backwards. I labelled that strategy as a strategic reset.

And that reset began with weapons not platforms.

On March 31, 2021, the Prime Minister announced a new effort in the weapons area.

“The Morrison Government will accelerate the creation of a $1 billion Sovereign Guided Weapons Enterprise, boosting skilled jobs and helping secure Australia’s sovereign defence capabilities. The Department of Defence will now select a strategic industry partner to operate a sovereign guided weapons manufacturing capability on behalf of the Government as a key part of the new Enterprise. The new Enterprise will support missile and guided weapons manufacturing for use across the Australian Defence Force.”

In doing so, the Australian government opened up discussions with the Trump Administration with regard to acquiring not only weapons but an ability to produce those weapons on Australian soil.

A key element of this discussion revolved around naval weapons. Which also highlights a key aspect of how the ADF has worked with the United States military over the past few years. The ADF has a close working relationship with the U.S. Navy and the USMC.

In fact, the RAAF has bought and operated a number of naval air platforms over the years in addition to the close working relationship which the Royal Australian Navy has with the U.S. Navy in operations and training.  And the RAAF is currently operating a number of key systems which will interact nicely with the new submarine, notably Triton and the P-8.

In the course of these discussions, the aperture opened on the possibility of the acquisition of a platform which could carry some of these weapons deep into the Pacific, namely, the nuclear submarine.

Because the nuclear navy is in many ways the crown jewel of the U.S. military, the ADF leadership has full confidence in them as partners. For the U.S. Navy, having worked for a long period with the British Navy, and in the case of the Astute class having engaged through its contractors in direct support for the UK at home in building the new nuclear attack submarine, a template was available which could be applied to the Australian case.

The re-set of Australian defence is wide-ranging and includes re-working Australia defense ecosystems for greater resilience, logistical depth, and shifts in geographical focus, namely towards Western Australia and the Northern territories. Having visited Western Australia in 2020 and the Collins submarine base just prior to the pandemic shut down of Australia, it is clear that a buildup of infrastructure in this area up to and including the Northern Territories is a core aspect of any strategic reset.

And the logical next step for the RAAF to join in this journey would be to acquire a long-range bomber.

The Strategic Shift by the Marines in the Pacific: The Logistics Challenges

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Strategic Shift by the Marines in the Pacific: The Logistics Challenges
09/24/2021

By Robbin Laird

The distributed laydown which started in 2014 has now been re-calibrated to focus on Marines operating further forward in the Pacific and doing so with closer joint force integration while retaining the capabilities to contribute significantly to full spectrum crisis management with allies and partners. To do this with the force structure and budgetary limits facing the Marines will be challenging.

Underlying the strategic shift is the effort to find ways to shape sustainment capabilities. Obviously, the sustainment system used for the past 20 years in the land wars has little or no relevance to providing for sustainment for a both distributed force in a maritime environment, as well as one that may need to aggregate from multiple locations.

As one Marine put it during my visit to MARFORPAC: “We need to have the ability to close forces at the decisive point. We are operating as an expeditionary force, which means we have to agilely deploy and rapidly close.  We need to combine speed with expeditionary flexibility and reach.”

How do you shape a logistics system which can support such an approach?  I had a chance to discuss the logistics challenges and the evolving approach to meeting those challenges during my visit with Maj Katie Petronio, G-4 Engineer Planner and Mr. Jorge Diaz, G-4 Logistics Plans and Exercises. And as one participant put the challenge: “It is all about space. How do position ourselves to sustain the force where it needs to operate?”

Broadly speaking, the Marines have a number of ways to support their force projection force.

The first is to pre-position supplies throughout the region and working with allies and partners in exercises provides such an opportunity. Similar to how the Marines store supplies in Norway, there are opportunities in the region to build out pre-positioning options.

The second is to work integration among the sea-bases and to leverage not only what the amphibious fleet can deliver ashore, but also leverage the broader fleet. The coming of the CMV-22B to the fleet adds a common capability shared with the Marine Corps which allows cross-decking support and projection to mobile or expeditionary bases ashore.

Here the Marines own heavy lift capability, now provided by CH-53Es but soon by the new CH-53K, along with the enhanced capabilities of the H-1 family (newly enabled with Link 16 and full motion video capabilities) can play an important role in working sea to mobile or expeditionary basing dynamics.

The third is to rely on longer range lift provided by the KC-130J to move Marine Corps forces around the Pacific chessboard. The KC-130J fleet does face major demands for tanking missions which compete with lift missions and that constitutes a constraint on moving the force on the chessboard.

A fourth way to deal with the logistics challenges is to work joint force support more effectively. This primarily with the Navy but there is no reason this cannot be highlighted with the USAF as well, a subject I will address in a later article.  And over the past few years, the Marines have worked with the Military Sealift Command to build new ships which allow the Marines to deploy and be supplied by new ships that are not classic amphibious ships. A good example of this is the purpose-built expeditionary mobile base ships, like the Lewis B. Puller.

A fifth way, and one underscored in the current Commandant’s Force Design 2030 effort, is to reshape the force to reduce the logistical footprint required by Marines operating from expeditionary bases. This certainly can be done with the insertion of a C2 or ISR cell supportive of a broader joint force effort.

A key point was underscored by one participant on the importance of what was raised earlier in the conversation about sustaining a joint task force.

By opening the aperture of the Navy working with the Marine Corps differently, that is baselining integration, there was an opportunity to expand ways to support one other in joint combat situations.

“The focus here is not only the Navy supporting us but how do we support the Navy. The Navy needs to work with us to identify gaps which they have which we can solve. By coming together more effectively, we can co-learn as well reshape how we work together to support combat operations.”

But combining these various options into an overall logistics enterprise to support the strategic shift the Marines are undergoing will be very challenging indeed. Logistics enablement is clearly a weapon system in terms of ensuring that the Marines “can have the ability to close forces at the decisive point.”

The way ahead is to shape logistics network which is adaptive and can sustain a forward engaged distributed force.

And a major part of the challenge is to adapt service logistics systems to be able to provide for support for integrated force operations or to operate on a functional level.

How will a modular task force which includes Marines, Sailors or Airmen in an integrated operation be sustained?

Featured Photo: An example of what the goal of expeditionary logistics is all about s being able to take a sensor like the G/ATOR radar and deploy it on an expeditionary base and be able to use it as part of air-maritime operations for the joint force. This approach was recently tested by the North Carolina-based Marines.

The photo: U.S. Marines with the Early Warning Control Crew, radar technicians, install the arms of the Ground/Air Task Oriental Radar (G/ATOR) on Sept. 16, 2015 at Cannon Air Defense Complex (P111), Yuma, Ariz.

This exercise is apart of the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course 1-16, a seven week training event, hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) cadre, which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Summer Dowding MAWTS-1 COMCAM/ Released)

With regard to the Military Sealift Command and meeting logistical challenges for the sea-based force, see the following:

U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command: Meeting the Demand from U.S. and Allied Sea Services

Sustaining the Integrated Distributed Force at Sea: The Military Sealift Command Challenge

Osprey Night Insert

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Osprey Night Insert

U.S. Marines with Charley Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Marine Rotational Force Darwin 21.2, prepare to conduct a night insertion as a part of Operation Sea Raider during Talisman Sabre 2021 in Townsville, Queensland, Australia, July 23, 2021.

TOWNSVILLE, QLD, AUSTRALIA

07.23.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Alyssa Chuluda U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office

France and the Australian Submarine: A Ministry of Defence Update

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on France and the Australian Submarine: A Ministry of Defence Update
09/23/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Australia has paid most of the €900 million (US$1 billion) due for work on the initial design studies for the Shortfin Barracuda attack submarine, with some payment still to be made, a French defense ministry official said Sept. 21.

“There remains some to be paid,” the official said in a telephone press conference held by the armed forces ministry, which sought to lay out arguments against Canberra’s cancellation of the French submarine for the Australian navy.

“Discussions have started” for seeking compensation from Australia, with advisors for Naval Group (NG) and the government working on the claim, the official said. The Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office and the French navy had worked closely with industry on the Australian project.

The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported in 2019 that NG would be paid A$404 million if the French shipbuilder delivered a detailed submarine design and Australia decided “to go no further,” The Australian daily reported.

The French compensation claim refers to Canberra effectively cancelling Sept. 15 a project for NG to design and build a 12-strong fleet of attack submarines for the Australian navy. The French designed diesel-electric boat would have been built in Adelaide, south Australia, if the program had gone ahead.

Instead, Canberra told France the Barracuda project was dropped as Australia planned to acquire nuclear powered submarines as part of its joining a strategic partnership with London and Washington, dubbed AUKUS, to counter a perceived threat of China in the Indo-Pacific.

The three allied nations set 18 months to draw up a detailed plan to build the boats for Australia.

Naval Group (NG) received a letter from the Australian authorities on the same day of the announcement that the company had cleared the system functional review and received “the stamp of approval,” the defense official said.

That approval in the system functional review was seen as a milestone and would have cleared the way for an Australian contract worth €1.4 billion for the basic design stage, with a further two years of studies.

Instead, Canberra was opting out of the French project to pursue a nuclear powered submarine fleet reported to be eight strong.

NG, as prime contractor, passed on some of the Australian payment to subsystem suppliers. The French company would have supplied the platform, while Lockheed Martin was supplier of the combat management system.

Australia had previously said a modified Barracuda boat, in the class of a 5,000-6,000 ton boat, met its requirement for long range capability, the official said.

NG was studying how to modify the nuclear-powered Barracuda being built for the French navy into the diesel-electric Shortfin version for the Australian service, at the request of Canberra.

The Australian navy would also have to wait to 2040, or 10 more years than the delivery set for the Shortfin Barracuda, the French official said, as U.S. engineers were fully engaged with orders for the Virginia nuclear attack and Ohio nuclear ballistic missile submarines for the US navy.

A June 2021 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service said the production cost of the last two Virginia class nuclear attack submarines would be $6.91 billion, or $3.46 billion (€3 billion) per unit, which was three times more expensive than the Barracuda, the French official said. The Australian navy also stood to face a “colossal” problem in finding the crews needed to run those boats.

The U.S.-designed boats will be nuclear powered, but Australia has “zero” capability in atomic energy, the official said, indicating the nuclear boiler rooms will be built and maintained in the U.S., and fitted into the boats. There may be American sailors required on the Australian submarines.

Australia will need to build nuclear infrastructure to support the submarines, which will be “very costly and complex,” the official said, and raise questions on whether Australian public opinion would support the nuclear program.

The Australians had never asked France for a nuclear submarine, the official said, and if there had been a request, that would have undergone a strict review procedure.

The French defense minister, Florence Parly, had sought to stay in close contact to her Australian counterpart, Peter Dutton, the official said, and when problems emerged on the project, she had sought to give “clarification” which Dutton had found “reassuring.”

There had been problems on the French project, but the switch to the nuclear option had never been evoked, the official said.

France and Australia held a 2+2 ministerial meeting on Aug. 30, with Parly and foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in talks with their Australian counterparts, Dutton and Maryse Payne, and there was no sign of a decision in favor of nuclear.

Le Drian, the top French diplomat who was defense minister when NG won the 2016 competition to build an Australian ocean-going conventional submarine, went on national television on Sept. 19 and  accused Canberra of lies, duplicity and contempt. Le Drian, on instruction from president Emmanuel Macron, recalled the French ambassadors to Australia and the U.S,. and left the ambassador to the UK in place, as Britain was no more than the superfluous “fifth wheel on the carriage.”

The Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, has denied lies were told, and said the Barracuda boats would not meet the threats in the region when they entered service.

The French official sought to play down concerns of French offers in the export market, with Indonesia, the Philippines and the Netherlands looking to buy boats.

French Navy sails with UK and US services

The French navy has close ties to the UK and US navies.

“Nothing has changed, said Captain Eric Lavault, French navy spokesman. “We are continuing our operations and training both with the Royal Navy and the US Navy.”

There is a French nuclear-powered attack submarine and the Aquitaine multi0m-ission frigate presently sailing in the Cutlass Ferry anti-submarine warfare exercise with the US navy off the Baltimore coast, he said.

“The longest standing ties the French navy has are with the U.S. navy,” he said.

The French aircraft carrier, the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle, led the U.S. naval task force 50 in May-June, flying the Rafale fighter jet against Daesh insurgents in Iraq and Syria, he said.

The French flagship was supported by a carrier strike group which included the Provence multi-mission frigate, Chevalier Paul air defense destroyer, Var fleet auxiliary, and the Belgian frigate Leopold 1. That was the second time the US navy asked the French navy to lead task force 50, with the first French leadership in 2015.

French naval pilots train for carrier take-offs in the U.S., and U.S. Navy officers sail on the Charles de Gaulle, as the catapults on the capital ship were built in the U.S.

The French navy and arms industry are studying the next generation carrier, which will likely use U.S.-built electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear, potentially extending the transatlantic relations to the future capital ship.

The French and U.S. navies maintained close operational links despite the frosty political relations after Paris declined to take part in the Iraq war. Bilateral relations fell to a low then, prompting The Simpsons television show to deploy taunts of “cheese-eating surrender monkeys” and the adoption of “freedom fries” in Congressional cafeterias.

There are close ties with the British Navy that date back well before the Lancaster House treaty and St Malo agreement, Lavault said.

The two bilateral agreements, respectively in 2010 and 1998, were attempts to forge close  ties between the services and arms industry in Britain and France, but there are signs the spirit of cooperation has faded, with a lack of fresh initiatives in joint weapons programs.

There are five French naval officers on the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, the British carrier which sailed in July with a task force in the Pacific, flying the flag for a Global Britain.

There are also French officers sailing on the Type 45 destroyer, he said.

NG won in 2016 a competition to supply 12 attack submarines, beating rival offers from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and a Japanese joint venture between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, backed by Japan.

The Australian deal was then reported to be worth A$50 billion ($36 billion) over 50 years, with a share for NG reported to be worth €8 billion.

Australian reports that the Barracuda budget had since risen to A$90 billion contributed to a decision to cancel the French project, and there was greater concern over China, leading to a partnership with the U.S. and the UK, and supply of a nuclear powered submarine fleet.

Featured photo: This handout picture taken on February 11, 2019 and released by the Australian Department of Defence shows Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison (C) shaking hands with Australia’s Defence Minister Christopher Pyne (L) and France’s Defence Minister Florence Parly (R) after signing a 66 billion USD submarine Strategic Partnership Agreement in Canberra.  (Photo by JAY CRONAN / AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE / AFP

Also, see the following:

French and US Naval Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Key Role of Carriers

Australia Changes its Submarine Acquisition Path: French Reactions

A New Generation of Military Unmanned Vehicles

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on A New Generation of Military Unmanned Vehicles

By George Galdorisi

At the highest levels of U.S. intelligence and military policy documents, there is universal agreement that the United States remains at war, even as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude. As the cost of capital platforms—especially ships and aircraft—continues to rise, the Department of Defense is increasingly looking to procure comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems as important assets to supplement the Joint Force.

As the United States builds a force structure to contend with high-end threats, it has introduced a “Third Offset Strategy” to find ways to gain an asymmetric advantage over potential adversaries. One of the key technologies embraced by this strategy is that of unmanned systems. Both the DoD and the DoN envision a future force with large numbers of unmanned systems complementing manned platforms.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred the development of unmanned air vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles to meet urgent operational needs. As a result, the lion’s share of previous years DoD funding for unmanned systems has gone to air and ground systems, while funding for unmanned maritime systems (unmanned surface vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles) has lagged.

However, this balance is shifting, as increasingly, warfighters recognize the need for unmanned maritime systems in the fight against high-end adversaries, as well as against nations or groups to whom these adversaries export their weapons systems. Like their air and ground counterparts, these unmanned maritime systems are valued because of their ability to reduce the risk to human life in high threat areas, to deliver persistent surveillance over areas of interest, and to provide options to warfighters that derive from the inherent advantages of unmanned technologies.

A Department of the Navy Perspective

Operating as it does in five domains (air, surface, subsurface, ground and cyber) the Navy and Marine Corps recognize the potential and the promise of unmanned systems to deliver asymmetric advantages to U.S. forces, especially in areas where adversaries have extensive anti-access and area denial capabilities.

In January 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations issued CNO NAVPLAN (Navigation Plan) designed to chart the course for how the Navy will execute the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy Advantage at Sea. Not surprisingly, this short (18-page) document identifies unmanned systems as an important part of the Navy’s future plans, noting, in part:

“Advances in autonomous systems have shown promise for an effective and affordable way for the Navy to fight and win in contested spaces. We will modernize the fleet to harness these technologies and maintain our advantage at sea…Objective analysis confirms that America needs a larger, more lethal fleet. The Navy requires greater numbers of submarines, smaller and more numerous surface combatants, more lethal offensive capabilities, a host of integrated unmanned platforms—under, on, and above the sea

“Unmanned platforms play a vital role in our future fleet. Successfully integrating unmanned platforms gives our commanders better options to fight and win in contested spaces. They will expand our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage, add depth to our missile magazines, and provide additional means to keep our distributed force provisioned…By the end of this decade, our Sailors must have a high degree of confidence and skill operating alongside proven unmanned platforms at sea.”

The Chief of Naval Operations announced the issuance of the CNO NAVPLAN at the January 2021 Surface Navy Association Virtual Symposium. In his remarks, he highlighted the importance of unmanned systems, and announced the impending release of a new Navy campaign plan focused on developing unmanned systems, noting, in part:

“Unmanned vessels also provide the service with affordable solutions as it works to grow its fleet…We need a hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned systems capable of projecting larger volumes of kinetic and non-kinetic effects across all domains…Additionally, the service will need its Sailors to be adequately trained to operate confidently alongside unmanned sea platforms.”

There is little doubt that the U.S. Navy is committed to making unmanned systems of various types and capabilities an important part of the Navy Fleet in the near-, mid- and especially long-term. As one indication of this commitment, industry is ramping up to deliver these capabilities, witness America’s largest shipbuilder, Huntington Ingalls Industries, purchase of Spatial Integrated Systems Inc., a leader in autonomous technology, in December 2020.

In March 2021, the Department of the Navy published its long-awaited UNMANNED Campaign Framework. Designed to coordinate unmanned systems efforts across the Department, the document lists ambitious goals designed to help make unmanned systems an increasingly important part of the Navy’s platform inventory. The framework has five goals:

  • Advance manned-unmanned teaming effects within the full range of naval and joint operations.
  • Build a digital infrastructure that integrates and adopts unmanned capabilities at speed and scale.
  • Incentivize rapid incremental development and testing cycles for unmanned systems.
  • Disaggregate common problems, solve once, and scale solutions across platforms and domains.
  • Create a capability-centric approach for unmanned contributions (platforms, systems, subsystems) to the force.

The UNMANNED Campaign Framework met with some Congressional criticism for being short on details and measurable goals. That said, the 38-page report does provide an organizing impulse and guide for how the Department of the Navy intends to shepherd unmanned systems into the Fleet and Fleet Maine Forces.

Running into Barriers

The DoD, and especially the DoN, have lofty goals for the extensive use of unmanned systems to support the Joint Force. However, these goals are constrained by the sheer physics of the ways in which current unmanned systems are designed. For the most part, developers of today’s systems began with the objective to “take the operator out of the machine.” This means that they started with a current aircraft of ship hull, and then attempted to operate it either remotely or autonomously.

This approach as many merits, especially in cutting costs by using existing platforms that have undergone years—or even decades—of research, development, fielding and operating. And these platforms have the additional benefit of being familiar to those working in the S&T, R&D and acquisition communities, and, of course, being immediately available to developers. This has enabled a great deal of progress—up to a point.

This way of doing business represents a somewhat limited and less-than-innovative approach, but it has delivered a robust first generation of unmanned systems to warfighters. This has, in turn, resulted in valuable operator feedback as to what capabilities are desired in the next generation of unmanned systems. In many cases operators have asked for UxS that can operate beyond human capability.

A New Paradigm for Unmanned Systems Development

While the current methodology of developing unmanned systems has some merits, it does have one major flaw. Those creating these UxS are constrained by the physics of those platforms they are modifying in that all of these aircraft or ships once had a crew onboard, and therefore could only be operated to the limits of human capability of the pilot in the cockpit or the mariner on the bridge.

As one small example of the limits of human capability, both versions of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) can travel in excess of forty knots. In a Navy that has centuries of a tradition of bridge watchstanders actually standing for the entirety of their watch rotation, due to the high speed and the way it pounds the seas, watchstanders on the LCS must be buckled into their chairs to survive their watches.

The U.S. Navy is beginning to see the benefits of designing and fielding unmanned systems that can operate “beyond human capability.” This paradigm shift is important for a number of reasons. In the surface domain, it enables the use of unmanned maritime systems that can travel at a higher speed than humans can long endure, operate in higher sea states than conventional vessels, and make turns with G-forces that would not be tolerable by humans.

The benefits of such systems are clear. They can travel at high speeds to an operating area to complete a mission in far less time, outrun any manned surface vessels seeking to attack them, and in any conflict, outmaneuver adversary platforms through high G-turns. These attributes open up concepts-of-operations that give commanders options that they never had—or might not have even thought of—before.

As one example of how industry is now developing and fielding unmanned systems that operate beyond human capability, one Florida-based corporation, Maritime Tactical Systems, Inc. (MARTAC), demonstrated such a system in an international high-speed run. By way of background, MARTAC’s family of unmanned maritime vehicles evolved from a long line of catamaran-hulled racing boats that had achieved speeds of  over 250 miles per hour and operated at high-Gs. Stepping down the size of these racing boats was an evolutionary—and revolutionary—process that has garnered the intense interest of U.S. Navy officials.

As one demonstration of this capability, this summer, MARTAC launched its Devil Ray T38 USV from Palm Beach, Florida Inlet with the goal of performing a fully autonomous run across the Florida Straits to West Bank, Bahamas in less than one hour, and then returning in the same time window.

During this demonstration, the Devil Ray T38 acquired its first alignment waypoint outside of the Palm Beach Inlet, Florida and began its high-speed run across the straits. The Devil Ray arrived at the Bahamas waypoint for a total run time of 57 minutes.  During the transit, the Devil Ray achieved a top speed of 82 miles per hour, which included a four-minute stop to avoid shipping traffic in the straits.

The return trip from West End, Bahamas to Palm Beach Inlet, Florida followed a similar track with a total transit time of 59 minutes including a six-minute stop to avoid fishing boat traffic.  During each round trip run, the Devil Ray maintained an average cruise speed of 70 miles per hour.

Importantly, in an environment where Congress is questioning the Navy’s ability to field unmanned systems that not only have strong operational capabilities, but also reliable basic mechanical and navigational systems, during these tracks the Devil Ray achieved an average tracking accuracy of +/- 1.3 degrees and a steady state cross track error of +/-3 m.

Here is how Bruce Hanson, MARTAC’s CEO, described this high-speed run:

“We are excited that our Expeditionary Class Devil Ray T38 is the first USV to fully autonomously perform a high-speed international run. This is a culmination of ten years of product development and thousands of hours testing and running our patented MANTAS-X Class and Expeditionary Devil Ray Class USV systems for reliability and accuracy. This is the first run in a series that will continue to vet and refine our technology to address the needs of our military, scientific and commercial customers’ missions and applications.  MARTAC’s USV classes simply operate beyond human capability.”

Here is a short video showing the track to and from Palm Beach Inlet to West Bank, Bahamas as well as the way that the Devil Ray pounded its way through the waves. Two observers were strapped into the Devil Ray to operate as onboard safety observers and to ensure that all COLREGS requirements were being met in its fully autonomous run.

A Way Ahead for Unmanned Systems Development

There is a popular quote making the rounds, “If you can imagine it, you can achieve it.” While this Bahamas run is just one example of what the next generation of unmanned systems can deliver, the Navy has been forward-leaning in inserting such systems in a series of exercises, experiments and demonstrations as a way to “imagine” how such platforms will support tomorrow’s Navy.

For example, the Devil Ray was featured during the summer of 2020 during the U.S. Navy’s Trident Warrior exercise in San Diego, as well as in the subsequent Inaugural Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem 21 to showcase these innovative unmanned capabilities. Additionally, Devil Ray’s capabilities were demonstrated at this summer’s Navy League SeaAirSpace Symposium.

This approach bodes well for the Navy’s efforts to have unmanned systems make up a substantial portion of the Fleet. And it brings to mind the motto of Admiral Wayne Meyer, the “Father of Aegis:” “Build a Little, Test a Little and Learn a Lot.” The future may well be a U.S. Navy with large numbers of UxS that can truly operate beyond human capability. The result will provide an asymmetric advantage for U.S. warfighters.

Marines Train for ASW

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Marines Train for ASW
09/22/2021

U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), drops a sonobuoy during the Advanced Naval Basing evolution of Summer Fury 21 at San Clemente, California, July 20, 2021.

Advanced Naval Basing offering forward logistics and support, as well as sensor and strike capabilities that make a significant contribution to undersea warfare campaigns in the Indo-Pacific region.

Summer Fury is an exercise conducted by 3rd MAW in order to maintain and build capability, strength, and trust within its units to generate the readiness and lethality needed to deter and defeat adversaries during combat operations as the U.S. Marine Corps refines tactics and equipment in accordance with Force Design 2030.

SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND, CA, UNITED STATES

07.20.2021

Video by Cpl. Nicolas Atehortua 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing