During my visit to Honolulu to visit PACAF and MARFORCOM in August 2021, I had a chance to discuss how U.S. forces are shaping a way ahead for Pacific defense.

Ed Timperlake and I are finishing our book entitled Maritime Kill Webs, 21^st Century Warfighting and Deterrence which highlights the template we see being shaped by U.S. forces for full spectrum crisis management, up to and including the high-end fight. Our book is based on a wide range of interviews over the past decade with U.S. and allied forces and how they are shaping the new template based upon which enhanced warfighting capabilities with credible deterrence options can be built out in the future.

At the heart of this capability is shaping a distributed integrated force in which the Navy’s approach to distributed maritime operations flows into the USAF’s agile combat deployment approach with the innovations which the USMC and USCG are in throes of implementing.

Effective crisis management requires escalation control ranging from HADR operations through gray zone conflict to higher levels of lethal combat.

A core challenge to be met is what one might call the ability to conduct effective seam warfare, namely through working with partners and allies to reduce the seams left open in either Pacific or European defense which the authoritarian powers can exploit.

I discussed this approach during my visits, and in one session with MARFORPAC future operations planners we discussed how exercises are a key part of shaping the force going forward both for the United States and partners and allies. That session was a discussion with Dr. Dave Hudspeth and Mr. Juan Zapata, G-35 Future Operations Planners.

After discussing at length the impact of the PRC military buildup and engagement politically and economically in the Pacific, we focused on the role which exercises are playing in shaping a way ahead.

In part, shaping ongoing exercises allows a meshing of U.S. capabilities and commitments with those of partners and allies.

In my own view, the USMC in the Pacific is a key linchpin between the USAF and the U.S. Navy, and a player which can deliver integrated combat force to a seam in times of crisis.

What emerged from the discussion was a renewed focus on innovative exercises which built off the operations of competitors in the region and which drove innovative approaches with regard to shaping more effective joint and coalition operations.

INDOPACOM and the Marines are not focusing on what one participant called “wash and rinse” repetitive exercises, but instead focusing on expanding both the number of like-minded international participants in each exercise and the exercise objectives themselves to create more realistic and innovative deterrence approaches that measurably change how peer competitors are operating.

The goal is to generate concepts of operations which present challenges to those adversaries in terms of seams which they would have difficultly closing in a crisis or more extended conflict.

The goal is to be able to place the right combat capability at the right place at the right time to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effect.

A key element for shaping the way ahead is to ensure that sensor clusters are operational in key areas to allow for the kill web deliver of the right weapons at the right time to deliver the desired effect.

As one participant put it: “We need to look beyond traditional military measures of performance in exercises – such as number of sorties flown – to understanding how we are actually impacting the operational environment.”

This means that working exercises is about to determining how to shape the right capability to work outcomes desired in terms of crisis or extended conflict.

Training and exercises are becoming core weapons. The challenge is to determine how best to do so from the standpoint of both the joint force and coalition partners and allies.

And those determinations are not always going to be the same.

The aperture has been opened with regard to shaping a way ahead for innovations in Pacific defense and the introduction of new capabilities in the near to mid-term will be evaluated in terms of how these capabilities will be evaluated in terms of how the force can operate more effectively in influencing the operational environment.

By Robbin Laird

As the Marines rework how they work Pacific defense both with the joint and coalition forces, three key weapon systems enabling the effort are the F-35, the Osprey and C2 capabilities at the tactical edge.

Each of these systems brings different capabilities to the fight, but the underlying capabilities being underscored is an ability to operate from flexible bases, to be able to aggregate desired combat effects and to morph into flexible task forces at the point of interest.

I had a chance while visiting MARFORPAC during my August 2021 visit to discuss the way ahead with Marines involved with F-35s, Ospreys and C2 evolution in a single roundtable. The participants in the discussion from MARFORPAC were Col. Manlee Herrington, AC/S Aviation; LtCol Shane Bursae, Fixed Wing Air Officer; Maj. Paul DiMaggio, Rotary Wing Air Officer; and Maj James Arnold, Aviation C2 Officer.

As one participant put it: “We need to have the ability to close forces at the decisive point.

“We are operating as an expeditionary force which means we have to deploy agile and close rapidly.

“We need to combine speed with expeditionary flexibility and reach.

“That is why the F-35/Osprey combination is so critical for the Marines.”

In this article, I am leveraging the conversation and shaping a number of takeaways but am not holding the participants responsible in any way for those takeaways,

The F-35 Piece

The coming of the F-35 to the Pacific is a major difference from my earlier visit to MARFORPAC in 2014. The Marines operate two squadrons of F-35s from Iwakuni with a third rotational squadron to be added in the future. The Marines operate the most forward deployed F-35s in the region and operate from the first Island Chain.

Now the USAF has deployed the F-35 into the region, and the Marines are working closely with them in shaping what the USAF calls “agile combat employment,” something for which the F-35B is ideally suited.

The U.S. Navy is deploying F-35Cs into the Pacific with the introduction of the USS Carl Vinson carrier group. Marines are also involved as they are F-35C operators as well.  Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 314 operates those aircraft.

With allies buying F-35s and working towards ship-based F-35B operations, the envelope of engagement of the Marines in shaping shared coalition operational concepts and capabilities has expanded as well. They are working with allied F-35As as well as F-35Bs which means that working the first island chain through to South Korea is clearly a work in progress.

Working closely with Japan and Australia as those allies deploy and develop their F-35 fleets provides significant opportunities to shape collaborative con-ops as well. Singapore is becoming an F-35 Security Cooperative Participant which extends the operational envelope as well for Marines working with allies in shaping collaborative defense capabilities and approaches.

The Marines as well are working new concepts like the Lightning Carrier, whereby operating of a ship like LHA-6, a larger number of F-35 can operate than with a traditional ARG-MEU. And intersecting the capabilities coming off the USS America with allies and the joint force afloat or based ashore provides an opportunity to expand significantly the impact of USMC F-35Bs can have in a combat situation in the Pacific. The reach of the sensor systems of an integratable F-35 fleet is a core enabler for the joint and coalition force in the Pacific.

But to get the full value out of a USMC F-35 force, it is crucial to fund the enablers.

The weapons development calendar is behind schedule, and there is a clear need to ramp up the weapons planned for development for the F-35 enterprise. As the U.S. shifts from the land wars, it is important to ramp up high-end capabilities in the missile domain for sure.

A second key enabler is tanking.

The KC-130J fleet is a key asset for USMC operations, and they are in short supply. If one wants to focus on their role to supply bases spread throughout the Pacific, then you are not highlighting their tanking role.

If you are highlighting the tanking role, then you are reducing the ability to supply bases. There is no way around this other than ramping up the buys of KC-130Js.

The Osprey Piece

When I was last at MARFORPAC in 2014, the Osprey was making its presence known. It was the key bedrock for shaping what was then possible with regard to the strategic approach for the distributed laydown.

In fact, I would argue that the Osprey was the bedrock for the initial transition of the Marines to a distributed laydown ecosystem which underlies the current approach to shape a more integrated distributed force.

We discussed at the outset during the meeting of the significant nature of the transition from the Ch-46 to the Osprey and the impact of that transition on the rest of the Marine Corps force. The shift away from a rotorcraft mindset has been a challenging one for the Marine Corps, and indeed one which the U.S. Army has yet to do. It is not just about speed and range; it is about rethinking how one operates in the extended battlespace.

And that thought process is still a work in progress.

When the Ospreys first came to the Pacific, an immediate impact was filling the gap caused by a shortage of KC-130Js. The Ospreys could move supplies and Marines around in ways that the KC-130J would traditionally do, with the role of the KC-130J in air refueling then highlighted.

Now as the Marines look to operate from multiple launch points and to do so with working from a network of sea and expeditionary bases, the role of the Osprey is without doubt enhanced.

At the same time, the ways an Osprey can support or work with such a force have expanded significantly.

One example has been highlighted in the recent Island Marauder 21 exercise which was held a week after my visit, but which we discussed during the roundtable.

This is how a recent article released by the USMC described the engagement of the Osprey in the exercise.

“For example, one exercise saw participants seize terrain to enable artillery units to gain fire superiority on a distant island chain. The Marines of VMM-268 transported 3rd Marines and their equipment in an MV-22 Osprey from a pickup zone to a nearby island. Marines traveled in an Osprey equipped with a Networking On-the-Move system for an airborne command and control exercise.

“Networking On-the-Move, a critical Force Design capability, was also integrated into a prototype Utility Task Vehicle and wheeled onto another MV-22 aircraft, showcasing its mobility and transportability. NOTM is a satellite command and control system Marines can leverage to communicate while mobile on the battlefield. “This was the first time 3rd Marines have used NOTM on an aircraft,” said Maj. Ben Gardner, MCSC’s lead for Island Marauder 2021. “The task proved successful.”

“During Island Marauder, MCSC integrated their communication equipment with LINK-16, a standardized communications system used by the U.S. and allied militaries. These capabilities helped to test interoperability among the joint forces in a denied or degraded environment.”

What the participants underscored was the importance of working new capabilities for the Osprey and the F-35 to work together, to shape various payloads, which the tandem could deliver to a distributed integrated force.

For example, the East Coast Marines have recently worked a distributed G/ATOR system deployed on an expeditionary base in support of the fleet.

How might this be worked in the Pacific?

Can the G/ATOR radar be reconfigured to be delivered by a platform other than the KC-130J?

Could it be done by Ospreys and CH-53Ks for example, and provide for even greater basing flexibility?

How to configure Ospreys to deliver USVs into the battlespace with ISR systems for information or deception?

In other words, taking the concept innovations forward, how best to leverage what the revolutionary duo of F-35 and Osprey can deliver to the force?

The C2 Piece

C2 is a weapon system for shaping and synchronizing the delivery of fires and maneuver of an integrated distributed force.

One participant drew an analogy between the USMC transition from CH-46 to the Osprey in terms of what was going on with C2. He argued that with the focus on the land wars, we are just beginning to see the implementation of a generational leap forward with the latest sensors and information systems.

But with a shift to working in contested environments, and one prioritizing expeditionary operations, new capabilities and new concepts of operations were necessary. Technology is at hand to shape a way ahead but ensuring that a distributed force can work in an integrated manner is an ongoing challenge.

What was described is that what historically was capabilities inherent in Marine Corps Aviation is now being pushed down to the expeditionary battalion level.

But as the Marines reshape themselves for operating as an inside force, how to ensure that the C2 for the inside force integrates with the air combat element for the Marines, or the Naval strike force or PACAF’s agile employment force?

As one participant put it: “This is uncharted territory.”

And with regard to the deployment of the new Marine Littoral Regiment, how to ensure that it has the appropriate reachback capability to ensure mission success?

In short, as one works the USMC transition, the Marines already have in their hands a number of the key tools for the transition.

It is just important to realize and remember that going forward.

Featured Photo: Marines prepare to launch a Networking-on-the-Move Airborne-equipped MV-22 Osprey at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Aug. 12, 2021. Marines with 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines participated in a notional air assault as part of Island Marauder. NOTM-Airborne provides Marines with real-time command, control and collaborative mission planning while airborne. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Ashley Calingo)

By Robbin Laird

During a July 2021 visit to 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) I talked with LtCol J. Eric Grunke and LtCol Jessica Hawkins. Grunke just relinquished responsibility to Hawkins for the Marine Aviation Training Systems (MATS) ecosystem within 2d MAW; encompassing all aviation simulators and the necessary infrastructure.  There is a MATS Site at each of the major 2d MAW air stations; MCAS Cherry Point, MCAS New River and MCAS Beaufort.

In order to remain America’s Force in Readiness, the Marine Corps must continue to adapt as the world changes.

Force Design 2030 is focused on designing the Marine Corps that will be needed 10 years from now.

Major General Michael Cederholm, Commanding General (CG) 2d MAW, emphatically believes that training must evolve exponentially to strengthen the Marines enduring advantages, and allow them to prevail in strategic competition with China or any other nation.

Keeping with this vision, the CG directed the integration of multiple, disparate platform simulators along with command and control (C2) systems to better prepare his force and support II Marine Expeditionary Force missions. 

China has fundamentally transformed the operating environment and the Marine Corps must modernize the force and its capabilities in order to continue to deter adversaries.

A key element of the combat learning process is integrating live, virtual, constructive training; a technique that combines simulation with real-world flights and ground maneuver.  This technique is a force multiplier when shaping tactics and concepts for new and emerging technology like the F-35.

War gaming is a time tested element of the planning process for informing a commander of the strengths and weaknesses in an operational plan.

However, advances in modeling, simulation, and workforce integration provide an alternative to the traditional war game.

Commanders that leverage the advancing capabilities in virtual and constructive environments are provided with a dynamic operational environment that truly exercises real time risk and force employment decision making at all levels.

More importantly, it will allow commanders to engage a “thinking” enemy and the associated friction often lacking in a static set of assumptions used by traditional war gamers. Ideally, thereby providing a more accurate assessment of an operational plan’s efficacy.

LtCol Grunke’s experience in Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OD) provides an example of the operational plan not playing out to script. 

LtCol Grunke was flying Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR) sorties in support of the OD, when he had to quickly change mindset and serve as the on-scene commander for an innovative downed pilot recovery effort using a combined flight of Ospreys and Harriers.

The team launched from an amphibious ship to rescue a downed USAF pilot in record time.

His actions were a potential war changing event war game modeling can easily overlook.

Much of my discussion with LtCol Grunke and LtCol Hawkins focused on how to enhance integrated training and increase pilot proficiency against enemy aircraft and weapons systems.

To address the pacing threat, the Marine Corps is evolving and innovating as part of the larger naval expeditionary force.

One theme we discussed is the 2d MAW effort to improve realistic, wing-level training.

One critical step is having real pilots operating in their platform specific simulators (e.g. a qualified Cobra or Harrier pilot flying in the simulators) and integrating with the Marine Aircraft Control Group (MACG) to conduct coordinated missions in support of the exercise scenario.

This concept was recently tested in 2d MAW’s COPE JAVELIN exercise.

An April 29, 2021 article by 1^stLt Michael Curtis of 2d MAW highlighted the exercise as follows:

“COPE JAVELIN,” which took place last month, was a simulation that followed a fictional operational scenario that could easily take place in the real world. Marine aviators from various unites across 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing strapped into flight simulators for different aircraft that were located at different bases across eastern North Carolina.

“They were able to connect across different simulation systems and work together to defend against a fictional enemy force. They communicated with each other and integrated forces in order to accomplish a mission without ever getting into the cockpit of a real aircraft.

“This integration of multiple simulation systems gives Marine pilots and Marine Air Control Group 28 Marines the opportunity to accomplish hard, realistic training without leaving their respective bases and saves a tremendous amount of money in fuel, ordnance, maintenance and various other costs associated with conducting this training in real time.

“The brains of this innovative and unique training is LtCol Eric Grunke, the director of aviation training systems for 2nd MAW. He saw the need to integrate all Marine Air-Ground Task Force assets in a virtual training environment in order to improve aviation combat training.

“Linking [systems] is not new, but we are taking it to a new level by incorporating [command and control Marines] training on their own equipment, and we are using a common scenario developed by the Training Support Center – normally a ground-centric agency.”

“Prior to this integration, the command and control Marines of MACG-28 who would be located in the Direct Air Support Center and the Tactical Air Operations Center would run separate simulations with simulated pilots and aircraft.

“Conversely, when a pilot is conducting simulator training, he or she would normally be speaking to a single pilot who would be acting as both the DASC and TAOC.

“While that training is effective, COPE JAVELIN provides additional opportunities to have key roles within the command and control structures manned by Marines who have the requisite skills to act in those specific billets. Normally, two to three integrated systems allow the pilots training in the simulator to conduct realistic communications, albeit with a makeshift TAOC or DASC outside of the simulator.

“Now, they can integrate more than ten simulators that bring together integral parts of the MAW, further allowing the MAW to be more effective in providing the six functions of Marine aviation.”

Achieving this level of integration was described by LtCol Grunke as a crawl, walk, then run process.

“The crawl phase was to get a Cobra pilot in their sim and a Harrier pilot in their sim and make sure they share the same visual representation to both fly and see the same terrain. They can then work together in that common operating picture.”

“The walk phase is to take that pairing and work with a Joint Terminal Aircraft Controller in their sim to execute a single sortie in the simulator. In that phase we still did not have the MACG (the C2 arm of the wing) fully virtual. They were purely constructive and travel to the various sites to participate. They were sitting in our simulator center just talking on the radio, doing their jobs, but not on their own equipment, and not in their own space.”

“The run phase which was seen in COPE JAVELIN was the C2 element at the DASC controlling the close air support assets coming in and out of objective areas on their own gear, while Harrier pilots in their sims and Cobra pilots in their sims participate in the engagement.”

“The goal here is to shape readiness at the wing level – Marines must be ready for anything, anywhere, especially when the nation is the least ready.”

LtCol Grunke highlighted the focus of effort as follows: “This is a working mission rehearsal.

“What I want to happen is a force-on-force exercise.

“We have a red team acting as the Russian commander; they do as they please with their forces.

“I want to ensure no telegraphing to the blue side of their intentions.

“The Harriers and the other air assets get their targets assigned and then the red force take force-on-force action appropriate to the enemy mission.

“This is how we truly achieve a force-on-force event; where we basically get to see whether our tactics work or not, given our assumptions, as the scenario unfolds.”

“They’re met with limited success in really achieving a true force-on-force, which is something we’ll want to work on for the next time.”

A second theme discussed was the challenge of networking individual platform simulators to deliver a more integrated operating space for the training effort.

When I visited Jax Navy, the challenge there is linking MH-60 Romeo with MQ-4C Triton and P-8 simulators, which is crucial as these three platforms operate as an integrated system to deliver a coordinated set of effects.

A similar challenge faces the trainers at 2d MAW.

As LtCol Hawkins put it: “We are working to streamline the data flow across not only the different flight simulators, but the other simulation systems as well, in order to run a more effective exercise.

“All of these systems have been developed somewhat independently and speak their own language.

“To work around that problem all the networking information has to run through a Distributed Information System (DIS) bridge which essentially interprets the various coding languages used by each simulation device, processes and converts it into usable language for each to understand.

“With the scale of COPE JAVELIN, the number of virtual and constructive friendly and enemy entities, the DIS bridge can become rapidly overwhelmed.”

A third theme discussed was training in the environment where operational plans are intended to be executed.  

As LtCol Hawkins underscored: “We need to obtain a more comprehensive visual data base in order to conduct true mission rehearsal exercises.

“All of the different platforms, represented by their own program offices have purchased visual imagery databases based on their own assessed priorities.  This has resulted in a disparity between the platforms; they don’t all have the same images.

“For example, a MV-22 might be able to go to Northeastern Europe in the simulator but the Harrier may not. The Cobra might be able to go to the Horn of Africa, but another platform might not. These are problems Aviation Training Systems are working through.”

A fourth theme discussed was how the training way-ahead will allow warriors to drive innovation beyond traditional war-gaming outputs.

As LtCol Grunke put it: “Instead of war gaming, let’s train for a real war.

“Let’s get into the areas where we expect to fight, with the actual terrain in a simulator, with the G/ATOR where we think it’s going to be, where we think the force is going to launch from, and see how we do.

“There’s no reason why we can’t do something like that, so long as all the imagery is unified in all the trainers, and we can see the effects of operations from the various simulator locations.”

A fifth theme we discussed was the allied aspect of training for an integrated combat effect.

I highlighted the discussion I had with the BALTOPS-50 team where Norwegian F-35s played the F-35 role in the exercise.

As LtCol Grunke underscored: “The Norwegian F-35As carry a much different ordnance load from the F-35B flown by the USMC. They also have different rules of engagement (ROE) considerations. So to work the virtual aspect we need to have a constructive role player from Norway to come over and indicate how they approach the operation.”

We closed with a question I posed to the new Director of the MATS: What key capabilities would you most like to add in the near term to accelerate the way ahead for training?

LtCol Hawkins: “I think there are two things.

“First, would be building and operating from a common global visual database.

“Second, simulators that are easily connected to one another and can talk and transfer data back and forth with ease.”

Also, see the following:

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/87255/marine-aviator-year-recalls-historic-mission-libya

The Featured Photo is from 2012: Maj. J. Eric Grunke, pictured here at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., April 24, 2012 has been named Marine Corps Aviator of the Year by the Marine Corps Aviation Association. The MCAA gives the award to the pilot who makes the most outstanding contribution to Marine aviation over that past year.

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