By Robbin Laird

At first blush, some readers would expect a title that focused on maritime autonomous systems to focus primarily upon their role within the Royal Australian Navy, rather than looking at the role within the overall ADF.

But because these systems are entering the force as it works its next phase of shaping joint operations, maritime autonomous systems can be viewed as enablers for and beneficiaries of the transition.

In my recently published book with Ed Timperlake, we focus on the reshaping of concepts of operations for the joint force upon kill web operational concepts.

It is about a distributed force where payloads to missions is a key element of building the modular task forces at the tactical edge which form the combat nodes from which force integration can be built in a fluid combat situation.

Maritime autonomous systems are defined by the payloads and the software which enables those payloads to support the missions in the distributed battlespace, rather than by the platforms which hold them.

This is a very different way around from the legacy approach to platform prioritisation and platform development. While certainly, core air, sea and ground platforms built under evolving systems engineering models will remain a key element of force design and development, the path for maritime autonomous systems is significantly different.

As Commodore Darron Kavanagh put it in our meeting at his office in September 2022: ”As soon as I say I’ve got requirements for a combat system, I immediately go into a classical systems engineering approach. But that approach doesn’t actually allow for the agility necessary rapidly to change that combat system.

“If I look at classical primes, they are often hardware first companies, software second. And there’s a lot of legacy in the design.

“One of the things we’ve been looking at is how would you take a software first approach to accelerate our maritime autonomous systems capabilities. This is one of the reasons that the sovereign industry players that we’ve selected recently to work with in the autonomous systems areas are software driven in their development rather than platform focused.”

The ADF has been looking for some time to work rapid software development and insertion into combat forces. This is much harder to do with core platforms than with software driven, payload defined, maritime autonomous systems.

This is why a key contribution to the ADF as a joint force can be provided by the kind of acquisition and operational models being shaped around maritime autonomous systems.

A key way ahead for these systems is to also shift from a classical understanding of product development.

While the approach does develop prototypes: this is not the primary focus.

It is about focusing on operational effects: as both contributions to the force in being and continuous and ongoing experimentation for force development under actual operational conditions.

The Commodore has his own MEGA hat – Make Experimentation Great Again. Maritime autonomous systems are purpose built to deliver the desired combat effects from the payloads onboard.

And working ways to cross-integrate data from payloads below the sea, on the sea and in the air will provide a key capability for building out a kill web enabled force, that can shape combat clusters able to operate in contested combat operations as well as throughout the full spectrum of warfare.

As he underscored: “if you actually want to deliver something different, if you want to actually get what I’d call asymmetric war fighting effects, then you must be prepared to experiment.

“Because those concepts of operations are not going to come from replacing what you have. Or indeed, an incremental improvement of what you have.

“You actually have to leverage what the technology will give you. It is because less and less it’s about a platform. It’s more and more about your intent. So, that’s command-and-control, and the payloads that deliver that intent.”

Commodore Darron Kavanagh underscored that the ADF is evolving and building out an ADF capable of effective distributed operations. And maritime autonomous systems will be a key enabler for such operations.

To do so, the systems need to be operating in the force as part of the overall operational capability for the force. As the ADF gains experience with these systems, these systems will face ongoing development and experimentation, both in terms of the payloads they carry as well as the operating systems on the platforms, as well as seeing platform development to better enable payload performance and targeted relevance to the operating force.

As he put it: “The challenge is being able to field them at the speed of relevance.  That is the difficulty in a bureaucracy such as any military.

“And so, one of the reasons it’s important to spend that time to work out how do we constructively disrupt? We are not building a one off system. The focus is upon delivering asymmetric warfighting effects again and again.”

I have found that one challenge facing the way ahead for acceptance of maritime systems into the operating force is not just the question of ensuring that one is deploying a trusted autonomous system: it is equally about the challenge of understanding the con-ops of a kill web force.

As we argued in the book: “when thinking through a kill web force, payloads are key building blocks for the distributed integrated capability which gives the force the necessary combat power. Those payloads can be found on a variety of sources, from air combat platforms, ships as sea bases, islands, land bases, mobile or expeditionary bases. The kill web mosaic is about having the launch point for key payloads which are appropriate to combat and escalation dominance,”

And we argued in the book that with a variety of ways to deliver payloads to missions, this also opened up the need to rethink what operational task forces might look like. We highlighted what we called “modular task forces” which can be formed within an operational context; rather than be defined with regard to what was initially deployed for an operation in terms of platforms making up that task force.

And this allows for mission command to guide a distributed force able to achieve integrated effects. As we argued: “Mission command guides a diversity of modular task forces, which deploy into the areas of interest, and provide engagement density. Sensor networks and C2 at the tactical edge enable modular task forces to execute their assigned missions and to do assessments and with their inherent ISR capabilities are able to ensure that the mission effect is being achieved.”

What this means for maritime autonomous systems is twofold. Either the USV or UUV can contribute to a modular task force as either individual or wolfpack capabilities or USVs, UAVs, and USVs can themselves operate as a modular task force.

One mistake in much analysis of this area of work is to focus on how various maritime autonomous systems are hermetically sealed or stove piped options: USVs compete with each other; UUV compete with USVs, and UAVs, compete with both.

That is old style platform think; what we are looking for here is complimentary in payloads for a variety of launch platforms. Shaping wolfpack operations for diverse maritime autonomous systems in a modular task force is a key way ahead for both operations and force development.

Recently, I looked at the Eager Lion 2022 exercise and highlighted the importance of such an approach:

“Recently, Iran temporarily capture a Saildrone Explorer  in the Red Sea. It would make sense to operate it with the Devil Ray which can provide some protection against adversaries trying to seize the saildrone.

“But the U.S. Navy to recapture the Iranian seized saildrone had to deploy manned assets to recover the UAS. According to the U.S. Navy: “While transiting international waters around 11 p.m. (local time), Aug. 29, U.S. 5th Fleet observed IRGCN support ship Shahid Baziar towing a Saildrone Explorer unmanned surface vessel (USV) in an attempt to detain it.

“U.S. Navy patrol coastal ship USS Thunderbolt (PC 12) was operating nearby and immediately responded. U.S. 5th Fleet also launched an MH-60S Sea Hawk from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 26, based in Bahrain,” 5th Fleet said in an Aug. 30 statement about the first incident.”

“It makes sense to find better ways to defend a UAS such as the saildrone by working with a wolfpack UAS  “task force” such as the Devil Ray or Mantas UAS.”

Commodore Kavanagh emphasized that the terminology is important in understanding what maritime autonomous systems are and how their role within the operational force will grow over time.

“I refer to these systems as uncrewed systems. And the reason I use that term is that it is less and less about the vehicle that actually delivers the effect.

“The payload is really important as it could be on all sorts of different vehicles, whether it’s in the air, below, in certain circumstances, or on the surface. This requires you thinking in a different way about how do you plug and fight different elements into the combat force.”

Featured Photo: Australian Defence Force personnel prepare to lower a MARTAC T38 Devil Ray unmanned vessel into Jervis Bay in Jervis Bay Territory, during Exercise Autonomous Warrior 2022.

Autonomous Warrior 22 (AW22) is a Navy-led Operational Experimentation (OPEX) activity conducted over the period 16-27 May 2022 in the vicinity of Jervis Bay and from several remote sites in Australia and overseas. Conducted against an overarching theme of Remote and Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI), Autonomous Warrior is the largest unmanned systems OPEX conducted in Australia. In 2022 it provided Australian and international military and industry partners opportunities to demonstrate innovations in autonomous and uncrewed systems and related technologies for use in the maritime and littoral domains, including operations in complex, congested and contested environments.

May 23, 2022

Australian Department of Defence

By Robbin Laird

I have known Wing Commander Keirin Joyce for a number of years, and last spoke with him at length after he chaired last year’s Williams Foundation Seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems.

During the seminar, he highlighted an example of how current forces can use new uncrewed technologies to support the evolving kill web, in which a small team with ISR and C2 capability can inform a firing solution by a virtual task force firing solution provider.

WGCDR Joyce noted that in an Exercise Hamel held in 2018, a two-man Army team using a Black Hornet Nano UAV was able to identify a tank formation, and then with their radio able to pass that information on to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) for a strike opportunity against that tank formation.

This example highlights certainly one role which uncrewed systems can play in providing ISR better labeled as information than intelligence surveillance reconnaissance because in this case you have the two-man team inside the Weapons Engagement Zone providing inputs to an external provider for a firing solution.

Now back in Australia for the next Williams Foundation Seminar, I had a chance to meet with the Wing Commander in person on a beautiful Spring Day. I asked him to provide an update since we last talked on shaping a way ahead for the RAAF in the UAS area.

According to WGCDR Joyce: “From an Air Force perspective, we have had some wins. The Loyal Wingman Ghost Bat program has been approved for expansion, that’s genuinely exciting. It’s an opportunity for us to get a highly automated system into the hands of our combat force, and experiment with, and find out what it can be good for and what perhaps it isn’t good for. And that will help us in defining the future air teaming system program, which is Air 6015.

“We need to enable learning by doing. And while we may make some clunky decisions about how we proceed, actual physical experience will contribute to enabling us to use these systems much faster than trying to design an elegant solution that’s going to be perfect, to be platinum plated. Because it probably won’t be perfect, this tech field moves so fast that the best aim point is gold plated, because there’s so much unknown about how to best use autonomy in Australian air power.

“From a Triton perspective, the Triton production line did not close as feared, so our first of three aircraft has rolled out of Northrup Grumman now. And our crews will commence training with the U.S. Navy soon. So that is exciting, as a bespoke niche capability in contributing to a piece of the maritime patrol and response capability set. The first aircraft should arrive in Australia in two years’ time, with crews fully calibrated, and then we’ll start our test and evaluation period.”

In 2017, I visited the base where both the P-8 and the Triton will be managed from.

This was what I wrote after that visit: “The P-8 and Triton integrated facility being built at RAAF Edinburgh, near Adelaide in South Australia. At the heart of the enterprise is a large facility where Triton and P-8 operators have separate spaces but they are joined by a unified operations centre.

“It is a walk through area, which means that cross learning between the two platforms will be highlighted. This is especially important as the two platforms are software upgradeable and the Aussies might well wish to modify the mission systems of both platforms to meet evolving Australian requirements.”

WGCDR Joyce noted that like the U.S. Navy, “we’re using the same crews – P-8 and Triton — at least to establish our initial operating capability. All the Triton operators will be qualified maritime patrol response officers, so the sharing of TTPs and forging the path forward for how we use this incredible increase in data and endurance should be maximized.”

He noted that “Right next to the P-8 building will be the Triton squadron headquarters, as well as building a new facility for our Distributed Ground Station Australia. Air 3503, which is where we’ll undertake level two processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED), and beyond. Level two, three, four for the joint force. We will learn how to use Triton first and then work ways to support the joint force as well as civilian agencies with Triton-generated data.”

We then discussed how Triton fits into the overall evolution of ISR platforms in the ADF.

According to WGCDR Joyce: “In effect, Triton is a very low Earth orbiting satellite and it helps monitor a wide area of interest from the sensors because it operates at such a high altitude. We can move this sensor rich aircraft to a specific area of interest.  And that is a huge advantage of Triton, but it is an expensive airplane, and we’ll only ever have so many, so we will have to closely manage those airplanes.”

We then discussed the cancelled Sky Guardian program.

As Joyce underscored: “The other thing that’s changed since the last conference, which was the cancellation of 7003, that project was buying an airplane that was a fraction of the cost of Triton, and subsequently we were scoping to buy many more of them.”

He did argue there was a need for a complimentary UAV capability to Triton. “Airplanes like a Triton are excellent in phase zero, but once the shooting starts, you need mass quickly, and you need airplanes that are not soaking up your entire budget quickly to fill those gaps.

“And that’s what we don’t have a plan for at the moment, which creates an operational capability gap. You need an airplane that’s got long endurance, the ability to carry the sensors for you, the ability to conduct strike, contributing to the kill chain at a minimum, but potentially with strike options itself.

“The ability to carry even cheaper, more expendable airplanes into combat and operating as a mother ship – also known as Air Launched Effects.”

“And you need to have them running at a level of automation that you can simply direct them to do missions. You don’t want a one to one pilot in the loop to conduct those operations, and that’s something we truly do need to scope into defence strategic review, or into projects that are already approved under FSP20, perhaps like AIR7555.

“We need additional aerial ISR, because once you transition from phase zero to phase one, when the shooting starts, you need platforms to be able to contribute to that, matching the con ops of your threat forces. Threat forces that will just keep shooting missiles until they hit. And I think that is a huge area of opportunity for Australia.”

We then discussed the importance of getting systems into operation to generate more rapid innovation as a means to build forward an expanded role for automated systems.

Joyce came from the Australian Army and returned to that experience to argue for a way ahead for the RAAF as well.

“I think Army learnt that lesson 15 years ago. At that time, Army decided it wanted to get a tactical UAS into service, and they went for a platinum solution but that didn’t work out. They then partnered with the U.S. Army, they lowered some of the capability requirements, but they got something in service fast – a gold plated solution – and started learning.

“And that’s been a really excellent model for the last decade, they learnt those lessons, they learnt what they wanted, what they didn’t want, what they wanted improvements in, and when they’ve gone to replace that project recently under LAND 129 Phase 3, they’re contracted now for a platinum solution.

“And what that means is that they’ve got a good chance of getting it, because they got something in the hands of 200 operators over the last decade, and they learnt the lessons, and they know what they want and how that will work.

“Perhaps something that Air Force is missing at the moment is we just don’t have a UAS squadron that’s got something off the shelf that we can partner with allies to learn lessons on and get our foot in the door so that we can expand when we need to.

“When somebody understands how to operate a UAV, how the controlling works, how the sensor links work, and perhaps how the kinetic links work, that enables you to have the ability to advance more quickly in the autonomous vehicle and systems area.”

WGCDR Joyce

WGCDR Joyce is currently Program Chief Engineer RPAS (MQ-4C Triton) at Royal Australian Air Force. He is an Australian Defence Force Academy graduate with an Honours Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering.

WGCDR Joyce has spent the last 16 years in support of the ADF Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) capability including deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. WGCDR Joyce is a Chartered Professional Engineer, holds a Masters in Aviation Management (specialising in Human Factors), a Masters of Aerospace Engineering, a Masters in Military and Defence Studies, a Graduate Diploma in Secondary Education (Mathematics) and has researched part time as a Doctorate of Philosophy student through ADFA.

Now with the RAAF, before that he was the Australian Army UAS Sub-Program Manager responsible for all Australian Army UAS activities, including Army Drone Racing, and then the Royal Australian Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) Sub-Program Manager.

Featured photos: Credit Northrop Grumman

And in a September 15, 2022 story published by the Australian Department of Defence, the first Triton for the RAAF was rolled off of the assembly line.

Australia’s first MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft System has been rolled out today as part of a partnership between the Australian Department of Defence, the United States Navy and Northrop Grumman.

Head Air Force Capability, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Denney, said the partnership would support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles, as well as a broad range of joint effects fully integrated into Defence’s combat architecture.

“This partnership is pushing the boundaries of Air Power to pursue a truly advanced platform that will provide both a foundational capability and a growth path for future decades,” Air Vice-Marshal Denney said.

“Once in service, the remotely piloted High Altitude Long Endurance aerial system will significantly enhance our ability to persistently patrol Australia’s north and north-western approaches, in the south-west Pacific and south to Antarctica.

“Triton will complement the surveillance role of the P-8A Poseidon by providing sustained operations at long ranges, and undertaking a range of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tasks.

“I look forward to exploring the ways in which Triton will enhance our Defence capabilities in the future.”

Head Aerospace Systems Division, Air Vice-Marshal Leon Phillips, commended Defence’s effective partnership with the United States Navy through the Triton Cooperative Program and with the manufacturer of the Triton, Northrop Grumman.

“This project is an excellent example of the successful partnership between our two nations and reflects the collaborative work between Defence and defence industry in delivering this strategic capability,” Air Vice-Marshal Phillips said.

“Defence will invest more than $900 million in Australian industry, including sustainment, ICT and facilities.”

Defence expects the first aircraft, of up to seven in total, to be completed and delivered to Australia in 2024.

Once delivered, the MQ-4C Tritons will be primarily based at RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory while being controlled from facilities at RAAF Base Edinburgh..

For a discussion of next generation autonomous systems, see chapter four in the book below:

For an analysis of Triton within the Maritime Patrol Community and as part of the shift to a kill web force see chapter six in the following book:

By Robbin Laird

Enhancing C² capabilities for the ADF in the near to midterm is a critical part of being able to deliver the kind of defense capabilities which Australia needs for its renewed focus on direct defense of Australia.

During my current visit to Australia, I had a chance to discuss this challenge with David Horton, Vice President at Systematic Australia. His service background is in the Australian Army and still serves part-time at the Australian War College (see his bio at the end of the article).

We started by discussing the dramatic reduction in warning time for Australia for crises in the Pacific. What this means is that long range planning for force development has its place, but the need to enhance the force we have in the short to mid-term is increasingly the priority.

As Horton put it: “the problem is that we’re facing a crises that could happen at any point. It could be next week, or it could be even the next three years or maybe five years, but we need enhanced capability in the short to mid-term for the ADF and for the nation.”

In my view, with the shift to the direct defense of Australia, one needs to focus on how to restructure the ADF which Australia has now and to build a template then for force building concurrently with that shift.  With a focus on the strategic space in the region, then the question of distributing and integrating the ADF requires a C² capability which can do so.

Horton underscored that this required an appropriate C²system. On the one hand, securing key information for national use is of course important. But on the other hand, for extended regional security, it is important to share information and to shape a common operational picture with partners in the region, and security barrios cannot be allowed to block this from happening.

He used an example which was reminiscent of my conversations when last in Australia with the Maritime Border Commander, Rear Admiral Lee Goddard. “Imagine two patrol boats operating from Fiji and patrolling their waters. We do not have a platform there, but we have an ability to generate and share information for their enhanced situational awareness, that would allow for a joint operational picture. And that means as well, we could make deployment decisions based on what Fiji is doing and sees the need to do as well.”

What Horton was highlighting was a way to build networks of relationships which do not fit into the legacy notion of alliances, but does capture the reality of what 21^st century alliances really are becoming – communities of interest, with national determination of what actions to take in times of crisis.

He noted progress on the Australian side with shaping joint C² as well. He highlighted that in the most recent Talisman Sabre, “for the first time, we had a joint common operating picture. This meant that the joint force commander was able to get the information he needed. And based on this experience, we can consider ways to share information with whole of government and then more broadly with allies and partners.”

In an August 25, 2021 Defence Connect article about Talisman Sabre 2021, the contribution of Systematic to resolving the challenge highlighted by Horton was described as follows:

During the exercise, SitaWare Headquarters provided commanders at the Deployed Joint Force Headquarters with a rich Joint Common Operating Picture. Although primarily an Army asset, the software incorporated air and maritime pictures, and was used by both Naval and Air Force staff offices in both headquarters.

 “SitaWare gave commanders a detailed understanding of the battlespace and demonstrated its ability to operate across domains,” explained Alastair George, senior business architect at Systematic.

 “The software’s architecture enables it to ingest multiple data sources and feeds from across a coalition.”

 “SitaWare doesn’t limit users to information from within their own force structure alone. Its ability to interoperate with other C2 and track management systems, and act as an enabler for Joint operations is a real force multiplier,” George said.

 “SitaWare was trialled at the Headquarters Joint Operations Centre to fuse multiple COP source feeds into a single view of the strategic domain.

 “At Talisman Sabre, SitaWare Headquarters provided chat capabilities horizontally and vertically and was used extensively as a planning and briefing tool and the software integrated effectively with role-specific C2 systems.

At the heart of the C² challenge is recognizing that the use of military forces in crisis management requires not just shaping effective joint modular task forces appropriate to a crisis management situation, but the ability of the civilians to shape overall political responses with allies, partners and adversaries in that situation.

There is no point in simply having the most exquisite combat information available but not translating that into information enabling crisis management resolutions as well.

The information sharing aspect a key element for reshaping the way Australia can work with allies and partners in the region in crisis management situations.

And perhaps forming joint operational capabilities in the region. For example, Indonesia and Australia could buy Ospreys to come up with a joint squadron would be one way to work HADR plus operations. By operating and sustaining a joint capability and building a C²system into the concept of operations for that joint capability, crisis management capabilities could be built out more rapidly.

And with the right kind of C² system, each nation could use their aircraft for specific national purposes as well.

Horton underscored that need to drive C² integration much more rapidly for the ADF, and its ability to work with partners and allies. And I would add, there is one need we often forget – the key element of how to communicate with adversaries in complex crisis management situations.

Referring back to the TS21 experience, he noted: “we’ve put together the interim battle management system in a year, and it works. And we can continue to build off this off-the-shelf solution set to move forward.”

We then discussed one aspect not widely considered that also affects a way ahead with regard to ISR.

That is the contribution of civilians in a society to ISR via their smart phone inputs. I saw this in Norway during Joint Warrior 2018 and we are seeing in Ukraine right now – significant inputs to Ukrainian ISR from the Ukrainian civilians. How to tap into this? How to weave this into the ultimate ISR in crisis management, which is information war?

Put in other words, working C² and ISR for 21^st century operations is not simply about building the most exquisite classified system possible; it is about building a system which allows for crisis management dominance, an ability to shape integratable forces in the battlespace for the ADF forces alone; but in a way that can allow for alliance and partner capabilities.

The ADF needs a C² and ISR system to build the relevant coalitions on the fly in an actual combat or crisis management system, rather than just being built to plug and play into a specific ally.

 David Horton is the Vice President responsible for the Asia Pacific Region for the Danish-headquartered software company, Systematic, where he has worked for nearly five years. The company develops the world’s leading Command-and-Control (C2) software, SitaWare, in service in 45 countries, including the US, UK, NZ, and Germany. SitaWare was recently chosen as the Australian Army’s interim Battle Management System and was being trialled at Headquarters Joint Operations Command as the Joint C2 capability.

David’s background spans applications (Microsoft), networking (Cisco), telecommunications (SingTel), business consulting, Systems Integration (HP, Fujitsu, NEC), as well as uniformed military service as an Infantry Officer, specialising in combat engineering and intelligence. David still serves part-time as Directing Staff at the Australian War College.

Based in Canberra for over 30 years, working in the Defence and security domains, David also spent four years at Microsoft’s US headquarters as Program Manager Government Requirements, with a particular focus on security across the company. He started his civilian career in the Public Service, which included Defence and Parliament House. David holds a Bachelor of Science from ANU

A great place to go to approach ways to answer that question is to visit The Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center or NAWDC which is best known to the public as “Top Gun.”

When I last visited NAWDC in 2020 which I did twice in that year, it was very clear from the visits and the discussions, that there was significant rethinking underway with regard to how Naval aviation could interact with the kind of fleet innovation necessary for effective distribted maritime operations.

The theme of integratability beyond the carrier air wing is a key one being worked at NAWDC.

As the head of NAWDC at the time of my visit, Rear Admiral Brophy, put it: “From a training standpoint, we work from the perspective of ‘it is not going to be a carrier strike group that wins the next fight on its own, it’s going to be an integrated joint force that wins the next fight. We’ve really broadened our aperture. Everything we do here now is based off of a single lens: does it move the needle for great power competition or not?”

A measure of the change at NAWDC has been the generation of working groups based at NAWDC that reach out to the fleet to devise and implement new ways to operate in the evolving strategic situation. COVID-19 slowed down this process, but the trajectory is clear. For example, in the first quarter of 2020, NAWDC sponsored work with the other Navy warfighting centers to address the question of fleet-wide TTPs to execute maritime strike. The purpose is to think beyond the classic airwing focus to a wider integratable air wing in support of fleet-wide operations than simply relying on U.S. Navy operated  platforms.

During my visit, I had a chance to talk with a number of the Departments working specific aspects of air wing training. There was clearly much re-thinking going on driven by the coming of the F-35 among other drivers of change. One of the most important take-aways from the visit was to learn more about MISR officers, which highlights a significant change in the fleet towards understanding the broader role of ISR in supporting fleet and joint operations.

But one question I asked the various Department heads was: where does the CMV-22b fit in?

There is a rotary wing department; would it be there?

Perhaps, but the officers I spoke to got the core point – this “logistics” asset was more than that. How could the CMV-22b drive innovation for the fleet and how might it evolve in ways benefiting from broader fleet innovation?

The arrival of the MISR officers and the CMV-22b provide an example of such innovation which might happen.

This is what I wrote after my July 2020 visit to NAWDC:

“There is another aspect of the coming of MISR to the fleet which could have a significant impact on operational capabilities beyond what the head of the MISR program discussed. And that flowed from conversations at lunch with the MISR course participants.

“There is a clear opportunity to add passive sensing to platforms operating within the force. For example, the CMV-22Bs will fly to the fleet for the logistics function, but why not place passive sensors on the aircraft to scoop up ISR information which can be distributed to an appropriate functional area?

“For example, the Romeo, P-8 and Triton communities are working to shape more effective integration. Clearly, MISR officers will know that ISR dynamics within that functional area and might be the perfect players to suggest what passive sensing on the CMV-22B might best provide to that force package or to one of the elements within that package.”

When one is operating in a contested environment, not only are the logistics challenging, but getting the right information from a fluid combat environment is crucial as well.

The CMV-22b certainly enables the first but could also provide inputs for the second.

For my NAWDC interviews, see the following:

Featured photo: A MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter assigned to the “Black Knights” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 4, stationed in San Diego, is refueled by a Navy CMV-22B Osprey from the “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30. The CMV-22B is the U.S. Navy version of the Osprey, a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable, medium lift, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor aircraft.

The Air Delivered Ground Refueling (ADGR) evolution was a first for HSC 4, en route to Naval Air Station Fallon. Air Wing Fallon is part of the predeployment training cycle for Navy’s carrier air wings. HSC-4, along with VFA-2, VFA-192, VFA-113, VFA-147, VAQ-136, VAW-113, and HSM-78 comprise CVW-2 and are detached to NAS Fallon in order to sharpen their warfighting readiness through a rigorous 5-week curriculum.

The training conducted during Air Wing Fallon drives air wing integration and ensures that all CVW-2 squadrons are ready to conduct the full range of military operations when they deploy later this year. HSC 4 provides vertical lift search and rescue, logistics, anti-surface warfare, special operations forces support, and combat search and rescue capabilities.

(U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Shannon Renfroe/Released)