Training for Distributed STOVL Operations: WTI 2-22

05/19/2022

U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), utilize bulk fuel equipment shown to conduct a ground refuel during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.29.2022

Photos  by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

How Finland and Sweden Joining NATO Would Impact NATO

05/18/2022

According a recently posted video by The Wall Street Journal on May 16, 2022, the subject was addressed of how the two states joining NATO would impact the organization.

We have focused for several years on how the Nordic defense dynamics are part of the reshaping od direct defense capabilities for Europe in dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers.

Our findings from many trips to the region can be found in our December 2020 book:

Next Step in Australian and Japanese Interoperability: KC-30 Refueling of F-2

In a story published by the Australian Department of Defence on April 29, 2022, the RAAF was noted as achieving a new milestone in its refueling of a Japanese fighter aircraft.

For the first time, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has conducted air-to-air refuelling flight testing with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF, or Koku-Jieitai).

Conducted in April over three weeks, the flight test engineering program in Japan involved a RAAF KC-30A multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) and Mitsubishi F-2 aircraft of the JASDF.

Air Vice-Marshal Darren Goldie, Air Commander Australia, said the successful flight test program was a leap forward for Australia and Japan’s interoperability, and would facilitate the increasing complexity and sophistication of bilateral engagement between both nations.

“This is the first time that a RAAF aircraft has refuelled a JASDF aircraft, and will help build the special strategic partnership between Australia and Japan,” Air Vice-Marshal Goldie said.

“The success of this program will facilitate Japan’s participation in Exercise Pitch Black 2022, which will take place in the Northern Territory this August and September.

“Working together will ensure we can continue to uphold and reinforce a secure, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific region.”

Over a series of flights, aircrew and engineers ensured the mechanical compatibility between these systems, and that both aircraft can be flown safely in a range of configurations and lighting conditions.

The RAAF flight test team has extensive experience with KC-30A refuelling trials in Australia, the United States and Singapore, with this most recent trial being the first time it has worked with the JASDF.

“The flight test program represents two years of close cooperation between our own Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU), and the JASDF Air Development and Test Wing (ADTW),” Air Vice-Marshal Goldie said.

In recent years, JASDF and RAAF personnel have worked together following natural disasters in Tonga and Australia, and trained with each other during Exercise Cope North in Guam, and Exercise Bushido Guardian in Japan.

Featured photo: An air-to-air refuelling flight test between Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft from No. 33 Squadron and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF or Koku-Jieitai) Mitsubishi F-2A over Japan.

Over 4-28 April 22, a flight test engineering program was conducted in Japan between the RAAF and Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF, or Koku-Jieitai) to provide a refuelling clearance between the KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and Mitsubishi F-2 fighter aircraft.

This marked the first air-to-air refuelling activity between Australia and Japan, and will facilitate closer and more complex engagement between both nations including JASDF participation in Exercise Pitch Black 22. The RAAF operates a fleet of seven KC-30As from RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland, with each one able to carry more than 100 tonnes of fuel.

 

The AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopter

05/17/2022

The AH-1Z Viper is the Marine Corps’ primary rotor-wing ground attack aircraft.

The AH-1Z attack helicopter provides rotary wing close air support, anti-armor, armed escort, armed visual reconnaissance and fire support coordination capabilities under day night, and adverse weather conditions.

The AH-1Z Vipers is fielded in Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons, or HMLAs. Detachments from the HMLAs are deployed as part of Marine Expeditionary Units to support ship-based amphibious exercises and operations.

A Canadian Perspective on the Biden Administration and the Russo-Ukrainian War

By LGen (ret) Michel Maisonneuve

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Kyiv on April 24th to provide support and highlight the determination of the U.S. to stand with Ukraine as Russia’s invasion continues its attempt to conquer a free country. Austin stated “We want to see Russia weakened so that it can’t do the things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”

What are we to deduce from that declaration? First of all, nothing in diplomacy is ever stated without a deeper meaning. When diplomats coming out of a meeting say “we had a frank and robust discussion”, it means they nearly came to blows. So in the case of Austin, what could he have meant?

Make no mistake, this was a huge turning point. The U.S. is now fully engaged in the war; they have publicly stated that they have skin in the game, and they will not allow Ukraine to lose. During his statement, Austin could not help himself from using “we” when he was speaking about Ukraine’s capabilities, firmly engaging his country.

The U.S. will be content to use the conflict as a proxy war being fought by the Ukrainians (and very well, by the way) on behalf of NATO and the United States. American soldiers will not overtly be committed to the fight, but the U.S. and NATO will provide all the means necessary for Ukraine to fight and win.

In terms of degrading Russia’s ability to fight in future, there would be in-depth defensive positions built by Ukraine in the Donbass that will draw in the Russian forces and attrit them as they advance. Destroying tanks, armoured personnel carriers, airplanes, and other equipment will reduce the Russian inventory, unfortunately killing hundreds of young Russian (mostly) men conscripted for service to Mother Russia, but who had not expected to attack a peaceful country next door.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia will hopefully remain, and render the immediate rebuilding of their forces impossible. Seeing the desolation and destruction of Mariupol and other cities, a huge reconstruction effort will be insisted upon by the international community after hostilities end.

There are reports of intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Ukraine which may have led to the sinking of Russian warship Moskva and other battlefield successes. There may be many countries’ “advisors” present on the ground in Ukraine providing support, advice and counsel to the defenders. Reports are also coming in of Ukrainian counter-attacks across the Donbass front.

All hopes are for a successful defence, and the West hopes not to have to put boots on the ground. But as a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff has stated, “hope is not a method” and the problem is that Putin will continue to use his nuclear arsenal as a blackmail tool, even if Ukraine wins. A coalition of the willing ground campaign could quickly drive him out of Ukraine and shorten the war, saving countless lives. To reduce the danger of nuclear weapons being used, non-nuclear nations could be used in the fight.

Add to this situation the different conflagrations that have destroyed some of the infrastructure in Russia, the unexplained death of several oligarchs and their families – one has to ask questions as to who might be behind all this. Are the CIA, MI6, other agencies, or some of NATO’s special forces active in Russia? Or are Russians themselves, appalled at a “special military operation”, finding targets to sabotage?

Is Putin losing his grip on the nation? His apology to Israel’s Bennett after comments by his Foreign Minister shows he cannot control everything;  Lavrov may yet develop what the Soviets used to call a “cold” and go missing. There is no doubt that as the failed invasion rages on, it will be more and more difficult for Putin to hide the brutality of his regime.

The Transnistria region has been identified by a Russian general as their next objective. Unfortunately, their defeat in Kyiv, and their current difficulties in the Donbass should remind them to focus on one success at a time, and not look beyond their current effort.

Coming back to Ukraine’s objective, if it is to attrit Russian forces to the maximum, Ukraine may remain on the defensive until Russia’s effort has been blunted, then go on to the offensive to re-establish their borders. It is difficult to predict when this may take place; unfortunately, Russia is also content to bomb, shell and destroy civilian and military targets indiscriminately from a distance while they attempt to take the Donbass with – so far – little success. Recent reports surmise that Russia could be running low on ammunition.

Finally, the issue of Crimea remains to be dealt with. If Russian forces are sufficiently weakened and the borders of Ukraine are re-established, will there be a move to return Crimea to Ukraine? Or is there a sense that Crimea has de-facto become Russian territory?

Whatever the outcome, the U.S. will not let Ukraine lose, and we will likely be going back to the Cold War days when U.S. and Canadian forces were deployed permanently in Europe as part of NATO. The Soviet bear has morphed into a Russian bear.

LGen (ret) Michel Maisonneuve is a former Canadian Army officer who served as Assistant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada and Chief of Staff of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk. He is currently a Senior Defence Associate at Samuel Associates.

This article was published by Front Line Defence on May 7, 2022.

Featured photo: KIEV, UKRAINE – Dec 08, 2015: Vice president of USA Joseph Biden during his speech in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Kiev

Emergency Arresting Gear System Training: WTI-2-22

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Alexandra Mendezmanzo, an expeditionary airfield systems technician from Coachella, California, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), operates an emergency arresting gear system, during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, March 24, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.24.2022

Photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

ADF and Allied Perspectives on the Way Ahead for Force Modernization

05/15/2022

On March 24, 2022, the Williams Foundation held its first of two seminars to be held this year.

The seminar was the latest in a series of seminars which started in 2014, and have been focused on the evolution of the ADF to deal with the evolving threats and challenges facing Australia, and its core allies.

The first seminar dealt with the launch of the fifth-generation force, and then over the next few years focused on key elements and building out the force and then since 2018, there has been an increasing focus on shaping new capabilities to extend the reach and the lethality of the force in the growing threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

A key thematic approach woven throughout the assessment process is the challenge of shaping an ADF that is more capable of being built “joint by design.”

And the point of that is to get full value out of any new capability introduced into the force, and, over the past few years, this has been joined with the theme of enhancing Australian strategic resilience and sovereignty with a broader encompassing of Australian political, economic and military capabilities becoming more integrated as well.

This process is reminiscent of what I have seen in the Nordic region, where since 2014, the Norwegians, for example, have focused on “total defense,” or upon how to take a whole of society and government approach to defense. This has been driven by the global challenge posed by the 21st century authoritarian powers whose goals are clearly to reshape the global order to their advantage as well as dealing with the consequences from the breakout of a war with global consequences and impacts, namely, the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Although the title of the seminar may seem narrowly focused on force building, it was not.

We have entered a new historical era of global conflict, and the challenges posed in the seminar are really about how Australia and its allies shape an effective way ahead.

The next seminar to be held in September 2022, will leverage the most recent seminars, those in 2021 on autonomous systems and building a new space enterprise, and the March 2022 seminar focus on the next steps for joint force design, and address the broader question of force building to deal with the new strategic environment.

Two particular presentations at the seminar underscored the nature of the transition facing the ADF and Australia as a whole.

The first was by Peter Jennings, the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the second by Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman, Head Military Strategic Commitments, responsible for the strategic level management and situational awareness of current and potential Australian Defence Force Commitments.

Jennings underscored the core point of the challenge we face, namely, a significant strategic shift in the global environment.

As Jennings put it: “the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes have made it very clear that their goal is to break the international order and to remake it under their control. Beijing and Moscow’s separate and shared interests have not been hidden and they made clear publicly for at least a decade. One thing you can say about these authoritarian systems is that they do not disguise their plans.”

And to meet this challenge on the military side, the point is about having extant capability which can meet the challenge, not building an exquisite defense force in some future point in history.

Jennings went back to his 2018 Williams Foundation seminar where he advocated that Australia add a bomber to its capabilities, in this case to join in the U.S. program to build the B-21.

And the underlying point about this is to add strike capabilities in the near term, not the long-term. He argued for the need to jump start Australian defense efforts along the lines of what he called the new German moment, when in facing the war in Ukraine, German leadership have been shocked into a reality zone on defense.

The good news in my view is that Australia has been focused on reality for far longer than Germany, and at the end of the day many of the key elements for shaping an effective way ahead.

And that point was highlighted in the presentation by the former Plan Jericho, co-head, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman. In his presentation, Chipman underscored the importance of integration as a force multiplier which has been a hallmark of when the Plan Jericho effort was first introduced in 2015.

But since that time, such capabilities need to be joined with Australian strategic resilience.

As Australia works enhanced sovereignty and resilience, this effort requires skillful work on the changing nature of alliances as well.

This is how Chipman put it: “There are limits to what a middle power can achieve, that’s why alliances and partnerships are so important. Allies don’t surrender sovereignty to each other, they share it; allies and partners strengthen national power and help mitigate the risks of critical vulnerabilities.

“What does this mean for defense efforts? We need sailors, soldiers, and aviators and public servants who are masters of their domains. We need experts who can integrate across domains, and we need experts that can provide the policy advice and strategy to ensure that our military power is delivered as a coherent expression of national power.

“There’s a human dimension to this challenge, building a culture that is biased towards teaming and constantly learning. There’s a procedural dimension to this challenge, creating space for innovation and fast adaptation. Sharing information to strengthen coordination and resilience, accelerating the speeds of decision and corresponding actions.

“And there’s a technical dimension to this challenge, prioritizing integration over platform optimization, encouraging the early adoption of new technologies, introducing advanced capabilities and baking in interoperability so that we can mesh with our allies and facilitate cooperation with partners.”

In short, the March 24, 2022 seminar provides a snapshot of where the ADF along with core allies are with regard to the challenge of force integration.

But how best to shape an effective way ahead to prevail against the 21st century authoritarian powers?

And as Jennings cautioned, answers to such a question go beyond simply shaping an exquisite networked force, but requires a broader whole of society and whole of government effort.

Featured Photo: General Kenneth Wilsbach, Commander Pacific Air Forces, speaking at the Williams Foundation March 24, 2022 seminar.

Training for Enhanced Lethality and Survivability

05/10/2022

By Robbin Laird

I recently finished my latest report for The Williams Foundation on their March 24, 2022, seminar which focused on shaping a way ahead for the integrated networked force. The moderator for the seminar was John Conway, a noted Australian defense analyst and former RAF officer.

In his comments during an interview which I did with him he underscored the growing importance of training to enhance the capability of the ADF in the art of warfare. This is how he put it:

““And we’ve now got an adversary, who is making us spend more and more money on survivability. We’d rather spend money on lethality, but they’re making us spend money on survivability because they’re becoming increasingly sophisticated, because it’s coming harder and harder to survive. And this is driving up the cost of survivability. But one way of mitigating that risk is getting your training systems right. And being able to fight the best fight with what you’ve got and invest in warfare rather than just war fighting.”

My recent visit to MAWTS-1 in Yuma Arizona reinforced Conway’s point. Here the Marines are focused on shaping ways ahead for their networked integrated but distributed force to enhance survivability and lethality.  I have been posting a number of videos and slideshows from the most recent WTI or weapons and tactics instructor course which certainly underscore the focus on force distribution for survivability and force integration for lethality.

In my follow up interview with the outgoing CO of MAWTS-1, Colonel Gillette, he underscored their core focus on enhanced lethality. This is how Colonel Gillette put it:

“The Commandant has issued guidance with regard to the direction he would like to move the USMC from an operational point of view. Over the course of the last two years, I would say, that there’s been a iterative processes that have been generated on not only to enhance what do we want to do today with the equipment and with the capabilities that we have, but that also better informs what we want for tomorrow and then, goes back into the feedback loop to CD&I, and the different organizations under that deputy commandant to determine what we need, two, three, four years from now, to better implement new operational concepts.”

“When I say iterative, I am also referring to the relationships that we have with all the different organizations, whether it’s the Marine Corps War Fighting Lab with different technologies, CDD for different operational concepts and equipment and technology that support those concepts, trying them in the environment at WTI, given the assets and the expertise that we have at MAWTS-1, and then, providing feedback as to how either pieces of this puzzle work, or in the grander operational environment, how we need to do things differently.

“I think that feedback loop is hugely important because it’s informed by doing, instead of the theory of the case on PowerPoint or in war games. I think that you have to go out and actually try it, create a contested environment as much as you can in training, and then, try these concepts and then provide that feedback, which inevitably makes the outcome two or three or four years more realistic, as opposed to just the theory of the case.”

For Gillette, any focus on force design needs to be driving the enhanced lethality of the USMC in operations. “I think that the underlying focus that we must never forget is that we’re out there for one reason and one reason only, and that’s for lethality when our country asks us to deploy on their behalf. How you do so and how do you survive and continue to be lethal in any combat environment? How do you best disperse, what types of command and control do you need from ship to land, land to ship, island, and these capabilities facilitate you being more lethal and effective.

“At WTI we have been and continue to be focused on enhanced lethality. We just need to figure out how to do that in this new environment that’s not what we’ve lived for the last 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Col. Gillette has been intimately involved in the introduction of the F-35 into the USMC and has worked closely in the joint force through those efforts as well. I asked him to look back at that experience and what conclusions he draws from that experience for the joint force going forward.

He started by discussing the early days of operating the F-35 and the relevance of that experience to bringing the latest aviation platform to the USMC, the CH-53K.

“For the initial guys that started flying the F-35,  you would think that we were just flying a better upgraded F18. Why? Because that’s what they had experienced. What wasn’t considered initially, was all of the new operational concepts and differences that, that airplane brought to the force. And it took us, several years of talking with the Air Force, talking with other agencies, and individuals to figure out how to best operate the airplane and to leverage what makes it most lethal.

“And I think that we’ll see the same evolution with the Kilo. The initial reaction will be to say, “it looks just like an Echo. So why don’t we just fly it and employ it like an Echo?” It will take time of people getting their hands on it, seeing the capabilities, and then leverage it as part of USMC transformation. The key is to ensure that we don’t let the inertia of what one knows so well in the past and impede the ability to use the new platform differently.”

We then discussed how the Marines operating the F-35 opened new joint and coalition integration capabilities.

Col. Gillette: “When we flew common platforms in the past, we wrote our own tactics manuals. We set up our data links differently. We called the same thing different names.

“But as we introduced the F35, very quickly we realized how important it would be for us to come together and understand common tactics for this airplane, based on its strengths, and how we would employ the airplane.

“You can see this kind of integration when we go to different exercises, whether it’s up on the Nellis range, whether we go up to Alaska, whether we participate in other exercises, but the reality is that whether the plane has Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps markings on the side, it really doesn’t matter. We all speak the same language, the data that’s going across the airplanes is exactly the same and so I think from a Joint Force perspective, has wildly increased our lethality. Because when you take that interoperability into an operational context or environment, airplanes can come from wherever and they show up to do a mission together. It’s just like you’re flying with your squadron mate. There’s no difference.

“And now, if you take that same concept and scale it across a coalition with our allies and partners that have that same technical and aircraft capability, you can see how quickly that becomes very significant and I think that, that idea of not only how do we fight the airplane in an integrated way and in a common way, but now, you take that to supply parts or parts in the supply system.

“You can take that capability to enhance integration on ships. It applies as well to integration with regard to base operations where we have common requirements to ervice an airplane.

“Very quickly you can see that the F-35 global enterprise is a quite the force multiplier. And I think that, to use your words, we’re just scratching the surface on that. And I think that over the next five to 10 years, we will see that aspect of it become extremely important when we start talking, again, about these operational vignettes or these operational areas of where it’s going to take a combined and joint effort to achieve our national objectives, as opposed to a service inside the United States or a country outside the United States.

“It’s one thing to just profess the theory of the case, but when you have these different venues of joint or integrated exercises, combined exercises, you can actually experience a new level of integration. What we did on the Queen Elizabeth is another great example that you have to go out and do it in order to have a reasonable assurance that if you need to do it, operationally, it will work.

“That needs to be the fundamental question that each service asks, what is your contribution to the Joint Force? And if it’s a contribution of the Joint Force, how does that piece fit into the larger picture? And then, how do you integrate with it?

“Services tend to look inward as to how to do that inside of their own service. Countries look inward on how they operate inside of your own country, but if we’re truly going to realize the benefit of what we’re talking about, it’s A, it’s very hard and B, you have to practice it. If you don’t, on game day it’s not going to work.

“Any weapon system that you bring online, whether it’s the Kilo, whether it’s the continued acquisition of F35, command and control systems, whatever the fact may be, you have to look at it in that light. How does it fit into the larger piece of the puzzle and then, how do you contribute and not only pull information, but push it out so that you are benefiting the entire team as opposed to your own little niche piece of it.”

And to conclude, what I have seen over the past few years at MAWTS-1 is a clear focus on what Col. Gillette emphasized in his interview. And this is really the function and key role of advanced training as opposed to war games, and death by briefing charts.

Featured Photo: An F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter flown by the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211 “The Wake Island Avengers” after becoming the first USMC F-35 to land onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth on 22 September, 2020, off the coast of the United Kingdom (UK). VMFA-211 joined the UK’s 617 Squadron onboard the 65,000 ton carrier as she sailed for exercises with NATO allies in the North Sea, forming the largest 5th generation Carrier Air Wing in the world. “The Wake Island Avengers” are proud to represent the United States Marine Corps and United States of America while they serve as part of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group.