Distributed Operations and Heavy-Lift: Connecting the Dots and Sustaining the Force

05/20/2022

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to MAWTS-1, I had a chance to talk with two Marine Corps officers with significant experience in working force distribution and sustainment issues with USMC heavy lift assets. With the coming of the CH-53K, the capability of the USMC to work distributed operations, from the sea, from the land, or in support of the joint force is significantly enhanced.

I met with Maj Sean Charvet and Capt Vihlen who spearhead the work of MAWTS-1 on heavy lift training and mission planning for using the unique heavy lift helicopter capability which the USMC has and is in the process of introducing the CH-53K, ramping up their capabilities as well.

The CH-53E and the CH-53K are both heavy lift helicopters unlike the Army’s Chinook series, which are medium lift helicopter. And both the E and the K are air refuellable helicopters, whereas the Chinook has some versions which are and most that are not. As one of the participants put it: “When discussing lift capacities of a helicopter, it is very dependent on environmental conditions. With the K we will see a consistent significant lift capacity at the higher end. So if you have to lift 20,000- 25,000 pounds, you might start taking things off the plane to make it lighter, which now may reduce the capability, its defensive capability, and your ability to carry troops. What the K provides is a stated capability to do heavy lift and it can do that on any given day. And that is the hardest concept for people to grasp about why the K is so significant for the USMC.”

They discussed how distance is a logistics problem. And the air refueling capability as well as the lift capacity of the K provides ways to deal with the distance problem. One way is simply the fact that it can fly further because it is air refuellable. Another way is by the load outs which the aircraft carries means it can support a wider range of basing locations and support a more widely distributed force.

This is especially important when comparing what the K can do compared to a fixed wing aircraft like the C-130J. As one participant put it, there are a limited number of airfields to which the C-130J can go. The adversary can plan in advance with regard to where the Marines might go given that logistical support requirement driven by fixed wing sustainment. With the K, there is no such limitation. Force distribution can be determined by need and impact and the K can insert and support and exit with that insertion force.

The officers made the point that the K was coming at the “right time” in terms of the focus on mobile and expeditionary basing but in terms of technological development as well. Because of the automation built into the aircraft, the crew can focus on mission management. And as a fully digital aircraft with slots for new digital capabilities, the aircraft can be part of a C2 mesh network and facilitate integration of a distributed force.

We discussed the role as well of seabases as mobile assets and how these seabases can operate as “mother ships” to insert, support and withdraw insertion forces. They made the point that a rotorcraft has a significant advantage over a small ship like the LCAC in doing so. As one participant put it: “If you can track an asset you can target it. The advantage we have in our helicopters is our capability to manage our paths to deploy and support force. We do not need to go from a fixed point to a second fixed point; we can operate with variable tracks and as the ship we launch from is moving as well. An asset like the LCAC while very valuable is not a very flexible deployment asset.”

Throughout the discussion, the officers highlighted in a variety of ways why they believed the K was coming at the right time. One aspect was that although the systems which allow automation on the K were new to heavy lift, they are not new to military or commercial aviation. That just simply had not been applied to heavy helicopter lift before.

They have both worked the fuel delivery side of USMC operations for many years. And in discussing the contribution of the K to the projected need to operate distributed bases, they emphasized that the lift capacity and flexibility of the K would be crucial to enabling effective sustained distributed force operations. This is how one participant put it: “Whether its an organic USMC or joint force asset, we can refuel multiple assets based on what a K can do, because it just carries more. It just has more capacity to carry the things that you need.”

For the Marines, the air element supports the ground combat element. So force integration is not a nice to have capability, it is a driver of the kind of training and operations which the Marines do. That particularly goes to the point of information sharing and integration between the air and ground combat elements. Working expanded and effective networks are a key part of the way ahead for the USMC, notably as it works towards greater integration with the joint force. Here the coming of the K as an all-digital aircraft can be part of the digital transformation of the USMC as it goes down the path of enhanced methods and approaches to force distribution.

Indeed, the K is coming at the right time to the USMC.

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 inspects a CH-53K King Stallion prior to its first operational flight at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, April 13, 2022. The flight signified the beginning of HMH-461’s modernization from the CH-53E Super Stallion to the CH-53K King Stallion. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)

Expeditionary Basing, Force Mobility and Aviation Support Capabilities

 

 

Training for Distributed STOVL Operations: WTI 2-22

05/19/2022

U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), utilize bulk fuel equipment shown to conduct a ground refuel during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.29.2022

Photos  by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

How Finland and Sweden Joining NATO Would Impact NATO

05/18/2022

According a recently posted video by The Wall Street Journal on May 16, 2022, the subject was addressed of how the two states joining NATO would impact the organization.

We have focused for several years on how the Nordic defense dynamics are part of the reshaping od direct defense capabilities for Europe in dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers.

Our findings from many trips to the region can be found in our December 2020 book:

Next Step in Australian and Japanese Interoperability: KC-30 Refueling of F-2

In a story published by the Australian Department of Defence on April 29, 2022, the RAAF was noted as achieving a new milestone in its refueling of a Japanese fighter aircraft.

For the first time, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has conducted air-to-air refuelling flight testing with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF, or Koku-Jieitai).

Conducted in April over three weeks, the flight test engineering program in Japan involved a RAAF KC-30A multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) and Mitsubishi F-2 aircraft of the JASDF.

Air Vice-Marshal Darren Goldie, Air Commander Australia, said the successful flight test program was a leap forward for Australia and Japan’s interoperability, and would facilitate the increasing complexity and sophistication of bilateral engagement between both nations.

“This is the first time that a RAAF aircraft has refuelled a JASDF aircraft, and will help build the special strategic partnership between Australia and Japan,” Air Vice-Marshal Goldie said.

“The success of this program will facilitate Japan’s participation in Exercise Pitch Black 2022, which will take place in the Northern Territory this August and September.

“Working together will ensure we can continue to uphold and reinforce a secure, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific region.”

Over a series of flights, aircrew and engineers ensured the mechanical compatibility between these systems, and that both aircraft can be flown safely in a range of configurations and lighting conditions.

The RAAF flight test team has extensive experience with KC-30A refuelling trials in Australia, the United States and Singapore, with this most recent trial being the first time it has worked with the JASDF.

“The flight test program represents two years of close cooperation between our own Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU), and the JASDF Air Development and Test Wing (ADTW),” Air Vice-Marshal Goldie said.

In recent years, JASDF and RAAF personnel have worked together following natural disasters in Tonga and Australia, and trained with each other during Exercise Cope North in Guam, and Exercise Bushido Guardian in Japan.

Featured photo: An air-to-air refuelling flight test between Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft from No. 33 Squadron and Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF or Koku-Jieitai) Mitsubishi F-2A over Japan.

Over 4-28 April 22, a flight test engineering program was conducted in Japan between the RAAF and Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF, or Koku-Jieitai) to provide a refuelling clearance between the KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and Mitsubishi F-2 fighter aircraft.

This marked the first air-to-air refuelling activity between Australia and Japan, and will facilitate closer and more complex engagement between both nations including JASDF participation in Exercise Pitch Black 22. The RAAF operates a fleet of seven KC-30As from RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland, with each one able to carry more than 100 tonnes of fuel.

 

The AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopter

05/17/2022

The AH-1Z Viper is the Marine Corps’ primary rotor-wing ground attack aircraft.

The AH-1Z attack helicopter provides rotary wing close air support, anti-armor, armed escort, armed visual reconnaissance and fire support coordination capabilities under day night, and adverse weather conditions.

The AH-1Z Vipers is fielded in Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons, or HMLAs. Detachments from the HMLAs are deployed as part of Marine Expeditionary Units to support ship-based amphibious exercises and operations.

A Canadian Perspective on the Biden Administration and the Russo-Ukrainian War

By LGen (ret) Michel Maisonneuve

U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Kyiv on April 24th to provide support and highlight the determination of the U.S. to stand with Ukraine as Russia’s invasion continues its attempt to conquer a free country. Austin stated “We want to see Russia weakened so that it can’t do the things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”

What are we to deduce from that declaration? First of all, nothing in diplomacy is ever stated without a deeper meaning. When diplomats coming out of a meeting say “we had a frank and robust discussion”, it means they nearly came to blows. So in the case of Austin, what could he have meant?

Make no mistake, this was a huge turning point. The U.S. is now fully engaged in the war; they have publicly stated that they have skin in the game, and they will not allow Ukraine to lose. During his statement, Austin could not help himself from using “we” when he was speaking about Ukraine’s capabilities, firmly engaging his country.

The U.S. will be content to use the conflict as a proxy war being fought by the Ukrainians (and very well, by the way) on behalf of NATO and the United States. American soldiers will not overtly be committed to the fight, but the U.S. and NATO will provide all the means necessary for Ukraine to fight and win.

In terms of degrading Russia’s ability to fight in future, there would be in-depth defensive positions built by Ukraine in the Donbass that will draw in the Russian forces and attrit them as they advance. Destroying tanks, armoured personnel carriers, airplanes, and other equipment will reduce the Russian inventory, unfortunately killing hundreds of young Russian (mostly) men conscripted for service to Mother Russia, but who had not expected to attack a peaceful country next door.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia will hopefully remain, and render the immediate rebuilding of their forces impossible. Seeing the desolation and destruction of Mariupol and other cities, a huge reconstruction effort will be insisted upon by the international community after hostilities end.

There are reports of intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Ukraine which may have led to the sinking of Russian warship Moskva and other battlefield successes. There may be many countries’ “advisors” present on the ground in Ukraine providing support, advice and counsel to the defenders. Reports are also coming in of Ukrainian counter-attacks across the Donbass front.

All hopes are for a successful defence, and the West hopes not to have to put boots on the ground. But as a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff has stated, “hope is not a method” and the problem is that Putin will continue to use his nuclear arsenal as a blackmail tool, even if Ukraine wins. A coalition of the willing ground campaign could quickly drive him out of Ukraine and shorten the war, saving countless lives. To reduce the danger of nuclear weapons being used, non-nuclear nations could be used in the fight.

Add to this situation the different conflagrations that have destroyed some of the infrastructure in Russia, the unexplained death of several oligarchs and their families – one has to ask questions as to who might be behind all this. Are the CIA, MI6, other agencies, or some of NATO’s special forces active in Russia? Or are Russians themselves, appalled at a “special military operation”, finding targets to sabotage?

Is Putin losing his grip on the nation? His apology to Israel’s Bennett after comments by his Foreign Minister shows he cannot control everything;  Lavrov may yet develop what the Soviets used to call a “cold” and go missing. There is no doubt that as the failed invasion rages on, it will be more and more difficult for Putin to hide the brutality of his regime.

The Transnistria region has been identified by a Russian general as their next objective. Unfortunately, their defeat in Kyiv, and their current difficulties in the Donbass should remind them to focus on one success at a time, and not look beyond their current effort.

Coming back to Ukraine’s objective, if it is to attrit Russian forces to the maximum, Ukraine may remain on the defensive until Russia’s effort has been blunted, then go on to the offensive to re-establish their borders. It is difficult to predict when this may take place; unfortunately, Russia is also content to bomb, shell and destroy civilian and military targets indiscriminately from a distance while they attempt to take the Donbass with – so far – little success. Recent reports surmise that Russia could be running low on ammunition.

Finally, the issue of Crimea remains to be dealt with. If Russian forces are sufficiently weakened and the borders of Ukraine are re-established, will there be a move to return Crimea to Ukraine? Or is there a sense that Crimea has de-facto become Russian territory?

Whatever the outcome, the U.S. will not let Ukraine lose, and we will likely be going back to the Cold War days when U.S. and Canadian forces were deployed permanently in Europe as part of NATO. The Soviet bear has morphed into a Russian bear.

LGen (ret) Michel Maisonneuve is a former Canadian Army officer who served as Assistant Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff of Canada and Chief of Staff of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk. He is currently a Senior Defence Associate at Samuel Associates.

This article was published by Front Line Defence on May 7, 2022.

Featured photo: KIEV, UKRAINE – Dec 08, 2015: Vice president of USA Joseph Biden during his speech in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Kiev

Emergency Arresting Gear System Training: WTI-2-22

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Alexandra Mendezmanzo, an expeditionary airfield systems technician from Coachella, California, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), operates an emergency arresting gear system, during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, March 24, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.24.2022

Photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

ADF and Allied Perspectives on the Way Ahead for Force Modernization

05/15/2022

On March 24, 2022, the Williams Foundation held its first of two seminars to be held this year.

The seminar was the latest in a series of seminars which started in 2014, and have been focused on the evolution of the ADF to deal with the evolving threats and challenges facing Australia, and its core allies.

The first seminar dealt with the launch of the fifth-generation force, and then over the next few years focused on key elements and building out the force and then since 2018, there has been an increasing focus on shaping new capabilities to extend the reach and the lethality of the force in the growing threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

A key thematic approach woven throughout the assessment process is the challenge of shaping an ADF that is more capable of being built “joint by design.”

And the point of that is to get full value out of any new capability introduced into the force, and, over the past few years, this has been joined with the theme of enhancing Australian strategic resilience and sovereignty with a broader encompassing of Australian political, economic and military capabilities becoming more integrated as well.

This process is reminiscent of what I have seen in the Nordic region, where since 2014, the Norwegians, for example, have focused on “total defense,” or upon how to take a whole of society and government approach to defense. This has been driven by the global challenge posed by the 21st century authoritarian powers whose goals are clearly to reshape the global order to their advantage as well as dealing with the consequences from the breakout of a war with global consequences and impacts, namely, the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Although the title of the seminar may seem narrowly focused on force building, it was not.

We have entered a new historical era of global conflict, and the challenges posed in the seminar are really about how Australia and its allies shape an effective way ahead.

The next seminar to be held in September 2022, will leverage the most recent seminars, those in 2021 on autonomous systems and building a new space enterprise, and the March 2022 seminar focus on the next steps for joint force design, and address the broader question of force building to deal with the new strategic environment.

Two particular presentations at the seminar underscored the nature of the transition facing the ADF and Australia as a whole.

The first was by Peter Jennings, the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the second by Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman, Head Military Strategic Commitments, responsible for the strategic level management and situational awareness of current and potential Australian Defence Force Commitments.

Jennings underscored the core point of the challenge we face, namely, a significant strategic shift in the global environment.

As Jennings put it: “the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes have made it very clear that their goal is to break the international order and to remake it under their control. Beijing and Moscow’s separate and shared interests have not been hidden and they made clear publicly for at least a decade. One thing you can say about these authoritarian systems is that they do not disguise their plans.”

And to meet this challenge on the military side, the point is about having extant capability which can meet the challenge, not building an exquisite defense force in some future point in history.

Jennings went back to his 2018 Williams Foundation seminar where he advocated that Australia add a bomber to its capabilities, in this case to join in the U.S. program to build the B-21.

And the underlying point about this is to add strike capabilities in the near term, not the long-term. He argued for the need to jump start Australian defense efforts along the lines of what he called the new German moment, when in facing the war in Ukraine, German leadership have been shocked into a reality zone on defense.

The good news in my view is that Australia has been focused on reality for far longer than Germany, and at the end of the day many of the key elements for shaping an effective way ahead.

And that point was highlighted in the presentation by the former Plan Jericho, co-head, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman. In his presentation, Chipman underscored the importance of integration as a force multiplier which has been a hallmark of when the Plan Jericho effort was first introduced in 2015.

But since that time, such capabilities need to be joined with Australian strategic resilience.

As Australia works enhanced sovereignty and resilience, this effort requires skillful work on the changing nature of alliances as well.

This is how Chipman put it: “There are limits to what a middle power can achieve, that’s why alliances and partnerships are so important. Allies don’t surrender sovereignty to each other, they share it; allies and partners strengthen national power and help mitigate the risks of critical vulnerabilities.

“What does this mean for defense efforts? We need sailors, soldiers, and aviators and public servants who are masters of their domains. We need experts who can integrate across domains, and we need experts that can provide the policy advice and strategy to ensure that our military power is delivered as a coherent expression of national power.

“There’s a human dimension to this challenge, building a culture that is biased towards teaming and constantly learning. There’s a procedural dimension to this challenge, creating space for innovation and fast adaptation. Sharing information to strengthen coordination and resilience, accelerating the speeds of decision and corresponding actions.

“And there’s a technical dimension to this challenge, prioritizing integration over platform optimization, encouraging the early adoption of new technologies, introducing advanced capabilities and baking in interoperability so that we can mesh with our allies and facilitate cooperation with partners.”

In short, the March 24, 2022 seminar provides a snapshot of where the ADF along with core allies are with regard to the challenge of force integration.

But how best to shape an effective way ahead to prevail against the 21st century authoritarian powers?

And as Jennings cautioned, answers to such a question go beyond simply shaping an exquisite networked force, but requires a broader whole of society and whole of government effort.

Featured Photo: General Kenneth Wilsbach, Commander Pacific Air Forces, speaking at the Williams Foundation March 24, 2022 seminar.