by Pierre Tran

Paris – It looks like Kremlin’s bloody advance through Ukraine has boosted Europe’s resolve to forge its own operational defense and security identity.

The European Union added Feb. 24 a redrafted forward to its Strategic Compass policy paper on defense and security to refer to the Russian assault, which has transformed four million Ukrainian citizens into refugees, fleeing a European nation devastated and partly occupied by troops from just across the border.

While there is clear intent from some European political leaders, there is also skepticism whether that willingness will convert intention into reality.

It remains to be seen whether there will be political leadership in that quest for European capability, and where that direction will come from.

Paris is keen to promote a European military capability – separate but working with Nato, while Berlin has pledged an unprecedented €100 billion ($111 billion) budget to upgrade German military, breaking with a deep and sustained pacifism after the second world war.

Berlin’s budget boost begs the question where leadership in Europe will come from, as Germany will outstrip France in arms spending, a French parliamentarian said.

Rise In Risk

“The war against Ukraine proves that Europe is even more in danger than we thought just a few months ago, when the first draft of this Strategic Compass was presented,” Josep Borrell, EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, said in a revised forward for the white paper published Feb. 21.

“This crisis has made it even clearer that we live in a world shaped by raw power politics, where everything is weaponized and where we face a fierce battle of narratives,” he said. “All these trends were already happening before the Ukraine war; now they are accelerating.”

Defense for Europe was one of the priorities of Emmanuel Macron, French head of state, when he took up in January the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, the policy-setting institution. “Europe must rise to the major economic, educational, migration and military challenges,” he said Dec. 9 2021, ahead of taking up the European Council post.

The European Council of the 27 member states adopted the Strategic Compass, which includes plans to form a 5,000-strong European military force, dubbed rapid deployment capacity. The policy paper also calls for “more and better” spending on defense, greater cooperation, and innovation to cut dependency. That EU plan sets a 10-year road map, seeking European sovereignty.

Macron has promoted in his five-year national mandate the concept of European sovereignty, to reduce a reliance on Nato, seen as dominated by the incumbent at the White House.

A chaotic U.S. evacuation from Kabul and lack of cooperation with allies heightened a perceived need among European partners to strengthen their ties.

There is a European perception of the need to develop the national arms industry, maintaining domestic jobs, rather than buying U.S. kit. The Strategic Compass reflects a view of some in France that Nato is an extension of the U.S. market, helping to boost the bottom line of American companies, while pursuing interoperability of equipment.

France Trims Arms Spending – Just For Now

The armed forces ministry had to scramble to explain why there was a quiet unscheduled €346 million cut in the 2022 defense budget of €41 billion, having to reassure the funds would be restored in July.

Some €202 million of the cut related to arms procurement, with the reduction arising from a switch in spending due to the Ukraine crisis, which pushed up energy prices and called for funds for receiving Ukrainian refugees.

Parliamentarian François Cornut-Gentille said in a March 29 op ed in afternoon daily Le Monde there was need for a “real debate” on defense spending, with the major presidential candidates saying they would increase the military budget.

France goes to the polls April 10 and 24 in a two-step election, with far-right candidate Marine Le Pen narrowing Macron’s lead in opinion polls. Le Pen has gained ground as she attacks Macron on the rising cost of living, a switch from the anti-immigration message of the National Rally party.

The chances Macron would keep his promise of a defense budget of €50 billion in 2025 are “extremely weak,” Cornut-Gentille said, due to economic problems arising from Covid. Even if funding were available, the services would still be unable to deter an aggressor, he said.

There is also need to rethink the “relevance” of big ticket programs, such as an aircraft carrier, medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, and future combat air system, he said. Space systems and hypersonic weapons were today’s equivalent of the tanks and aircraft which transformed combat in the 1930s. There should be a policy review on whether France had the right platform for nuclear weapons, with the parliamentarian saying there was no doubt France should hold on to the nuclear warhead.

Parliamentarians recently put the defense ministry on the back foot, pointing up a perceived lack of ammunition stock, with the forces running out within a couple of weeks in high intensity warfare. The ministry spokesman sought to calm fears, pointing up an extra €110 million for building 100 mm, 120 mm and 76 mm shells, with attention to improving production of heavy caliber shells due to problems in the export market.

Meanwhile, the French navy has put to sea three of its four-strong fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines, regional daily Le Télégramme reported. Usually, just the one nuclear missile boat would be at sea. In response to the war in Ukraine, France has deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the eastern Mediterranean, dispatched troops to Nato ally Romania, and sent Rafale fighter jets at fellow Nato ally Estonia, with defense minister Florence Parly visiting April 3 French air force personnel posted to the Amari air base in Estonia.

Macron has pledged to increase French military spending to two percent of gross domestic product by 2025, a target for Nato members.

Defense is second in national expenditure after the education budget.

German Budget Boost

A German commitment of hitting the two percent target of GDP will lead to €70 billion of annual arms spending, Cornut-Gentille said, bringing a “new context” for European leadership, as Berlin overtakes the Paris pledge of €50 billion.

Berlin spends some 1.3 percent of GDP on the services, which say they are poorly equipped.

Germany’s spending €100 billion on military modernization is part of the commitment to meet — and exceed — the two percent target, think tank Stockholm Peace Research Institute said March 25. That amount compares to €46.9 billion spent last year and will place Germany third in world arms spending, after the U.S. and China, and up from seventh in 2020.

German chancellor Olaf Scholz’s announcement of the hefty budget boost surprised the three parties in the government coalition, but they backed the policy shift, and opinion polls showed 69 percent support, up from 39 percent in 2018.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine shocked Germany, and the coalition partners — center-left Social Democrats, market-friendly Free Democrats, and the environmentalist Green party — rallied round Scholz, who dropped a postwar policy of working closely with Russia through Ostpolitik, and maintaining a minimalist military posture.
Tens of thousands of Germans took to the streets in anti-Putin protests, bearing Stop the War banners, and show support for Ukraine.

Putin’s invasion sparked talk of reviving German conscription and a parliamentary visit to Israel to consider ordering Arrow 3, a long-range, anti-missile system, as shield against a Russian attack. Such an arms order would be on top of German plans to buy the F-35 fighter jet to replace the Tornado, to carry U.S.-built atomic bombs for Nato.

Skepticism on the EU Plan

While the war in Ukraine has sharpened an EU search for military capability, such a quest merely repeats the past and lacks credibility where it matters – the commanders, an analyst said. Nato rules the reality game, not the EU.

“What really dooms the operational side of the (Strategic) Compass’s agenda is, of course, the same thing that has crimped the EU’s military aspirations from the beginning – the reluctance of top brass across Europe to take the enterprise seriously,” Nick Witney, senior policy fellow at think tank European Council for Foreign Relations, said March 31 in a research note.

“NATO has always been where ‘serious’ military business is done, where they rub shoulders with (and are told what to do by) the mighty United States,” he said in the note titled, “The EU’s Strategic Compass: Brand new, already obsolete.”

The EU plan lacked credibility as there had been a post-Kosovo plan for a 60,000 intervention force, followed by talk of 1,500-strong battle groups, he said. Neither came to fruition, casting doubt on the EU plan for a 5,000-strong force.

There is a “rejuvenated” Nato, backed by the U.S., but Washington will soon look to the “Europeans to provide their own defense,” with little more than American supply of intelligence and nuclear deterrence, he said. A genuine “member state-owned” drive for defense integration was needed. While there has been discussion, there is little to show for it.

It remained to be seen where that leadership might come from, he said, perhaps a partnership from Scholz and Macron.

More likely, Europeans would wait to see what the U.S. would tell them what to do, while switching focus to the Pacific, he said.

Europe Counts

Another view lies in a larger European role in Nato, and the need for the U.K. to find a place alongside Europe while being outside the E.U.

There is much uncertainty on the future of Nato, and whether the U.S. can be relied upon to back the alliance, a March 29 op ed in London daily The Times said. There is the prospect of Trump’s return to power, the right oscillating between “sneaking admiration” for Putin and Hungarian leader Viktor Orban and insisting America should not be pushed around, the op ed said. Meanwhile, the left is uncertain on militarily supporting liberal democracy, and hesitant on close ties to a European past steeped in “white imperialism.”

“What all this means is that Europe cannot rely on the leadership and support of the U.S. in future as it has done in the past. That leadership and support might be forthcoming. But it also might not,” the op ed said.

There is a call for Europeans to stand up for Europe. “It is perfectly obvious now that we face security challenges in Europe that we must tackle as Europeans,” the op ed said. But it was difficult “to forge a European defense identity” and for the U.K. to find its place after having left the E.U.

There is a call for London to work through Nato “to build common European defence aims” that the U.K. previously rejected, as that was seen as reducing Britain’s independence. “If we do not engage, then these policies will be decided without us.”

By James Durso

The U.S. and its main Persian Gulf partners, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have had a falling out in recent days.

The causes are both immediate and long-term and each party feels the blame lies with those ingrates on the other side.

Recently, the kingdom and the UAE refused to pump more oil to make up for the loss of Russian oil in the market in the wake of the war in Ukraine, and help to reduce the price at the pump in the U.S.

Both countries signaled their support for OPEC+, which counts Russia as a member, and the UAE oil minister explained, “We need their [U.S.] understanding that what we’re doing is to the benefit of the consumers, to the benefit of the United States and to the benefit of the consumers worldwide.”

In addition, the UAE abstained from a UN Security Council (UNSC) vote condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine, reportedly in frustration over U.S. the response to attacks by Houthi rebels on the emirate, though it later voted for a UN General Assembly motion condemning the attack.

Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) avoided U.S. president Joe Biden by being a no-show at the G20 meeting in March, and not being on the line during Biden’s recent phone call with Saudi King Salman.

But MBS did manage to pick up the receiver to talk to Russian president Vladimir Putin, and the kingdom invited China’s leader Xi Jinping to visit the kingdom this Spring. (UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) also ghosted Biden when the White House wanted to discuss the oil crisis.) MBS shrugged off Biden’s negative opinion of him with, “Simply, I do not care.”

During his visit to Riyadh, Xi will be sure to advocate that the kingdom should accept Chinese yuan for oil sales in a move to minimize China’s exposure to the U.S. financial sector and increase its financial leverage.

This has been talked about for a long time, but the time may finally be right as thinking about the end of the dollar’s dominance no longer seems far-fetched.

If the Saudis agree and lock in a long-term forward contract, Xi would return to Beijing in triumph before the 20th Party Congress, where he expects to be named to a third term as China’s paramount leader, his position made unassailable with the yuan enshrined as a petro currency, and the position of the US Dollar weakened.

Now, who wouldn’t want that IOU in his pocket?

Both sides should consider practical steps to get the relationship on a better footing, but what should Washington consider if it moves to do so?

First, how you treat your friends is more important than how you treat your enemies.

MBS and MBZ likely absorbed the appropriate lessons when the U.S. quickly dropped longtime U.S. client Hosni Mubarak after two weeks of protests. Washington then supported a UNSC resolution it then used as justification to attack Libya, causing the capture and death of the leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, the destruction of the country, and an unprecedented refugee crisis in Africa and Europe. In 2016, when some guy named Biden worked in the White House, then-president Barack Obama supported efforts to oust Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

More recently, the U.S. limited arms sales to Saudi Arabia to “defensive” weapons only, in an attempt to curb the kingdom’s fight against the Iranian-sponsored Houthi militia. Then the Biden administration reversed the Trump administration designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which may have encouraged the movement to increase attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. sale of the F-35 fighter to the UAE has been delayed over U.S. concerns about the surveillance ability of China’s 5G wireless network located near UAE airfields, and the U.S. desire for operational restrictions, which the emirate understands to mean it can use the aircraft to support U.S. foreign policy, but not its independent moves.

Recently, the UAE, after a U.S. demand, terminated a Chinese-funded $1 billion project in the Khalifa Port Free Trade Zone the U.S. said had military applications. U.S. President Joe Biden spoke about the project to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed who said he heard Biden “loud and clear,” though the emirate later declared, “our position remains the same, that the facilities were not military facilities.”

This must seem like Groundhog Day for the UAE.

In 2006, Dubai-owned DP World was forced to back out of an approved purchase of port management contracts at six major U.S. seaports after the U.S. Congress opposed the deal. Sixteen years later the UAE is learning it can’t even conclude a seaport project at home without a U.S. intervention.

As a result of the U.S. arm twisting, the UAE may have to make an offsetting accommodation to China, its top trade partner, that the U.S. will like even less, a prime example of “it seemed like a good idea at the time.”

The UAE and Saudi Arabia have no doubt noted that Israel, America’s top ally in the region, also came in for its share of abuse by Washington, so at least there’s misery in company.

In January, as the Russian troop buildup on Ukraine’s border continued, the U.S. withdrew its support for the EastMed natural gas pipeline from Israel to Greece. In 2020, Washington pushed Israel to stop Chinese investments in large infrastructure projects, most recently the new Haifa Port, the largest container port in Israel.

And the U.S. administration appears heedless of Iran’s declaration that Israel is “doomed to disappear.”  Or maybe it just doesn’t care.

Most distressing for the U.S. friends in the Gulf, is Washington’s mad dash to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was originally negotiated without any role for Iran’s neighbors, who will be most immediately threated by an unconstrained Tehran. The JCPOA negotiating team did include far-away Germany, likely as a sop to Europe, though, ironically, Germany was a source of much of the nuclear technology on Iran’s clandestine shopping list.

And recently, the crown princes (and the world) witnessed America’s livestreamed retreat in Afghanistan, as it blithely abandoned two decades of effort, $2 trillion dollars, and several thousand of its Afghan helpers and U.S. citizens to the mercies of the Taliban.

That was likely a clarifying moment for the princes who now knew that all that shona ba shona (“shoulder to shoulder”) stuff in Kabul was just talk, and they would be wise to diversify their portfolios.

Next, insult diplomacy doesn’t work.

Joe Biden famously called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” with “very little social [sic] redeeming value” for the killing of activist Jamal Khashoggi, and which should make for some awkward moments if Biden ever has to visit the kingdom.

Now, MBS no doubt commissioned Khashoggi’s killing, but he’s famously thin-skinned and is on the cusp of a multi-decade run as the leader of Saudi Arabia.

And the U.S. has no ability to influence succession planning in the kingdom, which was plain when Washington’s favorite, then-crown prince Muhammad bin Nayef, was ousted.

(Pro tip: a political figure who’s the public favorite of foreign security services doesn’t stand a chance.)

Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump, got much better results as he wasn’t averse to transactional diplomacy and he understood that do deal with a crown prince, he had to send his own crown prince, Jared Kushner, someone with walk-in privileges at the Oval Office.

He managed to get the UAE to sign on to the Abraham Accords, which probably required Saudi assent. Trump also appealed to the Saudis to reverse a planned oil export increase – which they did, even though it aided the U.S. oil and gas industry.

President Ronald Reagan likewise got the Saudis to act in America’s interest when he urged them to help defeat the Communists by depressing the price of oil, slashing the Soviet Union’s revenues and accelerating the collapse of the USSR. Both presidents understood that dealing with the royals required a personal touch or the opportunity to be the preferred partner in an epochal undertaking, i.e., destroying Godless Communism.

Today, MBS knows he can outlast the outbursts from the older man whose health challenges are increasingly obvious, though Biden’s deteriorating health poses some risk to the kingdom.

America’s manic pursuit of a new nuclear deal with Iran will leave Saudi Arabia and the UAE exposed to Iran’s export of revolution in pursuit of regional hegemony.

Bolstered by access to embargoed overseas cash, and the de-listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Iran’s moves will cause these friends to hedge by increasing trade and cooperation with China, Russia, and India, and not cooperating with U.S. policies when they have no stake in the outcome, i.e., Russia vs Ukraine.

Biden’s policy is seen as a continuation of Obama’s intent that Saudi Arabia needs to “share” the region with Iran, an Iran that has declared, “there will be no trace of Al Saud in Saudi Arabia by 2030.”

In late 2021, news reports indicated Saudi Arabia is building, with China’s help, solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Though the effort pre-dates the Biden administration, the state of the kingdom’s relations with the U.S. may encourage Riyadh to consider development of non-conventional warheads.

Not surprisingly, Saudi observers see the U.S. pursuit of Iran as the end of the relationship.

Mohammed al-Yahya, the former al-Arabiya editor-in-chief, declared, “When Barack Obama negotiated the nuclear deal with Iran, we Saudis understood him to be seeking the breakup of a 70-year marriage…Why should America’s regional allies help Washington contain Russia in Europe when Washington is strengthening Russia and Iran in the Middle East?”

And while the Saudis fret, Dubai is welcoming Russians (and their flight cash) and may have soon have to grapple with the “problems” of an overheated luxury property market and a shortage of Russian-speaking salesmen at luxury car dealerships.

Diversifying the portfolio is more than ignoring U.S. requests to pump more oil, pricing oil in yuan, and welcoming Russians.

It’s also about exercising autonomy by, say, hosting Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in the UAE, much to Washington’s ire, which will also give Moscow a foreign policy win in its support for Damascus, a diplomatic partner of Moscow since 1944 (Moscow was the first foreign capital to establish diplomatic relations with Riyadh – in 1926 – though the relationship included a 54-year break.) The Emirati view: “Our new approach emphasizes diplomacy, de-escalation and engagement … and we put our own interests first.”

But can we still be friends?

As it looks to the multi-polar future, Washington should consider that its securitization of the relationships in the Gulf has created the expectation in the Gulf countries, who have relied on the U.S. for 45% of their arms imports in recent years, that all that cash was buying a security guarantee.

The U.S., which was too busy counting the money, may not have understood the expectation it created so, when it turned its back on Afghanistan, made concession after concession to woo Tehran, and demanded the Gulf states fall in line with its anti-Russia policy, the loss of confidence was serious and Russia, China, and India may be more reliable partners for the long haul.

James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

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