CH-53K King Stallion Lift

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on CH-53K King Stallion Lift
07/06/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron (VMX) 1 and Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 24 transport a Light Armored Vehicle 25 with a CH-53K King Stallion helicopter at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, April 27, 2022.

The CH-53K King Stallion, the Marine Corps’ newest heavy-lift helicopter, can lift up to 36,000 pounds of equipment, holds up to 30 troops, and features a computerized fly-by-wire system for semi=autonomous piloting. CLB-24 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Logistics Group, the logistics combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION NEW RIVER, NC, UNITED STATES

04.26.2022

Video by Pvt. Rowdy Vanskike 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

And in an article we published on December 8, 2020, we highlighted how different the CH-53K is from its predecessors.

To the casual observer, the Super Stallion and the King Stallion look like the same aircraft.

One of the challenges in understanding how different the CH-53K is from the CH-53E is the numbering part.

If it were called CH-55 perhaps one would get the point that these are very different air platforms, with very different capabilities.

What they have in common, by deliberate design, is a similar logistical footprint, so that they could operate similarly off of amphibious ships or other ships in the fleet for that matter.

But the CH-53 is a mechanical aircraft, which most assuredly the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is not.

In blunt terms, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is faster, carries more kit, can distribute its load to multiple locations without landing, is built as a digital aircraft from the ground up and can leverage its digitality for significant advancements in how it is maintained, how it operates in a task force, how it can be updated, and how it could work with unmanned systems or remotes.

These capabilities taken together create a very different lift platform than is the legacy CH-53E. In a strategic environment where force mobility is informing capabilities across the combat spectrum, it is hard to understate the value of a lift platform, notably one which can talk and operate digitally, in carving out new tactical capabilities with strategic impacts.

The lift side of the equation within a variety of environments can be stated succinctly. The King Stallion will lift 27,000 lbs. external payload, deliver it 110 nm to a high-hot zone, loiter, and return to the ship with fuel to spare. What that means is JLTV’s (22,600-lb.), up-armored HMMWV, and other heavier tactical cargos go to shore by air, rather than by LCAC or other slower sea lift means. For less severe ambient conditions or shorter distances than this primary mission, the 53K can carry up to 36,000 lbs.

With ever increasing lift requirements and advancing threats in the battlefield, there is no other vertical lift aircraft available that meets emerging heavy lift needs. There are a lot of platforms that can blow things up or kill people, but for heavy lift, the CH-53K is the only option.

For the Marines, this is a core enabling capability. The CH-53K is equipped with a triple external hook system, which will be a significant external operations enabler for the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The single, dual and triple external cargo hook capability allows for the transfer of three independent external loads to three separate supported units in three separate landing zones in one single sortie without having to return to a ship or other logistical hub.

The external system can be rapidly reconfigured between dual point, single point loads, and triple hook configurations in order to best support the ground scheme of maneuver.

All three external hooks can be operated independently supporting true distributed operations. For example, three infantry companies widely dispersed across the battlefield can be rapidly resupplied with fuel, ammo, water or other supplies directly at their location—during the same sortie—eliminating the requirement for the helicopter to make multiple trips or for cargo from a helicopter to be transloaded to ground vehicles for redistribution—saving ground vehicle fuel and MAGTF exposure to ground threats.

The CH-53K’s triple external hook system is a new capability for the Marine Corps and an improvement in capability and efficiency over the legacy aircraft it replaces making it a game changer for providing heavy lift in support of combat, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, notably in a distributed operational space.

The CH-53K design integrates the latest technologies to meet the USMC requirement for triple the lift of the predecessor Super Stallion while still maintaining the size and footprint to remain compatible with today’s ships and strategic air transport platforms.

The aircraft is fully marinized for shipboard operations, including automatic blade fold and design robustness to meet new and extreme requirements for salt-fog and corrosion. It is already certified for transport in C-5 (2 x 53Ks) and C-17 (1 x 53K) aircraft and also includes an integral aerial refueling probe for long range missions or self-deployment.

The work process is very different as well, because of support for palletization. This may sound like logistic geek language, but it is about speed to deliver to the force for its operating efficacy. Given that speed to operation is a key metric for supporting the strategic shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is a key enabler for the new work flow essential to combat success.

The digital piece is a foundational element and why it is probably better thought of as a CH-55. This starts with the fly-by-wire flight controls. The CH-53K is the first and only heavy lift fly-by-wire helicopter.

The CH-53K’s fly-by-wire is a leap in technology from legacy mechanical flight control systems and keeps safety and survivability at the core of the Kilo’s design while providing a portal to an optionally piloted capability and autonomy.

The CH-53K’s fly-by-wire design drastically reduces pilot workload and minimizes exposure to threats or danger, particularly during complex missions or challenging aircraft maneuvers like low light level externals in a degraded visual environment allowing the pilot to manage and lead the mission vice focusing on physically controlling the aircraft.

The fly-by-wire design further complements safety and survivability through physically separated Flight Control Computers, separated cockpit controls with an Active Inceptor System, and load limiting control laws that will extend component lives. Other cargo Helicopters originated in the late 50s/early 60s, predating the emergence of Aircraft Survivability as an engineering discipline.

Not leaving anything to chance, the overall CH-53K survivability process includes an extensive, ongoing Live Fire Test Program, which started at a component level, and culminates with a full-up aircraft test with turning rotors. The CH-53K is the only heavy lift helicopter designed from the ground up to survive in battle, reflecting a 21st century level of survivability.

In addition, the CH-53K was designed from the start in an all-digital environment, taking advantage of virtual reality tools to optimize both manufacture and support of the aircraft throughout its life cycle. Fleet Marine personnel were engaged from the beginning of the design process to ensure the aircraft was designed for supportability and reduced O&S costs–from component access, support equipment, animated work instruction and electronic publications to the system integration with Sikorsky’s fleet management tools that were originally developed to support its commercial S-92 aircraft fleet.

The S-92 has demonstrated greater than 95% availability for a fleet of over 300 aircraft which now boast near 1.5 million flight hours, in harsh North Sea and other off shore Oil & Gas environments. Use of data analytics (“big data”) has proven to save money in the commercial fleet and these same tools are already in place for the CH-53K and being proven on the CH-53E in the interim.

The CH-53K’s triple redundant fly-by-wire design improves maintainability significantly through fault Detection and isolation capability providing the ability to detect failures in actuators and other electrical and electromechanical components including hydraulic leak detection with fault isolation.

While the CH-53K is bigger and far more capable in many important ways, it’s also smaller in terms of its logistics footprint and provides a best O&S value over its entire lifetime. The CH-53K’s logistics footprint is 1/3 less by volume with a 5,000 cubic feet reduction and 1/4 less by weight with a 25, 000 reduction compared to the legacy CH-53E. That’s equivalent to the storage volume of a 2-car garage and the weight of a two up-armored HMMWVs. In the cargo world, that’s 2 standard shipping containers, which is space and available payload on a ship or less equipment to transport to an austere support base.

The design reduces the maintenance workload as well. With no mechanical rigging requirement and fewer moving parts leading to fewer failures, the CH-53K provides a significant reduction in maintenance man hours, a 35% improvement in Mean Time to Repair, and ultimately increased readiness and availability to the warfighter.

Organizational-level maintenance peculiar support equipment for the CH‑53K is based on common and CH-53E support equipment in order to reduce the new peculiar support equipment required for the CH-53K. Only 150 items of peculiar support equipment were developed to support organizational-level maintenance, which is 146 less pieces of support equipment or a 52% footprint reduction compared to the CH-53E. Additionally the CH-53K support equipment was designed to reduce and optimize equipment weight and life cycle cost while material selection and coating changes from legacy aircraft to eliminate use of hazardous materials and provide better environmental protection from corrosion.

The T408-GE-400 engine brings more capability to the CH-53K through 57% more horsepower with a smaller logistics footprint compared to the T64 it replaces in the same size package but with 63% fewer parts. The T408 supports engine on aircraft maintenance and was designed to maximize two levels of maintenance—Organizational to Depot—with all on-wing engine maintenance being performed using the common tools in flight line toolbox further reducing the logistics footprint and maintenance man hours while increasing availability and readiness of the CH-53K.

The CH-53K sets the standard and is the 1st and only true 21st Century Heavy Lift Helicopter.

To be more specific, the current heavy / upper medium lift cargo helicopters that the CH-53K replaces—legacy Chinook, CH-53 A/D/G Sea Stallion, CH-53E Super Stallion and their engines—were literally designed in the mid-20th century.

In the more than half century that has elapsed between the design of these legacy aircraft and the first flight of the CH-53K in 2015, there have been significant advancements in helicopter design and manufacturing.

The CH-53K is superior to its predecessors, not by engineering miracles, but by over a half century of steady engineering and technology progress that was designed and incorporated into the CH-53K from the ground up.

The King Stallion is a totally new helicopter that leapfrogs the CH-53E design to improve operational capability, interoperability, reliability, maintainability, survivability, and cost of ownership.

Finally, the CH-53K is nearing completion of testing and well into production. The program remains on target for a 2021 IOC and 2023 deployment that meets the USMC’s operational needs. The King Stallion is the only aircraft that meets the heavy lift requirements for the USMC, supports the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, and provides that safety, survivability, supportability and growth capability to meet the service’s needs for the many decades to come.

A good sense of how the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) intersects with the new operating environment was highlighted in interviews I did in both Pax River and Marine Corps Air Station Yuma.

In an interview earlier this summer with a senior MAWTS-1 officer, we discussed the coming of TAGRS and of the CH-53K to the Marine Corps and how these new capabilities would allow for enhanced FARP capabilities and expeditionary basing support.

In that interview with Maj Steve Bancroft, Aviation Ground Support (AGS) Department Head, MAWTS-1, MCAS Yuma, we discussed the way ahead on FARPs enabled by TAGR and CH-53Ks.

Excerpts from that interview follow:

There were a number of takeaways from that conversation which provide an understanding of the Marines are working their way ahead currently with regard to the FARP contribution to distributed operations.

The first takeaway is that when one is referring to a FARP, it is about an ability to provide a node which can refuel and rearm aircraft. But it is more than that. It is about providing capability for crew rest, resupply and repair to some extent.

The second takeaway is that the concept remains the same, but the tools to do the concept are changing. Clearly, one example is the nature of the fuel containers being used. In the land wars, the basic fuel supply was being carried by a fuel truck to the FARP location. Obviously, that is not a solution for Pacific operations.

What is being worked now at MAWTS-1 is a much mobile solution set. Currently, they are working with a system whose provenance goes back to the 1950s and is a helicopter expeditionary refueling system or HERS system. This legacy kit limits mobility as it is very heavy and requires the use of several hoses and fuel separators.

Obviously, this solution is too limiting so they are working a new solution set. They are testing a mobile refueling asset called TAGRS or a Tactical Aviation Ground Refueling system.

As one source put it: “The TAGRS and its operators are capable of being air-inserted making the asset expeditionary. It effectively eliminates the complications of embarkation and transportation of gear to the landing zone.”

The third takeaway was that even with a more mobile and agile pumping solution, there remains the basic challenge of the weight of fuel as a commodity. A gallon of gas is about 6.7 pounds and when aggregating enough fuel at a Forward Air Refueling Point or FARP, the challenge is how to get adequate supplies to a FARP for its mission to be successful.

To speed up the process, the Marines are experimenting with more disposable supply containers to provide for enhanced speed of movement among FARPs within an extended battlespace. They have used helos and KC-130Js to drop pallets of fuel as one solution to this problem.

The effort to speed up the creation and withdrawal from FARPs is a task being worked by the Marines at MAWTS-1 as well. In effect, they are working a more disciplined cycle of arrival and departure from FARPs. And the Marines are exercising ways to bring in a FARP support team in a single aircraft to further the logistical footprint and to provide for more rapid engagement and disengagement as well.

The fourth takeaway is that innovative delivery solutions can be worked going forward.

When I met with Col. Perrin at Pax River, we discussed how the CH-53K as a smart aircraft could manage airborne MULES to support resupply to a mobile base. As Col. Perrin noted in our conversation: “The USMC has done many studies of distributed operations and throughout the analyses it is clear that heavy lift is an essential piece of the ability to do such operations.”

And not just any heavy lift – but heavy lift built around a digital architecture.

Clearly, the CH-53E being more than 30 years old is not built in such a manner; but the CH-53K is. What this means is that the CH-53K “can operate and fight on the digital battlefield.”

And because the flight crew are enabled by the digital systems onboard, they can focus on the mission rather than focusing primarily on the mechanics of flying the aircraft. This will be crucial as the Marines shift to using unmanned systems more broadly than they do now. For example, it is clearly a conceivable future that CH-53Ks would be flying a heavy lift operation with unmanned “mules” accompanying them. Such manned-unmanned teaming requires a lot of digital capability and bandwidth, a capability built into the CH-53K.

If one envisages the operational environment in distributed terms, this means that various types of sea bases, ranging from large deck carriers to various types of Maritime Sealift Command ships, along with expeditionary bases, or FARPs or FOBS, will need to be connected into a combined combat force.

To establish expeditionary bases, it is crucial to be able to set them up, operate and to leave such a base rapidly or in an expeditionary manner (sorry for the pun). This will be virtually impossible to do without heavy lift, and vertical heavy lift, specifically.

Put in other terms, the new strategic environment requires new operating concepts; and in those operating concepts, the CH-53K provides significant requisite capabilities. So why not the possibility of the CH-53K flying in with a couple of MULES which carried fuel containers; or perhaps building a vehicle which could come off of the cargo area of the CH-53K and move on the operational area and be linked up with TAGRS?

As this potential development highlights, if we called it a CH-55, we would grasp which the coming of the CH-53K has a significant impact on the way ahead for mobile expeditionary basing, which is itself a key building block in the way ahead for the integrated distributed force. Or put another way, multiple basig is a key capability required for operations in the extended but contested battlespace; and the CH-55 can provide a significant capability to enable multiple basing,

 

 

 

Exercise Hedgehog 22

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U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. William Horton, an unmanned aircraft systems operator and the Stalker team assigned to Task Force 61/2, assembles a satellite during Exercise Hedgehog 22 near Saaremaa, Estonia, May 19, 2022.

Task Force 61/2 is participating in the Estonian-led exercise Siil 22 (Hedgehog 22 in English). Siil 22 brings together members of the Estonian Defense Force and U.S. Sailors and Marines under Task Force 61/2 to enhance

Allied interoperability and preserve security and stability in the Baltic region.

SAAREMAA, ESTONIA

05.19.2022

Video by Sgt. Dylan Chagnon U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet

Europe, the War in Ukraine and Shaping a Way Ahead: The Perspective of General (Retired) Petr Pavel

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Europe, the War in Ukraine and Shaping a Way Ahead: The Perspective of General (Retired) Petr Pavel

By Robbin Laird

On July 3, 2022, General (Retired) Petr Pavel, the former head of NATO’s Military Committee, and now candidate for President of the Czech Republic, agreed to be interviewed by a team led Joël-François Dumont. Joining the interview team were Françoise Thom, the noted French Russian expert, Colonel (Retired) Joel Bros, former French Special Forces and former military attaché to Czech Republic and by myself.

In this article, a number of takeaways from the discussion are highlighted (with the biography of the General to be found at the end of the article), but for the complete discussion readers need to go to the European Security website.

Pavel underscored that what is unfolding in Ukraine today is a product of the long-range perspectives and policies of President Putin. He noted: “Russia still believes that the very possession of nuclear arsenal makes it a superpower, and enables it to dictate to other countries how to live and how to arrange their international relations.”

The Russians take no blame for their actions, but argue that the West is the trigger of their actions. He underscored that “They believe that they’re perfectly right. All the moves they do are well justified and the vast majority of Russian population stands behind President Putin in this belief. For all of us, it means that the situation international and security situation has fundamentally changed.

“Russia is no longer just a strategic competitor. It’s a direct threat to our security. President Putin, went so far by declaring a possible use of nuclear weapons against United Kingdom, France and other countries, threatening sovereign countries, including nuclear powers. It’s not an issue for us to think if Russia is bluffing or if they are just posing threats, they are determined to use these weapons and they expressed their determination several times pointing to existential threats, but without being very specific.”

“When we look at the breadth of Russian strategic thinking, we have to understand that anything that would harm Russian perception of being a global power could be taken as existential threat to Russia and as a justification for using nuclear weapons, tactical or any other level.

“But I believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even smallest tactical nuclear weapon would be breaching the threshold and would fundamentally change the whole paradigm of our security thinking.

“We don’t have to necessarily defeat Russia but we face the challenge of dealing with Russian thinking that whatever we do in terms of coming closer to them would be understood as our weakness and sooner or later, we would see them attack another country.”

He argued that the war in Ukraine was having a significant impact on a “reshuffling in Europe” whereby the states most directly familiar with Russia and closest to Russia have views different from key states like France and Germany.

He argued that “we see a new, I wouldn’t call it fraction line, but potential division within Europe where countries bordering Russia such as Bulgaria, Romania, Baltic countries, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic are almost of the same opinion on how to handle the crisis. That means being very tough within the framework of sanctions against Russia, being extremely helpful to Ukraine in terms of humanitarian assistance including military assistance.”

The exceptions to this are the states of Hungary and Turkey, as he noted, which form “special cases” as he noted.

He added that one outcome of the war in Ukraine could well be Ukraine becoming part of the European Union, which if this was to happen would enhance the weight of the Russian threat focused countries within the European Union.

He very clearly underscored the importance of working relationships in Europe so that new fault lines do not open up on the continent when facing the Russian challenge, as this would only aid the Russians in the long-term competition.

“That’s why I believe that one of the most important tasks of our current presidency, which Czech Republic took over the 1st of July, would be to keep Europe together and find ways to handle the crisis in Ukraine and relationships with Russia. Because if we let ourselves become divided then Russia would prevail and that was their primary objective from the very beginning. We need to bring our understanding of situation to the same foundation so that we don’t take different conclusions and potentially wrong decisions.”

He was asked about the impact of Finland coming into NATO and triggering a broader European rethink on the direct defense of Europe. He felt that Finland and Sweden coming into NATO could very much aide the kind of rethinking necessary both in NATO and in Europe.

“NATO over the years has become probably too politically correct in our own way that we were circling around the problems without being able to identify true nature. I was facing that situation even in a military committee when I asked my colleagues to come back to the basics and speak as soldiers, not as politicians or diplomats. At least around the table so that we understand each other.

“I believe that Fins and Swedes will bring a lot of direct language, not necessarily politically incorrect, but very direct language. And especially with regard to Russia, the Fins are very well respected. Because even though Russians won the Finnish War in three months war, it cost them such huge losses that they, remember the war with Fins up to present days.

“So even though Finland is a small country by geography, it’s a big country by their heart and approach and I believe that it may change the atmosphere in NATO for better because we would probably come back to calling problems by their proper names and finding straight and direct solutions to current problems.”

Europe certainly could strengthen conventional defense capabilities and shape enhanced horizontal conventional defense escalation options, notably with the possibility of an integrated Nordic defense.

But the nuclear challenge remains significant, and an open question of how NATO’s nuclear countries would address this challenge in more than a declaratory sense, such as was done at the recent NATO summit, where we learned yet again that NATO is a nuclear alliance.

That is good, but what modernization and training efforts will be generated to convey to the Russians that their strategy of “escalate to de-escalate” will not work?

This is how General (Retired) Pavel handled this challenge:

“Russians have developed the principle escalate to deescalate. We know it. They are very skillful in using it. I believe that we haven’t done good job facing Russian deterrents by using nuclear weapons because when President Putin and Minister Lavrov are starting talking on increasing level of readiness of Russian strategic nuclear forces and so on and potential strategic strikes to Western cities or even blowing the whole countries out of the surface, our reaction was a little bit scared.

“I believe that we should remind Russia that we have a nuclear weapons too and we are also determined to use them if we have to and that Russian cities are on our target list as well. But we are reasonable enough not to do it and not to threaten any country by using our nuclear weapons, but we only remind Russia that they are not the only country with nuclear weapons and with target lists.

“The Russians only understand our strength. And I’m always trying to explain in our debates with the Czech public, when I speak on deterrence, that the deterrence is not about frightening anyone, it’s not threatening. It’s simply reminding that we have the capacity and making our adversaries of our proficiency and willingness to use our capabilities. That’s the very substance of deterrence and we haven’t used it in such a way to answer Russian threats.”

We discussed the recent decisions made at the NATO Summit in Madrid to increase both force size and shift force deployments forward. Pavel welcomed these developments but cautioned that they will take time but must also actually be done and not just remaining as a summit declaration.

He was very clear that whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine after that outcome is sorted out, the task of rebuilding Ukraine including its defense capabilities would remain as a priority for Europe and NATO. “Once this war is over Ukraine military will have to be consolidated and provided with the equipment that will be interoperable, that would be manageable in logistic terms, but also in training terms.

“As we aid Ukraine now, we will have to think of for future, how to equip and how to handle Ukraine and their capabilities in future. It’s clear that their accession to NATO will not be in question for time, but at the same time it’ll be in our interest that Ukraine has a strong enough military, capable to deal with their security issues on their own but it’ll also in our interest that Ukraine remains our partner now that it is interoperable with our own forces.”

He was then asked about his own country, the Czech Republic, and shaping their way ahead in light of the current defense and security situation in Europe. He commented that “the Czech Republic went too far in reducing our defense expenditures after the end of the Soviet Union. At one point, and it was in times when I was Chief of Defense, we went even below 1% of GDP and the deficiencies in our capabilities were so serious that I confronted that time President Vaclav Klaus, because I saw that the capacity of military was so insufficient that we wouldn’t be able to meet even basic tasks.

“Since then, number of problems have been dealt with, but still the pace of modernization is not fast enough to meet the challenge. Now with new government, it seems that we will be able to finalize some modernization projects but given the pressure of state finances because of COVID crisis and now the war, I have some concerns that this government will be able to meet these commitments.

“Our primary goal must be to meet our capability target from NATO defense planning. And that’s heavy brigade equipped with tracked APCs ready by the end of 2025. Because this is our main contribution to NATO collective defense and also our contribution to increasing the capacity of NATO forces.

“Czech Republic contributes beyond its weight to the battle groups formed in our Eastern border, both in the Baltic countries and we are also taking command and significant contribution to Slovakian battle group.

“We also have contributed to air policing to multi countries and a number of other activities. And from what I hear from our government, it remains a priority, they are determined to keep the pace of our contributions and to meet also commitments made within NATO defense planning. However, I see that it’ll be a great challenge to succeed fully.”

The photos show General (Retired) Petr Pavel’s time in service as Chief of Staff of the Czech Republic armed forces or his time as Chairman of the NATO military committee. We credit the provision of these photos to @Anna Šolcová.

Biography of Petr Pavel

General Pavel was appointed Chairman of the NATO Military Committee on 26 June 2015.

From July 2012 to May 2015 General Petr Pavel served as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, the highest ranking officer in the Czech Army and the principal military adviser to the Czech Government. In September 2014, General Pavel was elected  Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

General Pavel graduated from the Army College in Vyškov, Czech Republic in 1983 and since then has spent a large part of his military career holding positions in Special Forces, Operations and Intelligence divisions. Throughout his career, General Pavel has held a range of positions from Deputy Military and Air Attaché of the Czech Republic in Belgium to Commander Special Forces to Deputy Director Operations Division at the Ministry of Defence,

In addition, General Pavel has also held his share of positions in International and National joint staffs representing the Czech Armed Forces as the National Military Representative to the US Central Command, as well as National Military Representative of the Czech Republic to SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

Furthering his education in the United Kingdom, General Pavel has studied at the Staff College, Camberley, the Royal College of Defence Studies, London and obtained an M.A. in International Relations from King’s College, London.

And here was an article in CZ Defence published July 20, 2019 which described his career from the standpoint of his memoirs:

The book brings a subheading “In the front line”. The Czechs loved General Pavel when he was the Chief of the General Staff. The world has known him as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. He found a way to soldiers’ hearts a long time ago thanks to his heroic action in former Yugoslavia. But nobody could suspect that he, as a kid, was suffered from ADHD. So primary school teachers cursed him. And much more…

This all has been written in a compact form not only by Petr Pavel, but also by his farther, sister, wife, sons and comrade-in-arms. His father, also an army officer, brought up his son in military style – he continually entrusted him with the tasks, which exceeded the boy’s age by demandingness.  And sent him to play hockey and to train gymnastics. On the threshold of adolescence, Petr went to a Military gymnasium and ensured a parental consent to jump with parachute.

He got here the best preparation so that he was able to assert himself in prestige reconnaissance units. At that time Czechoslovakia was part of the Warsaw Pact, but the ice was starting to melt. Young Petr Pavel did the right think when – apart of obligatory study of Russian – studied English as well. 

Thus, at the beginning of the ‘90s, he was one of the first, then Czechoslovakian, soldiers who participated in a foreign mission. Together with a unit consisting from volunteers, he set off to rescue French soldiers from captivity. In the middle of a ragging battle between the Serbians and Croats. The popular Czech slogan “We can come to an arrangement” didn’t work so much as the rescue team wished. In spite of this, all were survived, the prisoners were rescued. 

And only in the memoir the fans of General Pavel have a chance to find out all details of this adventure. For completeness’ sake, these details are additionally described in separate chapter by Colonel Karel Klinovský, a participant of the mission and the best friend. Not less interesting is to look at the general’s family life. He is relatively self-critical and admits that he hasn’t always had enough time for his loved ones. In spite of this, from our conversation with his family, it is evident mutual respect, tolerance, love and never-dying support.

General Pavel also does a big favour in the closing chapters, which describe his service in NATO, and, thus, functioning of this organization, its attitude towards different recent or actual conflicts. We can even say that a reader acquires two books at one stroke – a biography and a textbook of the global security policy.

Just two questions remain now: When a big foreign entertainment company shoots a picture about a rescue of the French contingent by an underestimated Czechoslovak unit? And when the memoires of General Peter Pavel can be issued at least in English translation for foreign readers?

And in the video below, General Petr Pavel is seen closing out his tenure as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee on June 29, 2018,

 

 

 

USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4)

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07/04/2022

CIVITAVECCHIA, Italy (May 9, 2022)

Sailors assigned to the Lewis B. Puller expeditionary sea base USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4) went on a five month deployment.

Hershel “Woody” Williams is rotationally deployed to the U.S. Naval Forces Africa area of operations, employed by U.S. Sixth Fleet to defend U.S., Allied and Partner interests.

05.09.2022

Video by Petty Officer 1st Class Fred Gray IV U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet

The Evolving Japanese-Australian Defense Relationship

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Evolving Japanese-Australian Defense Relationship
07/03/2022

By Graeme Dobell

Australia is removing the qualifications from its quasi-alliance with Japan.

The visit to Japan by Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles is another step in the fading of the qualifiers: ‘quasi alliance’, ‘small “a” ally’ and ‘alliance lite’.

The qualifiers apply because this is a pact without a treaty—no formal pledge to go to war together.

The quasi-alliance moniker describes the third leg of the trilateral, supporting the US–Japan alliance and the US–Australia alliance.

The small ‘a’ and lite descriptors fade because over the past two decades Japan has risen to become a defence partner for Australia that ranks beside New Zealand and Britain.

Japan sits on the second tier, with the traditional Anglo allies, below the peak where the US presides as the prime and paramount ally. The chatter grows about whether to admit Japan to the ultimate Anglo club, the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partnership, comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US.

In the first decade of this century, Canberra was the eager suitor, pushing Tokyo to do more, building the Australia–Japan–US trilateral. In the second decade, Japan stepped up under Shinzo Abe, showing uncharacteristic vigour and ambition. This decade is shaping as the moment Japan remakes itself as a military power.

In launching the trilateral in that first decade, John Howard’s government took the lead and Japan warmed slowly. When Foreign Minister Alexander Downer first broached the trilateral with his Japanese counterpart, he was told Australia was too insignificant as a security player for Tokyo to bother. Equally, Canberra was eager to go further than Tokyo in the ambit of the joint declaration on security cooperation that Howard and Abe signed in 2007. Australia wanted a treaty, while Japan would go only as far as a declaration.

In his second coming as prime minister in that second decade, Abe changed much in ways that matter greatly for Australia. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ may have been a US naval theory, but Abe’s adoption made it a diplomatic and military construct with heft; Australia joined Japan as the first adopter. Abe was equally important in growing the trilateral, the second coming of the Quad, and saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership after US President Donald Trump pulled out—a TPP without the US could only exist with Japan at its heart.

The quasi-alliance has its fullest expression within the trilateral. The three defence ministers had their 10th meeting last week during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Their ‘vision statement’ has the now essential language about opposing ‘coercion and destabilising behaviour’ and standing against ‘unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force’, underscoring ‘the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’.

To Australian eyes, the trilateral statement now has the same tone and style of an AUSMIN communiqué, with the effort to list ‘concrete’ outcomes such as exercises for interoperability and readiness; coordinated responses to regional disasters and crises; deepened cooperation on maritime capacity building; and a framework for research, development, test and evaluation to advance trilateral cooperation on advanced technologies and strategic capabilities.

When Abe departed the leadership in 2020, Australia confronted the question of how much the quasi-alliance was based on his personality and how much on permanent shifts in Japan’s policy personality. Abe pushed for a stronger, more autonomous Japan rather than a comfortable Japan declining gently into middle-power ease.

The answer offered by Indo-Pacific expert Michael Green in his new book, Line of advantage: Japan’s grand strategy in the era of Abe Shinzo, is that the trajectory is set—the Abe era will last much longer than the Abe tenure.

Green argues that Japan has done more than any other country to devise a strategy to manage China’s rising economic and military power, to ‘compete but not to the death’. Green’s prediction:

From now on for 10, 20, 30 years, people will be referring to Abe’s doctrine and Abe’s approach. There will be variations. There will be changes. There could be big changes if we have war in Asia or if the US retreats from Asia, but I don’t anticipate those. In terms of intent and trajectory, I think Japan will be very reliable and will be a thought leader and will be respected in Asia.

The shape of the Abe era came into sharper focus on 8 June when Japan’s cabinet approved a plan for a massive increase in defence spending from 1% to 2% of GDP. The 2% pledge is buried in footnote comparisons to NATO spending, so the transformation of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida from dove to samurai is still work in progress.

In his speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Kishida promised: ‘I am determined to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defence capabilities within the next five years and secure a substantial increase of Japan’s defence budget needed to effect such reinforcement.’

In tandem with reinforcing its alliance with the US, Kishida said, Japan would strengthen ‘security cooperation with other like-minded countries’. A new era, he said, needed a new ‘realism’.

Kishida noted that Germany had pledged to lift its defence spending to 2% of GDP, adding, ‘I myself have a strong sense of urgency that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.’

A Japan pushing fast to double its military spending will change much. After Kishida’s speech, the director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, John Chipman, pointed out that if Japan and Germany reached the NATO standard of 2% of GDP for defence, that’d make Japan the third-biggest defence spender in the world, behind only the US and China, while Germany would lift to number four.

Australia’s new prime minister, Anthony Albanese, has already had his first meeting with Kishida, at the Quad summit on 24 May. They are set to meet again at the NATO summit in Madrid in a fortnight’s time.

Just as NATO is always about alliance politics, these days Australia and Japan have their own alliance dialogue within the trilateral with the US.

Graeme Dobell is ASPI’s journalist fellow.

This article was published by ASPI on June 16, 2022.

Credit Image: Richard Marles/Twitter.

 

 

MRF-D 22

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on MRF-D 22
07/01/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 268, Aviation Combat Element, Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) 22, and U.S. Navy Corpsmen with the Enroute Care Team, Logistics Combat Element, MRF-D 22, perform a long-range casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) as a part of exercise Southern Jackaroo 22, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, Queensland, Australia, May 24, 2022.

The CASEVAC was performed as a proof of concept by MRF-D 22 personnel for providing long-range medical treatment within the Indo-Pacific region.

SHOALWATER BAY, QLD, AUSTRALIA

05.24.2022

Video by Cpl. Frank Webb Marine Rotational Force – Darwin

The Key Role of Training in Dynamic Evolution of Capabilities for the High-End Fight and Crisis Management

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Key Role of Training in Dynamic Evolution of Capabilities for the High-End Fight and Crisis Management
06/29/2022

By Robbin Laird

Training is one of the words that changes meaning as the liberal democracies face the military dimension posed by the 21st century authoritarian powers. Rather than being just about training to be prepared, which is obviously crucial, advanced training capabilities drive the adaption of the force which is crucial to prevailing in the high-end fight.

Learning to adapt the force in a dynamic combat environment is always crucial, but especially so when the United States and its allies need to operate closely in crises where the 21st century authoritarian powers concepts of operations and forces are designed to divide and conquer throughout the multi-domain spectrum of warfare.

And the art of warfare focuses on the need to understand the ends being pursued in a dynamic crisis or combat situation and to match those ends with the appropriate means understood as force packaging.

As my Williams Foundation colleague, John Conway, put it in a recent interview I did with him: “We have demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that we are good at warfighting, but we are not so good at warfare. And I think we have a generation of generals and politicians who only know war fighting. They don’t understand that there is a significant difference between warfighting and warfare.”

If we indeed focus on the art of warfare, the key focus is upon how to get the crisis management effect we need; not simply engaging in ongoing warfighting and positioning for warfighting.

And this means in turn, that the focus for the ADF or its allies is not simply providing balanced funding for the joint force, but prioritizing investments and training to shape a force with the most lethal effect and with most useful impact on advancing the art of warfare for the liberal democracies.

As the ADF moves forward, Conway discussed the “triangle of tradeoffs” for development of the force, namely, lethality, survivability and affordability. It is not about investing in balanced force development for its own sake; rather investments need to be directed to those elements of the ADF which can deliver lethality and survivability at the most affordable cost.

In such a context, advanced training is critical and as such will provide a key focus for discussion in the September seminar. As he put it: “Within a limited budget, you’ve now got to think really, really hard about survivability. And you’ve got to think really hard about preparedness and that links to the training piece.

“And we’ve now got an adversary, who is making us spend more and more money on survivability. We’d rather spend money on lethality, but they’re making us spend money on survivability because they’re becoming increasingly sophisticated, because it’s coming harder and harder to survive.

“And this is driving up the cost of survivability. But one way of mitigating that risk is getting your training systems right. And being able to fight the best fight with what you’ve got and invest in warfare rather than just war fighting.”

Put in other words, how to use U.S. and allied military capabilities to have the right kind of crisis management and combat effects?

And how to train to focus on such an approach?

This is how Paul Averna from Cubic Mission and Performance Solutions put the challenge in an interview I did with him in December 2021: “For effective training, we need to discover how to work our various platform capabilities to deliver decisive effects.

“And it’s not just the high-end kinetic end game of a conventional fight between us and a peer competitor. It is down at the lower rungs of conflict to manage escalation points. We need to be able to use asymmetric advantages to shape escalation options, and we need to train to do so.”

Training in the evolving combat environment is a key way ahead to shape not simply the skill sets to operate the force, but to provide significant domain knowledge to drive the development of the force or in other words, training when considered in terms of how to leverage the virtual world along with the live training piece can drive how the force can be continuously redesigned.

A key driver of change is the proliferation of fifth generation systems as the F-35 has become a key element for both the U.S. joint forces and the allies.

Fifth generation systems are multi-mission systems which drives further change in training requirements, which will become more significant over time as multi-domain operating capabilities are highlighted in defense acquisition.

In a recent discussion with Paul Averna, he highlighted how he saw the impact of the F-35 and fifth generation systems on the operating force and training. According to Averna: “Historically, we have operated and trained to single mission threads, such as counter-air or counter-surface warfare and we have used either a purpose-built system or operated with a pre-planned and interconnected group of capabilities synchronized to deliver a single domain effect. With the F-35, we have a multi-domain machine which can support multiple mission threads, and to do so at the same time.”

How do you train to leverage this capability?

Or as Averna puts it, “How do you create an authentic training environment for multi-domain effects?”

To do so, requires an ability to blend simulation or the virtual world with live training, but this requires a focus in the near term on funding such capabilities and getting the operators to operate in a more integrated manner.

Averna argued that “we are ready to proceed down the path of getting such capabilities live on the ranges within the next three years. We can leverage what we are learning in the joint simulation environment in terms of TTPs and can take those effects and model them into the training environment on the live ranges.”

And driving change in training systems associated with the F-35 would see a shift from prioritizing embedded learning systems in the aircraft to being able to work LVC dynamic training. With the current embedded learning systems, the operators learn to work in a wolfpack environment with four ship formations.

With the transition to LVC dynamic learning, the focus would be upon working force packages in a fluid combat space and using a multi-domain system – the F-35 more fully – which in turn would lay the groundwork for introducing new multi-domain systems in the future with a very clear notion of how to use them to get the kind of combat and crisis management effects desired from the combat force.

For the United States and our allies, training to deliver greater integrated capabilities will be critical in dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers, both to gain the combat mass desired as well as the coalition operational cohesion which can deliver crisis management dominance.

Again, the F-35 global enterprise can be a driver for innovation in enhanced interoperability.

As Averna put it: “The whole concept of the F-35 global enterprise is rooted in partner nations having a common capability so that one could replace a UK asset with a US asset or a Finnish asset or a Canadian asset, because they have a common operational capability. Training to leverage this commonality is crucial which then allows one to build around that idea that ‘whoever shows up with their F-35, the rest of the coalition knows what can be done with that asset from a coalition warfighting perspective.”

By forging an authentic training environment one can contribute to dealing with Conway’s triangle of challenges – survivability, lethality, and affordability.

Averna added two other dimensions to that triad. Averna noted that survivability, lethality, and affordability provide a design constraint for creating effects. “But the other two dimensions are time and interoperability. If you only design a unique stovepipe solution that works for your specific country that reduces interoperability and creates a vulnerability.

“And the kind of peer adversaries we face now require not only rapid decision making but timely evolution or adaptation of the force in terms of acquisition. The general focus now on designing a force for 2030 is simply too far away to deal with the threats we have now. We have to be able to shape force packages rapidly to tailor the effects we need now and not some abstract distant future.”

And while training for such effects, both the software can be reshaped for specific platforms to enable greater integratability and capability as well as learning how to adopt more rapidly to the opportunities for change.

For example, recently I spoke with a senior U.S. Navy Admiral about how he was using the findings of Task Force 59 – the autonomous systems task force in 6th fleet – to enhance the capability of his strike force. He noted that they were adopting capability and trying it out and adopting what worked for them and provided inputs to other elements of the fleet with regard to what particular systems could contribute now to the operating force.

In short, training is not simply preparing to operate the force you think you have; it is about generating the force packaging and operational capabilities you need in joint and coalition operations now and in the near term.

And in so doing, one is able to lay down requirements for acquisition going forward.

But this requires a significant shift in understanding the central role of training and providing the funding to accelerate the LVC elements within the training environment as well.

The graphic is credited to Paul Averna.

Training for the High End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s

Defense XXI: Shaping a Way Ahead for the United States and Its Allies

USMC Operations in Estonia May 2022

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on USMC Operations in Estonia May 2022

U.S. Marines with 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion attached to Task Group 61/2.4, conduct a movement to a helicopter pickup zone to relocate radar sensor to another site on Saaremaa, Estonia, May 22, 2022.

Task Group 61/2.4 provides naval and joint force commanders with dedicated multi-domain reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance (RXR) capabilities.

Task Group 61/2.4, under Task Force 61/2, is executing the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ Concept for Stand-in Forces (SIF) to generate small, highly versatile units that integrate Marine Corps and Navy forces.

Task Force 61/2 is deployed in the U.S. Naval Forces Europe area of operations, employed by U.S. Sixth Fleet to defend U.S., Allied and Partner interests.

SAAREMAA, ESTONIA

05.22.2022

Video by Sgt. Dylan Chagnon U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet