Fire and Ice: Crisis in Europe

03/17/2022

By Robbin Laird

My friend and colleague, New York Times best-selling writer George Galdorisi, has written a political-military thriller that is prescient regarding today’s events.

His book, Fire and Ice, published by Braveship Books March 2021, has a high concept that essentially predicted what is dominating our daily news: Putin holding Europe hostage to Russia’s energy, brutally attacking and occupying an Eastern European nation, and committing crimes against humanity, all while protests rage in Russia.

Life imitates art.

Galdorisi’s scenario is different from the Ukraine invasion, but highlights the impact of nuclear weapons, in his book, nucs being grabbed by a terrorist group.

He writes the novel from the standpoint of an intelligence operative, deployed to Europe, to work with others to solve the problem.

But the book also highlights Putin the competitor, who was competing with the Americans and NATO to recover the loose nucs.

But in his book, Galdorisi provides insight into the need to work with Putin, no matter how difficult.

Frankly, how you negotiate with authoritarian leaders is not a U.S. strong point and is a weak link in working what I have argued is the central challenge facing the liberal democracies, namely conflict with authoritarian powers, crisis management and escalation control.

A sense of the flavor of the challenge which must be met is provided in this passage in Galdorisi’s book:

“Did we both almost wind up in the middle of World War III?” Holden asked.

“I think so,” she replied. “People underestimate Vladimir Putin, and when they do, things go off the rails.”

​“Do you think we have him back in the box now?”

​“Hard to say.”

Also, see the following:

Meet Rick Holden: Living Through Future Warfare

Writing FICINT: George Galdorisi’s Rick Holden

France and the Ukraine 2022 Crisis: France Sends 2nd SSBN to Sea

03/11/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The French fleet air arm is flying a daily patrol of two Rafale fighter jets and a Hawkeye spy plane over Romania and Bulgaria, part of a Nato enhanced Vigilance Activities (eVA) mission, a French navy officer said March 8.

Those flights are from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has led to heightened military activity to support Nato allies close to the besieged East European nation.

It takes 45 minutes for a Rafale pilot to fly from the aircraft carrier, sailing in the Eastern Mediterranean, to reach Romanian airspace, said the officer. The fighter jets are also flying in a second operation, supporting the European Union Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the 14th day of the Russian invasion, there was a 12-hour ceasefire for Ukrainian civilians to take humanitarian corridors to escape artillery and rocket attacks. The Red Cross has called “apocalyptic” the conditions at the southern sea port of Mariupol.

Some two million refugees have left Ukraine, the UN has reported.

The French fleet air arm fighter jets and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) plane fly over the Black Sea, which Russia has effectively closed to warships of Nato allies since Christmas.

“That was no surprise,” the officer said.

The officer declined to confirm Le Telegramme, a regional paper, which reported March 1 a second French nuclear ballistic missile submarine has been ordered to take to sea.

“No comment. You have to call the other side of the Seine,” the officer said, referring to the president’s Elysée office.

This was the first sailing of two French nuclear missile boats since 1981, sparked by the Euromissile crisis, afternoon daily Le Monde reported. There is usually one nuclear ballistic missile submarine at sea.

Aircraft carrier on station

France has redeployed the Charles de Gaulle carrier to fly “air police and reconnaissance” flights over Romania, armed forces minister Florence Parly said March 3 on BFM TV.

The fighters and spy plane would “observe and deter,” she said, with the fleet air arm adding to air force patrols flying from France in response to the Russian assault.

The carrier task force had been on the Clemenceau mission against threats in the Middle East.

France has also sent some 350 troops and armored vehicles to Romania, part of the Nato “defense and deterrence posture,” the transatlantic alliance said March 8. The French armor includes Leclerc heavy tanks, photos with the statement show.

The French carrier-borne fighter jets were also flying a “a mission of presence,” the navy officer said, supporting the EU Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The EU, with its 700-strong European Union Force (Eufor), backs the Althea operation, which trains the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to bring them to Nato standards.

Tension has been rising in Bosnia, with Serbian separatists seeking to form their own armed forces, effectively breaking the terms of the Dayton-Paris agreement, which brought an end to the Serbo-Croat war in 1999.

“At this time when the security equilibrium in Europe is shaken, the EU demonstrates its continuing commitment and resolve to support a safe and secure environment in BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Western Balkans, Eufor said in a statement.

The French air patrols over Bosnia and Herzegovina began March 7. Nato also has headquarters in Sarajevo.

Nato set up a battle group in Romania in an enhanced Vigilance Activities  (eVA) operation, to bolster security among East European member nations against a perceived Russian threat.

“The establishment of the Nato eVA represents a decisive message of cohesion and solidarity,” the alliance said Feb. 15. “These measures increase the readiness, deter aggression, and clearly demonstrates Nato’s firm commitment to the defense of all allies.”

Meanwhile, French air force Mirage 2000-5Fs were due to leave Feb. 13 Luxeuil air base, eastern France, to fly to Estonia. The fighters will be based in Estonia, in the Nato enhanced Air Policing (eAP) mission, seeking to uphold “sovereignty of the airspace over the Baltic countries,” the air force said. The fighters will be stationed there until Aug. 1.

Russian Arc of Naval Reach

The Russian navy has an extensive arc of operations stretching from Murmansk in the north, through Sevastopol in the Russian occupied Crimea in Ukraine, to Odessa, also in Ukraine, the French officer said.

In the Arctic seas of the High North , the French navy sails the Fremm multimission frigate and maritime patrol aircraft, working with Western allies in the region.

Russia also has a naval base in Syria, which gives the capability to operate quickly and flexibly in the Mediterranean, and plans for a naval base in Sudan.

Meanwhile, China has a navy base in Djibouti and is fast building warships, including submarines and a carrier with catapult and arresting gear, the officer said, sparking Norwegian concern it was just a matter of time before a Chinese submarine sailed in the North Atlantic.

The security concern is that one day, Russia and China might use their bases to block maritime trade to Europe.

That perceived threat pointed up the importance of a European Union concept of Coordinated Maritime Presence, extending the reach of a European naval coalition to the Indian Ocean.

There would be a “coordinated European military presence,” the officer said, pointing up the significance of European allies working together in a new naval region.

“The (European) Council today also decided to launch the implementation of the CMP concept in the North-Western Indian Ocean by establishing a Maritime Area of Interest covering the maritime area from the Strait of Hormuz to the Southern Tropic and from the North of the Red Sea towards the centre of the Indian Ocean,” the Council of the European Union said Feb. 22 in a statement.

Missions with Western allies, which included the French carrier task force sailing with Italian and U.S. warships, pointed up the importance of coalitions, the officer said.

There is a real political decision to make: whether to act alone or in coalition.

European navies could sail some 100 frigates, “good ships,” the officer said, pointing up the importance of interoperability and resilience. The EU project to build a European Patrol Corvette reflected European cooperation.

The other EU measure for naval cooperation was to extend a Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf of Guinea for a further two years.

Meanwhile, it was commonplace for Russian warships in the Mediterranean to light up the Charles de Gaulle carrier task force with targeting radar, the officer said, a “highly disagreeable” measure intended to intimidate, and show their presence. There were also Russian Kilo class submarines sailing in the Mediterranean.

Relations with the Australian navy were now “rather cool,” the officer said.

That chilly relationship was due to Australia in September dropping a plan to build a fleet of diesel-electric submarines with French shipbuilder Naval Group. That followed Canberra’s unexpected switch to a nuclear-powered boat, in cooperation with the U.K. and the U.S.

Cooperation on operations was going well, such as the French FS Astrolabe, which sails from Hobart, Tasmania, off the Australian coast, to resupply the French Antarctic station.

The British first sea lord and naval chief, Adm. Ben Key, was due to visit France March 11 and 12, attending a work meeting with his French counterpart, Adm. Pierre Vandier, and going to Lorient, northwestern France, to watch the two rugby matches of men and women of the Royal Navy playing against the French navy.

American, British and French officers met at the Newport International Seapower Symposium last September. Just after that event, news broke of the AUKUS agreement on defense cooperation between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S., centred on an Australian plan to order nuclear-powered submarines.

A dependence on the U.S. to hit Serbian forces in the war with Croatia led to the then British prime minister, Tony Blair, and then French president Jacques Chirac, adopting a plan for European military cooperation at the bilateral summit at St Malo, northwest France, in 1998.

That agreement led to a European Council approval for a 60,000-strong European military force, a plan which stayed on paper.

Photo: Triomphant-class submarine. French Navy Photo

Germany Re-Boots its Defense Efforts in the Middle of the Russian Ukraine Invasion

03/10/2022

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I had a chance to talk again with Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz about Germany and the government’s recent decision to change course on defense and security. I first had the opportunity to meet Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz, a former German Air Chief, last Fall in Berlin at the International Fighter Conference.

During my visit to Germany in February 2019, where I was continuing my look at the challenge of building a 21st century approach to the direct defense of Europe, I had a chance to meet with him again, this time in Bonn, to discuss the challenges facing a German reset on direct defense.

According to my discussion with Stieglitz during the visit to Bonn in 2019: “The strategic environment has changed and requires Germany, a nation in the heart of Europe with more than 80 million people, to pay it’s fair share for the collective defense and to shape and focus on a force appropriate to the new situation.

“Obviously, the new defense effort requires more money. This is starting to happen.

But we are facing a significant rebuild given the state of readiness of the force today and the need to repair that force.

“Just undertaking the repair of todays state of readiness will make the Bundeswehr a construction site for the next years. We are almost back to 1955 when we had to build a new Bundeswehr.

“Our rebuild for the new strategic environment today is as significant as during these early years of the Bundeswehr. And all that happens after decades enjoying a peace dividend, where savings certainly have not been spent within the Bundeswehr.”

“But money alone is not enough. We are talking about changing the focus and building a 21st century defense force which can play its role at the heart of Europe.”

Unfortunately, not much progress has been made since that conversation.

But has Stieglitz put it in our recent discussion in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a decisive shift in Germany now to make this happen.

He underscored that “The German chancellor in day 3 of the Russian invasion, announced a major shift in German defense policy. Not only was new money generated for the Bundeswehr, but a new attitude was expressed towards the priority upon defense.”

He also noted that German companies were now leaving Russia and the Nordstream II pipeline stopped. He added: “I don’t see such a project getting support in the future. There is a new attitude and a new approach.”

“We are now discussing and will procure weapons systems which the German forces are missing very badly. Those steps will be taken in the next few weeks and months. But the really key point is the decisive action by the Chancellor and the government towards Russia and the focus on the defense of Europe and the forces for the NATO alliance.

“We have a new situation in Europe since the invasion. The war from the Russian side with the support of Belarus is a decisive change for Germany and for Europe.

“The government deployed German fighter aircraft to Romania. We will support the Baltics with air defense. We will strengthen the German ground deployment in the Baltics.

“We will enhance our role in safeguarding the airspace of Europe to the East. These steps have already been taken within the past few days. And this is in stark contrast to what Germany did after the 2014 Crimean takeover by Putin.”

With Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz’s core emphasis on the Chancellor’s announcement and his focus on that statement being an important turning point, let me turn to what the Chancellor indeed said in his policy statement of February 27, 2022.

The Chancellor underscored that the Russian attack on Ukraine means that “we have entered a new era.” He clearly warned Putin to not threaten NATO states with a direct attack.

“President Putin should not underestimate our resolve to defend every square metre of NATO territory together with our allies!

“We are absolutely serious about this. When we welcome a country into NATO, we commit to defending that country as a partner and ally. Just as we would defend ourselves!

“The Bundeswehr has already bolstered its support for our eastern allies – and will continue to do so. I thank the Federal Defence Minister for this important gesture!

  • We have deployed additional troops in Lithuania, where we lead the NATO battlegroup.
  • We have extended and enhanced our participation in air policing in Romania.
  • We want to contribute to the establishment of a new NATO unit in Slovakia.
  • Our navy is helping to secure the North Sea and the Baltic as well as the Mediterranean with additional vessels.
  • And we are also prepared to contribute to the defence of our allies’ air space in Eastern Europe using anti-aircraft missiles.”

“The page has been turned and Putin’s real agenda is clear to Europeans.”

As the Chancellor said: “Anyone who reads Putin’s historicising essays, who has watched his televised declaration of war on Ukraine, or who has recently – as I have done – held hours of direct talks with him, can no longer have any doubt that Putin wants to build a Russian empire.

“He wants to fundamentally redefine the status quo within Europe in line with his own vision.

“And he has no qualms about using military force to do so. We can see that today in Ukraine.

“We must therefore ask ourselves: What capabilities does Putin’s Russia possess? And what capabilities do we need in order to counter this threat – today and in the future?

“It is clear that we must invest much more in the security of our country. In order to protect our freedom and our democracy. This is a major national undertaking. The goal is a powerful, cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us.

“At the Munich Security Conference a week ago I said that we need aeroplanes that fly, ships that can set out to sea and soldiers who are optimally equipped for their missions. That is what is important. And it is quite certainly something that a country of our size and our significance within Europe should be able to achieve.

“But we should be under no illusions. Better equipment, modern technology, more personnel – all of this costs a lot of money. We will therefore set up a special fund for the Bundeswehr. And I am deeply grateful to Federal Finance Minister Lindner for his support on this! The 2022 federal budget will provide a one-off sum of 100 billion euro for the fund. We will use this money for necessary investments and armament projects.

“We will now – year after year – invest more than two percent of our gross domestic product in our defence. And I now appeal to all parliamentary groups within the German Bundestag: We must secure this special fund in our Basic Law!

“There is one thing that I would like to add. We have set this goal not only because we have made a promise to our friends and allies to increase our defence expenditure to two percent of our economic output by 2024. We are also doing this for us, for our own security.

“In the awareness that the Bundeswehr alone does not have the means to contain all future threats.

“We therefore need strong development cooperation. We will therefore strengthen our resilience – in terms of technology and as a society – for example against cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, against attacks on our critical infrastructure and channels of communication.

“And we will keep pace with new technology. This is why it is so important to me, for example, that we build the next generation of combat aircraft and tanks here in Europe together with European partners, and particularly France. These projects are our utmost priority. Until the aircraft are operational, we will continue to develop the Eurofighter together.

“Another encouraging development is that the contracts for the Eurodrone were finally signed this week. We are also pushing ahead on the purchase of the armed Heron drone from Israel.

“And with regard to nuclear sharing, we will procure a modern replacement for the outdated Tornado jets in good time.

“The Eurofighter is set to be equipped with electronic warfare capabilities.

“The F-35 fighter jet has the potential to be used as a carrier aircraft.

“And finally, ladies and gentlemen, we will do more to guarantee a secure energy supply for our country. The Federal Government has already initiated one important measure to address this.

“And we will change course in order to eliminate our dependence on imports from individual energy suppliers.

“After all, the events of recent days and weeks have shown us that responsible, forward-looking energy policy is not just crucial for our economy and our climate. It is also crucial for our security. This means that the faster we make progress with the development of renewable energies, the better. And we are on the right track. We are an industrialised country aiming to become carbon-neutral by 2045!

“With this goal on the horizon, we will have to take major decisions. For example, on building up a reserve of coal and gas. We have decided to increase the amount of natural gas in storage via long-term options to two billion cubic metres. Furthermore, we will acquire additional natural gas on the world markets – in consultation with the EU. And finally, we have made the decision to rapidly build two LNG terminals in Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven. I would like to expressly thank Federal Economics Minister Habeck for his efforts to facilitate this!

“Our current short-term needs can dovetail with what is already needed long-term for the transformation to succeed. An LNG terminal that today receives gas can tomorrow be used to import green hydrogen. And amidst all this, we will of course not lose sight of the high energy prices. They have now been driven up yet further by Putin’s war.

“This week we have therefore agreed on a relief package, which includes lifting the surcharge under the Renewable Energy Sources Act by the end of this year, as well as an increase in the commuter tax allowance, a heating subsidy for low earners, subsidies for families and tax relief measures. The Federal Government will act swiftly to set these in motion. Our message is clear. We will not leave individuals and businesses to face this situation alone.

“Ladies and gentlemen, this watershed does not just affect our country. It affects all of Europe. And this, too, is both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge consists in strengthening the sovereignty of the European Union sustainably and permanently. The opportunity lies in preserving the united front that we have demonstrated in recent days in agreeing the sanctions package.

“For Germany and for all of the EU’s other member states, that means not simply asking what they can extract in Brussels for their own country. But asking: What is the best decision for our Union? Europe is our framework for action. Only when we understand that will we prevail over the challenges of our time.”

We closed our discussion by this thought – perhaps the Russian invasion of Ukraine is as decisive a moment in the minds of the new generation of Germany as it was for the German and European generations at the time of the Berlin Airlift.

Lieutenant General (ret) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz was Chief of Staff, German Air Force from 2004 to 2009.

Lieutenant General Stieglitz joined the Luftwaffe in October 1968 and commenced officer training, followed by pilot training in the USA to become a fighter pilot. During his flying career he has accumulated more than 3.600 flight hours, mostly on combat aircraft, i.e. the F-104 Starfighter, F-4F Phantom, Mig-29 and Eurofighter/Typhoon. In 1981 – 83 he attended the German Armed Forces Staff College.

During his career he held numerous national and international staff and command positions, i.e. squadron commander, group commander, commander of a fighter wing, staff officer within the German MOD, staff officer at NATO Headquarters SHAPE, Belgium, commander of the NATO AWACS Component, Director Flight Safety of the German Armed Forces, commander of a German Air Division in Berlin and Deputy Commander NATO Air Forces Northern Europe, Ramstein.

In his last assignment he was Chief of Staff of the German Air Force from January 2004 to October 2009. Today he is engaged as senior advisor and consultant.

The featured photo shows the day when the Tornado bombers of the German Air Force are sent to their mission to Afghanistan.

Franz Josef JUNG l CDU federal minister of defence is together with general Klaus Peter STIEGLITZ/

April 2, 2007.

Credit: Alamay.

Lessons that Australia Should Learn from Conflict in Ukraine

03/09/2022

In this radio interview with our colleague John Blackburn, he discusses what Ukraine demonstrates to Australians as they work on a resilience-based defense effort.

This March 5, 2022 interview was conducted on the show Australia Overnight.

John Blackburn AO, Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) / Chairman of the Institute for Integrated Economic Research – Australia, chats  about what would happen to Australia if we were to find ourselves in the same situation as Ukraine.

Despite the courage of the Ukrainian people, it is clear that they are outmanned and outgunned against the Russians. Many experts believe that would Australia find itself in the same situation. John talks to Michael about why it’s so critical that Australia become more self-sufficient and not so reliant on foreign supplies and aid.

Reaping the Results of More than Two Decades of Western Appeasement of Vladimir Putin

03/08/2022

By Brian Morra

The War in Ukraine is on the front pages of newspapers and is the top television and streaming story in most parts of the world.

It’s delivering a major shock to the Post-Cold War geo-political system.

Why is this happening?

I think it’s important to understand that the ongoing catastrophe in Ukraine is in many ways the product of some twenty-three years of Western appeasement of Vladimir Putin. 

Despite the expansion of NATO over the years, the West has not responded forcefully to a series of Russian aggressions orchestrated by Vladimir Putin.

The parallels to the West’s appeasement of German leader Adolf Hitler in the 1930s are startling and eerie.

Since 1999 Putin has held the offices of prime minister (1999), president (2000-2008), prime minister (2009-2012), and now president for life (2013- ).

During his time in power, Putin’s Russia has waged war in:

Chechnya: The Second Chechen War, 1999-2000, resulted in the destruction of Islamic separatist groups and the demolition of the city of Grozny. The West responded with righteous indignation and little else.

Putin road-tested his way of war in Chechnya: first, claim he is fighting a war of Russian self-defense; second accept and/or cause high Russian and civilian casualties; and third demolish cities and towns that resist Russian armed forces.

Chechnya: A significant Chechen Insurgency was waged from 2000-2009 after the end of major Russian combat operations in 2000. Estimates of the dead are as high as 14,000 Russian troops and 50,000 Chechen fighters and civilians during the period of 1999-2009. In 2003 the Republic of Chechnya was formally recognized as part of the Russian Federation. The West largely ignored the period of insurgency.

All of Moscow’s war aims were effectively achieved. Both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush continued to meet with Putin during the war years, with little more than finger wagging as punishment.

Georgia:  Russia opposed Georgia’s application to join NATO (March 2008) and threatened to break off the northern provinces of Georgia and “free” the Russians residing there.

In August 2008, Russian separatists in the Georgian region of South Ossetia conducted artillery attacks on Georgian military targets, kicking off the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Putin accused Georgia of aggression against Russia and launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia by land, sea, cyber, and air.

He called this a “peace enforcement operation” (sound familiar?).

Georgians were ethnically cleansed from northern regions of Georgia – some 200,000 civilians became refugees.

Moscow prevented Georgia from joining NATO and still maintains a Russian military presence in Georgia’s northern provinces, effectively making them Russian provinces. President Bush publicly criticized Putin for invading a free, democratic state and for starting the Georgia War but did little else. Humanitarian groups accused Moscow of war crimes with little practical effect.

Ukraine: The Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2014.

Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine were supported by Russian Army forces beginning in August 2014.  A much larger Russian Army force entered the Donbas in October-November 2014. Russian forces also took over Crimea and Russia formally annexed Crimea in 2014, based on a referendum passed by ethnic Russians living on the peninsula.  The West was surprised by Russian military operations against Ukraine.

The Obama Administration decried Moscow’s aggression and levied limited sanctions against Russia that the Russians adroitly evaded.

Syria: Russian forces entered the Syrian Civil War on the side of Syrian President Assad in October 2015.  Russian ground and air forces helped turn the tide of the war in favor of the Assad regime. Russia brutally destroying of the ancient Syrian city of Aleppo with airpower and artillery strikes. The West wrung its hands over the wanton destruction and loss of civilian life. Groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch tabulated and decried civilian deaths and the creation of millions of Syrian refugees, accusing Moscow of war crimes.

The Obama gave Moscow a free pass in Syria after reneging on President Obama’s threat that Assad’s use of chemical weapons was a “red line” for the USA.

The Trump Administration levied sanctions and expelled scores of Russian diplomats from the United States.

Trump also supported NATO deployments to the front-line Baltic states.

U.S. forces also attacked the Wagner Group – a Russian-backed mercenary operation – and killed some 300 members in Syria in 2018 in reaction to a Wagner Group attack on a US special operations base.

Nonetheless, Russia’s geo-political goals were achieved in Syria. Russian naval, air, and ground forces remain in Syria today, furnishing Moscow with unprecedented military power and influence in the Middle East at a time of American retrenchment from the region, a trend that has accelerated during the Biden Administration.

Ukraine: The Russo-Ukrainian War that started in 2014 widened into an all-out invasion by Russia of Ukraine in February 2022.

Putin is telling the Russian people that the invasion is a “special military operation in the Donbas”, designed to protect ethnic Russians from the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev.

He is using the playbook he drew up in 1999 in Chechnya: first, claim he is fighting a war of Russian self-defense; second accept and/or cause high Russian and civilian casualties; and third demolish cities and towns that resist Russian armed forces.

Thus far, the West’s reaction to the expansion of the War in Ukraine has been more unified than to any other Putin aggression.

Unfortunately, military supply of the Ukrainian war effort has been tardy.

The West’s response is predicated largely on economic sanctions and NATO has eschewed the use of its own forces.

The West won’t even agree to cut off Russian oil and gas imports at this point.

The Biden Administration’s estrangement from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf oil states has led to their refusal to honor the White House’s request to increase production.

To date, the West’s response has not caused Putin to stop his genocidal military operations in Ukraine.

His decision making and risk calculus is, no doubt, heavily influenced by the West’s appeasement of his actions since 1999.

The featured graphic: credit: Bigstock

For Brian Morra’s new novel which brings the reader inside of the decision-making in the last major crisis involving the nuclear powers in 1983, see the following:

The Able Archers: A Novel which Takes Us Back to the 1983 Nuclear Crisis

Dassault, Exports and the Next Generation Fighter Aircraft

03/07/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Dassault Aviation insisted on being appointed lead prime contractor and architect on a European next generation fighter jet, and also lead contractor on the fighter’s flight control system, executive chairman Eric Trappier said March 4.

“These are two red lines,” he said on the sidelines of a news conference on 2021 financial results.

Dassault signed a contract on work on a technology demonstrator for the fighter, handed it the French procurement office, Direction Générale de l’Armement, and has been waiting since September for Airbus Defence and Space to countersign, he said.

The DGA declined comment.

Airbus DS is industrial partner on that fighter project, a key element in phase 1B on development of a European Future Combat Air System, a complex network linking up the planned fighter, remote carrier drones, and aircraft of allied nations. The new fighter would replace the Rafale and Eurofighter.

Dassault sees Airbus DS as seeking to share lead management of the fighter program, which the family controlled company resists.

There should be a “best athlete” approach,” with a single leader, Trappier said.

Airbus DS said it had made proposals on cooperation on the new fighter and was confident agreement could be reached.

“We have managed months ago to find fair and balanced agreements on all six other pillars, where even under a defined leadership the competence and capacities of each partner are respected and can participate in an equitable manner,” an Airbus DS spokesman said.

“Airbus has made several proposals to converge also on the Next Generation Fighter (NGF) and we are supporting any solution which will respect both the skills of each partner and the lead role of Dassault Aviation, leading to a fair agreement.

“We are confident that a resolution can be achieved if the rules of the cooperation agreed by the nations are respected in the NGF, as it is the case on other pillars,” the spokesman said.

“The FCAS programme is decisive to meet the requirements of Europe’s armed forces in the future and we are committed to it.”

The fighter is the first pillar in FCAS, with Dassault designated as the lead partner on the fighter. The other six pillars are the engine, remote carriers, combat cloud for network communications, simulator labs, sensors, and stealth.

The delay has been a “very high cost,” Trappier said, as some staff in the company’s some 100-strong design office have been re-assigned, with the prospect of re-assigning all those personnel if there were no contract on the fighter project.

Trappier declined to comment when asked if he had a plan B if an agreement failed to be reached.

Red Lines Issue

“We were surprised at how clear the issues on SCAF/FCAS have become for Dassault: the red lines are now glowing,” said Sash Tusa, analyst at equity research firm Agency Partners.

Work on the architecture and design of the flight control system was important, Trappier said, and Dassault’s design staff worked in Saint Cloud, the head office in the suburbs of the capital.

Airbus DS had design skills, and its staff worked in Toulouse, southwestern France, he said.

An analyst said that remark on the Airbus DS design engineers was a particularly barbed comment, pointing up a perceived lack of specialist experience in designing fighter jets.  Toulouse is the headquarters of Airbus, an airliner manufacturer, while the head office of the defense and space unit is in Manching, southern Germany.

It remained to be seen which would come first, Airbus DS signing the contract on the fighter project or Germany ordering the F-35 fighter, Trappier said.

On a contract signed Feb. 24 on a European medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, Dassault’s share of the deal was worth €1.2 billion and consisted of architecture for the flight control system and communications systems, he said. Thales, in which Dassault holds a 24.6 percent stake, will share the communications work.

The total budget for the European unmanned aerial vehicle is €7.1 billion, backed by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

German chancellor Olaf Scholz said Feb. 27 told the Bundestag parliament the 2022 federal budget would adopt a one-off fund of €100 billion ($109 billion) for military spending, and pledged an annual defense budget of more than two percent of gross domestic product.

Germany would also build the next generation fighter and tank in cooperation with France and other European partners, he said, and these projects were of “utmost priority.”

The chancellor made his speech, widely seen as a major policy switch, in response to the Russian assault on Ukraine, which has sparked Western sanctions against Moscow in banking, sports, culture, aerospace, trade, and airline travel.

Scholz said there was a contract signed the previous week for a European medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, pointing up the importance of German military spending and cooperation. Berlin would press ahead with an order for an armed Heron drone from Israel.

There would also be a replacement of the German Tornado fighter, which carries nuclear bombs under a Nato agreement, he said.

“The F-35 fighter jet has the potential to be used as a carrier aircraft,” he said, while the Eurofighter could be equipped for electronic warfare.

Cash Rich Dassault

The brakes were off for Dassault, such that the cash rich company should consider making an offer for Thales, a stock market research note from Agency Partners said Feb. 16, ahead of the 2021 financial results.

“We think a step change in the dividend payout ratio is possible, but we also suggest that Dassault could reassess its current minority shareholding in Thales, with the possibility of spending cash to buy a majority stake in, and control of, Thales,” the report said.

Dassault holds cash of €4.8 billion, a gain of €1.4 billion from a year ago, the company said in its financial results.

Success in exports and the resulting inflow of cash would fund that M&A deal, the Agency Partners report said. Winning an Indonesian contract for 42 Rafales meant the company had won export contracts for 188 fighters from five nations over the last 18 months, including two new client nations – Croatia and Indonesia, the report said.

That allowed a manufacturing “bridge” of legacy fighters and the Système de Combat Aérien du Futur (SCAF/FCAS), with an estimated production of three Rafale per month into the early 2030s.

That export success has sparked a “re-think” in France of working with Germany on the future combat air system, due to German concerns on arms exports and tension over leadership of the FCAS project, the report said.

France levies a tax of two percent on arms exports, to recover a “fair portion” of  the development cost of weapons ordered by the French authorities, Hervé Grandjean, spokesman for the armed forces ministry, told journalists Dec. 9.

That leads to limited direct financial gain for the French government from arms export, although prospects for overseas sales are factored in when funds for domestic projects are drawn up.

Profit Rise

Dassault reported a rise in 2021 adjusted net profit to €693 million from €396 million in the previous year, on sales rising to €7.2 billion from €5.5 billion.

That boosted net profit margin to 9.63 percent of sales from 7.2 percent.

Sales for 2022 were expected to fall. The book-to-bill ratio of orders to sales was 1.67.

Orders rose to €12 billion from €3.4 billion, helped by orders for 49 Rafales, of which 37 were export deals, including 31 units for Egypt and six new aircraft  for Greece. Athens also ordered 12 second-hand Rafales, which France replaced with an order for the same number.

The order book rose to €20.8 billion from €15.9 billion.

Croatia bought 12 second-hand Rafales and signed a service contract with the company.

Dassault was expecting to receive hefty down payments this year, based on a total of 128 Rafale orders, consisting of an 80-strong order signed with the United Arab Emirates in December , an Indonesian order signed last month for 42 fighters, and an expected Greek contract for six more fighters. The deal for the latter was authorized by the Greek parliament last month and a contract is expected to be signed shortly.

In general, the price tag for a Rafale is €100 million per unit, with Thales accounting for some 25 percent, Thales chief financial director Pascal Bouchier told March 3 a news conference on the 2021 financial results of the electronics company.

Dassault, which is pursuing other export deals for the fighter, is working on an upgraded F4 version and will work on further upgrades, Trappier said.

The company expects to deliver 12 fighters this year, after 25 last year, shipped to India and Qatar.

France is expected to order next year a fifth tranche of Rafales for the French air force, the company said, potentially consisting of 30 units as planned, and a further 12 units to replace those sold to Croatia. France has ordered 192 Rafales, so far.

 

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine, 2022: A New Series

03/06/2022

We are publishing a series on the run up to the war in Ukraine, and that timeline starts in the summer of 2021.

We have published three so far.

The first begins in June 2021, and a Russian exercise in the Pacific.

The second then highlights the new Russian national security strategy and Putin’s essay on the new Russian Slavic empire, both published in July 2021.

The third highlights the conflict in the Black Sea in the summer of 2021.

The future series then highlights the following:

The impact of the Biden Administration’s Fall, 2021 which starts with the Afghan Blitzkrieg withdrawal.

It then moved onto the AUKUS announcement and the undercutting of France in Western security and defense policy.

It then moved into the embracing of Ukraine without any realistic strategy for the longer term.

We then highlight Putin’s Valdai Discussion Club presentation and its implications.

Next we focus on the use of the migrants into Europe as a hybrid war tools which was part of the incorporation of Belarus into the new Russian empire.

We stop there and conclude with a couple of essays on Putin, Ukraine and the Way Ahead.

All of these articles can and will be found in our defense decisions micro site on defense.info.

Featured Image: KYIV, UKRAINE – Feb. 25, 2022: War of Russia against Ukraine. View of a civilian building damaged following a Russian rocket attack the city of Kyiv, Ukraine.  Credit: Bigstock

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine: 2022: June 2021

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine: 2022: July 2021

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine, 2022: Exercises, Conflict and Information War in the Black Sea, Summer 2021

Remembering Brendan Sargeant: March 13, 2022 Memorial Service

03/05/2022

By Robbin Laird

This is the piece which I published on February 15, 2022.

And the video provides an opportunity to see his friends honoring him at a memorial event in Canberra on March 13, 2022.

This is a piece I never wanted to write and certainly did not anticipate having to do so.

This weekend Australian friends informed me of the untimely death of my friend and colleague Brendan Sargeant, who would often point out that I misspelled his name.

Hopefully I got this right my friend.

I first met him many years ago when he was serving in the Australian embassy in Washington DC. He was introduced to me by a mutual American friend and his Australian wife.

I can remember that meeting clearly as my last. During our initial meeting we had a wide ranging discussion about the world, but then honed in on the issue de jure which was the joint strike fighter. By the time I had met him, I had met many of the pioneers in standing up the aircraft and the program and we discussed what I had written and what I thought about the coming of the program and its impact.

Having had the chance to work with Secretary Wynne, first as head of acquisition and then as Secretary of the Air Force, it was clear that the program was founded to create a new global capability for the United States and its allies. Brendan had honed on this aspect of the program and early on got it and its importance for Australia.

We had many conversations through the years, but they always we very similar to the first one — wide-ranging, blunt, and always left me with more to think about and to puzzle over.

I am sure his many friends would say the same.

Because that was the thing about Brendan — he would ignite reflection and curry thoughts, whether you agreed with the particular point or not.

When I finally got to Australia in 2014, and kept coming back because of my involvement with the Williams Foundation, my twice a year visits — at least until I left in a hurry on March 2020 — I would have the chance to meet with him and to visit his home and be hosted by his wife and he and be in the presence of his friends, and we would have a wonderful meal and have a wide ranging conversation about Australia, the United States and the world.

The fact that this will not happen again truly saddens me.

But whatever the loss for me personally, it is an even greater loss for Australia.

Australia, like the other liberal democracies, is entering a new historical era and sorting out our way ahead is more than challenging.

This was the topic we discussed frequently by phone since my last visit to Australia, and I was very much looking forward to my next visit and meetings with Brendan.

But in a way my last published interview with him is a very good epitaph for him.

That discussion was about the need for strategic imagination for a period of historical change such as we are clearly.

This is how he described what was needed:

“We need to be ruthless in our self-analysis, about our strengths and weaknesses, and who we are. We need to have a clear sense of the range of possible futures and the various responses that we may need to make. That is why I say a crisis is a challenge to imagination, a challenge to identity before it becomes a policy or a strategy challenge.”

This was what Brendan brought to the table. He met this challenge and provided constant insight and guidance.

To think that he is no longer here is very hard to contemplate.

I have lost a friend; and Australia has lost a leader.