Manned-Unmanned Teaming: USMC and Naval Aviation Work the Challenge

03/23/2022

By Maj. Jorge Hernandez

Marines from Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) and sailors from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 23 (HSC-23) teamed up to conduct tactics development in integrating manned and unmanned rotary-wing aircraft at Naval Air Facility El Centro, California on March 10, 2022.

During the exercise, VMX-1’s UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper helicopters conducted attacks while Marines and sailors operating in the ground control station assisted with the target detection and strike coordination utilizing a MQ-8C Fire Scout.

“This opportunity promotes greater familiarization and concept development of the manned-unmanned teaming that builds confidence and efficiency throughout the Blue-Green Team,” said VMX-1 Commanding Officer Col. Byron Sullivan.  “Our partnership plays an integral part of the Commandant and [Chief of Naval Operation]’s vision to embrace the future of warfare and turn it into our advantage on the battlefield.”

The services continue to develop manned-unmanned tactics to better align with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance.

As the exercise in El Centro progressed, the Navy-Marine Corps team became more proficient in planning, communicating, and coordinating effective fires from manned and unmanned rotary-wing aircraft.

The proliferation of unmanned rotary wing platforms on U.S. Navy ships makes integration with Marine rotary wing and the MQ-8C a likelihood in the littoral environment.

“Adversaries are going to be placed on the horns of a dilemma as we strengthen our naval expeditionary force in leveraging unmanned systems to complement our rotary wing,” said VMX-1 Science and Technology lead Maj. Ben Henry.

The mission of VMX-1 is to conduct operational test and evaluation of Marine Corps aviation platforms and systems.

The Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon: A March 2022 Update

03/22/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France is keen to work with the U.K. on a project for next generation cruise and naval missiles, while Britain looked determined to field a hypersonic weapon, a French navy officer said.

There are 18 months of talks under an Anglo-French agreement signed Feb. 18 on an assessment study of the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW).

The FC/ASW project aims to replace the French Scalp and British Storm Shadow airborne cruise missile, and Exocet and Harpoon maritime missiles.

The question for the British on hypersonic missiles is not whether but with whom, the navy officer said.

“We haven’t (got them) and we should,” the British chief of the defense staff, Adm. Tony Radakin, told Jan. 7 The Times, a London daily.

For the French, the preference is for supersonic weapons, to be studied under the FC/ASW assessment study.

“Which train will they hitch their wagon with tomorrow’s technology?” the navy officer said, referring to the British.

Either way, it looked like there would be significant impact for France, which stood to hold on to an industrial partner, or lose it.

The technical and operational discussions are taking place against the backdrop of cool political relations between the two allies.

“It is a very political issue,” the navy officer said, “relations between France and the U.K. are very difficult.”

For France, Onera and MBDA had planned to conduct a test flight of the Lea experimental project for a hypersonic cruise missile in the U.S. by the end of last year or early this year, and that flight has yet to be made, a spokesman for the research office said.

There is sensitivity on the Lea project, two sources said.

The perceived importance of hypersonic missiles could be seen with wide media coverage of Russia’s reported first combat use of hypersonic missiles in fierce fighting in Ukraine over the weekend of March 19 and 20.

The Russian defense ministry said air-launched Kinzahl hypersonic missiles were fired Saturday at an underground storage of missiles and aircraft munitions in Deliatyn, western Ukraine. Russian fighter jets fired Sunday the new generation Kinzahl to destroy fuel and lubricant storage for the Ukrainian services, near Kostiantynivka, southern Ukraine.

Kinzahl was designed for the Mig 31 fighter jet, with the attack on the Ukrainian fuel depot reported to be launched from the Crimean airspace.

That Russian brandishing of the hypersonic missile could be seen last week.

British tabloids The Sun and Mirror ran March 14 on their websites a clip of Russian TV Zvezda, showing a fiery launch of the hypersonic Zircon cruise missile from the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, sailing in the White Sea, south of the Barents Sea.

Russian television reported in December that naval cruise missile launch, but the release last week to Western media was seen as Moscow’s attempt to warn Western nations against support for Ukraine, resisting on day 25 the bloody Russian invasion.

“It’s gesticulation,” an executive said.

A second executive said, “demonstration of force.”

The Russian defense ministry is reported to be the owner of TV Zvezda.

Keen for Cooperation

French officers have discussed supersonic missiles with British counterparts, and their capabilities could be seen in last year’s Nato exercise Formidable Shield, the navy officer said. The French navy has worked on war gaming simulation of threats with the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office.

Cooperation with the U.K. has “enormous significance for France,” the navy officer said.

The political backdrop to the operational and industrial interest in new European missiles is marked by decidedly cool relations on the part of Paris toward London.

There is tension between French president Emmanuel Macron and British prime minister Boris Johnson, a source said.

Poor political relations stem from an announcement last September of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, Britain and the U.S., for a planned supply of nuclear-powered attack submarines to the Australian navy, in place of French designed conventional boats.

Armed forces minister Florence Parly responded by cancelling a September signing of a memorandum of understanding for working with the British on FC/ASW. It took six months before procurement chiefs – rather than defense ministers – signed an intergovernmental agreement and contract with European missile builder MBDA.

The U.K. is working with the U.S. on hypersonic technology, as the British are very close to the Americans, the source said.

“There is joint reflection,” the source said.

For Paris, there is quiet determination to master hypersonic technology.

“France is not part of the upmanship, or gesture politics, or unfettered competition, but seeks a reasoned development of what is seen as a technological necessity, to be in sync with the technology-operational requirement for combat in the near future,” Benjamin Hautecouverture, senior research fellow at think tank Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique told TV5 Monde, a television channel.

An industry executive said the Anglo-French agreement was important as it delivered a “continuity of cooperation.”

It is significant France cooperates with the U.K. on the future cruise missile, the executive said, but Paris keeps separate its work on a fourth-generation airborne nuclear missile, dubbed air-sol nucléaire quatrième génération (ASN4G), due to replace around 2035 the air-sol moyenne portée-amélioré ASMP/A supersonic missile.

A Tale of Two Concepts

The Anglo-French intergovernmental agreement allowed MBDA to sign an 18-month contract to make a detailed assessment of two missile concepts.

“These preparation works will focus on the co-ordinated development of a program of next generation deep strike and heavy anti-ship weapons,” the company said in a Feb. 18 statement on FC/ASW.

“It will assess two complementary missile concepts, expected to be fielded at the end of the decade: a subsonic low observable concept and a supersonic, highly manoeuvrable concept.”

The missile company had completed a concept study, which had a budget estimated at €100 million ($109 million). No details were given on the value of the assessment contract, which had been long awaited.

The concept study looked at various possibilities and came up with some 20 concepts, a second source said. The assessment study will take a closer look at the subsonic stealthy and supersonic concepts, and the work will be guided by air force and navy requirements.

There may be trade offs on the requirements, “which is a real subject for discussion,” the third source said. There could be two missiles rather than one weapon, or one missile with trade offs. Even with trade offs, the one missile could be expensive to build.

Finally, there will be a political decision.

The bilateral agreement allows for sharing common technology for a family of missiles, the second source said, much depending on the concept of operations drawn up by the services.

There will be need for the technology to be reliable and mature, the first source said. Given the operational need for reliability, cruise missiles are generally fired in salvoes of three, based on a redundancy approach.

There is a big technology challenge in developing propulsion and communications for a hypersonic missile, which will fly surrounded by a plasma wall which interferes with communications.

A hypersonic missile generates intense heat of some 3,000° C, requiring new materials technology, the first source said. While hypersonic technology has been known since the 1960s, maturing the know-how has been difficult.

There is the high cost of hypersonic weapons, making it good for hitting an aircraft carrier but excessive for a patrol boat, the first source said. The forces need to cover a whole theater of war, and if the services had only expensive weapons, they could only tackle, say, 10 percent of the threat. A mix of costly, high technology arms and lower cost, simpler weapons was needed.

In view of the complexity of hypersonic technology, the second source said, it might take maybe a decade for Britain, France, and the U.S to build affordable missiles backed by mature technology.

The full scale mock ups on the MBDA photo on the statement on FC/ASW cooperation  are a rough approximation, not an accurate representation of the future missiles, the second source said. The model of the future cruise missile is longer than the Scalp/Storm Shadow, indicating a greater range.

U.S. Seeks to Catch Up

For the U.S., there is strong political interest in catching up with Chinese and Russian industrial and military lead in hypersonic technology.

Defense secretary Lloyd Austin invited top executives from Aerojet Rocketdyne, BAE Systems, Boeing, Leidos, Lockheed Martin, L3Harris, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and another half dozen or so companies to a meeting with Heidi Shyu, the undersecretary of defense research and engineering, CNN reported Jan. 29.

Shyu told the media in January the six U.S. military branches were “pushing the contractors very, very aggressively” on developing hypersonic weapons, and that “no aggressive schedule, especially if you’re pushing hard on them, will go through perfectly without some problems,” CNN reported.

The Pentagon urging U.S. industry to pick up the pace came at a time when Moscow was massing military might on the border with Ukraine before launching the fateful invasion on the night of Feb. 24.

President Vladimir Putin said Russia led the world in hypersonic missiles, and by the time other powers fielded their own hypersonic weapons, Moscow would be able to field countermeasures to that technology, Reuters reported Dec. 12.

Russia has proudly displayed hypersonic capability, led by the Zircon and Avangard weapons.

The Zircon, or Tsirkon, is reported to have a speed of Mach 9 and capable of evasive flying to dodge detection. The missile, intended for launch from warships and submarines, is due to be delivered to the Russian navy this year.

There is the Avangard, a hypersonic glide weapon capable of carrying a nuclear or conventional warhead, also due to be delivered to the Russian forces.

The Russian seizing of Crimea in eastern Ukraine in 2014 led to a delay in development of Avangard, as a maneuver and targeting control system was built in Ukraine, according to Russian daily Izvestia, the specialist Missile Threat website of the Center for Strategic and International Studies reported.

Meanwhile, China has shown off in military parade its DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle mounted on the Dong Feng-17 medium-range ballistic missile.

The hypersonic glide vehicle is designed to fit in the nose of a rocket booster, which launches the vehicle into the upper atmosphere. The vehicle, powered by a scramjet at speeds above Mach 4, flies to the target, bearing a conventional or nuclear payload.

Designed to fly at great speed while maneuvering, the vehicle is intended to escape air defense radar and interception by anti-missile weapons.

Beijing denied Oct. 18 a Financial Times report the Chinese forces had tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile which had circled the earth, flying in space before gliding to a target, missed by some two dozen miles.

That had been a test of a reusable space vehicle, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said, when asked about the report.

That Chinese test flight had “caught U.S. intelligence by surprise,” the report said, drawing on five sources for the report.

Formidable Shield, a NATO naval exercise led by the U.S. Sixth Fleet last year, saw live fire of missiles, with the Smart L radar on a Netherlands frigate detecting incoming missiles, allowing interception by air defense missiles.

The featured Photo is credited to MBDA and their press conference can be found here.

The Meshing of Beijing’s Goals With Putin’s War

03/21/2022

By Michael Shoebridge

Beijing’s goals, set out in numerous speeches by Xi Jinping and in decisions and actions, are clear now.

Number one remains Xi and the Chinese Communist Party staying in power indefinitely as rulers of China’s 1.4 billion people—Xi’s real ‘China dream’.

Xi and his acolytes want three big things:

  • an external environment that continues to enable China to grow its economic, technological and strategic power
  • tighter control over China’s domestic economy and all Chinese individuals and entities, as Jack Ma and many other formerly powerful corporate figures now understand
  • deeper integration of other economies into China’s market, where China dictates the terms as a means of influencing and controlling actors in its external environment.

These priorities interact with the deep partnership that has developed between Moscow and Beijing, starting with the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, accelerating under the growing relationship between Xi and Vladimir Putin since 2013 and culminating in their joint statement less than three weeks before Putin launched his long-foreshadowed invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.

Looked at with these priorities and this context in mind, Putin’s war in Ukraine, like Covid-19 and increased strategic competition with the U.S. and other major powers, has negative and positive consequences for the rulers in Beijing.

On the negative side, Putin’s war exposes the contradictions in Chinese policy and action.

Beijing’s long espousal of the principles of non-interference in other states and respect for their sovereignty looks meaningless when placed against Xi’s and the broader Chinese government’s clear diplomatic protection for Putin as he engages in an aggressive war that directly breaches them.

Xi’s vague and conflicting language, repeated by China’s foreign ministry and various state media mouthpieces, attempts to blur and blunt the jarring contradiction at the heart of Beijing’s position on the war. But his words are entirely unconvincing, as many of the Chinese state voices engaged in this effort may well realise.

Here’s the foreign ministry’s readout of Xi talking to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and France’s Emmanuel Macron:

President Xi stressed that the current situation in Ukraine is worrisome, and the Chinese side is deeply grieved by the outbreak of war again on the European continent. China maintains that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter must be fully observed, the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously …

So, the ‘current situation’ is ‘worrisome’, as if the war were some naturally occurring phenomenon troubling Europe rather than the result of human decision-making—in this case by someone Xi knows well: Vladimir Putin.

While wrapping himself in a lofty reference to the UN charter, Xi ensures he supports Putin’s stated reason for starting this war and killing so many Ukrainian civilians and Russian and Ukrainian soldiers.

Xi tells Macron and Scholz that ‘the legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously’. He knows this phrasing is an echo of Russia’s language on the conflict, as we’ve heard from figures like Putin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko. He also knows there’s nothing legitimate about Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, a state China has recognised since 1992 and a UN member since 1991.

Putin’s war is also forcing Chinese companies and financial institutions to adopt the West’s broad, deep sanctions against Russian entities because, if they fail to comply, they risk losing much larger international markets than Russia.

There’s tension, no doubt, between these corporate decisions and the government’s opposition to the sanctions—characterising those adopted by the EU, the G7, every NATO member and numerous other countries from Switzerland to Australia as ‘unilateral’, despite the word’s mathematically implausibility in these circumstances.

But that tension may not be terribly pronounced or long-lasting: Xi’s reassertion of CCP control over state-owned enterprises and all Chinese companies means they’ll subordinate their commercial interests to state interests and policy directions.

Beijing clearly wants to find ways to continue to trade with and support Russia economically and financially while Putin wages war.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi has asserted that because China is ‘not a party to the conflict’, it shouldn’t have to adopt sanctions or comply with them. Chinese officials have gone further, saying China hopes to maintain normal trade with Russia while Putin is in the midst of his war.

This means we should expect the Chinese government’s policy for itself and for China’s corporate and financial actors to be to do the minimum required to be narrowly technically compliant with international sanctions while creatively engineering ways to provide Russia with economic and financial support.

While Chinese companies and institutions with international markets well beyond Russia are complying for now, the sanctions are giving Beijing’s policymakers an opportunity to learn how broad, deep sanctions might be developed as a policy tool for their government. This will inform Beijing’s work on its own sanctions machinery to use against others.

Like its position on state sovereignty and non-interference, we should expect the purity of Beijing’s position against ‘unilateral’ sanctions to not trouble Chinese officials at all when it comes to employing their own sanctions as weapons to complement their informal, truly unilateral economic coercion methods.

And the unified sanctions against Russia are a forceful catalyst to accelerate implementation of Beijing’s own economic and technological strategy of dual circulation, aimed at reducing China’s dependence on U.S.- and EU-led financial markets, supply chains and technology, with a particular focus on digital technologies.

This was already a core matter for Xi and his CCP politburo colleagues because of the growing strategic and technological competition between China, the US and, increasingly, the EU.

But the shock of seeing previously divided countries and powers across Europe and the Indo-Pacific act with such speed and unity of purpose against Russia will inject urgency into Chinese action.

So, we’ll see an acceleration of the technological ‘decoupling’ of China from the larger democratic world, and a broadening of that decoupling beyond the technology sector, with energy and even renewables being likely new areas.

That decoupling will become turbo-charged should Beijing provide not only economic, financial and diplomatic support to Putin but also material military assistance to his war.

U.S. intelligence has revealed that Moscow has already asked Beijing for such assistance—apparently including supplies like armed drones. And the information was sufficiently reliable for US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan to raise the issue directly with CCP politburo member Yang Jiechi in an inconclusive seven-hour meeting in Rome.

Beijing—and Xi himself—are likely to have absolutely no intention of shifting from their partnership with and support for Putin, but they will work covertly and in ways that allow them to claim they’re not in technical breach of sanctions but are ‘seeking peace’.

Beijing will continue to bet that the attraction of its large market and the passage of time will reduce other governments’ unity on Russia, and make it easier for Beijing to walk its preferred path.

But Beijing’s decision-making and calculations have proven far less supple and successful, and more strident and inwardly focused, as the Xi era wears on, so it’s unlikely to be able to strike this balance in the sea of contradictions it finds itself in.

To paraphrase that seasoned politician of the 1970s and 1980s, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, ‘You can’t sit on the fence and keep your ear to the ground without terrible things happening.’ The prospects of Beijing being exposed for deep, active support to Putin are growing.

The consequences will be a further shattering of what’s left of the ‘global economy’ and the beginning of a world challenged by the manifest strategic partnership between the twin autocracies of Russia and China.

This challenge, unexpectedly, is likely to be met with much greater unity and will than we had any right to expect before 24 February.

Michael Shoebridge is director of ASPI’s defence, strategy and national security program.

This article was published by ASPI on March 18, 2022.

Credit for Featured Photo: Photo 242306739 © Uladzimir Zuyeu | Dreamstime.com

The Timeline for the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: A Look Back at 2021

03/18/2022

By Robbin Laird

In this report, I highlight developments from June 2021 to the Fall of 2021 which made it abundantly clear that action by Putin against Ukraine was in the cards, but what he would actual do was a future question.

When perhaps; what perhaps; but not that something would happen, at least along the lines of 2014.

A PDF version of the report can be read below:

Timeline to Russian Invasion of Ukraine

An E-book version of the report can be read below:

Credit Featured Photo: Bigstock

Fire and Ice: Crisis in Europe

03/17/2022

By Robbin Laird

My friend and colleague, New York Times best-selling writer George Galdorisi, has written a political-military thriller that is prescient regarding today’s events.

His book, Fire and Ice, published by Braveship Books March 2021, has a high concept that essentially predicted what is dominating our daily news: Putin holding Europe hostage to Russia’s energy, brutally attacking and occupying an Eastern European nation, and committing crimes against humanity, all while protests rage in Russia.

Life imitates art.

Galdorisi’s scenario is different from the Ukraine invasion, but highlights the impact of nuclear weapons, in his book, nucs being grabbed by a terrorist group.

He writes the novel from the standpoint of an intelligence operative, deployed to Europe, to work with others to solve the problem.

But the book also highlights Putin the competitor, who was competing with the Americans and NATO to recover the loose nucs.

But in his book, Galdorisi provides insight into the need to work with Putin, no matter how difficult.

Frankly, how you negotiate with authoritarian leaders is not a U.S. strong point and is a weak link in working what I have argued is the central challenge facing the liberal democracies, namely conflict with authoritarian powers, crisis management and escalation control.

A sense of the flavor of the challenge which must be met is provided in this passage in Galdorisi’s book:

“Did we both almost wind up in the middle of World War III?” Holden asked.

“I think so,” she replied. “People underestimate Vladimir Putin, and when they do, things go off the rails.”

​“Do you think we have him back in the box now?”

​“Hard to say.”

Also, see the following:

Meet Rick Holden: Living Through Future Warfare

Writing FICINT: George Galdorisi’s Rick Holden

France and the Ukraine 2022 Crisis: France Sends 2nd SSBN to Sea

03/11/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The French fleet air arm is flying a daily patrol of two Rafale fighter jets and a Hawkeye spy plane over Romania and Bulgaria, part of a Nato enhanced Vigilance Activities (eVA) mission, a French navy officer said March 8.

Those flights are from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, in response to Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has led to heightened military activity to support Nato allies close to the besieged East European nation.

It takes 45 minutes for a Rafale pilot to fly from the aircraft carrier, sailing in the Eastern Mediterranean, to reach Romanian airspace, said the officer. The fighter jets are also flying in a second operation, supporting the European Union Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the 14th day of the Russian invasion, there was a 12-hour ceasefire for Ukrainian civilians to take humanitarian corridors to escape artillery and rocket attacks. The Red Cross has called “apocalyptic” the conditions at the southern sea port of Mariupol.

Some two million refugees have left Ukraine, the UN has reported.

The French fleet air arm fighter jets and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) plane fly over the Black Sea, which Russia has effectively closed to warships of Nato allies since Christmas.

“That was no surprise,” the officer said.

The officer declined to confirm Le Telegramme, a regional paper, which reported March 1 a second French nuclear ballistic missile submarine has been ordered to take to sea.

“No comment. You have to call the other side of the Seine,” the officer said, referring to the president’s Elysée office.

This was the first sailing of two French nuclear missile boats since 1981, sparked by the Euromissile crisis, afternoon daily Le Monde reported. There is usually one nuclear ballistic missile submarine at sea.

Aircraft carrier on station

France has redeployed the Charles de Gaulle carrier to fly “air police and reconnaissance” flights over Romania, armed forces minister Florence Parly said March 3 on BFM TV.

The fighters and spy plane would “observe and deter,” she said, with the fleet air arm adding to air force patrols flying from France in response to the Russian assault.

The carrier task force had been on the Clemenceau mission against threats in the Middle East.

France has also sent some 350 troops and armored vehicles to Romania, part of the Nato “defense and deterrence posture,” the transatlantic alliance said March 8. The French armor includes Leclerc heavy tanks, photos with the statement show.

The French carrier-borne fighter jets were also flying a “a mission of presence,” the navy officer said, supporting the EU Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The EU, with its 700-strong European Union Force (Eufor), backs the Althea operation, which trains the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to bring them to Nato standards.

Tension has been rising in Bosnia, with Serbian separatists seeking to form their own armed forces, effectively breaking the terms of the Dayton-Paris agreement, which brought an end to the Serbo-Croat war in 1999.

“At this time when the security equilibrium in Europe is shaken, the EU demonstrates its continuing commitment and resolve to support a safe and secure environment in BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Western Balkans, Eufor said in a statement.

The French air patrols over Bosnia and Herzegovina began March 7. Nato also has headquarters in Sarajevo.

Nato set up a battle group in Romania in an enhanced Vigilance Activities  (eVA) operation, to bolster security among East European member nations against a perceived Russian threat.

“The establishment of the Nato eVA represents a decisive message of cohesion and solidarity,” the alliance said Feb. 15. “These measures increase the readiness, deter aggression, and clearly demonstrates Nato’s firm commitment to the defense of all allies.”

Meanwhile, French air force Mirage 2000-5Fs were due to leave Feb. 13 Luxeuil air base, eastern France, to fly to Estonia. The fighters will be based in Estonia, in the Nato enhanced Air Policing (eAP) mission, seeking to uphold “sovereignty of the airspace over the Baltic countries,” the air force said. The fighters will be stationed there until Aug. 1.

Russian Arc of Naval Reach

The Russian navy has an extensive arc of operations stretching from Murmansk in the north, through Sevastopol in the Russian occupied Crimea in Ukraine, to Odessa, also in Ukraine, the French officer said.

In the Arctic seas of the High North , the French navy sails the Fremm multimission frigate and maritime patrol aircraft, working with Western allies in the region.

Russia also has a naval base in Syria, which gives the capability to operate quickly and flexibly in the Mediterranean, and plans for a naval base in Sudan.

Meanwhile, China has a navy base in Djibouti and is fast building warships, including submarines and a carrier with catapult and arresting gear, the officer said, sparking Norwegian concern it was just a matter of time before a Chinese submarine sailed in the North Atlantic.

The security concern is that one day, Russia and China might use their bases to block maritime trade to Europe.

That perceived threat pointed up the importance of a European Union concept of Coordinated Maritime Presence, extending the reach of a European naval coalition to the Indian Ocean.

There would be a “coordinated European military presence,” the officer said, pointing up the significance of European allies working together in a new naval region.

“The (European) Council today also decided to launch the implementation of the CMP concept in the North-Western Indian Ocean by establishing a Maritime Area of Interest covering the maritime area from the Strait of Hormuz to the Southern Tropic and from the North of the Red Sea towards the centre of the Indian Ocean,” the Council of the European Union said Feb. 22 in a statement.

Missions with Western allies, which included the French carrier task force sailing with Italian and U.S. warships, pointed up the importance of coalitions, the officer said.

There is a real political decision to make: whether to act alone or in coalition.

European navies could sail some 100 frigates, “good ships,” the officer said, pointing up the importance of interoperability and resilience. The EU project to build a European Patrol Corvette reflected European cooperation.

The other EU measure for naval cooperation was to extend a Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf of Guinea for a further two years.

Meanwhile, it was commonplace for Russian warships in the Mediterranean to light up the Charles de Gaulle carrier task force with targeting radar, the officer said, a “highly disagreeable” measure intended to intimidate, and show their presence. There were also Russian Kilo class submarines sailing in the Mediterranean.

Relations with the Australian navy were now “rather cool,” the officer said.

That chilly relationship was due to Australia in September dropping a plan to build a fleet of diesel-electric submarines with French shipbuilder Naval Group. That followed Canberra’s unexpected switch to a nuclear-powered boat, in cooperation with the U.K. and the U.S.

Cooperation on operations was going well, such as the French FS Astrolabe, which sails from Hobart, Tasmania, off the Australian coast, to resupply the French Antarctic station.

The British first sea lord and naval chief, Adm. Ben Key, was due to visit France March 11 and 12, attending a work meeting with his French counterpart, Adm. Pierre Vandier, and going to Lorient, northwestern France, to watch the two rugby matches of men and women of the Royal Navy playing against the French navy.

American, British and French officers met at the Newport International Seapower Symposium last September. Just after that event, news broke of the AUKUS agreement on defense cooperation between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S., centred on an Australian plan to order nuclear-powered submarines.

A dependence on the U.S. to hit Serbian forces in the war with Croatia led to the then British prime minister, Tony Blair, and then French president Jacques Chirac, adopting a plan for European military cooperation at the bilateral summit at St Malo, northwest France, in 1998.

That agreement led to a European Council approval for a 60,000-strong European military force, a plan which stayed on paper.

Photo: Triomphant-class submarine. French Navy Photo

Germany Re-Boots its Defense Efforts in the Middle of the Russian Ukraine Invasion

03/10/2022

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I had a chance to talk again with Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz about Germany and the government’s recent decision to change course on defense and security. I first had the opportunity to meet Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz, a former German Air Chief, last Fall in Berlin at the International Fighter Conference.

During my visit to Germany in February 2019, where I was continuing my look at the challenge of building a 21st century approach to the direct defense of Europe, I had a chance to meet with him again, this time in Bonn, to discuss the challenges facing a German reset on direct defense.

According to my discussion with Stieglitz during the visit to Bonn in 2019: “The strategic environment has changed and requires Germany, a nation in the heart of Europe with more than 80 million people, to pay it’s fair share for the collective defense and to shape and focus on a force appropriate to the new situation.

“Obviously, the new defense effort requires more money. This is starting to happen.

But we are facing a significant rebuild given the state of readiness of the force today and the need to repair that force.

“Just undertaking the repair of todays state of readiness will make the Bundeswehr a construction site for the next years. We are almost back to 1955 when we had to build a new Bundeswehr.

“Our rebuild for the new strategic environment today is as significant as during these early years of the Bundeswehr. And all that happens after decades enjoying a peace dividend, where savings certainly have not been spent within the Bundeswehr.”

“But money alone is not enough. We are talking about changing the focus and building a 21st century defense force which can play its role at the heart of Europe.”

Unfortunately, not much progress has been made since that conversation.

But has Stieglitz put it in our recent discussion in the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a decisive shift in Germany now to make this happen.

He underscored that “The German chancellor in day 3 of the Russian invasion, announced a major shift in German defense policy. Not only was new money generated for the Bundeswehr, but a new attitude was expressed towards the priority upon defense.”

He also noted that German companies were now leaving Russia and the Nordstream II pipeline stopped. He added: “I don’t see such a project getting support in the future. There is a new attitude and a new approach.”

“We are now discussing and will procure weapons systems which the German forces are missing very badly. Those steps will be taken in the next few weeks and months. But the really key point is the decisive action by the Chancellor and the government towards Russia and the focus on the defense of Europe and the forces for the NATO alliance.

“We have a new situation in Europe since the invasion. The war from the Russian side with the support of Belarus is a decisive change for Germany and for Europe.

“The government deployed German fighter aircraft to Romania. We will support the Baltics with air defense. We will strengthen the German ground deployment in the Baltics.

“We will enhance our role in safeguarding the airspace of Europe to the East. These steps have already been taken within the past few days. And this is in stark contrast to what Germany did after the 2014 Crimean takeover by Putin.”

With Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz’s core emphasis on the Chancellor’s announcement and his focus on that statement being an important turning point, let me turn to what the Chancellor indeed said in his policy statement of February 27, 2022.

The Chancellor underscored that the Russian attack on Ukraine means that “we have entered a new era.” He clearly warned Putin to not threaten NATO states with a direct attack.

“President Putin should not underestimate our resolve to defend every square metre of NATO territory together with our allies!

“We are absolutely serious about this. When we welcome a country into NATO, we commit to defending that country as a partner and ally. Just as we would defend ourselves!

“The Bundeswehr has already bolstered its support for our eastern allies – and will continue to do so. I thank the Federal Defence Minister for this important gesture!

  • We have deployed additional troops in Lithuania, where we lead the NATO battlegroup.
  • We have extended and enhanced our participation in air policing in Romania.
  • We want to contribute to the establishment of a new NATO unit in Slovakia.
  • Our navy is helping to secure the North Sea and the Baltic as well as the Mediterranean with additional vessels.
  • And we are also prepared to contribute to the defence of our allies’ air space in Eastern Europe using anti-aircraft missiles.”

“The page has been turned and Putin’s real agenda is clear to Europeans.”

As the Chancellor said: “Anyone who reads Putin’s historicising essays, who has watched his televised declaration of war on Ukraine, or who has recently – as I have done – held hours of direct talks with him, can no longer have any doubt that Putin wants to build a Russian empire.

“He wants to fundamentally redefine the status quo within Europe in line with his own vision.

“And he has no qualms about using military force to do so. We can see that today in Ukraine.

“We must therefore ask ourselves: What capabilities does Putin’s Russia possess? And what capabilities do we need in order to counter this threat – today and in the future?

“It is clear that we must invest much more in the security of our country. In order to protect our freedom and our democracy. This is a major national undertaking. The goal is a powerful, cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us.

“At the Munich Security Conference a week ago I said that we need aeroplanes that fly, ships that can set out to sea and soldiers who are optimally equipped for their missions. That is what is important. And it is quite certainly something that a country of our size and our significance within Europe should be able to achieve.

“But we should be under no illusions. Better equipment, modern technology, more personnel – all of this costs a lot of money. We will therefore set up a special fund for the Bundeswehr. And I am deeply grateful to Federal Finance Minister Lindner for his support on this! The 2022 federal budget will provide a one-off sum of 100 billion euro for the fund. We will use this money for necessary investments and armament projects.

“We will now – year after year – invest more than two percent of our gross domestic product in our defence. And I now appeal to all parliamentary groups within the German Bundestag: We must secure this special fund in our Basic Law!

“There is one thing that I would like to add. We have set this goal not only because we have made a promise to our friends and allies to increase our defence expenditure to two percent of our economic output by 2024. We are also doing this for us, for our own security.

“In the awareness that the Bundeswehr alone does not have the means to contain all future threats.

“We therefore need strong development cooperation. We will therefore strengthen our resilience – in terms of technology and as a society – for example against cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, against attacks on our critical infrastructure and channels of communication.

“And we will keep pace with new technology. This is why it is so important to me, for example, that we build the next generation of combat aircraft and tanks here in Europe together with European partners, and particularly France. These projects are our utmost priority. Until the aircraft are operational, we will continue to develop the Eurofighter together.

“Another encouraging development is that the contracts for the Eurodrone were finally signed this week. We are also pushing ahead on the purchase of the armed Heron drone from Israel.

“And with regard to nuclear sharing, we will procure a modern replacement for the outdated Tornado jets in good time.

“The Eurofighter is set to be equipped with electronic warfare capabilities.

“The F-35 fighter jet has the potential to be used as a carrier aircraft.

“And finally, ladies and gentlemen, we will do more to guarantee a secure energy supply for our country. The Federal Government has already initiated one important measure to address this.

“And we will change course in order to eliminate our dependence on imports from individual energy suppliers.

“After all, the events of recent days and weeks have shown us that responsible, forward-looking energy policy is not just crucial for our economy and our climate. It is also crucial for our security. This means that the faster we make progress with the development of renewable energies, the better. And we are on the right track. We are an industrialised country aiming to become carbon-neutral by 2045!

“With this goal on the horizon, we will have to take major decisions. For example, on building up a reserve of coal and gas. We have decided to increase the amount of natural gas in storage via long-term options to two billion cubic metres. Furthermore, we will acquire additional natural gas on the world markets – in consultation with the EU. And finally, we have made the decision to rapidly build two LNG terminals in Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven. I would like to expressly thank Federal Economics Minister Habeck for his efforts to facilitate this!

“Our current short-term needs can dovetail with what is already needed long-term for the transformation to succeed. An LNG terminal that today receives gas can tomorrow be used to import green hydrogen. And amidst all this, we will of course not lose sight of the high energy prices. They have now been driven up yet further by Putin’s war.

“This week we have therefore agreed on a relief package, which includes lifting the surcharge under the Renewable Energy Sources Act by the end of this year, as well as an increase in the commuter tax allowance, a heating subsidy for low earners, subsidies for families and tax relief measures. The Federal Government will act swiftly to set these in motion. Our message is clear. We will not leave individuals and businesses to face this situation alone.

“Ladies and gentlemen, this watershed does not just affect our country. It affects all of Europe. And this, too, is both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge consists in strengthening the sovereignty of the European Union sustainably and permanently. The opportunity lies in preserving the united front that we have demonstrated in recent days in agreeing the sanctions package.

“For Germany and for all of the EU’s other member states, that means not simply asking what they can extract in Brussels for their own country. But asking: What is the best decision for our Union? Europe is our framework for action. Only when we understand that will we prevail over the challenges of our time.”

We closed our discussion by this thought – perhaps the Russian invasion of Ukraine is as decisive a moment in the minds of the new generation of Germany as it was for the German and European generations at the time of the Berlin Airlift.

Lieutenant General (ret) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz was Chief of Staff, German Air Force from 2004 to 2009.

Lieutenant General Stieglitz joined the Luftwaffe in October 1968 and commenced officer training, followed by pilot training in the USA to become a fighter pilot. During his flying career he has accumulated more than 3.600 flight hours, mostly on combat aircraft, i.e. the F-104 Starfighter, F-4F Phantom, Mig-29 and Eurofighter/Typhoon. In 1981 – 83 he attended the German Armed Forces Staff College.

During his career he held numerous national and international staff and command positions, i.e. squadron commander, group commander, commander of a fighter wing, staff officer within the German MOD, staff officer at NATO Headquarters SHAPE, Belgium, commander of the NATO AWACS Component, Director Flight Safety of the German Armed Forces, commander of a German Air Division in Berlin and Deputy Commander NATO Air Forces Northern Europe, Ramstein.

In his last assignment he was Chief of Staff of the German Air Force from January 2004 to October 2009. Today he is engaged as senior advisor and consultant.

The featured photo shows the day when the Tornado bombers of the German Air Force are sent to their mission to Afghanistan.

Franz Josef JUNG l CDU federal minister of defence is together with general Klaus Peter STIEGLITZ/

April 2, 2007.

Credit: Alamay.

Lessons that Australia Should Learn from Conflict in Ukraine

03/09/2022

In this radio interview with our colleague John Blackburn, he discusses what Ukraine demonstrates to Australians as they work on a resilience-based defense effort.

This March 5, 2022 interview was conducted on the show Australia Overnight.

John Blackburn AO, Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) / Chairman of the Institute for Integrated Economic Research – Australia, chats  about what would happen to Australia if we were to find ourselves in the same situation as Ukraine.

Despite the courage of the Ukrainian people, it is clear that they are outmanned and outgunned against the Russians. Many experts believe that would Australia find itself in the same situation. John talks to Michael about why it’s so critical that Australia become more self-sufficient and not so reliant on foreign supplies and aid.