Night External Lift Preparations

05/30/2022

A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), conducts an external lift preparations during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at site 67 training area, near Wellton, Arizona, on April 6, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

04.06.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Noah Braswell Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Prologue to Autonomous Warrior 2022

05/29/2022

By Robbin Laird

On May 16, 2022, the Royal Australian Navy led a two-week exercise called Autonomous Warrior 2022.  According to an ADF press release, the exercise was built around “a simulated, next generation naval battlespace – Exercise Autonomous Warrior 2022 (AW22). This Royal Australian Navy (RAN) led Exercise will test and evaluate uncrewed, robotic and autonomous systems in Jervis Bay, in the nearby East Australian Exercise Area and the skies above.”

Prior to focusing on the reporting about AW22, I would like to look back at events leading up to the current exercise as the Royal Australian Navy has embraced autonomous systems and how the RAN is shaping its way ahead with regard to such systems and capabilities.

The Perspective of Cmdr. Paul Hornsby

My first encounter with the RAN and its approach to autonomous systems was when I attended the Royal Australian Navy’s Seapower conference held in Sydney from October 8th through the 10th, 2019.

There I attended a session led by Cmdr. Paul Hornsby, then the Royal Australian Navy lead on autonomous warfare systems.

His presentation provided an overview on how the Australian Navy is addressing the development and evolution of remote systems within the fleet. As Hornsby put it in his presentation: “We have no choice but to be leaders in this area.”

He underscored that the significant operational area which Australian forces need to patrol coupled with limited numbers of maritime platforms and manpower limits meant that the building, operating and integration of maritime remote systems in the fleet was an operational necessity for the Royal Australian Navy. “We could not get enough help from remote systems and artificial intelligence.”

He argued that there was a cross-societal engagement with remote systems in Australia which the Navy could leverage as well. He noted that Australia has been involved in allied exercises across the board in the remote systems area. He laid out through the various exercises in the UK, Australia and elsewhere that his team has been fully engaged in cross learning with allies, and to do so in order to harvest the best and leave the rest. He made a case for why Australia is a very important area for allies to work with the Aussies on remote innovations. The conditions in Australia are challenging and paraphrasing Frank Sinatra: “If you can make it here, you can make it anywhere.”

In his presentation, Cmdr. Hornsby underscored a number of key contributions of AI to the build out of a remote system distributed force. The following graphic highlights the key aspects which he highlighted.

Key points are reaching a stage where the remotes can work with one another, underwater and above water, to provide SA to the battle commander; and to shape ways for the distributed system to assist and make decisions in something which really as way beyond the classic OODA loop.

When the machines are working OO and notably with AI then the focus is upon how to DA.

And even more to the point, humans and machines need to work the decision-making loop together and this requires significant learning on the human side for sure.

As he concluded his presentation, he framed a number of key questions which he argued needed to be addressed and ways ahead found to answer them. It is often the case, that change is really about changing the nature of the questions which need to be answered, rather than finding new answers to older questions. The following graphic lays out the core questions which he posed:

I  followed up later with Hornsby to continue the discussion about the way ahead for the RAN in the autonomous systems area. The broad point is that Australia is focusing on robotics and artificial intelligence more generally in its economy, with clear opportunities for innovation to flow between the civil and military sectors. Australia is a large island continent with a relatively small population. For both economic and defense reasons, Australia needs to extend the capabilities of its skilled manpower with robotic and AI capabilities. For the Navy, this means shaping a much large “fleet” in terms of a significant web of maritime remotes working interactively with the various manned assets operating in an area of interest.

Commander Hornsby highlighted the 2018 Australian Robotics Roadmap as an indicator of the Australian approach to cross-leveraging robotic systems and AI. As the report noted: “Robotics can be the force multiplier needed to augment Australia’s highly valued human workforce and to enable persistent, wide-area operations in air, land, sea, subsurface, space and cyber domains.”

In our discussion, Commander Hornsby noted that collaborative R and D and shared experiences with allies was a key element of the Australian approach, but that Australia had unique operating conditions in the waters off of Australia, and systems that might work in other waters would not necessarily be successful in the much more challenging waters to be found in Northern and Western Australia, areas where the deployment of maritime remotes is a priority.

But one must remember that the maritime remote effort is a question of payloads and platforms. Not simply building platforms. His approach to maritime remotes is very much in the character of looking at different platforms, in terms of speed, range, endurance, and other performance parameters, measured up against the kind of payload these various platforms might be able to carry.

Calculations of the payload/platform pairing and their potential impacts then need to be measured up against the kind of mission which they are capable of performing. And in this sense, the matching of the payload/platform dyad to the mission or task, suggests prioritization for the Navy and the ADF in terms of putting in to operation the particular capability.

Commander Hornsby breaks out the missions for AUV and UUV employment in the following manner:

Home & Away operations…

  • Break Out (Around own critical / sensitive infrastructure – High end UUVs) •Break In (Deployed / Amphib – Low end AUVs / single shot / disposable)
  • Block Out (Autonomous Maritime Asset Protection / Robot UUVs / CIED)
  • Block In (High end AUVs – Sub Launch / XLUUVs / Mining / Intervention)
  • Surveillance (Persistent AUVs for surveillance / attribution – wave gliders
  • Servicing (Large UUVs for industrial off-shore tasks – in water docking)

Pending combination, provides: Deterrence, Sea Control, Sea Denial, Power Projection or Force Protection

What this means is that different payload/platform combinations can work different missions more or less effectively. And quite obviously, in working the concepts of operations for each mission or task which will include maritime remotes needs to shape an approach where their capabilities are properly included in that approach.

And in a 2016 briefing by Hornsby, he highlighted this point as follows:

But importantly, maritime remotes should not be looked at in isolation of the operation of the distributed force and how integratable data can be accumulated and communicated to allow for C2 which can shape effective concepts of operations.

This means that how maritime remotes are worked as an interactive grid is a key part of shaping an effective way ahead. And this allows for creative mix and matching of remotes with manned assets and the shaping of decision making at the tactical edge.  Remotes and AI capabilities are not ends in of themselves; but are key parts of the reshaping of the C2/ISR capabilities which are reshaping the concepts of operations of the combat force.

In that 2016 briefing, Commander Hornsby provided an example of the kind of grid which maritime remotes enable:

Such an approach is clearly crucial for Australia as it pushes out its defense perimeter but needs to enhance maritime security and defense of its ports and adjacent waters. And that defense will highlight a growing role for maritime remotes.

Next Generation Autonomous Systems

My next dealings in Australia with the Royal Australian Navy and autonomous systems was in 2021 when I wrote the Williams Foundation Report on Next Generation Autonomous Systems. I have had two gap years enforced by COVID-19 from my last visit to Australia in March 2020 where I focused on the new build Australian patrol boat until my forthcoming trip in September 2022. And will certainly follow up with regard to the next generation autonomous systems issues when back this Fall.

At the April 8, 2021, seminar (one which was originally scheduled during my March 2020 visit), the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Noonan, focused on the RAN perspective on the way ahead with regard to autonomous systems. At the seminar, he discussed the Navy’s RAS-AI 2040 strategy which he had introduced last year.

As he described that strategy: “The way that we’ve sought to visualize this vision is through five very fundamental effects. Force protection, obviously all about keeping our people safe and out of harm’s way so that they can get on and do their job. Force projection is about how we can achieve mass. Force potential using human machine teaming, ultimately to achieve better and more effective decision-making in the war fighting effort. Partnered force concept around how we will operate as an integrated and joint force by design.”

“The six fundamental principles were built around a user centered design. The system design is user centered. In terms of decision support, we are looking to have systems that significantly reduce the cognitive load on our commanders and operators alike, allowing for them to achieve greater shared situational awareness to deliver effective, efficient, and ethical decision-making.

“The joint integration piece is critical. I cannot stress that highly enough in terms of we must ensure that these systems are integrated. Not just integrated into the platforms or their parent platforms but integrated into the force.

“And they are capable of being evergreen. This is the new term for spiral development. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space. It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate.

“And are we incorporating old technologies? Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped.

“Finally, is the importance of made in Australia. Our systems must be designed for the very unique circumstances that we operate in, particularly in the maritime environment.”

Vice Admiral Noonan then highlighted really the key aspect of using any new sensor networks, whether they be autonomous or not, namely, their integration into a C2 system. “Operating all these systems would simply be too complex, too time consuming and ultimately unmanageable without a common control framework. Therefore, as part of the way that we seek to get after that, the building blocks of that framework, as we see them in Navy, it needs to be a legal and ethical module that allows us to have embedded and encoded regulatory and legal protocols. Clearly a common control protocol that unifies the means of machine control.

“We need common control bridges that provide an interface between the proprietary control systems and the combat management systems of the platforms from which they’re housed. We need a common control language that can express C2 in a way that both human operators and RAS-AI machines can understand. And ultimately, we need a common spectrum management protocol, levering and integrating programmed projects to harden and ensure the spectrum in which we operate.”

The Perspective of Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett

And after the seminar, I had a chance to discuss with Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett more fully the evolving approach of the RN to the way ahead with regard to autonomous systems. The discussion obviously built upon the presentation of Vice Admiral Noonan, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy. As mentioned earlier, Noonon provided his perspective on the way ahead for maritime autonomous systems in the build out and evolution of the Royal Australian Navy. At the heart of his presentation was an opportunity to discuss the Navy’s new Remote Autonomous Systems-AI 2040 strategy. As he put it: “Our Navy has already begun a journey to shape the maritime environment.

“To deter actions against our national interests. To respond with credible Naval power. To use robotics, autonomy, and artificial intelligence. Employing ever more reliable, robust, and repeatable systems. We will continue to drive our edge to help keep our people safe. To create mass, tempo and reach at sea and in all the lanes to enhance the joint force and strengthen our coalition with human command and trusted machine control. Our technologies, enabling our people to thrive. Our people, using technologies, to make smarter systems and better decisions.”

The RAS-AI strategy is focused on enhancing the fleet, not supplanting it. And he underscored that the Royal Australian Navy is working currently to introduce these technologies into the fleet.

I have argued elsewhere that that shift in manned platforms to relying on software upgradeability as a key driver for ongoing modernization clearly becomes a central piece in understanding how to build out RAS-AI capabilities for the maritime autonomous systems platforms or assets.

The Vice Admiral introduced a very useful term which covers the way ahead for thinking about integratability across the crewed and uncrewed assets in the force. As he put it: “Evergreen, I think is the new term for spiral development. That’s the way I look at it. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space.

“It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate. And are we incorporating old technologies? Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped.”

I had a chance to further discuss how to think about the way ahead for maritime autonomous systems within the fleet with Vice Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett. I have been in an ongoing discussion about maritime matters with Barrett ever since I first met him in 2015, and as a key architect for shaping the build out of the 21st  century Royal Australian Navy. I wanted to focus on the interaction between the new build strategy for the Navy’s surface and subsurface platforms and the introduction of autonomous systems into the fleet.

Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett is currently on the board of a key player in shaping a way ahead for autonomous systems, both in the civil and military sector. The CEO of that organization, Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre, spoke at the seminar and provided a broad perspective on autonomous systems.

This is how Jason Scholz, CEO of TAS, highlighted the purposes of the organization as follows: “Advance trusted autonomous systems technologies for asymmetric advantage so the ADF can fight and win; Create & foster game-changing research, of world standing, that pushes theoretical & practical boundaries of future trusted autonomous systems; Deliver autonomous systems & robotics technology with clear translation into deployable defence programs & capabilities for Australian Defence; and Build an environment in which Australian industry has the capacity & skills to deliver complex autonomous systems both to Australian Defence & as integral members of the global defence supply chain.”

This means that Barrett brings to the discussion a deep understanding of the challenges of building out the RAN’s surface and subsurface fleet with the coming of new autonomous technologies.

The challenge of course is to shape an approach which allows for their integration and dynamic processes of change over time. The core point which Barrett drove home in our conversation was the key challenge of building out the integrated distributed force with an open aperture to inclusion of the force enhancement capabilities which maturing autonomous systems can provide.

He argued that at TAS the focus was not just on the next big thing as how what developers can bring to the party which can enhance the capabilities of the force. As he put it: “the new technologies need to be fitted into a broader operational environment. The force has to fight tonight; how can we shape ways ahead which lead to force enhancement?”

In focusing on the subsurface domain, he argued that the context for submarines was changing significantly. They are increasingly operating in a broader kill web environment and need to be able to tap into trusted data to aid their operations and focus their efforts. Clearly, autonomous systems can play an increasingly role in mapping and tracking the undersea domain, and the manned assets become much more capable as trusted data networks can be tapped into.

As he noted: “Submarines are part of the undersea domain battle. They are key contributors, but they have to work within an integrated and distributed mode, which provides them with the information and context in which they can best operate and enhance the operational outcome.”

Evolving autonomous systems will be able to provide enhanced undersea domain awareness which will then enhance the capability of the force to execute their operational plans more effectively.

But this leads as well to reinforcing the broader challenge facing the force: How do you manage and distribute the data being generated to provide information for tactical decision making at the edge and for broader tactical theater wide decision making?

And this leads Barrett to his version of Occom’s razor when assessing what a particular autonomous system might contribute to the force: “I’m less interested in what the particular device being proposed – whether it is a swarming device, an undersea array or a sea glider — but I’m more interested in how your device obtains data, and how reliable it is and how to distribute it and how relevant it is or is not to the commander fighting the battle in operational space in which he is operating.”

Notably, how do autonomous systems close gaps in the information-decision dynamic within which forces can operate as an effective kill web? Answering this question is not a one-off platform decision; it is an evolving modernization effort in which the challenge identified by Vice Admiral Noonan needs to be met of working an evergreen force.

Autonomous Warrior 2022 is a next step in dealing with such a question and doing so from the practical approach to learn by doing which is a hallmark certainly of the ADF approach to force building.

CDRE Darron Kavanagh’s Perspective

And that leads me to the final presentation which I would like to highlight for this article. At the most recent Williams Foundation seminar, the focus was precisely on shaping a way ahead for force building. And a Naval officer who figured prominently in Autonomous Warrior 2022, CDRE Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, RN, spoke at that conference.

CDRE Kavanagh provided a Royal Australian Navy perspective on the way ahead with regard to the integration of the maritime domain within an integrated warfighting force.  Cavanagh’s presentation certainly recalled a core point made by Vice Admiral Barrett at 2016 Williams Foundation seminar when he underscored the following: “we are not building an interoperable Navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.”

Kavanagh highlighted the importance of the evolving role of the maritime force in the offensive-defensive enterprise which a kill web force embodies. “The proliferation of advanced technology and the associated rapid advances in offensive systems such as high-speed and sophisticated anti-ship missiles means that we, more than ever before, need to critically analyze and prioritize our capability development plans to ensure the necessary force protection measures are available while simultaneously developing offensive systems and war-fighting procedures that will contribute to our mission’s success.”

The challenge of getting operational decisions done rapidly and correctly at the point of interest is increasingly crucial, which is why decision making at the tactical edge enabled by new ISR and C2 capabilities is increasingly important for an evolving maritime force.

This is how CDRE Kavanagh framed the challenge: “The speed at which decisions must now be made and are being made by our adversaries and the need to incorporate data from a multitude of sources is key. Intelligence must be analyzed and interpreted quickly to serve the war fighter. The concepts of what are the weapons in our critical capabilities is changing.

“From the traditional platform centric views towards innovation and artificial intelligence, robotics, and sophisticated senses amongst many others, so that we can achieve cognitive superiority and decision-making advantage over an enemy by being networked and integrated across our three defense services.  Our ammunition is actually information and our success will be dependent on how accurate and relevant it is and our skill in using it. Our transition to developing this capability is critical.

“Now, the Navy sees itself as providing, not just traditional sea power with our ships and aircraft and submarines, whether they’re crude or uncrude, but through intelligent and integrated networking across defense. We are an integral part of a potential response that presents any adversary with an unacceptable level of risk to deter aggression against Australia and our national interests.”

And by building out the networked distributed but integratable force, Navy is in a good position to leverage maritime autonomous systems. Put another way, by building the proper foundation it is possible to add new ISR capabilities, for example, which lead to enhanced decision making rather than information overload.

This is how Kavanagh framed the opportunity being opened up by maritime autonomous systems: “In the maritime context, it’s clear that our journey towards a networked integrated force is essential to enable Navy to leverage the full capabilities that autonomous uncrewed and optionally crewed systems can give us.  There are real opportunities to leverage those systems, to deliver effects in a more asymmetric manner, using their attributes of low-cost mass. I.e., the use of the smart, the small, the many, the cheap to complement our traditional complex large, few, expensive, crude platforms.”

Kavanagh concluded: “More than ever, success in warfare is likely to depend on our capability to think creatively, to manage our information as a weapon of warfare. Tactically, we must use our technology and expertise to disrupt and degrade our adversaries’ decision-making. And we must ensure that our decision-making is sound and timely, base it on the best available inputs and trust it.”

Next Generation Autonomous Systems: A Williams Foundation Special Report

Shaping a Way Ahead for the Integrated Distributed Force

And for a further examination of the way ahead for autonomous systems, see chapter four in my recently published edited book Defense XXI;

https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/defense-xxi-robbin-f-laird/1141388804

https://www.kobo.com/us/en/ebook/defense-xxi

 

 

RAAF Exercise Diamond Storm 22

05/28/2022

In an article by Flight Lieutenant Jessica Aldred and Flight Lieutenant Bronwyn Marchant of the RAAF published on May 25, 2022, the launch of Exercise Diamond Storm 22 was highlighted.

The Royal Australian Air Force’s Exercise Diamond Storm 22 will be held in the skies above the Northern Territory from May 30 to June 24.

The exercise will take place from RAAF Bases Darwin and Tindal, and at Timber Creek, Douglas Daly region and the Delamere Air Weapons Range.

Exercise Diamond Storm is the final activity for the participants in the air warfare instructor course (AWIC), and follows other exercises held in the previous six months, including Exercises Diamond Seas and Diamond Shield.

More than 1400 Defence personnel will deploy to the Northern Territory for the exercise, working alongside Defence personnel based in the Top End, and the exercise will involve more than 60 aircraft from Australia and the United States.

This year will be the first time trainee air warfare instructors from the F-35A Lightning II, P-8A Poseidon and combat controller communities will take part.

Commander Air Warfare Centre, Air Commodore Ross Bender, said the Diamond series of exercises enhanced and promoted Air Force’s interoperability with the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and international partners. 

“Diamond Seas and Diamond Shield brought together Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force elements in complex maritime and defensive counter air-focused scenarios, providing training opportunities to practise and consolidate integrated tactics,” Air Commodore Bender said.

“As the culmination activity, Diamond Storm provides our candidates with the opportunity to apply their skills in high-end warfighting scenarios alongside international partners.

“We will conduct Exercise Diamond Storm throughout the Northern Territory to operate within some of the best training environments Australia has to offer.” 

Throughout the AWIC, trainee air warfare instructors have developed their expertise through academic activities and practical exercises that expose the candidates to complex scenarios aimed at broadening and improving their skills.

Following Exercise Diamond Storm, the newly trained instructors will be the next generation of tactical and integrated warfare experts across the air combat spectrum.

“On completion of the course, our air warfare instructors will be knowledgeable and approachable experts who can integrate people, systems and combat effects across the five warfare domains: air, land, maritime, space and cyber,” Air Commodore Bender said.

Featured Photo: F-35A Lightning II aircraft from No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit fly over the Northern Territory during Exercise Rogue Ambush 21-1. Photo: Leading Aircraftman Adam Abela

 

Next Generation Jammer: U.S. and Australian Co-Development

05/26/2022

By Australian Defence Business Review

Maintenance technicians from the US Navy and Royal Australian Air Force recently completed a six-week training event on the AN/ALQ-249(V)1 next generation jammer – mid band (NGJ-MB) that is being developed cooperatively by both countries.

The event – conducted at NAS Patuxent River (PAX) near Washington DC saw the personnel conduct maintenance tasks on the new pods, including the removal and reinstallation of 60 components including arrays, pumps, and actuators. The event also allowed the technicians to verify the technical manual procedures, and to provide feedback to the project office and support team.

“It was great to have our RAAF airmen join us for this event,” said US Navy PMA-234 program manager Capt. David Rueter. “Not only was it the first time the maintainers had access to the Mid-Band pods, but also the first time they worked together as a team, and it was seamless.”

RAAF LAC Adrian Bailey added, “It’s really invaluable for us Aussies to be here now, and while we won’t get the pods for a few years, we can take [the training] back and highlight the issues now, so we’re more prepared for it. It’s very different from how we operate the ALQ-99 pods and it’s good to get a head start.

“It’s been a really good opportunity,” Bailey said. “How many times do you bring out a new weapons system and they say, ‘let’s get the maintenance guys there first to see if they can improve it.’ I haven’t heard of that too many times.”

The ALQ-249(V)1 NGJ-MB is the first of three new jammer pods being developed for the Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft to replace the AN/ALQ-99 pods in US Navy and RAAF service. The next will be the AN/ALQ-249(V)2 low band (NGJ-LB) system which is currently in its Milestone-B engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase – but is reportedly delayed due to industry appeals – and then the AN/ALQ-249(V)3 high-band (NGJ-HB) system.

The NGJ-MB achieved Milestone-C production approval in June 2021, and is scheduled to enter service with the US Navy in 2023.

This article was written by Andrew McLaughlin and published by ADBR on April 14, 2022.

Featured photo: US Navy and RAAF technicians work on an NGJ pod at PAX River. (US NAVY)

Re-designing Supply Chains: The Australian Case

05/23/2022

By Gil Savage

Thanks to the Covid-19 pandemic, we’re more aware of the weaknesses of globalisation and the flaws of managing supply and demand through just-in-time practices.

The problem is clear for Australia’s policymakers, but the solution less so. Some hanker for a return to 1970s-style Australian manufacturing, forgetting it was an inefficient and highly subsidised artefact of an economic policy designed to manage unemployment. Others seek a return to globalisation, dismissing the sovereignty challenges of an increasingly complex and dangerous geopolitical world.

Neither form of extreme optimism is a sufficient risk-mitigation strategy. Whatever approach is adopted, this new insurance policy will come with a price tag that the market won’t meet.

The push to enhance Australia’s sovereign manufacturing capability, particularly in the defence arena, hasn’t yet produced the jobs or economic benefits promised. The defence industry policy statement in 2016 aimed to foster sovereign capability, but there has been virtually no increase in the ratio of defence acquisition dollars spent locally to those going overseas. Good intentions aside, we can’t and shouldn’t manufacture everything.

What should Australia manufacture and how do we decide what’s important? These decisions shouldn’t be based solely on current market forces, or on overly simplistic assessments of future returns on investment for shareholders.

Stockpiling is an oft-discussed response to supply-chain challenges. The 2020 defence force structure plan committed ‘up to $1.1 billion towards building up sovereign weapon-manufacturing capacity and between $20.3 billion and $30.4 billion towards weapon-inventory surety between 2025 and 2040’.

On the face of it, stockpiling appears to be a good idea, but it is expensive to set up, has the potential to distort markets, and risks stockpiling things that become obsolete. Commodities such as fuel have a shelf life, so stocking up when prices are low is only effective when your economy has the scale to turn over that stock. The government-led wool- and wheat-stockpile arrangements of past eras provide stark lessons of the failure of stockpiling to influence markets, manage commodity pricing and shore up supply chains.

The recent effort to map supply chains is welcome, but modern supply chains are complex and mapping takes time. The result may be an impressive infographic that attempts to simplify the picture, but then what? On what basis do we determine which parts of the supply chain are more critical than others? How do we assess the importance of one supply chain over another? Who would be brave enough to prioritise fertiliser over baby formula?

Supply-chain mapping may identify risks, but it won’t help us identify vulnerabilities to ensure resilience. This point was highlighted in the 2021 by the Productivity Commission, which noted that managing risks ‘does not mean that all disruptions identified by a firm can be avoided’ and that it also has costs.

There’s no question that our supply chains need to be resilient to withstand disruption, which in turn suggests a need to focus on the vulnerable parts of supply chains. The problem is that what makes a supply chain, or part of one, resilient can change and often what makes a supply chain vulnerable is out of our control.

Last year’s shortage of AdBlue (a diesel exhaust additive to reduce emissions made from urea) provides the perfect case study. The supply chain was ‘resilient’ up until the point that a trading partner, in this case China, made policy adjustments in response to domestic needs. The first factor was that the price of fertiliser (urea) was increasing, which was increasing the cost of food production and therefore the cost of food for Chinese consumers. The second was the need to improve Beijing’s air quality in the lead-up to the 2022 Winter Olympics.

China’s policymakers decided to have more urea available for domestic use and to make more AdBlue available for diesel vehicles in Beijing. These two decisions reduced the amount of fertiliser and AdBlue available for import into Australia. The result: a supply-chain vulnerability that we did not foresee.

This example highlights that a confluence of factors can lay the groundwork for a perfect storm that results in a supply chain becoming vulnerable. It also highlights the reactive nature of Australia’s approach to supply chains. Asking, ‘What’s the next AdBlue?’ is the wrong question. Instead, we should focus on what we can influence and what confluence of factors may render a supply chain vulnerable.

If we’re expecting to leverage northern Australia’s geostrategic position, we must appreciate that the north will need to accommodate surges in Australian and allied expeditionary forces. That will generate surges in demand for housing, water, food and fuel in addition to the air, land and sea capability that militaries rely upon.

Lifting supply-chain resilience and understanding potential vulnerabilities are essential if northern Australia is to play an effective role in our defence and security. It is a mistake to assume that we can transplant into northern Australia at a moment’s notice anything we need. Accepting that highways and rail in the north can be cut for weeks during the wet season positions it as a pseudo–developing nation and a highly ineffective geostrategic contributor.

Leveraging the north for defence and security goes beyond ensuring that infrastructure there is robust; it must have what’s expected in a modern advanced nation. Getting there will require articulation of the whole-of-community capability needed in the north and how governments, businesses and communities will collaborate to establish that capability. And it must be acknowledged that it will take time and coordinated investment to develop and sustain the workforce, build the operational capability, and establish the social infrastructure essential for the north to play its role effectively.

Policy decisions by other nations are out of our control, so let’s stop using them as an excuse for our broken supply chains and stop allowing them to shape our national positioning. We need a new definition of supply-chain vulnerability, one that emphasises the things we value as a nation so we can make the right policy decisions and achieve the best investment outcomes.

For too long, our approach to supply chains has prioritised low cost over other factors. But cheaper is not always better if it comes with an unacceptable risk. Of course, we should improve the supply chains we have, but what’s more critical is that we redesign our supply chains to meet future needs.

Gill Savage is a senior fellow with ASPI’s Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre and deputy director of ASPI’s Professional Development Centre.

Image: Department of Defence.

This article was published by ASPI on April 22, 2022.

Macron’s Strasbourg Speech: Shaping a Way Ahead for Europe in the Face of the War in Ukraine

05/21/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – President Emmanuel Macron called May 9 in a keynote speech in the European parliament at Strasbourg, eastern France, for a broader European defense and security community, a political project made all the more pressing by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Macron called for setting up a “European political community” as a speedy alternative to Ukraine and Baltic nations applying to join the European Union, a procedure which he said would take years, more likely decades, to complete.

The perceived need for closer defense ties was heightened as Russian president Vladimir Putin attended that same day the military parade in Moscow, marking the end of the second world war in Europe in 1945.

As Macron addressed European leaders, Russian forces fought in eastern Ukraine, seeking to seize the Donbas region and securing the hold on Mariupol, a strategic harbor city that ships Ukrainian grain to the world market. Russia was holding the world to hostage with its seizing Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken said May 19.

With Macron seeking to redraw the geopolitical map for Europe, the European Commission announced May 18 a project, dubbed Defense-EU, to set up streamlined, common procurement, with a proposed cut in value added tax for buying weapons and a €500 million two-year fund to support joint orders among the 27 EU member states.
Macron’s Strasbourg speech pointed up the need to create a “European political community,” to reach out to Balkan nations, including Moldova and Georgia, eager to enter the EU single market, but remaining at the door for some time to come.

“This new European organization would allow democratic European nations that subscribe to our shared core values to find a new space for political and security cooperation, cooperation in the energy sector, in transport, investments, infrastructures, the free movement of persons and in particular of our youth,” he said.

Open Door for the U.K.

“Joining it would not prejudge future accession to the European Union necessarily, and it would not be closed to those who have left the EU,” Macron said of the European political community.

British media, including The Times and The Independent, reported the latter point referred to the U.K., the only nation which has left the EU, with Macron reported to make clear the invitation to London when he spoke in Berlin later that evening.

Macron has sought to form some kind of European military cooperation with the U.K. after Brexit, but so far there is little sign of progress. Britain and France are the two strongest military nations in Europe, but political relations between the two powers have sunk to a new low, following a series of rows, including fishing rights and control of the Channel for refugees and migrants seeking to enter the U.K.

London’s key role in Canberra’s cancellation of a multi-billion euro project for a  French shipbuilder, Naval Group, to design and build an attack submarine for the Australian navy also hurt ties between prime minister Boris Johnson and Macron.

As Macron reached out to London for a broad European alliance, the U.K. threatened to renege on the Northern Ireland protocol, a key part of a hardline Brexit agreement negotiated and signed by the government led by Johnson.

A U.K. breach of that protocol with the EU pointed up a split among European allies, critics said, sending a signal of divisive self-harm to Putin, undermining a show of closed ranks among Western allies of Ukraine.

How the U.K. responds to Macron’s call for a wider European defense coalition remains to be seen, as the pursuit and execution of a tough Brexit deal signalled London’s reluctance to engage with Europe.

Macron said in Strasbourg that Europe was not at war with Russia, there was no intent to humiliate Moscow, and it was up to Ukraine to negotiate a settlement. There was also need to address a new security environment in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

“However, we are not at war with Russia,” he said. “We are working as Europeans to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine so that peace returns to our continent.

“It is up to Ukraine alone to define the conditions for negotiations with Russia. But our duty is to stand with Ukraine to achieve the ceasefire, then build peace. We will then be there to rebuild Ukraine as Europeans, always.

“Because in the end, when peace returns to European soil, we will need to build new security balances and we will need, together, to never give in to the temptation of humiliation, nor the spirit of revenge, because these have already in the past wreaked enough havoc on the roads to peace.”

A rising European concern over Putin’s attack on Ukraine could be seen with Finland and Sweden formally applying to join Nato. That application, if accepted, would extend the 30-strong military alliance to the Finnish 1,340 km common border with Russia, spelling out the significance of a treaty which pledges an attack on one is an attack on all. Macron is the present holder of the six-month rotating presidency of the European Council, which sets E.U. policy. Macron won last month a closely fought presidential election, beating a far-right candidate, and renewing a five-year term as holder of the Elysées office.

Electors go to the polls again next month to vote — or abstain – for members of parliament, and it remains to be seen whether Macron will win backing from a parliamentary majority which will support his aims to reform France.

Macron pursued a strategic autonomy for Europe in his first term, and his Strasbourg speech was seen as an ambition to widen that concept to a broader Europe, reaching out to Balkan nations which have been waiting in line to join the EU single market, all the more seen as a glittering prize in a time of open war on the continent of Europe.

EU Seeks to Boost Capability

“The Europeans need to spend together, more and better,” Josep Borrell, EU foreign policy and security chief, said on the project to boost European military capability.
The European Commission and the European Defense Agency set out May 18 their report, titled Defense Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward.

The report sets three priorities, namely refilling ammunition stockpiles, replacing Soviet-era weapons, and strengthening air and missile defense systems. It was clear those aims pointed up the depletion of stocks due to the Ukraine war.

Capabilities in the air, sea, space and cyber defense also needed to be addressed, the report said, and a defense joint procurement task force will be set up to “coordinate an EU response to very short term urgent needs, notably the refilling of stocks.”

“The call for common procurement of standard size munitions is simple,” said François Lureau of consultancy EuroFLconsult and former arms procurement chief. The €500 million budget for joint orders is small, he said, but that could mark the start of the long term aim. A waiver on VAT on weapons deals was standard practice for OCCAR, the European armaments agency.

The longer term political issue is whether there will be an EU procurement office, he said, a “European DGA” (Direction Générale de l’Armement) to place orders for weapons. There will be need for a real political determination for such an outcome.

The European Defense Agency is an EU institution for research and development projects rather than ordering weapons, he said, while OCCAR is separate from the EU.

Who Benefits – Europe or the U.S.?

While there is high level political commitment to boost European capability, there is concern on whether the budget will be spent on European or U.S. arms, whether companies on this side of the Atlantic will benefit rather than see the money flow across the ocean.

Much of European spending on weapons – more than 60 percent –  is spent outside the EU, Thierry Breton, European commissioner for internal market, said May 18. EU states would have spent more than €1.3 billion on arms if they had hit the spending target of two percent of gross domestic product since 2008.
Sceptics said on social media the bulk of European arms budgets went on the F-35 fighter jet and Patriot missiles, making European defense nothing more than a pipe dream.

Another drag on political intent are the industrial realities of tough talks on a contract for a technology demonstrator for a next generation fighter, with Dassault Aviation on the French side holding out for clear program leadership against claims for shared management by Airbus on the German side.

There is also a lack of drive on the Franco-German project for a main ground combat system, a plan to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2 heavy tanks with a system of manned and unmanned armored vehicles.

Also on the European industrial front, the Franco-Italian Navaris, a joint venture for future warships, has been seen as hit below the waterline, with partners Naval Group and Fincantieri competing against each other in the world market.

The Italian shipbuilder pitched its version of the Fremm multimission frigate to Greece, Naval News website reported July 21, 2021.

Athens opted last year for three Naval Group frigates for defense and intervention (FDI).

Thales competes with Leonardo to supply naval radars, a big ticket item on warships.

Germany Stands by France

For Germany, there is strong political will to work with France.

“There is political commitment at a very high level,” a German official said on the European new fighter project.

The fighter is the cornerstone of the European future combat air system and intended to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter.

“There are still issues to be discussed, but they are not insurmountable and (there is) strong interest to find solutions acceptable to both sides,” the German official said.

Spain is partner on the FCAS project, which competes with the British Tempest fighter project. France and Germany are due to hold a ministerial summit meeting in July.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has said Germany is committed to supporting the future combat air system, alongside ordering the F-35 fighter to carry Nato nuclear bombs.
Germany is closely coordinating with Nato and E.U. allies on arms deliveries to Ukraine, the German official said.

Scholz has abruptly reversed a previous policy of neutrality on Ukraine and agreed to send heavy weapons to the Ukrainian forces, including authorization for dispatch of the Gepard, a flakpanzer anti-aircraft vehicle built on a Leopard chassis.

Switzerland has declined to allow supply of the Oerlikon 35 mm shells for the Gepard, hitting that groundbreaking German policy switch, but Turkey is a possible alternative supplier of the ammunition, a French land weapons specialist said.

Berlin is also considering whether to green light the despatch of 100 Rheinmetall Marder infantry fighting vehicles to help the hard pressed Ukrainian army. There have also been calls to send the Leopard 2 tank to Ukraine. Germany has approved delivery of the track-mounted Panzerhaubitzen 2000 artillery to Ukraine, including training.

Macron was speaking at a special session of the European parliament in Strasbourg, marking the close of an 11-month reform project of listening to citizens’ juries, at the conference on the future of Europe.

Featured Photo:

France President Emmanuel Macron pictured at Cotroceni Palace, in Bucharest, Romania, Thursday, August 24, 2017.

Defense Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward

Distributed Operations and Heavy-Lift: Connecting the Dots and Sustaining the Force

05/20/2022

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to MAWTS-1, I had a chance to talk with two Marine Corps officers with significant experience in working force distribution and sustainment issues with USMC heavy lift assets. With the coming of the CH-53K, the capability of the USMC to work distributed operations, from the sea, from the land, or in support of the joint force is significantly enhanced.

I met with Maj Sean Charvet and Capt Vihlen who spearhead the work of MAWTS-1 on heavy lift training and mission planning for using the unique heavy lift helicopter capability which the USMC has and is in the process of introducing the CH-53K, ramping up their capabilities as well.

The CH-53E and the CH-53K are both heavy lift helicopters unlike the Army’s Chinook series, which are medium lift helicopter. And both the E and the K are air refuellable helicopters, whereas the Chinook has some versions which are and most that are not. As one of the participants put it: “When discussing lift capacities of a helicopter, it is very dependent on environmental conditions. With the K we will see a consistent significant lift capacity at the higher end. So if you have to lift 20,000- 25,000 pounds, you might start taking things off the plane to make it lighter, which now may reduce the capability, its defensive capability, and your ability to carry troops. What the K provides is a stated capability to do heavy lift and it can do that on any given day. And that is the hardest concept for people to grasp about why the K is so significant for the USMC.”

They discussed how distance is a logistics problem. And the air refueling capability as well as the lift capacity of the K provides ways to deal with the distance problem. One way is simply the fact that it can fly further because it is air refuellable. Another way is by the load outs which the aircraft carries means it can support a wider range of basing locations and support a more widely distributed force.

This is especially important when comparing what the K can do compared to a fixed wing aircraft like the C-130J. As one participant put it, there are a limited number of airfields to which the C-130J can go. The adversary can plan in advance with regard to where the Marines might go given that logistical support requirement driven by fixed wing sustainment. With the K, there is no such limitation. Force distribution can be determined by need and impact and the K can insert and support and exit with that insertion force.

The officers made the point that the K was coming at the “right time” in terms of the focus on mobile and expeditionary basing but in terms of technological development as well. Because of the automation built into the aircraft, the crew can focus on mission management. And as a fully digital aircraft with slots for new digital capabilities, the aircraft can be part of a C2 mesh network and facilitate integration of a distributed force.

We discussed the role as well of seabases as mobile assets and how these seabases can operate as “mother ships” to insert, support and withdraw insertion forces. They made the point that a rotorcraft has a significant advantage over a small ship like the LCAC in doing so. As one participant put it: “If you can track an asset you can target it. The advantage we have in our helicopters is our capability to manage our paths to deploy and support force. We do not need to go from a fixed point to a second fixed point; we can operate with variable tracks and as the ship we launch from is moving as well. An asset like the LCAC while very valuable is not a very flexible deployment asset.”

Throughout the discussion, the officers highlighted in a variety of ways why they believed the K was coming at the right time. One aspect was that although the systems which allow automation on the K were new to heavy lift, they are not new to military or commercial aviation. That just simply had not been applied to heavy helicopter lift before.

They have both worked the fuel delivery side of USMC operations for many years. And in discussing the contribution of the K to the projected need to operate distributed bases, they emphasized that the lift capacity and flexibility of the K would be crucial to enabling effective sustained distributed force operations. This is how one participant put it: “Whether its an organic USMC or joint force asset, we can refuel multiple assets based on what a K can do, because it just carries more. It just has more capacity to carry the things that you need.”

For the Marines, the air element supports the ground combat element. So force integration is not a nice to have capability, it is a driver of the kind of training and operations which the Marines do. That particularly goes to the point of information sharing and integration between the air and ground combat elements. Working expanded and effective networks are a key part of the way ahead for the USMC, notably as it works towards greater integration with the joint force. Here the coming of the K as an all-digital aircraft can be part of the digital transformation of the USMC as it goes down the path of enhanced methods and approaches to force distribution.

Indeed, the K is coming at the right time to the USMC.

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 inspects a CH-53K King Stallion prior to its first operational flight at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, April 13, 2022. The flight signified the beginning of HMH-461’s modernization from the CH-53E Super Stallion to the CH-53K King Stallion. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)

Expeditionary Basing, Force Mobility and Aviation Support Capabilities

 

 

Training for Distributed STOVL Operations: WTI 2-22

05/19/2022

U.S. Marines assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), utilize bulk fuel equipment shown to conduct a ground refuel during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Laguna Army Airfield, Yuma, Arizona, March 29, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

03.29.2022

Photos  by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1