By Robbin Laird

The March 24, 2022, Williams Foundation Seminar on “Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force” provided perspectives of core allies of Australia which assessed the state of current affairs with regard to such a force and providing insights with regard to the way ahead.

Because the seminar was held in the same week as the RAAF’s Air and Space Power Conference 2022 (entitled “Resilience and Innovation in Air and Space,” there was a clear opportunity to leverage that conference for the benefit of the Williams Foundation Seminar.

At that conference, the Australian Minister for Defence Peter Dutton announced the establishment of the Defence Space Command, a subject which was treated in significant detail in the last Williams Foundation seminar held last year, entitled “Requirements for Sovereign Defence Capability.”

At the Williams Foundation seminar, two American officers spoke, General Kenneth Wisbach, Commander Pacific Air Forces and LtGen Steven Rudder, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, one British officer, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Wigston, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, and Lt. General Aurelio Colagrande, Italy Deputy Chief of Air Force.

I will deal with each of their presentations in separate articles, but will focus here on the general takeaways from their presentations taken collectively.

First, either discussed directly by the speakers or assumed in their analyses was the changing nature of the strategic environment, and the need for significantly enhanced ready forces while transformation towards a more integrated force was underway. It is not just about possessing a small number of sophisticated platforms, or even integrated sophisticated platforms, it is about effective decision making in a contested environment.

Second, working ways to enhance how the operating forces work together now is a foundation for shaping a way ahead. Lt. General Aurelio Colagrande highlighted the successful efforts to enhance Eurofighter deployed integration in delivering enhanced combat capability in operating airpower in the Baltic region as one key example.

Third, LtGen Rudder highlighted how the Marines, the first to operate the F-35, had evolved their capabilities to operate afloat and ashore with allies, such as demonstrated in recent Pacific exercises or “rehearsals” as he called them with the United Kingdom and their Queen Elizabeth carriers.

The USMC and the UK have worked for many years on air combat integration first in the United States and then in the UK and elsewhere for their F-35s. Training the maintainers and the pilots for both forces from the ground up has delivered unique integrated capabilities and is suggestive of the kind of integration which is possible if training and operations are brought more closely together.

The RAF Chief of Staff underscored how he saw this process, highlighted by the MARFORPAC Commander:

“I can’t think of a better example of multi-domain integration than the UK carrier strike group that deployed last year in the Indo-Pacific region, as far as Japan. It brought to life, the deeper UK focus on the Indo-Pacific, a region the Integrated Review identified as critical to our economy, our security, and our global ambition to support an open and resilient international order.

“At the heart of that carrier strike group, of course, is our ability to operate fifth generation combat aircraft from the sea. Lightning is a phenomenal war fighting machine, from land or sea. And last year 617 Squadron Royal Air Force and VMFA-211 from the US Marine Corps demonstrated that enormous utility from the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth.”

Fourth, in discussing the Integrated Review, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Wigston highlighted a number of key developments suggestive of the broader approach of the allies in working force integration.

This is how he put the significance of the C2 and ISR efforts in providing for such an outcome:

“To operate and fight together, we need to connect together. That functioning interoperable digital C2 network is one of the most important technological challenges we all share. And after many years observing PowerPoint slides with lightning bolts connecting platforms, I am delighted to say that it is something that we are on the threshold of delivering at long last in the real world too.

“This is the combat cloud. We’ve long talked about, brought to life. Data from every sensor on any platform in the operating space, processed in real time, at the edge into useful information, flagged to any user with a need for that information, accessed remotely, fused with what is already known to give of situational awareness at any level and enabling better decisions than our adversaries, all executed at the speed of light.”

Fifth, the PACAF Commander, General Kenneth Wisbach, focused much of his presentation on how to shape a way ahead for force connectivity, notably in regard to how the USAF is addressing what it calls Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

But as an operational commander, he did not focus primarily on the long-term vision, but on how to get enhanced warfighting capability now with regard to the operating forces.

A key example he provided of what is the current focus and reality was his discussion of the recent Cope North 22 exercise.

“We focused on network integration during our recent Cope North 22 dynamic force employment exercise alongside Australia and Japan. Cope North allowed us to build our tactics, techniques and procedures in support of agile combat employment, or ACE, our operational concept that projects air power via network of distributed operating locations throughout the Indo-Pacific. The Australian air force, as well as the Japanese air force were both experimenting with ACE as well as the USAF.

“During the exercise, we executed 2000 sorties across seven islands and 10 airfields demonstrating operational unpredictability and redundant C2 that enabled rapid employment of fourth and fifth generation air power. Our assessment of the exercise showed that we were able to finer interoperability as we work toward the achievement of a networked force with our allies and partners.”

In short, the demand to fight tonight requires operational innovation delivered in the near to mid-term, not just in some abstract future. In fact, that future may never arrive.

As we are seeing in Europe, some were prepared and many were not for the stark reality of what 21^st century authoritarian powers are about in world where globalization was assumed to eliminate such events. Peter Jennings referred in his insightful presentation at the seminar that Germany has had its “German moment” in being shocked into reality. We shall see but the challenge is to deliver credible force now in decision-making environment where the 21st century authoritarian powers take seriously what the West is doing.

It is not about a power point presentation deck of what a credible future force might look like in a distant future.

The featured photo: U.S. Marine Corps Capt Craig Turner prepares to launch an F-35B from HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Pacific Ocean on August 20, 2021. The operation highlighted the interoperability of the F-35B and the strategic importance of the joint integration between the United Kingdom Carrier Strike Group and the U.S. Navy Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit. This mission was the first time in modern history the United States has cross-decked aircraft for a mission utilizing a foreign aircraft carrier, demonstrating naval partnerships in action.

For the first piece in this series on the Williams Foundation March 24, 2022 seminar, see the following:

Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force: The March 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar

The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability

Recently, the Solomon Islands leadership announced a security arrangement with China. As noted by The Economist in an article published on April 2, 2022:

“To the alarm of Australia and New Zealand, the Solomon Islands has reached a security agreement with China. The prime minister, Manasseh Sogavare, confirmed this on March 29th, furious that a draft of the agreement had been leaked a few days earlier. It envisaged the arrival of Chinese military personnel and police and occasional “ship visits” in order “to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects in Solomon Islands”. Already, China has started training the local force in riot control and handling replica weapons, after years when Australia and New Zealand have taken primary responsibility for dealing with unrest in the Solomon Islands and for reforming the police force.”

But what does this mean for Australia?

In an article written by Michael Shoebridge and published by the ASPI Strategist on April 11, 2022, the author provides a very good analogy from how China has worked its Djibouti arrangement to further shape its global presence and ability to project authoritarian rules of the game.

That article follows:

Why shouldn’t we believe Beijing’s claims that its security agreement with Honiara won’t result in a base or place to operate its navy from in Solomon Islands? Because we’ve seen this playbook before: in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. And because the Chinese government and military routinely lie about their intentions. Xi Jinping telling Barack Obama in 2015 that China would not militarise the South China Sea while he built military bases on reclaimed land there is one iconic example.

Rumours of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti started in 2014. Djibouti’s government even said publicly it was offering ‘Djibouti as home port to the Chinese navy’, and a draft bilateral security agreement was signed that year apparently talking about military port facilities for China.

Chinese officials downplayed ideas of a base for years afterwards. When foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying was asked about the possibility in May 2015, she said:

China and Djibouti enjoy traditional friendship. Friendly cooperation between the two sides has achieved constant growth over recent years, with practical cooperation carried out in various fields. What needs to be pointed out is that regional peace and stability serves the interests of all countries and meets the aspirations shared by China, Djibouti and other countries around the world.

By November 2015, another foreign ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei, responded to claims that China intended to build a naval base, saying: ‘China and Djibouti are discussing about a logistics centre. It is aimed to provide better facilities so that the personnel on Chinese vessels can get better rest and replenishments.’

This would enable Chinese vessels and personnel on escort duty to better fulfil international obligations, especially on UN peacekeeping missions, Hong said.

In January 2016, Hong announced: ‘China and Djibouti consulted with each other and reached consensus on building logistical facilities in Djibouti, which will enable the Chinese troops to better fulfill escort missions and make new contributions to regional peace and stability.’

When the facility opened in 2017, it was reported by international and even some Chinese media as China’s first overseas naval base, although Beijing officially described it as a logistics facility.

Announcing the initialling of the draft China–Solomons agreement recently, China’s embassy in Honiara said:

As two sovereign and independent countries, China and Solomon Islands are committed to normal law enforcement and security cooperation on the basis of equality, respect and mutual benefit, which conforms to international laws and customary practices. The cooperation is conducive to stability and security of Solomon Islands, and will promote common interests of other countries in the region.

The Agreement will further strengthen the bilateral cooperation between China and Solomon Islands in areas such as disaster response, humanitarian aid, development assistance and maintaining social order, to jointly address traditional and non-traditional security challenges. It will inject important positive energy and certainties into the security environment of Solomon Islands and the region as a whole.

Note the parallels in each case: consensus and respect for sovereignty between two highly unequal partners, along with references to the contributions to regional security that a Chinese military presence will bring.

And the leaked text of the draft China–Solomons agreement echoes the logistics support functions provided in Djibouti to China’s military: ‘China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands, make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands.’

That’s a logistics support facility for China’s military. As we’ve seen in the case of the People’s Liberation Army base in Djibouti, whether it’s called a base, a place or a duck won’t matter. If it goes ahead, the Chinese military will have a place to operate across the South Pacific from, supplied by Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and his government.

And the way the Djibouti base was negotiated, justified and described publicly should give no comfort to anyone watching this agreement come into being—apart from Beijing, Sogavare and any Solomons politicians benefitting directly from the arrangements and their negotiation.

Of course, there’s a glaring distinction between the Solomon Islands’ place in the South Pacific and Djibouti. The Horn of Africa faced external security threats—piracy and international terrorism—with multinational navy deployments to counter them, joined by the PLA Navy, and sits beside a key global shipping route.

The South Pacific, by happy contrast, is free from external security threats, with only the routine border security issues all states face. That cuts to the heart of Sogavare’s public rationale for the agreement, which he says is to deal with the Solomons’ ‘soft and hard’security threats.

Sogavare’s statement that, ‘Contrary to the misinformation promoted by anti-government commentators, the agreement does not invite PRC or any other countries for that matter to establish its military base here’, means nothing, other than showing he’s well practised in semantics and textual interpretations.

The people of Solomon Islands, the nation’s bureaucracy and police force, and all its Pacific partners and neighbours can see the path China is taking.

For Solomon Islanders, it’s one that leads to the presence of Chinese military power inside their country, operating according to China’s needs. And the security agencies China will send under this agreement—the Ministry of Public Security’s police, the PLA and People’s Armed Police—are responsible for the brutal crackdowns on freedoms in Hong Kong and Xinjiang and for the Tiananmen Square massacre. Their behaviour against their own people surely indicates how they’ll behave when used against Solomon Islands citizens, whether by Sogavare or ‘according to [China’s] needs’.

For other Pacific partners, from Fiji to Papua New Guinea and Nuie, it means bringing this same authoritarian military power to places near them, at the invitation of a government within the Pacific family.

And the contribution we can expect China to make to the South Pacific’s regional security? Military tension and even conflict will be the likely results.

We can see the future for the South Pacific in the Chinese military’s record in the South and East China Seas and Taiwan Strait. An example closer to home was the use of a military laser against a Royal Australian Air Force patrol aircraft off Darwin in February.

The Australian government’s approach has been to keep all projects and programs between Australia and the Solomons running as if none of this is happening. It’s even building a base for the Guardian-class patrol boats Australia has given the Solomons.

Australian, PNG and New Zealand police supported by the Australian Defence Force also continue to work there in accordance with the Solomons’ request for security assistance. This support, ironically, along with Chinese cash, has probably kept Sogavare in power and enabled him to keep negotiating his secret deal with Beijing.

Continuing Australian and regional support is understandable, despite the underlying impression of absurdity. It makes absolute sense to keep engaging with and supporting the Solomon Islands people and their government agencies to build the prosperity and security of our regional partner.

It makes little sense, though, to give Sogavare active support when he’s acting against the region’s security and against key Australian interests by pursuing his China deal.

It’s time to talk to and deal with Sogavare honestly, directly and publicly, in the frank ways his population, other Pacific partners and people in the Solomons parliament and other institutions need to hear. In a recent poll, 91% of Solomon Islanders said they wanted their country to be aligned with liberal democratic countries. Only 9% said they preferred China.

Sogavare is endangering his people’s individual and societal freedoms through his increasingly close partnership with Beijing and its repressive security forces. And he’s bringing real military tension and the prospects of actual military conflict closer to all of us. All for reasons that are incomprehensible aside from personal interest in power and perhaps money.

He cannot have even a whiff of support from Australia or any other Pacific nation as he goes down this path. Leadership engagement with Sogavare or any of his ministers has to at least begin with a public condemnation of his deal with Beijing and a call for him to scrap it.

And visits to Australia or other Pacific partners by Sogavare and his ministers should be on hold while the deal is on the table or in force. The recent letter from Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo shows the way: respectful but firm on the consequences of Sogavare’s actions being far wider than just himself and his nation.

It can’t be business as usual engaging with Sogavare while he damages his people’s freedoms, his country’s sovereignty and the region’s security.

Michael Shoebridge is director of ASPI’s defence, strategy and national security program.

Featured Photo Credit: Photo 178636613 / Solomon Islands China © Anastasiia Guseva | Dreamstime.com