By Robbin Laird

As II MEF transforms, a key challenge is force cohesion and force aggregation. For example, with the current Marine Expeditionary Unit, the MEU has a well-defined organic capability which allows it to operate effectively and to scale up with force integration with other force units. But going forward, how will the MEF forces be organized? What will the force packages look like? How much organic ISR and fire power? How much reliance on externally supplied ISR and fire power? And how to build a viable distributed but integratable force?

The only way such questions will be answered effectively is with the evolution of C2 capabilities, and systems which can shape integratable modular task forces, which can either be the supported or supporting building block for a scalable force.

But working C2 to achieve the kind of force flexibility which could lead to significant reworking of the mosaic of a joint or coalition force is a major challenge.

During my visit to II MEF in April 2021, I had a chance to discuss these issues across the command, but with an opportunity as well to focus specifically on the C2 piece with II MEF’s G-6 command, which is the communications element.  I had a chance to discuss C2 issues with the Assistant Chief of Staff of G-6, Colonel Hyla and Master Gunnery Sergeant Stephens, II MEF Defense Information Network Chief.

We discussed a number of aspects of the C2 challenges and transition. I will not hold them responsible for my takeaways from our conversation, but there were four key takeaways from my point of view.

The first is that the goal of greater Navy and Marine Corps integration faces a major challenge of ensuring that the two forces can work over compatible ISR and C2 systems. This simply is not the case currently. If there is an end goal of empowering Marines to be able to provide ISR to the fleet to enable fire solutions, or ashore Marines to leverage Navy ISR and provide for firing solutions either from afloat or ashore assets, the C2 needs to be adequate and effective to do so.

Data from various Navy systems must be usable by afloat or ashore Marines. USMC aviation assets afloat or ashore can provide for firing solutions organically or in terms of current USMC C2, but if third party targeting in support of the fleet is desired then C2 needs to be integratable across the fleet into the Marine Corps force.

The second is that meeting the challenge of what the Aussies refer to as transient software advantage is a major challenge. An ability to rewrite software code ahead of adversary capability to disrupt ISR/C2 systems is crucial. During a visit to Jax Navy last year, I saw the P-8 team working such an approach with regard to rewriting code. In an interview with Lt. Sean Lavelle, he described the approach as follows:

They are focusing on ways to execute in-house software development under PMA-290, the Program Office for the P-8. Within PMA-290 is an office called the Software Support Activity, which Lt. Lavelle and his team works with. There they are focused on building a system on the P-8 where mission system data, including data links, and information generated by the sensor networks goes to the “sandbox” which is a secure computing environment that can take data, process it, and generate decision-making recommendations for the operator or alert them to tactical problems. It does not directly push data to the aircraft, so it is divorced from safety of flight software considerations.

According to Lt. Lavelle: “This allows us to push updates to the sandbox on timescales measured in days or weeks, rather than years. The Weapons School is building the software for the sandbox based on operators’ experiences, while the traditional acquisitions enterprise builds the infrastructure to allow that development. The process is that we observe the fleet’s problems, we write code to solve those problems, we send the finished application to PMA-290, they do a security analysis, and then they push it back to be integrated onto the aircraft. We are funding this process operationally rather than on a project basis. We have four to six people at the weapons school at any one time who are trained to write software for the sandbox.”[1]

The Marines are focused on a similar effort. As Col. Hyle put it: “The Marine Corps has recognized the need to code ourselves, and we have our first cohort of what is now 0673s is the new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).”

The third is working new ways to integrate with core allies in terms of C2 capabilities This rests not simply on sorting through ways to work more traditional security arrangements, but new innovative ways of leveraging commercial networks in secure manners as well. II MEF has been hard at work in this area, notably in working with Canadians, Norwegians, the British and French forces in Europe to be able to shape shared C2 capabilities in new and innovative ways.

The fourth is the force aggregation and disaggregation issue noted at the beginning of this article.  As Colonel Hyla put it: “How do we fit into the transformation of Composite Warfare?  For example, I may be working under potentially the MEF today, but we may for a couple days move over to work for the carrier strike commander, or we may transfer a couple aircraft to work for the anti-sub warfare commander for a couple days, depending on the availability of assets in the battlespace.  But we’re not used to cutting away a platoon or a battery from a battalion or a company from a battalion to work for the Navy for a day or two and then come back to us. We’ve got to make sure, once they decide how we do that, that all our C4 systems align and work with them and we can talk with them, whoever our direct combat boss is in the battlespace.”

Much easier to do with briefing slides than with operational forces. And being able to fight tonight remains an imperative as II MEF serves many masters, including, EUCOM, Second and Sixth Fleet

[1] Robbin Laird, Training for the High-End Fight, Chapter Three, 2021, https://www.amazon.com/Training-High-End-Fight-Strategic-Shift/dp/1098350758/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=training+for+the+high+end+fight&qid=1620576406&sr=8-1

Featured Photo: Tents, communication networks and vehicles are set up for Marines to operate during MEFEX 16 at Camp Lejeune, N.C., May 16, 2016. MEFEX 16 is a command and control exercise conducted in a simulated deployed environment designed to synchronize and bring to bear the full spectrum of II Marine Expeditionary Force’s C2 capabilities in support of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Conducting exercises of this nature ensures II MEF remains ready to provide the Marine Corps with an experienced staff capable of integrating with international allies and partner nations in a combined joint task force, charged with accomplishing a wide range of military operations. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Kirstin Merrimarahajara/released)

By Robbin Laird

In the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems, an important consideration was how the ADF could leverage a broader ecosystem of change in the commercial sector where robotics and artificial intelligence were playing key roles. An important presentation at the seminar was by Professor Jason Scholz, CEO of the Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperation Centre. Scholz is this year’s winner of the McNeil prize, awarded to ‘an individual from Australian industry who has made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy’, he is also a tenured Innovation Professor at RMIT University in Melbourne.

The broader Australian effort with regard to autonomous systems provides an opportunity for the ADF to shape sovereign defense capabilities in this area as well as working more effectively with relevant global partners in this area. And it is not simply a question of kit; it is about working ADF concepts of operations interactively with core allies.

As the ADF works its way ahead with regard to building out its fifth generation force to enable integrated distributed operations, selective autonomous systems will enable the force to become more effective, more lethal and more survivable.

The Centre provides a catalyst for change. This is how the TAS website describes the organization:

Trusted Autonomous Systems is Australia’s first Defence Cooperative Research Centre, and is uniquely equipped to deliver world-leading autonomous and robotic technologies to enable trusted and effective cooperation between humans and machines. Our aim is to improve the competitiveness, productivity and sustainability of Australian industry.

 Supporting Australia’s defence capability

Trusted Autonomous Systems, together with its participants and the Department of Defence, is developing the capacity of Australia’s defence industry to acquire, deploy and sustain the most advanced autonomous and robotic technology through:

• delivering world-leading autonomous and robotic Defence technologies
• building innovative IP through targeted research and technology programs
• assisting Australian industry to develop new, improved and competitive autonomy technologies
• evaluating the utility of autonomous systems through capability demonstrations.
• Specifically, Trusted Autonomous Systems aims to:
• develop highly self-sufficient and survivable systems *
• develop highly self-determining and self-aware systems *
• develop human-autonomy systems that are human and context aware
• increase the speed to reach a deployable state for trusted autonomous systems
• increase the scalability and reduce the cost of autonomous systems technology solutions
• educate in the ethics and legal aspects of autonomous systems
• advocate and form national policy and regulations.

 Supporting acceptance, regulation and certification of autonomy

In addition to specific industry-led Projects, TASDCRC is undertaking two common-good activities that have broader, non-defence applications, in addition to their defence benefit. These activities are the Ethics & Law of Autonomous Systems and Assurance of Autonomy.

 Through these activities TASDCRC will:

• foster ethical and legal research including value-sensitive design
• develop policy pathways for projects and participants
• support development of Queensland air, land and marine ranges for trusted trials, test and evaluation
• establish independent, world-class certification pathways for global industry.

 How we work

Trusted Autonomous Systems fosters collaboration between Australia’s defence industry and research organisations and aims to increase small and medium enterprise participation in its collaborative research to improve the research capabilities of the Australian defence industry.

Established under the Next Generation Technologies Fund, with $50 million invested over seven years, and supplemented by other governmental funding, the Defence CRC aims to deliver trustworthy smart-machine technologies for new defence capabilities based on advanced human-machine teaming.

 * May be human piloted but never needs to be. If in trouble seeks human assistance. If assistance not forthcoming goes into a safe mode of operation.

This is how Scholz described the challenge and the way ahead for the ADF in the autonomous systems area:

“Autonomous systems for air, land, sea, space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information environments offers huge potential to enhance Australia’s critical and scarce manned platforms and soldiers, and realizing this now and into the future requires leadership in defence, in industry, in science and technology and academia with an ambition and an appetite for risk in effecting high-impact and disruptive change.”

He underscored the crucial importance of leveraging the broader commercial developments and uses already underway.

“We need a diversity of means to make this work. And it happened into the future. This is an initiative of defence and DST group. It leverages strong commercial technology drivers to solve these long-term challenges experienced by the department.”

The Centre takes an approach which is “defence needs-driven,” with every project clearly having to show how it can be a “game-changer for the ADF to fight and win.”

Projects are “industry led” often with smaller firms, to ensure new technologies get through the “valley of death.”

All projects are “research supported” which includes subcontracting government researchers and academics to industry – a novel approach.

I had a chance to discuss with Jason, to understand the nature of the way ahead in practical terms during a phone interview on May 27, 2021.

The focus of that conversation was very much on how to get these innovations into the hands of the ADF as operational capabilities as the ADF was working force transformation referred to as building a fifth generation force.

Although autonomous systems can be labelled as disruptive technology, in actual fact, the disruption is already underway.

What the ADF refers to as building a fifth generation force can also be labelled as building a distributed and human-machine-team integrated force.

This is clearly underway with the platforms and systems which the ADF is already acquiring, but what next generation autonomous systems can do is accelerate the transition and build out greater mass for a distributed force.

And as autonomous systems are leveraged, the way new capabilities will be added, and supported will change, including in terms of the industrial model supporting the force as well. For example, the ADF is operating a number of software upgradeable systems already, with the Wedgetail being the first platform introduced into the force which is built around software upgradeability.

With a manned system, obviously there is concern for the safety and security of the manned elements crewing the platform, so that software redesign needs to be done in regard to these key considerations.

But as Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster.

It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different.

“They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says.

And the question of how to handle the requirements process is very different.

This already true for software upgradable platforms like Triton, but it has been VERY difficult for acquisition systems to recognize how software upgradeability simply blows up the traditional requirements setting process.  Next generation autonomous systems are built around software and digital life cycles; this means that how they are validated and introduced requires a clearly modified acquisition approach.

I remember how difficult it was to introduce the Osprey into the USMC and then into the force. I interviewed a Marine in the early days of introduction and he referred to the challenge of transitioning from being a “bar act” to becoming a core combat capability which significantly transformed the force.

Autonomous systems face the problem of moving from being a “bar act.”

So where might these systems be introduced in the near term, gain operator’s confidence, and contribute in the short to mid-term to a more effective ADF?

The shortest path to escaping the “bar act” phase is in infrastructure defense.

Maritime autonomous systems certainly could provide a significant contribution in the relatively short-term to something as crucial as extended port security and defense.

Indeed, Scholz worked with CMDR Paul Hornsby in the 2018 Autonomous Warrior exercise.

According to Scholz: “This was the biggest trial of autonomous systems which the Royal Australian Navy has done to date. We had 45 companies actively participating with live demonstrations, as well hosting the final demonstration of the Five Eyes nations Autonomy Strategic Challenge which was an initiative of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). We were able during the exercise to control 13 separate semi-autonomous vehicles, in the air, on the surface, underwater and on land simultaneously from a single operator at a workstation. One of the vignettes was littoral base defense.”

He argued that for the ADF, a “human-centered, AI-enabled, internet of things” approach is a way to think of it. From our work with Second Fleet, VADM Lewis and his team are rebuilding their approach around mission command for a distributed force.

This is the strategic direction already underway.

Scholz sees autonomous systems as providing mass to the distributed force. “Humans express mission command goals to machines, machines express to the operator what actions they can take to achieve that, and a contract agreement is formed. Within the commander’s intent, machines then subcontract to other machines and so on, dynamically adapting as the battle evolves to build that Mosaic.”

In both his presentation and our discussion, he highlighted a capability which they are working now which can provide for sensors and communications capabilities to support the force which complements manned assets to provide for Information, Reconnaissance and Intelligence. In other words, autonomous systems can provide for sensor networks which can be part of the effort to leverage information systems to deliver more timely and effective decisions.

“For example, high-altitude balloons can operate at 50,000 to 70,000 feet, above manned aircraft – largely solving the detect and avoid airspace problem. The endurance of these are a few days to weeks with the potential to station-keep or track surface targets with edge intelligence. The cost of these are a few thousand dollars each.

“They are reusable maybe six times, and can carry comms and ISR. Launch them in hours not like the months for cube sats. They are attritable, so you can put them in places you wouldn’t put other assets. They can assist first responders or support to war fighters.”

In short, the ADF is already undergoing a transition to shaping a distributed integrated force.

Next Generation Autonomous Systems can provide a further set of capabilities for a more effective, dense, survivable and capable ADF as it builds out for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and enhances its defense of the Australian continent.

See below to view Professor Scholz’s presentation to the seminar:

04_NGAS_Scholz

 

 

By Marcus Hellyer

The government’s 2020 defence strategic update provided refreshing clarity about Australia’s deteriorating strategic environment and the need for new military capabilities to address it.

These include long-range strike capabilities to impose greater cost on potential great-power adversaries at greater range from Australia. The government also included a shopping list of those capabilities giving a broad outline of schedule and the scale of investment.

But there’s a big gap between where we are today and where we need to be, and the shopping list crosses that gap achingly slowly. In the vast reaches of the Indo-Pacific, range is crucial and the Australian Defence Force’s long-range strike cupboard is bare.

The F-35A has an effective combat radius of about 1,000 kilometres. That can be boosted to about 1,500 kilometres with the use of expensive and vulnerable tanker aircraft. But even that doesn’t cover much of our neighbourhood. It’s also easily out-ranged by Chinese missiles—it doesn’t matter how good the F-35A is if it’s taken out on the ground or its bases are destroyed.

The navy doesn’t have much to offer either. Its six submarines provide only two for operations, which doesn’t guarantee one on station to our north. They can only carry a few strike missiles and once they’re fired, it’s a one-month turnaround back to Australia to reload. And on the current Attack-class submarine schedule, it could be close to 2040 before the number of boats in our submarine fleet grows.

With the government providing Defence with $575 billion over the coming decade, the department has to do better at getting effective strike capability into service sooner.

One option that could deliver formidable long-range strike power well before the future submarines arrive are bombers. It’s strange that bombers don’t get much attention as a military option for Australia, considering we have a long history operating them. We flew bombers out of northern Australia during World War II against the Japanese to telling effect, and it was only a decade ago that the F-111, long a mainstay of Australia’s deterrent capability, was retired.

The only real candidate for a crewed long-range bomber is the B-21 stealth bomber, currently under development in the US and planned to enter service late this decade. Remarkably for a developmental project, the B-21 seems to be roughly on schedule and on budget by leveraging the technologies used in earlier stealth aircraft projects. It’s using two F-35 engines, for example, but it will have three or four times the range of the F-35. That will allow it to reach far out into the Indo-Pacific, greatly complicating the planning of any adversary operating against us or our friends. It also means it can be based deep inside Australia, far from threats, and still not need to rely on tanker support.

If Australia had a squadron of 12 B-21s, it could dispatch a flight of three aircraft carrying around 30 long-range anti-ship missiles in the morning and follow it up with another in the afternoon. Unlike submarines, bombers can do it all again the next day. If the mission was to strike ground targets, they could each carry 50 guided bombs.

Granted, bombers can’t do everything that submarines can do (and the reverse is also the case). But they can potentially deliver similar results differently, for example by destroying enemy submarines in port, rather than hunting them down at sea. Or by dropping sophisticated sea mines off an enemy’s naval bases.

Certainly, that kind of capability doesn’t come cheap. The US is aiming for a unit price under $1 billion. A squadron of 12 aircraft will likely total around $20–25 billion once we add in bases, support systems such as simulators and maintenance facilities, and so on. That’s a lot, but compared to the $45 billion to be spent on future frigates, the $89 billion on submarines or indeed the $30 billion on armoured vehicles, it’s a price worth considering. Deploying a B-21 would also mean sending a crew of two into danger, as opposed to more than 60 on an Attack-class submarine or 180 on a future frigate.

Of course, if we buy B-21s from the US, not a lot of money will be spent here on local industry in their acquisition. But the Defence budget shouldn’t be seen primarily as an industry program. At any rate, the bulk of spending over the life of a military aircraft is in its sustainment, and much of that will be spent here.

There’s one other potential option; a Goldilocks solution with greater range than the F-35 but less capability and cost than the B-21. It would involve developing a bigger, multi-engined version of the loyal wingman uncrewed combat aircraft recently test flown by Boeing Australia. That would take a commitment from the government and Defence to invest in its development, as well as trust that autonomous systems can deliver lethal effects at long range.

But we could pursue both approaches as an insurance policy to hedge against the risks we are facing.

Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.

A version of this article was published in The Australian.

This was published by ASPI on May 24, 2021.

Featured Image: US Air Force.

By Robbin Laird

The Navy and the Marines are reworking ways to enhance their warfighting and deterrence capabilities in the North Atlantic. This effort has been referred to as preparing for the “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic” by Adm. James Foggo III, when he was commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa.

As CNO Admiral Richardson established 2nd Fleet, he highlighted a new role of the High North as a key area of interest in dealing with the Russian challenge, one which for the direct interest of the United States is focused around what Admiral Gortney highlighted as the 10:00 O’clock threat to CONUS.

In an interview we did with the then head of Northcom and NORAD, Admiral Gortney, this is how he put the challenge:

“With the emergence of the new Russia, they are developing a qualitatively better military than the quantitative military that they had in the Soviet Union. They have a doctrine to support that wholly government doctrine. And you’re seeing that doctrine in military capability being employed in the Ukraine and in Syria.

“For example, the Russians are evolving their long-range aviation and at sea capabilities. They are fielding and employing precision-guided cruise missiles from the air, from ships and from submarines. Their new cruise missiles can be launched from Bears and Blackjacks and they went from development to testing by use in Syria.

“It achieved initial operating capability based on a shot from a deployed force. The Kh-101 and 102 were in development, not testing, so they used combat shots as “tests,” which means that their capability for technological “surprise” is significant as well, as their force evolves. The air and sea-launched cruise missiles can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, and what this means is that a “tactical” weapon can have strategic effect with regard to North America.

“Today, they can launch from their air bases over Russia and reach into North American territory.

“The challenge is that, when launched, we are catching arrows, but we are not going after the archers.

“The archers do not have to leave Russia in order to range our homeland. And with the augmentation of the firepower of their submarine force, the question of the state of our anti-submarine warfare capabilities is clearly raised by in the North Atlantic and the Northern Pacific waters.

“We need to shape a more integrated air and maritime force that can operate to defend the maritime and air approaches to North America as well as North America itself. We can look at the evolving threat as a ten o’clock and a two o’clock fight, because they originate from the ten and two. And the ten o’clock fight is primarily right now an aviation fight.”

But how does meeting this challenge look from the standpoint of North Carolina based Marines?

And with the enhanced focus on integration with naval forces, how will the Marines reshape their forces and approach to operate in the 10:00 O’clock area of operations?

During my visit to Camp Lejeune in April 2021, I had a chance to discuss the challenge of shaping an effective way ahead with three members of the II MEF team who have taken the longer-term perspective on meeting these challenges.

My meeting with Dr. Nick Woods, the Center for Naval Analyses II MEF Field Representative, with Dan Kelly, a retired Marine Colonel who works within the G-5, and Major Ronald Bess who works Plans as well at the command.

The three together provided a very helpful perspective in understanding how enhancing integration with the Navy looks like from a II MEF lens.

There are a number of takeaways from that conversation which I would like to highlight.

And as I have written with regard to earlier articles, I am not holding these individuals responsible for what I concluded from our conversation, but thank them for their insights.

There are four key takeaways.

The first is that this a work in the early phases of navigating the way ahead.

As one participant highlighted that it is extremely important that both the Navy and Marine Corps both work through what each side brings to the key warfighting functions in the North Atlantic.

Each side needs to better understand what each force can bring to the key warfighting functions, both in terms of contributions and limitations.

And with the clear focus of Second Fleet working with the only operational NATO command on U.S. territory, how best to work with Allied Joint Forces Command?

For example, if there is a shift from engaging the Marines built around the large deck amphibious ship, what then is the role of frigates or destroyers in supporting Marine Corps operations?

The second is to understand what warfighting gaps exists as such integration unfolds, and how best to fill those gaps?

And this needs to be realistic.

What capabilities do we have now?

What would we like to have?

And what is a realistic acquisition strategy to fill those gaps? As one participant put it: “The joint force as well as those of our allies and partners all are going through change and we need to crosswalk this so we identify Marine Corps contributions and do we have any gaps.”

The third is the impact of potential disconnect between what the Combatant Commands want from Marine Corps forces and potential new paths for future Marine Corps development.

The demand side clearly needs to change to provide for room for transformations that might well attenuate Marine Corps capability in the near to middle term but provide for prospects for new capabilities down the road.

The fourth is the general challenge of reworking how the fourth battle of the Atlantic would be fought.

How will the joint and maritime forces work together most effectively with allies to deliver the desired combat and crisis management effects?

This ties back to the first point, namely, ensuring that the Navy and the Marine Corps work through most effectively how to deliver with regard to the key warfighting functions in a correlated and where possible integrated manner?

As one participant put it: “We need to go to the White Board and work through each of the key functions to ensure that we can deliver an integrated capability before we let go of any current capabilities which we have.”

And as another participant concluded: “there is a strong argument to be made for divesting of legacy capabilities now in favor of future capabilities that would provide a greater contribution to European defense in the future.”

For an example of a change being worked, see the following:

In an article by Capt. Kelton Cochran, 24th MEU published on May 24, 2021, the deployment of HIMARS with the 24th MEU was highlighted.

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s 2021 deployment cycle brings with it a capability not yet employed by an East Coast MEU. In addition to the more traditional assets allocated to the MEU as it composited ground, logistics, and aviation combat elements in September 2020, the crisis response force was also assigned a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System detachment.

The 24th MEU is exploring a different approach towards employing HIMARS as a theater-level expeditionary asset—keeping the asset forward in the task force’s area of operations as opposed to embarked on naval vessels.

“MEUs operate globally, year around as the Nation’s Force-in-Readiness,” said U.S. Marine Corps Col. Eric D. Cloutier, commanding officer, 24th MEU. “As we lean into the future fight, expanding our reach and flexibility by utilizing platforms like HIMARS gives us the ability to facilitate maneuver and freedom-of-movement for friendly forces, and our Allies and partners, while denying our adversaries the ability to do the same.”

HIMARS is designed as an affordable and adaptable theater force protection asset. The system has been in service with the Department of Defense since 2005 and was fielded by the U.S. Marine Corps in 2008 in support of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

As the Corps looks to the future and refocuses on its naval roots, commanders are exploring the numerous options for employing the vehicle-mounted precision rocket system in more dynamic operations in the maritime and littoral environment. Embarking HIMARS platoons aboard Amphibious Ready Group ships and deploying them via surface connectors, such as landing craft utility vessels, is a concept of employment that West Coast MEUs have rehearsed, and developed to a high level of proficiency.

Maintaining a forward deployed land-based element of HIMARS that is attached to the MEU allows it to capitalize on strategic lift capabilities provided by USMC and Joint platforms in support of ARG / MEU missions. A HIMARS platoon, with strategic lift, can quickly infiltrate contested environments, prosecute targets, and depart before adversaries are able to detect or engage them. This technique is known as HIMARS Rapid Infiltration. The 24th MEU conducted HIRAIN in both live-fire and rehearsal events since early 2021 during pre-deployment training. Since deploying, the 24th MEU has engaged in multiple opportunities for sustainment through rehearsals with Joint units in theater, like the 352d Special Operations Wing, based in the United Kingdom.

The Iwo Jima ARG consists of the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17), and dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50). Embarked detachments for the Iwo Jima ARG include Amphibious Squadron Four, Fleet Surgical Team Six, Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 26, Tactical Air Control Squadron 21, Naval Beach Group Two, Beach Master Unit Two, Assault Craft Unit Two and Four, and Sailors from Amphibious Construction Battalion Two.

The 24th MEU consists of a ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team 1/8, a logistics combat element, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, and an aviation combat element, Medium Tilt-Rotor Squadron 162 Reinforced. The unit is a self-sustained amphibious fighting force comprised of a command element, ground combat element, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. Embarked with the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, this Marine air-ground task force is forward deployed in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa.

Iwo Jima ARG-MEU team is manned, trained and equipped to fulfill amphibious requirements in support of maritime security and stability. Amphibious ready groups and larger amphibious task forces provide military commanders a wide range of flexible capabilities including maritime security operations, expeditionary power projection, strike operations, forward naval presence, crisis response, sea control, deterrence, counter-terrorism, information operations, security cooperation and counter proliferation, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners, in order to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

The featured photo: Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit conduct firing training on a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) at RAF Fairford on March 30, 2021. Special operation’s capabilities enhance the execution of HIMARS Rapid Aerial Insertion missions, extend the reach of long-range, precision strike capabilities and enable the joint force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Roidan Carlson)