By Robbin Laird

Our focus over the past few years has been upon the shift from the Middle Eastern Land Wars to the refocus on peer competitors. The preparation for the high-end fight is a key part of this refocus, but not as the sole focus of attention; rather it is upon an ability to shape effective crisis management capabilities to be able to deliver escalation control.

The peers we are talking about are nuclear powers. Any high-end fight will be shaped by the presence of nuclear weapons in such an engagement.

Clearly, there is a desire on the United States to protect its interests short of nuclear engagement, but the United States is not the only player in such calculations.

This means that building out conventional warfighting capabilities entails thinking through from the outset how packages of conventional forces can be clustered for crisis management events in ways that provide for effective escalation management.

This requires civilians to prepare for escalation management, rather than when facing an event which can spin out of control, either ignoring or capitulating to the peer competitor. It is about doing more than verbal admonishment, or being reduced to invoking economic sanctions, or otherwise limited use tasks, which often have little real effect on deterring an authoritarian peer competitor.

The mindset of the peer competitor is a key part of preparing for crisis management as well. This means understanding what might allow for successful crisis management when dealing with such different cultural manifestations of global authoritarians such as Russia or China. This has a clear effect on the forces which might be tasked to perform crisis management tasks.

A key example is how the Russians deal with the evolving threat of Nordic integration to the classic intimidation strategies they follow in Europe. During my travels to the region, there is a clear concern on how Nordic integration can be strengthened and in so doing finding ways to shape more effective collaboration for crisis management.

How to avoid the seams that the Russians exploit in normal times, and will accentuate through various means of coercion in a crisis?

In our discussions with both Second Fleet, and with Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk, it is clear Vice Admiral Lewis and his team have focused from the outset of the 2018 standup of the new C2F upon how to shape a fleet which is optimized for crisis management and to operate in such a way that the Russians can exploit the operational seams in the North Atlantic.

The emphasis of the Nordics on a significant strengthening of their collaborative capabilities and the NATO reset in the region have provided a key context within which the U.S. and allied fleets are working new ways to distribute the force to the point of effect but to do so in a way that the force is integratable across the region.

What this means is the key role of the “relevant nations” in North Atlantic defense need to understand events in their region from the standpoint of crisis management.

And to be able to correlate that understanding with clear and decisive military and whole of government actions to convey to the Russian leadership what deterrence means in that specific case.

Deterrence is not universal state; it is delivered in times of key events shaping pre-crisis or crisis challenges.

The flexibility which VADM Lewis’s commands are demonstrating in exercises and operations is an element of providing the infrastructure for effective crisis management. The USAF and its engagement earlier this year with the exercising of bombers with Nordic fighter and ground force support is another.

But a key part of this effort is what the Marines can bring to the crisis management engagement. The Marines have provided a rotational force to Norway which has been a key element for providing initial crisis management support and doing so will remain crucial in the years ahead, and in the next piece in this series, I will make the case that indeed expanding this role might be one way to shape a more effective crisis management force.

A key objective of the North Carolina based Marines is the reinforcement of the Nordic area and operating with all four Nordic states — the Marines are a unique air land sea or already multi domain force and that is where they are best.

As the head of DIA recently warned that the Russians pose a significant direct military threat to the United States and he was not talking about hybrid war. From a US national security perspective that means the Kola Peninsula and Russia’s lateral moves to try to avoid being choked by a significant allied and Nordic defense effort is the core focus of direct defense in Europe.

As he put it in his April 29, 2021 statement:

“The Russian military is an existential threat to the United States and a potent tool designed to maintain influence over the states along its periphery, compete with U.S. global primacy, and compel adversaries who challenge Russia’s vital national interests.

“Moscow continues to invest in its strategic nuclear forces, in new capabilities to enhance its strategic deterrent and that place the U.S. homeland at risk, and in capabilities that improve its conventional warfighting.

“The Kremlin’s military strength is built on its survivable strategic nuclear forces and a conventional force largely postured for defensive and regional operations.

“Russia has a growing ability to project power with long-range precision cruise missiles and limited expeditionary capabilities.

“Military leaders are incorporating lessons from Russia’s involvement in Syria into their training and exercises as they seek to develop a better-coordinated, joint force.

As we wrote in our European book there are three very different European defense problems today but this is the on which most significantly affects directly the United States and that is why Lewis’s focus on HOW to reshape these capabilities makes his efforts so important.

The renewed focus on USMC-U.S .Navy integration embraces the important role which Marines play both in terms of re-imaging the role of the amphibious force in North Atlantic defense (e.g. the engagement of the USS Wasp in the Black Widow Exercise last year) or in terms of refocusing its capabilities to reinforce Nordic integration, of the sort that the Russians have to take seriously in terms of the ultimate choke point – namely, operations out of the Kola Peninsula.

Indeed, the Russians are expanding their Arctic reach in part to try to outflank such a challenge.

In short, to deal with the challenge of peer competitor nuclear powers and their global engagement, full spectrum crisis management capabilities are crucial up to and inclusive of the high-end fight.

But this means having insertion force packages at the point of critical impact in events which can grow up the escalation ladder.

As Paul Bracken put it in a 2018 piece:  “The key point for today is that there are many levels of intensity above counterinsurgency and counter terrorism, yet well short of total war. In terms of escalation intensity, this is about one-third up the escalation ladder.

“Here, there are issues of war termination, disengagement, maneuvering for advantage, signaling, — and yes, further escalation — in a war that is quite limited compared to World War II, but far above the intensity of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan…..

“A particular area of focus should be exemplary attacks. Examples include select attack of U.S. ships, Chinese or Russian bases, and command and control.

“These are above crisis management as it is usually conceived in the West. But they are well below total war. Each side had better think through the dynamics of scenarios in this space.

Deep strike for exemplary attacks, precise targeting, option packages for limited war, and command and control in a degraded environment need to be thought through beforehand.

“The Russians have done this, with their escalate to deescalate strategy. I recently played a war game where Russian exemplary attacks were a turning point, and they were used quite effectively to terminate a conflict on favorable terms. In East Asia, exemplary attacks are also important as the ability to track US ships increases.

“Great power rivalry has returned. A wider range of possibilities has opened up. But binary thinking — that strategy is either low intensity or all-out war – has not.”

One-Third Up the Escalation Ladder

Or see the 2018 report on Nordic defense and the strategic shift:

And see the recent report on Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk:

2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: A May 2021 Update

For the first two articles in the series, see the following:

https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/05/events-policy-making-and-strategic-imagination/

Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management

By Robbin Laird

Recently, 3rd Fleet completed what it called its “Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21” exercise. Here the Navy was able to work with a number of different companies bringing either their maritime remotes or autonomous systems to be seen and tested in a number of mission areas.

To be clear, the overwhelming majority of these systems are remotely piloted rather than operating autonomously. This is an important distinction because this affects the manpower demand side as well as the data management side of the equation, both key considerations when considering how to include these assets within the fleet.

According to Rear Adm. Robert M. Gaucher, director of maritime headquarters at U.S. Pacific Fleet. “By exercising our full range of unmanned capabilities in a Pacific warfighting scenario, UxS IBP21 directly supports U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s warfighting imperative of driving lethality through experimentation.”

“The overall goal is to integrate our unmanned capabilities across all domains to demonstrate how they solve CNO and Fleet Commander Key Operational Problems,” says Gaucher. “To get after these problems, UxS IBP21 will include maneuvering in contested space across all domains; targeting and fires; and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.”

The challenge is a practical one: how to shape an effective operational way ahead?

The military as an organization is often described as risk averse, but since the military has to be prepared to fight tonight, disruptive change for its own purpose can degrade military capabilities rather than enhancing them.

What the U.S. Navy is clearly working is distributed maritime operations, or maritime kill webs to enable an integrated distributed force.

Maritime remotes and autonomous systems can provide significant inputs to this transition, but in the words of Vice Admiral Barrett, the former head of the Royal Australian Navy: “Trusted autonomous systems are the not the end state we are pursuing they are a means to the end of extending the capabilities of an integrated distributed force.”

With such a template, the role of next generation autonomous systems can enable either enhanced mass to modular task forces, or enhanced decision-making capability either at the tactical edge or at the wider tactical or strategic decision-making levels.

As WGCDR Keirin Joyce, the moderator of the recent Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems put it: “we know that we have to go to war with what we’ve got. When you go to the next big thing in defense, you proceed from what you already have.”

From this perspective, the goal of efforts like “Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21” is to focus on ways to work new capabilities into the fleet and not leap to the scientific fiction world of Ghost Fleets. The quest for remotely piloted or autonomous maritime systems fits into the evolution of the evolution in the art of warfare.

For the U.S. Navy this revolves around shaping the distributed integratable force in which combat clusters can operate at the tactical edge with enough capability to achieve their tasks as allocated by mission command requirements. Distribution is about working multi-domain warfighting packages. Next generation autonomous systems can provide increased mass for each combat cluster notably with ISR payloads already on the way.

To gain some insight with regard to participation in the “Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21,” I recently talked with Bruce Hanson, CEO of Maritime Tactical Systems (‘MARTAC’), a Florida-based unmanned maritime autonomous system company. The company brought their T38E Devil Ray USV maritime autonomous system to the event to work a particular mission set. They also brought along a smaller T8, 8-foot MANTAS craft which can operate off of the larger vessel as well independent on the mission set.

Notably, the video released by the U.S. Navy about the event began with a T38E Devil Ray operating in the water.

The first point which he highlighted was they and other participating companies were able to provide first-hand information to a wide variety of distinguished visitors to the event and during the running of the event could demonstrate their capabilities as well.  This is an important part of the cross-fertilization process to familiarize the broader maritime community about what is really possible now with regard to these systems, and what is really longer term.

The second point he made was that it was very clear the difference with regard to what the unmanned piece could provide. As he described it, for the particular exercise, they included two men on the vessel as part of the effort. Normally, for the mission they performed they would not include men on the ship as they are not needed for the mission execution. But for the San Diego port safety requirements, they manned the vessel.

According to Hanson: “There were relatively high sea states in the exercise area. And these high sea states required us as a manned vessel to operate at 25 knots or below. The vessel unmanned would have been operated at 60-70 knots. This highlights what an unmanned capability can bring to the effort compared to a manned crewing element.  Truly  Beyond Human Capability”

The third point he highlighted was that they brought an autonomous system to the event, not a remotely piloted one.  This was illustrated that during the event, the Navy observers of their vessel were shocked when the MANTAC person sitting with them said: “I am going to lunch.” The observers reacted: “Who is going to control the vessel?” The MANTAC person said: “The vessel is autonomous it will take care of itself.”

What this highlighted is the importance of adding an adjective to “autonomous maritime systems.” Namely, unattended so that what MANTAC was operating was an “unattended autonomous maritime system” or “Unattended Autonomy” for short.

In closing, for MARTAC, the event provided an opportunity to highlight what they can do now; for the U.S. Navy the event allowed them to work with a variety of companies and to see what can be done now with these systems and to imagine the mid-term future as well.

See also the following:

The Quest for Next Generation Autonomous Systems: Impact on Reshaping Australian Defence Forces