By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

With the strategic shift from the land wars, and meeting the evolving Russian challenges, Admiral Richardson, then the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), directed the re-establishment of the U.S. 2nd Fleet in 2018. He put VADM Lewis in charge of the command, but it was a new departure not simply a re-establishment of the 2^nd Fleet.

Vice Admiral John Mustin, now head of Naval Reserves but former Deputy Commander of the newly established 2nd Fleet, commented: “As the 2nd Fleet Commander, VADM Lewis clearly understands that we need to shape a new approach. When I was in High School in the 80’s, my father was the 2nd Fleet Commander, so I can legitimately say that “The new 2nd Fleet is not your father’s 2nd Fleet.”

We had the chance to meet with the three commands under his leadership, C2F and NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFCNF) and the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE), which has been folded into C2F. That Centre has played an important role in working the kind of allied integration which Lewis has sought and is working to employ.

VADM Lewis provided insights throughout the span of our conversations and meeting with his commands, and we sat down at the end of those engagements to discuss with him in his office on May 10, 2021 how he saw the way ahead.

We started by discussing the original standup of the command in 2018. The CNO had a clear desire to re-establish a command that could address North Atlantic defense, and notably the growing importance of coalition operations in the high north. C2F is not a large command, certainly when compared with other numbered fleets. And VADM Lewis worked the first three months with less than 10 staff members, during which time he worked the foundation of how the fleet should be established and how best to work its concepts of operations.

Question: How did you do the initial launch process?

VADM Lewis: “We had a charter to re-establish the fleet. Using the newly published national defense strategy and national security strategy as the prevailing guidance; we spent a good amount of time defining the problem.

“My team put together an offsite with the Naval Post-Graduate school to think about the way ahead, to take time to define the problem we were established to solve, and determine how best to organize ourselves to solve those challenges. We used the Einstein approach: we spent 55 minutes of the hour defining the problem and five minutes in solving it. Similarly, we spent the first two and a half months of our three-month pre-launch period working to develop our mission statement along with the functions and tasks associated with those missions.

“From the beginning our focus was in developing an all-domain and all-function command. To date, we clearly have focused on the high-end warfighting, but in a way that we can encompass all aspects of warfare from seabed to space as well.”

Question: We are very impressed with the template you and your team have put together in shaping a way ahead. It is clearly an integrated distributed approach encompassing the allies as well. As you mentioned, resources are tight, and clearly effectively organizing U.S. with allied resources in the region provides significantly greater capability than simply focusing on the U.S Navy alone. How would characterize the shift which you and your team are shaping?

VADM Lewis: “Our Allies and partners across the Atlantic and into the Nordic region are also rethinking collective defense. These are both NATO and non-NATO nations that are clearly engaged in enhancing their national and collaborative capabilities.

“With regard to new strategies and policies, they are not simply checklists. It is reworking the art of warfare, innovating, overcoming things that do not work, and leveraging tools and processes that do work in reshaping force capability. We are clearly focused with our Allies on reshaping what we can do now with the forces we have now, in order to ensure a solid foundation for adding new capabilities in the future.

“I think that the challenge with overarching guidance from above is when it is too prescriptive. It is a question of working at the operational force level on new ways of doing things effectively. For example, there is an emphasis on shifting to distributed maritime operations. At C2F we are focused on concrete ways to operate from distributed maritime operations centers as a way to exercise agility at the fleet level.

“Although it is conceptual, our focus is on how to develop the Maritime Operations Center – or MOC – as an effective weapon system. We’re talking about a distributed operation center across the battle space that is able to command and control forces from various locations. This allows for ease of communication or the ability to command more effectively and provide command functions in order to receive timely feedback from the tactical forces.

“I think to do this you have to have some imagination and flexibility in order to put the pieces together. We have exercised this concept through several distributed operations centers to various locations – the USS Mount Whitney for BALTOPS 2019, Iceland, Tampa, Camp Lejeune, New York (with the Comfort), and again on the Mount Whitney this month for Steadfast Defender 2021.”

Question: The template which you and your team have put in place, shaping an integrated distributed force, is well positioned to encompass a number of the new technologies, such as maritime autonomous systems. How do you see the relationship between reworking concepts of operations and technologies?

VADM Lewis: “I’ve become somewhat jaded with technology because technology is just a means to an end. Said another way, it’s just a tool. You have to ask what are we trying to get out of it? What’s the objective? And then, how are we going to use that technology? The key point is that our processes need to be agile enough to absorb new technology without missing a beat. That’s where I think we need to focus our efforts.”

Later in the conversation, VADM Lewis brought together in a very clear way the importance of getting the C2 piece right and leveraging technologies approach to that effort to do so.

According to VADM Lewis: “An operational headquarters or a high-end tactical headquarters is a weapons systems. Normally, when warfighters discuss weapon systems, they refer to their platforms. But the operational or tactical headquarters should be looked at as being a key weapons system, the glue that pulls a multitude of different weapons systems together in a coherent manner – both kinetic and non-kinetic. They can mass fires, mass effects, and maneuver in a coordinated fashion at the fleet level. That’s what operational and tactical headquarters do.

“But we need to get better at being able to craft, shape and leverage operational or tactical headquarters as a weapon system. We have to get a lot better at doing so, and new technologies can be helpful here, which is one of my objectives for working with the Mid-Atlantic Tech Bridge.”

Question: There are other command challenges, such as the division between Second and Sixth fleets in the Atlantic or how C2F will work going forward with II MEF, for example. How do you see the way ahead?

VADM Lewis: “We are working hard on this challenge. My main effort as the Commander of two NATO commands and a U.S. Fleet command is to ensure there are no seams in the Atlantic – seams that our adversaries can exploit. By communicating and working closely with our counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic, we can ensure we are working to close any perceived gaps. As an example, we recently conducted staff talks with Second Fleet, Sixth Fleet and II MEF. We are making progress thanks to the relationships we have spent time developing.

“In terms of C2, we can always be better about how we talk about and exercise command and control. My focus has been on the principles of mission command in which you emphasize trust with your commanders to lead distributed forces. You have to first understand the environment, and then you have to give clear intent. Once you have given this guidance, you let the distributed forces operate in a way that allows them to self-organize in order to meet the mission. This doesn’t involve a whole lot of detailed control from various headquarters, rather it only provides enabling guidance that allows them to take initiative at the right level and to manage risk at the right level.”

“I believe my role with regard to my subordinate commands it to mentor the commanders below me. My goal is to give them the right guidance and then let them command.

“I have two discussions each week with the operational strike group commanders that work for me – the first is focused on man, train and equip issues, and the second is focused on mission command and operational issues. It’s an opportunity for me to hear about various issues and spend time listening. At other times, we’ll bring in a guest speaker and discuss operational dilemmas others have faced to use as case studies for the group. It is truly time well spent with the strike group commanders who make up our waterfront leadership. ”

Question: How do you view the way ahead with integration with the USMC?

VADM Lewis: “We have a fantastic relationship with our USMC counterparts, and because of that relationship we have made great progress with integration. We have a few Marine staff officers working at 2nd Fleet, but I think we would also benefit from an exchange of sorts at the Flag level. I think we could make additional progress if we integrate a Marine as the deputy commander of C2F, and vice versa, a Navy commander as the deputy commander at II MEF. I have such an approach with my NATO JFCNF command, and it works well as we shape very concrete ways ahead to build more effective fleet operations with our NATO counterparts.

For a special report which brings together all of our articles on our visits to Norfolk to talk with members of VADM Lewis’s commands, see the following:

2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: A May 2021 Update

Or it can be downloaded from our defense.info website as well:

The Standup and Evolution of 2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: Shaping A Core Capability for North Atlantic Defense

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

As the U.S. Navy works its 21^st century approach to fighting as a distributed but integrated fleet, a key element of success in doing so will be its ability to work more effectively with allied navies as they evolve as well.  As the maritime forces work through how to best to deter and to fight dealing with 21^st century authoritarian powers, notably those who possess nuclear weapons, it is crucial that presence provides for an ability to shape capabilities which can allow for crisis management and escalation control when needed.

To do so, requires for the U.S. Navy as it evolves its warfighting and crisis management approach to not just engage with allied navies but to learn from them as well with regard to how to work more effectively together. The standing up of Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk, co-located with the newly established 21^st century version of Second Fleet provides for such an opportunity.

During our March 2021 visit to Norfolk, we had a chance to discuss with a very experienced British Naval Officer serving on the JFC Norfolk staff.  Captain Paul Russell is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at the command. His experience spans global naval operations.

As examples of his experience, he deployed to the Falkland Islands for guard ship duties. He deployed down the West African coast and arrived as the first UK ship to go to Luanda for ten years. And his service has embraced working on the European Union Operation Sophia mission, which has been shaped to deal with the Mediterranean migration crises as well.

During most of his time with the Royal Navy, the size of the force was being reduced, and the Royal Navy had to focus on single ship deployments for their global operations. Obviously, this is challenging and requires significant seafaring competencies by the Captain and the crew. Captain Russell has navigated those waters for some time.

With the coming of the new carrier to the Royal Navy, there is a new focus on shaping task forces.

Notably, as the U.S. Navy shifts to thinking through new ways to fight as a fleet, in effect, what we call modular task forces are part of the recalibration as well.  There is little doubt that as the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force think through how to do air-sea task forces, their thinking will both influence and be influenced by the U.S. Navy as well.

As Captain Russell put it during the interview: “We provide a portal into NATO for the Second Fleet. Second Fleet is the tactical maneuver headquarters, but as a NATO command, we are focused on our role as an operational headquarters on protecting and defending the strategic lines of communication between Europe and America.”

NATO Defence Ministers decided in June 2018 to adapt the Alliance’s command structure with a new Atlantic command in Norfolk, and a command for support and logistics in Ulm, Germany. Joint Force Command Norfolk joined NATO’s two existing Joint Forces Commands, located in Brunssum, Netherlands, and Naples, Italy.

Captain Russell argued that NATO European navies, in part because of their size, work closely together. He sees the co-location with C2F as an opportunity to bring that experience to be able to work more closely with the U.S. Navy. And as Vice Admiral Lewis has sought to put NATO C2 on U.S. Navy ships, this effort will become more widespread and effective as well.

According to Captain Russell, one focus of attention on working with the U.S. fleet is to ensure that it works to NATO standards, and not just U.S. Navy standards. “NATO procedures are well-founded and need to be incorporated on the US Navy side more effectively as well.” Obviously, doing so will allow for a more effective integrated distributed force.

He also noted that changes in NATO policies are allowing for more flexible national engagements with other NATO nation’s navies. Rather than a more rigid process of committing national platforms to a particular joint command, more flexibility is being generated whereby national deployments for national purposes can provide capabilities to task forces for a specific duration to achieve a particular policy or combat effect.

He argued that as the size of fleets will not grow to the scale of the challenge, a clear way ahead is shaping more effective integratability.

And he underscored, that he saw this as not only a technological development.

As he put it: “When you discuss the kill web, I would argue that the most gains in being able to do so will come for changes in policy, not simply technology.”

The kind of policy changes crucial to progress in better integratability revolve around shaping more effective security management systems, such as foreign disclosure agreements, better use of software gateways to allow for more effective sharing of information, and the key element of shared training and warfare integration.

Captain Russell noted that with regard to the Royal Navy and the United States, the common aircraft, the common training and common operations being shared between the USMC and the Royal Navy onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth is a key element of the kill web.

“That engagement demonstrates an element of trust and information sharing beyond anything that has been shown before.”

In short, NATO is evolution; the U.S. Navy is in evolution.

The goal of the Norfolk commands is to shape effective convergence upon effective operational capabilities.

Authors Note:

Having a Royal Navy Surface combatant as performed by Captain Russell deployed to the Falkland Islands for guard ship duties makes several seminal points about the legacy of the Falkland Island War for all seafaring forces.

In 1982, Argentine Junta leadership comprised of former military officers including both army Generals and an Admiral  known as the “Galtieri Governmant” chose to invade and occupy British territory.

The first overt act was actually an “information war” move with “scrap metal merchants” infiltrated by Argentinian Marines raising their national flag on South Georgia Island.

A RN ice patrol vessel, HMS Endurance, had been sent to investigate. The CO of HMS Endurance Captain Nicholas Barker RN gave warnings that an invasion of the Falklands was possible and on 2 April 1982 Argentine forces mounted Operation Rosario an amphibious assault.

Sensing trouble the British very early had begun to move submarines south to cover the approximate 8,700 miles.

That was a prescient move because the surface naval battle of the Falklands war was settled decisively by HMS Conqueror.

On 2 May Conqueror became the first nuclear-powered submarine to fire in anger, launching three Mark 8 torpedoes at General Belgrano, two of which struck the ship and exploded. Twenty minutes later, the ship was sinking rapidly and was abandoned by her crew.

It was not surprising that a submarine could remove all surface threats against an opponent that was tragically for them clueless in conducting successfully any form of ASW. Using a submarine was a perfect platform.

This combat move was brilliant and not surprising because British military operations in the Falklands War were given the codename Operation Corporate and commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse.

The British Commander had a very impressive career.

Entering the RN in 1944; “In July 1964 he took command of HMS Dreadnought, the Royal Navy’s first nuclear submarine. He attended the Joint Service Defence College in 1966, after which he became second-in-command of the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes”

Operations lasted from 1 April 1982 to 20 June 1982.

There are many insightful after-action reports on how the campaign played out leading to the magnificent and courageous British victory.

However, there are two original source points that transcend the Falkland campaign that must be mentioned.

Ed Timperlake then 2^nd Lt USMC was assigned to the TA-4 advanced jet training pipeline in Kingsville Texas and had Argentine fellow student pilots in his squadron. They were very good pilots. Over a decade later their courage in flying a max range strike over the bitter cold South Atlantic against the British fleet in a single seat light attack A-4s is beyond dispute and they paid the price.

What was not known was that they were attacking to low and releasing their bombs before the mechanical fuse had a chance to spin up. Consequently, what could have been devastating for surface ships turned out mostly to be a direct hit only of the kinetic energy of just heavy non-exploding metal punching holes.  Consequently, RN shipboard damage control teams had less a problem to fix. However, bombs with “snake-eye” retarded fins could have had activated fuses with exploding warheads when they hit but apparently there were not many “snakes” in their inventory. The attacking force never figured this out.

Now enter 21^st Century social media because even just one individual in the British forces, including merchant seaman, bragging on a cell phone or on the internet about the Argie mistakes in their attack profile and many more ships could have been mortally wounded. Operational security, Op-Sec, is that important in today’s electronically interconnected world.

The second firsthand point was in Ed Timperlake taking over the OSD Office as Principal Director Mobilization and Planning and Requirements, a civilian political position appointed by President Reagan and reporting to Secretary Weinberger, he saw firsthand the action directed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

Secretary Weinberger ordered essentially “Give the Brits whatever they need.”

The lesson learned is National Command authority leadership always focusing on “the second day” of the outbreak of any combat; Where are the logistics and will everything be enough?

Queen Elizabeth II honored “Cap” Weinberger for his unyielding support during the Falkland’s War.

In a private audience Tuesday with Queen Elizabeth II, former Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger was awarded the highest honorary knighthood that Britain can bestow on a foreigner.

“He’s been a staunch friend to Britain and will be remembered most of all for his unfailing support and assistance during the Falklands war,” the Foreign Office said in a statement explaining the award.

The nature of the honor reflects the Thatcher government’s assessment of his contribution to Britain’s victory over Argentina in the Falkland Islands War of 1982.

Few details of U.S. involvement in the Falklands war have been officially confirmed, but the United States is believed to have passed to Britain critical intelligence material gathered by satellite, including Argentine ship and aircraft movements.

By Robbin Laird

II Marine Expeditionary Force supports service and Combatant Commander’s initiative as required. At the same time, II MEF is in transition and must focus on preparing for future operations, and shape new ways to do so while being able to operate now. This is hardly an easy challenge, but one which II MEF must meet head on.

In my discussions with the CG of II MEF, Lt. General Beaudreault, he underscored that he had a first-rate team to help him meet this challenge. During my time at Camp Lejeune, I had a chance to meet a number of these leaders and certainly can reinforce what the CG told me.

At the command, the head of G-35, Future Operations is Colonel Ryan Hoyle. He noted in our discussion that for the command, a look ahead in an 18-to-24-month period is the focus of future operations. But as we discussed, the focus on change was coming through exercises but also working ways to rework the Marines ability to integrate with the Navy and with allies to shape evolving capabilities for the future fight.

His background is diverse, and very impressive. I mention this because if you want someone to work through how to work a way ahead with the force in being, it is clearly an advantage to have someone with wide-ranging experience with the current force, but also with enough experience in working with non-Marine joint and allied forces focused as well on change. Among other experiences, he has been aide to camp to the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Amphibious Staff Officer and exercise planner at NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters. And he has a Masters of Science in Political Science from the Israeli National Defense College. There is probably no force in the world which has work joint integration in a more challenging political and military environment than the IDF.

He brings this experience to the current challenging task of transitioning and preparing for the future fight while reshaping the force in being.

How do you do this?

And how is II MEF approaching this challenge?

In the discussion, there are a number of takeaways which provide answers to these difficult questions.

Where appropriate, I will quote Col. Hoyle, but I am not holding him responsible for all my takeaways from the discussion.

The Israelis provide an interesting case because post-Abraham accords, they are focusing on their ability to have a strategic reach to be able to deal with threats on their periphery. It is no surprise than that the IDF is operating a core USMC capability, the F-35, and are adding the latest capability, namely, the CH-53K.  The IDF increasingly is focused on becoming more mobile and expeditionary which brings them closer to the USMC trajectory of change as well.

Col. Hoyle noted that they work within a 18 month and two and a half year planning cycle and work “to align resources to achieve the objectives that the CG or higher headquarters have given us. This is in terms of exercise preparation and providing forces of operations.” He reminded that as well as the Atlantic operations, II MEF provides forces deployed to Okinawa as well.

He has the naval integration portfolio in his shop as well which encompasses amphibious training and deck and well deck certification for those ships as well.

According to Col. Hoyle: “We coordinate the entire MEU program from the formation of the force to the integration with the Navy and their deployments with both NAVEUR and MARFOREUR in terms of their tasks in support of those commands.”

The refocus on Naval integration is a major challenge.

As I noted in an earlier piece, in effect, what is happening is co-evolution of the Navy and the USMC, which means that they are working for more integration, but there are centers of excellence each will have different from one another.

It is best conceived as a Venn diagram where one is shaping enhanced overlap but recognizes that each side of the Venn is different.

If one looks at the North Atlantic as a chessboard, how do the Navy, the Marine Corps (and the USAF) and allies work the pieces on the chessboard?

How do the Marines use their afloat resources differently with the fleet?

How does the fleet fight differently with those afloat assets integrated into the fight? How do mobile or expeditionary bases play into the effort?

What pieces are placed on the chessboard which the Marines can or might be able to provide?

How do the Marines work force integration with allies afloat or ashore to provide for more integrated warfighting solutions?

With the current amphibious fleet in the Atlantic region not likely to get new ships any time soon, how can the Marines work more effectively with allies afloat? Clearly, the current integration of Marines onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth is an example or operating Ospreys off of French amphibious ships.

A key challenge which is being worked but which is strategic in character is reshaping C2 to allow for force integration in a contested fight. Cleary, command guidance is required, and empowering tactical decision making at the edge.

As the Navy and the Marines work with allies newly highlighted areas of operation, such as the High North, the challenge will be to shape flexible or modular task forces which can demonstrate interactive interoperability to expand what Marines can contribute, rather than deploying them in isolated force fragments.

Col. Hoyle put the goal of the transformation effort in the following terms: “How do we provide operational flexibility to the fleet commander, to the combatant commander, to cause the decision calculus of the adversary to change?

“To do so, you need capabilities with which to project that force, whether it’s afloat capabilities or whether it’s basing rights somewhere and having the proper airframes in order to project that force.”

In short, the focus needs to be not simply on new ways to do naval integration.

The focus has to be on effective forces that an adversary sees as viable and capable of shaping a deterrent outcome.

As Col. Hoyle put it: “You have to have your high-end capabilities demonstrated to be effective in order to ensue deterrence, because if you are not demonstrating that you have the capabilities, then no—one is really deterred.”

Featured Photo: A United States Marine Corps V-22 Osprey assigned to the USS Iowa Jima lands at the Glasgow Prestwick Airport on May 17, 2021.

The aircraft is in Scotland as part of NATO exercise Formidable Shield.

Formidable Shield is a multinational exercise, taking place in the region of the North Atlantic Ocean around the United Kingdom and Norway.

U.S. Air National Guard photo by Senior Master Sgt. Vincent De Groot