Reaping the Results of More than Two Decades of Western Appeasement of Vladimir Putin

03/08/2022

By Brian Morra

The War in Ukraine is on the front pages of newspapers and is the top television and streaming story in most parts of the world.

It’s delivering a major shock to the Post-Cold War geo-political system.

Why is this happening?

I think it’s important to understand that the ongoing catastrophe in Ukraine is in many ways the product of some twenty-three years of Western appeasement of Vladimir Putin. 

Despite the expansion of NATO over the years, the West has not responded forcefully to a series of Russian aggressions orchestrated by Vladimir Putin.

The parallels to the West’s appeasement of German leader Adolf Hitler in the 1930s are startling and eerie.

Since 1999 Putin has held the offices of prime minister (1999), president (2000-2008), prime minister (2009-2012), and now president for life (2013- ).

During his time in power, Putin’s Russia has waged war in:

Chechnya: The Second Chechen War, 1999-2000, resulted in the destruction of Islamic separatist groups and the demolition of the city of Grozny. The West responded with righteous indignation and little else.

Putin road-tested his way of war in Chechnya: first, claim he is fighting a war of Russian self-defense; second accept and/or cause high Russian and civilian casualties; and third demolish cities and towns that resist Russian armed forces.

Chechnya: A significant Chechen Insurgency was waged from 2000-2009 after the end of major Russian combat operations in 2000. Estimates of the dead are as high as 14,000 Russian troops and 50,000 Chechen fighters and civilians during the period of 1999-2009. In 2003 the Republic of Chechnya was formally recognized as part of the Russian Federation. The West largely ignored the period of insurgency.

All of Moscow’s war aims were effectively achieved. Both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush continued to meet with Putin during the war years, with little more than finger wagging as punishment.

Georgia:  Russia opposed Georgia’s application to join NATO (March 2008) and threatened to break off the northern provinces of Georgia and “free” the Russians residing there.

In August 2008, Russian separatists in the Georgian region of South Ossetia conducted artillery attacks on Georgian military targets, kicking off the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. Putin accused Georgia of aggression against Russia and launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia by land, sea, cyber, and air.

He called this a “peace enforcement operation” (sound familiar?).

Georgians were ethnically cleansed from northern regions of Georgia – some 200,000 civilians became refugees.

Moscow prevented Georgia from joining NATO and still maintains a Russian military presence in Georgia’s northern provinces, effectively making them Russian provinces. President Bush publicly criticized Putin for invading a free, democratic state and for starting the Georgia War but did little else. Humanitarian groups accused Moscow of war crimes with little practical effect.

Ukraine: The Russo-Ukrainian War began in 2014.

Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine were supported by Russian Army forces beginning in August 2014.  A much larger Russian Army force entered the Donbas in October-November 2014. Russian forces also took over Crimea and Russia formally annexed Crimea in 2014, based on a referendum passed by ethnic Russians living on the peninsula.  The West was surprised by Russian military operations against Ukraine.

The Obama Administration decried Moscow’s aggression and levied limited sanctions against Russia that the Russians adroitly evaded.

Syria: Russian forces entered the Syrian Civil War on the side of Syrian President Assad in October 2015.  Russian ground and air forces helped turn the tide of the war in favor of the Assad regime. Russia brutally destroying of the ancient Syrian city of Aleppo with airpower and artillery strikes. The West wrung its hands over the wanton destruction and loss of civilian life. Groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch tabulated and decried civilian deaths and the creation of millions of Syrian refugees, accusing Moscow of war crimes.

The Obama gave Moscow a free pass in Syria after reneging on President Obama’s threat that Assad’s use of chemical weapons was a “red line” for the USA.

The Trump Administration levied sanctions and expelled scores of Russian diplomats from the United States.

Trump also supported NATO deployments to the front-line Baltic states.

U.S. forces also attacked the Wagner Group – a Russian-backed mercenary operation – and killed some 300 members in Syria in 2018 in reaction to a Wagner Group attack on a US special operations base.

Nonetheless, Russia’s geo-political goals were achieved in Syria. Russian naval, air, and ground forces remain in Syria today, furnishing Moscow with unprecedented military power and influence in the Middle East at a time of American retrenchment from the region, a trend that has accelerated during the Biden Administration.

Ukraine: The Russo-Ukrainian War that started in 2014 widened into an all-out invasion by Russia of Ukraine in February 2022.

Putin is telling the Russian people that the invasion is a “special military operation in the Donbas”, designed to protect ethnic Russians from the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev.

He is using the playbook he drew up in 1999 in Chechnya: first, claim he is fighting a war of Russian self-defense; second accept and/or cause high Russian and civilian casualties; and third demolish cities and towns that resist Russian armed forces.

Thus far, the West’s reaction to the expansion of the War in Ukraine has been more unified than to any other Putin aggression.

Unfortunately, military supply of the Ukrainian war effort has been tardy.

The West’s response is predicated largely on economic sanctions and NATO has eschewed the use of its own forces.

The West won’t even agree to cut off Russian oil and gas imports at this point.

The Biden Administration’s estrangement from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf oil states has led to their refusal to honor the White House’s request to increase production.

To date, the West’s response has not caused Putin to stop his genocidal military operations in Ukraine.

His decision making and risk calculus is, no doubt, heavily influenced by the West’s appeasement of his actions since 1999.

The featured graphic: credit: Bigstock

For Brian Morra’s new novel which brings the reader inside of the decision-making in the last major crisis involving the nuclear powers in 1983, see the following:

The Able Archers: A Novel which Takes Us Back to the 1983 Nuclear Crisis

Dassault, Exports and the Next Generation Fighter Aircraft

03/07/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Dassault Aviation insisted on being appointed lead prime contractor and architect on a European next generation fighter jet, and also lead contractor on the fighter’s flight control system, executive chairman Eric Trappier said March 4.

“These are two red lines,” he said on the sidelines of a news conference on 2021 financial results.

Dassault signed a contract on work on a technology demonstrator for the fighter, handed it the French procurement office, Direction Générale de l’Armement, and has been waiting since September for Airbus Defence and Space to countersign, he said.

The DGA declined comment.

Airbus DS is industrial partner on that fighter project, a key element in phase 1B on development of a European Future Combat Air System, a complex network linking up the planned fighter, remote carrier drones, and aircraft of allied nations. The new fighter would replace the Rafale and Eurofighter.

Dassault sees Airbus DS as seeking to share lead management of the fighter program, which the family controlled company resists.

There should be a “best athlete” approach,” with a single leader, Trappier said.

Airbus DS said it had made proposals on cooperation on the new fighter and was confident agreement could be reached.

“We have managed months ago to find fair and balanced agreements on all six other pillars, where even under a defined leadership the competence and capacities of each partner are respected and can participate in an equitable manner,” an Airbus DS spokesman said.

“Airbus has made several proposals to converge also on the Next Generation Fighter (NGF) and we are supporting any solution which will respect both the skills of each partner and the lead role of Dassault Aviation, leading to a fair agreement.

“We are confident that a resolution can be achieved if the rules of the cooperation agreed by the nations are respected in the NGF, as it is the case on other pillars,” the spokesman said.

“The FCAS programme is decisive to meet the requirements of Europe’s armed forces in the future and we are committed to it.”

The fighter is the first pillar in FCAS, with Dassault designated as the lead partner on the fighter. The other six pillars are the engine, remote carriers, combat cloud for network communications, simulator labs, sensors, and stealth.

The delay has been a “very high cost,” Trappier said, as some staff in the company’s some 100-strong design office have been re-assigned, with the prospect of re-assigning all those personnel if there were no contract on the fighter project.

Trappier declined to comment when asked if he had a plan B if an agreement failed to be reached.

Red Lines Issue

“We were surprised at how clear the issues on SCAF/FCAS have become for Dassault: the red lines are now glowing,” said Sash Tusa, analyst at equity research firm Agency Partners.

Work on the architecture and design of the flight control system was important, Trappier said, and Dassault’s design staff worked in Saint Cloud, the head office in the suburbs of the capital.

Airbus DS had design skills, and its staff worked in Toulouse, southwestern France, he said.

An analyst said that remark on the Airbus DS design engineers was a particularly barbed comment, pointing up a perceived lack of specialist experience in designing fighter jets.  Toulouse is the headquarters of Airbus, an airliner manufacturer, while the head office of the defense and space unit is in Manching, southern Germany.

It remained to be seen which would come first, Airbus DS signing the contract on the fighter project or Germany ordering the F-35 fighter, Trappier said.

On a contract signed Feb. 24 on a European medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, Dassault’s share of the deal was worth €1.2 billion and consisted of architecture for the flight control system and communications systems, he said. Thales, in which Dassault holds a 24.6 percent stake, will share the communications work.

The total budget for the European unmanned aerial vehicle is €7.1 billion, backed by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

German chancellor Olaf Scholz said Feb. 27 told the Bundestag parliament the 2022 federal budget would adopt a one-off fund of €100 billion ($109 billion) for military spending, and pledged an annual defense budget of more than two percent of gross domestic product.

Germany would also build the next generation fighter and tank in cooperation with France and other European partners, he said, and these projects were of “utmost priority.”

The chancellor made his speech, widely seen as a major policy switch, in response to the Russian assault on Ukraine, which has sparked Western sanctions against Moscow in banking, sports, culture, aerospace, trade, and airline travel.

Scholz said there was a contract signed the previous week for a European medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, pointing up the importance of German military spending and cooperation. Berlin would press ahead with an order for an armed Heron drone from Israel.

There would also be a replacement of the German Tornado fighter, which carries nuclear bombs under a Nato agreement, he said.

“The F-35 fighter jet has the potential to be used as a carrier aircraft,” he said, while the Eurofighter could be equipped for electronic warfare.

Cash Rich Dassault

The brakes were off for Dassault, such that the cash rich company should consider making an offer for Thales, a stock market research note from Agency Partners said Feb. 16, ahead of the 2021 financial results.

“We think a step change in the dividend payout ratio is possible, but we also suggest that Dassault could reassess its current minority shareholding in Thales, with the possibility of spending cash to buy a majority stake in, and control of, Thales,” the report said.

Dassault holds cash of €4.8 billion, a gain of €1.4 billion from a year ago, the company said in its financial results.

Success in exports and the resulting inflow of cash would fund that M&A deal, the Agency Partners report said. Winning an Indonesian contract for 42 Rafales meant the company had won export contracts for 188 fighters from five nations over the last 18 months, including two new client nations – Croatia and Indonesia, the report said.

That allowed a manufacturing “bridge” of legacy fighters and the Système de Combat Aérien du Futur (SCAF/FCAS), with an estimated production of three Rafale per month into the early 2030s.

That export success has sparked a “re-think” in France of working with Germany on the future combat air system, due to German concerns on arms exports and tension over leadership of the FCAS project, the report said.

France levies a tax of two percent on arms exports, to recover a “fair portion” of  the development cost of weapons ordered by the French authorities, Hervé Grandjean, spokesman for the armed forces ministry, told journalists Dec. 9.

That leads to limited direct financial gain for the French government from arms export, although prospects for overseas sales are factored in when funds for domestic projects are drawn up.

Profit Rise

Dassault reported a rise in 2021 adjusted net profit to €693 million from €396 million in the previous year, on sales rising to €7.2 billion from €5.5 billion.

That boosted net profit margin to 9.63 percent of sales from 7.2 percent.

Sales for 2022 were expected to fall. The book-to-bill ratio of orders to sales was 1.67.

Orders rose to €12 billion from €3.4 billion, helped by orders for 49 Rafales, of which 37 were export deals, including 31 units for Egypt and six new aircraft  for Greece. Athens also ordered 12 second-hand Rafales, which France replaced with an order for the same number.

The order book rose to €20.8 billion from €15.9 billion.

Croatia bought 12 second-hand Rafales and signed a service contract with the company.

Dassault was expecting to receive hefty down payments this year, based on a total of 128 Rafale orders, consisting of an 80-strong order signed with the United Arab Emirates in December , an Indonesian order signed last month for 42 fighters, and an expected Greek contract for six more fighters. The deal for the latter was authorized by the Greek parliament last month and a contract is expected to be signed shortly.

In general, the price tag for a Rafale is €100 million per unit, with Thales accounting for some 25 percent, Thales chief financial director Pascal Bouchier told March 3 a news conference on the 2021 financial results of the electronics company.

Dassault, which is pursuing other export deals for the fighter, is working on an upgraded F4 version and will work on further upgrades, Trappier said.

The company expects to deliver 12 fighters this year, after 25 last year, shipped to India and Qatar.

France is expected to order next year a fifth tranche of Rafales for the French air force, the company said, potentially consisting of 30 units as planned, and a further 12 units to replace those sold to Croatia. France has ordered 192 Rafales, so far.

 

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine, 2022: A New Series

03/06/2022

We are publishing a series on the run up to the war in Ukraine, and that timeline starts in the summer of 2021.

We have published three so far.

The first begins in June 2021, and a Russian exercise in the Pacific.

The second then highlights the new Russian national security strategy and Putin’s essay on the new Russian Slavic empire, both published in July 2021.

The third highlights the conflict in the Black Sea in the summer of 2021.

The future series then highlights the following:

The impact of the Biden Administration’s Fall, 2021 which starts with the Afghan Blitzkrieg withdrawal.

It then moved onto the AUKUS announcement and the undercutting of France in Western security and defense policy.

It then moved into the embracing of Ukraine without any realistic strategy for the longer term.

We then highlight Putin’s Valdai Discussion Club presentation and its implications.

Next we focus on the use of the migrants into Europe as a hybrid war tools which was part of the incorporation of Belarus into the new Russian empire.

We stop there and conclude with a couple of essays on Putin, Ukraine and the Way Ahead.

All of these articles can and will be found in our defense decisions micro site on defense.info.

Featured Image: KYIV, UKRAINE – Feb. 25, 2022: War of Russia against Ukraine. View of a civilian building damaged following a Russian rocket attack the city of Kyiv, Ukraine.  Credit: Bigstock

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine: 2022: June 2021

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine: 2022: July 2021

The Timeline to the War in Ukraine, 2022: Exercises, Conflict and Information War in the Black Sea, Summer 2021

Remembering Brendan Sargeant: March 13, 2022 Memorial Service

03/05/2022

By Robbin Laird

This is the piece which I published on February 15, 2022.

And the video provides an opportunity to see his friends honoring him at a memorial event in Canberra on March 13, 2022.

This is a piece I never wanted to write and certainly did not anticipate having to do so.

This weekend Australian friends informed me of the untimely death of my friend and colleague Brendan Sargeant, who would often point out that I misspelled his name.

Hopefully I got this right my friend.

I first met him many years ago when he was serving in the Australian embassy in Washington DC. He was introduced to me by a mutual American friend and his Australian wife.

I can remember that meeting clearly as my last. During our initial meeting we had a wide ranging discussion about the world, but then honed in on the issue de jure which was the joint strike fighter. By the time I had met him, I had met many of the pioneers in standing up the aircraft and the program and we discussed what I had written and what I thought about the coming of the program and its impact.

Having had the chance to work with Secretary Wynne, first as head of acquisition and then as Secretary of the Air Force, it was clear that the program was founded to create a new global capability for the United States and its allies. Brendan had honed on this aspect of the program and early on got it and its importance for Australia.

We had many conversations through the years, but they always we very similar to the first one — wide-ranging, blunt, and always left me with more to think about and to puzzle over.

I am sure his many friends would say the same.

Because that was the thing about Brendan — he would ignite reflection and curry thoughts, whether you agreed with the particular point or not.

When I finally got to Australia in 2014, and kept coming back because of my involvement with the Williams Foundation, my twice a year visits — at least until I left in a hurry on March 2020 — I would have the chance to meet with him and to visit his home and be hosted by his wife and he and be in the presence of his friends, and we would have a wonderful meal and have a wide ranging conversation about Australia, the United States and the world.

The fact that this will not happen again truly saddens me.

But whatever the loss for me personally, it is an even greater loss for Australia.

Australia, like the other liberal democracies, is entering a new historical era and sorting out our way ahead is more than challenging.

This was the topic we discussed frequently by phone since my last visit to Australia, and I was very much looking forward to my next visit and meetings with Brendan.

But in a way my last published interview with him is a very good epitaph for him.

That discussion was about the need for strategic imagination for a period of historical change such as we are clearly.

This is how he described what was needed:

“We need to be ruthless in our self-analysis, about our strengths and weaknesses, and who we are. We need to have a clear sense of the range of possible futures and the various responses that we may need to make. That is why I say a crisis is a challenge to imagination, a challenge to identity before it becomes a policy or a strategy challenge.”

This was what Brendan brought to the table. He met this challenge and provided constant insight and guidance.

To think that he is no longer here is very hard to contemplate.

I have lost a friend; and Australia has lost a leader.

Launching the Tiger Mk III Program: Next Steps in European Defense Industrial Cooperation

03/04/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – An announced deal for the upgrade of 60 Airbus Helicopters Tiger attack helicopters, flown by the French and Spanish forces, was worth €4 billion ($4.4 billion) for the first batch of work, a senior source said.

France will pay €2.8 billion for the upgrade of 42 Tigers to Mk3 standard, while Spain will pay €1.2 billion for 18 units, and that was “for the first bloc,” the source said. In total, “it is €8 billion for everything.”

OCCAR, a European procurement agency, has awarded a contract to Airbus Helicopters for “the upgrade of 42 aircraft for France (with the possibility to add another 25 helicopters) and 18 for Spain,” the Airbus unit said March 2 in a statement.

That deal for a midlife upgrade of the helicopter left the door open for Germany to join the program. Germany’s absence from the project has raised concern in France, with critics pointing to a lack of cooperation from Berlin on joint military projects.

“In addition, the contract provides the possibility for Germany to later join the Tiger Mk III program,” Airbus Helicopters said.

There have been media reports of Berlin’s interest in ordering Boeing Apache AH-64 attack helicopters, effectively to replace the Tiger, which was launched as a joint Franco-German program against a then perceived threat from Warsaw Pact forces.

That reported interest in ordering U.S. helicopters stemmed from a lack of availability of the Tiger for the German army.

Spain will also acquire a new air-to-ground missile in its upgrade, along with fitting a 70 mm guided rocket, the Airbus unit said.

Spain has yet to decide which air-to-ground weapon it will order, raising the question whether Madrid will opt for a version of the Rafael Spike missile or the MBDA MAST-F (Future Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile), a second senior source said. Spanish army Tigers already fly with the Spike weapon.

As France has already paid for the development of the MAST-F, Spain would be buying the weapon off the shelf.

The French Tiger Mk3 will add the MAST-F and an upgraded Mistral 3 air-to-air missile to its arms inventory, Airbus Helicopter said.

France was ordering 500 MAST-F missiles for €700 million by the end of 2020, business website La Tribune reported Nov. 14 2020.

That meant MBDA has been paid for development of the MAST-F, and the Mistral 3 is an upgraded version of the Mistral already fitted on the Tiger, the second source said. MBDA would be paid simply for integration of these weapons on the Tiger Mk3.

Among the upgrades are Thales FlytX avionics and Topowl digital display helmet-mounted sight, and upgraded Indra identification friend or foe system, Airbus Helicopters said.

Safran’s electronics and defense unit said March 3 in a statement it had won a contract from OCCAR for 85 Euroflir 510 electro-optical sights for the Tiger MK3. The optronic sights will be part of the weapon system, allowing identification of threat in night and day.

The communications system will use Thales Contact radio to plug into the French army’s Scorpion network and the helicopter can hook up with unmanned aerial vehicles, Thales said in a March 2 statement.

OCCAR signed the contract with Airbus Helicopters on behalf of the French and Spanish defense procurement agencies, Airbus Helicopter said. Development and upgrade work will be conducted in Albacete, southeast Spain, Marignane, southern France, and Donauwörth in southern Germany.

Featured Graphic: Airbus

The Ukrainian Crisis in a Wider Context

03/03/2022

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I talked with Dr. Harald Malmgren, the noted political-economist and strategist, about the Ukrainian crisis in the wider global context.

We started by discussing a  surprisingly little focused upon development since the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014, namely, the emphasis of the Putin regime on reducing Russian dependencies on the global economy, notably on its food supplies. Russia is the largest wheat exporter in the world and Ukraine is the fifth largest, which if the Ukrainian supply is under Russian control makes them a wheat export superpower along with their energy exports, two very key elements of a geopolitically oriented trading approach.

Harald Malmgren: “The two are indeed closely linked as agriculture depends on intense use of energy. The high price of energy drives the cost of seeding, harvesting, processing, and delivering food worldwide. Agriculture is highly energy intensive. For example, almost every crop has to be put in ovens to dry before it can be packaged. And the fertilizer, a large part of the fertilizer used worldwide is derived from or dependent on oil and gas. For example, 80% of nitrogen for fertilizers is derived from natural gas.

“And globally, there have been droughts and floods such as in the United States and China which further reduce the food supply which in turn drives up the cost of food.

“If I take a five-year view, energy may well be experiencing high costs, but food prices are probably going to be even more inflated. And such a situation can drive a prolonged recession or worse. In the United States, the average citizen will see whatever income gains they achieve being eroded by the inflationary pressures from food, heat and fuel costs for vehicles.”

I noted that Russia is clearly using both its export commodities as a targeted geopolitical approach, so that one might note that both Turkey and Egypt, for example, are the top importers of Russian wheat. The energy case has been clearly demonstrated for years in shaping European fuel dependencies.

We then discussed the Russian and Chinese relationship and how that relationship makes a sanctions policy to be even more difficult than in the past. With China not sanctioned, but China working a deeper relationship with Russia, it is obvious that alternative alliances are being shaped which a nation-only sanctions policy will have little effect in altering geopolitical behavior.

Harald Malmgren: “And China under President Xi is also pursuing a reversal of what China has been doing for decades. Over the past few decades, China opened up in order to extract knowledge and capital from all over the world. Now Xi is shutting down everything from permissions to go abroad to overseas education. Passports are no longer freely available, and they are shutting down much teaching of English, basically turning off connectivity with the U.S., and Western Europe while focusing  on self-sustainment.

“At the same time, there is growing resistance to Xi’s policies at home. He is under pressure as the economy is performing much worse than in the recent past as China is turning inward towards aspiration for self-generating growth.”

We then discussed European reactions to the Ukrainian crisis, and how those reactions could well reshape how the next phase of European development would not be led by Germany. With a clear inability to build hard power into an overall national approach to power, Germany’s position is clearly undercut. In this crisis, the Nordics and the Poles have led the way along with a French leadership increasingly wary of German failures in leadership. We have seen a recent commitment to doing more in Germany, but how that becomes real is an open question.

Harald Malmgren: “The impact on Germany and its role in Europe and the world is significant. Germany is in economic decline given their extraordinary dependence on exports and the kind of global economy where you can trade openly with states who are clearly unfriendly to the liberal order. To take the case of heavy machinery, China has been the key customer for Germany in this area. Now China has taken that technology, reproduced, and are trading to areas that Germany has had as clients in the past.

“In this crisis, other states are leading Europe, and this will have a lasting consequence in shaping the next phase of European development.”

In effect, what we are seeing in significant changes in alliance relationships, both on the authoritarian and Western sides. Clearly, the United States is a key player, but it is not and will not be the dominant player it once was. And the Biden Administration, although it seems to believe it is restoring “the pre-Trump luster of the Obama years,” has accelerated the changes in the alliance structure as well, starting with its rejection of U.S. energy independence, and rejection of the long overdue changes in U.S. nuclear modernization,

Harald Malmgren: “We are yielding our role in the world because of priority focus on internal rearrangements and domestic issues. For example, we are rearranging the economic dynamics among the states between the north and the south which override international concerns. The priorities are increasingly domestic. The U.S. will need to redefine what role it needs to play and can play realistically. But this is not happening in the Biden Administration or Congress.”

A final subject we discussed is how allies are changing their roles in what used to be called the American-led order. For example, South Korea has been reaching out to Australia and to red states in the United States to build out new capabilities in key resource areas to counter China.

Harald Malmgren: “South Korea has been playing an enhanced global role. It’s been in the shadows of Japan for a long time. It’s been under the umbrella of the U.S. for a long time. It’s been almost an orphan accepted into the family, but not really part of the family. South Korea is looking to make its own place and which makes it of course a dynamic but also unpredictable partner within the broader Western systems.”

It’s not just the authoritarian powers versus the liberal democracies. It’s also the question of changes of scale and roles among the allied powers as well. That will be extremely interesting to see. And Australia, South Korea are clearly two examples of the changing dynamics in the “Western” system.

Harald Malmgren: “Australia is a good example of the kind of global change we are undergoing. What is the role of a third party in global reconfiguration, meaning Australia is not central to the reconfiguration, but nonetheless it’s very much affected by how this reconfiguration takes place.  A key concern is how allies will work together in a crisis, and how the reconfiguration of cross-allied relationships take place in crises, which will be important than words written on treaty documents.”

Malmgren concluded: “The Ukraine crisis does remind us that there can be no return to complacency about global security.

“We are on a pace to see new challenges, but are we ready to operate in such a context?”

Featured Photo: February 25, 2022. View of civilian building damaged following a Russian rocket attack on Kyiv, Ukraine. Credit: Bigstock

Also, see the following:

Putting the Ukraine Crisis in a Broader Global Context

Gray Zones or Limited War?

Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century Authoritarian Powers

Time for a Competitive Germany

03/02/2022

By Dr. Andrew Denison

The invasion has made it all too clear that Germany is too big, too rich, and too geo-strategically important to forgo influence, to opt out of the competition with Russia and China.

European security urgently needs German leadership in providing military capabilities, developing geostrategy, and mobilizing allies for this ongoing struggle.

More than Cooperation

Germany needs a new language to meet the challenge of competition. In the foreign policy section of the new German government´s coalition agreement, the word “cooperation” appears 29 times, the word “competition” only once. Even the word “conflict” appears only 9 times, but in the sense of “causes” and “resolution,” not in the sense of “persevere” or “win.” Historic Bundestag speeches on Sunday, 27 February gave an indication of where Germany needs to go.

Cooperation is important, but not sufficient. It is time for Germany to focus on strengthening its influence and competitiveness. Germany’s decisions are of utmost consequence not only for Germany but for the entire Western alliance. Europe’s ability to avoid military blackmail will increasingly depend on Germany wielding influence effectively.

In the face of aggression from Russia as well as from China, the Federal Republic finds itself in a new position – no longer that of 1989 but rather that of 1949, albeit with marked differences. In 1949, Germany stood as a defeated, divided country, increasingly exposed to the ever more aggressive Russians. Today, also unlike 1989, Germany stands as the largest, richest, most geo-strategically important country in Europe – and faces a global competition with Russia and China the likes of which the world has not seen since the hottest phases of the Cold War.

Germany Must Take a Stand

Without German leadership in the sense of skillful use of the levers of power, including military power, Europe, if not the entire West, is increasingly vulnerable to a broad-based, well-conceived offensive by authoritarian, even totalitarian, rivals. Without a competitive and influential Germany, the European Union and NATO will be challenged to counter the threat posed by Beijing and Moscow.

Germany did not seek this challenge, but now the country must face it – just as the United States was forced to confront Stalin and Moscow after World War II. Whether Germany likes it or not, Moscow like Beijing, sees Europe´s peace and prosperity as a potent danger to its system of rule. While Germany enjoys Europe´s open order like no other, German´s location and wealth have also made it the vital if not sufficiently influential keystone of this order.

Germany needs the strategy, the organization, and the sustainability to bring its political, economic, and military strengths to bear – but also to recognize its weaknesses and reduce them. Germany needs carefully considered resilience in all areas of competition.

Europe has rarely succeeded in keeping the peace and becoming the master of its own destiny.

A strategic and competitive Germany focused on strengthening its global role could change this.

This article is an English version of his German article published on the Transatlantic Networks website on February 18, 2022.

Dr. Denison is the Director of Transatlantic Networks.

Transatlantic Networks is a center for political education and consulting based in Koenigswinter, Germany. The center’s research focuses on the possibilities and limitations of a globalization of the Atlantic partnership.

We have a forthcoming interview with Dr. Deninson on the current situation facing Germany and Europe.

The featured graphic: credit: Bigstock

For an earlier interview, we did with him, see the following:

The Return of Direct European Defense: The German Challenge

The Eurodrone Program Moves Ahead: February 2022

03/01/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – OCCAR, a European procurement agency, signed Feb. 24, 2022 a contract worth €7.1 billion ($8 billion) with Airbus Defence and Space as prime contractor for a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, marking a step in the European pursuit of military, industrial, and political independence.

“The Eurodrone program aims to deliver a sovereign capability in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, support for ground forces in a theater of operation and attack, having capability to fire missiles and guided bombs,” the French armed forces ministry said Feb. 25 in a statement.

The launch of the program “marks a key step in the strengthening of European cooperation,” the ministry said. The order, worth €7.1 billion, covered developing and building 60 drones, with 12 for France, and five years of service.

OCCAR signed on behalf of the four partner nations – France, Germany, Italy and Spain – for Airbus DS to develop, build and maintain an unmanned aerial vehicle.

The UAV was expected to be certified to operate in civilian airspace in Europe and fly as part of the European Future Combat Air System, a complex network with a new generation fighter and remote carrier drones.

“This is important,” said François Lureau, “as it is the precondition for FCAS. It is a European program led by Germany. Lureau is head of consultancy EuroFLconsult and a former head of the French procurement office.

The political significance of the program could be seen in the German chancellor referring to the drone contract in a Feb. 27 keynote speech, in which Olaf Schulz said Berlin would commit €100 billion to the German defense budget this year, up from €47 billion in 2021, and pledged to spend two percent of gross domestic product on the military by 2024.

That speech marked a sharp change in German policy in the light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Berlin pledging to send 1,000 anti-tank weapons and 500 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Ukraine forces.

Europe Seeks To Catch Up

The drone program would allow Europe to break a dependence on Israel and the U.S., allowing European industry to learn how to build a MALE UAV from scratch, an industry executive said. Although the first aircraft will likely be less capable than the Reaper, the foundations would be laid for a long term industrial capability for future European drones.

A second executive said the Ukraine crisis showed the prospect of “long term tension in Europe,” leading to the launch of an arms drive in Western Europe.

France needed to equip its forces for a “high intensity” conflict in Europe, as the army, apart from the Tiger attack helicopter and VBCI armored personnel carrier, was largely armed for overseas deployments in Africa, with wheeled armored vehicles rather than heavy tanks.

“There has been a change of software,” the second executive said.

On the military aspect, German forces launched attacks which led to the killing of civilians in the war in ex-Yugoslavia, the first executive said. Those slayings stemmed from the German forces relying on summaries of US intelligence rather than access to raw intelligence data and making their assessment. That led to Berlin launching the SAR-Lupe radar spy satellite program to cut that dependence.

Allied nations share summaries of intelligence, not the raw intelligence data, which pointed up the importance of gathering the data, assessing and then deciding the operations, the executive said.  Cooperation among allies with independent ISR systems offered a “complementarity” of threat assessment.

France is updating its intelligence gathering capability with a three-strong fleet of new generation optical spy satellites, dubbed Composante Spatiale Optique. A second CSO satellite was put into orbit Dec. 29 2020, at a height of 480 km, to give sharp resolution. Belgium, Italy, Germany and Sweden signed bilateral agreements for access to CSO.

CSO replaces the French Helios spy satellite, intended to cut reliance on the U.S.

In the first war with Iraq, the Helios system may have lacked the sharpness of the then six-strong American fleet of satellites, but France had an independent capability which led them to disagree with the U.S. assessment of the strength of the Iraqi army, afternoon daily Le Monde reported in 1996.

Spain and Greece are partners on the Helios program.

France Gradually To Retire Reapers

On the European drone, France has ordered four systems, with options for two more, the ministry said. A system consists of three drones and two ground stations. The new drones will gradually replace the fleet of Reapers, which will start to be retired from service after 2030.

Building the first prototype was due to start in 2024, the ministry said.

Development was due to run for four years, a third industry source said, with first flight due in 2026, and first delivery toward the end of 2028.

The UAV project took time to win governmental approval, as the lead contractor Airbus had made an initial budget estimate of some €10 billion and had to cut the price to an amount seen as acceptable.

Dassault Aviation and Leonardo are subcontractors on the program.

“This signature kicks off the development of one of the most ambitious European defense programs,” Mike Schoellhorn, chief executive of Airbus Defence and Space, said in a statement.

Eric Trappier, chief executive of Dassault, said, “This contract marks the determination of the European nations and industrial partners to achieve the political goals and to meet the technological challenges leading to European defense sovereignty.”

“Today’s announcement marks an important milestone for the European nations which confirms the determination and achievements of the industrial partners in meeting the challenges that accompany the development of a complex and strategic European defense and security program, said Lucio Valerio Cioffi, general manager of Leonardo.