U.S. Marines with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (3/6), 2d Marine Division, conduct multiple exercises as Marine Rotational Force-Europe 21.1, Oct. 2020, through April 2021.
The deployment strengthened the interoperability, mobility, expeditionary readiness and warfighting excellence of 3/6 and the Norwegian military.
NORWAY
10.15.2020
Video by Cpl. Andrew Smith 2nd Marine Division
By Robbin Laird
In my interview with Lt. General Rudder, the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COMMARFORPAC), he clearly outlined the way ahead for the Marines in the Pacific and identified a number of challenges to be faced and met to shape that way ahead. During my visit to MARFORPAC in August 2021, I had a chance to discuss those challenges with a number of staff members in the command.
One of those challenges is working effectively with allies and partners in shaping an effective deterrent strategy and ensuring that coherent warfighting capabilities can be leveraged in times of crisis.
I had a chance to discuss the partnering challenges with the MARFORPAC team responsible for working those challenges.
I met with Mr. Rich Hill, G-5 International Affairs Branch Head, Maj Zach Ota, G-5 NE Asia Desk Officer, Maj Dylan Buck, NE Asia Desk Officer, Mr. Justin Goldman, TSC Plans Specialist and Mr. Scot Hasskew, TSC plans Specialist.
This is an impressive team and we had a wide ranging discussion of allied and partnering issues in the region.
Because of my engagement with the Australians as a Research Fellow with the Williams Foundation, and because the Marine Corps Rotational Force-Darwin had just been set up when I was last visiting MARFORPAC in 2014, we discussed the Australian relationship at length.
But we also discussed the tapestry of change in the Indo-Pacific as the Chinese reached out with both their economic and military power deep into the Indo-Pacific as well.
The team articulated a key point underlying the Marine Corps approach in the Indo-Pacific.
They are focused on working with allies and partners from the standpoint of crafting approaches to operations and not just taking a U.S. built template and incorporating allies into that template.
As one participant put it: “We use our training exercises to experiment with what particular allies or partners wish to do, and to work through how we can build that into an effective coalition warfighting capability.”
With the concern about what is referred to as “gray zone operations” by adversaries, deterrence delivered through interactive training throughout the region is a key focus of USMC activity in the region.
Training is a weapon system, and no more so than in shaping the ecosystem for combat operations in the Indo-Pacific through training with partners and allies.
A key point which emerged from the conversation was how training as a weapon system actually shaped joint coalition warfighting capability.
The argument went like this: The Marines are training with partners and allies throughout the Indo-Pacific and through these efforts are shaping distributed survivable and agile network of training areas with partners and allies.
This, in essence, creates combined joint task forces of varying sizes and varying locations that are scalable and agile.
And by exercising through the various training events, one is creating a deterrent effect.
By working throughout the entire geographical areas of the Indo-Pacific, the Marines are able to operate from multiple vectors, which is a core strategic focus of the Marines in the Indo-Pacific today.
A key element of innovation in the Indo-Pacific is working through a way ahead for coalition amphibious operations, from ships to the shore, from the shore to the sea and shaping distributed and flexible combat clusters throughout the region.
We discussed how ARG-MEUs coming from CENTCOM through the Indo-Pacific both on the way and on the return have been part of the training regimes.
But clearly, a renewed emphasis on building amphibious task force capabilities in the Indo-Pacific is required going forward, but not simply in terms of the U.S. Navy and the USMC but broadening the efforts to shape coalition wide amphibious task force capabilities.
We spent much of the time discussing the Australian relationship with the USMC.
In my view, there is a significant evolution of Australian strategy underway and how that evolution crosscuts with how the Marines work their own relationship in the Pacific can provide a powerful stimulus for shaping effective deterrent forces in the region. (I wrote this prior to the announcement of the Royal Australian Navy’s nuclear submarine force which clearly underscores this point!)
In part it is about the evolution of MRF-D in the future.
How do the Aussies and MRF-D expand how they work together and with what focus?
If the Australians focus significant attention on shaping distributed but integrated forces from Western Australia to their first island chain (the Solomon Islands), that area of operation which encompasses significant interaction with the partners in the region, provides a very innovative and significant area in which the Marines can themselves work their cross-cutting innovations.
For example, bringing the newly formed Marine Littoral Regiment into an area of operations from Western Australia to the Solomon Islands and building out relationships with the Australian Army as that force rethinks its role in the region would drive significant cross-cutting operational changes important for both the Marines more widely in the Pacific and the Australians in reshaping their own defense capabilities.
I introduced another idea which we discussed but I am not holding the team responsible for my own conclusions.
There clearly needs to be an area to hold regular coalition amphibious task force training.
This is no longer limited to operating as a greyhound bus delivery of capability ashore, the amphibious task forces of today are radically different and more capable in working the full spectrum of operations.
It might make sense for the Aussies to sponsor an annual amphibious task force training exercise.
It would be bilateral at its core but of course, India, Japan, South Korea, and others who have capability to be tested in the 21st century concepts of operations for an amphioxus task force could engage in this ongoing combat learning and innovation effort.
The Marines face a challenge with regard to allies and partners and training which should be recognized as well. The Marines have built an integrated force capability which can deliver Marine Corps combat capability where needed.
If the Marines go down a path of redesigning their force only to fit uniquely into a U.S. Naval joint force integration package via a hyper-specialization focus, they become less useful to the kind of force integration which allies, and partners are engaging in to deal with the current and evolving Indo-Pacific defense threats.
But it is clear: the USMC in the Indo-Pacific will be most effective when it can integrate effectively with partners and allies throughout the entire gamut of operations from gray zone to higher levels of conflict.
Featured Photo: Soldiers of 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment embark a US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey for an Air Mobile Operations during Exercise Koolendong 2021. Credit:Australian Department of Defence. August 20, 2021.
By Pierre Tran
Paris – France heaped bitter resentment on Canberra’s axing an industrial partnership to build 12 attack submarines for the Australian navy, while opting to order American-designed boats as part of a strategic alliance with the U.S. and the UK.
The French foreign and defense ministers filled on Sept. 16 the airwaves with anger in response to a joint announcement the night before by Australia, the UK and the US of their alliance, dubbed AUKUS.
Under that trilateral agreement, the U.S. will release highly sensitive technology to allow Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines of American design, with support from the UK. The U.S. has only ever granted Britain privileged access to that know-how.
“I am angry — this is not done between allies,” foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said on franceinfo radio. “This is a stab in the back. This unilateral, brutal, unpredictable decision looks a lot like what Mr Trump used to do.”
France had built a relationship of trust with Australia, he said. “This confidence has been betrayed,” he said, adding that he felt “a lot of bitterness.”
Le Drian was defense minister when the French shipbuilder Naval Group won in 2016 a three-way competition with Germany and Japan to build a diesel-electric version of the French nuclear-powered Barracuda submarine for the Australian navy.
That 50-year deal was estimated to be then worth €30 billion ($35 billion) and was hailed as “deal of the century” for France and Naval Group.
The Australian switch away from building the French-designed Barracuda Shortfin boat was “serious,” and “very bad news for respecting one’s word,” armed forces minister Florence Parly said on RTL radio. The government would look at limiting any financial hit on Naval Group, she said, and did not rule out a claim for compensation against Australia.
That Australian realignment caught Naval Group by surprise as the company had been expecting to sign a contract for the basic design stage in the next few days, under an imposed deadline for a signing in September.
That two-year contract was reported to be worth €1.4 billion and opened the way for a detailed design deal. Naval Group had completed the preliminary design. The Australian media had long criticized the company for being behind schedule and pushing the cost higher.
Naval Group had pledged to meet an Australian condition of 60 percent of local content in the future submarine program and agree to transfer technology.
France has invested heavily in forging close operational and industrial ties with Australia, seen as a key ally in the Indo-Pacific region.
The French air force flew in January-February under the Skyros exercise four Rafale fighter jets, two A400M transport turboprops and an A330 multirole tanker transport jet to Australia.
That Skyros exercise was a step toward the target of flying in two years time 20 Rafales and 10 A330 MRTTs over 20,000 km to the other side of the world in 48 hours.
As part of that power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the French navy sailed the Emeraude nuclear-powered attack submarine, supported by the Seine fleet auxiliary ship, from France in September 2020 to dock at Perth, Western Australia, on November 9. The French boat took part in the Foxfish exercise with the Australian navy.
The Emeraude sailed on to the Guam US naval base and sailed in an Aswex anti-submarine warfare exercise with a US frigate and helicopter, and a Japanese helicopter carrier, the July edition of French navy Col Bleu service magazine said.
While France appears to remain committed to building its presence in the Indo-Pacific, ties with Australia and the U.S. look like they are hitting a low.
“This decision is contrary to the letter and spirit of the cooperation which existed between France and Australia, founded on a relationship of political confidence as well as development of a high level defense industrial and technology base in Australia,” Le Drian and Parly said in a Sept. 16 joint statement
“The American choice, which leads to Australia setting aside an ally and European partner such as France from a structural partnership, at a time when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region…marks a lack of coherence that France can only take note and regret,” the ministerial statement said.
“This is a major disappointment for Naval Group,” the company said in a statement, adding that over the last five years the company and its partners had “given their best” and “delivered on all its commitments” in France and Australia.
Naval Group will sit down with the Australian authorities to consider the effect the policy switch will have.
“The analysis of the consequences of this sovereign Australian decision will be conducted with the Commonwealth of Australia in the coming days,” the company said.
Thales, which is a supplier of subsystems to Lockheed Martin and holds 35 percent of Naval Group, said there was no “material impact” on its earnings. The orders from Lockheed Martin were less than €30 million, or less than 0.1 percent of the order book of €34.6 billion, the electronics company said. The stake in Naval Group contributed €22 million in 2020 earnings, or two percent of total earnings.
But in 2016, Thales had expected its share of the Australian submarine program to bring in some €1 billion, with an estimated €100 million per boat based on prospective sales of sonar and electronic warfare systems.
The Australian decision will have little effect in the short term for Naval Group, as the order book was fairly full with work on the Barracuda nuclear attack submarine and frigate for defense and intervention (FDI), and there were studies for the French next generation aircraft carrier and nuclear ballistic missile submarine, said Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a think tank.
But the company needs to boost exports, which will cut dependence on domestic orders and boost its order book for the medium term, he said. Greece is looking to order frigates, while the Netherlands is holding a competition for submarines.
On Greece, France has pitched four FDI frigates, with the first to be built in France and three in Greece, modernization of the present Greek Meko frigates, and local shipbuilding.
There has been an offer of a “gap filler,” with supply of two second hand French frigates, but that appears to be off the cards as the French navy needs all its warships, a defense official has said.
“The U.S. is an ally and also a competitor,” Maulny said.
The U.S. and UK pursue strategic interests, though it would have been courteous for the U.S. to give early notice to France.
Across the Channel, the UK has sought to play down tension with France.
“As the prime minister set out in the house, we have and continue to have a very close relationship with France,” a spokesman for the prime minister, Boris Johnson, told the Downing Street lobby, the Guardian daily reported.
“We have longstanding security and defense relationships, as exemplified by the Lancaster House treaties and as exemplified by our combined joint expeditionary force.”
The 2010 Lancaster House treaty maintains existing cooperative industrial programs but has failed to generate new arms projects for British and French industry, former British ambassador Peter Ricketts has pointed out.
A senior French navy officer has previously said the 1998 St Malo bilateral agreement between France and the UK created a structure for close operational ties between the two navies.
It remains to be seen whether that closeness will be backed by French political will.
For the UK, building the Astute class of nuclear-powered attack submarines for the Royal Navy was only made possible with U.S .help in technology transfer and engineering skills, media reports have said.
The UK’s membership of the AUKUS trilateral alliance means “Global Britain with the Americans,” Maulny said.
Britain needs to negotiate a trade treaty with the U.S., having left the European Union and cast off the EU trade agreement with Washington which covers the 27 EU member states.
The U.S. working an Australian submarine deal from France follows a widely held perception that president Joe Biden influenced Switzerland’s pick of the F-35 in a closely fought fighter competition.
Meanwhile, British sources told the Guardian daily the Australians opened talks about the nuclear power deal in March.
Australian prime minister Scott Morrison came to Paris in June, and his talks with Macron included French and Australian engagement in the Indo-Pacific and work on the future submarine program.
The sinking of that Australian Barracuda submarine program has prompted France to raise the banner for European strategic autonomy.
“The regrettable decision which has just been announced on the FSP program can only strengthen the need to raise loud and clear the question of European strategic autonomy,” the French ministers said. “There is no other credible way to protect our interest and our values in the world, including the Indo-Pacific.”
Macron takes up in January the rotating six month presidency of the European Union.
It remains to be seen what the German elections will deliver and whether Macron can rely on political support from Berlin in his drive for a stronger European arms industrial base and operational capability.
Featured Photo: France’s Defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drien and Australia’s then-PM Malcolm Turnbull (center right and center left) inspecting the submarine model in 2016
SCI Is Important for Navy Training.
SAN DIEGO, CA,
07.20.2021
Video by Kevin Dixon Naval Base Coronado
By Pierre Tran
Paris – France has warned of pulling military support out of Mali following a media report of a prospective deal between Bamako and the Wagner Group, a shadowy Russian company of mercenaries seen to be expanding its presence in Africa.
The French defense and foreign ministers told parliamentarians on Sept. 14 there was grave concern the military junta in Bamako was close to signing contracts with Wagner to train the Mali army and provide personal protection for senior Mali officials.
“If the Malian authorities sign contracts with the Wagner company, it will cause extreme concern,” armed forces minister Florence Parly told the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly. Such a deal would contradict and lack coherence with the French mission in the Sahel region, she said.
“Wagner is a militia which has shown itself in the past in Syria and the Central African Republic to have carried out abuses and all sorts of violations that do not correspond with any solution, and so it is incompatible with our presence,” foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told the foreign affairs committee.
Le Drian was speaking following a Reuters report that Mali was close to a deal in which the Russian private military services company could send at least 1,000 mercenaries and receive six billion CFA francs ($11 million) a month.
Wagner gets its name from the call sign of its commander, Dmitry Utkin, Luke Harding said in Shadow State (Harper), his book which tells of Russian named individuals quietly pursuing power around the world while seeking to undermine the West.
Utkin chose the name of the German composer as he particularly liked the helicopter combat scene in Francis Ford Coppola’s film Apocalypse Now, Harding narrated.
The Wagner company, allegedly funded by Evgeny Prigozhin, a “talented entrepreneur from St Petersburg,” allowed Russian private military services to be provided overseas, allowing the government to deny any responsibility, the book said.
Harding spoke about the Russian interest in the then U.S. President Donald Trump at the Folkestone Book Festival, speaking to journalist and university lecturer Lennox Morrison. Harding, a reporter with UK daily the Guardian, has also written A Very Expensive Poison, a book on the Russian poisoning of ex-FSB spy Alexander Litvinenko.
The Wagner company has been seen in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, and moved into the Central African Republic soon after France pulled its troops out of the latter in 2016.
The UN said on March 31 that independent experts, including the UN working group on mercenaries, were concerned over the presence of the Russian companies Sewa Security Services, Lobaye Invest, and Wagner in the Central African Republic.
The presence of “Russian advisers” at the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) military mission and evacuation of wounded “Russian trainers” to UN mission bases caused concerns, the UN said.
“In particular, they (the experts) expressed concerns about contractors’ connections to a series of violent attacks since the nationwide poll,” the UN said, referring to elections held Dec. 27 2020.
Meanwhile, in Mali the prospective arrival of Russian mercenaries may come as France pulls its troops out of the north of the African nation.
Parly said Sept. 13 in a keynote speech that France was not leaving the sub-Saharan Sahel region, but was seeking greater cooperation with the G-5 Sahel nations and its European partner nations.
“That is what distinguishes us from what the Americans did in Afghanistan in the last few months: we talk to our partners, we coordinate with them,” she said.
French president Emmanuel Macron said July 9 there would be ‘transformation” of the mission in Mali, with a switch in strategy to targeting senior commanders of the al-Aqaeda and Islamic State movements, and giving support for a greater operational role for the five-nation Sahel coalition — Chad, Burkino Faso, Mali, Mauretania, and Niger.
France is withdrawing troops from Mali bases in Timbuktu, Kidal and Tissalit, cutting the number of French boots on the ground to some 2,500 from some 5,100.
There are nine European allies in the Takuba task force, led by the French special forces, which trains and provide combat support for Malian troops. Takuba is the Tuareg term for sword.
Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, and Sweden have sent or signed up to send troops to Takuba. There are some 500 allied troops in Takuba, which is expected to grow to 600-700, a French defense official said.
Denmark plans to send troops next year to join Takuba, while Greece, Hungary and Serbia have shown interest, LCI radio said.
There is also a French special forces combat mission – also dubbed Sword – in Mali.
For training support, there is the 1,000 strong European Union Training Mission in Mali, backed by Germany and Spain.
There are talks to add a further 2,000 to the 13,000 troops in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), with plans for the UN-backed units to be moved to the north and center of the country, taking up the ground being left by French combat troops.
During my visit to Honolulu to visit PACAF and MARFORCOM in August 2021, I had a chance to discuss how U.S. forces are shaping a way ahead for Pacific defense.
Ed Timperlake and I are finishing our book entitled Maritime Kill Webs, 21st Century Warfighting and Deterrence which highlights the template we see being shaped by U.S. forces for full spectrum crisis management, up to and including the high-end fight. Our book is based on a wide range of interviews over the past decade with U.S. and allied forces and how they are shaping the new template based upon which enhanced warfighting capabilities with credible deterrence options can be built out in the future.
At the heart of this capability is shaping a distributed integrated force in which the Navy’s approach to distributed maritime operations flows into the USAF’s agile combat deployment approach with the innovations which the USMC and USCG are in throes of implementing.
Effective crisis management requires escalation control ranging from HADR operations through gray zone conflict to higher levels of lethal combat.
A core challenge to be met is what one might call the ability to conduct effective seam warfare, namely through working with partners and allies to reduce the seams left open in either Pacific or European defense which the authoritarian powers can exploit.
I discussed this approach during my visits, and in one session with MARFORPAC future operations planners we discussed how exercises are a key part of shaping the force going forward both for the United States and partners and allies. That session was a discussion with Dr. Dave Hudspeth and Mr. Juan Zapata, G-35 Future Operations Planners.
After discussing at length the impact of the PRC military buildup and engagement politically and economically in the Pacific, we focused on the role which exercises are playing in shaping a way ahead.
In part, shaping ongoing exercises allows a meshing of U.S. capabilities and commitments with those of partners and allies.
In my own view, the USMC in the Pacific is a key linchpin between the USAF and the U.S. Navy, and a player which can deliver integrated combat force to a seam in times of crisis.
What emerged from the discussion was a renewed focus on innovative exercises which built off the operations of competitors in the region and which drove innovative approaches with regard to shaping more effective joint and coalition operations.
INDOPACOM and the Marines are not focusing on what one participant called “wash and rinse” repetitive exercises, but instead focusing on expanding both the number of like-minded international participants in each exercise and the exercise objectives themselves to create more realistic and innovative deterrence approaches that measurably change how peer competitors are operating.
The goal is to generate concepts of operations which present challenges to those adversaries in terms of seams which they would have difficultly closing in a crisis or more extended conflict.
The goal is to be able to place the right combat capability at the right place at the right time to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effect.
A key element for shaping the way ahead is to ensure that sensor clusters are operational in key areas to allow for the kill web deliver of the right weapons at the right time to deliver the desired effect.
As one participant put it: “We need to look beyond traditional military measures of performance in exercises – such as number of sorties flown – to understanding how we are actually impacting the operational environment.”
This means that working exercises is about to determining how to shape the right capability to work outcomes desired in terms of crisis or extended conflict.
Training and exercises are becoming core weapons. The challenge is to determine how best to do so from the standpoint of both the joint force and coalition partners and allies.
And those determinations are not always going to be the same.
The aperture has been opened with regard to shaping a way ahead for innovations in Pacific defense and the introduction of new capabilities in the near to mid-term will be evaluated in terms of how these capabilities will be evaluated in terms of how the force can operate more effectively in influencing the operational environment.
U.S. Marines with 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, 3d Marine Division, and U.S. Air Force Airmen with Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Squadron load a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System into a MC-130J Commando II aircraft during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21, in Bundaberg, Queensland, Australia, July 21, 2021.
TS21, the ninth iteration and conducted since 2005, occurs biennially across Northern Australia.
BUNDABERG, QLD, AUSTRALIA
07.20.2021
Video by Lance Cpl. Kelly Snyder 3rd Marine Division
By Robbin Laird
As the Marines rework how they work Pacific defense both with the joint and coalition forces, three key weapon systems enabling the effort are the F-35, the Osprey and C2 capabilities at the tactical edge.
Each of these systems brings different capabilities to the fight, but the underlying capabilities being underscored is an ability to operate from flexible bases, to be able to aggregate desired combat effects and to morph into flexible task forces at the point of interest.
I had a chance while visiting MARFORPAC during my August 2021 visit to discuss the way ahead with Marines involved with F-35s, Ospreys and C2 evolution in a single roundtable. The participants in the discussion from MARFORPAC were Col. Manlee Herrington, AC/S Aviation; LtCol Shane Bursae, Fixed Wing Air Officer; Maj. Paul DiMaggio, Rotary Wing Air Officer; and Maj James Arnold, Aviation C2 Officer.
As one participant put it: “We need to have the ability to close forces at the decisive point.
“We are operating as an expeditionary force which means we have to deploy agile and close rapidly.
“We need to combine speed with expeditionary flexibility and reach.
“That is why the F-35/Osprey combination is so critical for the Marines.”
In this article, I am leveraging the conversation and shaping a number of takeaways but am not holding the participants responsible in any way for those takeaways,
The coming of the F-35 to the Pacific is a major difference from my earlier visit to MARFORPAC in 2014. The Marines operate two squadrons of F-35s from Iwakuni with a third rotational squadron to be added in the future. The Marines operate the most forward deployed F-35s in the region and operate from the first Island Chain.
Now the USAF has deployed the F-35 into the region, and the Marines are working closely with them in shaping what the USAF calls “agile combat employment,” something for which the F-35B is ideally suited.
The U.S. Navy is deploying F-35Cs into the Pacific with the introduction of the USS Carl Vinson carrier group. Marines are also involved as they are F-35C operators as well. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 314 operates those aircraft.
With allies buying F-35s and working towards ship-based F-35B operations, the envelope of engagement of the Marines in shaping shared coalition operational concepts and capabilities has expanded as well. They are working with allied F-35As as well as F-35Bs which means that working the first island chain through to South Korea is clearly a work in progress.
Working closely with Japan and Australia as those allies deploy and develop their F-35 fleets provides significant opportunities to shape collaborative con-ops as well. Singapore is becoming an F-35 Security Cooperative Participant which extends the operational envelope as well for Marines working with allies in shaping collaborative defense capabilities and approaches.
The Marines as well are working new concepts like the Lightning Carrier, whereby operating of a ship like LHA-6, a larger number of F-35 can operate than with a traditional ARG-MEU. And intersecting the capabilities coming off the USS America with allies and the joint force afloat or based ashore provides an opportunity to expand significantly the impact of USMC F-35Bs can have in a combat situation in the Pacific. The reach of the sensor systems of an integratable F-35 fleet is a core enabler for the joint and coalition force in the Pacific.
But to get the full value out of a USMC F-35 force, it is crucial to fund the enablers.
The weapons development calendar is behind schedule, and there is a clear need to ramp up the weapons planned for development for the F-35 enterprise. As the U.S. shifts from the land wars, it is important to ramp up high-end capabilities in the missile domain for sure.
A second key enabler is tanking.
The KC-130J fleet is a key asset for USMC operations, and they are in short supply. If one wants to focus on their role to supply bases spread throughout the Pacific, then you are not highlighting their tanking role.
If you are highlighting the tanking role, then you are reducing the ability to supply bases. There is no way around this other than ramping up the buys of KC-130Js.
When I was last at MARFORPAC in 2014, the Osprey was making its presence known. It was the key bedrock for shaping what was then possible with regard to the strategic approach for the distributed laydown.
In fact, I would argue that the Osprey was the bedrock for the initial transition of the Marines to a distributed laydown ecosystem which underlies the current approach to shape a more integrated distributed force.
We discussed at the outset during the meeting of the significant nature of the transition from the Ch-46 to the Osprey and the impact of that transition on the rest of the Marine Corps force. The shift away from a rotorcraft mindset has been a challenging one for the Marine Corps, and indeed one which the U.S. Army has yet to do. It is not just about speed and range; it is about rethinking how one operates in the extended battlespace.
And that thought process is still a work in progress.
When the Ospreys first came to the Pacific, an immediate impact was filling the gap caused by a shortage of KC-130Js. The Ospreys could move supplies and Marines around in ways that the KC-130J would traditionally do, with the role of the KC-130J in air refueling then highlighted.
Now as the Marines look to operate from multiple launch points and to do so with working from a network of sea and expeditionary bases, the role of the Osprey is without doubt enhanced.
At the same time, the ways an Osprey can support or work with such a force have expanded significantly.
One example has been highlighted in the recent Island Marauder 21 exercise which was held a week after my visit, but which we discussed during the roundtable.
This is how a recent article released by the USMC described the engagement of the Osprey in the exercise.
“For example, one exercise saw participants seize terrain to enable artillery units to gain fire superiority on a distant island chain. The Marines of VMM-268 transported 3rd Marines and their equipment in an MV-22 Osprey from a pickup zone to a nearby island. Marines traveled in an Osprey equipped with a Networking On-the-Move system for an airborne command and control exercise.
“Networking On-the-Move, a critical Force Design capability, was also integrated into a prototype Utility Task Vehicle and wheeled onto another MV-22 aircraft, showcasing its mobility and transportability. NOTM is a satellite command and control system Marines can leverage to communicate while mobile on the battlefield. “This was the first time 3rd Marines have used NOTM on an aircraft,” said Maj. Ben Gardner, MCSC’s lead for Island Marauder 2021. “The task proved successful.”
“During Island Marauder, MCSC integrated their communication equipment with LINK-16, a standardized communications system used by the U.S. and allied militaries. These capabilities helped to test interoperability among the joint forces in a denied or degraded environment.”
What the participants underscored was the importance of working new capabilities for the Osprey and the F-35 to work together, to shape various payloads, which the tandem could deliver to a distributed integrated force.
For example, the East Coast Marines have recently worked a distributed G/ATOR system deployed on an expeditionary base in support of the fleet.
How might this be worked in the Pacific?
Can the G/ATOR radar be reconfigured to be delivered by a platform other than the KC-130J?
Could it be done by Ospreys and CH-53Ks for example, and provide for even greater basing flexibility?
How to configure Ospreys to deliver USVs into the battlespace with ISR systems for information or deception?
In other words, taking the concept innovations forward, how best to leverage what the revolutionary duo of F-35 and Osprey can deliver to the force?
C2 is a weapon system for shaping and synchronizing the delivery of fires and maneuver of an integrated distributed force.
One participant drew an analogy between the USMC transition from CH-46 to the Osprey in terms of what was going on with C2. He argued that with the focus on the land wars, we are just beginning to see the implementation of a generational leap forward with the latest sensors and information systems.
But with a shift to working in contested environments, and one prioritizing expeditionary operations, new capabilities and new concepts of operations were necessary. Technology is at hand to shape a way ahead but ensuring that a distributed force can work in an integrated manner is an ongoing challenge.
What was described is that what historically was capabilities inherent in Marine Corps Aviation is now being pushed down to the expeditionary battalion level.
But as the Marines reshape themselves for operating as an inside force, how to ensure that the C2 for the inside force integrates with the air combat element for the Marines, or the Naval strike force or PACAF’s agile employment force?
As one participant put it: “This is uncharted territory.”
And with regard to the deployment of the new Marine Littoral Regiment, how to ensure that it has the appropriate reachback capability to ensure mission success?
In short, as one works the USMC transition, the Marines already have in their hands a number of the key tools for the transition.
It is just important to realize and remember that going forward.
Featured Photo: Marines prepare to launch a Networking-on-the-Move Airborne-equipped MV-22 Osprey at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Aug. 12, 2021. Marines with 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines participated in a notional air assault as part of Island Marauder. NOTM-Airborne provides Marines with real-time command, control and collaborative mission planning while airborne. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Ashley Calingo)