Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group conducts a strait transit in support of Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, May 27, 2025. During ARGMEUEX, the 22nd MEU, aboard IWO ARG shipping, conducts various mission essential tasks that enhance operational readiness as a unified IWOARG/22 MEU team.
05.27.2025
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
By Robbin Laird
On June 5, 2025, I had a chance to talk with Air Vice-Marshal Nick Hogan, the Head of Air Force Capability within the RAAF about the challenges and opportunities of incorporating autonomous systems within the Australian Defence Force and the impact this will have on the force.
Australia stands at the threshold of a strategic opportunity that could fundamentally reshape its defense capabilities. Australia faces a paradigm shift that could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry.
Autonomous systems are not simply unmanned versions of traditional platforms. They are essentially payload carriers that perform specific tasks for operational forces rather than replacing them. They are not multi-mission platforms which is the focus of traditional manned systems.
Rather than designing systems to perform multiple roles over 30-year lifespans — like the F-35 fighter jet — autonomous systems are conceived as single-purpose, task-specific tools that can be rapidly developed, deployed, and evolved. This shift requires new concepts of operations and, crucially, different relationships with industry partners.
Australia’s investment in the MQ-28A Ghost Bat provides the foundation for this transformation. Hogan sees this not as an end product but as a stepping stone toward a sovereign capability built on open systems architectures. By collaborating with partners and using government reference architectures, Australia can create platforms that allow for rapid digital design and testing with minimal flight-testing requirements that integrate with allies and partners.
The key is moving toward what Hogan calls “containerized software” approaches — plug-and-play payloads that work across different platforms, avoiding vendor lock and enabling smaller companies to compete based on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration capabilities.
This vision demands a radically different relationship with industry partners. Instead of the traditional vendor-locked arrangements exemplified by programs like the F-35, Hogan advocates for what he calls “intimate relationships” with industry — sharing cost constraints and fiscal targets to enable collaborative solutions.
“Opening up the books on both sides, so you can both see the constraints that you’ve got, you can work together to get a common solution,” Hogan explains. This approach has already shown promise in Australia’s work with Boeing Defense Australia, providing insights into what works well and what doesn’t in industry partnerships.
This model enables small and medium enterprises to compete on equal footing with large primes, focusing on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration. The result is a more dynamic, competitive environment that can drive rapid innovation and cost-effective solutions.
In my view, another key requirement of this approach is to get these systems into operators’ hands quickly for operational evolution rather than being captured by lengthy acquisition processes. My view is that it’s a question of the fighting force being able to get priority to provide operational evolution of these kinds of systems, rather than leaving them captured by the acquisition bureaucracy.
The ultimate vision is to shape a mosaic of capability —commanders having access to flexible, changeable, and dynamic combinations of manned and unmanned systems across air, maritime, and ground domains. This approach moves away from relying on single-purpose platforms for decades toward a more adaptive, responsive capability mix.
This mosaic approach will enable area commanders to look at specific operational requirements and determine the optimal mix of assets to achieve desired effects. It’s about maximizing effects rather than maximizing platform capabilities.
The technology exists, the operational concepts are being proven, and the industrial base is ready to respond. But the path forward requires several key elements:
There is the tremendous potential and the significant challenges inherent in this transformation. Success could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry. There is a generational opportunity to reshape defense capabilities for the challenges ahead.
Featured photo: Australian Army Drone Racing Team pilots were presented the Inter-Service Championship Team award by Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan, CSC – Head of Air Capability, during a drone racing event at the Australian International Airshow 2025 at Avalon Airport. March 3, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence
By Robbin Laird
I gave one of first public presentations certainly by an outsider in Israel on the F-35 at the annual airpower conference held by the Fischer Institute in Tel Aviv on May 25, 2011.
I gave a presentation on fifth generation aircraft which highlighted how the coming of the F-35 might affect the future development of the Israeli defense force.
The advantage of discussing the F-35 with allies was simply that the aircraft would bring multi-domain combat capabilities to the force prior to that term becoming a dominant part of the current strategic discussion.
Let me say that there was not a gaggle of F-35 advocates running around the United States at the time and I took my cartload of intellectual insults etc at the time for my analysis.
Senator McCain comes to mind as a guy who never got it, but he was hardly alone.
Secretary Gates great contribution of jettisoning the rebuilding of airpower for a world of major power competition has never really been properly addressed.
One can look back to the Commander-in-Chief, President Obama, who did not need that Cold War airplane, the F-22.
I have told the story of those who did show up and build the kind of combat airpower we desperately need in today’s multi-polar authoritarian world notably in my book on my fifth generation journey.
But let me bring back the interview I did in Israel with a former Chief of the Israeli Air Force, the full impact of his insights which we have only just seen in the Iranian operations.
Just contrast this with the Gates-Obama leadership and you can see who understood the reality of airpower in the world we live in, not the world we would like to live in.
An Interview with (Retired) General Herzl Bodinger
General Bodinger:November 2010
Question: What role has airpower played in the defense of Israel?
General Bodinger: From the beginning, airpower has been essential to the survival of Israel.
We have developed our Air Force at the maximum size that we can have with our resources.
The Air Force needs to cover the whole Middle East, and be able to strike any target that the government of Israel will decide is necessary for the defense of Israel.
The goal is to be able to convince adversaries that you cannot stop us, and you cannot retaliate in the same manner.
We have had total air superiority for a considerable period of time.
But air superiority is not a given.
We live in a dangerous neighborhood with new weapons, missiles and capabilities. T
his provides today’s challenge of air dominance against significant numbers of missiles and defensive systems, primarily not delivered from aircraft.
Ensuring air dominance against a polyvalent threat is crucial to the defense of Israel.
Question: The new approach to take away air dominance is to augment defenses and to proliferate missiles?
General Bodinger: Yes.
The effort is to provide new capabilities against our aircraft and to do so by using various means including, ground-to-air missiles of different kinds. And against the ability of Israel to retaliate, and to attack this very small country, a country with no strategic depth. Our adversaries are relying on the proliferation of missiles, both surface-to-air and the ground-to-ground to prevail.
Question: So how do you respond to this new threat environment?
General Bodinger: You can simply upgrade existing systems to deal with the new threats. There are some gaps that you can’t overcome just by making a small minor change done either by changing the tactics or simply upgrading the aircraft. There comes a time that you have to make a leap forward in combat capability which we plan to do with the F-35.
Comment: Your point is that you need to introduce a different type of combat system to deal with the new threat environment.
General Bodinger: A different kind.
Now, you know that we went to robotic systems or UAVs of various kinds. We were the first to use them in numbers in 1982. So this was one solution.
And this is also a solution for staying over the battlefield for a long time.
I call it a satellite in the atmosphere.
Comment: It gives you persistence.
General Bodinger: Yes, it stays there for hours, and provides information, and sometimes can attack.
But it’s a robot with the limitations of a robot. You need to shape the correct mix between manned and unmanned aircraft, which is an evolutionary process.
But you clearly need to deal with the threat from the defensive systems for both the manned and unmanned systems.
You need the ability to overcome all these threats, which are being developed against it, like the S-300 and S-400.
Question: So you need to craft effective capability to deal with the new defensive systems and missile proliferation, which threaten both manned and unmanned systems?
General Bodinger: Correct.
So, the correct way to go, which we watched very carefully, was what the F-117 introduced at first.
The idea of low observable and low radar cross section, and it really looks a newer way to go. Of course, with all the avionics that come with it, at first all these machines are very expensive.
But to keep buying the old aircraft simply creates targets for the new defensive systems and is a much more expensive approach. For us airpower is a spearhead force, which can be used as an icebreaker. It will open the way for the rest of the aircraft to come.
For us, this will be the F-35.
Because it can lead the way, and it can reach the targets.
It can fly over any point over the Middle East, and strike any target. I just want to finish this and say that the surface-to-surface missiles also are a big problem here.
Maybe other places less.
Because of the range and because of the size of the country. We don’t have strategic depth. So, we have to bear in mind that all our assets are at risks from missiles.
Whether it’s the military assets or it’s the civilian assets.
From electric power stations, airports, and refineries and factories, and airbases, the entire infrastructure can be held at risk.
Question: And your point is that offensive and defensive systems need to be available to Israel to deal with the new threat environment?
General Bodinger: Clearly you can take some points of interest, and maybe defend them better.
And if worse comes to worse, and there is such a bombardment, so the civilians, you can put to shelters and you can even evacuate for a period of time.
We don’t know what our adversaries will do.
What we’ve seen from 1991, they bombed two towns, two big cities in Israel. Forty missiles, twenty on each. And about one to two a day. So, it shows the ability to inflict a lot of damage. You are not simply going sit back and take strikes.
You have to defend your offensive assets so that you can strike back. We can put aside the defense against surface-to-surface, there are different means and layers, there’s a whole theory here in development of weapons. But we need time to get better results and better integration. And our defense forces always have to think like that. And we have to prepare for the worst; defense spending is like insurance. How much you invest in insurance, is the value of the assets that you want to insure.
And the probability they will be damaged. So this time, the asset is a country.
So, it’s invaluable.
And the probability that it will be damaged is not low enough.
So we have to invest wherever we have to invest.
Even if at the end at the day, maybe we have seen the dark side of the cloud, and we’re pessimistic, one could say, and nothing happened.
No alarm and disagreements, and everything is flourishing; it’s like Europe here.
So, we hope for that, but hopes are not a plan of work.
Comment: But what we do know on the defense technology side is the defense is getting better; the missile technology is getting better. So all of that could be bundled into different threat environments that could be very, very difficult if you cannot manage the battle space.
General Bodinger: That’s why we need the new aircraft.
One would say we need better tanks; we need better everything.
But when we talk about the ranges, and the value of air power not as a partner of the ground forces, but as a lead. So, here now we are coming to the F-35.
As I look back in the development of the Israeli air force certain aircraft gave us an opportunity to make a leap forward, and the F-35 fits into that tradition.
Looking back one quality leap was provided by the Mirage, the other by the F-15.
I remind people that in the late 50’s and the beginning of the 60’s, there were arguments here in the government level and the military, and also in the Air Force whether or not we needed the Mirage. Maybe we can take the aircraft that we have, we had all fresh stuff. We can upgrade them.
That was the idea.
Really, many officers and pilots in the Air Force supported this. We can do with upgrades, you carry the advanced weapons, and you’re better off.
Why do we need to spend a lot of money with something, which could be a little better?
But the problem with those who cannot envision the future is that they can not understand the leap which a new platform can provide.
It’s another kind of aircraft; another kind of capability.
The Mirage was the first revolution in the early Air Force.
The second time such a thing happened, we had Phantoms, we had Sky Hawks, we converted to American machines, it was very good, but the F-15 brought a breath of fresh air.
The whole way we started to fight, we got the first aircraft that we received were in 1977, four prototypes of F-15s. We bought them from the test aircraft; they were fit to make some changes to become operational. And we got those.
This was a revolution in the Air Force.
The whole way of flying changed after the first four aircrafts came here.
Of course, when they were multiplied and then came the F-16, it became the Air Force as it is today. But the first aircraft that arrived already made the change.
And we didn’t expect that this would be the change. And so, when you ask me about the F-35, I know the qualities of the aircraft.
I know the value of low radar constriction, the fact that you have the communication network, the missiles and weapons that you can hold inside, and whatever you can reach. And I know the qualities of the aircraft, but I am sure that the minute the aircraft will actually be used; again, I know that there will be a big dramatic change.
Comment: No one has ever flown a 360-degree aircraft with combat systems, which allow it to manage that space. We have written on the website about the cultural change associated with the new aircraft. We’ve talked to many test pilots of this aircraft. And the notion of a 360-degree aircraft, with the kind of combat system integration, which the aircraft has, will create pressure for a culture change.
General Bodinger: You can understand it only if you experience it. And it is very difficult to transmit it to somebody who’s never flown the aircraft. And I’m sure that this will not be a small leap, again, it will be a dramatic change.
Comment: Similar to your F-15 kind of experience.
General Bodinger: Yes. I was lucky to put in place the first pilots in the country who flew F-15s. And I’m sure that this will be what will happen. And I know that there will be a big development, but you cannot even imagine what it will be. When it will come, we will know. And it will lift the whole Air Force to another level.
Comment: I think at the heart of the issue from my point of view is sortie generation rate. Your ability to turn an aircraft around quickly to go back into combat.
General Bodinger: Now, you’re coming back to the defense against surface-to-surface missiles. We have to retain our ability to take off. But let me go back to discuss the robots which I consider to be satellites in the atmosphere. I think that wherever you can send a robot, instead of a person, you should prefer a robot.
Where can you do it? When the targets are static targets, the headquarters of something, any installation that you wish or asset to bring down is ideal for a robot.
That is an important for the war, strategically or tactically.
And you know where it is, and it is located there, and this is what you have to do.
And all those cases, I think it’s a waste to send a person, because you can do the punch, whatever you wish, it will go and will kill the target and come back.
And if it doesn’t come back, you send another one. So this is a robot.
All the other cases that you have need to have a human mind on the battlefield to decide, because you don’t want to kill people who are not involved, how the targets have moved to another location, you need to decide on the spot.
Or suddenly, you want to make another priority, and you have the authority to do it, because that shift in targets is necessary to success.
Comment: That’s a really crucial issue, reprioritization in a fluid environment.
General Bodinger: So then, you have to have a person on board.
Now, it could be, I’m looking at one step forward, we didn’t do it yet. You could do it in an F-35, two or three or four. Lead a herd of those machines — the robots — and give them missions on the spot. Especially when adversaries start to become very accurate because of GPS or any other means via there missiles, we will need dominance in the decision making cycle to prevail.
We look to the F-35 to be key to that process.
And as we develop the combat capability, we may eliminate many robots; you don’t even need a UAV, why do you need a platform to carry your weapon? Launch the weapon. Like the tomahawk, but this will be different tomahawks.
Operation Rising Lion Marks Unprecedented Use of Stealth Technology Against Iranian Targets
Artisans on the Fleet Readiness Center East (FRCE) H-53 aircraft line work on a CH-53K King Stallion, the first inducted for maintenance at the depot.
FRCE inducted the aircraft April 17 as the first of 14 planned for induction as part of the Age Exploration Program, Depot (AEPD); it is the first King Stallion ever inducted for depot-level maintenance. AEPD collects information regarding the aircraft’s condition through controlled testing and analysis and assists in the development of effective and efficient maintenance schedule for new aircraft.
A recent Forbes analysis by retired Air Force General David Deptula examines how Ukraine’s innovative drone strikes are reshaping military doctrine — and exposing American weaknesses
When Ukrainian forces launched coordinated drone attacks against four Russian airbases on June 1, 2025, they weren’t just destroying enemy aircraft — they were demonstrating a revolutionary approach to modern warfare that has profound implications for U.S. military strategy.
That’s the assessment of retired Air Force General David Deptula in a comprehensive analysis published in Forbes on June 12, 2025, where he argues that Ukraine’s “Operation Spider Web” represents far more than a tactical victory. Instead, it signals a fundamental shift in how smaller nations can compete against militarily superior adversaries.
Using inexpensive quadcopter drones armed with small explosive charges, Ukrainian forces successfully penetrated deep into Russian territory and damaged valuable bomber aircraft. What makes this significant, according to Deptula, isn’t just the mission’s success, but its methodology.
“Ukraine demonstrated that it is fighting smarter than the Russians,” Deptula writes, describing how the operation exemplifies “effects-based” warfare — achieving strategic objectives through innovative means rather than traditional force-on-force confrontation.
Unlike conventional counter-air operations that require coordinated strike packages of fighters, bombers, and support aircraft, Ukraine accomplished similar results using readily available commercial technology. The approach offers a template for how technologically sophisticated but numerically inferior forces can compete against larger adversaries.
But Deptula’s analysis extends beyond this single operation. He notes that small lethal drones have fundamentally altered the character of modern warfare by democratizing precision-guided munitions. Individual soldiers now have access to capabilities previously reserved for combat aircraft.
The numbers are striking: Ukrainian Army units now engage approximately 80 percent of front-line targets using portable drones, leading Deptula to suggest that artillery may be losing its traditional role as the “king of the battlefield” to unmanned systems.
Perhaps most concerning for U.S. readers is Deptula’s assessment of American vulnerabilities. The retired general, who previously served as Director of Operations for Pacific Air Forces, argues that the United States has become dangerously complacent about force protection since the Cold War’s end.
During the Cold War, he notes, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Korea maintained aircraft in hardened shelters, recognizing the risks of leaving valuable assets exposed. That mindset has largely disappeared, even as threats have evolved.
Deptula points to several warning signs: the 1999 Chinese military doctrine “Unrestricted Warfare,” which outlined asymmetric strategies to neutralize U.S. advantages; drone incidents at Virginia’s Langley Air Force Base in 2023; and the general proliferation of drone technology that makes such weapons accessible to both state and non-state actors.
The implications, according to Deptula, could be catastrophic. While the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack targeted a limited set of distant military installations, a modern equivalent using drone swarms could impact targets across the entire United States simultaneously.
“If executed across a comprehensive set of key targets, America’s ability to competently fight could be derailed at the opening of a conflict,” he warns.
Deptula’s recommendations are straightforward but expensive: prioritize force protection through hardened shelters, layered defenses, and decentralized operations. He argues that “airpower, along with every other element of military power, without assured survivability is a hollow deterrent.”
The general notes that China has already embraced this philosophy, constructing thousands of hardened aircraft shelters while the U.S. has largely ignored such defensive measures. A 2004 proposal he made to build hardened shelters on Guam was rejected due to funding constraints—a decision that looks increasingly shortsighted given current threat assessments.
For Ukraine, Deptula suggests that expanding effects-based operations beyond counter-air missions could provide the best path to victory against Russia’s numerically superior forces. Rather than engaging in prolonged attrition warfare, Ukraine should focus on identifying and striking key Russian vulnerabilities across all domains.
The strategy offers hope for other nations facing similar challenges, demonstrating that “strategic insight and operational innovation can be more decisive than numerical superiority alone.”
Deptula’s analysis serves as both a celebration of Ukrainian innovation and a stark warning about American complacency.
As drone technology continues to proliferate and adversaries study Ukraine’s tactics, the United States faces a choice: adapt to this new reality or risk having its military advantages neutralized by the very technologies it helped create.
The question isn’t whether such capabilities will be used against American forces and infrastructure, but when — and whether the United States will be prepared when that moment arrives.
General David Deptula is a retired U.S. Air Force three-star general and currently serves as Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. His full analysis is available at Forbes.com.
The featured image was generated by an AI program.
Port Security Unit (PSU) 301 conducted tactical operations with additional Coast Guard assets near Cherry Point, North Carolina, May 6, 2025. During their two-week Active Duty for Training period, the waterside division tested their skills in numerous real-life scenarios. PSUs are rapid-response forces that defend critical assets at ports and are mostly made up of Reservists.
05.05.2025
Video by Lt.j.g. Joseph Rutledge
U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area
During my visit to Australia in May-June 2025, I have focused significantly on the coming of autonomous systems and how to incorporate them effectively into the Australian Defence Force and for security operations. I have published a new book which looks specifically at the paradigm shift in maritime operations and how maritime autonomous systems are key drivers in that shift.
The point is that such systems are not simply uncrewed variants of crewed systems: rather they follow a very different logic and purpose. They operate to perform tasks which would otherwise not be done, or they do a mission driven task differently from a crewed system.
I had a chance to talk with my friend and colleague Keirin Joyce during my visit. Joyce is really a true knowledge source on such systems given his experience in the Australian Army and the Air Force with such systems and his recent work and writing in the maritime domain. He currently is the Sir Richard Williams Scholar at the Air and Space Power Center and I am a senior research fellow at the foundation, so a perfect opportunity to collaborate and to think through ways to consider these systems for use within a broader Australian strategy.
And to be clear, we are talking as much about security operations as we are about defense operations. Many of the pressing threats facing our nations are in the security domain, and without credible security of our territories, defense capabilities will matter much less. Certainly, the recent Ukrainian attack WITHIN Russia using various packages of forward deployed drones makes that point rather obvious.
Current Australian maritime autonomous systems operate at what Joyce referred to as “level 2 autonomy” — essentially sophisticated remote-controlled vehicles with humans firmly in the decision-making loop. While impressive technological achievements, they fall short of the transformative capability that true autonomy could provide.
Joyce underscored: “Right now, Tesla’s autopilot is operating at about level four autonomy. “Our maritime systems need to take that next evolutionary step to be equipped with the sensing and computation power to reach similar levels of independence.”
This autonomy gap represents more than just a technological challenge — it’s a strategic limitation that prevents Australia from achieving the “mass dividend” that autonomous systems promise. Without one-to-many or many-to-many control capabilities, the ADF cannot deploy these systems at the scale necessary for effective deterrence across the Pacific’s enormous distances.
Aerial autonomous systems have made significant progress in solving the twin challenges of sensing and security. Collaborative combat aircraft are already incorporating infrared search and track systems and detect-and-avoid capabilities that operate continuously without human intervention.
The MQ-9B drone or SkyGuardian, for instance, features certifiable detect-and-avoid radar providing 120-degree coverage at all times. These aircraft represent an evolution toward systems that can sense their environment and adapt their behavior accordingly, rather than simply following pre-programmed instructions.
Enhanced autonomy requires upgraded security frameworks, moving these platforms from their current “official and protected” classification levels to secret and top-secret operations. This transition demands onboard encryption, zeroization equipment, and robust cybersecurity measures — capabilities that current maritime autonomous systems largely lack.
Rather than viewing security requirements as obstacles, Australia could leverage its maritime autonomous systems to strengthen regional partnerships while building operational experience. Lower-classification missions like fisheries patrol, border surveillance, and maritime domain awareness offer ideal testing grounds for these emerging technologies.
Traditional Australian naval engagement in the Pacific involves periodic patrol boat visits and occasional maritime aircraft surveillance — valuable but inherently limited by the intermittent nature of crewed operations. Autonomous maritime systems could provide persistent presence, offering partner nations continuous surveillance capabilities rather than fleeting support.
This approach offers multiple strategic benefits. Partner nations gain enhanced maritime security capabilities, Australia builds deeper defense relationships across the Pacific, and the ADF accumulates crucial operational experience with autonomous systems in challenging maritime environments. Most importantly, this persistent presence contributes to “deterrence by detection” — the principle that visible surveillance capabilities can deter malicious actors in gray-zone conflicts.
I have argued in my new book that maritime autonomous future operates very differently from capital ships. Capital ships operate in task forces which are increasingly learning to operate in terms of distributed operational approaches.
Maritime autonomous systems, dependent on how they are configured in terms of C2 and ISR payloads, can operate as “mesh fleets.” They are carriers for the payloads onboard and have significant capability to perform several maritime tasks currently.
But they need to be deployed, not treated as science experiments for the distant future. There is a need and opportunity in deploying platforms primarily to gain operational experience while gradually upgrading their capabilities through advanced payloads and sensors. Unlike traditional naval platforms that deploy with their full capability suite from day one, autonomous systems can evolve their mission sets over time.
This evolutionary approach offers significant advantages. Adversaries cannot easily assess the true capabilities of a mesh fleet, as individual platforms may carry different sensor and payload configurations. The fleet can adapt to changing mission requirements by swapping payloads rather than building entirely new platforms. Most importantly, operational experience gained through lower-stakes missions provides the foundation for more advanced capabilities when tensions escalate.
The strategic value of maritime autonomous systems extends beyond their immediate tactical capabilities. In an era where gray-zone conflicts challenge traditional deterrence models, the ability to persistently monitor and document activities across vast ocean areas becomes a powerful tool for maintaining rules-based order.
China’s approach to the South China Sea demonstrates how incremental actions below the threshold of armed conflict can gradually shift strategic balances. Effective deterrence in this environment requires consistent observation and documentation of rule-breaking behavior. Autonomous maritime systems, operating at scale across the Pacific, could provide this persistent surveillance capability.
The psychological impact of known surveillance should not be underestimated. When potential adversaries understand that their actions are being continuously monitored and recorded, they face difficult choices about escalation. This “deterrence by detection” becomes particularly powerful when combined with transparent sharing of surveillance data with partner nations and international bodies.
The transition to truly autonomous maritime systems faces several technical hurdles that must be addressed systematically. Link 16 data link systems, essential for secure communications, currently cost $100,000-200,000 per unit — prohibitively expensive for attritable autonomous platforms. Future communication systems must provide equivalent security and interoperability at dramatically reduced costs.
Sensor integration represents another critical challenge. Maritime autonomous systems need the same environmental awareness capabilities being developed for aerial platforms: radar systems for threat detection, infrared sensors for target identification, and collision avoidance systems for safe navigation. These sensors must operate reliably in harsh maritime environments for extended periods without human intervention.
Security frameworks must evolve to protect increasingly sophisticated autonomous systems without compromising their operational effectiveness. This includes not just cybersecurity measures, but also physical security features that prevent technology compromise if platforms are captured or recovered by adversaries.
Australia’s geographic position and strategic commitments across the Pacific make autonomous maritime systems not just advantageous but essential for future defense planning. The distances involved in Pacific operations, combined with the need for persistent presence rather than intermittent patrols, align perfectly with the capabilities that autonomous systems can provide.
Success requires more than technological development — it demands new operational concepts, revised training programs, enhanced partner nation cooperation, and evolved command and control structures.
The technology exists to make this vision reality. What remains is the strategic commitment to deploy these systems, gain operational experience, and build the partnerships that will define Pacific security for decades to come. In an era where presence enables influence and power, autonomous maritime systems offer Australia the opportunity to maintain persistent influence across distances that would otherwise prove prohibitive.
Featured image: The AI-generated image depicts a map of Australia, showcasing its geographic position and strategic commitments across the Pacific Ocean. It highlights the use of autonomous maritime systems, illustrating the vast distances involved in Pacific operations and the significance of persistent presence for defense planning.
We have a growing experience with drone warfare and its impacts.
The best way to understand their impact is how they have already re-shaped combined arms operations.
Notably when combined with payload revolution and fifth generation warfare operations, as seen in the recent Israeli operation in Iran, drones are becoming a key part of the evolution of combined arms.
Analysis of the Ukraine-Russia war, Houthi drone campaigns, and Israeli precision operations provides insights with regard to the dynamics of con-ops changes.
The Ukraine-Russia war has generated the most comprehensive battlefield laboratory for drone warfare in modern history, with documented lessons that challenge fundamental assumptions about military effectiveness and cost structures.
Ukrainian forces achieved 70-80% casualty rates against Russian forces using $400-500 FPV drones to destroy targets worth millions, demonstrating revolutionary cost-exchange ratios that have forced both sides to completely restructure their tactical approaches.
Russian electronic warfare capabilities initially dominated the battlefield, with sophisticated layered defense systems covering 10-kilometer front sections and tactical-level “trench EW” systems carried by individual soldiers. However, Ukrainian adaptation through AI-enhanced terminal guidance, frequency-hopping communications, and fiber-optic control systems has created an ongoing technological arms race where innovation cycles compress from years to months.
The conflict has revealed that permanent aerial surveillance now creates 25-kilometer “gray zones” where traditional military movement becomes difficult forcing fundamental changes in operational planning. Both sides have learned that electronic warfare density across frontlines makes GPS-dependent systems largely ineffective, driving rapid development of autonomous navigation and AI-powered target recognition systems.
Mass production has emerged as the critical capability, with Ukraine establishing 500+ manufacturers producing millions of drones annually through decentralized networks resistant to strategic strikes. This contrasts with Russia’s centralized approach dependent on Iranian technology transfer and Chinese components, creating strategic vulnerabilities that sanctions have effectively exploited.
Houthi drone operations in the Red Sea have achieved strategic effects far exceeding their military investment, forcing the diversion of 2,000+ ships and affecting 12% of global trade while costing under $1 billion annually in operational expenses. Their campaign demonstrates how determined non-state actors with state backing can achieve strategic objectives through sustained, coordinated operations that exploit the economic vulnerabilities of conventional military responses.
The tactical evolution from basic RPG attacks to sophisticated multi-domain operations combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, explosive drones, and unmanned surface vessels shows rapid adaptation under pressure. Houthis achieved 40+ vessel attacks by February 2024 with 21 direct hits, while simultaneously conducting precision strikes against land-based infrastructure over 2,600 kilometers away.
Iranian technology transfer has enabled Houthi production facilities to manufacture domestic variants of Shahed systems while establishing supply chains utilizing components from six countries. The integration of Iranian intelligence assets, particularly the Behshad surveillance vessel, with Houthi operational capabilities demonstrates effective proxy warfare coordination that maintains plausible deniability while achieving strategic objectives.
Cost asymmetry has proven decisive, with $2,000-$50,000 drones forcing $2-27 million interceptor responses from coalition forces. This unsustainable defensive equation has forced recognition that current approaches to drone defense must prioritize cost-effective solutions over technical sophistication.
The campaign’s success stems from strategic patience and economic warfare doctrine, targeting commercial shipping to impose maximum costs while avoiding escalation that would trigger overwhelming military response. Insurance premiums for Red Sea shipping increased 250% for Israeli-linked vessels, demonstrating how military actions can achieve political objectives through economic pressure.
Israeli drone operations against Iran represent the technological pinnacle of precision warfare, with covert pre-positioning of assets within Iranian territory demonstrating unprecedented operational security and strategic planning.
Mossad operatives successfully established drone bases “in the heart of Tehran” while maintaining complete operational security, enabling precision strikes that eliminated senior IRGC commanders and caused significant damage to nuclear facilities.
The integration of intelligence operations with precision strike capabilities has compressed sensor-to-shooter timelines to minutes while maintaining operational security that confounds traditional attribution methods.
Operation Rising Lion demonstrated coordinated employment of over 200 aircraft with ground-based drones to strike 100+ targets using 330+ munitions, showcasing advanced multi-domain integration.
Israeli innovations in cost-effective precision have led to development of the Iron Beam laser system, offering $3 per interception compared to $50,000-100,000 Iron Dome interceptors. This revolutionary cost reduction addresses the fundamental economic challenges of defensive systems while maintaining effectiveness against swarm attacks.
The Refaim (Ghosts) unit’s integration of infantry, armor, air force, engineering, and intelligence into cohesive formations represents doctrinal evolution toward permanent multi-domain operations rather than exercise-based cooperation. No ground operations occur without drone oversight, with continuous surveillance enabling pattern recognition and optimal strike timing.
Technological integration includes AI-powered target identification systems that enable autonomous engagement while maintaining human decision-making authority for strategic targets.
The successful deployment of systems without identifying markings or transponders maintains strategic ambiguity while complicating adversary attribution and response.
All three conflicts demonstrate that successful drone integration requires fundamental changes to command and control structures rather than simple addition of unmanned platforms to existing formations.
Ukrainian forces developed the Kropyva targeting system integrating multi-source intelligence with tablet-based control systems, enabling real-time coordination between drone operators and artillery that converts “dumb” artillery into precision weapons.
Russian adaptation included drone-mounted jamming platforms and “drone-on-drone” aerial combat, while developing fiber-optic control systems immune to electronic warfare. Their integration of strategic electronic warfare systems like Krasukha with tactical Repellent systems creates layered defense that Ukrainian forces counter through distributed production and rapid innovation cycles.
Houthi integration of Iranian intelligence assets with domestic operational capabilities demonstrates effective proxy coordination that maintains strategic objectives while avoiding direct confrontation. The combination of sustained intelligence gathering, precision targeting, and strategic patience has created a new model for proxy warfare that achieves strategic effects through operational persistence.
Israeli multi-domain integration represents the most sophisticated approach, with Mossad-IDF coordination enabling operations impossible through traditional military channels alone.
The permanent integration of intelligence, special operations, and conventional forces creates capabilities that transcend traditional organizational boundaries.
Combat experience has accelerated innovation cycles from years to months, with successful adaptations rapidly spreading across military organizations.
Ukrainian success in integrating commercial components with military applications has democratized precision strike capabilities, while Russian mass production focus demonstrates alternative approaches emphasizing quantity over individual platform sophistication.
Houthi integration of off-the-shelf components with Iranian technology creates effective weapons systems that challenge traditional technology control regimes. Their ability to maintain production capabilities despite international sanctions demonstrates the limitations of supply chain interdiction against determined adversaries with state backing.
Israeli emphasis on cost-effective precision solutions addresses the fundamental economic challenges of defensive systems while maintaining technological superiority. The rapid transition from experimental concepts to operational deployment within months demonstrates agile development processes that traditional military procurement cannot match.
Electronic warfare has emerged as the critical domain determining operational success, with all three conflicts showing that GPS-dependent systems become largely ineffective in contested environments. This has driven rapid development of autonomous navigation, AI-powered target recognition, and communications systems resistant to jamming.
The fundamental lesson across all three conflicts is that cost-effectiveness has become more important than individual platform capabilities. Ukrainian success with $400 FPV drones destroying million-dollar targets has forced reconsideration of military economics, while Houthi operations demonstrate how sustained economic pressure can achieve strategic objectives without decisive military victory.
Defensive systems face unsustainable cost ratios, with Israeli Iron Beam development representing the most promising approach to achieving cost-effective defense. The $3 per interception cost addresses the fundamental challenge of defending against mass, low-cost attacks that have characterized modern drone warfare.
Supply chain lessons demonstrate that distributed production networks prove more resilient than centralized manufacturing, while rapid innovation cycles become more valuable than initial technological advantages. Ukrainian volunteer networks supporting production and innovation have proven more effective than traditional military-industrial approaches.
The conflicts show that training requirements have compressed dramatically, with traditional flight training reduced from hours to minutes through simulator-based programs using commercial gaming equipment. This democratization of operator training has strategic implications for force structure and personnel requirements.
All three conflicts demonstrate that drone warfare represents evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, but with profound implications for military doctrine, procurement, and operations. The emergence of “robots first” strategies prioritizing unmanned systems reflects recognition that traditional combined arms must integrate autonomous capabilities to remain effective.
NATO adaptation includes European drone training centers and Germany’s “drone wall” concept for border defense, while Pentagon acknowledgment of the need to learn from Ukrainian experience has shifted procurement priorities toward mass, low-cost systems rather than individual platform sophistication.
These three case studies establish that modern warfare has fundamentally shifted toward persistent, precision-enabled operations where cost-effectiveness determines strategic success.
The combination of mass production, rapid innovation, and effective integration with conventional forces has created new paradigms for military effectiveness that reshape considerations of future force design.
Having acquisition planners envisage a future platform centric force has been overtaken by the operational realities of 2025.
Future force planning is increasingly interactive with how the fight tonight force reshapes its capabilities in the near to mid-term.
A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Operations: Autonomous Systems and Their Impact
