Moscow’s Cold War Nostalgia

12/21/2021

By Richard Weitz

Last Friday, the Russian government published the drafts of the proposed treaties they had presented to NATO and the United States two days earlier, via Assistant Secretary of State Karen Donfried, who was visiting Moscow. The following day, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov spoke with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to explain the documents.

In a Friday news conference, Russian Deputy Minister Sergei Ryabkov contended that the West needed to urgently act on the drafts. He insisted that they were an integrated package rather than a list of menu items from which NATO and the United States could cherry pick their preferences.

In content, the documents echo what Putin reportedly told Biden in their late November video call. The exchange yielded less success than the White House hoped in dampening tensions. The texts read as a combination of a list of wishes, grievances, and red lines—extending far beyond the current Ukraine crisis. They aim to give Moscow negotiating leverage now, but can provide a pretext for Russian military aggression later.

For over a decade, Moscow has been pushing for a legally binding European security treaty that would establish equal and indivisible security throughout the continent. In the late 2010s, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a “European Security Treaty,” accompanied by a draft “Agreement on Basic Principles to Govern Relations among NATO and Russia in the Security Sphere.”

As with these earlier texts, the drafts released on Friday call for “indivisible, equal, and undiminished security.” The new documents affirm the peaceful resolution of disputes and the preeminence of the UN Security Council in international security matters. Additional articles oblige the parties not to pursue actions that may infringe other countries’ security or treat other states as adversaries.

As earlier, neither NATO nor the United States will accept these new drafts as now written. Russian diplomats presumably expect rejection or they would not have made their texts public. Doing so can be useful for propaganda purposes, at home and abroad. NATO governments will reject the texts, though perhaps adding a general reaffirmation of their willingness to continue the dialogue with Moscow on European security issues.

The wording on threats in both new draft treaties overly subjective and bound to lead to different interpretations in specific applications. The proposed NATO text reads that the parties shall not participate in or support actions or create situations that threaten other parties’ national security.

The text of the treaty with the United States affirms that the sides will “refrain from deploying their armed forces and weaponry…in regions where their deployment could be perceived by the other Side as a threat to its national security.” It specifically excludes NATO countries placing their own forces and armaments on the territory of any of the new members that joined the alliance after May 27, 1997, the day when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed,

These prohibitions could cover any action a party considered objectionable. They are also too subjective. For example, whereas Russian analysts would probably see further NATO expansion as harming Moscow’s interests, NATO representatives would claim that it enhances Russian security by making its neighbors more secure.’

Countries can hardly “not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties” since that is the purpose of such national defense efforts as well as alliances like NATO. It also goes against the logic of international politics to demand that countries “shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party.” Furthermore, how do you measure “equal security?”

The demand on Washington to “refrain from supporting organizations, groups or individuals calling for an unconstitutional change of power” is also a non-starter given Western concerns regarding how the Russian authorities restrict Western-backed NGOs.

NATO members will also not legally commit to exclude new members. Such a pledge goes against the alliance’s principles. It would be difficult for some member governments to secure domestic parliamentary ratification of any pledge. Even more implausible is the demand that NATO remove all foreign military forces and infrastructure from any countries there were not alliance members in 1997. These countries include Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The proposed ban on all NATO military activity on the territory of Ukraine and other countries near western Russia reflects Moscow’s pining for its Cold War sphere-of-influence in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. This approach has been evident for a century, seen in Stalin’s approach toward Hitler’s Germany and then Churchill and Roosevelt. Some alliance members would insist on continuing joint training and exercises with former Soviet republics that requested the assistance.

Though NATO has de facto accepted a series of buffer states between Russia and eastern alliance members, formally accepting such a sphere is politically impossible in Western democracies. That said, Moscow has created an artificial crisis since there are no prospects of Ukraine entering NATO anytime soon due to the lack of an alliance consensus on the issue.

The demand to end NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement might be acceptable if paired with negotiations to eliminate Russia’s large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The proposed ban on “flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments” in “areas outside national airspace…from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party” is one-sided in Russia’s favor. Some Russian strategic bombers can reportedly launch cruise missiles while in Russian air space that can reach targets in North America. Any prohibitions on INF-range missile deployments must deal with Moscow’s record of cheating on the INF Treaty.

U.S. officials have, however, already indicated that some parts of the texts could offer a foundation for negotiations. One might be the proposal that the parties “shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations.” The calls for peaceful resolution of disputes, additional military-to-military “hotlines,” and for “reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” might also provide a basis for deeper discussions on crisis management and military doctrines.

NATO lacks the authority to negotiate and ratify a collective treaty; all NATO members would have to ratify any legally binding agreement. Given this challenge, it would make more sense to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures that could enhance crisis stability by decreasing fears of surprise attack.

There may also be opportunities to discuss limits of military deployments and exercises near Russia’s borders if Moscow made reciprocal commitments regarding European states’ frontiers. The NATO-Russia Council, the new Russian-U.S. strategic stability dialogue, and other mechanisms could offer a suitable venue for dialogue.

In any case, we are hardly likely to see an end to Moscow’s policy of manipulating periodic war scares. Russian officials value their utility in decreasing the prospects of Ukraine’s entering NATO, pressing for more concessions from the West, and distracting attention from the Russian troops that are already occupying substantial Ukrainian territory.

Credit Photo: Photo 41588914 / Russian Flag © Lerka555 | Dreamstime.com

The Coming of the CH-53K to the USMC: A December 2021 Update

12/20/2021

The photo slideshow contained in this article highlights the next round of preparation for the coming of the CH-53K to the operating force.

According to II MEF:

“U.S. Marines with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) test the capabilities of the CH-53K King Stallion on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Dec. 16, 2021.

“Personnel with VMX-1 conducted surge flight operations to test the external lift capability of the CH-53K in support of amphibious operations.

“It can externally transport 27,000 lbs. over 110 nautical miles and has a max external lift of 36,000 lbs., three times that of the legacy “E” aircraft.

“The CH-53K King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter currently being produced and tested to replace the CH-53E Super Stallion.”

But the CH-53K is part of the enhanced focus of the USMC on mobile basing and has signifiant potential for the Army, the Air Force and the Navy to use this unique heavy lift capability in their own mobile and flexible basing needs and requirements. 

We are focusing on the basing shift for the integrated distributed force in a series on defense. info, and will highlight ways in which this new heavy lift helicopter can play a key part in enabling the joint force, in addition to expanding USMC capabilities to work from sea to mobile to expeditionary basing options.

For the most recent piece in the series, see the following:

Managing Co-Evolution of the U.S. Navy and the USMC: The North Atlantic Case

 

HMLA-367 Live Fire Exercise

U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper helicopters assigned to Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 367 conduct live-fire operations off the coast of Hawaii, Nov. 4, 2021.

HMLA-367 conducted live-fire training with the use of various weapon systems, to demonstrate readiness and combat proficiency in austere, expeditionary environments within the Indo-Pacific.

11.04.2021

Video by Cpl. Dalton Payne 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Bomber Task Force

12/15/2021

Two U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancers from the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, fly a Bomber Task Force mission alongside two French Dassault Mirage 2000s, as well as two U.K. and two U.S. F-35 Lighting IIs from U.K. Carrier Strike Group’s HMS Queen Elizabeth over Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Nov. 11, 2021.

The mission represented the international participants’ collective commitment to stability and security in the Horn of Africa, highlighted Djibouti as a leading security partner in the region, and exercised U.S. ability to operate in and through a variety of airspaces.

The BTF mission coincided with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s Allied Appreciation Day event where approximately 200 guests and senior leaders representing Djibouti, France, the U.K., Spain, Japan, Italy and the U.S. came together to witness the low approach and participate in a variety of interactive and static demonstrations.

The low approach also included a U.S. C-130 Hercules from Camp Lemonnier and a Japanese P-3 Orion from the Japan self-Defense Force Base Djibouti. The event showcased the combined military strength present in Djibouti and also served to honor the shared partnerships, history and devotion to peace. (Video by Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa)

CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

11.11.2021

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa

The British Army Shapes Its Modernization Strategy

12/14/2021

In an article published on the UK Ministry of Defence website on November 25, 2021, MOD announced a way ahead for UK Army modernization.

Following on from the Integrated Review and the significant increase in defence spending announced by the Government last year, Future Soldierdemonstrates how the Army is modernising to address next-generation threats across the globe.

This will be bolstered by an additional investment of £8.6-billion in Army equipment over the next ten years. This will bring the total equipment investment to £41.3-billion for that period.

Alongside investment in our people, infrastructure, emerging technologies, and cyber capabilities, Future Soldier will position the Army as a globally engaged fighting force that benefits the whole of our Union.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

“Future Soldier is reinforced by the ambition outlined in the Defence Command Paper to transform the Army into a more agile, integrated, lethal, expeditionary force.

“We have underpinned this generational work with an extra £8.6-billion for Army equipment, bringing the total investment to £41.3-billion.

“Our Army will operate across the globe, equipped with the capabilities to face down a myriad of threats from cyber warfare through to battlefield conflict.”

Commander Field Army Lt Gen Ralph Wooddisse said:

“Future Soldier is the next evolutionary step for the British Army; the most radical change for the British Army in 20 years. It will mean changes to the way we operate our structure, technology, and workforce.

“This will make us leaner, more agile and adaptable. Future Soldier is about ensuring the British Army is a competitive and resilient organisation able to meet the challenges of modern warfare.”

Ranger Regiment

One of the most significant changes is the creation of a new Ranger Regiment. Standing up from 1 December 2021, the Regiment will embody the Army’s new expeditionary posture. It will form part of the newly established Army Special Operations Brigade and will be routinely deployed alongside partner forces around the world to counter extremist organisations and hostile state threats.

This shift to a globally engaged posture will mean more personnel are deployed for more of the time, with a new network of Land Regional Hubs based on existing training locations in places such as Oman and Kenya.

The Ranger Regiment’s cap badge will take its inspiration from the Peregrine Falcon and everyone will wear a metal badge, irrespective of rank.

Modernised Warfighting

Another key pillar of Future Soldier is ensuring the Army is a central contributor to NATO warfighting by delivering a fully modernised warfighting division by 2030, with capabilities designed to detect and defeat at greater range and accuracy.

New equipment such as Ajax, Boxer, Challenger 3, AH-64E Apache, long range precision fires and un-crewed aerial systems will be introduced, while much of the fighting force will fall under new self-sufficient Brigade Combat Teams.

To ensure land forces adapt at a rapid pace to challenge future threats, a new Experimentation and Trials Group will be established in 2022, leading on trialling new technologies and integrating them into how soldiers will fight and operate. The Army will also benefit from a significant share of the £6.6-billion R&D investment.

Our people

Creating an Army fit for the future will see some restructuring and reorganisation of units over the next four years, which will be supported by a rebalancing of personnel across the United Kingdom. The Regular Army will stand at 73,000 strong by 2025 and combined with an Army Reserve of 30,000, the British Army will stand at over 100,000.

The proportion of the Army based in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland will be sustained or increased by 2025, and this will be reinforced by around £3.35-billion from the Defence Estate Optimisation budget and a further £1.2-billion of Army investment in remaining sites.

Scotland

Scotland will be home to more units and a greater proportion of the Army’s workforce than today. Glencorse Barracks in Edinburgh will be retained, while Kinloss and Leuchars will continue to grow. The £355-million investment in the Army estate will deliver over a £1-billion of economic benefits to Scotland.

Wales

The number of soldiers in Wales is set to increase with the return of the ‘Welsh cavalry’, The Queen’s Dragoon Guards, and a new Reserve company of The Royal Welsh established in North Wales. The retention of Brecon and growth in Wrexham locations are part of a £320-million investment.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland will keep the same number of Army units but host a greater proportion of the Army’s workforce.

Reservists will play a pivotal role in the modern Army, taking principal responsibility for Homeland Protect and Resilience operations.

Opportunity for serving personnel

Future Soldier will drive forward changes to make the Army a great place for all, and for the first-time soldiers commissioning from the ranks will not be limited on how far they can be promoted – increasing the opportunity for a Private soldier to leave the Army as a General. Under the transformation programme, plans are also being developed to launch a Soldier Academy that mirrors the prestige of Sandhurst and new career management system that is fit for the digital age is also being developed.

Finally, a Force Mental Health Team will be established within the Field Army, who will help support the promotion of mental health and wellbeing and provide a deployable healthcare capability in support of persistent engagement.

The featured photo is taken from the article and is credited to the Ministry of Defence.

The speech by the Minister of Defense can be found here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-announces-future-soldier-for-the-british-army

Task Force 59: Another Perspective

12/12/2021

By Robbin Laird

The recent formation of Task Force 59 by the U.S. Navy launches a significant way ahead in working a path for the introduction of maritime unmanned or autonomous systems.

And the main storyline or narrative to date has been just that.

This narrative was the main element of a story written by MC1 Roland Franklin and published on September 9, 2021 by the U.S. Navy:

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) established a new task force, Sept. 9, to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence with maritime operations in the 5th Fleet area of operations.

Task Force 59 is the first U.S. Navy task force of its kind.

The U.S. 5th Fleet region’s unique geography, climate, and strategic importance offer an ideal environment for innovation.

“The bottom line on why we’re doing this is so that we can develop and integrate unmanned systems and AI as a means to do two things,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of NAVCENT, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. “One, enhance our maritime domain awareness, and two, increase deterrence.”

Cooper also stated the task force would rely heavily on regional and coalition partnerships.

“The launch of Task Force 59 really invigorates our partnerships around this region as we expand our common operating picture.”  

Cooper appointed Capt. Michael D. Brasseur, an expert in maritime robotics, as Task Force 59’s first commodore during a commissioning ceremony onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Thursday. Brasseur served as a founding member of the NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative prior to arriving in Bahrain.

“It’s an honor to be named commander of this historic and innovative task force,” said Brasseur. “As we continue to adapt and implement cutting edge technology, I fully expect our talented team will enrich and enhance the 5th Fleet mission.”

Brasseur’s staff includes experienced operators with region-specific expertise, including directors for unmanned systems; unmanned exercises; task force integration; cyber, AI and space; and partnership opportunities.

In the coming weeks, the task force aims to build trust and confidence in human-machine teaming through a series of operations at sea. International Maritime Exercise (IMX) 22, slated for next year, will provide NAVCENT a real-world opportunity to demonstrate the resiliency and scalability of human-machine teaming technologies.

IMX-22 will include more than 60 nations and international organizations and features the extensive use of unmanned systems in various operational scenarios designed to challenge the technology in a dynamic environment and ultimately enhance partner capabilities through manned and unmanned teaming.

The U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses nearly 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The region is comprised of 21 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen.

And more recently, a 5th Fleet Public Affairs press release highlighted the completion of their first unmanned integrated exercise at sea.

On Oct. 26, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) completed exercise New Horizon, the first at-sea evolution for its new unmanned task force.

During the two-day training exercise, Task Force 59 integrated and evaluated new MANTAS T-12 unmanned surface vessels (USV) that operated alongside manned U.S. patrol craft and Bahrain Defense Force maritime assets.

This marked the first time NAVCENT integrated USVs with manned assets at sea in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations. New Horizon was also the first time for NAVCENT’s integration of USVs with manned assets at sea alongside partner forces.

“Working with our regional partners on unmanned systems integration is crucial to enhancing collective maritime domain awareness,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of NAVCENT, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. “Bahrain, as our first regional partner to collaborate with Task Force 59 during an at-sea exercise, demonstrates the strengthening of our strategic relationship.”

The first phase of New Horizon, conducted Oct. 20, featured operators controlling the USVs aboard patrol coastal ship USS Firebolt (PC 10), while the vessels conducted high-speed maneuvers in formation.

The final phase on Oct. 26 brought together a larger force of manned and unmanned maritime and aerial assets from NAVCENT, the Royal Bahrain Naval Force (RBNF) and Bahrain Coast Guard. Participating units also included patrol boat USCGC Maui (WPB 1304), an SH-60S helicopter, a V-BAT unmanned aerial vehicle and RBNF patrol craft.

Both U.S. and Bahraini forces practiced operating the vessels in formation to strengthen mutual understanding and interoperability.

“This is a significant milestone for our new task force as we accelerate the integration of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence into complex, cross-domain operations at sea,” said Capt. Michael Brasseur, commander of Task Force 59. “Real-world evaluation is essential.”

NAVCENT established the task force Sept. 9. To focus U.S. 5th Fleet efforts on unmanned systems and artificial intelligence integration.

The U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses about 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The expanse is comprised of 21 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen.

Recently, the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited Bahrain to participate in an IISS meeting, and took time to learn about the efforts of Task Force 59 and that visit underscored the new efforts to integrate unmanned or autonomous systems. And without doubt this visit had an impact on his comments made later at the Reagan National Defense Forum this month.

During his engagement at the Forum he underscored that “the Department of Defense wants to be more capable of operating unmanned systems.” And the impact of the visit on his thinking seems obvious from this remark: “I was in Bahrain several weeks ago and saw how the Navy is doing innovative things with autonomous systems.”

He also underscored the importance of partners in shaping a way ahead for U.S. defense in the evolving strategic encironment.

It is at this point that I would like to focus on a different narrative one that in no way de-emphasizes the importance for the U.S. Navy or DOD working more effective ways to use unmanned or autonomous systems.

Rather, I would like to focus on where such efforts fit within the reshaping of the ISR enterprise which is being shaped by allies, partners, regional coalitions, and the U.S. joint force.

Too often the emphasis is upon what the United States can do rather than on the reshaping of regional coalitions of partners and allies and what they can do for themselves and how we can plug and play with their systems and find ways for such coalitions to be more effective themselves or how we can benefit from the evolution of those coalitions.

In my book with Murielle Delaporte, I focused on what we see is a key trend, namely, clusterizaiton of defense partnerships. This is how we put it in our book:

“Security threats have unleashed national reactions, with various nations seeking to rebalance their position in the global order and seeking to work with clusters of either like-minded states, or with states capable of providing key needs. Coalition defense in today’s world of defending the interest of “coalitions of the willing” of liberal democratic states is clearly about the exercise of effective operations in a semi-sovereign coalition environment as seen from a national perspective. It is not exactly the return of nationalism, for that has not been absent in any case, but is clearly the return of security and defense concerns as a priority, and these concerns are always led by states seeking allies, partners or friends, or “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” types of partners.”

And in that book, we highlighted a particularly important trend in terms of Nordic defense cooperation and one articulated by Harald Malmgren:

“A new cluster European nations with a common security objective have quietly emerged recently in the form of focused military cooperation and coordination among the Nordic nations, Poland, the Baltic States, and the UK. This cluster is operating in close cooperation with the US military. The Danes, Norwegians, the Swedes and Finns are cooperating closely together on defense matters. Enhanced cooperation is a response to fears of Russian incursions, which are not new, but have roots in centuries of Russian interaction with Northern Europe.”

For such clusters to operate together the key capabilities are shared C2 based on shared information, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (traditionally known as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or ISR). It is here that new maritime autonomous systems can prove especially significance in working with the GCC and with those GCC states working within the framework of the Abraham accords with Israel as well.

How to generate ISR which can be shared? And shared in an environment of trusted information? Sharing common platforms in the unmanned surface vessel world and then shaping ISR and C2 payloads which can be deployed onboard provides an opportunity to then work the webs of information coming off these systems which can be shared.

It must be remembered that the Gulf is a narrow body of water with significant maritime traffic and the challenge in such circumstances is clearly to be able to distill information from noise. And to do so rapidly and among the cluster of states working together to shape common security or defense responses.

Working national systems to deliver effective information and intelligence is hard  enough, doing so among partners in a security or combat cluster even more so. The advantage of shaping a common fleet of USVs is that is not just about 5th Fleet getting better; it is about the coalition of the willing learning to work together more effectively.

And not just for the U.S. or the coalition, but for the nations who are pursuing such USV ISR capabilities as well.

If one were to take the case of Bahrain, the Kingdom is investing significantly in the development scientific and technological capabilities to shape its future. Working in AI, digital systems, and ISR is clearly an area where local expertise and capabilities can be developed significantly to the benefit of Barthian and its partners.

The question then is how Bahrain can best work with like-minded partners to deliver more effectively ISR to the nation and at the same time leverage more effectively relevant capabilities which its partners posses as well.

How best to deliver an ISR cluster which can provide for enhanced security and defense for Bahrain and for the nations with which they work?

In other words, it is not just about developing new platforms, or simply new ways to work with unmanned or autonomous systems; it is about reworking how ISR clusters can be shaped and worked among those states willing to work together.

Featured Photo: A MANTAS T-12 unmanned surface vessel (USV), front, operates alongside U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat USCGC Maui (WPB 1304) during exercise New Horizon in the Arabian Gulf, Oct. 26. Exercise New Horizon was U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Task Force 59’s first at-sea evolution since its establishment Sept. 9. Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Dawson Roth and credited to 5th Fleet Public Affairs.

For our discussion of the evolution of European direct defense around the clusterizaiton dynamic, see the following:

For a discussion of the Abraham Accords and their impact, see our assessment in the following: