Capt. Roberto Torres, the executive director of The Interdiction Committee (TIC), explains how the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction mission is changing June 22, 2021.
“We are using the newest technologies and innovative approaches to continue to be always ready,” Torres said.
(U.S. Coast Guard video by Petty Officer 1st Class Travis Magee)
By Robbin Laird
Logistics is often viewed as the enabler of operations. But if one is designing the force to operate throughout an extended area of operations or an extended battlespace logistics capabilities are part of the definition of the art of the possible for crisis management. In a crisis, the goal is to be able to put force up against the critical choke point in the crisis seen as a process.
Getting to that choke point or decision point with the right force with enough sustainability to achieve the desired effect is the goal. The duration of the crisis and the scope and nature of escalation then define what other pieces on the chessboard one brings to bear and with enough sustainability and lethality to get the job done. This is a function of how sustainable the crisis management force is at the point of influence.
For the USMC, the nation’s crisis management force – certainly at the initial stages – to be able to play their desired role they have built significant organic support to their force insertion capabilities. But those core assets – the Osprey, the C-130J, the CH-53 and the Yankee – have been taxed significantly in the land wars and need replenishment and augmentation to play their base line role.
This is significantly true as in the redesign of what II MEF is to do in support of Second Fleet (C2F) and Sixth Fleet (C6F) is to engage in operations from the High North to the Western Mediterranean. II MEF is receiving the new CH-53 the K soon, but in limited quantities. The Ospreys are being cut back in the North Atlantic region, and the Viper/Yankee family is being reduced in the region as well. The venerable C-130J has seen significant engagements in the Middle East and needs upgrades and enhanced numbers as well.
This is even before we get to the duration challenge. For how long, and with what combat effect does want the initial USMC insertion force integrate with joint and coalition forces to have the duration necessary to get the desired escalation control and crisis management effect?
The first question – initial insertion – can be answered by a focus on organic assets.
The second can only be answered with regard to how robust the logistics combat enterprise is in terms of supporting the desired joint or coalition operations in the crisis area.
During my April 2021 visit to II MEF, I had a chance to speak with Lt. Col. Smith, the senior strategic mobility officer. He and his team focus on the end-to-end supply to the force, through air, sea and ground movements to deploying or deployed forces. As he noted, the Marines work end to end transportation which means that “the embarkers at the units actually do all the preparation for their own equipment, do all the certifications, do all the load planning, and move their units out.”
When I visited II MEF in June, Lt. Col. Smith was on terminal leave from the USMC but was kind enough to come into II MEF to continue our discussion.
And in this discussion, we focused on this second question.
How can we build out a more sustainable force through longer duration crises?
For the Marines, who are working deeper integration with the U.S. Navy, part of the answer is enhanced integrability with the fleet.
This means that there needs to be a combat logistics management system which encompasses both the Marines and the fleet in its entirety to provide the kind of supportability which sustained combat engagement requires.
Clearly, such a system is not yet in place, but the new approach to joint task force management between Expeditionary Strike Group 2 (ESG-2) and Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2dMEB) will certainly require such capabilities and could shape building blocks going forward.
By purposing distributed maritime operations with an overall integrated distributed force, the Navy and the Marines clearly need to focus on sustainability across a distributed chessboard.
How to get the supplies from industry to depots or prepositioned locations?
How to move those supplies to the afloat Marine Corps forces, the fleet or ashore?
How do it with the speed and effectiveness required?
What we focused in the discussion was on ways to build out such capacity to sustain forces throughout the distributed battlespace.
On one level, the fleet and afloat combat force simply needs more supplies afloat to get the job done. This requires enhanced MSC capabilities, and one way to do so might be building out the very effective T-AKE ships.
On another level, the challenge is to move supplies throughout the battlespace to the point of need. Here the challenge would be met by the tiltrotor and rotary force in terms of ship to ship and ship to shore movement or movement from pre-positioned locations to combat locations.
There are new systems in train which if plus-ed up in numbers can play this role, the CMV-22B and the CH-53K each with different but complimentary capabilities could provide a very significant combat sustainability capacity.
But a key point which he underscored throughout the discussion was the following: “You need a fleet logistics management system that is integrated into not only every naval platform but also with regard to Marine Corps platforms if you’re going to truly do integration between the Navy and the USMC.”
Another key element to shaping a re-invigorated logistics backbone is the question of tanking the fleet, both in terms of getting the new fleet tankers into the fleet, but also tanking for the lift force.
There is a tanking shortfall and when I worked for Secretary Wynne we certainly saw that and tried to get the job done.
But now the demand side on the USAF and on the USMC already exceeds demand and will be a key delimitator of the ability to sustain the combat force for the duration required for full spectrum crisis management.
How might we deal with this issue?
The MQ-25 is coming to the carrier to deal with carrier requirements, but can autonomous systems be developed to support the tiltrotor and rotary fleet working to support the distributed force?
The challenge is to shape a sustainable combat force at the point of interest and to be able to do so through the duration of a crisis. You need to have a robust launch capability and then to build up capacity throughout the duration of the crisis.
And he underscored as well that the integration with the deployable supply chain was crucial as well. “If you look at the defense of the North Atlantic, you still have several nodes that you have to create to make sure supply is moving.” He underscored the importance of building in redundancy to such an effort as well.
In short, logistics is not simply what you think about down the list of what you need; it defines what one can actually accomplish in a crisis management setting.
Featured Photo: The CH-53K King Stallion successfully plugs into a funnel-shaped drogue towed behind a KC-130J during aerial refueling wake testing over the Chesapeake Bay. Photo by Erik Hildebrandt.
By Robbin Laird
During my lifetime, the USMC has been the initial crisis management for the nation. It continues to do so, but after a long interlude of becoming land centric due to the demands of the nation’s leaders. With the return of direct defense in Europe and with the changing strategic situation in the Pacific, the USMC is in transformation to recalibrate how to play its crisis management role with the presence of peer competitors.
The Marines as we underscored in our book on Pacific defense published in 2013 already have several key elements necessary to play a more agile, and flexible role in the Pacific. The Osprey coupled with the F-35 provide significant tools in providing an entry insertion point which is a significant one. The Marines are building on this advantage and looking to find new ways to shape their force forward in the Pacific and to do so with enhanced joint and allied cooperation.
I had a chance to discuss the way forward with the CG of I MEF, Lt. General Karsten Heckl. I last talked with him when he was the CG of 2nd Marine Air Wing. Before that, I talked with him Norway when he was COS STRIKEFORNATO, and before that when he was the Deputy to the Deputy Commandant of Aviation.
We started by discussing how he saw the challenge. He underscored that a key part of understanding the nature of the threat environment is to understand the nature of the Chinese regime. Although this can be labelled great power competition, in the Pacific the great power is run by leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. They are communists, they are authoritarians, and they wish to play by their rules.
It is not simply a military challenge but a political-military and cultural one as well. Certainly, a key part of working the Marine Corps role in the Pacific is political-military as well as a narrowly warfighting role.
We often hear about hybrid war and the gray zone; with a Marine Corps well respected in the Pacific and working relationships with partners and allies in the region, the Marine Corps can play a more effective role as a crisis management force.
Lt. General Heckl underscored that a major challenge facing I MEF was enhancing its ability to operate forward or west of the international dateline. “I have a 7,000 nautical mile physics problem, but we’re doing a lot of things already that have us operating West of International Dateline.”
He noted that the strategic shift provided in the defense guidance to focus on the great power competition is a key driver for change, but the transformation necessary to do so needs to be accelerated. This includes the question of augmenting Indo-Pac exercises as well. He noted that this Fall the next iteration of Freedom Banner, an exercise run out of Japan.
Clearly, the Marines like the rest of the joint force is working through how best to deter the Chinese and to engage in operations over an extended area or over an extended battlespace. This is clearly a work in progress. He noted that I MEF has a great working relationship and is enhancing integration with Third Fleet but both on located on the West Coast of the United States. How best to operate forward?
This entails the question of how to do effective blue water expeditionary operations. This entails the question of how to work the Pacific geography with allies and partners to get the maximum political-military and combat effect.
It is also a question of taking advantage of new ways to operate as well. For example, as seen in the Black Widow Exercise in the North Atlantic, the Marines can certainly contribute to ASW operations. How might the Marines assist more effectively the Navy in sea denial and sea control in the Pacific?
A key limitation for the Marines in the Pacific for sure is that size, and state of the amphibious fleet. It is clear that operating at sea and from the sea with Marine Corps air assets provides very agile and powerful force insertion assets to deliver crisis management effects.
But the decline in the numbers of amphibious ships is a critical problem, and how best to rebuild the fleet is a work in progress.
But when I was last in Hawaii, the MARFORPAC team was focused on ways to expand the amphibious force in the Pacific with allies, or to enhance what they referred to as “amphibiosity.”
That was 5 years ago, and now allies are indeed expanding their amphibious forces, in South Korea, Japan and Australia.
And allies are adding F-35Bs and Ospreys to their force.
How can the USMC best leverage this upsurge in capabilities?
It makes little sense to further devolve the U.S. amphibious fleet as allies themselves see greater utility in this force for crisis management and warfighting.
As Lt. General Heckl put it: “My biggest concern right now is amphibious shipping and connectors.” And in this sense, the expeditionary force leverages what the Navy and Marines have now, but creative thinking about how to build out an amphibious fleet is clearly needed, but to build actual integrable assets as well.
In my co-authored forthcoming USNI book, we argue that shaping a kill web enabled maritime force can build upon re-imaging how to leverage the amphibious force.
We argued: “The evolution of the amphibious force and shaping amphibious task forces can contribute significantly to expanded capabilities for maneuver warfare at sea.
“By leveraging the new air capabilities, adding new defensive and offensive systems on the fleet, and expanding the C2 and ISR capabilities of the fleet, the contribution of the amphibious task force can be reimagined, redesigned and thereby enhance the combat power of the US Navy in maneuver warfare at sea.”
As Lt. General Heckl put it forcefully: “The challenge seen from I MEF is that for us to be effective we need to be credible.
‘To be credible, we need to be forward with credible forces.
“We are focused on positioning the MEF to be in a position to be an effective deterrent force.”
I’ve looked at the Marines as the initial crisis management force.
But what does that actually mean in today’s Pacific?
Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Karsten S. Heckl, center, the commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), is briefed during a visit at the I MEF Information Group (MIG) headquarters building at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, Aug. 19, 2020. I MIG is committed to meeting the expeditionary requirements of our commanders, and improving readiness in the information environment. I MIG showcased its support to I MEF exercises, deployments, and operations in the information environment. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tia Carr)
ODESA, Ukraine (July 2, 2021) Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG 71), Ukrainian navy Island-class patrol boat Starobilsk (P191) and (P190) return to Odesa, Ukraine during Exercise Sea Breeze 2021, July 2, 2021.
Exercise Sea Breeze is a multinational maritime exercise cohosted by the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy since 1997.
Sea Breeze 2021 is designed to enhance interoperability of participating nations and strengthens maritime security and peace in the region.
(U.S. Navy video by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Richard Hoffner/Released)
By Robbin Laird
During my most recent visit to Camp Lejeune, I had a chance to talk with the CG of the II MEF Information Group and his team.
The meeting was suggested by the CG of II MEF, Lt. General Beaudreault, who underscored: “I think it would be hugely valuable to just rifle a bunch of questions, because there’s a lot going on in the information space that we’re also coordinating and collaborating with Second Fleet, Sixth Fleet but primarily Sixth Fleet.
“Whether it’s BALTOPS, Sea Breeze, and the other exercises that are going on, or real-world operations, we are in the competitive information space every day against our competitors.
‘Col. Brian Russell is front and center on leading that effort. In many ways, I think he’s the best I’ve ever met in working in that space. And he’s very well connected and he’s not shy about reaching out to organizations like the 16th Air Force and other joint partners, on how all of us are working collaboratively in the information domain.”
Needless to say, I did follow up, and the CG’s assessment of his information group certainly was on the mark.
At the end of this article, I have included an April 2021 article by Col. Russell in which he discussed what it takes to be successful in the information warfare space. He labelled his article the five OIE or operations in the information environment truths.
We started the discussion with Col. Russell highlighting that the MIGs or Marine Information Groups we first stood up in 2018.
All the MEFs have a MIG, and they have indeed shaped an association of the practioners of the art who will next meet in September 2021. He noted that “the MIG was borne out of the MEF Headquarters Group here. We had some of the components already, but they were reorganized under a different construct with some different capabilities, like the communication, strategy and operations company. Psychological operations capabilities, defensive cyber capabilities, were packaged in this MEF Information Group.
“I think the key for the MEF Information Group is taking all those capabilities and making them work together rather than having operational silos such as just coms and just intel; we need to work information operations as a whole.”
Col. Russell then underscored: “Marines are the original hackers, in my sense. You give them a piece of technology and a piece of equipment, and you give them a different mission, they will absolutely reconfigure that kit or gear to meet that mission.
“We’ve done that throughout our entire history.
“I think of my cyberspace marines, my coders, my application developers, really as cyberspace engineers. They can modify that terrain to our operational advantage and make it go faster, better. Or they can modify that terrain to make it harder for the adversary to disrupt our operations.
“We need to realize that in the information space everybody fights.
“Whether you recognize it or not, whether you like it or not, you are in the information environment. All of our marines on their computer systems every day are in that environment, you need to be careful about it, but we can maximize some opportunities as well.”
He argued that for a MIG to be successful they need to pursue a campaign approach.
It is about working in a joint warfighting context and being embedded with the joint force as well. In the case of II MEF, there is a concerted effort to work with 6th Fleet, for example, and to shape Naval-Marine Corps integration in the information space.
The allied piece is certainly of increasing importance as working a distributed force able to operate over an extended battlespace requires effective communication in the information space.
For example, in the recent BALTOPS 50 exercise, “we had a team with the 30-commando information exploitation group supporting 45-commando, also operating with second MEB.”
These two groups are part of the UK Royal Marines.
A key task for the MIG in the operations information environment is providing information environment battlespace awareness.
According to Col. Russell: “We scope our efforts to the need at hand, what is the commander interested in his particular area of operation?
“We could support US EUCOM in the high north, working with our Norwegian partners, or we support MEF forces in the exercise Sea breeze right now with division forces on the ground in the Ukraine.
‘There is a complicated information environment in Sea Breeze, so what do we need to do to provide that commander on the ground with an awareness of what is going on around him, not only from the threat perspective, but the opportunities in the information space.
“What does the commander of 1/6 want to think about the COMMSTRAT photo of his marine and the Ukrainian navel entry brigade soldier working together, that really helps with the narrative that we’re trying to attain there, that’s the level of thinking the commanders need to take nowadays.
“We help provide that to elements of the MEF, and it gets back to a basic ground truth in the information domain: humans are in fact more important than hardware.
“We get very technical focused sometimes in this information warfare fight.
“There’s a human adversary behind that trying to influence whatever we’re doing, we need to understand what that is.
“But this true from the standpoint of the individual marine in terms of his training and education: how do we make that marine resilient to the message he’s going to get from a Russian on his cellphone while he’s overseas during an exercise?
“I think that’s the aspect we have to take as commanders, prepare for the environment, understand the adversary approach to it, and then make our marines resilient to adversary information in the operational environment as well.”
Clearly, operating effectively in the information environment is a key part of crisis management and escalation control.
By gaining significant battlespace awareness, one is better positioned to be proactive and to act with the most relevant means without generating undue escalatory pressures.
For example, prior to Sea Breeze 21, the USCG sent a white hull into the Black Sea, which provided a “gray zone” capability, and assessing Russian as well as U.S. allied reactions to that deployment provided useful input to understanding the evolving information operational environment.
The-Five-OIE-TruthsOr the article can be read in e-book format:
By Robbin Laird
The strategic shift from the Middle Eastern land wars to the high-end fight revolves around effective crisis management. With the 21st century authoritarian powers working hard to make the world safe for authoritarianism, the liberal democracies need to focus on protecting and expanding their abilities to defend their interests.
The USMC has been the nation’s crisis management force throughout my lifetime.
But after a long period engaged in land operations, how will the USMC effectively become a full spectrum crisis management force which deters peer competitors and contributes most effectively to escalation control?
In part the answer revolves around the Navy in transition working effectively with the USMC to combine sea-basing and mobile basing into an effective engagement force.
When I visited II MEF in April 2021, I learned from its CG, Lt. General Beaudreault, that the Commandant of the USMC gave him very clear guidance when he took over the command: “Paraphrasing the guidance: tighten your lifelines with Second and Sixth Fleets. As the Navy shapes itself to do distributed maritime operations, how do we help, and how do we reconfigure?”
When I visited II MEF again at the end of June 2021, I had a chance to meet with Lt. General Beaudreault as well as Colonel Garrett Benson and we focused on a way ahead being worked by II MEF with regard to shaping new crisis management and escalation control capabilities,
The initial conversation was with Colonel Benson and highlighted the strategic shift underway. The Colonel had recently been involved with the BALTOPS 50 exercise and operated aboard the C2 ship, Mt. Whitney. And in that capacity worked closely with the joint and coalition force on the C2 aspects of that exercise.
His background in the USMC has been completely wrapped up in the land wars, with his coming to II MEB being his initial engagements with operating from the sea. Indeed, his coming to II MEB is focused upon the integration the Navy and working new ways ahead with regard to joint operations from the sea.
As he put it: “Right before I checked into the MEB I was actually CJTF-OIR chief of operations. When I got back to the MEF, it was an uphill ramp for me to get back into the Russian problem set.”
He noted that over the past 18 months, ESG 2 and 2d MEB have been engaged in a number of exercises to work ways to craft more integrated approaches. But that is really prelude to the next phase of development.
Lt. General Beaudreault underscored that an agreement was being coordinated with 6th and 2nd Fleets whereby 2d MEB would stand up an integrated headquarters, potentially based at Camp Lejeune that would work integrated operations between the fleet and the MEB.
Although details will need to be worked with regard to the standing up of an integrated naval headquarters, the strategic direction was clear.
“Conceptually, this force would be ESG 2 integrating with 2d MEB to form an integrated naval headquarters that supports NAVEUR. When ESG 2 and Second MEB came together and went to a BALTOPS, they went to the Mount Whitney to train and then were disestablished and went back to their respective locations.
“But we are interested in creating a permanent structure which stays together. Whether it’s for exercises, we see it as an opportunity to command rotational forces in the high north. When we send battalions or squadrons or a fighter squadron to Finland, all of those kinds of organizations could be underneath the integrated headquarters. The goal is to create permanent structure, with full-time personnel.”
He added that it would function in some ways like Task Force 51/5 which had been established under CENTCOM in 2018.
And as Vice Adm. Jim Malloy, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. 5th Fleet/Combined Maritime Forces, noted concerning the integrated Task Force 51/5 command:
“Task Force 51.5 is an integrated force that demands a combination of agility and forethought from its leaders, in part because it’s a unique command model that is innovative and new. This Task Force remains vital and irreplaceable in this region – a catalyst for tailored combat effects and an accelerant for Amphibious Forces from the sea. Their tactical strength and ability to be ‘where it matters, when it matters’ protects American and partner lives and assets.”
The command could work flexibly with the “relevant nations” in a crisis response as well. And there is a clear interest to work with allies as they transform their force insertion capabilities from the sea as well. An example would be the UK’s Littoral Response Group North.
As Johnathan Bentham noted in his article on this new UK force:
“The LRG is part of a broader initiative to adapt the UK’s amphibious forces to operate in a more dispersed and agile way in response to the increasingly challenging environments that they are now facing. These adaptations include a new Future Commando Force, as reforms to the Royal Marines are being dubbed, with greater focus on technology and raiding missions from the sea. The LRG idea could form part of that, including within a larger UK or multinational force, and the latest deployment has involved exercises with NATO allies and other partners, including this year’s BALTOPS exercise in the Baltic Sea.
“As part of this, the LRG is being used as a testbed for a range of innovative capabilities including uninhabited systems. These changes are also meant to provide force packages able to undertake a range of maritime security tasks, potentially including counter-terrorism, limited interventions and evacuation operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief missions. Another priority for the LRG concept is to maintain forward presence and undertake capacity building and defence diplomacy, a key component of a wider effort to increase the Royal Navy’s global presence and improve its responsiveness.”
Lt. General Beaudreault added: “The new integrated command would give the NAVEUR commander a third operational arm.
“He’s got Second Fleet, he has Sixth Fleet, and now he would have this Task Force to provide him more C2 options to support distributed maritime operations.
“And this focuses on a key question: what do we want an integrated naval headquarters to do in support of NAVEUR?
“The answer is more effective crisis management and escalation control.
“This organization could be a key part of escalation management and help to create both pressure and potential off ramps in a crisis.
‘Amphibious forces forward deployed in international waters are able to deter, assure, ratchet up or dial down until policy makers can get some kind of resolution to the crisis.”
In our discussions with the 2nd Fleet and with the Allied Joint Force Commander, Norfolk, VADM Lewis, he underscored the importance of the command structure as a weapon system.
This would be an additional weapon system in the quiver of the Atlantic fleet commanders.
The featured photo: U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Brian D. Beaudreault, commanding general, II Marine Expeditionary Force, speaks at a Rehearsal of Concept meeting to prelude the official start of MEFEX 21.1 at Fort A.P. Hill, VA, Nov. 3, 2020. A Rehearsal of Concept provides participants within the exercise an opportunity to practice combat mission plans and put contingency plans into place. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Cheyenne Stillion)
HMAS Ballarat has come to the end of a three-month deployment to Southeast and Northeast Asia where it conducted a number of navy-to-navy engagements with partner nations across the region, including the United States.
Following a request from the Indonesian Government, HMAS Ballarat also assisted in the search for the missing Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala 402.
The Anzac Class Frigate also successfully completed Operation Argos supporting the enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions on goods moving into North Korea.
Over a two-week period, HMAS Ballarat’s MH60R helicopter was flying up to two sorties to gather information on vessels of interest suspected of being involved in illegal ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned goods.
The Indo-Pacific is at the centre of global commerce, so it’s important that the Royal Australian Navy working with partner nations maintain a presence to promote a secure and stable region.
Australian Department of Defence
June 27, 2021
ODESA, Ukraine (July 2, 2021) Ukrainian navy Island-class patrol boats depart a pier as the River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Trent (P224) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG 71) return to Odesa, Ukraine, July 2, 2021, during Exercise Sea Breeze 2021.
Exercise Sea Breeze is a multinational maritime exercise cohosted by U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy in the Black Sea since 1997.
Sea Breeze 2021 is designed to enhance interoperability of participating nations and strengthen maritime security and peace within the region.
(U.S. Navy video by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jack D. Aistrup/Released)