Global Britain? Reconsidering the UK-EU Relationship

12/22/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – UK prime minister Boris Johnson needs to face up to geopolitical reality and forge strong links with the European Union, and accept Global Britain is little more than a “title in search of a plot,” said a report from the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank.

Johnson would do well to work with the EU, an important geographical neighbor, rather than rely on notions of a national identity forged from former greatness, said the report, titled Beyond Global Britain: A Realistic Foreign Policy for the UK.

A “preoccupation with the second world war,” exemplified by when the UK stood alone in 1940, underpinned the Brexit campaign, but denied the economic reality of a forecast four percent drop in gross domestic product due to leaving the EU, the report said.

The ECFR report was presented here Dec. 16 at a seminar with French government officials, European diplomats, and officials of French think tanks.

Meanwhile, Johnson’s Conservative party took Dec. 19 a resounding hit with the unexpected resignation of David Frost, a minister charged with negotiating with the EU in the wake of Brexit, reported to be “the prime minister’s man.”

Frost resigned in dispute with government policy on anti-Covid measures and tax increase, with foreign minister Liz Truss taking up the Brexit brief.

That departure of a top negotiator with the EU followed a political setback for Johnson, with the Dec. 16 defeat of the Conservative party in a parliamentary by-election. A Liberal Democrat candidate won with a 34 percent electoral swing a parliamentary seat previously held almost 200 years by the Conservatives.

Johnson had “one more strike,” said a senior Conservative parliamentarian, as that local election had been a referendum on the prime minister seen to be leading a government mired among political charges of alleged corruption and deceptions, including Christmas parties held last year at Downing Street, the office of the prime minister, when a lock down forbade social events.

Such setbacks are seen as weakening Johnson, who won his dream job on pledges he would unshackle Britain from the Brussels bureaucracy and deliver a great and sovereign nation.

Johnson’s Global Britain approach holds little place for the EU, the ECFR report said.

“The Johnson government seems to need perennial fights of a permanent Brexit, but this approach is eroding the UK’s capacity to cooperate with the EU on foreign and security policy,” said the authors, Jeremy Shapiro, research director, and Nick Witney, senior research fellow.

“Brexit has become more an ideology than a policy,” the report said. “But the ideology of permanent Brexit cannot suspend the laws of distance and strategy. The UK may have left the EU, but it cannot leave Europe.”

The UK as Junior Partner to the U.S.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is “self-absorbed” and looks to the Indo-Pacific and China, the report said. The UK would do well to work with the EU as an alternative to being junior partner in a special relationship that London claimed with Washington.

The UK would benefit from a balanced relationship with the EU and the U.S. in a triangle, the report said, rather than depend on goodwill of the latter.

“The best way to protect British interests is to triangulate between the EU and U.S. positions, the report said.

“The UK defense establishment remains deeply committed to America,” Witney said. “The aircraft carriers and, indeed the Royal Navy, often resemble subsidiaries of the U.S. navy.”

On the trilateral AUKUS agreement between Australia, the UK and the U.S., the report said the U.S. navy has great reluctance to share its nuclear propulsion technology, and U.S. and British nuclear power plants have evolved in significantly different ways since 1958 when the U.S. service shared its know-how with the UK.

The U.S. might prefer the British to supply nuclear propulsion for the Australian boats to protect their “doubtlessly more advanced” technology, the report said.

That AUKUS pact, which aims to pave the way for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, damaged close Anglo-French ties. The trilateral partnership led to Canberra canceling a plan to build French-designed diesel-electric boats for the Australian navy, a deal estimated to be worth some €30 billion ($34 billion).

As a result, France has put a hold on links with the UK, with Paris postponing assessment studies for European missile maker MBDA on the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon project.

French political support is needed for the study to go ahead, a source close to the deal said, while industry is ready.

The assessment study would seek to lower risk and look at concepts for increased stealth and greater speed for the missile, which would replace the Harpoon anti-ship weapon for the Royal Navy and Exocet for the French navy, as well the Scalp/Storm Shadow cruise missile for respectively French and British air forces.

The Royal Navy has put on hold a planned order for an interim weapon to plug a capability gap after retirement of the Harpoon in 2023 and the entry into service of FC/ASW in 2030. Time was needed to consider the long term prospects for FC/ASW, which could feature a hypersonic missile, rather than rush an order for an interim solution, Admiral Tony Radakin said, UK Defence Journal reported Nov. 6.

MBDA executive chairman Eric Béranger said March 31 the launch of assessment work on FC/ASW was one of the key events of this year, pointing up the importance of the 2010 Anglo-French Lancaster House treaty on cooperation in the arms industry.

Money Down the Drain

The UK’s military aerospace sector is a “key economic asset,” the  ECFR report said, but much rides on the Tempest next generation fighter jet and whether it can compete with “a better-funded and more advanced effort conducted by France, Germany, and Spain.”

The British pursuit of the Tempest, partnered with Italy and Sweden, and the Future Combat Air System being developed by France, Germany and Spain are “a grotesque waste of European resources,” Witney said, pointing to a future repeat of competition between the Rafale and Eurofighter, and the prospect of two future European fighters.

On the FCAS project for a next generation fighter, the French armed forces minister, Florence Parly, told Dec. 14 the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly a contract for a technology demonstrator for the new fighter was expected to be signed in the first half of 2022.

“There are still some issues to be resolved,” she said. The main issue was there should be a prime contractor on specific domains, with a clear set of responsibilities for the contractor.

A demonstrator was expected to fly in 2027, she said, which might appear far off, but in reality there was little time as there was much work to be done.

Agreement was needed to sign contracts to launch phases 1b and 2 on the demonstrator, with a budget reported to be worth some €3.5 billion ($4 billion), funded by the three partner nations.

Looking for a Reset

The Sunday Times, a British paper, reported Nov. 20 senior aides of Johnson were drawing up plans for extending cooperation with France beyond the Lancaster House treaty, a new Entente Cordiale, to include nuclear testing, fighters flying from each other’s aircraft carriers, and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

That article met with skepticism from French think tank officials at the ECFR seminar, pointing up that these ideas were not directly from Johnson and there had been little further press coverage.

Britain and France could not afford to wait until after the French April elections to hold talks, Georgina Wright, senior fellow and director of the Europe program at Institut Montaigne, said in a Nov. 24 article for the French think tank.

Both countries suffered from a lack of bilateral cooperation yet shared similar world views, she said. The U.S. and other partner nations expected the two countries to work together in their own region and elsewhere in the world.
“Complex geopolitical problems cannot afford strategic patience,” she said.

The AUKUS agreement made France more strategically alone, she said, and while the deal helped Britain in its Global Britain approach, more was needed to convince countries of the UK’s new role in the world.

“Finally, the longer the UK and France wait to hold talks, the more the gap will widen,” she said.

There have been no Anglo-French summits for two years, with political ties worn thin from tension arising from the new normal of post-Brexit disputes, including fishing rights in the Channel and trade across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

The next high-level meeting might take place late next year, as time was needed for a new French administration to settle down after the April elections, think tank officials said at the ECFR seminar. There was little chance of a summit before then, as president Emmanuel Macron prepared for the upcoming elections.

The EU as partner to the UK

The ECFR report, with opinion polls conducted by Datapraxis, showed the EU was seen as the UK’s most important partner, with 39 percent of respondents in favor of the EU, followed by 22 percent for the US, and six percent for Australia. China drew three percent, and Australia one percent.

Of allies and necessary partners, Australia led the field for allies with 61 percent and 18 percent for necessary partner; 34 pct saw the U.S. as ally and 43 percent as necessary partner, followed by Germany with 28 percent ally, 37 percent necessary partner. Twenty two percent saw France as ally, 36 percent as partner, while India drew18 percent as ally, 41 percent partner.

“Global Britain is a delusion,” the ECFR report concluded.

“But there is a foreign policy that can command the support of the British public and map out a secure and influential future for the UK. The real question is whether the British people will find a government with the wit and the will to seize the future.”

Featured Graphic:  Photo 119099644 / Britain European Union © Florin Seitan | Dreamstime.com

USS AMERICA. Port Call MCAS Iwakuni

USS America (LHA 6), the Navy’s only forward-deployed amphibious assault ship, docks at the harbor at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Nov. 18, 2021.

Due to its geographic location and co-located airfield and harbor, MCAS Iwakuni is uniquely postured to provide advanced naval integration in support of regional security,

IWAKUNI, YAMAGUCHI, JAPAN

11.18.2021

Video by Cpl. Evan Jones AFN Iwakuni

Moscow’s Cold War Nostalgia

12/21/2021

By Richard Weitz

Last Friday, the Russian government published the drafts of the proposed treaties they had presented to NATO and the United States two days earlier, via Assistant Secretary of State Karen Donfried, who was visiting Moscow. The following day, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov spoke with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to explain the documents.

In a Friday news conference, Russian Deputy Minister Sergei Ryabkov contended that the West needed to urgently act on the drafts. He insisted that they were an integrated package rather than a list of menu items from which NATO and the United States could cherry pick their preferences.

In content, the documents echo what Putin reportedly told Biden in their late November video call. The exchange yielded less success than the White House hoped in dampening tensions. The texts read as a combination of a list of wishes, grievances, and red lines—extending far beyond the current Ukraine crisis. They aim to give Moscow negotiating leverage now, but can provide a pretext for Russian military aggression later.

For over a decade, Moscow has been pushing for a legally binding European security treaty that would establish equal and indivisible security throughout the continent. In the late 2010s, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a “European Security Treaty,” accompanied by a draft “Agreement on Basic Principles to Govern Relations among NATO and Russia in the Security Sphere.”

As with these earlier texts, the drafts released on Friday call for “indivisible, equal, and undiminished security.” The new documents affirm the peaceful resolution of disputes and the preeminence of the UN Security Council in international security matters. Additional articles oblige the parties not to pursue actions that may infringe other countries’ security or treat other states as adversaries.

As earlier, neither NATO nor the United States will accept these new drafts as now written. Russian diplomats presumably expect rejection or they would not have made their texts public. Doing so can be useful for propaganda purposes, at home and abroad. NATO governments will reject the texts, though perhaps adding a general reaffirmation of their willingness to continue the dialogue with Moscow on European security issues.

The wording on threats in both new draft treaties overly subjective and bound to lead to different interpretations in specific applications. The proposed NATO text reads that the parties shall not participate in or support actions or create situations that threaten other parties’ national security.

The text of the treaty with the United States affirms that the sides will “refrain from deploying their armed forces and weaponry…in regions where their deployment could be perceived by the other Side as a threat to its national security.” It specifically excludes NATO countries placing their own forces and armaments on the territory of any of the new members that joined the alliance after May 27, 1997, the day when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed,

These prohibitions could cover any action a party considered objectionable. They are also too subjective. For example, whereas Russian analysts would probably see further NATO expansion as harming Moscow’s interests, NATO representatives would claim that it enhances Russian security by making its neighbors more secure.’

Countries can hardly “not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties” since that is the purpose of such national defense efforts as well as alliances like NATO. It also goes against the logic of international politics to demand that countries “shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party.” Furthermore, how do you measure “equal security?”

The demand on Washington to “refrain from supporting organizations, groups or individuals calling for an unconstitutional change of power” is also a non-starter given Western concerns regarding how the Russian authorities restrict Western-backed NGOs.

NATO members will also not legally commit to exclude new members. Such a pledge goes against the alliance’s principles. It would be difficult for some member governments to secure domestic parliamentary ratification of any pledge. Even more implausible is the demand that NATO remove all foreign military forces and infrastructure from any countries there were not alliance members in 1997. These countries include Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The proposed ban on all NATO military activity on the territory of Ukraine and other countries near western Russia reflects Moscow’s pining for its Cold War sphere-of-influence in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. This approach has been evident for a century, seen in Stalin’s approach toward Hitler’s Germany and then Churchill and Roosevelt. Some alliance members would insist on continuing joint training and exercises with former Soviet republics that requested the assistance.

Though NATO has de facto accepted a series of buffer states between Russia and eastern alliance members, formally accepting such a sphere is politically impossible in Western democracies. That said, Moscow has created an artificial crisis since there are no prospects of Ukraine entering NATO anytime soon due to the lack of an alliance consensus on the issue.

The demand to end NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement might be acceptable if paired with negotiations to eliminate Russia’s large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The proposed ban on “flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments” in “areas outside national airspace…from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party” is one-sided in Russia’s favor. Some Russian strategic bombers can reportedly launch cruise missiles while in Russian air space that can reach targets in North America. Any prohibitions on INF-range missile deployments must deal with Moscow’s record of cheating on the INF Treaty.

U.S. officials have, however, already indicated that some parts of the texts could offer a foundation for negotiations. One might be the proposal that the parties “shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations.” The calls for peaceful resolution of disputes, additional military-to-military “hotlines,” and for “reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” might also provide a basis for deeper discussions on crisis management and military doctrines.

NATO lacks the authority to negotiate and ratify a collective treaty; all NATO members would have to ratify any legally binding agreement. Given this challenge, it would make more sense to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures that could enhance crisis stability by decreasing fears of surprise attack.

There may also be opportunities to discuss limits of military deployments and exercises near Russia’s borders if Moscow made reciprocal commitments regarding European states’ frontiers. The NATO-Russia Council, the new Russian-U.S. strategic stability dialogue, and other mechanisms could offer a suitable venue for dialogue.

In any case, we are hardly likely to see an end to Moscow’s policy of manipulating periodic war scares. Russian officials value their utility in decreasing the prospects of Ukraine’s entering NATO, pressing for more concessions from the West, and distracting attention from the Russian troops that are already occupying substantial Ukrainian territory.

Credit Photo: Photo 41588914 / Russian Flag © Lerka555 | Dreamstime.com

The Coming of the CH-53K to the USMC: A December 2021 Update

12/20/2021

The photo slideshow contained in this article highlights the next round of preparation for the coming of the CH-53K to the operating force.

According to II MEF:

“U.S. Marines with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) test the capabilities of the CH-53K King Stallion on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Dec. 16, 2021.

“Personnel with VMX-1 conducted surge flight operations to test the external lift capability of the CH-53K in support of amphibious operations.

“It can externally transport 27,000 lbs. over 110 nautical miles and has a max external lift of 36,000 lbs., three times that of the legacy “E” aircraft.

“The CH-53K King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter currently being produced and tested to replace the CH-53E Super Stallion.”

But the CH-53K is part of the enhanced focus of the USMC on mobile basing and has signifiant potential for the Army, the Air Force and the Navy to use this unique heavy lift capability in their own mobile and flexible basing needs and requirements. 

We are focusing on the basing shift for the integrated distributed force in a series on defense. info, and will highlight ways in which this new heavy lift helicopter can play a key part in enabling the joint force, in addition to expanding USMC capabilities to work from sea to mobile to expeditionary basing options.

For the most recent piece in the series, see the following:

Managing Co-Evolution of the U.S. Navy and the USMC: The North Atlantic Case

 

HMLA-367 Live Fire Exercise

U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper helicopters assigned to Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 367 conduct live-fire operations off the coast of Hawaii, Nov. 4, 2021.

HMLA-367 conducted live-fire training with the use of various weapon systems, to demonstrate readiness and combat proficiency in austere, expeditionary environments within the Indo-Pacific.

11.04.2021

Video by Cpl. Dalton Payne 1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Bomber Task Force

12/15/2021

Two U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancers from the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, fly a Bomber Task Force mission alongside two French Dassault Mirage 2000s, as well as two U.K. and two U.S. F-35 Lighting IIs from U.K. Carrier Strike Group’s HMS Queen Elizabeth over Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, Nov. 11, 2021.

The mission represented the international participants’ collective commitment to stability and security in the Horn of Africa, highlighted Djibouti as a leading security partner in the region, and exercised U.S. ability to operate in and through a variety of airspaces.

The BTF mission coincided with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa’s Allied Appreciation Day event where approximately 200 guests and senior leaders representing Djibouti, France, the U.K., Spain, Japan, Italy and the U.S. came together to witness the low approach and participate in a variety of interactive and static demonstrations.

The low approach also included a U.S. C-130 Hercules from Camp Lemonnier and a Japanese P-3 Orion from the Japan self-Defense Force Base Djibouti. The event showcased the combined military strength present in Djibouti and also served to honor the shared partnerships, history and devotion to peace. (Video by Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa)

CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

11.11.2021

Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa

The British Army Shapes Its Modernization Strategy

12/14/2021

In an article published on the UK Ministry of Defence website on November 25, 2021, MOD announced a way ahead for UK Army modernization.

Following on from the Integrated Review and the significant increase in defence spending announced by the Government last year, Future Soldierdemonstrates how the Army is modernising to address next-generation threats across the globe.

This will be bolstered by an additional investment of £8.6-billion in Army equipment over the next ten years. This will bring the total equipment investment to £41.3-billion for that period.

Alongside investment in our people, infrastructure, emerging technologies, and cyber capabilities, Future Soldier will position the Army as a globally engaged fighting force that benefits the whole of our Union.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

“Future Soldier is reinforced by the ambition outlined in the Defence Command Paper to transform the Army into a more agile, integrated, lethal, expeditionary force.

“We have underpinned this generational work with an extra £8.6-billion for Army equipment, bringing the total investment to £41.3-billion.

“Our Army will operate across the globe, equipped with the capabilities to face down a myriad of threats from cyber warfare through to battlefield conflict.”

Commander Field Army Lt Gen Ralph Wooddisse said:

“Future Soldier is the next evolutionary step for the British Army; the most radical change for the British Army in 20 years. It will mean changes to the way we operate our structure, technology, and workforce.

“This will make us leaner, more agile and adaptable. Future Soldier is about ensuring the British Army is a competitive and resilient organisation able to meet the challenges of modern warfare.”

Ranger Regiment

One of the most significant changes is the creation of a new Ranger Regiment. Standing up from 1 December 2021, the Regiment will embody the Army’s new expeditionary posture. It will form part of the newly established Army Special Operations Brigade and will be routinely deployed alongside partner forces around the world to counter extremist organisations and hostile state threats.

This shift to a globally engaged posture will mean more personnel are deployed for more of the time, with a new network of Land Regional Hubs based on existing training locations in places such as Oman and Kenya.

The Ranger Regiment’s cap badge will take its inspiration from the Peregrine Falcon and everyone will wear a metal badge, irrespective of rank.

Modernised Warfighting

Another key pillar of Future Soldier is ensuring the Army is a central contributor to NATO warfighting by delivering a fully modernised warfighting division by 2030, with capabilities designed to detect and defeat at greater range and accuracy.

New equipment such as Ajax, Boxer, Challenger 3, AH-64E Apache, long range precision fires and un-crewed aerial systems will be introduced, while much of the fighting force will fall under new self-sufficient Brigade Combat Teams.

To ensure land forces adapt at a rapid pace to challenge future threats, a new Experimentation and Trials Group will be established in 2022, leading on trialling new technologies and integrating them into how soldiers will fight and operate. The Army will also benefit from a significant share of the £6.6-billion R&D investment.

Our people

Creating an Army fit for the future will see some restructuring and reorganisation of units over the next four years, which will be supported by a rebalancing of personnel across the United Kingdom. The Regular Army will stand at 73,000 strong by 2025 and combined with an Army Reserve of 30,000, the British Army will stand at over 100,000.

The proportion of the Army based in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland will be sustained or increased by 2025, and this will be reinforced by around £3.35-billion from the Defence Estate Optimisation budget and a further £1.2-billion of Army investment in remaining sites.

Scotland

Scotland will be home to more units and a greater proportion of the Army’s workforce than today. Glencorse Barracks in Edinburgh will be retained, while Kinloss and Leuchars will continue to grow. The £355-million investment in the Army estate will deliver over a £1-billion of economic benefits to Scotland.

Wales

The number of soldiers in Wales is set to increase with the return of the ‘Welsh cavalry’, The Queen’s Dragoon Guards, and a new Reserve company of The Royal Welsh established in North Wales. The retention of Brecon and growth in Wrexham locations are part of a £320-million investment.

Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland will keep the same number of Army units but host a greater proportion of the Army’s workforce.

Reservists will play a pivotal role in the modern Army, taking principal responsibility for Homeland Protect and Resilience operations.

Opportunity for serving personnel

Future Soldier will drive forward changes to make the Army a great place for all, and for the first-time soldiers commissioning from the ranks will not be limited on how far they can be promoted – increasing the opportunity for a Private soldier to leave the Army as a General. Under the transformation programme, plans are also being developed to launch a Soldier Academy that mirrors the prestige of Sandhurst and new career management system that is fit for the digital age is also being developed.

Finally, a Force Mental Health Team will be established within the Field Army, who will help support the promotion of mental health and wellbeing and provide a deployable healthcare capability in support of persistent engagement.

The featured photo is taken from the article and is credited to the Ministry of Defence.

The speech by the Minister of Defense can be found here:

https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-announces-future-soldier-for-the-british-army