The ITS Cavour’s F-35 Sea Trials

03/16/2021

We wrote some years ago about the coming of the F-35 to the Italian air enabled small deck carrier.

One of those articles focused on the importance of the Italian pilots and maintainers working with the USMC in preparing the way ahead.

In that article published on February 18, 2016, we highlighted the following:

We have discussed the evolution of Italian Airpower with senior Italian Air Force leaders.

And the Italian reshaping of their airpower capabilities with the modernization of the Eurofighter and the building, deploying and integration of the F-35, both the the As and the Bs, is a key part of the way ahead for Italy and its role in coalition operations through the Mediterranean and beyond.

The standing up of the Cameri facility in only four years, and building the first two F-35s outside of the United States is a major achievement.

And with the first F-35 transatlantic flight recently conducted by Ninja, the all-Italian air package — one F-35, two Eurofighters and two KC-767 tankers — crossed the Atlantic from the Azores in 7 hours against stiff headwinds.

The pilot had only 50 hours on the F-35 prior to the flight and the plane only 15 flight hours.

Even though Italy is clearly working airpower transformation, and the Italian Navy is on track to buy F-35Bs to replace their harriers for the Cavour, we have heard very little from them about how the evolution of Airpower intersects with naval modernization.

In a recently piece written by Commander Mauizio Modesto of the Italian Navy and published in the JPACC Journal, a perspective is provided with regard to “Italian Naval Air Power: New Challenges and Capabilities.”

At the end of the article we learn that:

A further major challenge ahead for Italian Naval Air Power is the renewal of embarked fixed wing aircraft with the gradual replacement of AV88 Plus with the STOVL version of the F-35B.

The F-35B is a revolutionary aircraft wit extraordinary operational capabilities supported by a logistics system with global reach that will allow the Italian Navy to make a leap into 5th generation combat aircraft.

The article provides a look at the evolving strategic situation within which the Italian Navy is operating and the need to extend its reach and to ensure the flexibility of operational capabilities to operate throughout the spectrum of warfare in a fluid and dynamically changing situation in the Mediterranean.

The F-35 is a key element for providing the kind of ISR and C2 which a dispersed fleet will need while operating across the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic.

But what is not clear is whether the Italian Navy really grasps this fundamental point about the capability.

And the F-35Bs which can fly organically off of the Cavour can link directly and instantly with the Italian Air Force F-35s flying from land bases or those of the coalition.

As a senior RAF pilot put it with regard to the shift from Harrier to F-35B which will fly from the Queen Elizabeth: “Before I leave the flight deck I will see the battlespace from my cockpit through my connectivity with F-35s already flying in the objective area.”

Taking this concept back to the Italian Navy and its consideration looking forward, getting to Beaufort Air Station and working with the RAF and the USMC might make a great deal of sense to build the F-35B and its operations into the ground floor of shaping the Italian Navy’s way ahead.

Unfortunately, the current approach seems to be dealing with the F-35B was silver bullet or high-end asset which will be added like a cherry on the cake.

What the Marines and the RAF have emphasized is that it is not that at all — but a building block for shaping the future evolution for the operation of the sea services in a hybrid strategic environment.

The Italian Air Force is building its coalition capability from the ground up at Luke AFB.

As Ninja, the first F-35 pilot to cross the Atlantic put it:

“We are learning together from the ground up. We are learning the same Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTPs) from the ground up. This builds in coalition possibilities which we can shape going forward.”

The Cavour will be eventually be stocked with the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, replacing the aging Harriers. It has room for ten F-35Bs in the hanger and six on the deck. Credit Photo: Italian Navy
The Cavour will be eventually be stocked with the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter, replacing the aging Harriers. It has room for ten F-35Bs in the hanger and six on the deck. Credit Photo: Italian Navy

The Italian Navy has a similar opportunity at Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station.

And doing so now is crucial so that the approach and capabilities of the aircraft are seamlessly integrated into the transformation of the Italian Navy and not added as an afterthought.

It is about fifth generation enablement; not 5th generation layered on top of a legacy approach, fleet and concept of operations.

As we wrote earlier:

By having very flexible air assets operate across the Gator Navy, and the Osprey is the current driving force for change, the entire sea base operates differently.

Add the F-35 B as a “flying combat system” and the capabilities are not only enhanced by the role of each individual key ship, which can operate F-35Bs, will become key elements for the distributed force.

For the first time, amphibious ships and carriers the size of the Cavour will carry their own airborne C5ISR capabilities.

This means that the smaller ships will not only carry more organic punch, but be able to provide overwatch and strike support to a distributed fleet.

The intersection of land based and seabased assets can conjoined in coordinated operations as the F-35 fleet becomes a reality operating in the Mediterranean as well.

A ship like the Cavour, operating F-35Bs, can form a centerpiece of a maritime operational force or provide overwatch and strike support for an allied coalition force, seen as a distributed force.

Given Italy’s key location in the Mediterranean, its land and sea based assets can be blended into a more coherent capability to protect Italian interests by more effectively combining its air assets around the F-35.

For example, if one looks at the Mediterranean and considers simply the deployment of three F-35B carriers, the Cavour, the new Queen Elizabeth class or the USS America class, the Mediterranean can be considered under the reach of the air fleet but one clearly considered not as an end in itself but as integral part of joint and coalition operations.

That was in 2016; it is now five years later and now the ITS Cavour is working F-35 integration off of the U.S. East Coast.

According to a March 11, 2021 article released by the F-35 Joint Program Office Public Affairs, there is indeed significant progress being made.

WESTERN ATLANTIC OCEAN (March 11, 2021) — As the second week of F-35B sea trials aboard the Italian aircraft carrier ITS Cavour (CVH 550) begins, talk of the test plan has turned to discussion of specific test points tallied, moving the Italian Navy one nautical mile closer to certification to operate the fifth generation fighter aboard its flagship.

Cavour set sail from Norfolk Naval Station, Virginia, Feb. 28, and specially instrumented developmental flight test jets from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23 performed vertical landings for the first time March 1.

Since then, the embarked test team from F-35 Patuxent River Integrated Test Force (Pax River ITF) has partnered with the ship’s crew, working in some cases shoulder-to-socially-distant-shoulder to achieve test objectives.

“The first full week at sea has yielded great progress in our planned testing, and we are well on our way to capture all necessary data to permit the development of a highly useful and flexible operating bulletin for F-35 operations aboard ITS Cavour that will serve the Italian Navy well for decades to come,” said Andrew Maack, F-35 Pax River ITF chief test engineer and site director. “The leadership of ITS Cavour recognizes that our unique and sometimes unconventional flight operations are necessary to make our sea trials objectives successful and they are pulling out all the stops to provide flexible and aggressively helpful cooperation in all ship departments at all levels in the organization. The partnership could not be stronger.”

The flight deck is visible evidence of the growing working relationships.

“Watching the teamwork that Italians and Americans are doing on the deck is truly rewarding and honorable. I am proud of the excellent results achieved in just one week of work,” said ITS Cavour commanding officer Italian Navy Capt. Giancarlo Ciappina. “The cooperation between the American ITF and the Cavour ship crew represents, today, the emblem of the historic link between Italy and the USA. We feel proud protagonists of these “pages of history” for the Italian Navy and we are grateful to the American staff who is working closely with us for this achievement.”

The ship’s rhythmic rise and fall—the horizon visible one moment, gone the next—and the sometimes “angry” sea with its white caps, are the backdrop for Cavour’s ponte di volo, or flight deck. On this ‘tela’, or canvas, per se, is a rainbow of life preserver vests, inside of each is a key partner in successful air operations.

“Watching the teamwork on the deck is exciting. There is an exchange of knowledge between the professionals and we are working to the best of our abilities and skills for the success of the Ready for Operations campaign of the aircraft carrier Cavour, milestone of the Italian Navy,” said Italian Navy Cmdr. Mario Massacci.

The F-35 Pax River ITF and ITS Cavour are conducting sea trials as part of Italian Navy’s “Ready for Operations” campaign that will bring the fifth generation fighter aircraft to the navy’s flagship.

And to be blunt about it: what is the difference between 4 Harriers coming off of the deck of the ITS Cavour and a 4-ship integrated F-35 wolfpack?

A core capability which can integrate into an allied kill web is the simple answer.

A more complex answer is suggested by the graphic below:

In the graphic below, a notional intersection of F-35Bs operating off of an Italian carrier with that of the UK with that of the USN-USMC Amphibious Ready Group in the Mediterranean is represented:

The fleet operates by the machines within the plane trading data with one another so that the circles represent a common operating picture over the reach of the multiple flying assets.  The COP provides a setting within which the pilots can operate to shape situational decision making appropriate to the mission.

And the circles are actually 360 degree situational awareness enabled operating areas. The reach throughout the Mediterranean simply from three ships operating their F-35Bs and delivering situational awareness, strike and situational decision-making is significant even without considering the other assets with which the fleet will interconnect with.

Re-Crafting North Atlantic Defense: The Impact of the 2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk

03/15/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

A recent article in the London Times highlighted the new role of the Royal Navy in the Arctic. “The Royal Navy will have a regular presence in the Arctic Circle to counter the Russian strategic advantage over trade routes that will open as the ice caps melt, sources have revealed.”[1]

What this story does not highlight is the dynamic defense infrastructure which is being built underlying such an effort. That infrastructure is a combined effort for the new version of the 2nd Fleet and the only operating NATO command on U.S. territory, the Joint Force Command Norfolk. These two commands are headed by a U.S Navy Vice Admiral, Andrew “Woody” Lewis.

The significant and dynamic innovation with these interactive and in many ways integrated commands has largely been unnoticed, although not by the Russians. With the concern with the Chinese and their policies in the Pacific and beyond, it can be forgotten that the most immediate and direct military threat to the United States emanates from the Russian Kola peninsula. Here is to be found the highest concentration of Russian military force in the world.

When the 2nd Fleet in 2011 was sunsetted, it was a nadir of the peace dividend. Only Putin had a different agenda, which already was evident in his actions in George in 2008 and then Ukraine along with many of his public declarations since then.

With the return of Crimea to Russia via the hybrid strategy underwritten by military force, it was difficult to miss that the North Atlantic threat was back.

But Russia is not the Soviet Union. And Russia does not have a Warsaw Pact with the geography to surround Western Europe; those former Warsaw Pact members now face Russia as a competitor or partner, but outside of the direct occupation of Russian troops.

The Kola challenge is a primary one to the United States and its direct defense.

It is also a key definer of what the North Atlantic Alliance faces. This is an alliance which is not facing the core challenge of a central front and an inner-German border. For the United States, the air-maritime challenge is the core one for our direct interests; and for the relevant nations to the maritime regions in the Alliance, the Russian threat is a direct and extensional one.

A key element of the way the defense threat plays out now is a defense arc from Poland to the UK through the Nordics and from there down the path of Greenland, Iceland, Canada and the United States.

What the standup of the 2nd Fleet in 2018 and of the Joint Force Command Norfolk more recently, these two commands signify a clear focus on shaping a credible 21st century defense capability and infrastructure for deterrence and warfighting in the region.

The geography has returned as a core part of the North Atlantic defense challenge, but to meet the challenge new command relationships, new technologies and innovative concepts of operations are being shaped by the commands, and under the leadership of Vice-Admiral Lewis.

The Vice-Commander of Second Fleet is a very experienced Canadian Rear Admiral. The Vice-Commander of JFC is the first commander of HMS Queen Elizabeth, and a very well regarded British Rear Admiral. Those Admirals, along with a Norwegian, French, and German Admirals and a RN Commodore all have tremendous command experience at sea in navigating some of the most challenging sea states in the world.

This advanced state of very senior defense collaboration is a key incubator for the shaping of new defense capabilities, add in the emerging role of Sweden and Finland and it is an important and significantly enhanced command element compared to the Cold War period of deterrence.

These are just some of the most obvious changes.

Another one is the scope of the territory covered, as the Times article highlighted, namely the key role of defense efforts in the High North.

When the CNO in 2018, Admiral Richardson, stood up the new version of the 2nd Fleet, this is how he described the new scope of operations: “A new 2nd Fleet increases our strategic flexibility to respond — from the Eastern Seaboard to the Barents Sea. Second Fleet will approach the North Atlantic as one continuous operational space, and conduct expeditionary fleet operations where and when needed.”

The new operational area covered by 2nd Fleet synergistically shaped as well by the JFC  experienced Admirals clearly includes the Arctic, the High North more generally, and the Nordic waters.

At the time of the standup, CNO Richardson highlighted that change in this new approach. Admiral Richardson made clear the focus will be on projecting force.

“This one will be high-end, blue-water warfare using major elements of maritime power.”

Under the leadership of Vice-Admiral Lewis, the commands – for the two together really constitute the shaping of the new defense infrastructure – have pursued a very innovative approach to building out capability.

We have recently visited 2nd Fleet and JFC, and in the weeks ahead will lay out and highlight what we have learned about the significant innovations which have been generated in shaping a maritime distributed force.

The evolving integrated distributed force is crafted to deliver the kind of defense capability required for deterrence and warfighting capabilities with the current Russian and evolving Chinese engagement in the High North Sea routes requires.

The 2nd Fleet and JFC working relationships provide a case study of how the U.S. Navy and its evolving shift in its warfighting approach interact significantly with changes in how the cluster of “relevant” nations in the area of operations are approaching defense as well.

And the reshaping of navy concepts of operations along with the integratability with the efforts of the “relevant” nations is providing a significant way ahead for innovation in both deterrence and warfighting approaches to the Russians.

The Second Fleet has not just been reestablished; it has been transformed.

Editor’s Note: It should be noted that the stand up of the new command occurred on the carrier named for the U.S. President who was heavily involved in the emergence of the new Europe, with the creation of a unified Germany and building upon President Reagan’s efforts to end the Soviet Union. 

[1] Larisa Brown, “Royal Navy to defend Arctic trade as ice melts,” The Times (March 10, 2021).

A Hybrid Diesel-Electric Engine for the New Franco-German Tank?

03/14/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Arquus, a French builder of light and medium armored vehicles, has pitched the concept of a hybrid diesel-electric as an alternative to a conventional diesel engine for a planned tank for the French and German armies, executive chairman Emmanuel Levacher said March 10.

“We have proposed a large hybrid engine,” he said on the sidelines of a news conference on 2020 financial results.

Arquus has pitched the concept to Nexter, the French systems integrator and prime contractor in the Main Ground Combat System, a cooperative project looking to replace the French Leclerc and German Leopard 2 heavy tanks in 2040.

Arquus is a subsidiary of Volvo, a Swedish truck maker.

A Nexter spokesman confirmed there were talks over the hybrid concept.

The hybrid concept draws on two motors, one diesel, the other electric, with the  latter used to power electronic systems on board, with the diesel engine switched off while the tank is static.

An electric motor can recharge batteries, and offers stealth and silent operations, with the tank’s heat signature lowered when the diesel engine is turned off.

An electric motor could also power laser instruments fitted on the tank.

If Arquus were to supply a hybrid engine, the company would ship a military version of Volvo heavy truck motors, and its own electric motor.

The proof of concept is the Arquus Scarabée, an eight-ton, four-wheel drive light armored vehicle, which had a commercial launch at the Idex trade show for land weapons, which ran Feb. 21-25 in Abu Dhabi.

Arquus gave a live demonstration of the Scarabée in September, at Versailles, just outside the capital.

Much is riding on the Scarabée, a flagship offering Arquus will pitch as a replacement for the French army’s véhicule blindé léger (VBL) scout car. France has yet to launch a tender, but the company launched the project in 2018 and invested own funds to develop the vehicle in reconnaissance and combat versions.

The Scarabée is pitched at a high-end niche market, such as special forces, with a small number of potential client nations. Operators can opt for a version with a battle management system.

The company will need to convince prospective clients the hybrid vehicle is fast enough and has sufficient range, an arms specialist said. A hybrid car in town has nothing in common with a hybrid-powered combat vehicle in the field.

The French army has a 1,600-strong VBL fleet to be replaced, with a competition likely to be open to European suppliers.

Arquus has also set up a Hornet business unit, seeking export sales of its remote control weapon station, a system fitted on the Griffon multirole troop carrier, and Jaguar combat and reconnaissance vehicle, two key elements in the French army’s Scorpion modernization program.

Arquus seeks to win five to 10 percent of world sales in remote weapon systems and will encounter stiff competition from Kongsberg, which holds an estimated 60 percent of the world market. Much of the value lies in the weapon system rather than the guns, with client nations free to choose weapons ranging from 7.62 mm machine guns to 40 mm grenade launchers.

On Arquus’s 2020 profitability, the results were below those of the previous year and were “slightly positive,” Levacher said. There were extra costs and a 50 percent drop in exports due to COVID 19. A foreign sale of 200 Bastion armored personnel carriers was postponed last year, reflecting increased uncertainty and budget cuts.

Budgets were slashed even if demand was there, he said.

“Competition is brutal,” he said, with low barriers to entry into the market, with aggressive competition from emerging markets. There is competition from Turkey, South Korea and South Africas for light armored vehicles.

Armies trailed in the defense budget compared to the air force and navy, he said.

The outlook for 2021 was for a year of recovery, he said.

The aim for 2021 is to post a 10 percent rise in sales, following the 10 percent drop in 2020, he said.There had been fears of a bigger fall in sales. Sales in France rose 23 percent last year.

The target is an average annual sales growth of five percent, hitting €1 billion ($1.2 billion) by 2030, seen as delivering critical mass, he said. Annual sales have been around €600 million.

The book-to-bill ratio of sales to orders was 1:1. The order book was stable at €5.5 billion, of which €1.3 billion were orders, with the remainder including optional tranches of orders.

There is need for some caution as there is “low visibility,” but the company remained ambitious, he said. Service has contributed 42 percent of sales, and the aim is to increase that to 50 percent, with the balance coming from production.

The company is reorganizing four factories around specialization, with Saint-Nazaire, western France, working on service support; Marolles, near the capital, making military modifications to motors, and building and repairing vehicle parts; Garchizy, central France, building armored cabins and delivering spare parts; and Limoges, central France, building new vehicles.

Some €8 million is being spent on the Limoges plant, and €2.5 million over three years for Saint-Nazaire.

MTU supplies the diesel engine on the Leopard 2, while Leclerc has a Wartsila motor.

The featured graphic is taken from the following source:

Germany, France to spend €200 million on next-gen main battle tank

USAF Combines Orange Flag With Black Flag: Working Kill Web Integration

03/13/2021

According to a recent USAF article, the USAF has recently combined two exercises — Orange Flag and Black Flag in order to accelerate change in operating in contested airspace.

EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. (AFNS)

By 2nd Lt. Christine Saunders, Air Force Test Center Public Affairs and 1st Lt. Savanah Bray, 53rd Wing Public Affairs

Orange Flag, the large force test event carried out three times annually by Air Force Test Center’s 412th Test Wing, combined with the 53rd Wing’s Black Flag, brought several firsts for the test community March 2-4.

Both central to achieving Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the two test capabilities combined their mission planning processes and streamlined test objective synthesis. Test execution took place during a Black Flag event and two separate Orange Flag’s.

“The benefits of a combined Orange and Black Flag event include the test of materiel, technical, and tactical solutions in an integrated fashion, lower administrative overhead, and improved understanding of how to use tactics to multiply technical capabilities,” said Maj. Brandon Burfeind, Orange Flag director.

The rationale of combining the planning process is simple: Orange Flag focuses on technical integration and innovation across a breadth of technology readiness levels, while Black Flag focuses on the tactical integration of more mature technologies.

“By combining resources and some objectives with the Orange Flag enterprise, we were able to achieve desired test objectives at minimal cost to the government,” said Capt. Clifford Peterson, mission commander of Black Flag 21-1.

“Due to the combined nature of the events, we were able to get both highly data driven developmental test objectives and more operationally-focused and accurate objectives completed for similar tests.”

This iteration of Orange Flag focused on two primary objectives: kill web integration and advanced survivability.

Kill web integration included Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Space Force sensors and tactical networks, as well as legacy and emerging JADC2 nodes.

“Orange Flag started three years ago with the intent to assess integration of warfighting systems in a dense threat, operationally representative environment,” said Maj. Gen. Christopher Azzano, AFTC commander. “It has been tremendously successful.”

A major Orange Flag success is the testing of F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptor integration with land-based long-range fires, naval fires, and space-based sensors without humans-in-the-loop.

Other successes include tests on multi-national F-35’s, command and control integration, strategic intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance integration through all domains.

This was the first official Black Flag since COMACC Plan 21 was signed in December 2020 to formalize the test event.

Black Flag focuses on testing and validating Tactics Improvement Proposals presented each year at the annual Weapons and Tactics Conference.

TIPs tested at Black Flag 21-1 included HH-60G Pave Hawk air-to-air survivability, F-35 emissions control tactics development, and continued tactics development and evaluation for the F-16 Fighting Falcon APG-83 AESA Radar, among others.

“As a venue for innovation through integration, Black Flag is ultimately a deep-end testing arena to create and discover capabilities utilizing existing and emerging materiel,” said Lt. Col. Mike Benitez, 53rd WG director of staff and Black Flag lead project officer.

“Black Flag’s largest benefit is that it’s a tactical initiative with strategic impact.”

Aligning Orange and Black Flag allows for improved integration and the combining of resources and participants to provide better test data and a more robust operationally-relevant environment.

Orange Flag, Emerald Flag, and Black Flag work in concert as the “test triad” to provide robust test environments geared toward the advancement of Joint All-Domain Operations and the National Defense Strategy.

These premier large force test events support testing of JADC2 and the Advanced Battle Management System and validate new tactics and technologies for warfighting forces.

Orange Flag welcomes event participants from every service, all domains, any organization, and a full range of technical readiness.

Orange Flag is range agnostic and will tailor range use to participant test objectives.

Meanwhile, Black Flag, developed as a venue for tactics development and for joint and coalition fighters, bombers, RPAs, space and more, remains invite-only.

The next iteration of Orange Flag, planned for June 2021, anticipates testing GatewayONE, Skyborg, and several emerging JADC2 capabilities as well as welcoming back our current participants.

The efforts of Orange Flag, Black Flag, and the 53rd WG will be on display this May at Northern Edge 2021.

Launch of F-X Program by Japan

03/12/2021

According to the Japanese, Ministry of Defence, Japan has launched the F-X program.

They describe the program as follows:

The Japan-led F-X development program to succeed the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-2 fighter jet has started in Japan’s fiscal year 2020. “Air superiority” which is the basic premise for the JSDF operations, can be regarded as what is called “public goods”, essential for the defense of Japan.

In order to secure this “air superiority” into the future, it is vitally important to develop the next fighter jet with excellent performance, freedom of modification, future upgrade potential, and domestic defense infrastructure for maintenance and repairs, as the successor of the F-2, which is scheduled to start retiring around 2035.

Following the policy that MOD/SDF will “launch a Japan-led development project at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight” as set forth in the Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 – FY 2023), the MOD has made a contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and embarked on the F-X development on October 30th, 2020.

In addition, in December 2020, the MOD has released the direction of international collaboration on the F-X development as follows.

In developing the F-X, the MOD has decided to advance this program with necessary support and cooperation from the U.S., such as selecting the U.S. company Lockheed Martin as the candidate for an integration support company, and starting a new project with the U.S. from next fiscal year to ensure interoperability between Japan and the U.S.

Also, the MOD will continue discussions with the U.S. and the UK to pursue possibility of collaboration on the F-X at system level such as engine and avionics in order to reduce development cost and technical risk.

The development of the F-X is an extraordinarily large program compared to the MOD’s previous aircraft development projects. In order to make this grand program a success, the MOD will develop the F-X by making maximum use of technological and human resources possessed by domestic companies and further strengthening collaboration between the government and companies, and between the companies, as well as considering the direction of international collaboration as mentioned above.

Also, see the following:

UK Defence Co-Operation with Japan

The featured graphic is the concept design of the F-X fighter as proposed by Mitsubishi.

French Indo-Pac Strategy: A Balancing Act

03/11/2021

By Murielle Delaporte

’Initiated and adopted by several nations in the past years, the concept of an Indo-Pacific theater does not mean the same for each one of them.

For France, which is the very first European nation to have replaced the traditional Asia-Pacific concept with a more assertive Indo-Pacific strategy, the key is the inclusion of India in the equation. The reason is tied to New Delhi’s political dimension which is crucial to counter-balance Beijing’s growing weight in this part of the world’’, explains a French submariner familiar with this region.

Balance is indeed the leit motiv in the current Macron government’s approach to foreign affairs.

Fearing an escalation fueled by increasing military expenditures and growing tensions while dreading a replay of the Cold War – this time between the United States and China – France is once again positioning itself as a ‘’stabilizing power’’ in a zone which ‘’spans from Djibouti to Polynesia’’, as stressed in the 2019 ‘’French Defence Strategy In the Indo-Pacific’’ official document.

The latter followed President Macron’s Australian Garden Island speech, which he made a year earlier on his way to make an official visit to India.

The 2018 statement highlighted the concept of a ‘’Paris-Dehli- Canberra axis,’’which his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian had already promoted in 2016 when he was Minister of Defense in terms of a ‘France-India-Australia trilateral framework.

Sharing the exact same diagnostic as Washington (both under President Trump and President Biden) as far as the serious nature of Chinese aggressive action is concerned, the French government has not been shy in condemning Beijing on multiple grounds, ranging from the Uyghurs’ genocide to the Belt and Road Initiative.

Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, the concerns expressed by French officials are indeed specifically related to Beijing’s ability systematically to ‘’fill the vacuum’’ whenever an opportunity emerges and deny access to other players.

The ways and means progressively to evict other nations’ influence are limitless and include in particular:

  • The polarization and militarization of international waters with the unilateral extension of territorial waters from 12 to 15 nautical miles (e.g., the Paracel Islands in 2017 in the South China Sea): according to a 2016 DoD estimate, 3,200 acres of land have been artificially created at the time.
  • Investments in key strategic infrastructure via China’s One Belt One Road Initiative : the deep-water port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, the development of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka or the operational control of the Gwadar port in Pakistan by the China Overseas Port Holding Company are all part of the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road under way since 2013 designed to enhance connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa.
  • A growing military presence officially aimed at protecting Chinese communities abroad : the most telling example of such a strategic shift in Chinese military doctrine is the case of Djibouti.   Beijing’s footprint – and foothold in the Western Indian Ocean – has been growing since 2008 through various investments in salt, railway, and the port of Doraleh. Its naval military presence has evolved from anti-piracy operations to the inauguration in 2017 of its very first overseas naval base, which currently hosts an estimated 2,000 troops but has a capacity of 10,000. In ten years – from 2008 to 2018 -, China’s 350-ship Navy trained about 100 ships and 26,000 sailors in the Gulf of Aden alone.

Such a trend privileging the policy of ‘’fait accompli’’ has been enhanced by the Covid crisis, during which China has been multiplying its military maneuvers in the straights of Taiwan, Miyako and Bashi, while the very first deadly border clash with India in 45 years occurred last June in the Himalaya.

‘’In a region including seven out of ten of the highest defence budgets in the world (the Unites States, China, Saudi Arabia, India, France, Japan and South Korea), strategic and military imbalances constitute an underlying danger with global consequences.

While several open crises persist and new rivalries emerge, the breakdown of strategic stability, or a lasting deterioration in the regional security environment, would have an immediate impact on France’s political, economic, and sovereign interests’’, states the above-mentioned 2019 “French Defence Strategy In the Indo-Pacific” official document.

Having appointed last November and for the first time an Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, France is indeed a riparian and sovereign Indo-Pacific nation with clear vested interests starting with the protection of some 1.6 million French citizens leaving in its seven overseas regions, departments and communities (called DROM-COM in French for ‘’Départements ou Régions français d’Outre-Mer’’ and ‘’Collectivités d’Outre-Mer’’).

In the Indian Ocean are Mayotte, Reunion, the French Southern and Antarctic territories (Kerguelen, Amsterdam and Saint-Paul islands, and the Crozet islands). In the Pacific are New Caledonia, Wallis & Futuna, and French Polynesia. In addition, 200.000 French citizens settled in the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean, in Asia and Oceania. Far away and tiny for some of them, these territories nevertheless represent all together 93% of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (9 out of 11 million square kilometers), making it the second in the world after the United States.

Stability, with the defense of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), and, more generally, of the Global Commons at a time when military competition knows no boundary and opens new ones ranging from seabeds to exoatmospheric altitudes, is indeed a main concern shared not only by Paris and Washington, but also and foremost by the regional players in the Indo-Pacific.

How to reduce threats in order to enhance stability and promote the ‘’new Golden age’’ many experts foresee in that part of the world is however where differences of approach compete.

Forging Alliances Among Like-Minded States

’The French strategy in the Indo-Pacific region lies on three axes: developing joint crisis management tools, enhancing bilateral relations and fomenting a rule-based multilateral framework’’, describes a French diplomat formerly based in Beijing.

Reviving multilateralism in an inclusive manner as a way to contain a potential ‘’Great Power Competition’’ clash or growing tensions is where France and the United States has till now differed since Washington’s position under President Trump was aiming more towards a policy of isolation against China.

This difference of approach has been highlighted in diplomatic terms, but tends also to translate in the military posture of both countries in the region (all proportion kept of course) : ‘’When the U.S. Navy will choose to deploy an aircraft carrier, the French Navy will show its willingness to defend the freedom of navigation (e.g. in the strait of Taiwan where for the first time a French Frigate – the Vendémiaire – was blocked by the Chinese Navy in April 2019) using a frigate or an amphibious assault helicopter carrier (PHA in French for ‘’porte-hélicoptères amphibie’’) and choosing to sail a straight course rather than demonstrating a more assertive posture’’, notes the French Commander.

Having concluded a strategic partnership with China along with the ones negotiated with India and Australia, France advocates less a policy of containment than a policy of coercion which does not preclude commercial ties.

A form of ‘’Realpolitik’’ or ‘’Pacific coexistence’’ which resonates with many of the states leaving in the region which economies are heavily dependent on good relations with China.

Clearly the more ‘’like-minded’’ states the better to counter Chinese illegal endeavors in the region. ‘’Paris favors a regional multilateralism which is ideal to promote ad hoc structures best suited to address the challenges in this part of the world whether humanitarian, health-related, digital, environmental or else.

Last September, was held for instance the first trilateral meeting between France, India and Australia with the participation of the General secretary of the minister of foreign affairs.

The goal is to include Japan next. More multilateral coordination for a common action to be effective is necessary’’, stresses a French Quai d’Orsay official. Hence Paris’ recent request accepted last September to become a partner to the existing ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a multilateral framework created in 1967 (two years after France’s withdrawal from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO – i.e., the equivalent of NATO in Asia – because of disagreements between France and the United States over Vietnam).

In addition, Paris has been developing strong bilateral relationships over the years – in particular with India, Australia (both countries with which Paris has concluded global strategic partnerships) and more recently with Japan – as well as various fora of discussion ranging from commercial and technological exchanges, climate change and natural disaster anticipation, to the fight against transnational threats (illegal traffics, criminality, jihadism, etc.).

France is for instance – in chronological order and in a non-exhaustive way – a member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium since 1988, concluded the FRANZ agreement with New Zealand and Australia for disaster relief in 1992, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) established in 1997, as well as the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Groupe with the United States, Australia and New Zealand since 1998. France is also a founding member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) established in 2008, belongs to the South Pacific Defence Ministers mechanism since 2013, as well as the Pacific Islands Forum with the participation of both New Caledonia and French Polynesia since 2016.

Because France has been itself a medium-sized Pacific power for more than two centuries, it feels directly threatened by the growing instability impacting its territories and communities, some of them in risk of vanishing because of climate change and consequent water rising.

Strengthening strategic autonomy is also a shared concern, hence the well-known Rafale deal with India and submarine ‘’deal of the century’’ with Australia. But military ties between France and its main allies in the Pacific go increasingly way beyond industrial partnerships towards more comprehensive operational relations between not only “like-minded” states, but also comparable military formats.

 Enhancing Joint Indo-Pac Power Projection

Protecting the sovereignty of its territories and the growing number of French citizens leaving in them always required an adequate military force composed of forward-based assets and troops. These ‘’prepositioned’’ forces are called ‘’presence forces’ and include 7 to 8,000 permanent troops, as well as 700 temporary deployed personnel.

They are organized under five commands, three sovereign – in the Indian Ocean in Reunion and Mayotte (FAZSOI) and in the South Pacific in New Caledonia (FANC) and French Polynesia (FAPF) – and two in foreign countries – Djibouti (FFDj) and the United Arab Emirates (FFEAU) – for a ‘’permanent deployment in the Northern Indian Ocean’’, as described by the French Ministry of the Armed Forces.

It is from the latter that the French armed forces participate to Allied operation Inherent Resolve against Daesh, and, before that, to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (till 2012).

Very much like most NATO forces, the overseas sovereign forces were rather neglected in the name of the Peace dividends and a false sense of security. Although ‘’absolutely crucial to defend sovereign interests and participate to ad hoc coalitions’’, as pointed out by the above-quoted French naval officer, it is only in the past few years that they started to be modernized and built back close to their 2008 level, while power projection from the mainland has become increasingly visible and inclusive with more and more allies beyond the traditional four, i.e., the United States, India, Australia and Japan.

‘’As a maritime, air and spatial power, France possesses high level intelligence gathering means and significant force projection platforms. France is therefore able to contribute to each aspect of international security with its allies and partners.

France organizes regular multilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean (Papangue) and in the Pacific (Equateur, Croix du Sud, Marara). These exercises can gather up to several thousand military personnel coming from a dozen partner States.

France participates to many multilateral military exercises in Southeast Asia (Cobra Gold, Komodo, Pitch Black, Tempest Express, Coores, Marixs), in Northeast Asia (Khaan Quest, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve) and in the Pacific (Rimpac, Southern Katipo, Tafakula, Americal, Kakadu, Pacific Partnership). These exercises aim to increase mutual understanding and to create bonds between the different armed forces.

Many bilateral exercises are also organized at each French Navy and Air Force assets visits in the region. The regular high-level bilateral exercises Shakti (Army), Varuna (Navy) and Garuda (Air Force) embody the strategic partnership bonding France and India”, summarizes the 2019 “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific” official report.

In addition to the regular exercises traditionally organized in the Indian Ocean, such as the above-mentioned Varuna with India since 1993, as well as in the Pacific, such as the biannual ‘’Croix du Sud’’ humanitarian and relief exercise held from New Caledonia, what is interesting to highlight is the recent ability of the French armed forces to project faster and further both at sea and in the air from the continent. Strategic depth has become the name of the game for French military planners and the technology makes it possible today in unprecedented ways.

The acquisition of the A330 multirole Tanker Transport (MRTT) Phenix as well as of the A400M has for instance been game-changers for the French Air and Space Force which can now conduct long-range and in-depth raids.

The MRTT is an asset particularly important for the airborne strategic nuclear forces which are the ones conducting these type missions.  In 2018 the ‘’Pegase’’ mission occurred in the aftermath to the French participation to the Australian ‘’Pitch Black’’ exercise. Launching a new type of Air diplomacy able to be mixed and matched with the more traditional naval diplomacy, ‘’Pegase’’ gathered three Rafale fighters, one A400M, one C-135 FR tanker and one A310 and 120 aviators and included stops in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and India.

It might be noted as well that the acquisition of the European tanker by the Royal Australian Air Force, in turn, has been a gamechanger as well for the Aussies. It has allowed them to marry up with their C-17s to have global lift and reach.

From January 20th to February 5th, 2021, the French Air and Space Force conducted a long-range mission called Skyros which started in Djibouti to go to India, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Greece and involved four Rafale, one MRTT, one A400M and some 170 aviators. In June another power projection mission called ‘’Heiphara’’, is planned in the Indo-Pacific deploying again 170 personnel, with this time four Rafale, two MRTTs and one A400M straight to Tahiti and back via Norfolk to celebrate the 240th anniversary of the battle of Yorktown in the Fall. As a French Air and Space Force officer stressed, ‘’These kinds of exercises allow to improve our interoperability: with a country like India which traditionally purchases a third of its military equipment from Russia, a third from Israel and a third from NATO countries, it is interesting for Rafale and Sukoi 3 to train as wingmen…’’

The same goes in the maritime theater where the French Navy conducts operations all the time, such as the current deployment of the Frigate ‘’Prairial’’ from Tahiti to monitor the embargo against North Korea in cooperation with Japan after a technical stop in Guam (a remake of the 2019 mission in that area).

The ‘’Marianne mission’’ which deployed for eight months and for the first time since 2002 a nuclear attack submarine, the ‘’Emeraude’’, with a support ship, the ‘’Seine’’, just ended and was aimed at enhancing cooperation with France’s main naval partners, Australia, the United States and Japan.

A few days ago, the yearly training mission ‘’Jeanne d’Arc’’ started and an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) – including the PHA ‘’Tonnerre’’, the Frigate ‘’Surcouf’’, an amphibious task force armed with two ‘’Gazelle’’ helicopters – departed for a five-month deployment period (instead of the usual four) through the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the South China Sea, the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A mix of operational missions – counterterrorism, security, interoperability with NATO’s Combined task Force CFT 150, as well as humanitarian (with a Covid prism) – will be carried out, while conducting several bilateral exercises with some of the visited countries (Egypt twice, Djibouti, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan twice, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka). An amphibious exercise is for instance planned with the US and Japan in the Senkaku Islands in May.

If the defense of French interests in the Indo-Pacific region has been re-affirmed under the Macron presidency, it is done under the umbrella of the same desire to get other European nations to join forces all around the world – whether in Sahel or in the Levant region – in order to weigh more in front of abusive authoritarian powers and/or transnational violence, as well as in the counter-proliferation field given the coexistence of several nuclear powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides the United Kingdom, another traditional Asia-Pacific power, but because of Brexit, France was for a while the only European nation to have a specifically laid-out Indo-Pacific strategy. Not anymore: Germany designed last September its own Indo-Pacific strategic guidelines and sent a ship for a show of presence in what is considered today the world’s economic lung.

There has been increased concern about the rise of joint naval exercises carried by both China and Russia not only in the Western Pacific and South China Sea, but also in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltics. Indeed, the Chinese entered the Baltic Sea for the first time during a Sino-Russian exercise called ‘’Joint Sea 2017’’. Two years later, “Joint Sea 2019” was the theater for the very first joint sea-based live-fire air defense exercise involving the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Russian Navy. And this month, Russia, China and Iran are conducting joint naval exercise in the northern Indian Ocean.

The French government’s observation that a dangerous ‘’contraction of the geopolitical space’’ is taking place due to globalization, the impact of climate change on the maritime roads (e.g., the Chinese goal to link the Baltic sea region to the polar silk region in the Arctic) and new great powers’ military assertiveness is rooted in such drastic evolutions.

A lot more than the eye can meet is therefore at stake and that is what Paris hopes to convey during its next European presidency during which a common European Union Indo-Pacific strategy could be born adding a little extra-weight in a region striving for the right and perennial balance of power.

Featured photo: A French Air Force (Armée de l’Air) Dassault Rafale taxis after landing at RAAF Base Darwin in the lead up to Exercise Pitch Black 2018.

A condensed version of this article was published on Breaking Defense on March 11, 2021.

UK-Australian Space Bridge Agreement

According to a UK Ministry of Defence story published on February 23, 2021, the UK and Australia have signed a new ‘Space Bridge’ partnership to increase knowledge exchange and investment across the two countries’ space sectors.

The world’s first Space Bridge will unlock improved access to trade, investment and academic research opportunities, better advice to businesses and innovative bilateral collaborations.

The UK and Australia share future ambitions for space and have similar plans to increase the size and job creation potential of the sector. This agreement will further develop the longstanding relationship between the two countries which dates back to the 1970s when the Prospero satellite built in Farnborough, UK, launched from Woomera, South Australia.

The arrangement enhances cooperation between the UK Space Agency, UK Department for International Trade, Australian Trade & Investment Commission, and the Australian Space Agency, coordinating opportunities for the UK and Australian governments and companies to work on space-related activities, including sharing Earth Observation data to collaborating on robotic and artificial intelligence.

UK Science Minister Amanda Solloway said:

“The signing of today’s Space Bridge partnership, a world’s first, with one of our closet international allies, is another step forward in our ambition for the UK to become a globally-competitive space power.

“The bond will allow our most innovative space businesses and universities to collaborate and share best practice more effectively than ever. I’m excited to see how this partnership will unlock new space jobs in both countries while driving forward new ideas that could enrich all of our lives.”

Minister for Exports, Graham Stuart MP said:

“Space exports hit £5.5 billion in 2017 and it is this international demand for our space goods and services which is driving the development of the UK’s vibrant and innovative space industry.

“Like the UK, Australia recognises the enormous potential of space science and recognises that closer partnership and alignment between our two sectors can boost progress and jobs in both countries. I believe that UK exports to Australia could grow by £900 million as a result of a Free-Trade Agreement and the Space Bridge programme can play a critical role in space contributing to this growth, and further strengthening our UK-Australia relationship.”

The UK boasts strong Foreign Direct Investment levels into its space sector and the Australian space sector reports a strong appetite to expand operations into the UK. Leaders for Australia and UK’s space agencies recognise the importance of stronger space ties between both countries, as the UK ramps up plans to become a leading global player in space.

The announcement comes as the UK and Australia begin the fourth round of negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement this week. We have already made good progress in several chapter areas including digital, telecommunications, customs, rules of origin, and procurement in previous rounds.

Australia is influential in the Indo-Pacific and a Free-Trade Agreement will help us pivot towards this dynamic area of the world. This will help diversify our trade, make our supply chains more resilient, and make the UK less vulnerable to political and economic shocks.

Dr Graham Turnock, Chief Executive Officer of the UK Space Agency, said:

“As the UK extends its ambitions in space, it’s only right that we forge new and stronger alliances with new and existing partners all across the globe.

“This agreement has the potential to unleash innovation, promote knowledge exchange and build relationships that will help both the UK and Australia maximise the vast economic and scientific potential that the space sector offers. It will help create better opportunities and greater security for people in both nations.”

Enrico Palermo, Head of the Australian Space Agency.

“The Space Bridge Framework Arrangement will help propel the Australian civil space industry into its next phase of growth, opening doors to build local capability, as well as significantly boost our collaboration with the UK Space Agency.”

The space sector is one of the fastest-growing UK sectors with 30,000 new jobs expected by 2030. The Australian space sector is also growing with up to 20,000 new Australian jobs expected by 2030.

The Space Bridge Framework Arrangement was signed on Tuesday, 23 February 2021 at the British High Commissioner’s residence in Canberra, Australia, and at Westminster, in London, United Kingdom.

The arrangement was signed by the Australian Minister for Industry, Science and Technology Karen Andrews, UK Minister for Science, Research and Innovation Amanda Solloway, in the presence of British High Commissioner to Australia Vicki Treadell CMG MVO, High Commissioner to the UK The Hon George Brandis QC, Australian Space Agency Head Enrico Palermo, UK Space Agency Chief Executive Officer Dr Graham Turnock, UK Space Agency International Director Alice Bunn, Chair of UKSpace Nick Shave and Space Industry Association of Australia Chief Executive Officer James Brown, who joined the signing virtually.

C2, the Kill Web and Concepts of Operations

03/10/2021

By Robbin Laird

In my recent book, Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s, a major element of the shift focused upon was how command changes with the crafting of a distributed but integrated force. The book started by quoting Rear Admiral Manazir, then head of N-9, in an interview which I did with my colleague Ed Timperlake in 2016:

“The key task is to create decision superiority.

“But what is the best way to achieve that in the fluid battlespace we will continue to operate in?

“What equipment and what systems allow me to ensure decision superiority?

“We are creating a force for distributed fleet operations.

When we say distributed, we mean a fleet that is widely separated geographically capable of extended reach.

“Importantly, if we have a network that shares vast amounts of information and creates decision superiority in various places, but then gets severed, we still need to be able to fight independently without those networks.

“This not only requires significant and persistent training with new technologies but also informs us about the types of technologies we need to develop and acquire in the future. Additionally, we need to have mission orders in place so that our fleet can operate effectively even when networks are disrupted during combat; able to operate in a modular-force approach with decisions being made at the right level of operations for combat success.”

We are continuing our focus on the strategic shift in our forthcoming book to be published by USNI press entitled: Maritime Kill Webs, 21st Century Warfighting and Deterrence.

And in that book, our focus on the kill web is as follows: “Shaping a distributed force which is capable of being integrated with the relevant joint or coalition capabilities through interactive kill webs to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effect. The structure can then enable new innovations and the capability of the fleet to be able to fight at the speed of light in the case of threats which can jeopardize the viability of the fleet as a whole.”

A key element of the technological innovations underlying this strategic shift is in the domain of command and control. Here the shift in the command structure leverages technological developments in connectivity as well as how ISR systems can generate information for decision superiority.

The U.S. Navy is clearly working a new template of command, crafting integrated distributed ops, or shaping the maritime distributed force. By reshaping their command template, they are in a position to tap into the C2.

Combing the shift in operational art with new technological enablers or force generators will allow for better decisions in the distributed operational space, at the right time, to make a timely impact on a crisis, or a combat situation.

Recently, I talked with industrial expert Mike Twyman, who has worked for many years on the evolving C2 technologies. He has worked most recently at Cubic Corporation and previously with Northrop Grumman/Logicon, two leading C2/ISR firms. He now heads the consulting firm Wizard Defense focused on enabling solutions for improved decision making.

We started by discussing how he saw the co-evolution of the command shift with the technological dynamics for enabling technologies in the C2 domain.

Mike Twyman: “I love the concept of co-evolution because, what you’re seeing now with what the Navy’s doing is they’re leading with ideas. And they’re basically developing the plans and the tactics with existing capabilities.

“They’re integrating the F-35. They’re integrating the Triton. They’re integrating the P-8. They’re integrating all these great capabilities and really, in very novel ways, to build this distributed integrated task force. That’s going to be what they go to the fight with today but are positioning themselves for what new technologies can enable down the road.

“At the same time, technology changes can drive operational art, where a technology enables a solution that, when integrated, could change how you conduct your operations. The Navy is clearly work this angle as well as seen in exercises like Resolute Hunter.

“By working exercises and empowering training to encompass development, they can see what the possibilities are and they can then guide those of us in industry on what are the key requirements for change. Our engineers know what it can do, but they don’t know what’s most important. And If we can get that feedback through this exercise loop, then we’ll get things that are meaningful and not just pie in the sky.

“We don’t want to build another JTRS radio. That was not informed really by operational warfighter input. As an acquisition, it failed because the government tried to lead that revolution. Today, software defined radios are essentially a commodity. By having the government try to lead the emergence of software defined radios, they ended up with the same capability in a different box and a big bill for integration.

“It didn’t work. You just can’t invent a new technology because it’s a cooler, neater way to do it. It needs to be aligned with the warfighter.”

Laird: “In other words, it needs to be CONOPS informed.”

Mike Twyman: “That is a great way of putting it. Co-evolution is a key element of how to understand what is happening in the C2 domain.

“In my view, there are three streams of activity shaping the way ahead.

“The first is how the adversaries are working C2 for themselves and shaping tools for disruption and contesting the C2 space.

“Second, there is what our warfighters are doing to shape operational art and innovation.

“Third, there are the dynamics of change in the C2 domain globally, such as the emergence of 5G systems. it’s really the co-evolution of operational art and technology that leads to new solutions to counter the threat, both today and in the future.”

We then discussed what is happening in terms of developments in the C2 and ISR space.

Mike Twyman: “I see three critical areas that are evolving, and offer capabilities which can reinforce and accelerate the shift to the integrated distributed force.

“The first is in the digital domain. Here there is a major shift underway in how the warfighter sees the battlespace and to leverage that vision to deliver decision superiority. I am intrigued by the U.S. Navy establishing MISR officers whose role is to deliver to the maritime force what can be leveraged from the joint and coalition force to get the information to the right place at the right time.

“Another digital example is DARPA’s Adaptive Warfighting Architecture. Here the focus is upon micro-modularity in C2 and the importance of being able to push processing and decision capabilities to the tactical edge. You need the ability to move the command post as needed to provide for the flexibility to commander where the force is operating in an area of influence. You need flexibility in terms who you can integrate at that point of influence.

“I like to call it composing the force for a particular mission or effect that you’re trying to achieve. DARPA’s Adaptive Warfighting Architecture, I think is going to help move that along in the next evolution of capability.

“The second is in the embedded Internet of Things domain. High-performance, secure computing is being brought to the tactical edge. With the evolution of sensor networks, there is a major opportunity to integrate sensor networks into the distributed task force operational approach. With flexible C2 and ISR systems, one can both pass and integrate information, and get it to the right people to achieve the desired effects.

“Additionally, there is the coming of artificial intelligence and machine learning. This is in its infancy for military ISR and C2 decision-making. What AI solutions will be part of is strengthening information processing at the edge? What we’re going to need to do is more processing at the tactical edge.

“And third, with contested environments, driven by the near peer threat, we need the ability to maneuver throughout the spectrum. We’re really seeing the importance of protected communications in both the space and aerial network layers, to allow the force to communicate and make necessary connections. Reducing the need to over manage information in centralized centers of decision making is a key element of change.”

From this perspective, Twyman highlighted the importance of gateways to provide for distributed integrated operations. Rather than ramping up exquisite organic capabilities platform by platform, the use of gateways allows for the distribution of capabilities and does so through a variety of wave forms and interoperable messages. By wave form diversity, greater information security is obtained with greater redundancy.

He also foresees the evolution of capabilities in the electronic warfare SIGINT domains or what he calls Counter-RF solutions which will allow our forces to find the areas in spectrum where they can communicate and conduct their missions.

According to Twyman: “One of the areas that I think is really going to break through in the next few years is the exploitation of free space optical communications. It’s a different region of the spectrum. Traditional optical capabilities suffer from some physics limitations, new solutions are coming out, and recent demonstrations have occurred, where now we have the possibility of having a free space optical backbone for some of these networks to move the information around. This will be especially useful to shape the kind of maritime kill webs you are focused upon as well.”

In short, reworking the command element enabling an integrated distributed force will be reinforced in the next few years by innovations in the C2 and ISR (understood as Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) technologies. Co-evolution is a key driver of change in combat capability.