Climate Change Versus Defense: The Swedish Case

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Climate Change Versus Defense: The Swedish Case
03/04/2021

Although the militaries of the industrial West certainly are interested in and in some cases actively pursuing new forms of energy sources to operate their forces, clearly defense needs to operate with fossil fuels for the foreseeable future.

But a EURACTIV story highlights a warning from the Swedish military that Sweden’s climate change goals may actually undercut their ability to defend Sweden.

“Sweden’s ambitious plans to stop using fossil fuels may endanger and limit the military’s ability to carry out its tasks, while biofuels will fail to power most vehicles and could also be unsuitable for Scandinavia’s cold surroundings, the country’s military has warned the government.

“War remains an unlikely scenario, but the military may be needed when natural disasters or other crisis situations occur.

“Moreover, Sweden’s Armed Forces have pointed out that the country may hinder itself with its climate targets and have called for a military exemption to be considered, reported Sweden’s financial newspaper Dagens Indudstri and Russia’s Sputnik News.”

And one might point out that the Nordic defense reset is underway because one can not assume war notably war the way the Russians play it is unlikely.

Being an energy rich country, Russia can fuel an ambitious military enabled foreign and security policy.

Certainly, no Russian military officer is shooting off a memo to Putin with a similar message tot that of the Swedish military.

France and the Sale of Rafale to Egypt: Sans Meteor

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on France and the Sale of Rafale to Egypt: Sans Meteor
03/03/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France withheld the sale of the Meteor long-range, air-to-air missile to Egypt in response to a request from Israel, an arms specialist said.

That French decision to forego an order for the Meteor missile differed from an initial withholding of the Scalp cruise missile to Egypt, with the latter due to the US declining to authorize American components under the international traffic in arms regulations (ITAR).

France appears to have since delivered the cruise missile to Egypt.

A French arms sale in the foreign market requires approval from an interministerial committee, the commission interministérielle pour l’étude des exportations de matériels de guerre (CIEEMG). Any deal calls for a green light from the foreign ministry on the Quai d’Orsay.

Some arms exports can be seen as going too far, such as sales to Saudi Arabia and  the war in Yemen, a foreign policy analyst said. The Quai d’Orsay may take a different track from the defense ministry on the interministerial committee.

Israel has a strong arms market, with the US as privileged partner and a commitment for Israel to maintain a qualitative military edge over Middle East nations.

An Egyptian Rafale fighter, armed with a Meteor missile, designed to hit targets beyond visual range, would “destabilize completely the forces,” a second arms specialist said. Israel would say no to that.

Israel, which is flying the F-35 fighter jet, developed its Derby air-to-air missile in response to an initial US rejection of a sale of the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM), the second specialist said. There was eventually a policy switch, with Washington agreeing to allow sales of the AMRAAM for the Israeli F-35.

An Israeli opposition to Egyptian Rafales armed with the Meteor showed concern over the European long-range weapon, the second specialist said. There were moments when a stealth fighter lost its stealthy qualities, but a long-range  missile remained long range.

On the sale of the French cruise missile to Egypt, an official Egyptian video  appeared to show Cairo had received the Scalp, dubbed Black Shaheen.

The official video shows Egyptian and French Rafale fighters flying in the French Skyros exercise, with the Egyptian air force chief of staff, general Mohammed Abbas Helmy, standing in front of a Scalp missile in a hanger.

The French armed forces minister, Florence Parly, has previously said the US components on the Scalp would be replaced.

Egypt had requested the Meteor and Scalp missiles as part of a 2015 order worth €5.2 billion ($6.3 billion) for 24 Rafale fighter jets, with an option for 12 more units.

France has sold relatively little in the way of weapons to Israel, with the 2020 government report to parliament on arms export showing €208.3 million of sales from 2010 to 2019.

The political ties in the Middle East have shifted, with the US, Israel and the United Arab Emirates signing up for cooperation under the Abraham Accords, an agreement that reflects a common concern over a perceived threat from Iran.

Among the commercial deals are Dubai Ports World and Israel Shipyards signing up as partners, reportedly to jointly buy Haifa port from Israel, and sailing ships from Dubai through the Red Sea to Eilat. That would bypass the Suez Canal, viewed as costly, and gain for Dubai alternative maritime access to the Mediterranean.

Egypt controls the Suez Canal and would see a loss of income.

The French air force flew from Jan. 20 to Feb. 5 Rafale fighters and A400M transport aircraft on the Skyros mission, deploying to India, the UAE, Egypt and Greece. Force projection, interoperability and cooperation were the aims of the exercise.

 

First Flight of Australia’s First Locally Constructed Defence Aircraft in over 50 years

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on First Flight of Australia’s First Locally Constructed Defence Aircraft in over 50 years
03/02/2021

The Boeing/RAAF Loyal Wingman has had its maiden flight.

This marks the first flight of an Australian locally constructed defence aircraft in more than 50 years.

“The Loyal Wingman’s first flight is a major step in this long-term, significant project for the Air Force and Boeing Australia, and we’re thrilled to be a part of the successful test,” said Air Vice-Marshal Cath Roberts, Head of Air Force Capability for the RAAF.

According to an article published on March 2, 2021 by our partner Australian Defence and Business Review: 

The Boeing Airpower Teaming System (ATS) uncrewed aerial system (UAS) being developed for the RAAF’s Loyal Wingman program made a successful first flight at Woomera on February 27.

The flight comes after a series of successful engine tests and low speed taxi tests at Amberley, and high-speed taxi tests at Woomera. It was pushed back from a planned December 2020 timetable primarily due to the fluctuating status of state borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and unfavourable weather conditions at the remote test facility in recent weeks.

Development of the ATS is being partially funded to the tune of A$155 million by the RAAF under its DEF 6114 Loyal Wingman development program which will include three test aircraft. If successful, the program may lead to a requirement for an uncrewed combat capability to augment manned fighters, electronic attack aircraft, and high-value assets such as the E-7A Wedgetail and KC-30A MRTT.

Additional funding of $115 million was announced on March 2 following an government commitment to fund the development of three additional aircraft.

“The Australian government’s continued investment in the innovative Loyal Wingman program will create jobs and opportunities for over 35 Australian suppliers and small businesses, including BAE Systems Australia, RUAG Australia, AME Systems and Ferra Engineering,” Boeing Australia, New Zealand & South Pacific president, Dr Brendan Nelson said in a statement.

Boeing says the additional funding will support the maturation of the aircraft design, evolution of current and future payloads, and create the sustainment system for the aircraft in operations. 

“In addition to progressing the air vehicle design and support system, we will further develop the aircraft’s mission system including advanced AI decision-making capabilities and new payloads,” Boeing ATS program director, Dr Shane Arnott said. “Continued digital engineering and significantly expanded live testing of the system will provide RAAF and Boeing with the ability to jointly take the concept to the next level, activities that are critical for us to rapidly understand how the Airpower Teaming System can be employed in the future battlespace.”

In a separate statement, the RAAF’s Head of Air Force Capability, AVM Cath Roberts added, “The Loyal Wingman’s first flight is a major step in this long-term, significant project for the Air Force and Boeing Australia, and we’re thrilled to be a part of the successful test. The Loyal Wingman project is a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams.”

Revealed at the 2019 Avalon Airshow, the ATS features low observable shaping, a single engine derived from a business jet, an internal fuselage weapons/sensor bay, and detachable nose sections that can carry various sensors or electronic warfare equipment.

“Boeing and Australia are pioneering fully integrated combat operations by crewed and uncrewed aircraft,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security President and CEO Leanne Caret said. “We’re honoured to be opening this part of aviation’s future with the Royal Australian Air Force, and we look forward to showing others how they also could benefit from our loyal wingman capabilities.”

Apart from the RAAF’s Loyal Wingman program, the ATS is expected to be developed into several different versions and be offered for similar programs currently underway in the US and UK, including the USAF’s Skyborg program.

And in a Defence Connect article published on March 2, 2021, the commitment of the Australian government to the program was highlighted.

Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price has confirmed that the federal government will invest a further $115 million to procure three additional Loyal Wingman aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), doubling the size of the fleet.

This is in addition to the $40 million already invested in the program, as part of a broader effort to assess the benefits of enhanced interoperability between piloted and remotely piloted air team systems in support of Australia’s defence and national security objectives.

According to Defence, the investment will ensure ongoing support of the current workforce and key industries, including advanced mission system software development, high technology aircraft manufacturing and uncrewed aircraft flight testing.

The Loyal Wingman program is part of the strategic shift Australia is undergoing.

In an article written after a Williams Foundation seminar held in the first part of 2019, this shift was highlighted as follows:

The latest Williams Seminar held in Canberra on April 11, 2019 focused on the strategic shift for Australia within the context of the evolving global situation.

Facing the rising challenges posed by the 21stcentury authoritarian states, and by the changing nature of alliances in the Pacific and in Europe, Australia needs to enhance its sovereign capabilities to operate within a regional or global crisis.

And this requires, Australia to have more capability to sustain its evolving integrated force and to do so in the service of the direct defense of Australia.

The Williams seminars over the past five years have focused in detail on the reshaping of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a more integrated force, one which can operate as discrete Australian force packages able to operate with allies or on their own.

The acquisition of the F-35 is seen as a trigger for accelerating the kind of force integration which Australia is seeking, namely a very capable force package within which fifth generation enablement enhances the lethality and survivability of modular force packages.

But the goal is to have such capability both for the direct defense of Australia and to work with allies during sustained periods of crisis.

It was clear from the latest Williams Seminar that this is not just a technical force packaging effort. It is part of a broader reset within Australian thinking about how to move ahead as the global competition changes.

As Williams Research Fellow, Dr. Alan Stephens put it, Australia needs to focus on Plan B:

“A military posture based on the premise that Australians will assume the burden of combat of defending their own country.”

“For most of our history, Australia has been unwilling to confront the imperatives of a defence posture which would require us to assume the burden of responsibility. Consequently, when faced with our only existential threat, in World War II, we were left dangerously exposed; while on other occasions, the apparent need to pay regular premiums on Plan A has drawn us into morally dubious wars of choice.

“In short, Plan A has distorted our strategic thinking and compromised our independence.

“If Australian defence is to be credibly self-reliant – if we are to have a Plan B – we can start by looking to the examples of those individuals and local industries that have challenged traditionalists and science-deniers, and have instead embraced innovation and transformation.”

Dr. Andrew Carr then followed highlighting what this means in terms of the strategic reset for Australia in dealing with the direct challenges from China and the changing dynamics of the American Alliance. Carr argued that Australia needed to focus on its regional interests rather than following American proclivities over the past three Administrations to pursue conflicts significantly removed from direct defense challenges to Australia itself.

“This is not to suggest an isolationist or inward-looking turn. Far from it. Nor is it about returning to the 1980s Defence of Australia concepts.

“Rather, it is a position which takes seriously the idea that we may be early into a half-century or more of strategic competition. This means knowing what we will fight to protect and how we can do so. And then being able to go forward from a secure continent. That is what a return to fundamentals means.

“To do otherwise, to keep focusing on what we can do at the furthest limits from our core interests, attempting merely to hold firm to the status quo is to risk our own version of a grey zone style crisis.

“A world where we are making commitments to our allies abroad that we can’t be sure future government’s and the Australian public will want to keep.

“Nor does this extended approach make sense in the face of our specific adversary on the field today. A strategy of simply trying to give ‘110%’, year in and year out, by tired and debt-ridden Western nations, finding ourselves always on the defence against a better resourced and fresher People’s Republic of China is not a winning approach.”

He posed a key question: What are the fundamentals of continental security for Australia?

Carr underscored that Australia needed to deal with the new strategic challenge and to do so by rethinking its defense and security strategies.

“Unfortunately, this is a question we will need to think through afresh, rather than hoping that past generations have done the work for us. The Defence of Australia policy, which was in place from roughly 1972 to 1997 took shape in a very different world, politically and technologically. This was an era where our continent was secure – something that is not obviously true today.”

The well-known Australian strategist Brendan Sargeant then contributed his thoughts on the way ahead in this new historical era.  Sargeant has had many policy positions in the Australian government and spoke from that experience to discuss the challenges facing Australia in this new period of history.

His focus was upon how best to take the capabilities Australia has built and is building and how to leverage them effectively in Australian interests

“The development of capability is important, perhaps the most important element of defence policy, but also important is understanding how these capabilities might need to be used in the future.

“How should we shape the force to respond to future crises?

“How we think about that question will in part determine how we want to evolve capabilities, and how powerful and sustainable we will want the force to be.

“Have we thought sufficiently about how we might need to use defence capability in the future, and are we building for that day or days?”

The remainder of the seminar focused on what one might call the eco system for a more sustainable ADF.  A key element of shaping a way ahead clearly is to shape a more sustainable force which can endure through a crisis. This meant taking off the table the capability of the Chinese to disrupt the supply chains into Australia and choking off the sustainability of the ADF. This clearly needs to be dealt with by crafting “buffer” capabilities to sustain the force.

Another key aspect being worked is enhanced local industrial support to ADF forces, as well as new approach to stockpiling parts and skill sets to sustain the force.

There are clear security issues as well. There needs to be enhanced security of Australian civil as well as military infrastructure, in terms of IT, C2 and energy security.

Put in blunt terms, with a focus on direct defense of Australia comes a broader social recognition of the long-term challenges posed by its powerful neighbor in the region as well as finding ways to rethink crisis management tools. An integrated ADF which able to operate in flexible force packages as a key enabler for sovereign options in a crisis is a different trajectory than envisaged in the last White Paper.

But to enable, you need to survive and be sustained. This is why active defense measures are being stood up and rethinking about logistics and industrial support under way.

It is clearly a work in progress.

But the new Aussie approach will have significant implications for Australia’s allies and industrial partners as well.  A focus on sustainable direct defense will clearly mean a shift in focus and reorientation of how Australia will work with global partners and industry.  And this has direct consequences for programs such as the British frigate, the French submarine and US produced 21st century air combat assets, such as P-8, Triton, Growler and F-35.

Dr. Carr highlighted how different the way ahead is from the recent past.

“We should find a new language instead of the term self-reliance.

“This term has always been used by Australians to mean an exception to usual practice. Self-Reliance was we did in the worst-case scenario, or did on the margins while normal allied cooperation was the mainstay.

“Instead we should think of this issue as most other countries do. Defending ourselves is our task and our primary responsibility. We will build alliance cooperation on top of this, we will seek to use our geography to support and sustain a regional order that has been very valuable to us. But what we do alone is not the exception, but a fundamental part of a re-invigorated, and resilient approach.

“So let us take this moment to rethink and regroup. The siren calling us back onto the pitch is sure to blast very soon, and the next half is going to be even tougher. But with a better plan, based on the fundamentals, I am confident the game’s momentum will soon run our way.”

For our examination of the evolution of Australian defence strategy, please see the following:

Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy

 

Leveraging an African Opportunity for the Counter-Terrorism Fight

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Leveraging an African Opportunity for the Counter-Terrorism Fight
03/01/2021

By Murielle Delaporte

Sahel is among the worst nightmares for any counter-terrorist expert and planner.

It feels like the old saying of getting rid of an enemy through the door before it comes back – regenerated or under a different form – via the window.

In some ways the level of danger and violence resembles the early 2000’s with the same type of alliances between the Touaregs of Northern Mali and Al Qaida terror groups which triggered the Malian government to request Paris help to roll back the Islamist threat,

The Serval operation in 2013 became Barkhane in 2014 in order to enhance regional stability among the newly created G5 Sahel group which includes in addition to Mali, its neighbors Niger and Burkina Fasso, as well as Mauritania and Chad on each side.

Since 2013 a myriad of organizations and countries have been acting like fairy godmothers providing financial help for development and military support to fight violence, and the number is still growing as more European partners’ special forces are in the process of joining the recently created Takuba Task Force.

The U.S.-supported but French-lead Barkhane operation has been successful in containing the Jihadist threat, but has not been able to fully eradicate it, as the negative spiral between terrorist attacks and the resulting increased poverty and migrations keep feeding each other.

The real origin of this centuries-old regional chaos has indeed mostly to do with the immensity and the harshness of the territory, making it difficult for any state authority to settle and provide governance, food, jobs, as well as education.

Terror groups come and go constantly adapting to the security posture and regenerating while living on the multiple traffics the geography allows (humans, drugs, arms, etc).

Figures of increased attacks and civilians’ deaths would be enough to discourage any attempt to go on and try to get rid of a few thousands agile and deadly fighters bringing hell on a daily basis to terrorized populations.

However, they mask another reality on the ground, which is the breakthrough of having the G5 countries recognizing they have to unite to fight their common enemies. If bilateral or trilateral mixed patrols between Sahelian countries and Barkhane, as well as with Niger-based U.S. forces, have been existing since the Serval aftermath, the concept of an all-African regional military coordination allowing the conduct of operations is rather new. And such a force is tailored to deal precisely with jihadist groups grafting themselves on the misery of populations caught in the middle of multiple and multiform strife.

The G5 Joint Force In Sahel : A Promising Case Study of a Way Ahead

The G5 force was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in April 2017 and was strengthened by the adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2359 in June.

It was shaped on the basis of lessons learned from the Multinational Joint Task Force (a combined multinational formation comprising units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to fight Boko Haram) as well as other similar experiences (Somalia). The G5 Joint Force in Sahel (or FC-G5S for ‘’Force conjointe du G5 Sahel’’) was meant in its current Commander (COMANFOR), general Oumarou Namata Gazama’s words, ‘’to respond to the regional nature of the threat and to fill the trans-border security gap in order to accompany the G5 Sahel in carrying on with its credo : Security and Development.’’

The approach has focused in countering the spillover of terror groups between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in the area known as ‘’the three borders.” Before 2017, none of the armed forces of these countries were allowed to pursue their enemies in the neighbor’s territory. The terrorist groups took advantage of such a weakness to spread and hide before regrouping.

But now the G5 Joint Force can operate in three 200-kms sectors (it used to be only 100 kms and the area of operation keeps increasing, which is a sign of the existing virtual circle between success and confidence). After a false start caused by a deadly attack on their headquarters in Central Mali in 2018, the

G5 Joint Force in Sahel has been generating and training its forces (currently comprised of 7 battalions and a total of 4,000 men). These successes have been evident last year. The joint command has gathered not only the three African countries, but also French and U.S. military officers in Niamey, Niger, wide-ranging operations.  And these operations were able to be planned and coordinated with others led by national armed forces, the Barkhane Force as well as with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali initiated since 2013 (MINUSMA).

As an example of the typical multilateral cooperation that goes on the ground on a regular basis, a recent major operation designed to control a 300-mile wide specific area of the theater involved 3,000 troops, half of which originating from Mali and Niger. This operation was also not only supported by U.S., British and Danish air and ISR assets, but also (and for the very first time) by French and Estonian special forces from the Takuba Task Force. And these forces operated along with units from Mali and Niger as well.

Backing the efforts of the G5 Joint Force in Sahel provides an example of how Western and African forces can work together to not only contain but contribute to eradicate terrorist violence and control illegal trafficking in the region. And this is being done without a large contingent of western boots on the ground which would simply generate another endless war.

At the same time, the G5 Joint Force provides a way to continue Western engagement to work with Africans to deal with the ongoing terrorist challenges in Africa, Europe and beyond. Supporting a toolset such as the G5 Joint Force in Sahel constitutes in that sense a genuine springboard for future transnational stability, accountability and peace, as its main focus is cross-border operations coordination, which is key to fight the terrorist groups’ and counter their strategy.

Source for the photos: G5 Sahel facebook September 2019

An earlier version of this article appeared on Breaking Defense.

Looking Back and Looking Forward with Regard to Airpower: Don’t Ignore Organizational Culture in Sorting Through Mastering the Targeting Enterprise

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Looking Back and Looking Forward with Regard to Airpower: Don’t Ignore Organizational Culture in Sorting Through Mastering the Targeting Enterprise
02/28/2021

By Robbin Laird

In his book, Selling Schweinfurt, Col. Brian D. Vlaun discusses how combat leaders, supported by their structures that provide cross-cutting assessments of target effectiveness, sorted through the challenge of how to use the World War II European-based bomber force.

The core effort was pretty straightforward — attrite German military capabilities.

But beyond that focal point, questions loomed over how best to attrite the industrial and economic base supporting the German war effort, while determining how best to support the coming invasion force.

There certainly was not consensus on how to do either of those efforts optimally.

Intelligence organizations developed during the war clearly influenced judgements about targeting and how to employ the bomber force toward favored objectives from the various communities’ analytical preferences.

From this standpoint, nothing has changed.

In armed conflict, objectives need to be selected and forces packaged to achieve the desired effects.

With modern ISR systems, one has more data, but follow-on damage assessment is still challenging.

Determination of what to do in terms of follow-on force attacks and tactical or strategic judgements about the conflict are subject to very different analytical paths dependent upon the chosen data, the analysts’ preferences, and the political and institutional interests of the policy makers.

The policy narrative will lead a targeting approach, and the danger is that this narrative will also highlight the “correct” intelligence assessments.

As the author cautions: “An air campaign may never be fought with perfect information, but we can endeavor to ask the right questions: What are the organizational interests at play?

“What ideas and symbols are they selling, and why? And how will these affect the air campaign?”

I had a chance recently to interview Col. Vlaun and to discuss his book further as well as lessons learned going forward towards what I would call the shift from the single service kill chain to a multi-domain kill web.

I think the importance of his book, from my point of view, is that working the culture of targeting across multi domain forces is not solved by technology.

Technology can facilitate big data management; but does not deliver, by itself, enhanced targeting capabilities and solutions.

Col. Vlaun is a USAF officer in the bomber force. He has served in the Middle East with the B-1 and has four B-1 deployments. He then went to the Nellis Weapons School for the B-1 and taught at the weapons school. His experience led him to think about the challenge of learning how to best employ modern weapons systems and how to deliver effective targeting solutions.

And that interest led him during his studies at the Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies to look at the World War II bombing campaign experience with regard to how targeting solutions and effectiveness were determined and assessed.

He later had a NATO assignment in Spain where he gained practical experience with the challenge of managing different combat cultures and working targeting integration.

Clearly, Combined Air Operations Centers teach one the challenge of managing the microcosm of cultures that need to be understood to build and shape air tasking orders.

He is now serving at Minot Air Force Base In North Dakota, where he is Vice Commander of the 5th Bomb Wing, which operates a fleet of B-25H Stratofortress bombers as part of the USAF’s conventional bomber task forces and strategic deterrent force.

According to Col. Vlaun: “My background has made me really interested in the parallels between the things we were seeing 70 years ago to what I think we’re looking at today.”

We discussed the evolution of targeting as the kill chain evolves into the kill web.

Col. Vlaun’s perspective informed by his research is to highlight the challenge of shaping the right sort of questions as we move forward for dynamic targeting with a multi-domain force.

How do we determine the changes necessary to steer the organizational cultures underlying multi-domain targeting?

According to Col. Vlaun: “What we need to be doing now to help organizations learn for tomorrow’s fight?

“And are we developing the right competencies to best shape the growing role of multi-domain targeting?”

“As we continue enhancing the capabilities that we have between our sensors, our command and control, and our shooters, I think we need to have our eyes open to whether we’re looking at just an evolution in our approach to targeting, or whether we may add all of this up to something that is revolutionary in the way that we plan and apply air power.”

Looking back 70 years ago, it was clear that, in Col. Vlaun’s words: “Organizations are not particularly good at self-reflection, which I think is an important consideration moving forward, because we have expanded our feedback loops to commanders, and it is up to commanders to drive the learning and changes necessary for effective targeting in a multi-domain environment.

“How do we continue to enhance commanders’ and their organizations’ abilities to make these kinds of crucial self-assessments in multi-domain environments?

He added: “If we’re going to change the way we fight, we’ve got to figure out how to be able to assess and improve our organizational cultures, understanding, of course, that these things don’t happen quickly.

“But at least having our minds open to where the influences of culture are on our organizations, we can chart paths to accelerate change in the right direction.”

From my perspective, as we focus on kill web solutions, the cultural dimension for shaping effective targeting goes up, not down.

And Col. Vlaun’s insightful look at the cultures within and outside of the Army Air Force in WW II shaped the targeting approaches during that war inform how we should think today about the way ahead.

This is how he concludes his book:

Understanding airpower requires an understanding of the organizations nominating targets and performing analysis. This imperative does not appertain solely to historical analyses; it is also incumbent upon those preparing for and fighting wars to assess not only external organizations but also their own.

This is no easy task, however, especially for those on the inside. Stephen Rosen aptly offers, “Although it is hard to understand others, it is harder to understand ourselves. … Organizational self-assessments have rarely displayed a realistic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the organization.”1

The effort is worthwhile, because organizational learning may help reduce the costs of war or avoid campaigns of attrition altogether through a more comprehensive strategy. An air campaign may never be fought with perfect information, but we can endeavor to ask the right questions: What are the organizational interests at play? What ideas and symbols are they selling, and why? And how will these affect the air campaign?[1]

He warns: “Perhaps no factor is more prescient or insidious than the organizational implications of air intelligence modernization.”[2]

He then went on to identify two key challenges facing the strategic shift in targeting culture.

The first is the built-in problem of organizational interests shaping the intelligence assessment and not understanding how that interactive dynamic works in shaping tactics and strategy for the use of airpower.

The second is the danger of making unrealistic assumptions about what big data analytics can deliver with regard to judgements about intelligence in service of targeting, and even more to the point in terms of the dynamics of rapid battle assessment.

In short, Col. Vlaun has provided a very interesting look at the history of the targeting regimes and various metrics shaped in the European bombing campaign.

And he has provided a lot to think about with regard to the challenges of modern kill chains and kill webs when addressing how to shape the kind of combat or crisis management effects desired in combat.

[1] Brian D. Vlaun, Selling Schweinfurt (History of Military Aviation) (p. 213). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

[2] Brian D. Vlaun, Selling Schweinfurt (History of Military Aviation) (p. 211). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

Colonel Perrin Provides an Update on the CH-53K: February 2021

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Colonel Perrin Provides an Update on the CH-53K: February 2021
02/27/2021

By Robbin Laird

A year ago, I visited Pax River and had a chance to discuss the progress of the CH-53K with  Colonel Jack Perrin Program Manager, PMA-261 H53 Heavy Lift Helicopters, US Naval Air Systems Command at Pax River Naval Air Station.

And this week, he provided an update at this week’s International Military Helicopter Conference.

What was especially noteworthy was that Col. Perrin was able after a year of COVID-19 disruptions to report significant progress on the program.

Indeed, when answering a question from the virtual audience, he underscored how the team – government and industry – had adapted to the challenging conditions to continue progress on the program and to continue to close on to the IOC for the program.

He noted that the sea trials held last year were done under challenging conditions but were completed very successfully.

This is a testament to a very good working team supporting the program and hats off to them being able to persist in the face of significant uncertainties.

But then again they are Marines!

My visit to New River during the first week of December 2020 underscored the significant progress underway which Col. Perrin discussed at the conference.

Notably, the training systems are in place, the maintenance regime is working well, and last month, the Marines were able to completely maintain their CH-53Ks at New River on their own without contractor support as they moved down the road to later operational testing this year.

And last month, CH-53K King Stallion took its first fleet flight. Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) at Marine Corps Air Station New River, NC, launched the CH-53K King Stallion on its first fleet flight January 15, 2021.

The aircraft now enters a new phase of testing where it will be used to train Marines as they prepare for Operational Test and Evaluation later this year.

Col. Perrin focused significantly in his presentation on what the only new heavy lift helicopter for the joint force would bring to that force.

“I would tell you the 53K is what I would call the 5 th generation or the leading generation of heavy lift helicopters for all helicopters. It is fly by wire it has the power and speed that you really need in a helicopter and really executes its mission extremely well.”

He put a key point very well which pilots of the CH-53K have emphasized: “The pilots can put the aircraft where they need to in the combat environment.”

This is about the ability to work in degraded environments and with the fly by wire and other digital systems are able to put that aircraft exactly where the optimal location in the combat environment.

When I met with Lt. Col. Frank of VMX-1, the officer in charge of the CH-53K Operational Test Detachment, he underscored the importance of this capability to the warfighter.

“I’ve started in the Ch-53D in 2004, they’re my first love. I’ll always love them.

“They were much harder to fly. And the ease of flying this, the flight control system is probably the biggest game changer for the 53 community.

“We’re not used to anything like this. It’s very intuitive. It can be as hands off as you know, a brand-new Tesla, you can close your eyes, set the autopilot and fly across country.

“Obviously, you wouldn’t do that in a tactical environment, but it does reduce your workload, reduces your stress.

“And in precision hover areas, whether it’s night under low light conditions, under NVGs, in the confines of a tight landing zone, we have the ability to hit position hold in the 53 K and have the aircraft maintain pretty much within one foot of its intended hover point, one foot forward, lateral and AFT, and then one foot of vertical elevation change.

“It will maintain that hover until the end of the time if required. that’s very, very stress relieving for us when landing in degraded visual environments. Our goal at VMX-1 is to create tactics that employ that system effectively.

“Some communities struggle with how they use the automation, do they let the automation do everything? Do they let the pilots do everything? How to work the balance?

“We’re working on a hybrid where the pilots can most effectively leverage automation.

“If you know you’re coming into a brownout situation or degraded visual environment, you engage the automation at a point right before the dust envelops you. And then in the 53-K, you can continue flying with the automation engaged.

“You continue flying with the automation engaged, and you can override it, but as soon as you stop moving the controls, it will take your inputs, estimate what you wanted and keep the aircraft in its position.

“It’s a very intuitive flight control system, and it blends very well with the pilot and the computers. It allows you to override the computer.

“And then the second that you stop overriding it, the computer takes back over without any further pilot input.

“That’s probably the biggest game changer for our community.”

Colonel Perrin also emphasized the importance of enhanced survivability. “It was designed with survivability in mind.

“And what does that mean?

“When we define survivability it is how does the aircraft perform after its been hit and what I mean by that that is after its been shot at or after a missile has been shot at it.

“The 53K was designed to perform extremely well to get those pilots and crew out of that danger area…. Its ability to have survivability and survivability capabilities are extremely good.”

When met last year, we discussed at length a key element of new air systems, namely, being designed from the ground up for digital interoperability and software upgradeability.

Colonel Perrin highlighted that the aircraft was a “smart aircraft” and that it would both draw from and contribute to the integratable combat force working in a digital combat space.

In my words, it is designed to be a kill web contributor as well as engagement asset in the extended combat space.

He was asked a question of how it would work with the Osprey and highlighted how the two working together would help redefine the nature of the assault force.

Some of that change was already presaged in the Deepwater exercise conducted last summer at 2nd Marine Air Wing.

He concluded: “We’re just going to be able to bring more and farther and faster with the 53K as it integrates and moves forward …. I see this as a backbone of support, logistic support for the Marine Corps.”

Featured Photo: The CH-53K King Stallion successfully plugs into a funnel-shaped drogue towed behind a KC-130J during aerial refueling wake testing over the Chesapeake Bay. Photo by Erik Hildebrandt.

Also, see the following:

Marine Corps Conducting Fleet Flight Tests of CH-53K Ahead of IOT&E This Summer

COVID-19 and Live Virtual Constructive Training

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on COVID-19 and Live Virtual Constructive Training
02/26/2021

By Tony McCormack

The world has changed rapidly over the past 18 months and the way Australia’s defence organisation trains its people needs to change with it, or skills and readiness will surely decline.

A combination of the Australian Defence Force’s involvement in responding to natural disasters over the summer of 2019–20 and Covid-19 restrictions throughout 2020 resulted in the cancellation of major military exercises such as Hamel, and the scope of those that did proceed was reduced. Pitch Black 20, initially cancelled, was eventually held as a scaled-down virtual exercise. This pattern was consistent across the Five Eyes, with RIMPAC also drastically reduced in scale and scope.

Despite this reduction in activities, military personnel were still required to retain their individual skills and the ADF to maintain its readiness and preparedness levels. However, the lack of realistic training opportunities no doubt resulted in some atrophy of the ADF’s operational ability.

Despite the availability of a vaccine, Covid restrictions are going to remain with us for a while yet, precluding a return to large-scale training activities and preventing international travel to exercise with allies and partners. Greater investment is needed in alternative approaches that leverage emerging trends in simulation to rectify the deficiencies that the reduction in training will produce.

Live, virtual and constructive training, or LVC, is a taxonomy used mainly for military training, where there’s a mix between real people, simulated capabilities and environments, and computer-generated elements. Imagine a soldier in the field in the Northern Territory, calling in a simulated airstrike from an F-35 pilot seated in a simulator at a Royal Australian Air Force base in New South Wales against a computer-generated threat.

The holy grail of LVC is the ability to integrate all the individual components to conduct complex multidimensional training at varying levels of complexity and security, with widely dispersed personnel and platforms. The ultimate goal is an event that links all components together, giving the participants the maximum training benefit in as realistic an environment as possible.

The ADF conducts LVC to a limited extent. During 2020, the ADF participated in virtual exercises such as Coalition Virtual Flag, Wirra Jaya and Fleet Synthetic Training, to name a few. While all were international, they were constrained to a narrow focus on elements in the air, land and sea environments.

Unfortunately, LVC hasn’t yet reached its potential. The main obstacles are the cost of implementation and of service-specific training systems and, up until last year, the abundance of live training activities and exercises. The changed environment wrought by 2020 has provided the opportunity for a more considered approach to LVC for the ADF.

Covid-19 isn’t the only catalyst for change; the complexities of contemporary military equipment necessitate and complicate the development and implementation of LVC. The combat systems and weapons on high-end platforms such as the F-35 joint strike fighter and air warfare destroyer operate on manufacturers’ proprietary systems at high levels of classification and consume and create massive volumes of data. Stringent security protocols are required to protect both the source codes and the data that is carried, as well as access to a large amount of secure bandwidth.

These weapon systems are also expensive to operate. Combat aircraft cost tens of thousands of dollars per hour to fly, so every hour flown in a simulator means a flying hour saved, a longer period between maintenance cycles and a longer airframe life.

While increasing the scope, quantity and frequency of LVC activities would undoubtedly maximise training opportunities for the ADF and improve the skills and competencies of personnel, it will be difficult to achieve. However, there are some steps that could be taken to improve LVC opportunities.

To begin with, all relevant simulators and computer-based training systems need to be compatible with the LVC network. This will take a change to procurement processes, as current training systems often support only the needs of a particular weapon system, with little thought given to broader interoperability. Where appropriate, new and emerging systems should have LVC compatibility mandated. An extant system should be modified only if it will provide a proven return on investment.

Next, a stand-alone, multi-security, layered IT network should be established. This would remove the added bandwidth demands required to operate LVC from daily operating systems, reduce the chance of data spills and remove any possibility of a simulated scenario being mistaken for an actual event. A robust network may also help to assure manufacturers that their proprietary information won’t be shared with a competitor.

Importantly, an LVC network must be easy to join. A system that’s difficult to get into and navigate will be underutilised and likely provide no training benefit. The system needs to be built for the user and not the IT specialist.

Finally, LVC should not and cannot be pursued by Defence alone. LVC needs a balance of contributors: those who build and maintain the environment, those who provide the training expertise and those who use it. It must be a combination of military and civilian personnel with a broad mixture of qualifications and practical experience.

There’s already a community of Australian companies providing expertise and services in this area. Cubic Australia, for example, currently provides support to all three services across Australia and Milskil, mainly focuses on supporting the fighter force at RAAF Williamtown. Teaming and agreements are already in place and non-defence investments are being made. The North Queensland Simulation Park, or NQ SPARK, is a collaborative activity involving government, industry and academia that’s aimed at providing a multi-user simulation facility.

A more nuanced approach to LVC is needed but it won’t happen unless it is given a higher priority. Resources (particularly budgetary ones) and personnel need to be devoted to building the LVC enterprise. Importantly, LVC needs to be championed at the highest levels to ensure its implementation is promoted and enforced.

While the holy grail will likely never be achieved, circumstances have changed and the requirement to conduct more blended exercises creates opportunities to improve the quality and availability of LVC for the ADF. Training is about people and not just simulators or computers. Any LVC solution needs to be simple to use and provide a training benefit, not a burden.

Tony McCormack joined ASPI’s professional development staff in April 2018 after an extensive career in the Royal Australian Air Force. Image: Department of Defence.

This article was published by ASPI on February 10, 2021.

Also, see our recent book on training for the High-End fight:

In his recent review of the book, Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown had this to say:

For the last 20 years high-end training has continued to be a feature of major USN/USMC and USAF exercises.

However the emphasis and the training has always been modified to take account of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While this was a necessary requirement of the times, it did lead to a stagnation in high-end warfighting concepts as the exercises and training have remained largely unchanged for the last 20 years.

The proliferation of 5th generation technology and the threat posed and encompassed in the cyber and EW domains has continued to evolve rapidly to the point that the latest generation SAMs are not necessarily or even the most significant threats posed to the deployment of Allied Air Power.

The emphasis on operations in the Middle East has meant that the high-end exercises have not evolved as quickly as the technology or the threat.

While the U.S. has continued to develop and deploy leading edge technology for the high-end fight, the training concepts and virtual environments have not necessarily kept pace with the requirements of this new technology.

High quality and realistic training has always been and will continue to be the major determinant in military success.

Training for the High-End Fight is the only recent significant work that looks in detail at this issue.

Robbin Laird uses his significant research over the last seven years and his unprecedented access to USN, USAF and USMC senior warfighters to detail the major shift in thinking that is underway as the U.S. works through the training requirements of Allied Air Power when all the domains are contested by a capable adversary.

Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise “Forest Light“

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise “Forest Light“

From December 7th to 18th, 2020, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) conducted the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercise “Forest Light” with the U.S. Marine Corps in Sekiyama Training Area, Somagahara Training Area and Camp Somagahara.

“Forest Light” aims to enhance bilateral cooperation and improve bilateral response capabilities by conducting field training for bilateral operations upon the respective chain of command of the JGSDF and U.S. Marine Corps. 

Approx. 400 personnel from the 30th infantry regiment, 12th Brigade of the Eastern Army and approx. 500 personnel from the 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division participated in this exercise.

In addition, six MV-22s of U.S. Marine Corps joined in this exercise as well, and carried out the training relocation of MV-22s stationed at MCAS Futenma to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. 

Bilateral exercises in peace time are considerably important for not only maintaining and enhancing the bilateral response capabilities, but also improving the tactical skills of respective forces. Considering these points, the MOD/Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) will continue to enrich bilateral exercises.

Published by the Japanese Ministry of Defence.