INDOPACOM MAGTF Exercise

10/04/2021

U.S. Marines assigned to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, and Marine Wing Support Squadron 172, 1st Marine Air Wing conduct forward arming and refueling point operations during Indo-Pacific Warfighting Exercise in the Northern Training Area on Okinawa, Japan, August 31, 2021.

This force-on-force exercise demonstrated the ability to seize and defend key-maritime terrain and provided an opportunity to employ techniques to rapidly establish FARPs. 2/3 is currently attached to 4th Marines as a part of the Unit Deployment Program.

OKINAWA, JAPAN

08.31.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Jerry Edlin

3rd Marine Division

An Australian Strategy for National Resilience

By Robbin Laird

My colleague John Blackburn has focused for some time on the importance of the Australian defence forces becoming more sustainable from Australian sources. He then broadened his look at resilience to the energy and then maritime sectors. This was PRIOR to the pandemic.

With our societies facing a major challenge in re-launching after the pandemic, the question of resilience, and secure supply chains is now a key part of any effective or successful project for the recovery of the liberal democratic societies.

Recently, I have interviewed Blackburn on the launch of a new study which focuses on the challenges facing Australia in shaping a resilient society. And I will publish that interview in the near future.

Notably, this week the final report of the project is being released.

According to the team which generated the report:

“In early 2020, the International Institute for Economic Research – Australia (IIER-A), in partnership with Global Access Partners (GAP), embarked on an 18-month long project to consider Australia’s resilience in the face of a changing world. Over 250 people participated in 40 activities which included Taskforce meetings, workshops focused on specific issues, and the GAP Summit on National Resilience.

“This politically independent effort involved participants from all sectors, including retired Federal and State politicians and the heads of major peak bodies.

“This report presents an integrated view of the National Resilience Project’s nine component studies.”

The executive summary of the report highlights the findings of the report and follows:

The COVID-19 pandemic was a dual shock to our health and economic systems. The ongoing widespread lockdowns, the troubled vaccination rollout, interstate rivalries and social dislocation exposed vulnerabilities in many systems that underpin our society.

In 2021 Australians are faced with concurrent, and in some cases existential, challenges. These include climate change and the urgent need to reduce emissions, growing global and regional security risks, a global pandemic which will have persistent societal and economic impacts, a global energy transformation where we are lagging the developed world, and a global market model that has resulted in reduced resilience, as evidenced in the face of recent crises.

Our National Resilience Project posed three fundamental questions to our workshop participants: What is a resilient society? Are we resilient enough? Can we make ourselves more resilient? We postulated three key attributes of a resilient society: shared awareness and shared goals; teamwork and collaboration; and the ability to prepare and mobilise in the face of a crisis.

The Project has highlighted our lack of resilience in all three areas. Faced with a crisis that it had not prepared for; the Federal Government closed the nation down and then applauded its’ brilliance in preventing outbreaks of the scale seen overseas.

However, 18 months later we remain closed to the outside world, reactive, and crisis managing the present whilst failing to prepare for the significant health and economic challenges we will face in the next few years. We are not unique; the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a global lack of resilience because of a collective failure of preparedness and mobilisation.

We observe that there is a lack of shared awareness and shared goals in Australia and limited honesty and directness from some Australian politicians about our future challenges. This situation is exacerbated by our Federation’s political systems which has not been able to address our risks and vulnerabilities in a coherent, systemic manner.

Political reactions are often too little, too late, and too short-sighted. A complicating factor is that our Federation structure may have been fit for purpose a century ago, but it cannot deal with the constellation of challenges we face today.

Unfortunately, the prevalence of political spin in lieu of substance over the past decade has also dulled our senses to the point of complacency. Neither side of politics is blameless in this respect. Social cohesion enables and derives from social activity, especially collaborative and supportive activity built on a foundation of trust.

Strong, trusting social bonds that survive and thrive in the face of differences of opinions, beliefs, life circumstances and living conditions are crucial for a society or community to be ‘resilient’, especially when confronted by sudden change or catastrophic threats or events. Federal, state and territory governments need to cooperate on a comprehensive, evidence-based national resilience framework to assess current capabilities and future threats and set national, state, territory, and local policy objectives as part of an overall resilience strategy.

Whilst the formation of the National Cabinet in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with hope and optimism, that soon faded when the behaviour of Federal and some State leaders regressed into self-interest and power plays, compounded by the partisan elements in the media.

As Australia attempts to move on from the COVID-19 pandemic our immediate national challenges are ones of response and recovery. However, we must also prepare for future challenges.

A sovereign nation must buttress, rather than outsource, its self-reliance, and while State, Territory and Federal Governments have taken measures to protect and restore the economy in the wake of COVID-19, a broader long-term vision for domestic manufacturing and trusted supply chains would prepare the ground for a more sustainable recovery, and better prepare the nation for the future.

We are likely to see more compounding disasters on a national scale with far-reaching consequences. We need to be better prepared for these disasters. A nationally coordinated and, where appropriate, standardised, and interoperable disaster preparedness and mobilisation system needs to be developed. Business-as-usual, or more correctly businessas-was, is not an option.

Whilst this is a grim assessment there is some cause for cautious optimism. The actions we need to take are not beyond our ability to design and implement.

We have considerable expertise and resources in this country.

To address some of our resilience deficiencies, we are recommending the creation of an independent National Resilience Institute. The Institute could contribute to a deeper, apolitical, examination of the issues raised in this report.

The aim is to help inform the public policy debate, to improved shared awareness, and to offer ideas on how to improve our national preparedness.

The report can be found in PDF at the following two websites:

Global Access Partners and the Institute for Integrated Economic Research-Australia.

The report can be read in e-book form below:

The Defence 24 Conference on Polish Defence, September 2021

10/01/2021

By Robbin Laird

Warsaw

I am in Warsaw and have just attended the two-day conference held by Defence 24.

According to the organization: “Defence24 Group, the publisher of Defence24.pl portal, is organizing a third edition of Defence24 DAY & SOFEAST conference, focused on the major issues in the areas of defence, security and defence industry.

“This year, Defence24 DAY will take place in a two-day formula, combined with SOFEAST, a scientific conference dedicated to the Special Operations Forces as well as combat medicine.

“Defence24 Day is the leading defence and security sector conference, focused on the major issues of the sectors both in Poland and around the world.

“The event is a place where decision makers, senior administration & Armed Forces officials, defence industry representatives and experts may debate and share their experience.

“It is planned that Mariusz Błaszczak, the Polish Minister of National Defence, Paweł Soloch, the Head of National Security Bureau as well as numerous senior Polish Armed Forces commanders will take place in the conference.”

The agenda for the conference can be found on the Defence 24 website.

I will be reporting on the presentations and discussions which I attended at the conference as well as providing in depth interviews from Polish defence experts with regard to the challenges being faced by Poland and shaping a way ahead for Poland within the overall transition in direct defense in Europe.

In our book, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21st Century Authoritarian Challenge, Murielle Delaporte and I focused on how the current phase of defense in Europe drew upon Cold War history but was very different in many ways as well. Notably, there is a broader challenge posed by both modern Russia and China in which shaping new joint defense capabilities across the European operational landscape needs to be combined with new approaches to security to deal with new infrastructure threats.

That clearly was the perspective provided by participants in the conference.

After 2014, Poland along with other states serious about defense, such as the Nordic states, shifted their focus from out-of-area forces, to reworking how to defend their own national territory against the authoritarian states and their challenges.

And in so doing, for the Poles, as a key state on the Eastern flank of Europe facing the unincorporated states in Europe, both Belarus and Ukraine, and the Putin driven Russian state revival, how to do so is an ongoing work in progress.

The conference provided a number of insights with regard to the agenda for the Poles in shaping a way ahead. I would note that Poland is certainly focused on the challenges of enhanced national security, akin to the concerns I have discussed while in Finland and in the Nordic region, and increasingly in Australia as well,

There is a core concern with dealing with what have been called hybrid threats, namely, the authoritarians working wedges within a society and within that society’s broader alliances by creating asymmetrical threats.

For Poland currently, the Belarusian use of migrants to breach the Polish border on their way into Europe more generally is such a case. This challenge was extensively discussed at the conference, and the Polish response in part has been to mobilize the territorial forces to provide a new brigade to support border security.

This has led to broader European concerns about how to secure European borders, with Poland receiving both criticism and support from a wider European community.

And the wider community aspect is a key one both discussed at the conference and in my interviews.

The Poles clearly see a Russian direct threat to them and to Europe. And they are closer to de Gaulle’s vision of Europe, one of nations cooperating on common interests than to the views of today’s European Commission which sees the way ahead as creating a single set of rules for the entire European community. Here Poland is on collision course with the Commission.

At the same time, there is growing concern among nations who believe that Russia and China pose direct threats to Europe and see the need for enhanced cooperation among like-minded states. Certainly, there is scope for enhanced cooperation with the Nordic states who have deepened their own cooperation as well.

There were references as well about the United States and the dramatic Biden Blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan and the AUKUS announcements. And the elephant in the room clearly is what the Biden Administration is going concretely to do going forward with regard to defense, both globally and in Europe.

The Polish government has raised its defence budget and is considering additional capabilities for its operational approach to direct defense. The challenge will be to build a more integrated joint force going forward and one which can work effectively with allies.

How will the territorial force be shaped going forward? How will it intersect with more mobile capabilities, such as with its F-35 force?

In a period of time in which the allies of Poland are reworking their own defense templates, it is fair to say that there is no model for Poland to apply to its own direct defense which is congruent with what allies are doing themselves.

The Nordics for example, are reworking how to shape a more integrated territorial defense but one in which air and missile power can expand the perimeter for their defense. The F-35 consortia is a key part of reworking how Europeans will deliver multi-domain capabilities to drive greater force integration, and Poland buying the F-35 will be able to participate in this ongoing development.

The United States is facing a significant change from its preoccupation on the land wars in the Middle East to shaping a new 21st century force, kill web enabled, and crafted to provide for force distribution and integration.

But this is a work in progress, one which I have focused on for a number of years with my colleagues.   

How does Poland then intersect with ongoing American and European allied warfighting developments, which are driving significant changes in the templates which will deliver relevant force capabilities against adversary forces, which themselves are undergoing fundamental change?

A notable challenge for Poland is how to both defend its national territory and to operate in its perimeter with mobile forces.

The opportunity to integrate more effectively with its Nordic partners and operate in the defense of the Nordic states is not a task for Abrams tanks.

How best to shape a realistic mobile force which can both operate in the perimeters and aid in the territorial defense?

This applies as well to working with the states in the Black Sea region and when necessary, in the Polish perspective being able to participate in the defense of Ukraine.

The challenge can be simply put: (1) Poland needs to combine credible territorial national defense, but (2) with an ability to participate with allies in breaking down the anti-access area denial approach of the Russians and (3) with credible mobile forces which can move to the point of attack by the Russians on the seams which they hope to open up by hybrid or direct warfare needs. The seam warfare piece of what is often called hybrid warfare is something I discussed recently with MARFORPAC in the Pacific.

In short, Poland is in the front lines of European defense.

How they work their own defense is a key part of the broader allied approach and will drive it as well.

When you are the front lines you tend to take the threat more seriously than when you are not, and that is one of the challenges clearly facing the vision of those like President Macron who champions “European Sovereignty” yet pursues his own vision of Russia in Europe.

Featured Photo: The panel held at the end of day one of the conference on “Technology Development in the Defence Sector: Key Success Factors for R and D and Technology Transfers.” Credit: Second Line of Defense

Talisman Sabre 2021: Support at Sea

Royal Australian Navy destroyer HMAS Brisbane and the United States Navy replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock rendezvoused in the Coral Sea to conduct a core navy-to-navy evolution – a Replenishment at Sea (RAS) during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (TS21).

Commissioned into service in 2018, it was the first time the Australian Hobart class warship conducted an international RAS. Held every two years,

TS21 is the largest bilateral training activity between Australia and the United States, aimed to test Australian interoperability with the United States and other participating forces in complex warfighting scenarios.

In addition to the United States, TS21 involves participating forces from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Australian Department of Defence

July 30, 2021

Shaping a Way Ahead for Force Design 2030 in the Pacific: The Perspective of the MARFORPAC G-9 Branch Head

09/30/2021

By Robbin Laird

Another change since my last visit to MARFORPAC in 2014-2015 was how the distributed laydown begun in that period was being reworked in terms of expanding basing flexibility and force distribution associated with the current Commandant’s Force Design 2030 effort.

I have had a chance both with the East Coast Marines and with the Commander of I MEF and with the Lt. General Rudder and his team in Honolulu to discuss the changes being worked as part of the Force Design 2030 effort.

A very helpful briefing and discussion on the overall effort during my visit was provided appropriately by the head of G-9 Capabilities and Requirements branch within the command, Col. Steve Fiscus. In a previous assignment, he was the commanding officer, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, and his bio from that command is included at the end of the article.

I have had a chance certainly with the East Coast Marines to discuss and observe changes associated with Force Design 2030, and in my time with MARFORPAC have been given the ability to do so with regard to Marines in INDOPACOM.

Col. Fiscus provided really one of the best explanations of how the Force Design 2030 effort was helping shape the Marines after their very significant engagement for 20 years in the Middle Eastern land wars.

The Marines have been working a shift for some time, but it the ability to make a dramatic shift has been constrained by the Middle East land wars and the priority demands from CENTCOM. For the Marines to succeed more effectively in making the shift, it is crucial for them to be able to focus on reworking their forces in line with joint and coalition forces in both Europe and in the Pacific.

A key element of the Force Design effort clearly is to work with the Joint Force in reshaping how that force can work more effectively together against peer adversaries.

And as Col. Fiscus put it: “Within the joint force, someone has to be able to work within the Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) and to be able to identify mobile and fleeting targets for the joint force to engage.”

He put it this way: “The Marines are working towards becoming a light force focused on forward positioning and persistence inside the weapons engagement zone of the adversary to be able to conduct reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance and to be able to hold key capabilities of the adversary at risk.”

He noted that the Marines really do not currently have the kinds of sensors that they need for such a mission focus.

And a good deal of the experimentation and force redesign going forward is to identify, acquire and reshape a land-based force (agile in terms of expeditionary basing) which possess sensors for reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance and to have the kind of low-signature C2 which would allow them to use those sensors as part of a wider kill web.

Col. Fiscus made an extremely important point with regard to enhancing the role of sensor and C2-engaged Marines.

“We need to get much better in understanding the Red Side and how they operate.” And as I saw when visiting East Coast based Marines, there is a growing realization of the importance of ramping up Red Side understanding more akin to how the Marines operated in the Cold War.

These are what the Marines refer to as stand-in forces.

According to Headquarters Marine Corps, stand-in forces are defined as follows: “Stand-in Forces are designed to generate technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements that confront aggressor naval forces with an array of low-signature and affordable platforms and payloads. They must remain resilient under demanding conditions.

“When other elements of the Joint force are outside the weapons engagement zone, preparing for deliberate actions, our forward elements will remain operationally unpredictable, combining lethal and non-lethal capabilities with continued maneuver to facilitate denial activities and otherwise disrupt or deter adversary operations. They don’t have to get to the fight, they’re already there.

“Stand-in Forces will be supported from expeditionary advanced bases and will complement the low signature of the bases with an equally low signature force structure comprised largely of unmanned platforms that operate ashore, afloat, submerged, and aloft in close concert to overwhelm enemy platforms.”

This is an important part of the redesign effort.

But at the same time, the Marines are shaped around what their Marine Expeditionary Units  as a standing force.

The MEUs operating off of the amphibious fleet play a key role in crisis response and contribute significantly to the joint force’s full spectrum crisis management capabilities.

We concluded by my posing the question of where one would look to see the focal point of changes unfolding for INDOPACOM Marines.

He responded that changes will most readily be apparent in the experimentation being undertaken at III MEF as well as the innovations being generated by the MEUs.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN V. FISCUS

LtCol Fiscus was raised in Florida and enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in May 1993.  From 1993 to 1996, he served in 4th Amphibious Assault Battalion.  In December 1996, he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Biology from the University of Central Florida.  In January 1997, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant.

As a Company Grade Officer, LtCol Fiscus served as Platoon Commander, Weapons Platoon, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines; Platoon Commander, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company; Assistant Operations Officer and Element Commander, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Detachment One (MCSOCOM Det-1); and Commanding Officer, Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines.

As a Field Grade Officer, LtCol Fiscus was assigned as the Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; completed USMC Command and Staff College; served as the Infantry Advocate and the Commandant’s Operations Briefer in HQMC, PP&O prior to his most recent assignment as a Non-DoD LNO in Marine Corps Augmentation and Training Support Unit (MCATSU).

LtCol Fiscus has completed 13 total deployments: two combat tours to Iraq (OIF-I and OIF-II) with 1st Force Reconnaissance Company and MCSOCOM Det-1 respectively, three WESTPAC deployments with the 11th MEU (SOC), one 31st MEU deployment, and seven combat deployments to Afghanistan (OEF) while serving as a Non-DoD LNO.

An example of the work being done to implement an aspect of the Force Design 2030 approach has been seen recently in the Navy-led Large Scale exercise. The photos in the slideshow below highlight some aspects of the USMC engagement in that exercise.

A Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System launcher, a command and control vehicle and a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle are transported by a U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushion from Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands, Hawaii, out to U.S.S. San Diego, Aug. 16, 2021. The movement demonstrated the mobility of a Marine Corps fires expeditionary advanced base, a core concept in the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units came together from across 17 time zones as they participated in Large Scale Exercise 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Luke Cohen, released)

U.S. Paratroopers Drop in on Talisman Sabre 2021

09/29/2021

United States Army troops from the 3rd Batallion, 509th Infantry Airbourne conducted an airborne assault dropping into ‘Kangaroo Dropzone’ near Charters Towers, Queensland for Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (TS21).

The paratroopers, based in Alaska, jumped from RAAF C-17A Globemaster aircraft, testing interoperability between Australia and the U.S.

Held every two years, TS21 is the largest bilateral training activity between Australia and the United States, aimed to test Australian interoperability with the United States and other participating forces in complex warfighting scenarios.

In addition to the United States, TS21 involves participating forces from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Greece Signs Agreement to Buy French Frigates, September 2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France and Greece signed Sept. 28 a memorandum of understanding for the sale of three French frigates for defense and intervention (FDI), with an option for a fourth unit, in a deal worth some €3 billion ($3.5 billion), the armed forces ministry said.

“This Tuesday September 28, in the presence of the minister of the armed forces, the Greek defense minister signed with the executive chairmen of Naval Group and MBDA a memorandum of understanding, which envisages the acquisition by the Greek navy three frigates for defense and intervention built in France, with an option for a fourth, as well as their service and related weapons,” the ministry said in a statement.

Announcement of the prospective sale to Greece came almost two weeks after Australia cancelled a project to build 12 French designed conventional attack submarines, and switching to nuclear-powered submarines in a partnership with the UK and US, dubbed AUKUS.

Hervé Grandjean, spokesman for the ministry, said that Australian cancellation was the “exceptional rather than the rule,” when asked in a press conference on the timing of the announcement of the Greek deal.

The defense and foreign ministers of France and Greece also signed a strategic partnership agreement, which included a pledge of mutual assistance, the spokesman said.

Tension between Greece and Turkey has risen in recent years, with conflicting claims over territorial rights in the eastern Mediterranean.

The warship sale to Greece was worth around €3 billion, shared between Naval Group (NG) and MBDA, and included three years of service, the spokesman said. The weapons included Aster 30 and Exocet missiles, and MU 90 torpedo. There will not be naval cruise missiles on the warship.

Talks on the deal were due to run for some three months to allow a contract to be signed.

The spokesman declined to say how the overall €3 billion amount would be shared between Naval Group, a shipbuilder, and missile maker MBDA. Those companies declined to give the value of their shares of the deal.

Asked about the absence of the corvettes in the expected order, the spokesman said the Gowind could meet the requirements of the Greek navy, and although there was no announcement today, that did not rule out talks with the Greek client.

French and Greek media reports had reported before the official announcement the naval deal would include the FDI frigates and Gowind corvettes, boosting the value to some €5 billion.

The FDI was designed for the export market, and Greece will be its first foreign client, if Athens signs the order contract.

There will be no change for delivery of the first FDI for the French navy, which will receive the first of class warship in 2024.

The French navy will then wait for the following two ships, as both will be redirected to the Greek navy in 2025, with the third vessel delivered to Greece in 2026.

The priority for delivering to Greece meant the second and third FDI for the French navy will be a few months late, with delivery respectively in early 2026 and late 2027, the spokesman said.

The fourth and fifth FDI for the French navy will be delivered as scheduled in 2028 and 2029.

Steel has already been cut for what could be the first FDI for Greece.

Talks will open with the French navy and the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office for the new delivery timetable, the spokesman said. A previously announced upgrade of the Lafayette stealth frigate will bridge the gap for the French navy until all the FDI are delivered.

The French navy is expected to sail 15 first rank warships by 2030.

All three FDI for the Greek navy would be built at Lorient, Brittany, northwest France, and Naval Group has held talks with Greek companies to act as local partners.

That shipbuilding in France differs from a previous plan NG set out in a May 28 statement with an Athens dateline. In that plan NG offered four FDI – with three of those built in Greece, two second hand French frigates as a gap filler, and modernization of the Greek navy’s fleet of Meko warships. Weapons offered on that batch of FDI included 21 rolling airframe missiles from the US. NG usually offers European missiles on its warships.

The offer of two used warships was later withdrawn as the French navy needed those vessels.

An upgrade of the Meko fleet would cost around €1 billion, while NG was offering the Gowind 2500 corvette at some €350 million per unit, Naval News website reported.

NG executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellett went to Athens last week to make the latest offer, Challenges business magazine reported Sept. 27.

The Greek quest for new warships drew rival offers from Babcock, Damen, Fincantieri, Lockheed Martin, and TKMS. Lockheed Martin pitched its HF2, based on the Littoral Combat Ship, and that offer was reported in French media as a serious contender.

The potential warship deal with Greece reflects the rising importance of French arms export within Europe, with sales to European allies accounting for 25 percent of all foreign sales of weapons last year, compared to 10 percent in 2017.

Greece has ordered 18 Rafale fighters, 12 of which are second hand from the French air force and six are new aircraft, in a deal worth €2.5 billion. Greece has also said it would order a further six Rafale.

Greece would receive a 4,500 ton warship with the Thales Sea Fire radar, and MBDA 32 Aster 30 B1, and Exocet MM40 Block 3C missiles. There will also be an anti-torpedo decoy.

The warships will be interoperable with European and Nato allies, NG said.

Featured Photo: Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (left) shakes hands with French president Emmanuel Macron at the Élysée Palace. Photograph: Ludovic Marin/EPA

Source for Photo: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/28/greece-to-buy-french-warships-in-multi-billion-euro-defence-deal

And according to the source cited above:

“The Greek navy, which had overseen the deal, had taken stock of tenders from countries that included France, the US and UK. Although the French bid was costlier, it was subsequently improved in the aftermath of the collapse of the submarine sale to Australia, according to Greek media, which reported that under the accord France had also agreed to offer military assistance if necessary.”

 

Marine Corps Leadership Focuses on Ground-Based Ship-Killing Missiles

09/28/2021

 

By Ashley Calingo

Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va.—The Marine Corps’ top modernization priority is fulfilling the requirement for a ground-based anti-ship missile capability.

The operational requirement for this ship-killing capability is a relatively new development stemming from the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the Corps’ Force Design 2030 efforts.

“As the Marine Corps’ first Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile capability, the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System is a force modernization priority central to the Marine Corps’ contribution to the Naval expeditionary force’s anti-surface warfare campaign,” said Lt. Col. John Fraser, Fires branch head at Marine Corps Combat Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration.

When integrated into sensor and communication networks supporting a naval or maritime kill chain and synchronized with the employment of other missile systems, the Marine Corps’ medium-range missile battery will serve as a component of the Naval expeditionary force’s stand-in force in support of the naval sea control effort, said Fraser.

MCSC plays a critical role in equipping Marines with the next-generation, modernized capabilities needed to meet and defeat an evolving threat. In two years, the Long Range Fires program office at MCSC has acquired NMESIS, an anti-ship missile capability meeting the GBASM requirement. Medium-range missile batteries serving as part of Marine Littoral Regiments conducting expeditionary advanced base operations will employ NMESIS, said Fraser.

“In a nutshell, NEMSIS is the ground-based launcher that gives us the ability to fire the Navy’s latest anti-ship missile, the Naval Strike Missile, or NSM,” said Joe McPherson, program manager for Long Range Fires at MCSC. “While the GBASM requirement can encompass multiple materiel solutions and systems under the GBASM requirement, NMESIS is the first system for the Marine Corps providing that ground-based, anti-ship missile capability.”

While the Department of Defense possesses ships and aircraft with anti-ship missile capabilities, McPherson said that the NMESIS uniquely complements these efforts.

“Everything our adversaries have designed over the last 20-30 years are intended to counter [the DOD’s] ships and aircraft,” said McPherson. “The Marine Corps bringing a ground-based solution complicates [the adversary’s] ability to counter our anti-ship capabilities since ground-based launchers, as we’ve found in previous wars, are hard to find. This is what NMESIS brings to the fight—a launcher that is survivable inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone.”

A key element of the system’s survivability is its teleoperated transport vehicle, called the Remotely-Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary Fires.

“By going with a teleoperated vehicle, we increase the survivability of the crews because they’re not co-located with the launcher, which tends to be what gets targeted,” said McPherson.

Marines can control the ROGUE-Fires with a gamelike remote controller or command multiple launchers to autonomously follow behind a leader vehicle. The ROGUE-Fires vehicle, built on a Joint Light Tactical Vehicle platform, provides the Corps with a robust expeditionary system capable of operating anywhere.

Maneuverability and mobility are critical components of NMESIS, and Marines’ ability to operate ROGUE-Fires in both autonomous and teleoperated modes provides the operational commander with strategic options in his battlespace. The ability to displace crews and vehicles in a remote manner apart from one another is a critical step in increasing the survivability of Marines.

McPherson made sure to point out that the NMESIS is not considered an autonomous launcher; Marines are required to directly interact with the fire control system in order to fire the missile.

“The actual fire control system that fires the missile is completely separate from all of the self-driving and autonomy,” said McPherson. “There’s always a Marine who does the mission plan and actually fires the missile.”

The program office selected the Navy’s NSM after extensive market research and analysis on options within industry and the DOD. McPherson noted that missile development is a costly and potentially risky endeavor. The program office used a proven missile solution to eliminate that extra cost and mitigate risk.

“[The program office has] made excellent progress by adopting the Navy’s missile,” said McPherson. “We’ve been able to focus on developing the launcher itself. We’ve built multiple prototypes, successfully conducted multiple firing tests, gone through our initial mobility tests, and we’re on a good path to transition into the next phase of the program.”

The Marine Corps successfully demonstrated NMESIS during Large Scale Exercise 21 in August. The system launched an NSM that flew a non-linear flight path covering over 100 nautical miles before successfully hitting two targets.

“We made it fly a [non-linear] route to simulate what Marines would experience in a real-world situation, where they may have to navigate around friendly and neutral shipping or any other impediments between the ground-based firing position and the target,” said McPherson. “The ability for us to provide waypoints and plan a complex route improves the survivability and utility of the system before impact.”

Though the NMESIS launch at LSE 21 was not an official test associated with MCSC’s acquisition of the system, it provided an opportunity for MCSC and CD&I to gain valuable user feedback from the Marine community who will use the system in the future.

“We hope to get this in the hands of more Marines so we can get that operational feedback, and so they can get more reps and experience on the system,” said Lt. Col. Ryan Collins, Rockets and Artillery Capabilities Integration Officer, Marine Corps Capabilities Development Directorate, Combat Development and Integration. “Because this is a new operational concept, we think it’s very important for them to get involved early in the process.”

In October, the program office plans to send NMESIS assets to Marines in Camp Pendleton, California, so they have additional opportunities to familiarize themselves with the system.

“They’ll be exercising with the system continuously for the next two years, so we can gain user feedback and develop all of the technical techniques and procedures for this new operational concept,” said Collins.

“This will also give us the opportunity to tie in all of the [command and control] and higher-level capabilities that are going to be needed to fully implement the system. Ultimately, Marines are slowly transitioning into getting the system in their hands and getting an understanding of it.”

The program office anticipates deploying their initial set of launchers to a Marine Littoral Regiment by the end of 2023, achieving a significant milestone for Force Design.

This article was published by the Marine Corps Systems Command on September 14, 2021.

For a recent interview with Col. Miagany, G-3, MARFORPAC who discussed Working Integrated Fires in the Pacific, see the following:

Working Integrated Fires in the Pacific: Col. Miagany, G-3, MARFORPAC