The International Fighter Conference 2020: Effectors and the Evolution of Airpower

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12/17/2020

By Robbin Laird

The second strand of the International Fighter Conference 2020 was the question of the effectors which could be delivered by the evolution of air combat power, notably leveraging multi-domain capabilities. This strand was woven throughout the day and could be seen in a variety of ways, in a diversity of presentations.

When one focuses on effectors and is discussing fighter aircraft, the first thing that comes into mind are the weapons carried by that fighter and how they are used, for which targets and at which range. One might also focus on the non-kinetic effects if one is highlighting the domain of the “Old Crows,” namely electronic warfare. But most assuredly the focus is upon what is being carried on those fighters and how those fighters might work with other airborne assets to deliver a combat effect.

But the fighter conference shifted the focus of attention on how fighters can deliver a combat effect within a broader set of interactive combat relationships, which in my mind, constitute a kill web.  The first allied force, which actually discussed the kill web concept, was the RAAF. And it appeared in an interview I did with Air Commodore Roberton now Air Vice-Marshal Steven Roberton which I had prior to ta 2017 Williams Foundation seminar in his office at Williamtown Airbase with as he discussed what he called a three-phase process underway and “we are only at the first step.”

“We need to be in the position where our maritime surface combatants are able to receive the information that we’ve got airborne in the RAAF assets. Once they’ve got that, they’re going to actually be trying to be able to do something with it. That is the second level, namely, where they can integrate with the C2 and ISR flowing from our air fleet.

“But we need to get to the third level, where they too can provide information and weapons for us in the air domain. That is how you will turn a kill chain into a kill web. That’s something that we want in our fifth-generation integrated force. And in a fifth-generation world, it’s less about who is the trigger shooter, but actually making sure that everybody’s contributing effectively to the right decisions made as soon as possible at the lowest possible level. And that is why I see the F-35 as an information age aircraft.”

This year’s Fighter Conference clearly was operating within this frame of reference somewhat like the famous Moliere’s gentlemen who was speaking prose without knowing it.

There were a number of ways the changing nature of effectors was discussed.

The first was with regard to the changing machine to machine relationships among the ISR collectors and how those collectors would gain more utility to fighting at the speed of light with artificial intelligence decision tools managing the data worked among the ISR machines.

The second was how then machines could work more effectively with humans, cognitively and interactively. But as a senior USAF scientist put it, the key effort needs to be to integrate any innovations in the man-machine working relationships into evolving concepts of operations, otherwise innovations in these domains would not be realized.

The machine dynamic was discussed in part in terms of remotes working with manned aircraft. A very insightful presentation was with regard to the loyal wingman program in Australia. Here Boeing Australia is working with the RAAF to shape a remote system with different payloads which could work with a manned aircraft to shape a wolfpack operationally.

Getting to the point where this would work is challenging for a number of challenges need to be met and resolved in order for remotes to fly effectively with a manned asset to deliver the effects which a wolfpack could deliver.  These challenged include but are not limited to integrating into future battle space management frameworks, communications, and cyber standards, and the development of trusted AI algorithms, as these elements are critical to ensure that the RAAF would be able to trust the Loyal Wingman on combat operations.

The FCAS presentation highlighted the coming of remote carriers and their potential role in providing for combat effects and is seen as a major aspect of shaping the design and configuration of the new combat aircraft envisaged to replace Rafale and Eurofighter. Similarly, the Tempest program has similar aspirations, and notably MBDA is in both programs, and as they already build loitering munitions, it is not surprising that they would be on ground floor for smaller remote carriers as well.

Clearly, the first strand of the conference – the enablers – was highly interactive with this second strand focusing on effectors. For example, with regard to third party targeting, a key element of any kill web approach, the question is how to have trustworthy ISR determination and verification of where and when one wants the combat effect, and to then order and direct the means to the area of interest, and to be able to do so without a kinetic or non-kinetic effector necessarily operating directing from a particular fighter.

Many of the discussions of the conference were abstract, conceptual and futuristic but I recently went to Naval Air Station Fallon and observed a future is now event. My visit occurred as the US Navy was hosting a new exercise called Resolute Hunter which is being designed to shape a new paradigm for how 21st century ISR capabilities can be worked to provide for enhanced mission execution.

Much like how NAWDC has added two new warfighting competencies to its program, namely, dynamic targeting and MISR officers, Resolute Hunter is complementing Red Flag, but in some important ways launching a new paradigm for the ISR forces to provide a more significant and leading role for the combat forces.

With the significant upsurge in the capabilities of sensor networks, and the importance of shaping better capabilities to leverage those networks to shape an effective mission, the role of the ISR platforms and integratable forces are of greater significance going forward in force development.

Rather than being the collectors of data and providing that data to the C2 decision makers, or to specific shooters, the ISR force is becoming the fusers of information to provide for decisions distributed in the battlespace to deliver the right combat effect in a timely manner.

When I returned to the East Coast, I had a chance to discuss with Rear Admiral Meier, Naval Air Force Atlantic, how Resolute Hunter was different from Red Flag. “The origins of Red Flag and of TOP GUN were largely tactically focused. Resolute Hunter is focused on shaping an evolving operational approach leveraging the sensor networks in order to best shape and determine the operational employment of our forces and the delivery of the desired combat effect.”

The reshaping of enablers, and recrafting of effectors and their delivery is part of the redesign of capabilities and the question of what kinds of concepts of operations are entailed in these changes is the subject of my next article

Note: Ed Timperlake and I are working a manuscript entitled Maritime Kill Webs, 21st Century Warighiting and Deterrence to be published by USNI Press in 2022. 

Working a Way Ahead on European UAVs: The Perspective of Airbus Defence and Space

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By Pierre Tran

Paris – Airbus Defence and Space expected to sign a contract for a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle in the first quarter of 2021, a deal the company saw as critical for European arms companies, chief executive Dirk Hoke said Dec. 9.

“Here, we are very confident because last week we got the confirmation from OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement) that the nations approved to go towards a contract for early next year,” he told journalists on a virtual link to the Manching office, southern Germany.

“So we will be finalizing last steps, securing the budgets and if everything goes right, we expect a contract signature around the first quarter next year,” he said.

Hoke declined to disclose the budget, saying the amount was in line with the French request.

The French armed forces minister, Florence Parly, put public pressure on Airbus DS to meet a budget capped at €7.1 billion ($8.6 billion) after submitting an initial offer worth almost €10 billion, business magazine Challenges reported. That budget will include development.

Challenges contested the government’s financial case, with officials giving figures which sought to make the European drone cost less than the U.S. Reaper or SkyGuardian.

The revised offer was worth €7 billion or a little under, a source close to the deal said. The final agreement could be signed in January or February.

“Our ambition is clearly to remain at the forefront of unmanned flight in Europe,” Jana Rosenmann, head of Airbus DS unmanned aerial systems, said.

Airbus DS submitted its offer in June, prompting “interesting and lively negotiations with OCCAR,” she said.

There were “very respectful discussions. What we have now on the table is a very fair and reasonable offer for both sides,” she said.

The OCCAR program board and the four partners – France, Germany, Italy and Spain – approved Nov. 19 the offer and there was Dec. 2 a formal “go-ahead,” which allowed the nations to start their approval process, she said.

Each nation has its procedure, with the Bundestag parliament for Germany and the Direction Générale de l’Armament procurement office for France working on the deal, the source said.

The industrial partners, Airbus DS, Dassault Aviation, and Leonardo will work on an integrated digital platform in Manching and also on their own national digital platforms, Rosenmann said.

The UAV will be the first military development program to be worked on the basis of the Digital Design  Manufacturing and Services approach, which will succeed a sequential path in the product life cycle, she said. This aimed to allow co-design and development, while considering the consequences for manufacturing and service once the aircraft was in operation.

There will be heavy use of virtual engineering and behavior simulation, to spot inconsistencies in design, seeking to avoid cost and time overruns, she said. The partners were expected to employ just over 7,000 highly skilled engineers.

The planned order was for 20 UAV systems, with three units per system, making a total fleet of 60 drones. First flight would be in 2025, with series production and delivery in 2028. The commercial wing of Airbus in Toulouse helped prepare the offer.

Significantly, there would be a single final assembly line in Germany, as opposed to the multiple final assembly line model of the Eurofighter.

Remote carrier tests

Airbus DS was also working on remote carriers, which will fly with manned aircraft, she said. The company took part in the Nato Timber Express exercise in June, supplying two simulated remote carriers, connected on the Link 16 data network on the ground and pilots flying Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon, and H-145 helicopters, she said. That allowed high level commands to be made to RCs.

Tests with RCs will continue next year, with sensors, and flying with a Learjet and Tornado, she said. There was also work to integrate with Eurofighter and the future combat air system.

Negotiations were going on for a contract for RCs in phase 1B, after Airbus DS submitted its work in October, she said.

Phase 1B is the next step in design studies on FCAS, intended to fly technology demonstrators in 2026/27.

Airbus was working to mature RC technology up to technology readiness level six, she said.

TRL is a measure of the maturity of technology in an acquisition process.

There was work on small and expendable RCs, as well as larger, conventional units which could serve as loyal wingman, she said. The company was working with MBDA in France and Germany, and a Spanish consortium comprising Cena, GNV, and tecnobit.

The MALE UAV would be integrated with the FCAS system of systems, flying with RCs, the source said.

There would be a first wave of expendable RCs “lighting up” the air defense system, sending back the target information before they were hit.

A second wave might include the UAV, to provide more information, conduct electronic warfare or destroy radars, allowing a third wave of manned aircraft such as the next generation fighter to fly in.

There could be further waves of aircraft.

“We are in a very critical time,” Hoke said. “These are very important projects for European sovereignty and…the European defense industry.”

The featured photo: Jana Rosenmann, head of Airbus DS unmanned aerial systems, briefing reporters at the 2020 Airbus Defence and Space Trade Media Event, December 9, 2020.

Editor’s Note: The Australians are working with Boeing Australia to build a Loyal Wingman UAV, something akin to what the overall goal of the larger UAVs in FCAS might look like.

Recently, a senior Australian RAAF officer involved with the program highlighted a key challenge facing UAVs when operating in integrated airspace with combat aircraft as the key managers of the battlespace.

“The Loyal Wingman is challenged on a range of fronts, including future battlespace management frameworks, communications, and cyber standards, and the development of trusted AI algorithms, as these elements are critical to us being able to trust our Loyal Wingman on combat operations.”

This RAAF officer highlighted the key aspect of trust between the customer and the prime contractor to deliver the kind of development to production process which Rosenmann was talking about.

“Despite the many challenges the trust built between the Royal Australian Air Force and Boeing Australia has grown substantially over the course of the program and has contributed to its success so far.

“This trust is fundamental to the future flexibility needed to adapt this design, should we make further investments. It also provides the foundation for us to adapt quickly, when new designs are needed, and give our primes the ability to foresee needs, before we have fully had the chance to define them. This close partnership is a natural advantage for smaller air forces, which we can make the most of.

“Too much flexibility can also lead to deviating from the goal. And a key design challenge has been maintaining discipline within the program.”

The International Fighter Conference 2020: Enablers, Effectors, and Evolving Capabilities

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12/16/2020

By Robbin Laird

The last two International Fighter Conferences, 2018 and 2019, where very different from this one.

And I am not just referring to the virtual nature of the conference.

This fighter conference was less about fighters than about the changing context of airpower in terms of what enables it, how effectors are being delivered and the multi-domain capabilities to which the fighter forces are expected to deliver.

The enablers were a dominant theme in the conference which focused a great deal of attention on the ISR, and C2 systems within which the fighters operate and how a multi-domain force operates and will operate as those systems evolve over time.

C2 for many of the presenters really stood for Combat Cloud, and for the U.S. speakers the focus was on the USAF led multi-domain C2 efforts.

The effectors really revolved around how fighters and the evolving machine enabled ISR and C2 capabilities would change the battlespace and how fighter engagements would change over the decade ahead.

And evolving capabilities were discussed largely in terms of the impact of the F-35 on the maritime force and upon the legacy combat force and in terms of shaping new ways for European nations to collaborate to deliver either a Tempest system of systems or an FCAS system of systems

At last year’s conference several speakers from states facing front line threats from either Russia or China addressed the key issues of how to ramp up their capabilities to defend themselves in the world as it is now, rather than speculating on the future air systems of 2040.

This was largely absent this year, but that does raise a fundamental question from my standpoint.

My travels over the past two years to European, Australian and American air and naval forces have underscored how rapidly capabilities are changing.

And they are changing in a way that speculating about a long-range future in ways that might not happen at all.

What I have seen is that operations, training and development are increasingly being shaped by a cycle of change, notably with regard to the coming of software-enabled aircraft, such as the P-8 or the F-35.

As the systems envisaged in both Tempest and FCAS are clearly projected to be software enabled aircraft, one can certainly pose the question of how innovations with today’s forces will significantly reshape how the future force will be built and what it would look like.

And combat drives significant change.

It is difficult to believe that in the near or medium term that the air forces of the 21st century authoritarians and of the liberal democracies will not directly engage in combat.

Even if the full spectrum crisis management they engage in might well be contained below the threshold of general war, those engagements will lead to lessons learned and reshaping of capabilities.

And those conflicts do not need to be directly between them but through partners or allies using their equipment and we have some of this already in Syria.

Operations will drive training and training will drive development, a point which is at the center of my forthcoming book on Training for the High End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s.

As before the DefenceIQ fighter conference provided a wide range of insights on the way ahead for airpower, and I will address each of these three elements, enablers, effectors and projected capabilities in separate articles.

With the nature of the virtual conference, the organizers were able to draw in a wide range of speakers and broaden the audience as was forecast by Alexander Stephenson when we spoke earlier this year about the Conference. I think his projections were definitely realized,

Navigating the COVID-19 World: Shaping a Way Ahead for the International Fighter Conference 2020

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Franco-German Consolidation: Next Steps at KNDS

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By Pierre Tran

Paris – KNDS, a Franco-German joint venture in land weapons, seeks a more streamlined management with the appointment of Philippe Petitcolin as chairman and Frank Haun as the sole chief executive, the French finance and defense ministries said Dec. 14 in a statement.

The appointment of a single chief executive officer of KNDS replaces the previous agreement of two CEOs, one drawn from France, the other from Germany, with Haun sharing the post with Stéphane Mayer.

Mayer now leaves the joint venture and also steps down as executive chairman of Nexter, the ministries said.

Nexter is the French partner of the 50/50 joint venture KMW and Nexter Defense Systems (KNDS), with privately owned Krauss-Maffei Wegmann its German partner. Setting up the joint holding company was a step toward European industrial consolidation in the land sector.

Meanwhile, KNDS’s projects list includes building a new European main battle tank, to sell into the East European market, a defense executive said. That tank would be all new, distinct from a concept model presented at the 2018 Eurosatory trade show, built from a turret from the French Leclerc and chassis from the German Leopard 2.

On the KNDS appointments, these aimed for “greater efficiency and integration to the benefit of clients,” the ministries said. A French successor to Mayer will be appointed as Nexter CEO in the next few weeks, and that executive will hold the post of operations director at KNDS.

KNDS will also be slimmed down to one board of directors.

“The shareholders have decided to streamline the governance structure by establishing a single board of directors replacing the existing supervisory and management boards,” Nexter said Dec. 14 in a statement.

The chairman and CEO posts will rotate every four years, an industry executive said. The changes marked a milestone, granting more power to KNDS in the pursuit of integration.

There was no great surprise Haun was named as sole CEO, as news had leaked into the press last week, but the “brusque” departure of Mayer was unexpected, a defense official said.

The lack of a named successor to Mayer as Nexter CEO stood in contrast to KMW’s announcement Ralf Ketzel will be its CEO, stepping up from his previous position as chief business development officer.

The slimmed down structure marked the end of a five-year trial period for KNDS.

In 2015, Emmanuel Macron, the then finance minister, told the French parliamentary lower house there would be a five-year trial period to see if the Franco-German alliance worked, and if it did not, the deal could be unwound.

The creation of separate chairman and CEO posts echoed the shakeup at Airbus, which previously, under political pressure, shared its top management between French and German executives based on passport rather than management skill.

The appointment of Haun and Petitcolin will be closely watched as both have strong personalities. The former was seen as the senior partner when the two CEO posts were held.

Petitcolin, who will take up the chairman’s post March 1, is CEO of Safran, the aero-engine builder. Petitcolin has direct experience in working with tough industrial partners.

Safran is prime contractor on the new engine for the next generation fighter in the Future Combat Air System.

German partner MTU was reported to have been keen to share that pole position and it took some time to make clear the prized prime contractorship was reserved for Safran.

MTU finally accepted Safran’s leadership and agreed to be main partner in the phase 1A study for FCAS, and only then the companies agreed to form an engine joint venture.

The main project for KNDS is to build the Main Ground Combat System, which consists of a heavy tank and associated vehicles to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2.

There is a project for new artillery, the Common Indirect Fire System, to replace the Caesar, but there has not been much work on that recently, the executive said.

There is also the project for a new European main battle tank to replace the vast fleets of Russian tanks in Eastern Europe.

That new tank will need to carry a low-price tag, be well armed and well protected. There will be stiff competition from the Israeli Merkava and South Korean K2 Black Panther, the defense official said.

Featured photo of Frank Haun credited to Reuters.

CH-53K Shapes a Way Ahead: The Training Dimension

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By Robbin Laird, Marine Corps Air Station, New River.

On December 3, 2020, during my visit to New River, I experienced flying in the cockpit of the Marine Corps’s latest key air capability, the CH-53K.  I was in the cockpit with LtCol Luke “Amber” Frank, the VMX-1 Detachment OIC. He is a very experienced  Marine Corps pilot having flown virtually every type of rotorcraft the Marine Corps has, including being a presidential pilot as well.

He is experienced; obviously I am not.

So where did this flight happen?

In the new flight simulator which has been built and is operating at VMX-1.

The man-machine working relationship is a central part of the flight experience, with new capabilities crucial to mission success built around key man-machine capabilities.

A central one is the ability of the aircraft to hover with the automatic system, which allows pilots to operate in very degraded operating conditions to put down their aircraft at desired locations to deliver their payloads.

During our flight, in spite of the bright clear but cold day outside, we experienced several difficult landings in degraded conditions, dust storms, turbulence, and various challenging situations to land the aircraft.

Why does this matter in terms of concepts of operations?

This means that the crew can deliver the payload, Marines or cargo, to the area which is desired in terms of commander’s intent with regard to the landing zone selected for maximum combat effectiveness.

If one is inserting a force to support an effort to destroy key enemy capabilities, being able to take the right kind of situational awareness and land EXACTLY where the commander has determined the force could have the highest combat effect is a core combat capability with tactical and even potentially strategic effect.

This is how a capability within a new aircraft translates into enhanced probability for combat success.

And if you are an allied military which needs capability to insert force rapidly in special operations environment, the CH-53K could be a game changing capability for force insertion.

After my CH-53K ‘flight,’ I toured the first of the VMX-1 CH-53ks on the flight line. What quickly leaps out at you inside the aircraft, is the configuration to manage standard USAF pallets for rapid load and off-load operations.

In the near future, I will publish my interview with LtCol Frank.

And in an interview with Sean Cattanach, Sikorsky’s senior program manager of the U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K Training System, USNI News reported: “One of the benefits of developing a training system concurrently with the aircraft is that we’re able to utilize the digital designs from the aircraft to make sure the training is accurate.”

Bill Falk, Sikorsky CH-53K program director, added in a statement: “The training devices will ensure a flawless entry into service for the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter.”

 

The View from 2nd Marine Air Wing: The Perspective of Major General Cederholm

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12/15/2020

By Robbin Laird

I first visited 2nd MAW in 2007, at the beginning of the Osprey era. There I saw a small number of the aircraft on the tarmac and met with pilots and maintainers at the beginning of a long period of disruptive change, a period of change which delivered new capabilities, and new approaches for the USMC in global operations.

With this visit, I had a chance to follow up on discussions earlier this year with MAWTS-1 and with NAWDC about the dynamics of change with regard to the Marine Corps role in naval operations.

This changing role is being shaped at a time when the U.S. Navy is focused on blue water maneuver warfare, and the Marine Corps part of this might be referred to as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness in support of fleet operations.

But whatever the long-term vision, the future is now.

With the world as it is, and with the rise of 21st century authoritarian powers working skill sets for full spectrum warfare, for 2nd MAW it is about the challenge of being able to fight now and prepare for the future by leveraging current operations and shaping new approaches.

Over the next few weeks, I will generate a series of articles with regard to my visit and the insights I gained from this combat force as they train as they fight, and train as they will need to fight as the threat evolves.

My host for the visit was Major General Cederholm, the CG of 2nd MAW. The CG has flown almost every aircraft in the 2nd MAW inventory, most recently being the F-35. At the end of my visit, we sat down and discussed how he viewed the challenges facing his command and key priorities moving forward.

Without a doubt, the key theme for the CG was readiness to be able to fight with the force he has and to do it on demand.

The readiness theme is one that strategists far from the force can readily forget, but for the operational commanders, and those responsible for the train and equip functions, it is the baseline from which operational realities start.

When I interviewed the U.S. Navy Air Boss earlier this Fall, he underscored how important the challenge of readiness, understood in terms of available fully mission capable aircraft was to the Navy.

Question: What are the biggest challenges you faced when you became the Air Boss?

Vice Admiral Miller: “There were three main things when I came in, and most of them were near term focused.

“Readiness was unacceptable.

“For example, 50% of our FA-18s weren’t flyable. Readiness was clearly the first and the highest priority.

“The second one was to shift our training from counter-terrorism to what we need to fight and win a great power competition.

“The third involved manning challenges. We had gotten ourselves to where we had no bench.

“:We were putting our combat teams together right at the end game and sending them out the door on deployment, and we really weren’t cultivating the expertise we need for the high-end fight.

“We knew that meeting these challenges was not an overnight challenge, but required a sustained effort.”

Major General Cederholm underscored very similar themes.

He started by underscoring that in his view 2nd MAW was “America’s Air Wing.”

“We operate all over the globe. Right now, we have forces all the way from Europe into the Far East, and everywhere in between.

“The sun never sets on 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. We have to have a ready force and generate combat power today as we face the challenges of transformation tomorrow.

“We can never lose our readiness trait, or our ability to respond immediately when called upon.

“We’re looking at efforts right now to increase our readiness and our availability across fully mission capable aircraft, which is basically our no-go criteria when it comes to combat operations. The metric that matters to me is the availability of fully mission capable aircraft, not simply availability of an aircraft.

“When we send aircraft into harms way, we owe the aircrew and the Marine Riflemen, a fully mission capable aircraft.

“In this context, we are focused on increased reliability of parts and weapons systems. I have been focused significantly in my career on training; now I am laser focused on the logistics side as well.

“We are examining reliability across the parts for every type, model, and series of aircraft at 2nd MAW, and working with various institutions to improve reliability.

“Even if there are higher upfront costs to get reliability enhanced, it will be cheaper in the long run for the operation of a more resilient force, which is clearly what one needs when the demand is to fight right now, when the phone rings.”

With regard to the training side, the focus is upon transformation as well.

The shift on the demand side to deal with the pacing threat means that the force needs to be more capable of operating as a distributed but integrated force.

This means as well that the Marines operating the various units in 2nd MAW need to be prepared to work the shift between being a force supporting a command or becoming the lead element in an operation.

This kind of problem-solving flexibility is a key theme at NAWDC and MAWTS-1 and, it is not surprising, to find the same focus upon training for flexibility at 2nd MAW as well.

This is especially true of assault support innovations.

The MV-22B was birthed at 2nd MAW and the disruptive change which Osprey introduced is still driving changes with the force.

The CH-53K is now at VMX-1 as the Marines prepare for it to generate similar processes of change.

“Changes, great changes, in Marine Corps assault support have always originated in 2nd MAW – today is no different.”

The Marines are reworking the maintaining side of the business. “We are revising our table of organization and manpower for logistics.

“We are looking for new balances of working relationships as well between contracted maintenance and uniformed maintainers to free up capability for front line squadrons.

“Our biggest project associated with transformation is in this manpower area.”

With regard to transformation, 2nd MAW as a ready to fight now force works with what they have but are opening the aperture to rethinking about how to use the force elements they have but to operate them in new ways.

I saw a lot of evidence of this point during my stay and will write about them in forthcoming articles.

These changes include new ways to operate the AH-1Zs and UH-1Y with the Ground Combat Element. New training approaches are underway to provide new engagement approaches by operating 2nd MAW with 2nd MEF to deliver new combat approaches to deploying the force.

A recent Deepwater exercise highlighted new ways to leverage assault support and to operate in an extended battlespace. Romeos are starting to train with Vipers to give the fleet better self-defense capabilities. There is a new focus on how Marine Air works with the fleet to contribute to surface and sub surface missions as well.

“We don’t need to wait for force design initiatives to come to fruition to increase our lethality and transform our operating concept.

“We’re doing that through training inside our own formations,  our own platforms and focusing on better ways to deal with the pacing threat.”

The CG highlighted a key way the Marines working with the Navy can enhance combat flexibility within the fleet.

I have argued that the shift from the ARG-MEU to the amphibious task force if appropriately understood can allow that task force to provide significant contributions to sea control and sea denial.

The way the CG put it was as follows: “We are changing our mindset.

“We can swap out the composition on an amphibious deck within two hours to tailor the force to the mission or the threat.

We can configure for HADR operations and swap out with a ship like the USS America into a full up lethal strike asset with F-35s and Ospreys onboard. Mix and match and swapping out assets is a part of working the chess board for 21st century combat operations.”

Another example of the mindset change being worked on the training side can be seen in 2nd MEF/2nd MAW cooperation.

“With the pacing threat, we may not conduct mass regimental lifts.

“I am excited to be working with Second Marine Division with regard to battlefield planning and training on the correlation of what forces they will insert and what assault support is most appropriate to that effort.

“You are taking a smaller element of the GCE, combining it with a smaller element of the ACE, and operating in a chain saw like fashion.

“This means that every seat on the assault aircraft, every pallet being lifted, has to have a design purpose for force inserts. We are changing the way that we think about resupply for the insertion force.”

In short, the challenge is to operate now, but generate change.

As Major General Cederholm put it: “We are generating combat power and transitioning at the same time.”

Maj. Gen. Michael S. Cederholm’s welcome video to 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, July 9th, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Paige C. Stade)

Australia’s China Options

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By Peter Jennings

Australia has a brilliant opportunity to shape US President-elect Joe Biden’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific in a way that will secure a major increase in American military power in the region. This will be a test of the Morrison government’s agility to move quickly to secure an advantage.

The United States Navy plans to re-establish ‘an agile, mobile, at-sea command’ known as the 1st Fleet, focused on Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

Recently the secretary of the US Navy, Kenneth Braithwaite, told a congressional committee, ‘This will reassure our allies and partners of our presence and commitment to this region.’

Planned to grow to the scale of the US 7th Fleet based in Japan, the 1st Fleet restores a unit disbanded in 1973 at the lowest point of America’s experience in the Vietnam War.

Characteristically, the Trump administration seems not to have raised the idea with Australia or indeed Singapore, mooted as the potential shore headquarters of the fleet, but don’t write this off as a last-minute Trump flash in the pan.

The US has long realised that it needs to lift its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. When Australia negotiated the US Marine Corps ‘rotational presence’ operating out of Darwin, the plan agreed with Barack Obama in 2010 was ultimately to locate some major US warships at the Australian navy base, HMAS Stirling, near Perth.

That trail went dry for some years because our own Defence Department has never met an opportunity it could not squander by prevaricating. It’s time to restart this conversation. We should propose to Biden that elements of the US First Fleet should operate out of Stirling and from the Port of Darwin. If Singapore is reluctant to host a land-based headquarters, then we should offer to be the host.

The way to overcome any reluctance in Washington from a new administration considering adopting a late Trump announcement would be for Australia to step forward and offer to bear some of the cost of hosting these ships.

Make no mistake that there is substantial deterrence value for us to have the US Navy and Marines on our shores, working with the Australian Defence Force. Any country looking to do us harm would have to factor the US presence into their calculations. Moreover, we could aim to have some vessels arrive in 2021—contrast that to the decade and a half we will wait for our new submarines to be launched.

Readers will quickly point out that Washington won’t be thrilled to base ships at the Port of Darwin, leased to a Chinese company in 2015 for 99 years. The idiocy of that blunder continues to get in the way of urgent strategic business.

The Australian government has the power to take the ownership back and it should now work with the Biden administration to make the Port of Darwin and HMAS Stirling the military and strategic hubs they need to be.

A chorus of Beijing’s local fanboys will cry that such an Australian act will offend the Chinese Communist Party. The tone will be wrong, the time is not right, more nuance is needed, let’s pick up the phone and find a party functionary sympathetic to our plight.

So much of the critique of Australia’s pushback against CCP assertion focuses on tone rather than the underlying strategic trends. What is happening in the bilateral relationship has little to do with diplomacy and everything to do with the fact that China and Australia have irreconcilable strategic aims and interests.

We have just witnessed the angriest week in Australia–China relations. Many seem bewildered that the situation could have got to this point. Does a call for an investigation into the origins of the worst global pandemic and economic crisis in a century really explain why China is now in effect permanently burning its bridges to rapprochement with Canberra?

The CCP’s strategic plan remains opaque, and deliberately so. The 14-point grievance listreleased by the Chinese embassy in late November tells us the issues over which Beijing is unhappy: foreign investment, 5G, anti-interference laws, independent media and noisy think tanks.

None of this explains how China’s leaders think ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and military sabre-rattling delivers the global leadership they crave and the deference they demand.

For our part, the call is that we must ‘repair’ relations as though we broke the Ming vase in China’s shop. Hold on, weren’t we the ones who were determined to be ‘country neutral’ when cyber spies attacked our national institutions and who cherished (in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s words) our ‘constructive relationship with China, founded on shared interests, mutual benefit and mutual respect’?

At times like this it’s useful to step back to look for the patterns, constraints and opportunities (if any) in the relationship as a way to understand what might happen next.

Economists and strategists use game theory to try to understand individual, company or national decision-making. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ requires two non-communicating parties to choose between cooperating or not cooperating with each other. Over repeated games between trusting parties, cooperation gives both sides the most rewards, but between distrustful parties the short-term pursuit of individual interest, where one side benefits at the other’s expense, usually triumphs.

Applied to Australia–China relations, the prisoner’s dilemma offers some insights but not much hope that things can be fixed.

For much of the past 30 years Australia and China cooperated to mutual benefit. Prime Minister John Howard’s formulation for the relationship was that we could choose to cooperate in areas where we had mutual benefit, principally trade, and agree not to make a fuss where the two countries differed, such as on human rights and on China’s approach to Taiwan.

The prisoner’s dilemma was successful because Beijing mostly chose to cooperate. There were occasional breakdowns: the massacre of protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 should have been read by the world as a sign that the CCP had no intention of relaxing its grip on power.

On balance, though, there was simply too much in it for Australia and China to cease cooperating, but the nature of the Australia–China relationship started to change dramatically in the last decade.

At the same time as our level of economic dependence on China was growing and expanding into areas such as education, tourism and foreign investment, Beijing was also dramatically scaling up its military, turning the People’s Liberation Army into a high-technology force.

A turning point was Beijing’s decision around 2014 to annex and militarise the South China Sea. Between 2014 and 2016—exactly the time it took us to produce a defence white paper—China created three airbases and put enough missiles and aircraft into the region to enable it to shut air and sea traffic any time it pleased.

The CCP’s attempts to buy political influence in our federal and state parliaments and its full-on cyber and human espionage efforts in Australia are becoming more visible.

In the prisoner’s dilemma game, China was defecting from cooperation. It saw that it could make major short-term strategic gains by doing so. For much of the last decade, while China was openly and covertly defecting from cooperation, Australia continued to cooperate. Beijing was more than happy to take advantage of our naivety.

Why were we so gullible?

Partly because many officials and politicians had their careers shaped during the long years of cooperation and were too invested in that world to see it being predated away.

Our intelligence focus was too myopically directed towards combating Islamist extremism and too many businesses, universities and state governments were fixated on making Chinese money without knowing or caring about the military and strategic picture.

My view is that there is little that Australia can do unilaterally to persuade China back towards the mutual-cooperation paradigm. That is because China is more strategically important to us than we are to it. It can afford to defect from cooperation.

But we do have options. Australia has four points of advantage in dealing with China. In order of value they are our alliance with the US, our ability to shape how other democracies deal with China, iron ore and, finally, the things we produce that wealthy Chinese consumers like.

The US alliance is what makes Australia strategically relevant to China and hinders its desire to dominate the Indo-Pacific. That is why China constantly attacks the alliance and its defence industry base. Making the alliance stronger, including by hosting the US 1st Fleet, is the necessary response.

Australia constantly under invests in and underestimates our ability to shape how other democracies deal with China.

Beijing hated our decision on 5G not because of the value of the Australian market but because they judged that our decision to exclude Huawei would have an impact on what other democracies would do. That fear is turning out to be well grounded.

Our best hope to push back against CCP coercion is to internationalise the problem, as has happened with 5G, persuading friends and allies that they will be bullied too if we don’t collectively say to China that their greatness can’t be built on a foundation of contemptuous behaviour.

If China could have found a reliable and plentiful source of iron ore other than Australia, it would have made the switch by now. Brazil is unlikely to replace Australia as a stable, cost-effective and long-term supplier. We have a major leverage point if the government is brave enough to step in and start making controls around price and supply.

Demand for other exports like food, wine, timber, education and tourism comes from Chinese consumers. The CCP might see tactical political advantage from imposing bans or tariffs, but it does so at the risk of annoying its own people, from whom the party seeks legitimacy.

These leverage points give more scope for Australia to secure its interests than is widely understood. Capitulation to Beijing is unthinkable. After years of being lulled into complacency, we need some policy imagination and decisive decision-making to secure our future interests.

Peter Jennings is the executive director of ASPI and a former deputy secretary for strategy in the Department of Defence. A version of this article was published in the Weekend Australian.

This article was published by ASPI on December 5, 2020.

Featured Image: Mark Nolan/Getty Images.