By Robbin Laird

The development and incorporation of autonomous systems into the Australian fifth-generation force requires a close working relationship between defense industry and the Department of Defence and the services. But also requires meeting the challenge already seen with regard to the introduction of software upgradeable systems such as F-35, P-8 and Triton. That challenge is for the warfighters to be able to drive advantages through rapid code rewrites and being able to develop and generate with the autonomous systems advances, disposable systems as well.

This was well put in the discussion with Jason Scholz. As Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster.

It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different. “They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says.

At the seminar, there were presentations by six industrial partners.

Boeing Australia focused on the development of the Loyal Wingman.

With the space which Australia has along with the technical capabilities in the country, Australia is in a good position to be a leader in autonomous systems. According to Andrew Glynn, Boeing Australia, the Airpower Teaming System, which has been established to develop loyal wingman is an important approach to shaping a way ahead. He noted that “the loyal wingman program is an experimentation program with RAAF to provide insights in the use for this type of capability.”  Clearly, from Boeing’s perspective, the standup of the program in Australia is not simply about meeting the ADF needs, but provides a launch pad for broader global development.

Glynn underscored that the teaming approach is designed to develop capabilities which can work with existing fleets. “Once ATS is operational, it will assist the RAAF to protect and project force by addressing quantity at the right quality.”

He noted that the program went from concept to first flight in under three years and that was enabled by the fact that the platform is built on a completely digital foundation.

A second presentation was given by Dr. John Best of Thales, Australia.

In his presentation, he focused on the opportunity to build or enhance sovereign defence capability built around autonomous systems. But to do is not just an industry challenge, it is in his words “an enterprise challenge.” What is required is defence and industry to shape an ecosystem where they can work together to deliver the desired outcome. He also underscored that Australia has the building blocks in place to deliver such a solution.

A particularly important aspect of shaping a way ahead is to shape more effective ways to manage complex systems, and within that context the autonomous piece of complexity. And the continuous learning piece which comes from use in the real world of combat and gray zone operations needs to be fed into the evolution of systems, This means that the “learning piece” needs to be worked into the contractual relationships which industry has with Defence.

A third presentation was by Dr. Andrew Lucas of Agent Oriented Software.

He provided a very helpful clarification of how autonomous systems are different from automatic or automated systems. For Lucas, an autonomous system is goal directed and capable of rational reasoning with regard to those goals. An autonomous system can perceive its environment, determine if the environment affects its goals and then takes actions in alignment with its goals up against the operational environment. It is able to balance proactive and reactive behaviors. This is in contrast to automated system which simply follows a task list or script.

He then provided a way to look at the evolution of autonomy within the context of man-machine operations. His schema is built around the axis of increasing levels of delegation to the system. It moves from the machine simply providing timely advice with the humans making all the decisions; to a semi-autonomous relationship in which the machine is subordinate to a certain level of human authority; and then operating fully autonomous in which the machine operates without huma control or direct oversight.

Dr. Lucas then discussed the relationship between AI and autonomous systems. AI is defined by him as the “theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence.”  AI enables machine learning which is to be understand in terms of “a computer program can learn and adapt to new data without human intervention.” And this then enables to creation of intelligent agents which can be defined as “a computer program that is capable of perceiving and interpretating data sensed from its environment, reflecting events in its environment, and taking actions to achieve given goals without permanent guidance from its user.”

He underscored that to achieve the capability for autonomous systems, several trend lines in the evolution of AI and machine learning need to coalesce or synthesize. From this point of view, he noted that there were several AI trends, thrusts and directions which are shaping a way ahead. These included image analysis and recognition, or sensor identification and assessment, speech recognition and the ability of the human and machine enablement of dialogue, intelligent search and assessment, and intelligent software agents able to work through big data. With such capabilities evolving then situate AI and robotics are enabled with the possibility of machine learning.

In other words, there is clearly a pathway already being shaped to autonomous systems, but investments, experimentation and development remains. And he argued that Australia needs to invest in this development to deliver on the promise of autonomous systems both for the civil and defence sectors.

A fourth presentation was by Northrop Grumman, but done by remote participation from the United States.

Northrop is a key player in Australian defence, and in the area of man-machine teaming, clearly the arrive of Triton is part of the way ahead. But the key focus which the company has upon expanding the types and nature of sensor networks and finding ways to leverage those networks to deliver timely decision-making data is a key part of the way ahead.

Clearly one way already that Northrop is contributing to such a way ahead is with regard to how the F-35 functions as a C2 and sensor “flying combat system” and enables it to fight in an 8-ship formation as a wolfpack. This was not mentioned at the seminar but clearly is a key enabler of the way ahead for the ADF which also provides a foundation for shaping the broader efforts to shape an integrated distributed force able to work a diversity of sensor and communication networks to deliver the desired combat effects.

In the Northrop Grumman presentation, a key point is to shape a way ahead for battleship control where sensors can track operations within that battlespace. Clearly, remote sensors are proliferating and the importance of AI and autonomy for helping the tactical and strategic decision makers to que systems to perform key and dynamic tasks will become increasingly important in the extended battlespace.

A fifth presentation by defense industry was given by Air Vice Marshal Bill Henman (Retd), who is currently a strategic advisor Air and Space for Raytheon Australia.

His presentation focused on a key issue, namely, the countering of autonomous systems. This subject is a key one both in terms of understanding how adversaries are using their own automated systems, which needs to include not simply the question of technology but concepts of operations, which in turn allows you to examine the vulnerabilities of your own systems.

Autonomous systems have vulnerabilities which can be built around spoofing, data corruption as well as braking effective sensor network to C2 communication flows. At the heart of the autonomous system impact is the control challenge. Henman defined control as “enabling friendly manoeuvre while denying adversary manoeuvre. He argued as well that control also involves deconfliction of friendly manoeuvre in terms both of kinetic and non-kinetic fratricide.

In his presentation, he highlighted how autonomous systems can be disabled or eliminated in combat. This can happen by disrupting or spoofing the detection and tracking systems. Or this can happen through various softkill options, such as jamming and spoofing, electronic attack or cyber intrusions. He then highlighted a number of hardkill options both kinetic (close in weapons systems) and non-kinetic, notably high energy lasers and directed energy systems.

These vulnerabilities clearly provide a realistic cautionary note to how autonomous systems can be introduced and used. And this is why their introduction into infrastructure defense such as extended port security or into logistical support, up to and included logistical management systems, are good places to start and to sort through how to do so enhancing rather than compromising national defense and security. `

He ended his presentation by proposing a number of key actions as the way forward with regard to autonomous systems is worked.

First, it is important to create the optimum environment to allow industry, Academia, Research and Development communities to be able to create and field innovative control soltuions. Second, it is crucial to be able to understand the operational implications of an adversary who has greater freedom of manoeuvre with respect to all dimensions of governance of autonomous systems than do the liberal democracies. Third, there needs to be as much focus on the development of superior autonomous decision cycles as there is upon the development of the sense and respond control systems enabling autonomous systems. And finally, he argued for shaping autonomous decision making ‘tutorship’ in roder to build the future confidence needed to send autonomous systems into combat as the force evolves with more agile, multi-domain C2 capabilities.

A final defense industry presentation was by Lockheed Martin Australia. Dr. Tony Lindsay, formerly of the Australian Department of Defence’s Department of Science and Technology or DST, provided insights as well.

Lindsay provided an overview on the decision cycles for the force and how autonomy might provide both enhancements to such decision making as well as more capability to leverage the proliferating sensor networks.

He argued that AI and autonomous systems have the possibility for impacting on all parts of the decision cycle, such as persistent ISR, sensor cuing, scene understanding, and cognitive battle management. They could just as well undercut decision effectiveness if not worked into an effective decision-making cycle. This requires allowing the operator to act using relevant information, be able to align with commander’s intent and provide for system adaptation.

The broader shift associated with the fifth-generation force transformation, namely distributed force which can be scalable and integratable provides a solid foundation for managing proliferating sensor networks as well as finding ways to use autonomous systems within distributed decision-making systems.

In short, shaping a new enterprise approach already underway driven by software-upgradeable systems, and reworking how platform providers work with the forces and defence, presages the significant changes underway into which autonomous systems will be introduced and integrated within the force.

The featured graphic is taken from Dr. Tony Lindsay’s presentation to the Seminar.

By Robbin Laird

During late April 2021, I had the chance to visit II MEF at Camp Lejeune.

This command is a key part of the overall effort to reshape the working relationship between the operational Navy and the USMC to enable integrated operations.

The entire effort encompassed by Second Fleet, Allied Joint Force Command, 2^nd Marine Air Wing and IIMEF constitutes a significant reshaping of how to fight the 4^th Battle of the Atlantic.

For II MEF, such an effort provides both significant challenges and significant opportunities for transformation.

The significant challenge can be put simply: the US Navy is in the throes of significant change as it refocuses on blue water operations and fighting as a fleet.

This is a work in progress.

The USMC under the current Commandant is focused on reshaping to work with the Navy more effective in integrated operations, but doing so when the fleet itself is changing is particularly challenging.

And the strategic shift from the land wars to blue water expeditionary operations is very challenging as an entire generation of Naval and Marine Corps sailors and Marines and their officer have worked in support of COIN and not upon high end warfare.

At the same time, for II MEF there are significant opportunities as well.

The redesign of North Atlantic defense is coming at a time when the Nordic allies are committed to direct defense and to enhancing their own integration to deal with the Russian challenges.

Although IIMEF is not the epicenter for receiving new Marine Corps kit, with the exception of the CH-53K (it does not have F-35Bs as part of its organic fighting force, e.g.), it must find was to innovate with the kit it has and to find new ways to work with an evolving US Navy to sort through how to deliver combat effects from ashore and at sea in support of the maritime fight.

I had a chance to discuss those challenges and opportunities with the three-star IIMEF Commander, Lieutenant General Brian D. Beaudreault, a very experienced Marine who has worked with the core group of leaders who have stood up the innovation cluster from Norfolk through North Carolina to shape a way ahead for a more integrated USMC-USN effort in the Atlantic.

We started by his highlighting the command guidance he has received from the USMC Commandant.

As Lt. General Beaudreault put it: “Paraphrasing the guidance: tighten your lifelines with second and sixth fleet. As they Navy shapes itself to do distributed maritime operations, how do we help, and how do we reconfigure?”

One of the challenges clearly is working both with Second and Sixth Fleet, with C2F as the new kid on the block and Sixth Fleet reworking its efforts in Atlantic defense. There is a clear command issue which needs to be sorted out going forward which is important in helping the Marines to better integrate with Navy evolution. Second Fleet C2 authorities end with Greenland with 6^th Fleet having C2 authorities after that point. But Vice Admiral Lewis is the commander as well of Allied Joint Force Command whose forces obviously extend beyond Greenland into the continent.

In my discussions in the command during my visit, this issues was raised several times and clearly this is a work in progress.

The reason this is especially important for the Marines as that (in my view), a key Cold War mission for the Marines was to get to Norway as rapidly as possible to reinforce their efforts against the Soviets. In those days, the Warsaw Pact geography gave the Russians key advantages in a conflict which they do not have in the new geography.

The Soviets planned in case of conflict, a German style operation against Norway and Denmark.

This is off the table as the Nordic integration of Finland, with Sweden, with Norway with Denmark, and out to the wider reaches of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland, with Iceland as the perimeter of this geographical reach of the Nordic region creates a new strategic situation and opportunity.

For the Marines, a key contribution to the maritime fight in the region is clearly to be able to operate afloat and ashore, and interactively between the two in providing key reconnaissance, key choke point capabilities and fires in support of the maritime maneuver force.

And at the outset, the new capabilities which the Marines are developing will be viewed by the Navy as complimentary to their capabilities, and will need to demonstrate to the fleet that some of their sea denial and sea control functions can be ceded to the Marines in time of conflict.

In effect, a chessboard is being shaped where the fleet interacts with air and land assets to create a 360-degree operational area from Florida to Finnmark.

And the goal as seen by Lt. General Beaudreault is to “leave no operational seams the Russians can exploit in times of conflict.”

A key tool set important to the reworking is clearly training and exercises.

Lt. General Beaudreault emphasized that what is occurring is a “refocus on scale” where the focus is upon the expeditionary strike force level, not at the MEB level. The C2 redesign efforts prioritized by VADM Lewis are a key part of how IIMEF is addressing how to shape the kind of distributed force capability which can deliver a more effective integrated force able to deliver the kind of crisis management and combat effects needed in the North Atlantic.

As Lt. General Beaudreault put the challenge: “What command and control arrangements do we need for a naval distributed force to be effective?” And as this being designed, tested and exercised how will the MEF be reshaped as a key partner in the maritime fight?

The recent testimony of the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency highlighted the central nature of the Russian challenge to the United States and its allies. For the United States, in many ways the most direct threat to our country comes from the forces operating from the Kola Peninsula.

This means that although China may be the pacing threat, warfighting and deterrence of the Russians is crucial. What this means is that experimentation to shape the integrated distributed force needs to reinforce combat capability and not have open ended disruption which reduces the ability to engage the adversary at his time and choosing.

What this means in turn is that there is a clear need to work with the kit that IIMEF has now and not a decade from now.

Part of this is re-imaging what the amphibious forces can bring to the maritime fight.

Part of this is focusing on how legacy assets like Hueys and Cobras can be retrofitted with anti-surface weapons and sensors.

Part of this is relaying on the central role which Ospreys can play in moving forces and support across the chessboard. In other words, modernization accounts need to keep abreast of how the Marines can support the kind of innovation underway with the fleet and the allies in the Atlantic.

In the Commandant’s focus on the Pacific, III MEF is prioritized. T

his leaves II MEF in the position to ensure that it can work more effectively with allies in support of the reshaping of the Marines role in the maritime fight.

As Lt. General Beaudreault put it: “One of our lines of effort in the campaign plan is to deepen our ties with our alliance partners, and not just from an interoperability, I mean truly interdependence, and not just integrated, but interdependent.”

And this clearly is happening with what Rear Admiral Betton, Deputy Commander of Allied JFC. Refers to as the “relevant nations.”  In our recent interview with Betton in Norfolk (I first interviewed him in Portsmouth when he as the first commander of HMS Queen Elizabeth) he underscored how the allied and U.S. efforts were blending and how that blending was central to the strategic redesign.

As Betton put it: “The U.S. is by far the dominant figure of NATO, but it’s not the only piece.

“And it’s not always just the heavy metal that is relevant. It’s the connectivity, it’s the infrastructure and the architecture that enables the 30 nations of NATO to get so much more than the sum of the parts out of their combined effort.

“But it’s particularly the relevant nations in the operational area and their ability to work together which is an important consideration.”

This perspective is certainly shared by Lt. General Beaudreault and is part of the focus on redesign of II MEF. He highlighted in our discussion their working relationships in recent exercises with the UK Royal Marines, with the French 6^th Light Armored Brigade, operational working relationships in Norway, with the Canadians, with the Dutch, etc.

This is not just about exercising, it is about shaping an integratable force, and doing so is a key part of ensuring that Atlantic defense capabilities can be enhanced even while China is being focused on as the “pacing threat.”

We discussed some of the innovations being pursued by IIMEF.

One innovation is working a way ahead to be able to deploy fires ashore in support of the maritime maneuver force.

Currently, they are working with the HIMRS artillery systems and anticipate working in the near term with the naval strike missile, which of course, was developed by the Norwegians but is managed on the U.S. side by Raytheon.

A second innovation is working new ways to work C2 and firing solutions, and their work with 18^th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg is an important part of this effort.

He noted that later this year, II MEF will be working with 18^th Airborne Corps in support of a Navy large-scale exercise to work C2 enabled third party firing solutions.

Lt. General Beaudreault highlighted what he saw a key role ahead for amphibs in the Atlantic theater of operations.

The current force needs better C2 and as I focused on last year, integrating Vipers with Romeos onboard amphibs provide for enhanced sea control and sea denial options as well.

He argued that going forward with a new generation of amphibs he would like to see them have organic fire power to operate more independently.

This is how he put it: “We need more air defense systems, and we need more offensive striking capability out of an amphib with less reliance on cruisers, destroyers, in the future.”

In terms of next steps in working integration, he highlighted the importance of the role which the Marines can make to the maritime fight in terms of sensing.

He argued that a key effort will be to “refashion Marine Corps reconnaissance. What can we put on manned aircraft and unmanned systems to help extend the eyes and ears of the Navy?”

Expeditionary basing is being work as well to “help unlock naval maneuver from support of forces ashore.

“How can we best help support naval maneuver from our distributed forces ashore?

“And crucial to all of this will be our ability to change the C2 arrangements we have to be able for our forces to be either the supported or supporting capability in a blue water maneuver force.”

Such an approach which can be labelled as Naval-Marine Corps integration obviously involve integratability with Air Forces as well.

Notably, if the Marines do not have organic F-35s, they are relying then on Nordic air power which in the case of Norway and Denmark are F-35s.

With the re-focus as well on the High North and progress in Nordic integration, there clearly is a rethinking of what the USMC’s role in supporting a maneuver force in support of the direct defenses of Northern Europe through to the Baltics.

This is a major challenge and one driving the force design which IIMEF is undergoing in interaction with the changes occurring in Norfolk and the Nordics as well.

Lieutenant General Beaudreault, Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Lieutenant General Beaudreault was commissioned in May 1983 upon graduation from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and was designated as an infantry officer upon completion of training.

His operational assignments include: Platoon Commander and Company Executive Officer, 1st Bn, 3rd Marines, Kaneohe Bay, HI; Assistant Operations Officer, Logistics Officer, Maritime Special Purpose Force Commander and G Company Commander, Battalion Landing Team 2/9, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), Camp Pendleton, CA (Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia); Inspector-Instructor, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marines, Memphis, TN; Operations Officer, 31st MEU (SOC), Okinawa, Japan (Operation Stabilise, East Timor); Regimental Executive Officer, 1st Marine Regiment, Camp Pendleton, CA; Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 13th MEU (SOC)/ Expeditionary Strike Group One (Operation Iraqi Freedom); Commanding Officer, 15th MEU(SOC), Camp Pendleton, CA (Operation Iraqi Freedom); Deputy Commander, Marine Forces Central Command/Commander MARCENT (Forward), Manama, Bahrain; Commanded Task Force South in support of flood relief in Sindh Province, Pakistan; and Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division.

His Supporting Establishment assignments include service as Guard Officer, Marine Corps Security Force Company, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico and Director, Expeditionary Warfare School, Quantico, VA.

LtGen Beaudreault completed joint duty assignments as Ground Plans Officer (CCJ3-PP), Operations Directorate, US Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL; Deputy Director, Future Joint Force Development, Joint Staff (J7) and Deputy Director, Joint Training, Joint Staff (J7), Suffolk, VA; and most recently served as Director of Operations and Cyber (J3), U.S. Africa Command.

His professional military education includes the following: The Basic School; Amphibious Warfare School; US Army Command and General Staff College; Armed Forces Staff College; Naval War College (MA with Highest Distinction, National Security and Strategic Studies); Higher Command and Staff Course, UK Defence Academy; and Pinnacle, National Defense University.

Featured photo: U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Brian D. Beaudreault, commanding general, II Marine Expeditionary Force, discuss the upcoming Marine Air Ground Task Force Warfighting Exercise (MWX) at the Marine Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, Calif., Oct. 25, 2019. Beaudreault visited the training area to discuss the upcoming MWX at the MCAGCC with members of the 2nd Marine Division staff. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Nathan Maysonet).

For our report on II MEF which contains all of the interviews done during the April visit plus one from the December visit to 2nd Marine Air Wing, see below:

By Robbin Laird

In a press release today, it was announced: “The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has successfully demonstrated in flight testing a two-way connection between the AH-1Z Viper helicopter and a ground station using new Link-16 hardware and software.”

In the context of reshaping the current force in the kill web age, this is about expanded integrated force capability.

A key driver of change both in terms of the extant force and the future force is shaping ways for platforms to work more effectively together.

From the perspective of the distributed force these means shaping integrated force packages which can operate at the point of desired effect and through reachback linkages to be scalable.

This means that the combat effect of a specific platform is now a function of what it has on it organically, what it can rapidly integrate with in its operational area and what it can provide to other assets in the force in terms of sensors, data, information, or weapons.

Such is the case of the impact of adding Link 16 to the Viper helicopter.

The Viper is the expeditionary strike helicopter flown by the USMC. The U.S.a Navy is in the throes of a significant transition to fighting as a fleet, rather than operating around classic carrier task forces.

One aspect of the change is reworking how the amphibious fleet can operate within the larger fleet to exercise sea control and sea denial. The Viper is becoming an integrated asset through the addition of Link-16 and Full Motion Video. This is part of the USMC’s digital interoperability initiative.

But it means that as an at sea force it will play a team role in counter-air and counter-surface ship operations as well. The US Navy is in transition; the USMC is in transition and so is the Viper. The Viper can land at sea on virtually any ship to gas and go as well.

In an article published on June 16, 2020, I highlighted how the addition of network capabilities from a kill web perspective for platform modernization enables significant expansion of the current force. That article follows:

With integratability comes an opportunity to shape a kill web approach to platform modernization.

It is a question of how the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, and what each platform not only can contribute to the whole, but what it needs to be a robust and redundant part of the kill web.

This clearly can shape how to think about platform modernization going ahead.

Ensuring that the core platforms have the digital tools to work together, then there is the opportunity to think of the integratable task force and what the platforms operating within that task force can bring to the fight, and what they can leverage from other platforms, and what they can contribute.

A case in point is how to conceptualize the way ahead for the Viper attack helicopter.

Building in Link 16 and video links into the Viper allows it work differently with both Aviation and the Ground Combat Element within the USMC.

And allows it to operate differently within the Navy-Marine Corps team at sea as well.

As argued in an earlier article:

As the US Navy reworks how it is operating as a distributed maritime force, which is being reshaped around the capability to operate a kill web force, the question of how best to leverage and evolve the amphibious force is a key part of that transition itself.

This is a work in progress, and one in which a determination of various paths to the future are in evolution and will be subject to debate as well.

Part of that evolution are changes in other elements of the amphibious task force which can over time play roles different from how various “legacy” platforms can be reworked to provide for new or expanded capabilities for the US Navy overall.

A case in point is how the Viper attack aircraft can evolve its roles AT SEA with the addition of key elements being generated by the digital interoperability effort, as well as adding a new weapons capability to the Viper, namely, the replacement for the Hellfire missile by the JAGM. 

What this means is that the Viper can be a key part of the defense of the fleet while embarked on a variety of ships operating either independently, or as part of an amphibious task force.

Because the Viper can land on and operate from of a wide range of ships, thus enabling operational and logistical flexibility, and with integration of Link 16 and full motion wave forms as part of digital interoperability improvements, the Viper can become a key member of the kill web force at sea.

Additionally, with digital interoperability enablement, the Viper can be reimagined in terms of how it might work with other members of the at sea task force.

A key example would be how it might work with the Seahawks operating from the L Class ships as well.

As argued in an earlier article:

My interviews with NAWDC have underscored how the Navy is working through the question of how the integratable air wing will change when the MQ-25 joins the fleet, and working ways for the Romeo to work with MQ-25 and Advanced Hawkeye will inform Romeo as part of its fleet defense function.

“The Romeo community is already looking at how having sensors onboard the MQ-25 can expand the reach and range of what the Romeo’s onboard sensors can accomplish for the maritime distributed force.

“It is also the case that as sensor demands currently made on the Romeo can be shifted elsewhere.

“The Romeo can refocus its task priorities and enhance its contributions to broader mission sets such as ASW and to focus on contributing capabilities that other platforms within the strike group are not prioritized to perform.”

Clearly, integrating Romeos which fly onboard the amphibious class ships with the Viper would provide a significant enhancement of the flank defense capabilities for the amphibious task force.

And working a Romeo/Viper package would affect as well the evolution of the Romeos that would fly off of the L class ships as well.

And all of this, frees up other surface elements to support other missions at sea, rather than having to focus on defending the amphibs as greyhound buses.

Working cross modernization of Romeo with Viper is an example of how a kill web perspective built on digital integratability can provide a clear concept for providing both timely and cost-effective modernization.

In a follow up conversation with Major Thomas Duff and Mr. Michael Manifor, HQMC Aviation, APW-53, Attack and Utility Helicopter Coordinators, about the Viper maritime attack helicopter, we discussed some ways to think about a way ahead.

One aspect of a cross-modernization approach shaped by integratability is finding ways for Viper to leverage Seahawk.

They noted that the Seahawk has a surface radar which the Viper does not but with integratability, they could have access to that data in addition to what they have organically onboard the Viper.

Currently, Viper and Seahawk pilots go to flight school together.

But what is needed is moving beyond the initial experience to shape an integratable capability with the deployable force.

Another aspect is the emergence of “smart” aircraft which can work together more effectively in combat packages.

For example, aircraft working together in a USMC assault package that could share information on the nearest fuel sources via wave form links, and sharing onboard information such as fuel state and fuel burn rates with such links, can lead to more effective integrated operations.

One such “smart aircraft” is the CH-53K. It as an all-digital aircraft with significant flexibility within its data management systems could, if properly configured, proactively know that an H-1 was in need of fuel and give them a time buffer to establish a FARP site, which would lead to more effective combat operations as well.

Another aspect is the modernization of the EW capabilities onboard the Viper.

There clearly needs to be enhanced organic EW capability provided for the Viper, but if done in the kill web manner, of being able to leverage the integrated distributed force, it is clearly a case of no platform fighting alone, but being able to both enhance the Viper’s survivability, but being able to provide data, and strike capabilities to support the kill web force.

Another aspect is working future weaponization from a kill web perspective.

A key aspect with regard to weaponization is the coming of directed energy weapons within the fleet.

Directed energy weapons reduce logistical footprints, extend ranges and allows for effective engagement across many targets.

It is clear that ships have significant advantages over aircraft with regard to the ability to operate directed energy weapons.

This means that the aircraft which fly with a directed energy enabled fleet will be able to tap into those capabilities as part of the kill web without having to operate them onboard their particular aircraft.

Third party targeting is enabled by a kill web; and with the enhanced impact of both directed energy weapons and the fusing of weapons and remote carriers, there is an expanded role which a modernized Viper can provide.

With directed energy weapons in the fleet, which is clearly coming, the airborne assets working with the fleet can focus more broadly on longer range strike opportunities. This is especially the case as targeting data becomes available from assets operating within the kill web that could inform a shooter like Viper, even though the Viper will not carry directed energy weapons itself.

The question then is putting longer range strike weapons on the Viper itself.

With the coming of low cost, collaborative, and tube launched systems like the Coyote UAS, the Viper can fire at greater distance with targeting data provided by C2 at the tactical edge from a partner platform. Swarms can be created by a system like Coyote UAS, but the swarm does not have to be generated by a single platform, but integratable platforms operating as a wolfpack.

A final point is the absolute centrality of common weapons throughout the kill web force.

A Viper needs to land at a FARP, or FOB, or on a Navy ship and be able to fly with common weapons and expendables. With a distributed missile and swarm UAV capability deployed to mobile or expeditionary bases, an asset like Viper can provide integrated strike capability which empowers a kill web.

The Viper has the ability to land virtually anywhere which means that it can tap into a widely dispersed weapons load outs on ships and FARPs throughout the extended battlespace.

In short, as the kill web approach gains traction, it can clearly affect the way ahead for platform modernization as well as to find ways to get best value out of legacy and evolving platforms, and shape the kind of new platforms that will come into the force.

The Viper is a case in point.

Also, see the following:

The H-1 Family Enhances Its Integrability with the Combat Force

Viper and Digital Interoperability