USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) conducts combat systems ship qualification trials (CSSQT), April 16, 2021.
CSSQT is a Naval Sea Systems Command requirement to verify that ship personnel can operate and maintain their combat systems in a safe and effective manner.
Ford is underway in the Atlantic Ocean conducting its final independent steaming event of post-delivery tests and trials.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
04.18.2021
Video by Petty Officer 3rd Class Angel Jaskuloski
By Robbin Laird
Our focus over the past few years has been upon the shift from the Middle Eastern Land Wars to the refocus on peer competitors. The preparation for the high-end fight is a key part of this refocus, but not as the sole focus of attention; rather it is upon an ability to shape effective crisis management capabilities to be able to deliver escalation control.
The peers we are talking about are nuclear powers. Any high-end fight will be shaped by the presence of nuclear weapons in such an engagement.
Clearly, there is a desire on the United States to protect its interests short of nuclear engagement, but the United States is not the only player in such calculations.
This means that building out conventional warfighting capabilities entails thinking through from the outset how packages of conventional forces can be clustered for crisis management events in ways that provide for effective escalation management.
This requires civilians to prepare for escalation management, rather than when facing an event which can spin out of control, either ignoring or capitulating to the peer competitor. It is about doing more than verbal admonishment, or being reduced to invoking economic sanctions, or otherwise limited use tasks, which often have little real effect on deterring an authoritarian peer competitor.
The mindset of the peer competitor is a key part of preparing for crisis management as well. This means understanding what might allow for successful crisis management when dealing with such different cultural manifestations of global authoritarians such as Russia or China. This has a clear effect on the forces which might be tasked to perform crisis management tasks.
A key example is how the Russians deal with the evolving threat of Nordic integration to the classic intimidation strategies they follow in Europe. During my travels to the region, there is a clear concern on how Nordic integration can be strengthened and in so doing finding ways to shape more effective collaboration for crisis management.
How to avoid the seams that the Russians exploit in normal times, and will accentuate through various means of coercion in a crisis?
In our discussions with both Second Fleet, and with Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk, it is clear Vice Admiral Lewis and his team have focused from the outset of the 2018 standup of the new C2F upon how to shape a fleet which is optimized for crisis management and to operate in such a way that the Russians can exploit the operational seams in the North Atlantic.
The emphasis of the Nordics on a significant strengthening of their collaborative capabilities and the NATO reset in the region have provided a key context within which the U.S. and allied fleets are working new ways to distribute the force to the point of effect but to do so in a way that the force is integratable across the region.
What this means is the key role of the “relevant nations” in North Atlantic defense need to understand events in their region from the standpoint of crisis management.
And to be able to correlate that understanding with clear and decisive military and whole of government actions to convey to the Russian leadership what deterrence means in that specific case.
Deterrence is not universal state; it is delivered in times of key events shaping pre-crisis or crisis challenges.
The flexibility which VADM Lewis’s commands are demonstrating in exercises and operations is an element of providing the infrastructure for effective crisis management. The USAF and its engagement earlier this year with the exercising of bombers with Nordic fighter and ground force support is another.
But a key part of this effort is what the Marines can bring to the crisis management engagement. The Marines have provided a rotational force to Norway which has been a key element for providing initial crisis management support and doing so will remain crucial in the years ahead, and in the next piece in this series, I will make the case that indeed expanding this role might be one way to shape a more effective crisis management force.
A key objective of the North Carolina based Marines is the reinforcement of the Nordic area and operating with all four Nordic states — the Marines are a unique air land sea or already multi domain force and that is where they are best.
As the head of DIA recently warned that the Russians pose a significant direct military threat to the United States and he was not talking about hybrid war. From a US national security perspective that means the Kola Peninsula and Russia’s lateral moves to try to avoid being choked by a significant allied and Nordic defense effort is the core focus of direct defense in Europe.
As he put it in his April 29, 2021 statement:
“The Russian military is an existential threat to the United States and a potent tool designed to maintain influence over the states along its periphery, compete with U.S. global primacy, and compel adversaries who challenge Russia’s vital national interests.
“Moscow continues to invest in its strategic nuclear forces, in new capabilities to enhance its strategic deterrent and that place the U.S. homeland at risk, and in capabilities that improve its conventional warfighting.
“The Kremlin’s military strength is built on its survivable strategic nuclear forces and a conventional force largely postured for defensive and regional operations.
“Russia has a growing ability to project power with long-range precision cruise missiles and limited expeditionary capabilities.
“Military leaders are incorporating lessons from Russia’s involvement in Syria into their training and exercises as they seek to develop a better-coordinated, joint force.
As we wrote in our European book there are three very different European defense problems today but this is the on which most significantly affects directly the United States and that is why Lewis’s focus on HOW to reshape these capabilities makes his efforts so important.
The renewed focus on USMC-U.S .Navy integration embraces the important role which Marines play both in terms of re-imaging the role of the amphibious force in North Atlantic defense (e.g. the engagement of the USS Wasp in the Black Widow Exercise last year) or in terms of refocusing its capabilities to reinforce Nordic integration, of the sort that the Russians have to take seriously in terms of the ultimate choke point – namely, operations out of the Kola Peninsula.
Indeed, the Russians are expanding their Arctic reach in part to try to outflank such a challenge.
In short, to deal with the challenge of peer competitor nuclear powers and their global engagement, full spectrum crisis management capabilities are crucial up to and inclusive of the high-end fight.
But this means having insertion force packages at the point of critical impact in events which can grow up the escalation ladder.
As Paul Bracken put it in a 2018 piece: “The key point for today is that there are many levels of intensity above counterinsurgency and counter terrorism, yet well short of total war. In terms of escalation intensity, this is about one-third up the escalation ladder.
“Here, there are issues of war termination, disengagement, maneuvering for advantage, signaling, — and yes, further escalation — in a war that is quite limited compared to World War II, but far above the intensity of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan…..
“A particular area of focus should be exemplary attacks. Examples include select attack of U.S. ships, Chinese or Russian bases, and command and control.
“These are above crisis management as it is usually conceived in the West. But they are well below total war. Each side had better think through the dynamics of scenarios in this space.
Deep strike for exemplary attacks, precise targeting, option packages for limited war, and command and control in a degraded environment need to be thought through beforehand.
“The Russians have done this, with their escalate to deescalate strategy. I recently played a war game where Russian exemplary attacks were a turning point, and they were used quite effectively to terminate a conflict on favorable terms. In East Asia, exemplary attacks are also important as the ability to track US ships increases.
“Great power rivalry has returned. A wider range of possibilities has opened up. But binary thinking — that strategy is either low intensity or all-out war – has not.”
Or see the 2018 report on Nordic defense and the strategic shift:
And see the recent report on Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk:
2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: A May 2021 Update
For the first two articles in the series, see the following:
https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/05/events-policy-making-and-strategic-imagination/
By the end of April 1942, the tally of Japanese victories saw its flag fly over: Hong Kong, the Philippines (save for the island bastion of Corregidor), Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, and most of Burma.
Having already unleashed devastating raids on Darwin and Broome, the Empire of Japan next set its sights on Port Moresby in the then Australian Protectorate of Papua.
In history’s first great naval action between aircraft carriers, Japan’s Zuikaku and Shokaku faced the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown.
With a combined US/ Australian naval task force, including the US carriers, three cruisers – HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart and USS Chicago, and a few destroyers, the Japanese naval strike force was met head on in the Coral Sea, south east of Papua.
It was the first major resistance faced by the Empire of Japan, stopping their naval advance, and believed by many to be the battle that saved Australia.
May 14th, 2021 marks the 79th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea and the commemorative ceremony attended by Minister for Defence Industry, Melissa Price, invited guests and members of the Australian Defence Force was held at the Australian-American Memorial at Russell Offices in Canberra.
Australian Department of Defence
May 16, 2021
According to a story published by U.S. Sixth Fleet Public Affairs on May 3, 2021, Formidable Shield 2021 is underway.
FERROL, Spain – The Spanish Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105) is this year’s designated flag ship for the execution of Exercise At-Sea Demonstration/Formidable Shield 2021, scheduled to take place May 15 to June 3.
At-Sea Demo/Formidable Shield is a U.S. Sixth Fleet-led exercise, conducted by Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), in which NATO Allies are the participants.
“It’s a wonderful opportunity to show our relationship with the exercise organization and with this big challenge of the ballistic missile defense in Europe,” said Cristóbal Colón Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Juan Bautista Payá. “It’s a really demanding task to be the flag ship, but the Spanish Navy is prepared for that and we are doing our best to embark [U.S. personnel] and to allow you to perform the command and control for the exercise in the best way.”
STRIKFORNATO will provide a maritime battle Staff Operational Command directly to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), delivering a rapidly deployable and scalable headquarters capable of planning and executing full spectrum joint maritime operations and providing command and control of maritime Ballistic Missile Defense, primarily through integration of U.S. Naval forces.
Commander, Task Force (CTF) 64, Capt. Jon Lipps will lead this year’s exercise as the Commander, Task Group Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Lipps addressed the crew after a brief tour of the Cristobal Colon, April 30.
“Like the namesake of this warship, you will lead an international armada at sea that will make history conducting the world’s most complex joint and combined integrated air and missile defense exercise across the Maritimes,” Lipps said. “From below sea level to low earth orbit, you will reinforce the importance of mission command across all domains in high-end warfare. It is truly an honor and a privilege to join you today as we prepare to set out to sea.”
The exercise is designed to improve allied interoperability in a live-fire joint IAMD environment, using NATO command and control reporting structures. Ten nations will participate by sending ships, aircraft, ground assets, and embarked staff in Task Group IAMD, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
“We are really happy about embarking American staff from Sixth Fleet from the U.S. Navy and from Striking and Support Forces NATO from NATO. For us, of course, it’s a good opportunity to show the Spanish ‘will’ to support NATO and this new and demanding challenge of ballistic missile threat,” Payá said.
There will be 15 ships, more than 10 aircraft, and approximately 3,300 personnel participating this year.
Exercise At-Sea Demo/Formidable Shield receives support from U.S. European Command, Missile Defense Agency, the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum (MTMD-F), and Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-IWS). The exercise is intended to assure Allies, deter adversaries, and demonstrate the commitment to collective defense for the NATO alliance.
Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, based in Lisbon, Portugal, is a rapidly deployable, maritime headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of warfare areas.
U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with joint, allied and interagency partners, to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.
And a NATO press release highlighted the exercise as follows:
The exercise, which takes place May 15 to June 3, 2021, provides the opportunity to demonstrate the ability to conduct land and sea based defence against simultaneous cruise and ballistic missile threats with coordinated command and control.
According to Royal Marines Colonel Andrew Lock, Assistant Chief of Staff Operations at STRIKFORNATO: “At-Sea-Demo/Formidable Shield allows Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) headquarters command and control of a multinational force to provide capable, credible deterrence against aggression. These types of exercises demonstrate our technical and tactical capabilities to defend the Alliance.”
This year, as the command and control node for NATO forces, STRIKFORNATO is conducting the exercise between the ten participating nations as they work together to respond to integrated air and missile defence threats. Serving as the critical link to integrate the complex sea, land, air, and space systems from multiple nations into a task force, the staff is focused on strengthening their ability to share common tactical pictures, share situational awareness, and conduct NATO-level mission planning and engagement coordination.
According to U.S Navy Cmdr. Brett Lefever, Deputy Integrated Missile Defence branch at STRIKFORNATO: “Several live-fire and simulated engagements against subsonic, supersonic, and ballistic targets demonstrations will take place during the exercise, including the first defensive live-intercept of a ballistic missile using multinational data systems to track the target. The multinational cooperation for a ballistic missile intercept in outer space is truly remarkable and proves the Alliance’s commitment to interoperability and defence.”
To fully support the complex nature of the exercise, STRIKFORNATO responded by standing up a Joint Operations Centre in Oeiras, Portugal and a forward-deployed staff at-sea onboard the Spanish Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105), which is the designated flagship of the Commander, Task Group Integrated Air and Missile Defence, Capt. Jonathan Lipps. Additional personnel support events taking place at the range control stations in the U.K.
STRIKFORNATO is a rapidly deployable headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of the alliance’s fundamental security tasks. As part of that mission, STRIKFORNATO is responsible for integrating U.S. naval and amphibious forces into NATO operations.
U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners, to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.
Featured Photo: Boatswain’s Mate 3rd Class Chance Vaughan, from Houston, Texas, directs an MH-60S Seahawk assigned to the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 22 “Sea Knights” off the flight deck of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) during exercise Formidable Shield 19, May 16, 2019. Formidable Shield is designed to improve allied interoperability in a live-fire integrated air and missile defense environment, using NATO command and control reporting structures. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Fred Gray IV/Released)
A Royal Navy story published on May 15, 2021 highlighted their engagement in the exercise.
Three Royal Navy warships today join NATO allies in the world’s largest test of naval air and missile defences.
Played out off Scotland’s Outer Hebrides and Norway’s Arctic coast, the three-week-long Formidable Shield 2021 will test missile systems, sensors, software – and the hundreds of men and women operating them as they demonstrate their ability to deal with the latest aerial threats.
It will see live missile launches as the NATO allies demonstrate their individual and collective ability to track, identify and ultimately destroy incoming threats in the skies, including testing ballistic missile defence.
HMS Dragon leads the Royal Navy’s participation as a dedicated air defence destroyer designed to shield a task group with her Sea Viper missile system.
Using her Sampson radar – the spinning ‘spiked egg’ atop her main mast – the Portsmouth-based warship has the ability to detect and follow a missile’s progress from launch to ‘splash’ (when it is destroyed).
She’s joined by frigates HMS Lancaster and Argyll, whose Sea Ceptor systems also provide shorter range defence against incoming missiles and aircraft.
Both systems will be tested against supersonic high-diving targets plummeting towards the task group at speeds in excess of 12,000mph – 16 times the speed of sound – as well as sea-skimming drones simulating missiles, weaving at high sub-sonic speeds in a bid to outfox the radars tracking them.
The highlight for the Royal Navy will be one of Dragon’s Sea Viper missiles intercepting a Firejet target drone, racing over the Atlantic at more than 400mph but just 20ft above the waves.
Other missiles in the Sea Viper family will be fired by other participants, alongside US-made Sea Sparrow and Standard Missiles 2, against a mix of sub and supersonic drone targets.
Rigorous safety checks and procedures are in place to ensure the ranges are safe and the risk to surrounding areas and other users are negligible.
In addition to testing the weapon systems and sensors, the British ships are also due to test cutting-edge software which is designed to alleviate the burden on the team in the operations room who pore over the display screens constantly looking out for potential threats.
Ten NATO nations – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the UK and USA – have thrown their hats in the ring, committing ships, aircraft, ground assets, and staff.
Led by the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet and using Spanish frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón as the flagship, in its 2021 iteration – Formidable Shield is staged every two years – the exercise involves 15 ships, more than ten aircraft and in excess of 3,000 personnel.
The exercise is intended to assure allies, deter adversaries, and demonstrate the commitment of NATO to collective defence.
“Delivering integrated air and missile defence, and specifically ballistic missile defence, is one of STRIKFORNATO’s primary roles on behalf of the Alliance,” said Rear Admiral James Morley, the British Deputy Commander of STRIKFORNATO.
“Formidable Shield 21 is an important opportunity to further develop fighting capability and domain integration against a challenging set of realistic targets – a demonstration of our resolve to counter the threat.”
By Leading Seaman Jarrod Mulvihill
HMAS Parramatta has joined French Navy Marine Nationale vessels FS Tonnerre and FS Surcouf — operating as the Jeanne d’Arc Task Group — to complete a cooperative passage through the South China Sea.
The Sydney-based Anzac class frigate had recently completed the Japan-led Exercise Arc21 with Tonnerre and Surcouf also taking part.
The three ships conducted a range of training activities, including communication exercises, replenishment-at-sea approaches, maritime manoeuvers and joint-flying serials using Parramatta’s MH-60R and Tonnerre’s Panther helicopters.
Commanding Officer Parramatta Commander Anita Nemarich said the ship’s time sailing in-company was another great opportunity to practice core skills and maintain a commitment to both nations’ shared values, goals and security interests.
“The Royal Australian Navy and the French Marine Nationale have enjoyed multiple opportunities to work together in the region recently,” Commander Nemarich said.
“It is great to be able to continue on the tremendous work of HMA Ships Anzac and Sirius who worked with the Jeanne d’Arc Task Group recently during Exercise La Perouse building our interoperability as like-minded nations.”
Commander of the Jeanne D’Arc Task Group and Commanding Officer Tonnerre Captain Arnaud Tranchant also found value in both navies working together.
“Operating in-company with the Australian Navy, with whom we share the same commitment to freedom of navigation, means reinforcing our ties and our capability to operate together with the same purpose,” Captain Tranchant said.
“It is also a great occasion for our naval cadets to be working with a partner Navy they will very likely encounter again in their future postings.”
Parramatta is on a two-month deployment to South-East and north-east Asia. Operating as a task group with HMAS Ballarat, the two vessels are conducting a number of navy-to-navy engagements with partner nations across the region.
This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on May 26, 2021.
The featured photo: A French Navy helicopter from FS Tonnerre approaches HMAS Parramatta as the two ships sail together in the South China Sea. Photo: Leading Seaman Jarrod Mulvihill
By Pierre Tran
Paris – Croatia has opted to order 12 second hand Rafale fighter jets in a deal which points up the significance of European sovereignty, the French armed forces ministry said in a statement.
“Croatia’s choice is a choice of sovereignty, resolutely European,” armed forces minister Florence Parly said in the statement.
The deal for the Rafale F-3R fighter was worth some €1 billion ($1.2 billion) and included Mica NG air-to-air missiles, AASM powered smart bombs, a canon, training of pilots and mechanics, and service, officials in the minister’s private office said.
Croatia has selected the fighter jet, a French official said, and negotiations will be held over the next few months, with a contract due to be signed by the end of the year. This would be a government-to-government deal, with no requirement for offset investment.
The fighters will be drawn from the French air force, which played a key role in the presentations, an official said. A Rafale order will be the biggest French arms deal with Croatia, which joined Nato in 2009 and the European Union in 2013.
The pick by Croatia is the second European victory, following a Greek order in January worth €2.5 billion for 18 Rafale. The French fighter has long lagged behind US rivals in the world export market.
Zagreb picked the Dassault Aviation Rafale F3-R in a competition which attracted rival offers of the Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 from the US, Saab Gripen C/D from Sweden, and the F-16 Block 30 from Israel, Air Force Technology website reported. The Israeli offer of 12 second hand F-16s was worth an estimated $500 million.
Parly visited Croatia twice last year, in March and November, an official said.
France will deliver two batches of Rafale, with the first to be shipped in the third quarter 2023, and a second batch sent some 18 months later, an official said. That 18 months compared to the three years needed for building a new fighter.
There were no details on the financing and it was up to the Croatian authorities to decide the best way to fund the deal, an official said.
Saab said in its pitch of the Gripen that “cost-effectiveness” was a key factor for Sweden and Croatia, which were small countries. The Gripen package included all the service support Croatia would need to maintain the fighter.
In other tenders, Switzerland is expected to pick a fighter by the end of the first half, an official said, while Finland is due to select by the end of the year. The former is looking to order 30-40 fighters, while the latter seeks a fleet of 50-64 fighters.
In the Swiss tender, France has pitched the Rafale against the Eurofighter Typhoon, Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, and Lockheed Martin F-35A.
The Finnish competition has attracted the same fighters, plus the Saab Gripen.
Indonesia is also looking to acquire a fighter, with the Janes website reporting a contract for 36 Rafale might be delayed due to “lack of clarity over funding sources.”
France has no plans to replace the 12 fighters drawn from the French air force before 2025, an official said, when there will be a fleet of 117 Rafale flying.
France has sold 12 second hand and six new Rafale to Greece, and ordered 12 to replace the former for the air force.
The deal with Croatia is seen as boosting bilateral ties between Paris and Zagreb.
“This choice will considerably strengthen the strategic partnership between France and Croatia,” the defense ministry said. “This export deal illustrates a strengthening of the strategic links between France and Croatia and their common determination to work toward a strong and ambitious European defense.”
The decision by Croatia “reinforces the Rafale’s position in the European air forces, making an active contribution to European defense sovereignty,” Dassault said in a statement.
By Robbin Laird
In an important paper by Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, the authors address the question of the impact of reduced warning time upon Australian defence and security. This comes from both the nature of the Chinese challenge, and the changing nature of threats, such as cyber attacks.
How best to defend Australia in an environment with reduced warning time?
Although obviously about Australia, the discussion in the report raises a broader set of questions of how to know when an event is setting in motion a chain of events which provide a direct threat to a liberal democratic nation and how to respond. It also raises the question of shaping capabilities which can be inserted into a crisis early enough to provide confidence in an ability to have effective escalation management tools available as well.
For the United States, for example, the integrated USMC has provided for a long time an insertion force which could anchor a scalable force which can provide time for policy makers to work through next steps.
To the extent to which the USMC remains an integrated crisis management force, it will continue to play such a role in the United States military tool box.
And the question of an ability to move force rapidly to a crisis becomes increasingly significant as escalation control returns as a key element of constraining, managing, and protecting one’s interests in a crisis.
This is why I have preferred to focus on full spectrum crisis management as the challenge facing the liberal democracies in meeting the challenges of 21st century authoritarian powers, rather simply preparing for the high-end fight.
And there is another reason: it is very likely that a high-end fight between the major powers will end up entailing nuclear use.
But for Australia, what the author’s underscore is the importance of deterrence through denial with regard to the Chinese threat.
And to deal with this threat, the government’s emphasis on long-range strike is a key part of what the author’s see as a way ahead.
“Having a deterrent force based on the concept of denial—as distinct from deterrence through the much more demanding concept of deterrence through punishment—should be more affordable. Deterrence through punishment involves attacking the adversary’s territory, whereas deterrence through denial is limited to attacking the adversary’s forces and associated infrastructure directly threatening us. In any case, the idea of Australia being able to inflict unacceptable punishment on a big power such as China would be ridiculous.
“The bottom line for defence policy is that, as confidence in deterrence by denial goes up, our dependence on early response to warnings should go down.”
A key part of expanding the buffer to manage crises entails Australia enhancing self-sufficiency and self-reliance through expanded stockpiling of fuel and key war stocks.
And over time, some new systems will be added through domestic production as well, notably as the autonomous weapons revolution evolves, and accelerates.
As the authors warn: “Australia now needs to implement serious changes to how warning time is considered in defence planning.
“The need to plan for reduced warning time has implications for the Australian intelligence community, defence strategic policy, force structure priorities, readiness and sustainability. Important changes will also be needed with respect to personnel, stockpiles of missiles and munitions, and fuel supplies.
“We can no longer assume that Australia will have time gradually to adjust military capability and preparedness in response to emerging threats. In other words, there must be a new approach in Defence to managing warning, capability and preparedness, and detailed planning for rapid expansion and sustainment.”
The United States remains the indispensable ally for many reasons, but the U.S. will be preoccupied in crises on its own interests as well.
This means that an expanded focus on building out Australian buffer capabilities will be significant to shaping an effective response to reduced warning times.
New digital technologies have altered the question of warning time is all about.
Notably, with regard to the cyber threats, when is there an attack, and what does it mean?
As the authors note: “A campaign of cyberattack and intensified cyber-exploitation against Australia could be launched with little notice, given the right level of motivation, and would have the advantage of having at least a level of plausible deniability while imposing limits to what might be envisaged as a proportional response. Such response options available to Australia would include retaliation, such as a government-sanctioned cyberattack—a capability that the Australian Government has acknowledged that it has. (This capability has already been used against terrorists, but whether it’s been used more widely isn’t publicly known.)
“The warning time for the need to conduct such operations is potentially very short, meaning that there needs to be a high level of preparedness, including the ability quickly to expand the cyber workforce (with a concomitant need for expedited security clearances), and cyberattack campaigns that are thought out well in advance.
“There’s a strong argument that such planning should include within its scope the possibility of causing high levels of damage to the adversary’s infrastructure.”
They end their report with regard to making five policy recommendations.
The first is to establish a National Intelligence Officer for Warning.
The second is to establish a Directorate of Net Assessments.
And the author’s highlight the focus of such a Directorate as follows: “While it’s unlikely that China would directly attack our continent, we must prepare for credible contingencies involving Chinese military coercion in our immediate strategic space. That coercion could involve the threatened use of military force, including from future Chinese military bases located to our north and east. Ignoring such probabilities risks strategic surprise involving our key national security interests.
“If the Directorate of Net Assessments is to have relevance, it will need to simulate high-level political and policy decision-making in real time. Without such time-urgent inputs, it won’t be possible to play other than theoretical war games.”
The third is establishing a priority for long-range missile strike.
Here the reinforce the importance of the commitment the current government has made to this task, but I would add that Australia can work much more effectively with its allies, including the United States in shaping a new generation of strike weapons, rather than simply replicating what the United States is already doing.
The fourth is realistically assessing their U.S. ally.
For the authors this means: “We need to accept in our strategic thinking that America is now a more inward-looking country that will foreseeably give more attention to its domestic social and political challenges. It also needs to be remembered that the US has from time to time–undergone severe bouts of isolationism. 30 We don’t think that’s likely to happen under the Biden administration, but it could recur under a differently motivated presidency.
“We need prudent analysis about how the US will react to its own warning indicators of potential military attack and what it would expect of Australia. In our own broader region, we can’t afford not to be fully informed about US contingencies in Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula, so we need to assess US military capabilities as well as Washington’s intentions.”
I would add my own comments to this judgement.
For me, one of the challenges for either the United States or our allies is to understand what a good ally actually is. It is one which has a realistic understanding of what it can and can not do and an ability to assess realistically the global environment. I would argue that is in shorter supply in both the United States and in many of our allied Departments of Ministries of Defense.
I would note as well that the concerns about paying more attention at home than abroad is true of the United States and all or most of our partners.
The challenge then is how can the liberal democracies realistically work together to deal with global authoritarian states who see global influence and adventurism as a coin of the realm for enhancing their power?
And as for the political comment about the Biden Administration, given the dominance of identity politics in the Administration, one might see considerable inward preoccupation. President Trump for all his tweeting and rhetoric enhanced the capabilities of the U.S. in many ways, although his inability to support multilateralism conceptually was always a limiting factor in his global policy.
And the final factor is increased preparedness and force expansion.
As the authors put this challenge: “For the first time since World War II, Defence needs to also take seriously the conditions under which force expansion and mobilisation would happen. It wouldn’t be acceptable to defer such consideration until Australia were within warning time of a serious military attack against us or our key interests.
“Planning for timely and effective mobilisation doesn’t at this stage require a detailed plan but rather the development of principles that would be applied to the development of the force structure and defence policy for industry. The place to start would be to identify those steps that should be taken now to ensure that force expansion and mobilisation would achieve their goals.”
I would add that in their approach to deterrence through denial a major effort over the next decade could well be working a new defense approach for integrated defense from Western to Northern Australia to the first island chain (the Solomon Islands.).
And in so doing, air and maritime integration, the introduction of new force multipliers through autonomous systems, the ground forces learning how to do expeditionary basing, and working that basing with air-sea integration will be a key part of deterrence through denial.
When that chessboard is established and worked, the question of what the strike force can achieve in terms of longer range becomes an even more formidable consideration than simply having longer range missiles.
And in this context, reworking how to work with the partners and allies in the region, and working new integrated distributed concepts of operations with the United States and Japan will be critical as well.
For a PDF version of the report, see the following:
For an e-book version of the report, see the following:
Also, see the following:
The FREMM DA Alsace was launched April 18, 2019 at the Naval Group shipyard of Lorient thirteen months after its keel laying.
It is the ninth FREMM frigate built by Naval Group and the seventh one for the French Navy.
According to Naval Group: “On April 12, 2021 in Toulon, in the presence of Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Naval Group delivered, in accordance with its calendar commitments and expected performance, the FREMM DA Alsace. “Intended for the French Navy, it is the first of the two air defense frigates of the FREMM program.
“This is the seventh European Multimissions FREMM Frigate ordered by the General Directorate of Armaments (DGA) for the benefit of the French Navy, and whose program management has been entrusted to OCCAR 1.”