The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 3

12/07/2020

By Robbin Laird

I am in the throes of finishing up my book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy over the past several years, from 2014 until now.

With the announcement of the new government defence strategy by Prime Minister Morrison on July 1, 2020, it seemed a good time to draw together the work I have done over the past several years in Australia.

The book provides a detailed narrative of the evolution over the past few years of how Australia got to the point where it currently is with regard to national defense.

Hopefully, the book will provide a helpful summary of that evolution. It is based on the Williams Foundation Seminars over this period, and highlights the insights provided by the practitioners of military art and strategy who have presented and participated in those seminars.

In that sense, this book provides a detailed look at the strategic trajectory from 2014 through 2020.

During my visits to Australia during this time, one of my interlocutors in discussing Australian and global developments has been Jim Molan, retired senior Australian Army officer and now a Senator. I have included in the book, the interviews I did with Senator Molan in the appendix to the book as a good look into the dynamics of change being undergone over the past few years.

Recently, Senator Molan has launched a podcast series looking at the way ahead and how Australia might address the challenges which its faces.

This is the third podcast in his series.

He starts each podcast with this introduction:

“Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist tells us that strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.

“But tactics without strategy is just noise before defeat.

“My name is Jim Molan and welcome to our Noise Before Defeat podcast.”

Markets Produce Prosperity, Not Security

This podcast will look at why Australia is so vulnerable to a national security shock. And of course, we’ve just had an enormous one of those in the form of COVID and we’re still living through it. It’ll look at why Australia lacks self-reliance as a nation. And as a result, Australia is not prepared for an uncertain future that may involve conflict and war. Australia’s very sovereignty, our independence and perhaps our existence as a nation would be seriously threatened unless we start to prepare.

Well quite simply, I reckon there are five vulnerabilities. In essence, Australia is overly dependent on imports to run the nation. And as I say all the time, we’re not self reliant enough as we found out in COVID. We are overly dependent on one single market and the sea lines for exports and imports that make us prosperous. And China is using that against us now. In essence, Australia has a military developed for a different era and a different task. It’s very high quality. It’s the best that I have seen it in the 50 years that I’ve been exposed to the Australian military. It’s a fabulous base for development, but it’s incapable at its present size of defending the nation now or in the foreseeable future….

I suggest it goes a long way further than just the running shoes and t-shirts that we get from overseas because they’re cheap. We’re overly dependent on imports of manufactured goods and the import of information technology devices. We’re overly dependent on critical items, such as liquid fuels, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, and many others. We need to import complex spare parts and industry. For example, the energy industry and the mining industry, defense items and spare parts and technical weapons such as missiles. And all of this could be denied to us by an increasing tension or by war. Liquid fuels for example, at the moment we import roughly 90% of our liquid fuels directly as crude oil or as a refined product. And where does it come from? One of the most unstable places in the world. It all comes from the Gulf, either as crude directly to Australia or as crude to other refiners in North Asia who then send it back to us.

We are totally vulnerable to that. But I do note that we have taken a major step forward very, very recently in that the minister for energy has started seriously to ensure that we keep our refining capability, and we start building reserves of liquid fuels in this country. Now, pharmaceuticals is another one that we should be worried about. 90% of our pharmaceuticals are imported. And during the initial stages of COVID, we did have some reserves and that was a great discovery that I was not aware of. We did have reserves in this country of pharmaceuticals, but we came close to running out in some areas. And of course, we saw recently some union bans on ports that are achieving exactly the same thing now. And that’s a real vulnerability for us….

It’s where we export it to and therein lies the problem. We are overly dependent on a single export market and that’s China. And if that was denied to us by one nation or by increases in regional tensions or actual war, our prosperity would drop significantly. Social tension would increase, our ability to fund recovery or adaption would decrease. And our ability for sustained defense would evaporate because we would run out of missiles and spare parts.

We don’t have a current comprehensive overall strategy. What the government of which I’m a part does brilliantly is solve problems one at a time. And even whilst working on COVID, I was blown away by the fact that the prime minister could come out and address a strategic update in terms of a defense strategy. And we’ve looked at cyber and we’ve looked at energy and we’ve looked at gas and we’ve looked at a vast range of things. It’s not as though we’re a one trick pony, but what I would say is that the basic thing that we must address is our self-reliance. And I use that term all the time. And in fact, everyone in government is using that term in relation to self-reliance because we’ve all realized it, but I think government and across the nation, that we need to be much more self-reliant.

Self-reliance I consider to be where a nation makes domestically what it needs for its security, but still buys everything else from the global market. Now, if you say that one particular thing is essential for us to be prepared to make in Australia, it doesn’t mean that you have to make all of it and you have to make it now. It does mean that you must be able to make enough of it. And then you buy the rest cheaper from overseas in Australia, so that if you have to expand at some stage when you are cut off from sea lines of communication, then you can actually do that. You have the technology and the base to expand and be self-reliant.

For the rest of it, until something happens, you can buy from overseas. In no way in the world am I ever suggesting that we back off from globalization. We just need to identify… And this is a job for government. We need to identify those items that are critical for us and how much we need to produce in Australia. So that in a certain period of time, when perhaps reserves that we’ve got run out, we are ready to produce much, much more.

If I look at the global market, I look at our inputs and I don’t care if we don’t have, as I said before, running shirts and running shoes, and t-shirts during a period of crisis. We don’t need them. But I do care if we cannot produce certain pharmaceuticals in Australia, or I do care if we can’t produce petroleum products in Australia. As a self-reliant nation, we must still be able to import and to export, we have just to identify across the nation, every single item that needs to be a bit produced in Australia and the time period that we need to have reserves in Australia of that particular item.

The Need for a National Security Strategy

Our national security system has no one organization responsible for developing national strategy. It doesn’t have this system to prepare our nation and it doesn’t have those professionals for advising the national leadership, particularly the prime minister during a serious ongoing crisis because we haven’t needed it in the past. And for 75 years, we haven’t had to do it.

We currently have a military not ready to go to war tomorrow. It could become much more prepared, relatively fast. And that’s the judgment that you’ve got to make, but that’s where the big money is. We need to examine that military and see whether its preparedness is high enough and what it would cost to raise that if we decided. But primarily it lacks serious and self-reliant lethality, mass and sustainability for the rapidly developing future.

And that military cannot in any way, defend this nation against the developing threats that most people agree are coming towards us now. I do acknowledge and I should to be fair acknowledge the extraordinary achievements within defense that the coalition government, since 2013 has embarked on particularly the shipbuilding programs, particularly the adequate resourcing of that military in order to provide the kind of military we’ve needed for the last 75 years. The point I make is that having done that, and it’s a great achievement and I personally thank them as someone who has a great love for our military. I personally thank our government, but now we need to look at the next step….

We should create a military that can defend the nation and support coalitions if we need to. And that military needs to be much stronger, much bigger and better supported so it can fight for longer. We need to create a government national security system, which is far more sophisticated and sophisticated enough to prepare us for conflict and a fast-moving war and manage 21st century crisis. And finally, realistically and publicly, we need to address the need for national security. And I can’t say it often enough. We must begin with a national security strategy to tie it all together.

 

 

 

Australian Support for Japanese Space Efforts

12/05/2020

The Department of Defence and the Australian Space Agency are supporting the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA’s) Hayabusa2 mission to return the first ever sub-surface asteroid samples to Earth from the asteroid Ryugu. The Hayabusa2 sample return capsule landed in the Woomera Prohibited Area (WPA) on 6 December 2020.

Hayabusa2 departed Ryugu in November 2019, with the return journey taking just over one year to reach back to Earth. The capsule will return to the ground with samples from Ryugu while the Hayabusa2 spacecraft will re-join its interplanetary transfer orbit.
The samples from the 4.5 billion year old asteroid will help scientists study the origin and evolution of the solar system, including the origin of organic matters and water of Earth’s oceans and the source of life.

A team of mission specialists from JAXA will conduct the sample recovery mission in the WPA, supported by a specialist team from NASA who will conduct airborne observations of the re-entry.

The movie below was taken on February 22, 2019(JSTwhen Hayabusa2 first touched down on asteroid Ryugu to collect a sample from the surface.

It was captured using the onboard small monitor camera(CAM-H). The video playback speed is five times faster than actual time.

Credit: JAXA

Taiwan Trends and Scenarios: Challenge for the Next U.S. Administration

12/04/2020

By Richard Weitz

One of the major issues confronting the next U.S. administration is to fortify Taiwan’s defense and deterrent capabilities against the growing threat from the People’s Republic of China.

The last few years have seen increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China.

There have been growing naval and air activity in the island’s vicinity, including repeated deep incursions across the Taiwan Strait Median Line and PLA Air Force circumnavigation flights around the island. The intent has been to both intimidate the Taiwanese and wear down the defender’s air fleet. The rhetoric emanating from Beijing regarding Taiwan has also become increasing bellicose.

A no-warning PLA assault on Taiwan is presently unlikely but possible. We have recently seen how the Chinese-Indian confrontation abruptly escalated earlier this year.

If an invasion were imminent, warning indicators could include Beijing-inspired riots, sabotage, and assassinations in Taiwan. The PLA would also probably mobilize its reservists and concentrate a flotilla of vessels on the PRC coast opposite the island.

Following the Russian example, the PLA might also try to lure Taiwanese defenders off guard by launching an invasion during one of its increasingly frequent military exercises around the island.

Although PRC policy making is opaque, certain “red lines’ as well as opportune circumstances may induce Beijing to attack.

Commonly cited red lines include major moves toward Taiwan independence, the island’s impending acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the stationing of large U.S. military forces permanently on the island.

Of course, PRC decision makers might change their red lines over time and might not fully know what would prompt military intervention. Chinese scholars sometimes site the Korean War as an example of how Beijing (and Washington) became entangled into a major regional conflict without much premeditation.

Regarding targets of opportunity, the PRC might see widespread internal unrest on the island as an invitation to attack.

A regional crisis, such as one involving North Korea, could provide the necessary distraction to encourage a PLA move against Taiwan.

A related tactic might be to exploit one of the joint Russian-Chinese military exercise to imply Moscow’s support for Beijing’s assault.

Conversely, Beijing might be restrained if its confrontations with its other neighbors—especially India and Japan—remain elevated to avoid the strains of managing concurrent multi-front campaigns.

But major PRC domestic problems could induce either caution or risk-taking, as seen in the classic example of the Argentinian junta launching the Falklands/Malvinas War to preempt (actually just delay) its impending overthrow.

In the interim, which may last as long as October 1, 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic, PRC policy makers are preparing the legal, political, diplomatic, intelligence and military battlefield for long term reunification.

Major steps include the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, its renewed campaign to exclude Taiwan from international institutions like the World Health Organization, and its comprehensive intelligence gathering operations aimed at influential Taiwanese as well as their organizations, defenses, and networks.

In the military domain, the PLA is augmenting its network of ground sensor and reconnaissance satellites covering Taiwan and the surrounding sea and airspace.

Though the PRC has not (yet) aggressively building a large amphibious fleet, it has been militarizing its commercial fishing and maritime transport fleet to supplement its Navy and Coast Guard.

In a Taiwan scenario, the PRC’s maritime militia could function like Russia’s little green men, occupying Taiwan’s outlying islands with little notice. The PRC would likely describe the seizure as a police action or other non-military operation short of a state of war, which would make it harder for the Taiwanese and their American allies to respond militarily.

If Beijing encounters a weak response, as has been the case in the South China Sea, then the PLA could take a more direct role in seizing additional territories. Such a staged island-hoping operation would be easier to undertake than abrupt full-scale amphibious assault, which no country has undertaken since General MacArthur’s seizure of Inchon port in September 1950.

It is even possible that Beijing may change its future course and renounce military options. The current PRC leadership is substantially more confrontational and risk-acceptant than its predecessors. The next team might return to a more cautious, bide-your-time strategy.

A comprehensive regime change that engendered a liberal democratic China, an improbable if hoped-for development, might even make unification a popular option for the Taiwanese as well as reconcile Hong Kong and other occupied territories to a mutually beneficial partnership.

Barring a radical change at home, the PRC timeline for reunification might depend on decision makers’ expectation of future trends. They would consider the evolving military balance, economic trajectories, changes in Taiwanese popular opinion, and other variables to determine if time is on Beijing’s side.

Despite refining its disinformation assaults on Taiwanese politicians and other targets, PRC information managers have utterly failed to win over Taiwanese public opinion to unification. Polls show that support for unification is hovering in single digits, with young people especially seeking a future independent of Beijing.

Indeed, Beijing’s policies have done little to make one-China mergers attractive to the island’s voters. The PRC’s repressive policies toward Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang leave little to the imagination.

The PRC also has failed to exploit cross-strait economic ties to either attract substantial support in Taiwan or to pursue an Anaconda strategy to strangle the widespread opposition. Military threats and economic coercion have failed to enervate the resistance.

The Chinese Communist Party’s Unified Front strategy can no longer attract strong local allies into its PRC-controlled networks.

So if current trends continue, the PRC leadership, given the lack of viable alternatives will have to choose either to accept Taiwan’s de facto autonomy or use military force to end it.

If the PLA were to successfully seize Taiwan, the PLA could use the new territory to more effectively threaten Japan.

Furthermore, freed from preparing for a Taiwan contingency, the PLA could redeploy military forces to other theaters, such as against India to the west and against ASEAN states and Australia to the south.

Taiwan’s conquest would also embarrass and weaken the United States, which has offered Taiwan security guarantees and is seen internationally as the island’s most important military partner. The result would be to encourage U.S. allies and partners to appease the PRC or pursue alternative military paths, such as acquiring nuclear weapons.

So what to do?

Taiwan should continue its striving to be a net global security provider in areas such as global health. It should also spend more on defense to reverse years of decline.

The additional funds could help increase ground-force training to protect Taiwan’s approximately fifteen beaches suitable for invasion and exploit the island’s mountainous terrain to preclude easy PLA airborne assaults.

Reforming the system for mobilizing reserves should be another priority to compensate for Taiwan’s diminishing active duty personnel.

In terms of future weapons procurement, Taiwan needs to replace its aging fighters with F-35s as well as F-16s.

Investing more in both autonomous aerial and maritime drones would help compensate for the PLA’s more numerous warships and warplanes.

Additional naval enhancements could include acquiring more (anti-ship missiles, mines, and missile boats.

In essence, Taiwan should pursue a porcupine strategy to make Beijing understand that the costs of any aggression would exceed the benefits.

The United States can aide the Taiwanese by continuing to pursue a robust defense partnership with its military.

Although the focus of popular attention has naturally been on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the military partnership appropriately extends well beyond that to include military training, joint threat assessments, tabletop exercises, and helping Taiwan improve its indigenous defense industrial and technological capabilities.

In the information domain, U.S. messaging should make clear to the PRC that unprovoked aggression against Taiwan would reinforce the narrative that China’s ascent is presenting the same problems to the international system as the rise of Japan and China before World War II.

Conversely, to dampen Chinese overconfidence in military options, U.S. communications should emphasize that the PLA lacks any recent combat experience and could easily suffer defeat if it attempted an extremely difficult amphibious assault on Taiwan.

Featured Photo: A Chinese military training complex in Inner Mongolia, shown in this satellite image taken on Sept. 29, includes full-scale replicas of targets such as Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building.

Source: Satellite image 2020 Maxar Technologies

See, also the following:

Airpower When Directly Faced with the Authoritarian Powers: The International Fighter Conference 2019

Taiwan in Pacific Defense: Turning a New Page

The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 2

FARP Refueling

U.S. Marine Corps Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jacob Almaguer, Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) officer in charge, and Sgt. Andrew Lohse, a noncommissioned officer in charge, both with Bulk Fuel Company, 9th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB), 3rd Marine Logistics Group (MLG) speak about FARP operations on Ie Shima, Okinawa, Japan, during Exercise Valiant Workhorse from Sept. 23-24, 2020.

During the exercise Bulk Fuel Company, 9th ESB, 3rd MLG, set fuel lines and manned the stations for a FARP in support of UH-1Y Venom, AH-1Z Viper, and MV-22B Osprey aircraft with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawks.

Almaguer, a native of Dorr, Michigan, graduated from Hopkins High School in 2008 and enlisted out of Recruiting Station Grand Rapids in 2007.

Lohse, a native of Clinton, Iowa, graduated from Clinton High School in 2013 and enlisted out of Recruiting Station Quad Cities in 2013. 3rd MLG, based out of Okinawa, Japan, is a forward deployed combat unit that serves as III Marine Expeditionary Force’s comprehensive logistics and combat service support backbone for operations throughout the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.

IE SHIMA, OKINAWA, JAPAN

09.21.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Alpha Hernandez

3rd Marine Logistics Group

Flying the CH-53K: Visiting Marine Corps Air Station New River

12/03/2020

By Robbin Laird

Marine Corps Air Station, New River.

Yesterday, during my visit to New River, I experienced flying in the cockpit of the Marine Corps’s latest key air capability, the CH-53K.  I was in the cockpit with LtCol Luke “Amber” Frank, the VMX-1 Detachment OIC. He is a very experienced  Marine Corps pilot having flown virtually every type of rotorcraft the Marine Corps has, including being a presidential pilot as well.

He is experienced; obviously I am not.

So where did this flight happen?

In the new flight simulator which has been built and is operating at VMX-1.

The man-machine working relationship is a central part of the flight experience, with new capabilities crucial to mission success built around key man-machine capabilities.

A central one is the ability of the aircraft to hover with the automatic system, which allows pilots to operate in very degraded operating conditions to put down their aircraft at desired locations to deliver their payloads.

During our flight, in spite of the bright clear but cold day outside, we experienced several difficult landings in degraded conditions, dust storms, turbulence, and various challenging situations to land the aircraft.

Why does this matter in terms of concepts of operations?

This means that the crew can deliver the payload, Marines or cargo, to the area which is desired in terms of commander’s intent with regard to the landing zone selected for maximum combat effectiveness.

If one is inserting a force to support an effort to destroy key enemy capabilities, being able to take the right kind of situational awareness and land EXACTLY where the commander has determined the force could have the highest combat effect is a core combat capability with tactical and even potentially strategic effect.

This is how a capability within a new aircraft translates into enhanced probability for combat success.

And if you are an allied military which needs capability to insert force rapidly in special operations environment, the CH-53K could be a game changing capability for force insertion.

After my CH-53K ‘flight,’ I toured the first of the VMX-1 CH-53ks on the flight line. What quickly leaps out at you inside the aircraft, is the configuration to manage standard USAF pallets for rapid load and off-load operations.

In the near future, I will publish my interview with LtCol Frank.

And in an interview with Sean Cattanach, Sikorsky’s senior program manager of the U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K Training System, USNI News reported: “One of the benefits of developing a training system concurrently with the aircraft is that we’re able to utilize the digital designs from the aircraft to make sure the training is accurate.”

Bill Falk, Sikorsky CH-53K program director, added in a statement: “The training devices will ensure a flawless entry into service for the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter.”

CH53-K Training Suite Video from RMS Creative Solutions on Vimeo.

Moving About During COVID-19: Observations of a Traveler

12/01/2020

By Robbin Laird

During 2020, with the pandemic descending upon the world, my usual year of global travel obviously was not to be.

But except for April and May 2020, I travelled at least once a month within the United States from June to December and globally from January to March as the pandemic descended on the world.

My year of pandemic travel began with my return flight from Sydney to Houston and then Houston to Washington.

The Australian government waffled for several days before throwing us foreign threat folks out.

So when I went to fly towards the last days I could do it, flights were cancelled all across the board.

Then in the flight back to the United States, no one had a clue what the regulations would be when we landed.

Notably, did we global entry folks have to fill out forms or would we do the death-defying act of using touch screens?

No one knew so we filled out forms, only to discover that we could use the touch screens.

Fortunately, these screens were cleaned after each use by some woman with a spray and a cloth towel which never changed during the ritualistic cleaning.

As a high-risk person, I travelled with care, but frankly without excessive fear.

And what I have seen during this year has been truly amazing, on many levels.

Observing human behavior is a constant pastime, but this year has provided some new manifestations of behavior, the kind of stuff one would have read in history books but not have seen first-hand in recent times.

I would note that I have travelled through many U.S. states over the past month, and it is clear that most people are cautious and risk managing.

That is why holding up masks in presidential debates is so amazing, as masks have been everywhere, I have gone, whether in transit or visiting the many cities I have visited.

If you think Americans are not using masks, frankly you have been spending too much time in your basement hiding out.

I have seen a number of types of behavior during the year.

First, there are the prudent and careful but those travelling without losing their sense of humanity.

This has been the largest group of folks, people you can chat with on the plane, or get a sandwich from in a store in the airport, or working in hotels, or walking down the street.

But there are exceptions which surprise you.

For example, after flying three hours sitting next to a chap, when he got up and crowded in the aisle, yelled at me that I was too close to him as I stood up at my seat, but not yet entering the aisle.

Apparently, where social distancing occured was a determination in this guy’s mind.

Second, there are the totally panicked folks, who frankly are people who generate uneasiness wherever they are in the travel chain.

For example, look at these folks in Dulles airport and ask yourself, why are they travelling at all.

Third, there are those who have read a Brothers Grimm fairy tale and believe in the magic mask.

These folks wear their mask everywhere.

Folks in cars are the most amusing.

I have seen in LA a chap driving down the freeway with his top down on his Mercedes and wearing a mask.

I saw a Harley-Davidson driver with a mask on in Jacksonville Florida, who yelled at me for not having my mask on in my rental car and I was at least 20 feet from this mask vigilante

Fourth, there are the totally paranoid.

You see these folks on planes, cautiously approaching the bathrooms and fearful of entering such a dangerous place.

You would think they are about to be threatened by an IED if they opened the door.

I even saw a chap crawling on the flight back from Sydney in March and open the door of the bathroom with his head as he somehow thought that was safer than opening the door with his hands.

Fifth, I have seen animals on flights which look saner the people they are with.

Take a look at this Great Dane looking at the masked folks and clearly puzzling over his place in the world.

Sixth, there are the Stasi mask folks wondering around who love to come up to you and threaten you if you might have done something which they think is threatening the world.

These are the folks building apps to trace your every movement to determine if you are a risky mobile contact. I am sure the Chinese government is finding these folks to be good future customers or perhaps members of future Cabinets in Washington DC.

I would observe that if you saw the masked folks coming onto the planes as they do now, you would fear another 9/11 but now these are friendlier folks.

Hopefully, we can end this nonsense sooner rather than later.

But the behaviors evident in travelling this year certainly will persist.

Clearly, we will all need the Stasi personalities to get more power because we are so unable to manage our lives without them.

Well back to my basement.

Sorry really don’t have one in the Outer Banks so I guess I will have to travel again.