Boxer Live Fire Training

08/16/2021

The accuracy and lethality of the Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle has impressed personnel on a turret conversion course.

After completing several weeks of theory, members of the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment finally got their chance to set the sites of the main 30mm armament of the Boxer at the live-fire component of the course at the Wide Bay Training Area.

The Boxer’s primary role will be reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance in stable to high threat environments.

It will replace the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) which has been in use by the ADF since the 1990s.

Australian Department of Defence

July 21, 2021

Defence of Japan 2021: A Focus On Proactive Defense Efforts With Allies

08/15/2021

By Thomas Wilkins and Daisuke Akimoto

Japan’s new defence white paper, Defense of Japan 2021, affirms Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s continuation of his predecessor Shinzo Abe’s proactive contribution to regional peace and security.

Stemming from a desire to counter any trend towards a norm of ‘might is right’ in the region, the white paper must be seen in the context of broader diplomatic efforts by Japan to champion a rules-based order. This is exemplified by its vision for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, first introduced in 2016, which has three ‘pillars’: rule of law, economic prosperity, and peace and stability. The 2021 white paper is designed to support each of these objectives.

The new white paper has been warmly received by allies and partners in Washington and Canberra, but has drawn predictable denunciation from Beijing, particularly for its stance on Taiwan and the explicit statement that ‘Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community’. Xi Jinping’s reiteration of his desire to achieve ‘national reunification’ in his speech at the centenary celebrations of the Chinese Communist Party, along with the US Indo-Pacific Command’s warning that a conflict could break out within the next six years, have alarmed Japanese policymakers.

Noting the shifting military balance in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in the region as a whole, in China’s favour, the white paper states that Japan must ‘pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before’.

Though Japan has maintained warm, if low-key, relations with Taipei, it has traditionally eschewed overt support for the beleaguered island democracy. The 2021 white paper signals a significant policy change. This comes on top of slightly overwrought comments by Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, a long-time supporter of Taiwan, who said that ‘Japan and the US must defend Taiwan together’ if China mounts an invasion of the island. The remarks were later retracted, and both Tokyo and Washington recited their pro forma commitments to the ‘One China’ principle. Nevertheless, it’s clear that the mood in Tokyo, as in Washington, has shifted towards increased support for Taipei, not least because of the sympathies of some of Japan’s policymakers in Japan at present, including not only Aso but also Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi.

The white paper also addresses the related issue of Chinese assertiveness towards Japan directly, backed by ever-expanding military power. Japan bears the brunt of this in the East China Sea in the waters around the Senkaku Islands (claimed by China as the Diaoyudao (and Taiwan as the Diaoyutai)). The document notes that ‘China has relentlessly continued attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by coercion in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands, leading to a grave matter of concern’. Typical of the grey-zone tactics brought to bear in this maritime space are the incessant incursions of China Coast Guard vessels into territorial waters. The white paper expresses consternation at China’s recent coastguard law, which it claims is inconsistent with international law, especially in the authorised use of weapons.

The white paper discusses a range of other ongoing security concerns, with North Korea’s continued nuclear bellicosity salient among them, but also touches on environmental challenges and the response to natural disasters.

But it is more than mere talk. To support Japan’s more proactive role in regional diplomacy and security, the white paper showcases recent developments in Japanese defence technology, especially in the new domains of space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. This is backed by defence budget increases for nine years running.

Japan has invested in defence collaboration with other countries for the development of game-changing military technologies, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, quantum technology and 5G. Notably, the white paper highlights the development of standoff missile as a strike capability, often described as the ‘Japanese Tomahawk’. Yet, it’s important to stress that in accordance with domestic and international legal frameworks they can’t be used for a pre-emptive strike.

The white paper also recognises that regional security challenges ‘cannot be dealt with by a single country alone’. In addition to a significant effort to better mobilise its defence capabilities and diplomatic strengths, key to Japan’s regional posture is the support of other significant players in the region. The longstanding alliance with the US, which Japan is actively strengthening, provides a major fillip, due not only to the military power and influence it carries, but also to the diplomatic support that the US has afforded to Tokyo through its own adoption of the principle of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Australia, too, has been a de facto supporter of this principle, and Canberra’s ‘special strategic partnership’ with Tokyo continues to be augmented. The Japanese ambassador to Australia, Shingo Yamagami, recently made overtures to Canberra about engaging Australian support for Japan’s predicament in the East China Sea. India is another country that Japan looks to in its bid to uphold the regional order, and the partnering process is brought together in the alignment of the four countries through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Criticism of the new white paper has been quick to emerge, with Beijing diplomatic and media outlets seizing on the Taiwan statements. Criticism has also extended to the presentation of the document, particularly the decision to put a ‘warlike’ image of an equestrian samurai on the cover, perhaps in a bid to resurrect perceptions of Japan’s prior militarism.

Nevertheless, as a response to the intensifying strategic competition in the region and Japan’s perception that its security environment is further deteriorating, the white paper provides firm evidence of the Suga administration’s determination to uphold national interests and the regional rules-based order through a combination of proactive diplomacy, internal mobilisation and enhanced collaboration with allies and partners.

Thomas Wilkins is a senior lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney and a senior research fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of JIIA. Daisuke Akimoto is an official secretary in Japan’s House of Representatives and a former assistant professor at the Soka University Peace Research Institute. His views are his own and do not represent the official position of the House of Representatives or the Japanese government.

This article was published by ASPI on July 29, 2021.

An Update on the Australian KC-30 Tanker: June 2021

08/12/2021

In a June 29, 2021 article by Flight Lieutenant Robert Cochran, provided an update of the KC-30A operating in Exercise Arnheim Thunder.

Providing air-to-air refuelling services to some of the world’s most advanced combat fighter jets is just another day in the office for Air Force pilots Flight Lieutenant Kristen Crick and Flying Officer Danny Kitcher.

They fly a KC-30A multi-role tanker transport, one of seven operated by No. 33 Squadron.

Less than an hour into a daytime mission during Exercise Arnhem Thunder, they refuelled four F/A-18F Super Hornets and two EA-18G Growlers.

“In operations and exercises such as this, our job is pretty simple: meet up with aircraft and offload fuel to allow them to stay on station for longer,” co-pilot Flying Officer Kitcher said.

“During Arnhem Thunder, the KC-30A has allowed the fighters to participate in back-to-back vulnerability windows, to maximise their training outcomes for the exercise.

“It’s always a good feeling when a rendezvous plan works nicely, and we can drop off our receivers close to their working airspace.”

KC-30A multi-role tanker transport pilots, Flight Lieutenant Kristen Crick and Flying Officer Danny Kitcher in the cockpit after completing a mission during Exercise Arnhem Thunder. Photo: Leading Aircraftman Stewart Gould

Aircraft captain Flight Lieutenant Crick said it all came down to the KC-30A being in the right place at the right time to give the receiver pilots the fuel they needed to complete their mission.

“You usually know some of the crew in the receiver formation, so they’re your mates on the wing, and like all good wingmen, you just need to be there for them when they need you,” Flight Lieutenant Crick said.

“Whether it’s dragging fighters through the airspace or anticipating where they might need us for a top-off, we remain flexible and work together so they can meet their mission objectives.”

For the two pilots, the best things about flying the KC-30A were the variety and the people.

“We’re able to do passenger and cargo moves, hose-and-drogue and boom refuelling, and formation flying,” Flying Officer Kitcher said.

Flight Lieutenant Crick said: “Flying the KC-30A means you’re always working with a crew and No. 33 Squadron is full of good characters”.

“While the KC-30A is first and foremost an air-to-air refuelling system, given our multi-role, we’re not only working with receiver pilots for air-to-air refuelling, but also looking after passengers, and making sure we provide a comfortable service to get them to their next domestic or international destination,” Flight Lieutenant Crick said.

“I enjoy the responsibility of sitting on the flight deck, keeping watch with a coffee, while the back-end fall asleep.”

No. 33 Squadron deployed one KC-30A aircraft from RAAF Base Amberley to RAAF Base Darwin to participate in Exercise Arnhem Thunder 21.

Featured Photo: F/A-18A Hornet A21-008 refuels in the air over the Northern Territory during Exercise Arnhem Thunder. Photo: Leading Aircraftman Stewart Gould

 

Shaping a Way Ahead for the TACAIR Community: Visiting MAG-14

08/11/2021

By Robbin Laird

During my July 2021 visit to 2nd Marine Air Wing, I had a chance to meet with the leadership of MAG-14.

I met with Col. Williams, the MAG-14 Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Harrell, the MAG-14 Executive Officer and Maj. Cunningham, the MAG-14 Operations Officer. Based at Cherry Point, MAG-14 operates AV-8B Harriers, KC-130Js and the RQ-21A Blackjack. It is in transition from the Harriers to F-35s, and their KC-130Js are key enablers for the entire MAGTF.

2nd MAW includes Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501), the Warlords, which is an F-35 training squadron at MCAS Beaufort.

But the coming of operational F-35s to MAG-14 and 2nd MAW will be another driver of transformation of 2nd MAW capabilities. Operationally, 2nd MAW deploys all over the globe, to include recently working with allied F-35s in the North Atlantic and European theaters in the recent BALTOPS-50 exercise.

But transition is always challenging, and one can see significant construction in preparation for the standup of the F-35 at the base.

As Col. Williams put it: “We are in transition as we wind down the Harriers and get ready for the arrival of the F-35s in the 2023 timeframe.

“We are scheduled to receive the first six aircraft in late FY23, while VMU-2 will transition from the RQ-21 to Reapers in the FY25 timeframe.”

“We will continue to support the East Coast MEUs with Harriers, and will be sustaining the Harrier force through fiscal year 2028. When the F-35s take over the East Coast MEU’s duty that will represent a significant transformation.”

The first hangar is being built as well as the simulator building for the F-35s coming to the base. As Col. Williams noted: “We will eventually have two more hangars. A new headquarters will be built for MAG-14 as well.”

The challenge is to make the transition, but to maintain the readiness of the current force. 

Managing the two dynamics is the challenge which the MAG-14 leadership is facing. The Harriers deploy with the MEUs and as the MEUs transition towards more North Atlantic defense missions as opposed to Eastern Mediterranean missions.

The pilot and maintainer force will transition as the F-35s come onboard at Cherry Point as well.

And this aspect is a key one in managing the transition as well; the Service has used incentive programs, such as Selective Retention Bonus to encourage reenlistment and continued service of highly qualified Marines—particularly aviation maintainers.

We then discussed the KC-130J.

My own observation over the years is that the KC-130J is crucial to Marine Corps operations by providing logistic support, air-to-air refueling and close air support to fleet operating forces.

As a multi-sensor image reconnaissance and close air support platform, the KC-130J aircraft may be equipped with the Harvest Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit (HAWK) configuration as well.

The Marine Corps has integrated the Harvest HAWK system, that provides the Battlefield Commander with a limited, persistent surveillance capability with the onboard Production Target Sight Sensor (TSS).

The TSS can also provide the ability to employ precision weapons using laser guidance.

A core focus for MAG-14 is ensuring the readiness of the aircraft and crews for the KC-130Js.

Given the aging inventory of aircraft, this is a key challenge going forward.

There has been a new focus on the long-range firing function which the USMC could participate in as they address evolving concepts of operations for extended littoral operations, such as the Marine Littoral Regiment. 

The MLR is a purpose built unit designed to enable the Marine Corps’ new service strategy and employs three uniquely designed subordinate elements: a Littoral Combat Team, a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, and a Littoral Logistics Battalion.

The LCT is designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-sized expeditionary advance base sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning.

It has seemed to me that the Harvest HAWK experience could be leveraged here in terms of either working with longer range missiles, or adapting a Harvest HAWK capability for the Ospreys to provide rapid insertion fires into the fight.

There is also the clear possibility that airlifters can be modified by using missiles in the box to be able to carry weapons that can be launched from the back of the aircraft.

Clearly, kill web approaches can allow for that, and setting up advanced expeditionary bases of C2 or sensor operating Marines supporting air-delivered fires is more expeditious than trying to move first to EABOs themselves.

MAG-14 is in transition, but it can be viewed as maintaining the competitive edge within a larger transition of the USMC itself.

Author’s Note: All three officers are C-130 drivers by trade and one with previous EA-6B Electronic Countermeasures Officer experience. This includes Harvest HAWK work as well, the USMC innovative approach to weaponization of the airlifter.

Featured Photo: ATLANTIC OCEAN (DEC. 14, 2019) A U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 365 (reinforced), 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, arrives aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) for deployment in the Atlantic Ocean Dec. 14, 2019. The Bataan is operating in the Atlantic Ocean in support of naval operations to maintain maritime stability and security in order to ensure access, deter aggression and defend U.S., allied and partner interests. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tanner Seims)

Talisman Sabre 2021: Multi Systems Live Fire Mission

A live fire activity featuring different weapons systems from land, air, sea and cyber was conducted at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area as part of Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021 (TS21).

Synchronising traditional warfare and digital assets, TS21 participants conducted an attack against a simulated adversary on Townshend Island. “Multi-domain Strike” capability is one of the ADF’s newest joint warfighting concepts.

Held every two years, TS21 is the largest bilateral training activity between Australia and the United States aimed at testing the ADF’s interoperability with the US and other participating forces.

In addition to the United States, TS21 involves participating forces from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Australian Department of Defence

July 20, 2021

Shaping a Way Ahead for the Assault Support Community: Visiting the “War Eagles” of MAG-29

08/10/2021

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to 2nd Marine Air Wing in July 2021, I had a chance to discuss the way ahead for the assault support community with the Commanding Officer of MAG-29, Col. Joyce, and with Maj. Bowing, the Operations Officer for MAG-29.

In terms of aircraft, MAG-29 has CH-53E in the heavy lift squadrons, and AH-1Z Vipers and UH-1Y Venoms in their light attack helicopter squadrons.

The Marine Corps is scheduled to deliver the CH-53K to MAG-29, as well as adding Link 16 and full motion video capabilities to the H-1 assets.

These upgrades will provide significant options for the aircraft to support the way ahead as part of the evolving capabilities for the assault force.

For Col. Joyce, the return of naval integration is really the return to his roots in his initial operational time in the USMC.

He has also served on the Navy staff in the N98 Air Warfare Division as the Marine Corps officer working with Naval aviation, where discussions of how to leverage and integrate the Marine’s role as naval aviators into the future maritime fight were a daily event. Non-Marines often forget that Marine Corps aviators are indeed Naval aviators and as such provide a key access point in the effort to find new ways to integrate the two forces.

As Col. Joyce put it: “We are really talking about reintegrating our Naval Force.

“Getting back to our roots as a Corps to provide Fleet Marine Forces for service with the Fleet.

“Our history over the past six decades may be filled with periods of sustained operations ashore, but our legacy as a Corps is that of naval campaigning, amphibious operations, and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

“Today’s reintegration focus is oriented on a vision of maritime warfighting designed to posture the Naval Force for the next six decades.”

Col. Joyce entered the Marine Corps towards the end of the Cold War and is one of the officers I have interviewed in the Navy or the USMC over the past three years that brings real operational experience in this strategic competition environment.

Major Bowing has been part of the Huey community from the beginning of his time in the USMC and has served for three years in MAWTS-1 working assault support training and concepts of operations.

One issue we discussed was the integration of Link-16 and full motion video upgrades for the H-1s and their potential impact.

Col. Joyce put it this way: “I believe the integration of Link-16 along with many other digital interoperability (DI) efforts should help us look at ourselves differently moving forward.

“I would argue the attack and utility community over the last 20 years largely viewed our pursuit of DI efforts such as Link-16 from a consumer’s perspective. Meaning, we wanted the ability to ingest mostly targeting data via Link-16 to create a tactical effect on the battlefield from our own platform.

“I would also suggest this idea is consistent with the way we’ve been tactically employed over the past two decades.

“But the future of naval campaigning and maritime warfighting, especially within the close-in, confined, and contested key maritime terrain of the littorals, requires the HMLA community to view ourselves much more as participants and enablers of larger kill chains and kill webs.

“This means attack and utility capabilities out forward – acting as an extension of the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) – to screen, scout, and sense within both the landward and seaward areas of the littorals.

“As participants in a larger kill web, we must be able to gather, disseminate, receive, exploit, and/or act on the information depending on the tactical task assigned.”

“Our core missions within Assault Support Aviation will remain vital in future littoral battles – conducting assault support operations, providing forward arming and refueling points, conducting aviation reconnaissance and surveillance, and conducting aviation delivered fires remain core competencies of the future force.

“What is different from our recent past is the explicit focus on supporting Surface Warfare and Sea Denial operations.”

“What do we bring to that fight?

“Where are the warfighting gaps?

“Can we fill those gaps?

“Should we fill those gaps?

“How do we contribute to anti-surface warfare (ASuW) missions?”

“These are some of the questions we’re looking at right now within MAG-29.

“We are the only Service viewing this future environment through the lens of a Stand-In (versus Stand-Off) force.

“How do we contribute to Surface Warfare and Sea Denial operations as part of the Stand-In Force?

“How do we continue to provide close-in support to the MLR maneuvering throughout the landward area of the littorals in a high-threat non-permissive environment, while enabling the larger kill web oriented on Sea Denial operations within the seaward area of the shallow blue waters?

“Are we postured through ongoing DI initiatives to gather, disseminate, receive, and exploit information across subsurface, surface, air, and information domains?

“I would argue this is a paradigm shift in mindset from our operations over the past 20 years in the desert.

“Lethality across Assault Support Aviation, including our heavy lift platform, remains a critical as ever in the future fight.

“But our ability to screen, scout, and sense within the littorals and then contribute to the larger kill web may be even more important in the years to come.”

Looking ahead, the leadership of 2d MAW is clearly looking at working towards the tactical missions that are likely to be dominant in the 2030 timeframe.

As Col. Joyce hammered home: “There is absolutely a critical role for Assault Support Aviation looking forward. When you look at the shear expanse of geography, force dispersion and distribution, and challenges with our maritime logistics fleet in just one example, I can’t envision a situation where somebody tells me we have too much heavy lift capability.

“What we must do as a community to help the larger Force Design effort is to focus our analysis on capabilities, rather than specific platforms.

“We must experiment ruthlessly with those capabilities through the lens of future tactical tasks and missions.

“And then focus our platform modernization efforts and develop aviation tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to deliver those needed capabilities to the Fleet Marine Force.”

His earlier discussion with regard to how assault support can contribute to sea control and sea denial is an example of what he means by looking at capabilities through different tactical or mission lenses.

Rather than define the mission sets by the primary operations of the past twenty years in the Middle East, the aperture is being opened to correlate capabilities with evolving mission sets.

They are adding the CH-53K to the force, and Col. Joyce underscored that the new platform brings new capabilities to the force.

But rather than simply describing how the platform is replacing the CH-53E, the focus needs to be upon how to leverage new capabilities to deal with evolving mission sets. The Marine Corps has been investing in capabilities to  respond globally to crisis and contingency and build the capabilities to compete and blunt potential adversary’s aggression.

As Col. Joyce put it: “Logistics is our pacing function.

“It doesn’t matter if it’s the High North or the Indo-Pacific.

“Assured logistics, assured movement, and assured sustainment of the force requires the capabilities that the heavy lift team brings to the fight. And the CH-53E and future CH-53K is the only heavy lift rotary-wing capability within the Department of Defense.

“The CH-53K is simply an exponential leap in heavy lift capability in terms of range, payload, and digital interoperability.”

“No one can predict with precision what the future holds. Advances in long-range precision strike, unmanned systems, loitering munitions, low earth orbit system sensing, and AI/ML will change how we currently perform our warfighting missions.

“But Close Air Support, Strike, Aerial Delivery, Assault Transport, Air Evacuation, and Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel to name a few absolutely have a future role in the Nation’s Crisis Response force.”

Major Bowing built on the discussion and added a core point, namely the weaponizing of communication.

The sharing of information and data as part of the shaping of enhanced capabilities for an integrated distributed force is a key part of the way ahead for shaping the role for the assault support community.

We did not discuss the following point specifically, but if one combines a number of thoughts which have been shared by Marines at both II MEF and 2nd MAW with me, the blending of assault support with C2/ISR warfare could well emerge from the process of working integration with the Navy.

In an August 2021 exercise, we will see the establishment of an advanced expeditionary sensor base built around a G/ATOR Radar.

The assault support community – notably by heavy lift – can deliver that radar to such a base.

The C2 community is very capable of not only supporting G/ATOR at that base but could fly in the Osprey, which is an assault support asset, and with a roll-on roll of capability, provide the C2 linkages from that sensor base to the key combat nodes in the kill web, as was done in last year’s Deep Water exercise.

One could establish on another advanced expeditionary base information warfare Marines or MIG- combat members who could contribute to spoofing, jamming, or various disinformation efforts in support of the deployed force, and again that would be a payload delivered by the assault support force.

In other words, the assault support community can deliver a wider array of payloads than simply direct kinetic force.

Indeed, if one focuses on maritime kill webs, the Marines really do not need to carry weapons to the point of attack; they can deploy capabilities which can find targets, communicate those targets to other fire solution combat capabilities, and contribute to the electronic warfare aspects of the fight.

With the flexibility inherent in roll-on roll of capabilities on the Osprey a variety of mission support elements could be put on the unique tiltrotor-enabled range and speed asset.

And with an ability to put interior fuel cells into the Osprey, endurance is enabled as well.

In other words, capabilities seen through the lens of expanded mission sets can drive the transformation process.

Featured Photo: A Marine Corps UH-1Y Huey and two AH-1Z Vipers with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 conduct training at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, July 16, 2020. HMLA-167 conducted flight operations to improve proficiency and maintain mission readiness. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Juan Dominguez)

 

Triton Begins Multi-Intelligence Capability Phase

According to a press release published on July 29, 2021 from NAVAIR, the U.S. Navy has conducted first MQ-4C Triton test flight with multi-intelligence upgrade.

The Navy conducted its first test flight of the MQ-4C Triton in its upgraded hardware and software configuration July 29 at NAS Patuxent River, beginning the next phase of the unmanned aircraft’s development. 

The MQ-4C Triton flew in its new configuration, known as Integrated Functional Capability (IFC)-4, which will bring an enhanced multi-mission sensor capability as part of the Navy’s Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (MISR&T) transition plan.

Triton’s Integrated Test Team (ITT) comprised of the U.S. Navy, Australian cooperative partners, and government/industry teams completed a functional check flight and initial aeromechanical test points, demonstrating stability and control of the MQ-4C after a 30-month modification period.  

“Today’s flight is a significant milestone for the program and a testament to the resolve of the entire ITT, their hard work, and passion for test execution and program success,” said Capt. Dan Mackin, Persistent Maritime Unmanned Aircraft Systems program manager. “This flight proves that the program is making significant progress toward Triton’s advanced multi-intelligence upgrade and it brings us closer to achieving the initial operational capability (IOC) milestone.” 

Multiple Triton assets have been modified into the IFC-4 configuration in support of IOC in 2023.  A single test asset is in the current IFC-3 configuration to support sustainment of deployed systems as well as risk reduction for IFC-4. 

Currently, two MQ-4C Triton aircraft in the baseline configuration known as IFC-3 are forward deployed to 7th Fleet in support of early operational capability (EOC) and Commander Task Force (CTF)-72 tasking. VUP-19 will operate Triton to further develop the concept of operations and fleet learning associated with operating a high-altitude, long-endurance system in the maritime domain.

“The MQ-4C Triton has already had a tremendous positive impact on operations in USINDOPACOM and will continue to provide unprecedented maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities which are especially critical to national interests with the increased focus in the Pacific,” Mackin said.

Triton is the first high altitude, long endurance aircraft that can conduct persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions to complement the P-8 in the maritime domain. The Navy plans to deploy Triton to five orbits worldwide. 

Featured Photo: An MQ-4C Triton flew its first test flight in its new hardware and software configuration July 29 at NAS Patuxent River, Md. The new configuration will bring an enhanced multi-mission sensor capability as part of the Navy’s Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (MISR&T) transition plan. (U.S. Navy photo)

 

July 2021 Japan-UK Defence Ministerial Meeting

08/09/2021

According to a press release from the Japanese Ministry of Defence, the Japanese and UK defence ministers met on July 20, 2021 in Japan.

On July 20, 2021, commencing at 13:00 for approximately 60 minutes Minister KISHI held a Defense Ministerial Meeting with Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Rt Hon Ben Wallace.

1  The two Ministers welcomed their first face-to-face meeting and Minister Kishi welcomed the accompanying of the 1st Sea Lord and the Chief of Air Staff to Japan. Secretary Wallace welcomed the recent deepening of Japan-UK defense cooperation and stated that the UK would like to strengthen cooperation with Japan that shares the same values. Minister Kishi stated that Japan and the UK, as countries who share fundamental values, should address together challenges that we are facing in the Indo-Pacific.

2  With respect to the Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) led by HMS Queen Elizabeth on its way to Japan, the two Ministers shared the recognition that through bi/multilateral exercises and the CSG21’s visit to Japan:

  1. the defense cooperation between Japan and the UK—standing on a long history and tradition—has elevated to a “new level;”
  2. the UK’s commitment to realize a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is a robust and an irreversible one; and
  3. Japan-UK defense cooperation serves not only for the security of Japan but for securing the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region and the international community, and that it will also tackle global challenges.

3  The two Ministers confirmed that, during the CSG21 visit to Japan, HMS Queen Elizabeth would berth at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka, and that the other escort ships would dispersedly berth at the following ports: JMSDF Yokosuka, JMSDF Maizuru, JMSDF Kure, U.S. naval base Sasebo and the White Beach area.

4 The two Ministers affirmed accelerated discussion to explore FX/FCAS collaborations at sub-system level, with a special focus on Power and Propulsion System. Furthermore, both Ministers also agreed to intensify efforts toward a bilateral arrangement between both ministries that is necessary for implementing that collaboration of Power and Propulsion System, if it is agreed to be conducted. They welcomed that a new cooperative research on chemical and biological protection technology was started this month.

5  The two Ministers also exchanged views on the regional issues in the Indo-Pacific. Regarding the East China Sea and the South China Sea, they once again expressed their will to strongly oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion, and any activities that escalate tension regarding the situation. They concurred the importance of a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

6  Regarding North Korea, the two Ministers condemned the launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea which violate UNSC resolutions and pose a threat to the peace and stability of the region, and shared the view that, including the repeated launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea thus far, those posed a serious challenge to the international community as a whole. Upon that, the two Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to closely coordinatetoward the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, including collaboration on responses against “ship-to-ship transfers.”