A Logistics Perspective on II MEF Transformation

05/14/2021

By Robbin Laird

As the Marines work with the U.S. Navy to reshape capabilities for the maritime fight, two key elements for successfully doing so are the right kind of C2 for distributed integrated operations and logistical capabilities to support such a force. The logistics piece is not an afterthought, but a key enabler or disabler for mission success.

With a sea-based force the force afloat has significant capability built in for initial operations, but the challenge is with air and sea systems to be able to provide the right kind of support at the right time and at the right place.

Engaging in operations against a peer competitor means that the force needs to be able to operate end to end in terms of secure communications and logistics. Ensuring an ability to operate from home ports or allied ports is part of the security challenge; finding ways to use air systems to move key combat assets to the various pieces on the operational chessboard in the Atlantic is crucial; and having well placed and well protected stockpiled supplies which can be moved to support the force is a key part of the overall logistics puzzle which needs to be solved.

I had a chance to discuss these challenges during my visit to II MEF in April 2021 with LtCol Perry Smith, the senior strategic mobility officer. He and his team focus on the end-to-end supply to the force, through air, sea and ground movements to deploying or deployed forces. As he noted, the Marines work end to end transportation which means that “the embarkers at the units actually do all the preparation for their own equipment, do all the certifications, do all the load planning, and move their units out.”

But when force mobilization occurs for the joint force, the Marines are competing with the other services for lift support, and in North Carolina this means that they are competing with 82nd Airborne Division “for the same ports and airfields.”

The logistics piece has two key elements. First, there is the ability to support the initial deployment of the force. And secondly, there is the challenge of sustaining the force going forward?

For the Marines, the logistics piece comes in two parts, namely, support afloat and support ashore, so there is a “naval slice and a ground slice.”

For operations in the Atlantic AOR, the Marines are working with the Navy as well as key allies to work the logistics supply chain in a dynamic combat situation. This means that they need not only to work closely with the U.S. Navy but to be able to work closely with the support structures of key NATO allies in the support of European operations, including in the High North.

The Trident Juncture 2018 exercise provided an opportunity to work closely with the Norwegians on finding more effective ways to work with their domestic transportation systems, including capabilities like Norwegian ferries, to move equipment and supplies into the operational areas.

As LtCol Smith put it: “What I saw at Trident Juncture was their willingness to make this plan work because they have to. I think they depend on us in a time of need to be able to do reception staging, onward movement, and get to the point where we can back them up in a fight if we needed to.”

And to do this requires shaping as seamless as possible a logistics supply line.

As CNO Richardson stood up the Second Fleet, a key focus was on incorporating the High North into the shaping of new defense capabilities. To do so from a USMC point of view is challenging because of limited logistical infrastructure and the clear need to rely on air systems with fairly long legs, which means the Osprey and the coming CH-53K.

There is also the challenge of the environment.

As LtCol Smith highlighted: “In the Pacific, you don’t have the problems we have in the High North with sub-zero temperatures with 24 hours of sun in the summer and two hours of daylight in the winter.”

The Norwegians are very competent in such conditions and the Marines have a lot to learn from them, and leveraging the kind of clothing, and telecoms equipment which they deploy with would make a great deal of sense.

As LtCol Smith put it: “How do we take advantage of the knowledge of our allies and leverage their capabilities for our forces to enhance our own survivability and lethality?”

The communication challenges are significant. As you operate from sea, and work with an expeditionary base, linking the two is a challenge, which requires having an airborne capability to link the two.

When looking at the North Atlantic arc from North Carolina to the Nordics, strategic mobility is delivered by a triad of airlift, sealift and pre-positioning. Where best to pre-position? How best to protect those stockpiles? And how to move critical supplies to the point of need rapidly?

Reworking the Marine Corps force to work more effectively with the U.S. Navy requires a reset of the logistics enterprise.

But with the Navy in flux, the USMC in flux, and the strategic environment in flux, and our allies in flux, how do you shape effective convergence for effective combat capability?

As LtCol Smith articulated the challenge: “How do you shape convergence of your technology, your tactics, your techniques and procedures with the assets which are available to an effective combat force?”

Good question. That is challenging with the force you have, let alone for some future force.

What can be too easily overlooked is that adding new platforms, deliver new capabilities only if they can be used by the operating forces effectively and in a sustained operating environment.

Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Lance Cpl. Clay Weedman, an embarkation specialist with 2d Marine Division, ties down a vehicle onto a rail car in preparation for Operational Logistics Exercise on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N.C., April 13, 2021. During OPLOGEX, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces will transport material and equipment on rail and ship and conduct pier-side offload of the USNS Williams at Blount Island command, Fla. (U.S. Marine Corps photo be Lance Cpl. Samuel Lyden)

In an article published by II MEF on April 15, 2021, the latest logistics exercise conducted by II MEF was highlighted.

MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA – U.S. Marines with II Marine Expeditionary Force began Dynamic Cape 21.1, a live maritime prepositioning exercise that includes an Operational Logistics Exercise with a subsequent final exercise event, taking place from Apr. 7-28, 2021. 

As a part of DC 21.1, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, II MEF, and Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, are participating in an OPLOGEX taking place across the eastern United States. 

Locations hosting the exercise include Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, Wilmington, North Carolina; and Blount Island, Florida.

During the OPLOGEX, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces will transport materiel and equipment on rail and ship and conduct pier-side offload of the USNS Williams at Blount Island Command, Florida. II MEF will also maintain an element in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina to command and control the offload while rehearsing the command’s ability to deploy, employ, and redeploy a forward element.

This exercise facilitates the rapid deploy-ability of scalable naval expeditionary forces in support of major combat operations. Marines and sailors train to increase critical expeditionary capabilities and facilitate bridging the seam between operations on land and sea.
U.S. Marine Corps Col. David R. Everly, the commanding officer of 2d MEB, said units are prepared to coordinate and respond to any situation when it comes to logistics.

“They’re ready to respond to any crisis,” he said. “An exercise like this is just another opportunity for us to show that we have a focus on all different spectrum of challenges that are hitting us, and we’re ready to respond.”

The OPLOGEX provides an opportunity for II MEF to develop, refine, and test portions of theater opening and force deployment processes to gain MEF-level warfighting proficiency and readiness.

Naval Group in Australia and the Future Submarine Program: A May 2021 Update

05/13/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Naval Group has appointed Lilian Braylé as executive vice-president to run the Australian program to build 12 ocean-going Attack class submarines, the French shipbuilder said May 11.

“Lilian Brayle will join Naval Group on 31 May as executive vice-president for the Australian Future Submarine Program,” the company said in a statement.

Braylé, as head of program, will manage teams in France and Australia with the stated objective of being able to deliver the program on time and on budget, while drawing on the Australian supply chain and spending at least 60 percent of contract value in Australia, NG said.

Braylé will be supported by John Davis, chief executive and deputy head of the program and David Peever, chairman of Naval Group Australia, NG said. Braylé will sit on the Naval Group executive committee.

Brayle has worked in France and Australia, and holds dual nationality. His previous employer was Nexter, a land weapons manufacturer, where he was head of support and customer services, the company said.

Previously, Brayle worked on the Airbus A400M military airlifter program, as head of service support, and before that he worked at ATR, the Franco-Italian regional turboprop aircraft manufacturer.

Brayle was in Sydney between 2002 and 2008, working for the Australian unit of Safran, a French supplier of aero-engines and equipment, the company said.

His studies include the management school at the university of New South Wales, engineering school INSA in Toulouse, southwest France, and mechanical engineering at Sheffield university in the UK.

The previous program director on the Attack submarine, Jean-Michel Billig, moved to other duties, NG executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellet told journalists March 30.

NG would meet the requirement for at least 60 percent of local content by the end of the submarine program, Pommellet said.

The company is in negotiations for the contract for basic design, which is expected to last two to three years, followed by detailed design, and then manufacture.

Meanwhile, UK daily The Times reported May 11 from Australia that vice-admiral Jonathan Mead of the Australian navy was conducting an internal inquiry on the A$90 billion ($71 billion) submarine program.

The inquiry was taking place amidst delays in the program and at a time of heightened tension between Australia and China, the report said.

Mead has warned the Attack boats “may arrive too late to pose any deterrent to Chinese aggression,” the report said, adding that Chinese president Xi Jinping has pledged to take control of Taiwan by 2050.

China would take “retaliatory” measures, including long range strikes, if Australia defended Taiwan, Chinese newspaper Global Times has reported, The Times reported from Sydney.

Meanwhile, Australia announced its budget, which expects a 2021-2022 deficit of A$106.6 billion, which is A$53 billion less than forecast in the previous budget, UK daily The Guardian reported from Australia. Higher than expected rises in iron ore prices and a quicker and stronger than expected recovery in the economy underpinned that reduced forecast deficit.

Net debt was forecast to peak in mid-2025 at A$980 billion, or 40.9 percent of gross domestic product, the report said.

Rethinking Expeditionary Operations in the North Atlantic

05/12/2021

By Robbin Laird

As the U.S. Navy reworks how to do blue water expeditionary operations into and through the North Atlantic with integrated capabilities with our Nordic and Baltic allies, how best to shape an expeditionary approach for an offensive-defensive enterprise? 

What building blocks are essential to work more effective Marine Corps engagement in such an effort? And what does the U.S. Navy need to do to enable more effective Marine Corps engagement? 

And how does the USAF and its evolving capabilities, such as the coming of F-35s at RAF Lakenheath come into play?

Finally, how does the defense transformation being undergone by our allies in the North Atlantic intersect with the changes being driven by the U.S. Navy and supported by the USMC?

The broad point is that there are several trajectories of change in the process of change and working how to get the most effective convergence of combat capability is a major challenge.

During my visit to Camp Lejeune in April 2021, I had a chance to discuss these challenges with LtCol Daniel Macsay, an Expeditionary Operations Officer. He highlighted a number of the challenges which needed to be met to enable the Marines to be effectively engaged in North Atlantic force transformation.

I will highlight a number of takeaways from the conversation, and am not holding him responsible for what I took away from the conversation. But what is clear is that the process of change has fully engaged II MEF and very experienced Marines, like LtCol Macsay are fully engaged in the process of creating real capabilities for the strategic shift from the land wars to the Fourth Battle of the Atlantic. 

The first point may seem obvious but it is crucial.

There is a strategic triangle among the seabases, the land bases and airpower which enable the combat effects to be delivered throughout the North Atlantic defense arc from Florida to Finnmark.

As the Marines go ashore, or operate afloat, what is the major focus, mission or contribution?

One area of interest is the evolving capabilities for the reconnaissance mission.

How might ashore Marines throughout the arc connect with the US Navy, the Air Force and allies, to provide enhanced information central to the fight? 

This could be targeting information; this could be crisis management information; this could be providing information in a key situational awareness gap.

But for this to work, the C2 side of the equation needs to be significantly worked. 

How does Navy C2 onboard the amphibious and strike fleet integrate to provide a grid into which Marine Corps reconnaissance information most effectively flow?

The second point is that we are at early days in terms of Navy-Marine Corps integration.

We discussed Navy and Marine Corps targeting which currently is not well integrated.

But there is also a C2 challenge.

As LtCol Macsay put it: “We have got to get past the idea that the Navy has one lane, and we have another.

“If there’s specific skills and functions that we can do and ones they can do, then we need to work ways to operate more effectively together?”

The Marines having worked ashore in the land wars, have worked very effective C2 for fires solutions ashore.

The Navy is focused on C2 for the blue water fight.

How can these two efforts become blended with a more effective capability to work the triangle of seabases, airpower, and ashore forces?

This is a significant strategic reset that requires training, experimentation and acquisition of capabilities to enhance their ability to work together.

Scalability of the force is a key capability which is the target of Marine Corps-Navy integration but how to enable such a capability?

The third point is honing skills operating as a distributed force within an integrated battlespace. 

This means shaping new skill sets, and in LtCol Macsay’s words: “Building a discipline that allows us to actually deploy with distributed command and control.

“This requires shaping capabilities where the overall commander can have a serious level of confidence in the distributed force’s ability to carry out command guidance.”

And the final point is that this needs to be done in a denied combat environment as necessary. 

For this to happen, reducing demand on communications bandwidth is required.

This requires enhanced training of the forces working together in the distributed combat environment so that there is a good deal of in LtCol Macsay’s words, “implicit understanding of what to do” that does not need to be communicated over networks sucking up bandwidth. 

This makes the training function increasingly important to shaping the new combat approach and capability to be relied upon in North Atlantic defense.

Rather than having to do too much explicit communications, “we need to shape enhanced implied communications capabilities.”

By reshaping operations, and the exercises that support the process of changing how to operate, the template for change is created within which technologies can be identified which further the approach.

Rather than waiting for new technologies that operate as magic wands to deliver feasible Marine Corps-Navy integration, the approach of Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Norfolk under VADM Lewis to craft the template now and technology will follow seems to make a lot of sense to North Carolina based Marines.

The featured graphic: Map of the Gulf and North Atlantic stream in the Atlantic Ocean

VMFA-323

USS Nimitz, part of Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, returned to Naval Base San Diego, Feb. 26, 2021, after a more than 10-month deployment to U.S. 5th Fleet and U.S. 7th Fleet, which included freedom of navigation operations and participation in Operations Freedom’s Sentinel, Inherent Resolve and Octave Quartz.

02.26.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Levi Voss

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

The Marines and Naval Integration: The F-35 and the New UK Carrier Force

05/11/2021

We have heard a good deal about the desire to work Navy and USMC integration.

What can be forgotten in this discussion is how important USMC air is in such an effort.,

It is not surprising for as the U.S. Navy refocuses on the high-end fight, at the heart of such an effort is refocusing on air-sea battle.

This means as well that a priority on USMC aviation in any transformation of the USMC remains at the heart of the effort.

But for such an effort to succeed, continued focus on the ability of the USMC and its naval aviators to have the resources and capabilities they need are crucial to play an effective role in shaping a way ahead.

But this effort almost did not happen and that near failure reminds one of the need for a renewed effort as well.

The partnership of the Marines with the Royal Navy can clearly be seen in current HMS Queen Elizabeth operations.

Because of seeing through the F-35B to deployments and now significant operations, it is possible for the Marines to publish a story like this one published by 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing on May 10, 2021.

US and UK Special Relationship Strengthened by CSG-21 Deployment

(ABOARD HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, Irish Sea) — With the arrival of F-35B stealth fighters, the United States’ tri-maritime support to the United Kingdom (UK) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 21 is underway. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 aboard Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Queen Elizabeth, DDG-68 USS The Sullivans, and U.S. Coast Guard engineers on exchange programs round out the United States support to the strike group, for their upcoming deployment. This will be the first time US F-35’s have deployed on another countries carrier. 

“This deployment highlights the global reach of the U.S. and UK armed forces and their interoperability,” said Col. Simon Doran, US Senior National Representative (SNR) to the CSG. “The UK stands amongst our most stalwart and capable allies and this deployment enhances the deterrence and defense capabilities of the NATO Alliance.” 

“We are proud to represent the United States on this historic deployment reinforcing the longstanding and unbreakable alliance and defence relationship between the U.S. and U.K,” said CDR.David Burkett, the commanding officer of USS The Sullivans. “The deployment is the culmination of a decades long cooperation effort to deepen U.S. and U.K. interoperability in an unprecedented way.”

USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) is homeported out of Mayport, Florida. This multi-mission destroyer is capable of conducting Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Anti-Surface Warfare.

The Sullivans is named to honour five brothers from Waterloo, Iowa who served together on the USS Juneau during World War II. The Sullivan brothers: George, 28; Francis, 27; Joseph, 24; Madison, 23; and Albert, 20; lost their lives during the Battle of Guadacanal on November 13, 1942. They were adamant about serving together in spite of the Navy wartime policy to separate family members.”

“We are excited to operate from the deck of the Royal Navy’s Flagship alongside 617 Squadron, supporting a unique, historic opportunity” said Lt. Col Andrew D’Ambrogi, the commanding officer of VMFA-211. “Marines are expeditionary, we exist to operate forward and to provide rapid response capabilities in support of national and allied defense.”

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA)-211 is based out of Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona and assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 13, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Their mission is to destroy surface targets and enemy aircraft, day or night under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint or combined operations. 

VMFA-211 can trace its lineage to January 1, 1937 when Marine Fighting Squadron 4 -was activated at Naval Air Station San Diego, California. The “Wake Island Avengers” were the second operational squadron to transition to the F-35B and were the first unit to fly the F-35B in combat. The F-35 combines next-gen fighter characteristics of low observability, sensor fusion, fighter agility and advanced logistical support with the most powerful and comprehensive integrated sensor package of any fighter aircraft in history, providing unprecedented lethality and access to highly-contested environments. 

VMFA-211 is also supported with U.S. Navy personnel assigned to USS John C. Stennis. The Sailors, all aviation ordnancemen, will be assembling ordnance in support of VMFA-211 for the duration of the deployment. 

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 and USS The Sullivans are humbled and proud to continue the special relationship with the United Kingdom through the deployment of Carrier Strike Group 21. Their interoperability with the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and additional international allies will preserve military advantage and reinforce rules-based international order. The United States and United Kingdom’s forward-deployed forces remain ready to respond to crises globally as a combined maritime force. 

But looking back, this partnership almost did not happen.

More than a decade ago, the UK government announced that they were pulling out from the F-35B program to buy F-35Cs, and to redesign their new carriers to use catapults, namely, the new electronic catapults planned by the US Navy for the USS Ford class.

As part of the UK’s 2010 strategic review, the government committed to rebuilding their new carriers to enable “cats and traps” as the launch mechanism, and the purchase of F-35Cs versus F-35Bs.

This decision left the USMC in a very difficult situation within the Pentagon at the time, ramping up pressure on their F-35B purchases.

As Asian allies have now joined the F-35B effort, the importance of the USMC commitment to allies is certainly clear and those allied Pacific F-35Bs will be key contributors to the kind of air-sea integration necessary in the Pacific and working collective defense.

As fixed airfields become higher risk propositions, an ability of an aircraft to fly from a wide variety of sites which can operate as airfields in a crisis, has become not a nice to have capability but a necessary one and a key part in the way ahead in conducting successful distributed operations for an air-sea integrated force. 

Also, see the following:

Aboard the USS Wasp: Participants in Operational Testing Provide a Progress Report

USMC Deployment Onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth: The Partnership Which Almost Did Not Happen

Nuclear Submarines and Nuclear Power in Australia?

By Denis Mole

In Adelaide’s The Advertiser newspaper on 7 March, former defence minister Christopher Pyne said, ‘Then there is the nonsensical argument that the Attack Class submarines are no good because they aren’t nuclear. Almost all of these arguments are driven by people who either know nothing at all about submarines and defence or have outdated information that is no longer relevant.’ Pyne must therefore believe that Australia’s current and recent submarine commanding officers know nothing about submarines.

The 2016 defence white paper called for Australia’s future submarines to be ‘regionally superior’. As a former commander of the submarine force, I don’t know any submarine commanding officer over the past 30 years who has any doubt that, overall, nuclear-powered submarines are superior to diesel submarines of similar vintage. Australia’s new Attack-class submarines will probably be superior to most diesel submarines in our region, but they won’t be superior to China’s nuclear-powered submarines entering service in the 2040s and beyond. China’s navy is numerically larger than the US Indo-Pacific fleet now and is forecast to be more powerful than the American fleet by 2035. Australia’s 12th Attack-class submarine won’t enter service until around 2054 and will be in service until about 2080.

Pyne went on to say, ‘Australia does not have a nuclear industry. One cannot be created overnight.’ Pyne might have the cart before the horse. The Americans had their first nuclear-powered submarine in service before their first nuclear power station. The nuclear power station program in the US had been languishing until Captain, later Admiral, Hymen G. Rickover was appointed to head the nuclear reactor development for both naval and civil applications. In the early years, it was trained nuclear submariners leaving navy service and going into the commercial power sector that allowed that industry to grow rapidly.

The claim that Australia can’t have nuclear-powered submarines because it doesn’t have a nuclear industry has never been tested. An Australian ability to manufacture and reprocess nuclear fuel wouldn’t be essential in order to own and operate nuclear-powered submarines. Modern American and British submarines are built with nuclear fuel to last the life of the vessel. Japan has 33 nuclear reactors in power stations but doesn’t manufacture or reprocess nuclear fuel. This is also true of many countries in Europe and the Middle East that have nuclear power. Australia buys advanced combat aircraft and weapons that are manufactured overseas, so why not nuclear reactors and the whole-of-life fuel they require? Nuclear-powered submarines could be built in Australia with imported reactors.

Notwithstanding that reactors and fuel can be purchased from other countries (the OPAL reactor at Lucas Heights is from Argentina), why doesn’t Australia have a larger and more diverse nuclear industry? Of the top 20 economies (Australia is 13th), 17 have nuclear power. Australia, Italy and Saudi Arabia are the three exceptions. Italy imports 16% of its electricity from adjacent countries, more than half from France where it is produced from nuclear power. Saudi Arabia is acquiring nuclear power. And, as various countries commit to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, it’s noteworthy that no major economy intends doing so without nuclear power in the mix.

Diesel submarines have been around for about 120 years and nuclear submarines have been around for about 65 years, so neither form represents new technology. With a choice between the two technologies, the leading Western maritime powers of the US, UK and France all adopted the nuclear option with no diesel attack submarines, because nuclear power is the more effective and superior technology.

At the time when replacements for Australia’s Oberon-class submarines were being developed in the 1980s, it’s almost certain that neither the US nor UK would have sold nuclear submarines to Australia. With the Cold War at its peak, their focus was on the Soviet Union and the possibility of maritime warfare in the North Atlantic. France was just starting to develop its first nuclear-powered attack submarines. But what about when it came time to explore options to replace the Collins-class submarines?

The 2009 defence white paper announced that the Collins class would be replaced and Australia’s submarine force would be expanded to 12 boats. The defence minister at the time, Labor’s Joel Fitzgibbon, directed the department that, in developing options, it was not to bring forward any nuclear proposal. Three years later, when he was no longer defence minister, Fitzgibbon admitted it was a mistake ruling out a nuclear option; however, neither of his successors altered the ‘no nuclear’ guidance to the department. Consequently, when the Coalition government came to power in 2013, only conventional options had been developed.

The notion of conventionally powered submarines’ suitability for Australia in the second half of this century needs to be challenged. The Attack-class program should proceed as replacements for the six Collins-class submarines to avoid a capability gap; however, options to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the additional six boats and eventually replacements for the six Attack-class submarines should be pursued immediately.

Submarines could lead to a broad nuclear industry in Australia.

Denis Mole served in the Royal Australian Navy for more than 35 years, commanding submarines and attaining the rank of commodore. He has recently retired from the commercial marine and defence support sector.

This article was published by ASPI on April 15, 2021.

The featured photo: WATERS OFF GUAM (Dec. 11, 2020) The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Asheville (SSN 758) steams off the coast of Guam during a photo exercise with the French Navy Rubis-class nuclear powered submarine (SSN) Émeraude. Asheville and Émeraude practiced high-end maritime skills in a multitude of disciplines designed to enhance interoperability between maritime forces. Asheville is one of four forward-deployed submarines assigned to Commander, Submarine Squadron 15. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger)

Reshaping ISR for Navy-USMC Integration

05/10/2021

By Robbin Laird

The terms C2, ISR and training are changing significantly in the shift from the land wars to the high-end fight. C2 is migrating from hierarchical direction to mission command and distributed operations; ISR is moving from intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to INFORMATION to decision making for an integrated distributed force; and training is open ended learning process of how to shape modular task forces that can work together to deliver the desired crisis management and combat effects.

We have written a great deal in the past months about the very significant changes in these domains, and I have recently published a book which highlights some of these changes.

But as the Marines work with the Navy towards more effective integration for the high-end fight, both sides face significant challenges to work with one another. On the one hand, the US Navy has added new ISR capabilities in the form of P-8s and Tritons which have not been designed in any way to support the kind of maneuver operations which the Marines are built to do. On the other hand, the excellent C2 which the Marines have built to operate ashore are not built to work with the at sea maneuver force.

There is no magic technological wand which can be waved over the two forces and create integratability. This must be worked from the ground up on each side and the ultimate purpose of doing so needs to be shaped in very concrete ways and in very clear mission areas. Why are they integrating? For which crisis management or combat effect? Against which adversaries and for what demonstrated positive outcome?

During my visit to II MEF, I had the chance to discuss the way ahead on the Marine Corps side with a very experienced SIGINT officer, who is the head of II MEF G-2 and is the senior intelligence officer for the MEF, Col. William McClane. He joined the Marines towards the end of the Cold War, and as I have seen in both Marine Corps and Navy interviews, there are a smattering of such officers towards the end of the careers who bridge the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new phase of peer competition.

Obviously, the bulk of their careers have been through the land wars period, but these officers understand how very different those wars are from facing an adversary with full spectrum forces able to conduct contested operations across the battlespace, up to and including nuclear weapons.

I have referred to this as the strategic shift, but in many ways, this is more of a strategic shock than a strategic shift. The Navy is shifting from support to land operations to blue water maneuver warfare; the Marines are shifting from being best mates of the U.S. Army to reworking into a maneuver force for full spectrum crisis management. In my own view, the question of being reworked as a maneuver force for full spectrum crisis management is only partly subsumed under an effort for enhanced integration with the Navy. Land-based operations even in the conditions of maneuver warfare is only partly part of the maritime fight.

In effect, what is happening is that as the Navy reworks its locus from the land wars to blue water expeditionary operations, the Marine Corps is reworking how it can assist in such a shift but also, how it can operate from afloat and ashore mobile bases to shape a way ahead in their ability to work with allies in interactively shaping more effective support for allied defense, on the one hand, and more effective allied integration with the Marine Corps and the joint force’s ability to operate across the extended and contested battlespace.

I had a chance to talk with Col. McClane on several issues but will highlight three major ones. The first one is the return of Russia as a definer of North Atlantic defense. The second is the intelligence to information transmutation of ISR. And the third is the challenge of working more convergence between Navy and Marine Corps ISR systems.

But the overview point made by Col. McClane was clearly articulated by him: “We are in a campaign of learning to shift from COIN operations to great power competition.”

Part of that learning is re-focusing on the Russians. When I went to Columbia University for my PhD in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the universities were committed to Russian studies. They certainly are not now. If there is a refocus on dealing with the Russians, the absence of analysts with Russian knowledge, language, and substantive, is a major problem.

This is certainly reflected in refocusing a force like the USMC. What Col. McClane noted was that our Nordic allies certainly have not taken a vacation from dealing with Russians, and that their domain knowledge is a key part of shaping a rethink of how to understand Russian behavior training, and operations. And clearly, it is the Russian military we are dealing with, not the Soviet Union.

This means that there is a double knowledge challenge. The first is that much of the residual U.S. knowledge remains under a Soviet hangover. And second that fresh knowledge of how the Russians operate under President Putin militarily needs to be built out.

The second is the intelligence to information shift in ISR. As Col. McClane put it: “We tend to get too fixated on the cyber piece to the determinant of working the information piece about how Russian decision makers operate and will operate in a crisis. That is a craft which we need to master.”

The information piece is about shortening the cycle from knowing to acting, as well as working information war. Col. McClane noted that “it is crucial we master the process whereby information can be tailored for messaging that affects the adversaries’ cognitive decision making. The messaging is key.”

The third key challenge we discussed is aligning USMC and US Navy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. A key example is that the P-8 which is being operated by the US Navy and our allies in the North Atlantic is not generating data easily usable by the USMC. In fact, in the recent Dynamic Cape 21 exercise, the Marines were able to work much more effectively with USAF unmanned aerial systems than Navy assets in terms of ISR missions.

This means, for Col. McClane: “We need naval capability development not just US Navy, and USMC separate acquisitions in the ISR area. If we are truly going to fight a naval campaign, the Marines will need to be able to tap into U.S. Navy systems useful to a Marine air-ground task force. Fixing and resourcing the Naval ISR enterprise is a key part of shaping the way ahead.”

Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Corps CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters, assigned to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to retrieve U.S. Marines during a simulated air assault as part of exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in Keflavik, Iceland, Oct. 17, 2018. Trident Juncture, a NATO-led exercise, hosted by Norway, will include around 50,000 personnel from NATO countries, as well as Finland and Sweden, and will test NATO’s collective response to an armed attack against one ally, invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Nelson)