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The Australian Army faces a significant challenge as it adapts to its role within the ADF and as the ADF refocuses on the Indo-Pacific.
A clear consideration is how the Army will address force mobility, basing flexibility, and operate within an integrated air-maritime task force.
Several years ago when visiting MARFORPAC, a key dimension of the rethink going on then was about the expanded role for amphibiosity in the context of blue water expeditionary operations and force mobility.
In that 2015 interview with Brigadier General Mahoney, Deputy MARFORPAC, we discussed the evolution of defense in depth and amphibiosity.
Last year I visited MARFORPAC, and interviewed the staff and the then head of MARFORPAC, Lt. General Robling During my last visit, I focused on the broad strategic restructuring which the Marines were undergoing which they refer to as the distributed lay-down.
The U.S. Marine Corps is in the throes of a significant shift in the Pacific in the disposition of its forces. Because two thirds of Marines are deployed to the Pacific, such a shift is a key event in shaping the Marine Corps stance in the decade ahead.
The demand to support distributed forces is rising and will require attention to be paid to the connectors, lifters and various support elements. Part of that demand can be met as allies modernize their own support elements, such as Australia and Singapore adding new Airbus tankers, which could be leveraged to support Marine Corps Ospreys as well as other aircraft.
Indeed, a key element of the distributed lay-down of our forces in the Pacific is the fact that it is occurring as core allies in the region are reshaping and modernizing their forces as well as partners coming to the table who wish to work with and host USMC forces operating on a rotational basis with their forces. The military and political demands for the kind of forces that the Marines are developing also are what allies and partners want for their operations.
In turn, this drives up the importance of exercises in the Pacific with joint and coalition forces to shape new capabilities for the distributed force.
The distributed lay-down, the evolution of the capabilities for distributed forces, the modernization of allied forces and the growing interest in a diversity of partners to work with the USMC are all part of shaping what might be called a deterrence-in-depth strategy to deal with the threats and challenges facing the United States and its allies in shaping a 21st-century approach to Pacific defense.
In a visit to Hawaii on the way to Australia in late July 2015, I had a chance to sit down with Brigadier General Mahoney, Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific.
The key focus of discussion was on the evolving approach to shaping a coalition among amphibious nations in the Pacific, and the concurrent evolution of capabilities by the USN-USMC team with regard to their own amphibious capabilities under the twin impact of the Osprey and the coming of the F-35B to the fleet in the Pacific.
In May 2015, the Navy and the Marines hosted a first ever meeting of nations either with or aspiring to shape amphibious capabilities in the region.
“We just had the PACOM Amphibious Leaders Seminar here, PALS 2015, the first of its kind. Twenty-four countries either have an established capability, a burgeoning capability or an interest in amphibious operation. The PALS, the symposium I think was a great success just in folks who wouldn’t have ever talked to each other were now talking directly. We connected a matrix of people who now understand that there are other friends and capabilities out there that they can connect with. And I think we’re going to try and do that again next year.”
The clear focus of an emerging coalition is upon the application of amphibious capabilities to the 21st challenges posed in the Pacific region. How best to shape and use the tool sets provided by amphibious forces?
The May conference is an important step forward in shaping a narrative to craft a teaming approach for amphibious operations.
“One of the larger points in the evolving narrative is the teaming of force projection capabilities where the amphibious element is a core capability. It is not simply about amphibious ships being transport vessels; it is about reshaping forces to deal with 21st century operations.”
BG Mahoney discussed how under the concept of amphibious, there are very different notions at play, ranging from a transport and support fleet to a strike or force insertion fleet.
The term “amphbiosity” was used to express the broad umbrellas under which diverse notions of what kinds of amphibious forces a nation might wish to operate.
“What we learned during the, the PACOM Amphibious Leaders’ Symposium was what people understand and appreciate with regard to amphibiosity is sometimes completely different. There are close partners as well as some in our own joint force who in their mind’s eye really view amphibiosity as a floating a chow hall, an airfield, a hotel, and a mode of transportation; not a maneuver element, not a C4I node, not a presence effect.”
But clearly, the shortfall in amphibious ships, and support vessels, is of concern the Navy and the Marines.
“The demand side for Phase Zero operations in the Pacific is insatiable. And now we are in the process of distributing our presence among several different locations in the Pacific. Great, but how do we connect all of this into a true operational network? A challenge is that we do not have enough L-class ships; the Commandant and the CNO have made this point very clearly.”
When asked if investment could be increased where would he put it to deal with the demand rhythm and distributed operational requirements, the BG put it this way:
“Give me my 10th Amphibious Ready Group, and more L-class ships in the FDNF (Forward Deployed Naval Force). Then in teaming with PACFLEET, get after the job of dealing with the demands in the Indo-Asia-Pacific which is a growth industry.”
Given the high demand tempo, the Navy and Marines cannot wait around for the proper number of ships to show up, so the approach is to work a broader amphibious coalition and to work various pairings between grey hulls and MSC ships.
“I think that there’s a huge area under the curve to be exploited in experimentation and pairing, or combinations of, gray hull ships with other class ships. I know that in some quarters, that notion is blasphemy; it’s the proverbial slippery slope. But the fact of the matter, it is a practical reality that we need to explore capabilities in combining hulls like LMSR, TAK-E, AFSB, MLP, LCS, JHSV with that L-class ship and see what we can do with it, not assume what we can’t do with it.”
It should be noted that pairings do not make an MSC ship as capable as an L-class ship; but they do provide for greater operational sustainability and enablement of the L-class ship. In a discussion with the Navy, a senior Naval captain made a key point that pairing is crucial as long as one does not equate each member of the pair in terms of capability. A gray hull is neither an MSC ship nor does an MSC ship magically have the capabilities of an L-class ship….
In short, the Marines are leading the way in transforming the very meaning of amphibious operations.
We are only at the beginning of understanding what an F-35B and Osprey enabled amphibious fleet can do and might do; and with it the leavening effect such capability can have on the evolution of a Pacific amphibious coalition.
But one thing is certain: the MARFORPAC organization is crucially involved in shaping an evolving future.
That was five years ago; now as the Australian Army faces its evolving future, how will it tap into the dynamics of USN-USMC integration for blue water expeditionary operations?
The argument can be put simply.
First, the new Australian defence strategy focuses on defense in depth and mobile defense out to the first island chain for Australia which is the Solomon Islands.
Second, the roles of integration of the RAAF and the RAN are quite clear in this strategy, but the Army less so.
Third, the de facto role of the Australian Army is to provide for defense of Australian territory by enhanced mobility within the continent, including base and missile defense.
In the new strategy, the roles of Western Australia and the Northern Territories is enhanced.
The role of the Army in providing for base protection should go up as well.
But the Australian Army in its land wars Middle Eastern phase has become U.S. Army like; not USMC like.
The new strategy de facto calls for a more Marine Corps like Army.
But can the leadership embrace such a shift, even while embracing the concept of an “Army in Motion.”
The outlier in this discussion is the question of how the Australian Army approaches mobility, mobile basing and even expeditionary basing.
And what role the afloat assets would play in this effort; and as well, how the Royal Australian Navy looks at the amphibious force as it looks to expand its integration across the fleet to contribute to the mobility options out to the first island chain?
In a recent discussion with an Australian Army colleague he highlighted the challenge this way:
“Our ships were largely acquired just to fulfill a mobility need rather than combat need.
“It has not been central to our thinking for sure.
“We’re in an area of operations predominantly enabled by others, and the United States, in many cases.
“But we understand the idea of what used to be sea basing, but we haven’t really conceptually organized things.
“For Army, this is a new capability that’s designed to get to the area of operations and then supporting those operations.
“We have fit our thinking into an approach to mobile basing, but conceptually, we haven’t really grasped the whole picture of sea-basing and operations as the USMC is addressing these operations.”
A recent discussion with Brendan Sargeant, the well respected and well-known Australian strategist, underscored how significant the strategic shift facing Australia is and notably, underscored how the strategic shift impacted most directly on the question of the future of the Australian Army in the decade ahead.
According to Sargeant, “As we focus on our region, Army will have a key role, but in terms of the joint force.
“How best to work their role?
“What do they need to be able to do in the joint and integrated force context?
“One answer clearly would be for the Army to focus on how their new interest and capabilities in amphibious warfare would work within a regional joint force context?”
Featured Photo: HMAS Canberra departs the Port of Darwin to commence the Regional Presence Deployment 2020 in Southeast Asia and off the coast of Hawaii.
Later this year, we are publishing a book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy.
In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, the prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison, launched a new defense and security strategy for Australia. This strategy reset puts Australia on the path of enhanced defense capabilities.
The change represents a serious shift in its policies towards China, and in reworking alliance relationships going forward. “Joint by Design” is focused on Australian defence modernization and policy, but it is also about preparing liberal democracies around the world for the challenges of the future.
The F-35 fleet emerging in the Pacific is the 21st century version of the US Navy’s World War II “big blue blanket.”
With the Japanese expanding their F-35 fleet and adding the B to its As, training with the USS America is a natural evolution of the collaborative effort.
As an October 25, 2020 press release from the USS America noted:
America conducted integrated air defense operations on Oct. 20 with F-35A Lightning II aircraft from the Japan Air Defense Command. The advanced training operations were designed to increase the tactical proficiency, lethality, and interoperability of the amphibious forces of the America Expeditionary Strike Group and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) in the maritime domain.
“The U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone of stability and security in the Indo-Pacific for more than sixty years,” said Capt. Luke Frost, America’s commanding officer. “We have no more capable partner in the world than the Japan Self Defense Force. Every opportunity we have to continue to train and exercise together improves our interoperability and strengthens our joint integrated capabilities.”
Our alliance will continue to play that role in the future. Operations included advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures to exercise command and control in employing the F-35A Lightning II in air defense and sea control.
“These are the most advanced capabilities to ever sail or fly. America is a fifth-generation amphibious assault platform, built from the keel up to optimize the most advanced capability of the fifth-generation F-35 platform. We are forward-deployed to integrate exactly these advanced capabilities with Japan, recognizing the importance of our alliance and working together to maintain regional peace and stability,” said Frost.
“The training proved to be a very significant opportunity for us,” said Col. Shinichi Nomura, flight group commander, 3rd Wing, Japan Air Self-Defense Force. “Training with assets of other services is essential to improve interoperability and joint operations capability.”
USS America and the Japan Self Defense Forces operate routinely together in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen a shared commitment to regional stability and a free and open Indo-Pacific.
“I am assured that our participation not only contributed to improving tactical skills but also confirming the robust Japan-U.S. alliance and commitment to the Indo-Pacific region,” said Nomura. “We will continue moving forward and further strengthen the Japan-US alliance and partnership.”
America, the flagship of the America Amphibious Ready Group, is forward-deployed in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility to support stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.
The America class LHA can operate as many as 20 Short Take-off Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B variant of the Lightning II.
Japan plans to eventually acquire 42 F-35Bs, which will be used on its own ships in the future.
In 2015, we published a piece which highlighted the coming of the F-35 enabled big blue blanket for the fighting Navy.
That article as published on November 2, 2015 follows.
Fifty years ago, 1965, in Bancroft Hall at the United States Naval Academy, Plebes (freshmen) were required when making a very loud announcement to a gathering of fellow Midshipman to began with the alert-“attention world, attention world.”
It was a time when some of those who had fought WWII in the great “Big Blue Blanket” war winning con-ops were still in uniform, several of the Navy Pilots who were featured in the great work “the Bridges of Toko-Ri” were still in uniform, and Vietnam Yankee and Dixie station Carriers were beginning to fight that war.
From Plebe to Four Star Admirals, all in the United States Navy and Marine Corps were constantly engaged and challenged in understanding and mastering the dynamic nature of war at sea and the role of Navy/Marine power projection from across the beach. In those days sailors still in uniform wearing the Dolphins of the “silent service,” the Navy Submarine Community, would proudly point out that with the loss of 52 subs “still on patrol” they actually sunk over 50% of the tonnage of the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII.
In WWII the Fleet Carriers captured in a famous picture “murders row” carried the fight to the enemy and victory.
It was costly in ships and crews lost.
In the Korean War and Vietnam War, the carriers could operate close to the battlefield and the fight was aggressively pursued by the pilots.
Desert Storm, shorter in duration, again had the luxury of Carriers essentially operating with total sea dominance.
Since those 20th Century combat engagements,everything has changed and nothing has changed.
The US Navy’s Nimitz Class and soon to be Ford Class aircraft Carriers, the most complex and demanding engineering accomplishment ever built in the history of the world, are still a significant and necessary critical component of America’s national security.
The combat function of a carrier designed and crewed to go into battle in any ocean from the Arctic, to the Equator, to the Antarctic is still essential, that has not changed.
The ability at all ranks of the fighting Navy to understand the strengths and weakness of their weapons and train train, train has not changed.
The combat imperative to understand how to fight with all the “ships at sea” in air enabled combat has not changed.
Carriers both large Nimitz/Ford and the smaller ones USS America and others in the Navy/Marine Amphibious forces, along with surface combatants and submarines engaging against a determined well equipped reactive enemy has not changed.
The teaming of the fighting Navy with a fighting Air Force has not changed and understanding how to build fighting alliances with other nations military has not changed.
What has changed is profound.
Because of historic advances in communications coupled with the power of computer, a combat learning 21st Century way of war is now with all combat forces in the world.
How the most senior leaders capture and exploit this dynamic ever evolving revolution is the key to victory in combat.
Dynamic combat learning empowered by a sensor information processing command and control technological imperative is now the key to victory.
It is the melding of a computer-human interface that can make a huge difference if understood and employed correctly.
In the cockpit the F-35 “z-axis” a revolution in air combat can start from the cockpit out.
But as the F-35 is a catalyst for this 21st Century way of war from cockpit out, other combat systems are synergistically connected from the commanders at all levels of the fight.
From legacy aircraft such as F/A-18 to E-2s, Aegis, and other fleet elements, combat commanders at all levels need to learn how to accept and use the information presented to fight, adjust, fight, adjust and win.
The commanders have to practice over and over to evolve a much broader scope of understanding and direction in this 21st Century information world.
It is a 21st Century challenge to understand the dynamic learning from a computer-human interface while also recognizing it is the goal of a reactive enemy to attempt to destroy not only individual platforms, sink ships and subs and shoot down aircraft, but wreck the very synapses of all things command and control.
Information assurance with redundancy and reliability is critical but also the ability to act independently as systems are degraded to fight and win cannot be forgotten in all training exercises.
The enemy always gets a vote but so does the United States Navy.
The decade ahead is not a repeat of the past 15 years; it is not about a continuation of the land-centric and counter-insurgency slow motion war.
It is about global agility, the ability to insert force to achieve discrete and defined objectives, and to maneuver in the extended battlespace to work with allies and joint forces to credibly prevail in the range of military conflict across the range of military operational situations.
For the power projection forces –USN/ USMC, USAF with appropriate elements of the US Army, especially Air Defense Artillery – it is about the capability to work across an extended battlespace with flexible means which can be linked together as necessary to prevail in the military and strategic conditions facing the US and its allies in the period ahead.
It is about building capabilities at the high end, which have the flexibility to operate through the range of military operations or ROMO.
It is about powerful and flexible force packages which can operate and dominate in specific military situations but be linked to other capabilities to provide the kind of reachback and dominance which effective deterrence requires.
By leveraging some of the new platforms coming online and replacing older, costly, and stove-piped platforms and systems, a new scalable force structure can be built. And at the heart of doing so will be the inclusion of allies and U.S. forces within a modular scalable structure.
The strategy is founded on having platform presence. By deploying assets such as USCG assets— for example, the national Security Cutter, USN surface platforms, Aegis, or other surface assets— by deploying subservice assets, and by having bases forward deployed, the United States has core assets that if networked together and end a stovepiped acquisition strategy of platforms bought separately from one another can make significant gains in capability possible. Scalability is the crucial glue to make a honeycomb force possible…..
Two other key elements are basing and weaponization. Basing becomes transformed as allied and U.S. capabilities become blended into a scalable presence and engagement capability. Presence is rooted in basing; scalability is inherently doable because of C5ISR enablement, deployed decision-making, and honeycomb robustness.
The reach from Japan to South Korea to Singapore to Australia is about how allies are reshaping their forces and working toward greater reach and capabilities. For example, by shaping a defense strategy that is not simply a modern variant of Seitzkreig in South Korea and Japan, more mobile assets allow states in the region to reach out, back, and up to craft coalition capabilities.
The approach we have suggested is built around “no platform fights alone,” whereby we look at key platforms as nodes in a honeycomb force which can act with effective lethality throughout an extended battlespace.
Those platforms which can operate in an interconnected manner are the crucial ones to build, deploy and sustain in the period ahead, versus those which are very limited in their capability to provide synergy to joint or coalition forces in the battlespace.
This means as well that force packages need to be examined, less in and of themselves terms, than in terms of their synergy and capabilities in shaping dominant combat power in the interconnected battlespace.
Although seemingly obvious, as the current Deputy Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Air Force, Air Vice Marshal McDonald, puts it: Even with the blindingly obvious, sometimes you have to be quite innovative to make that blinding obvious come into an executable outcome.
The large-deck aircraft carrier is a clear case in point.
The USS Ford will not be simply a continuation of the Nimitz class carrier, but even the upgraded Nimitz class carriers under the influence of the dynamics of change in their airwing, as well as they systems with which they will connect at sea or in the air or over land will change their contribution as well to an integrated fighting force.
These studies suggest dispensing with the current air wing and building instead specialized longer-range unmanned and manned assets where range is the critical variable for the aircraft flying FROM the carrier.
Leaving aside the small fact that PowerPoint airplanes only kill the audience listening to the brief, the modernization plans of the US Navy are the baseline from which combat capabilities will be generated from the carrier decks.
And the recent Russian actions have clearly shown the limits of current unmanned technology to operate in contestable airspace.
Totally ignored is the question of the reach of the aircraft in the networked battle space.
And the Navy is focusing on building out the capabilities of a multi-mission and multi-tasking air wing of networked capabilities to shape the reach of the carrier into the battlespace.
No platform fights alone.
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
And the real meaning of what the carrier will contribute is not suggested simply by an analysis of what the aircraft carrier can organically do on its own; it is really a question of how the modernization of the air wing alters the capability of the carrier as a highly maneuverable strike asset and shapes convergence and synergy with other elements in the offensive-defensive strike enterprise.
It is the offensive-defensive strike enterprise which is the focus of change whereby key combat elements shape capabilities across an expanded battlespace to rip apart adversary strategies to claim anti-access and area denial capabilities, which a diversified, distributed warfighting force can take apart and destroy.
This is what former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne calls the attack and defense enterprise. The strategic thrust of integrating modern systems is to create a grid that can operate in an area as a seamless whole, able to strike or defend simultaneously.
This is enabled by the evolution of C5ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and it is why Wynne has underscored for more than a decade that fifth generation aircraft are not merely replacements for existing tactical systems but a whole new approach to integrating defense and offense.
By shaping a C5ISR system inextricably intertwined with platforms and assets, which can honeycomb an area of operation, an attack and defense enterprise can operate to deter aggressors and adversaries or to conduct successful military operations.
Inherent in such an enterprise is scalability and reach-back. By deploying the C5ISR honeycomb, the shooters in the enterprise can reach back to each other to enable the entire grid of operation, for either defense or offense.
The modernization of the large deck carrier is seeing several new developments emerge which reshapes its ability to provide synergy across the battlespace.
The new carriers – the USS Ford or the British Carrier the Queen Elizabeth – bring new command capabilities and operational infrastructure which enhance their contributions to other combat capabilities in the battlespace.
The coming of the F-35 puts on the carrier deck a core capability to operate at the edge of the carrier’s battlespace and can reach deep into the operational networks which support each cell of a honeycombed force.
The legacy assets will be modernized under the influence of synergy opportunities as well as fifth generation warfare dynamics to work more effectively in expanding the capabilities of a synergistic joint or coalition force.
Currently, the Super Hornets operating with the new Hawkeye are beginning to demonstrate the expanded reach of the carrier by delivering off boarding weapons capabilities, whereby one asset can direct the fire of another.
The ability to reach back to the carrier or to land-based air changes the meaning of the amphibious force and its impact for presence or as the initial insertion force for an engagement.
As the carrier air wing is being modernized, the USAF is undergoing transformation as well which expands the reach of their operational force.
As General “Hawk” Carlisle recently commented about the strategic direction of the modernization of airpower, the growing impact of the F-22 was really about the overall transformation of warfare, not simply adding new platforms.
It is important to look at the impact of the F-22 operations on the total force. We do not wish, nor do the allies wish to send aircraft into a contested area, without the presence of the F-22.
It’s not just that the F-22s are so good, it’s that they make every other plane better. They change the dynamic with respect to what the other airplanes are able to do because of what they can do with regard to speed, range, and flexibility.
It’s their stealth quality. It’s their sensor fusion. It’s their deep penetration capability. It is the situational awareness they provide for the entire fleet which raises the level of the entire combat fleet to make everybody better.”
The shift is to a new way of operating.
And allies adding new air capabilities with an ability to share information over an integrated and expanded battlespace is crucial as well.
The emergence of a global F-35 fleet is a key contributor as well to U.S. and allied capabilities in reaching deeper into the battlespace.
The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group and the Indian Navy’s Western Fleet sail in formation in front of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan during a passing exercise. The PASSEX symbolized the completion of the exercise, which was designed to increase cooperation between the Indian and U.S. Navies while enhancing the cooperative security relationship between India and the U.S. Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group is on a routine deployment in the 7th Fleet area of responsibility. Operating in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, the U.S. 7th Fleet is the largest of the forward-deployed U.S. fleets covering 52 million square miles, with approximately 50 ships, 120 aircraft and 20,000 Sailors and Marines assigned at any given time.
And the capability of the large deck carrier to empower that integration with an increase in distributed lethality is a key element of the combat synergy to operate in the expanded battlespace and to prevail.
The carrier provides a very flexible, and mobile strike and defense asset capable with its evolving airwing to work more effectively with a joint and coalition force to deliver greater synergy.
It is really not a question of building the wrong airwing; it is about understanding how the evolution of the airwing and the large deck carrier intersect with the evolution and transformation of joint and coalition capabilities to prevail in the expanded battlespace to deliver combat synergy for a resilient honeycombed force.
As Vice Admiral Aquilino, the PACFLEET’s Director of Maritime Operations and now Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5) put it in an interview in Hawaii earlier this year:
“We need to have the ability to operate where it matters and when it matters. And we can do that.”
He followed the lead of the CNO who emphasizes that if one fights the high end fight, one can adapt to the other challenges; but the reverse is not necessarily true.
We discussed distributed lethality and the evolving US Navy’s joint and coalition approach to deploying diversified and distributed capabilities which can when combined in coordinated concepts of operations deliver what is needed in the area of interest.
“What I think is meant by distributed lethality is an ability to have an agile and diversified force operating over an extended battlespace but with an ability to concentrate force against the crucial tasks, targets and goals to execute an effective strategy.”
Vice Admiral Aquilino sees the carrier as a key part of distributed lethality not just for the sea services but also for the joint and coalition forces.
When asked what technologies are coming to the Pacific which we enable PACFLEET to achieve this strategy more effectively, he quickly focused on the coming of the F-35 to the fleet and to the region.
“I mentioned earlier that our task is clearly that we need to have the ability to operate where it matters and when it matters.
The F-35 will enhance our ability to do so.
Although I am a naval aviator, I am not speaking as one when I make this point about the new aircraft.
It is a force multiplier and enhancer not just a new combat aircraft. It clearly will enhance or air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, but it as a deployed and integrated sensor aircraft it extends our reach and expands our flexibility and agility.”
He focused on the F-35’s role organically with PACFLEET (on carriers and on amphibious ships) but also in terms of being able to draw from the sensor stream of a deployed USAF as well as allied force of F-35s.
“The integration of the sensor grid is a crucial and evolving capability which will be expanded as the F-35 enters the Pacific.”
As we put in our book on the evolution of Pacific strategy:
“In World War II, the USN shaped what became called the big blue blanket of ships to cover the Pacific operations. Obviously, this is beyond the ken of current realities, but shaping a connected set of U.S. and allied forces able to work together to shape defense and security in the Pacific is not.”
The Admiral clearly had a similar thought in mind in our discussion.
So much for building the wrong airwing; the question really is to put the modernization of the airwing within a broader context of shaping U.S. joint forces and those of the coalition to fight effectively in the integrated and extended battlespace.
It is not about carriers fighting on their own in the South China Sea with a mythical robotic airwing; it is about real carriers flying real airplanes and participating in the shift in war fighting capabilities and approaches along with the relevant joint force and those of our allies to prevail in the real world conflicts already upon us.
I am in the throes of finishing up my book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy over the past several years, from 2014 until now.
With the announcement of the new government defence strategy by Prime Minister Morrison on July 1, 2020, it seemed a good time to draw together the work I have done over the past several years in Australia.
The book provides a detailed narrative of the evolution over the past few years of how Australia got to the point where it currently is with regard to national defense.
Hopefully, the book will provide a helpful summary of that evolution. It is based on the Williams Foundation Seminars over this period, and highlights the insights provided by the practitioners of military art and strategy who have presented and participated in those seminars.
In that sense, this book provides a detailed look at the strategic trajectory from 2014 through 2020.
During my visits to Australia during this time, one of my interlocutors in discussing Australian and global developments has been Jim Molan, retired senior Australian Army officer and now a Senator. I have included in the book, the interviews I did with Senator Molan in the appendix to the book as a good look into the dynamics of change being undergone over the past few years.
Recently, Senator Molan has launched a podcast series looking at the way ahead and how Australia might address the challenges which its faces.
I am going to highlight those podcasts and summarize the main elements of his argument on this website.
He has entitled his podcast series: “Noise Before Defeat.”
This is how the series is described on his website:
“Australia is in a time of uncertainty and faces real peril.
“We are being challenged on the political, economic and public health fronts.
“Senator Jim Molan AO DSC has seen the best and worst of what Australia might experience over the next decade.
“His series of six podcasts with host Sarah Davidson explains that we need to get organised at the national level to face these challenges: otherwise, all our separate activity is just ‘Noise Before Defeat’.”
In the first podcast, Molan addresses the question of “Haven’t we done enough on security?”
This is how the website describes this first podcast:
“Jim and Sarah take you into the world of national security. Jim explains the threats to Australia, its alliance with the United States, strategy and defence spending, and his reasons for pursuing a stronger Australia with such passion. He and Sarah explore why all Australians should be interested in and informed about these topics, and why preparation is a critical national endeavour.”
Molan underscores: “These are new times for Australia and Australia must adjust. We face a number of critical issues and this podcast will address them. The most immediate issue, as we all know is COVID, we’re working to overcome the health and the economic consequences, and that’s bad enough, but we can manage our way out of it. And we’re doing that.”
Australia faces an Uncertain Strategic Environment
“In the 75 years since the end of World War II. and you mentioned World War II, the U.S. by being the strongest superpower in the world, guaranteed both our freedom and they have prosperity and that’s important.
“This is pretty special.
“The U.S. did that by guaranteeing stability across their trading partners and across the sea routes that make trading possible. And I’m not saying that the U.S. is perfect, and it’s got plenty of problems at the moment. I’ve worked in the belly of that beast. I know its failures and its strengths. I fought alongside soldiers in war time. Like all of us it’s far from perfect, but at least it shares our values and interests and that’s critically important.
“Two developments have ended this extraordinary situation where we have enjoyed prosperity and security for the last 75 years. First, United States is not as strong as it used to be compared to other powers since the end of the Cold War in about 1991. 17 years of war in the Middle East, the Obama administration, and a general tiredness in the U.S. of being the world’s policeman is the reasons. This is a critical factor to think about. Everyone thinks that U.S. power is infinite, and it is not.
“The second event that’s happened is the rise of other powers.
“And that’s really what this podcast is about. Particularly China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, as well as the continuing presence of Islamic extremism, the U.S. is being challenged as we are by these authoritarian regimes who are hostile to liberal democracies because we represent an alternative to their control of their populations and so are a threat to them.
“We in Australia had the luxury of becoming very rich and very secure without, as a society having to do much of it. So as I say, now the world has changed. We in Australia must look after ourselves much more than it has occurred for decades, especially as regards to the possibility of conflict and war.
“What COVID has shown us is that we, as a nation have really frightening vulnerabilities to external interference. We’re far too dependent on countries that might be hostile to us. And not everyone loves Australians as some of us think.”
The Shift from Wars of Choice to the Direct Defense of Australia
“We weren’t being threatened by anyone and we couldn’t foresee at least for the next 10 years that we were going to be threatened by anyone. And the series of white papers from 1976 until 2016 had the statement in them that there was no threat to Australia for 10 years.
“As a result of that statement, of course, you didn’t have to prepare the Australian defense force for any (direct) threat (to Australia.
“And we could spend what we wanted to spend on the defense force. And it was the defense force that went away to war. The nation didn’t go to war.
“We carried the burden of those Wars of Choice all through that period from all through the post-war period.
“Now I spent many, many years in the defense force fighting the defense force for my view of what the army and what the defense force should look like. I’ve really given up on that because you can take on every issue that you want. You can take on the issue of strike fighters in the air force, of submarines, of armed vehicles and fight every battle. But if you get the strategy right at the top, everything else falls out cleverly underneath.
“We’ve had inquiry after inquiry into the problems that the defense forces faced and all those inquiries stopped at one step below government. And my view is that government is responsible for the strategy.
“It is up to us in government to solve the problem of uncertainty by coming up with a strategy. We don’t have to identify exactly who we’re going to fight, but we do have a responsibility for identifying exactly what the characteristics of such a fight might be and signed to ourselves. Can we do that?
“In 2016, when our defense strategy came out and we decided that no enemy was going to threaten us for 10 years, we didn’t say to ourselves, if it takes an enemy 10 years, which was ridiculous, to threaten us, why would it be that we in Australia didn’t need the same 10 years to prepare for such a threat.”
In the later podcasts, he focuses on the strategic shift for Australia and what that means for shaping a comprehensive national security strategy.
HMAS Ballarat and USS John S. McCain united on the high seas and remained in company through the Malacca Strait while sailing for Exercise Malabar.
Both ships will soon join with Indian and Japanese partners for the high-end military exercise.
Ballarat’s Commanding Officer, Commander Antony Pisani, welcomed the cooperative deployment with the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
“The cooperative deployment allows HMAS Ballarat and broader Navy to hone our warfare and mariner skills and develop our ability to operate and communicate together,” Commander Pisani said.
“The shared mutual trust both navies have for each other ensure such activities are mutually beneficial, enhancing the readiness and preparedness of the ships that undertake them.
“This deployment reinforces our commitment and right to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight under international law across our Indo-Pacific region.”
Commander Ryan T Easterday, Commanding Officer of USS John S. McCain, said the activity reinforced the strong bond with Australia.
“We find tremendous value in sailing with our close ally Australia, as well as our other allies and partners in support of a free, open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region,” Commander Easterday said.
“The training we are conducting while we operate together helps both ships’ crews improve their mariner skills and warfighting proficiency, in addition to the interoperability benefits we accrue by working together as a team.”
Ballarat’s Officer of the Watch, Lieutenant Matthew Newman, was on duty during the exercise between the two warships.
“The opportunity to exercise close manoeuvring at high speeds was a unique experience that solidified a number of core mariner skills in a real-time context,” Lieutenant Newman said.
“Ballarat and John S. McCain conducted a number of turns, wheels and formations that demonstrated the capability of both vessels and our ability to fight and win at sea.”
816 Squadron is the Fleet Air Arm’s MH-60R ‘Romeo’ operational support squadron deploying up to 8 Flights in the Navy’s destroyers and frigates.
A multi-role Maritime Combat Helicopter, 816 Squadron aircrew and technicians are specialists in flying and maintaining the MH-60R in order to provide a ship or task group with an enhanced anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capability.
Requiring a crew of three, the Aircraft Captain, Mission Commander and Sensor Operator combine to maximise the employment of the Romeo.
Recently, Pippa Malmgren, a U.S. analyst baed in London, provided thoughts on American developments.
An article by Tyler Durden published on October 18, 2020 provided the interview.
Here we are excerpting the discussion of the digital civil war, but the video below provides the full interview.
Erik: I want to pick up on a phrase you used just a minute ago, “a new kind of civil war”. Tell us more about what you mean, because it seems to me we do have scope for this unrest, to grow to a scale that really is a civil war. But obviously, this is not the 1800s we’re not going to dig trenches and have soldiers on either side with muskets trying to shoot at each other. It seems like we’re already seeing burning things down major arsons, are one of the elements of these new tactics of what I think could escalate into this new kind of civil war. What are the other attributes? What is this new kind of civil war? What does it look like?
Pippa: Well, another attribute of it is its digital quality. And there’s a lot of writing about it and you and I have talked in the past about the changed balance of power between states and citizens, and the use of data, and digitization, the use of mobile phones, for example to track behaviors. And again, COVID has totally accelerated that process with the introduction of track and trace, and ever larger powers and freedoms by governments to keep an eye on the citizens using their electronic technology and every nation does this differently.
Recently, I think just this week, we saw in Hong Kong the Chinese authorities blocked off a few city blocks, and everyone inside those few city blocks basically had a data search done. And it heavily targeted young people because they’re trying to find who are the protesters, who are the organizers of the protest against the Chinese state. And so basically your digital identity, which is in your phone gives away so much information about you, who you connect with, where you’ve physically been.
It’s capable of being used as a microphone to record everything that you say, there’s a record of all your emails, all your communications, all your text messages. So, this is the new war zone, it is a data space and I don’t that we’ve reached an agreement about what’s a reasonable amount of data for governments to have access to and what’s not.
I don’t think we’ve reached that in China and I don’t think we’ve reached it in the West either because it’s all so new, people still don’t even understand that they’re giving away that information. They still will have conversations in front of an Alexa and think that it is still private when in fact all that data is easily auctioned off on the net and available for sale.
So I think data is the second war space or Warzone where the civil unrest is unfolding and then I think another area of it has to do with morals. And this is such a super controversial area because everyone takes the high ground and says my morals are better than your morals, but the point is, they’re all arguing about what’s the right set of morals.
And I think that’s a really fascinating fight about philosophically what are the right set of morals for a modern society? And that’s why again, the Supreme Court issue is so important. And we just saw this opinion being released by Justice Clarence Thomas that calls into question the case that allowed gay marriages. And such an interesting question because for me when I was growing up a conservative was liberal in the sense that the view was, once you get to your own front door, anything you want to do, should be allowed inside within a certain reason.
But, basically, the freedom to be who you were was protected, today that’s not considered the conservative position. And the liberal position has moved to, we’re entitled to come into your house and tell you what you can and can’t do. It’s like a complete reversal of where things used to be. So some of this is navigating in a moral space, which is a bit like the 17th and 18th centuries, particularly 18th century where those were the kinds of issues that we had civil unrest over, they were moral issues, and we’re seeing maybe a repeat of history on that front.
For me, the biggest surprise during my several months of discussions about training for the high-end fight has been learning about the contribution of the Romeo community to the innovation underway.
With the shift from the primacy of the land-wars to a return to Blue Water operations, the capabilities of the systems onboard the Romeo have been given much more prominence.
Part of it is due to the work with Fire Scout for the S-60 community working through ways ahead for manned-unmanned teaming, which is an increasingly important aspect for shaping the way ahead. And part of is due to the enhanced emphasis on shaping a wide range of ISR-capabilities to inform combat operations.
In my discussions at NAWDC with the head of the Maritime ISR (MISR) Weapons School, CDR Pete “Two Times” Salvaggio, the CDR underscored how he viewed the contributions of the Romeo community to the MISR effort. According to “Two Times:” “They are a force to be reckoned with. 50% of the people we are getting come from the Atlantic Romeo squadron.”
Prior to my July 2020 visit to NAWDC, I had the chance to talk with CDR Jeremy “Shed” Clark, CO of the Naval Rotary Wing Weapons School (SEAWOLF) at NAWDC but was able to continue our discussion during the July visit. In our earlier discussion, he highlighted how he saw the change underway.
“The new generation of Navy operators are clearly thinking in kill web terms – they are not focused simply on what their platform can do based on how they were trained, but how they can work in the broader battlespace to deliver the desired effects working closely with partners in the sensor, decision-making and strike web. He argued that this meant that NAWDC is looking at how to change the entire dynamic of the strike group with such an approach.”
One role we discussed during the July meeting was how Romeo was working with Growler to deliver electronic warfare capabilities to the fleet. When the fleet transits narrower areas, the Romeo is working EW functions for the fleet. And to do so more effectively in the future, how should payloads be shared with unmanned systems, like the Fire Scout. And because they are already operating Fire Scout, it is not simply an abstract discussion, but can be translate into how the Firescout can work differently with the S-60s.
CDR Clark also reinforced the point made by “Two Times,” namely, that the Seahawk community was increasingly engaged in the expanded ISR for the fleet. He noted that after officers come through the Seahawk program, they now spend time at MISR to focus on the ISR part of what the Romeo provides. They are focused on ways to use their systems in an integrated ISR environment.
But he cautioned: “We are not training to our broader community.” But he sees the MISR engagement as a way to shape that broader community focus. I did note that during my visit of the new building to host integrated simulators there was no planned Romeo simulator in the building. He noted: “We are currently working on a white paper on why such an acquisition is necessary and what capability the Romeo will bring to the integrability effort.”
CDR Clark highlights the importance of identifying capability gaps and then looking at the operational platforms in terms of targeted modernization strategies.
He noted: “We eeed to look at the gaps in the mission sets, and then consider the applicable platforms whose upgrades could close those gaps most expeditiously and cost effectively. We should look for the lowest cost solutions on a particular platform, rather than looking to upgrade the entire force. And such gaps could well be met by changes in USMC or USAF platforms, not just with regard to US Navy platforms.”
I would add that as software upgradeable platforms enter the force, like F-35 and P-8s, this approach is particularly apt.
And I had such a conversation during a 2016 visit to the United Kingdom with the Commander of the ISTAR force. According to Air Commodore Dean Andrews:
“Treating each of the platform types as interconnected segments of an ISTAR capability Venn diagram will allow us to create the breadth of intelligence and understanding in the common operating picture that the Joint Force needs.
“Getting out of the platform stovepipe mentality will not be easy; it will be necessary to shape an overall operational approach to where the key operators of the platforms become plug and play elements in the overall ISTAR Force.”
We discussed the idea that as the core platforms are replaced by an all software upgradeable fleet, the possibility could exist to put the platforms in competition with one another for modernization upgrades.
“Which upgrade gets the priority for which platform to make the greatest contribution to the integrated ISTAR capability are the sort of decisions that should lie with the ISTAR Force in the future – it is at Force level, not within individual programmes and projects that the overall capability benefit can be seen and prioritized.”
Operating as a kill web has clear implications for shaping modernization approaches for the platforms engaged in the integrated force.
Featured Photo: Oct. 13, 2020: An MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter, from the “Battlecats” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 73, prepares to land on the flight deck aboard the aircraft USS Nimitz (CVN 68).
Nimitz, the flagship of Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations, conducting missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, and maritime security operations alongside regional and coalition partners.
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Cheyenne Geletka/Released)
