A U.S. Air Force BQM-167A Subscale Aerial Target launches during a Weapons Systems Evaluation Program exercise at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, Jan. 27, 2021.
Using sub scale drones give pilots the opportunity to fire live munitions and missiles during training to train the way they fight.
01.27.2021
Video by Staff Sgt. Stefan Alvarez
325th Fighter Wing Public Affairs
By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake
During our visit to Norfolk in March 2021, we had a chance to meet with CDR Bobby Hanvey, Executive Director of the Mid-Atlantic Tech Bridge. The US Navy has set up a number of Tech Bridges to foster greater collaboration with the private sector in a way that does not rely on the traditional acquisition process. In addition, the Mid-Atlantic Tech Bridge is different from the others in that it is the only Tech Bridge with a formal tie to the operational Navy via its support of Second Fleet.
This is how the Department of the Navy has described the Tech Bridge concept:
“The NavalX Tech Bridges are a connected network that enhances collaboration between Naval Labs, industry, academia, and other military branches.
“A NavalX Tech Bridge offers a collaboration space in a commercial business space, rather than on base. An off base location offers a more easily accessible landing spot to foster a collaboration ecosystem to build productive partnerships and accelerate delivery of dual use solutions to the warfighter.
“A NavalX Tech Bridge offers access to State and Local government and academic agencies creating a richer regional innovation ecosystem and further supporting economic development.”
As the US Navy looks to modernize, it can be categorized in three ways;
Traditional methods to achieve the above have proven slow, and sometimes, unresponsive to existing and emerging threats. To expand the Navy and Marines ability to meet those threats, they have set up a number of Tech Bridges to foster greater collaboration with the private sector in a way that does not rely on the formal acquisition process.
Linking a Tech-Bridge operating philosophy with an operational fleet has tremendous potential for increasing the value of any technology modernization initiative by looking at the final output which is the condition of the operational inventory at a given point in time. This is a very significant change in how innovative technology initiatives can be validated much quicker by the operators who will fight the Fleet.
CDR Bobby Hanvey is a graduate of the Naval Academy. After about 10 years of active duty service, he entered the Navy Reserves and later joined the Reserves in a full time capacity, called Full Time Service, or FTS. Working in this capacity he led substantial efforts to create a learning culture and feedback framework in the Navy Reserves, conceived and launched a feedback portal for sailors to submit ideas to improve the Navy, and introduced design thinking and human centered design as methods to attack complex problems. With his wide experiences he has come to really understand the kind of cultural change which faces a 21st century naval force.
He discussed with us the crucial role Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, (ASN RDA) Jim “Hondo” Geurts, has played in shaping what is now known as the Tech Bridges. Geurts came from SOCOM where he established SOFWERX, which has been a key force for innovation within the Special Forces. It is described as follows on the SOFWERX web page: “SOFWERX is a platform that helps solve challenging Warfighter problems at scale through collaboration, ideation, events, and rapid prototyping.”
Geurts brought that same mentality to the Navy, but recognized the SOFWERX model was not well suited for the Dept. of the Navy, (DON). The DON, unlike the other services, did not divest themselves of their multiple laboratories. These labs, called Warfare Centers, contain rich engineering, science expertise and knowledge, and are valuable assets which are not centralized in nature.
The Navy and Marine Corps have 22 warfare centers and many other laboratories.
According to CDR Hanvey, the problem is that “they aren’t designed to work together. They have what is called a working capital model and need to prove their value to ensure continued funding. In a simplified description, they must earn the work and only get funded for the work program offices and other entities award them to perform. This has positive and negative impacts. The positive impact is they must prove their worth or they don’t earn continued funding, thus ensuring they stay sharp in their field and continue to prove their value to the Navy and Marines. The negative is they have little freedom to explore outside what is funded and assigned.”
With the above, the opportunity to tap into the private sector innovations and the significant investments in that sector, is greatly reduced. Innovation and investment in the commercial markets dwarf what the government is able to do and tapping into those markets is key to increasing, maintaining, or even closing gaps in naval capability as compared to our peer competitors.
With NavalX, the approach is to cross these silos and discover cross-cutting innovations. They started with a key effort to “super-connect across the silos” as there is already substantial innovative solutions and approaches within the Navy and Marines.
Initially, NavalX was established under ASN RDA Geurts and is now largely part of the Office of Naval Research, while still working heavily with the ASN office. A key focus for Secretary Guerts, which he brought from SOCOM, is on ensuring that the Navy can find ways to talk with industry, and in particular, industry that doesn’t normally deal with or talk to the government.
This is how Hanvey characterized the focus: “What about industry? Industry is where stuff’s happening. Startups in the garage, entrepreneurs, small businesses. How do I get them to work with us?”
The process started by Guerts forging the Agility Cell, of which CDR Hanvey was a member. They visited the many “silos of excellence” with the Navy and Marines to understand how best to scale those efforts. This included visiting other services and their innovation efforts to include SOCOM and SOFWERX to scope out how they did their approach to innovation. From these visits, the cell worked with Guerts to sort through how to adapt a similar approach in the Navy and this evolved into the NavalX effort and spawned the Tech Bridge concept.
With the establishment of the Tech Bridges, CDR Hanvey’s focus has clearly been upon how to establish an effective tech bridge in the very large naval operational world of Norfolk/Hampton Roads. His tech-bridge is different in that they work directly with Second Fleet. And because VADM Lewis and his team have prioritized C2 and distributed C2, the Mid-Atlantic Tech Bridge is also focused on those challenges.
For VADM Lewis, the team is working with current systems to deliver mobile command and control capabilities. The role then of the associated tech bridge is to look at evolving technologies which can do this better than current systems.
The process of examination is not just about new technologies, but also about technologies being used by other organizations which could be adapted to the Second Fleet environment.
According to CDR Hanvey: “Second Fleet is focused on a distributed C2 network, not just a unitary and centralized capability. We’re going to use DJC2. We’re going to potentially use NETC2 and that’s great. Well, there’s a lot of commercial technology out there that can do this on a smaller and more agile scale. There’s a lot of technology already in the government, the Secret Service and the Special Operations user base, which does exactly what Admiral Lewis wants to be able to do. We can be disaggregated and distributed and work through a coalition network, or a commercial network, and still securely connect, consume and participate. We look to adapt such technologies and bring them to Second Fleet.”
“We are not here to replace existing innovation efforts, or avenues to solve complex problems. The goal of the Tech Bridge is to enable finding solutions faster, better and which are less expensive. If the Tech Bridge can’t do it faster, better, or for less cost than the existing avenues we have through the Navy or the Marines, then we shouldn’t be doing it. But if I can make it happen faster, give you a much better result, and/or significantly less cost, that is our sweet spot.”
To achieve these goals, they are working ways to partner differently with organizations the Navy and Marines do not normally work with in order to make this work. They are utilizing Partnership Intermediate Agreements (PIA) which allow them to work with non-profits to work the evolving eco-system of technological innovation as well.
During our visit to Norfolk in March 2021, we have had a chance to deal with the two startup commands which are driving change in how to best shape maritime capabilities for the maritime fight – Second Fleet and Allied Joint Forces Command. Along with the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE), the three organizations clearly understand the central importance of shaping effective C2 mission command capabilities.
The focus is on the fight tonight, which means they need to leverage what exists but to work these capabilities into an enhanced warfighting capability. But they are doing so with an eye to shaping the kind of template which can embrace significant change, the kind of change which their working relationship with the Mid-Atlantic Tech Bridge can help shape.
For further tech bridge information, see the following:
TB_2020 Annual Report_LowResAlso, see the following:
757 Accelerate: Contributing to the Evolving Ecosystem for Innovation
By Pierre Tran
Paris – Sherpa, a French non-governmental organization, said it filed April 28 a request for a judicial inquiry into alleged corruption on India’s acquisition of 36 Rafale fighter jets in a deal worth €7.8 billion ($9.4 billion).
“Sherpa, represented by its lawyers William Bourdon and Vincent Brenghart, is filing a complaint and requesting the opening of a judicial investigation for corruption, favouritism and various financial offences likely to have occurred in the context of the sale of 36 combat aircraft produced by Dassault Aviation and sold to India in 2016,” the NGO said in a statement.
The filing was in response to a lack of official action following Sherpa’s Oct. 26 2018 call for a French investigation into the pick of Reliance as the Indian industrial partner for Dassault, the anti-corruption office said. Reliance had little experience in the aeronautics industry,
The French National Financial Prosecutor, in the wake of the 2018 filing, failed to conduct a full enquiry into the selection of Reliance, which was then in financial difficulty and was led by an executive close to the Indian prime minister, Sherpa said.
Before the appointment of Reliance, Dassault had been in talks with state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) as local partner on a prospective deal for 126 Rafales. New Delhi in 2015 ditched the talks with Dassault and switched to a government-to-government order for 36 units.
It was part of that €7.8 billion deal for 36 Rafales that India selected Reliance as local partner to Dassault.
Apart from an informal interview with a Dassault lawyer, the French prosecutor’s office failed to conduct a detailed inquiry, and in June 2019 ruled “absence of an offence,” reported the website Mediapart, Sherpa said.
Sherpa has worked on the case separately from Mediapart, a lawyer for the NGO said.
Sherpa has conducted its own inquiry over the last two years, the NGO said, and the reporting of Mediapart pointed up a “passivity” of the French Anti-Corruption Agency, while there were suspicious payments, “hidden commissions” and the absence of anti-corruption clauses in weapons contracts.
Mediapart reported that Dassault paid €1 million to Sushen Gupta, an Indian “middle man” who helped secure the Rafale contract. The French aircraft builder told the Anti-Corruption Agency the payment covered 50 reduced size models of the fighter, to be presented as gifts to customers in India.
There was concern that the €1 million payment may have covered illegal commissions, and the excising of anti-corruption clauses from the Indian contracts may be related to that payment, Mediapart reported.
The Indian authorities have conducted investigations on Gupta following corruption allegations on the 2010 sale of AgustaWestland helicopters.
The Anti-Corruption Agency reported to two ministries — budget and justice — seen as placing the office under political pressure.
There were flaws in a French anti-corruption system which gave “too much leeway for the implementation of internal procedures in companies to fight corruption,” Sherpa said.
“The present case is an example of the failure of this approach, which relies on a convergence of the private interests of the company and those of the general interest that criminal law is supposed to protect,” Sandra Cossart, executive director of Sherpa, said in the statement.
“Those latest revelations show to what extent the admissibility of associations to bring judicial actions before the courts is a central component of our democracy.”
A Dassault spokesman declined to comment and referred to an April 8 company statement in response to the Mediapart reporting.
Official organizations, including the French Anti-Corruption Agency, had conducted “numerous controls,” the Dassault statement said, and no violations were reported in the Indian contract for 36 Rafales.
The company acted in strict compliance with the OECD anti-bribery convention and in line with national laws, particularly the French law known as Sapin 2, adopted Dec. 9, 2016, the company said.
“Since the early 2000s, Dassault Aviation has implemented strict internal procedures to prevent corruption, guaranteeing the integrity, ethics and reputation of the company in its industrial and commercial relations,” the company said.
“In the context of the Sapin 2 law, the company has completed and strengthened its system for the prevention and detection of corruption and influence peddling, both at the level of the parent company and its subsidiaries.”
U.S. Air Force Special Tactics operators with the 24th Special Operations Wing, conduct water operations with U.S. Navy aircrew members assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Nine, in a MH-60 Seahawk Helicopter during Emerald Warrior 21.1, at Hurlburt Field, Florida, Feb. 18, 2021.
Water operations training is part of training for exercise Emerald Warrior that focuses on U.S partner nation relationships while emphasizing joint force interoperability.
HURLBURT FIELD, FL.
02.18.2021
Video by Senior Airman Edward Coddington
Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs
Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) is currently conducting dynamic interface testing operations off the coast of Southern California. The operations are tests for compatibility usage of variants of the V-22 Osprey and MH-60 Seahawk with the ship’s new flight deck, and the first time a V-22 has landed on an MSC hospital ship.
The testing takes place following a seven-month maintenance period where the ship’s flight deck was expanded and reinforced to accommodate the size, weight and heat of larger aircraft, allowing the ship to receive patients and supplies through a variety of aviation platforms.
Over the course of several days, the ship will exercise with the V-22, practicing take-offs and landings from Mercy’s flight deck, followed by operations with the MH-60s. Increased flight operations will allow critical patients a quicker route to the ship for treatment, vice a slower boat ride from one of the ships tender boats.
Because this is the first time the V-22s have conducted flight operations onboard Mercy, Navy personnel from San Diego, Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4), Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Stethem (DDG 63), America-class amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA 7), Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) Squadron 3 and Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron 49, are onboard to train and assist the civil service mariner crew.
“This is a historic event in the storied life of the USNS Mercy, and for MSC,” said Capt. Kendall Bridgewater, commander, Military Sealift Command Pacific. “Improving the capability of the ship to support newer aircraft platforms such as the MV-22, allows greater flexibility and enhances the embarked Medical Treatment team’s ability to continue providing the outstanding care they are known for. This investment in new capability is a great example of MSC’s continued support to the fleet and plays an important role in keeping the U.S. Navy competitive well into the future.”
The dynamic interface operations are one of several training, testing and inspection periods the Mercy will undergo in preparation for future missions, including the Pacific Partnership humanitarian mission.
This article was published by the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet on April 19, 2021.
Video by Seaman Luke Cunningham
Military Sealift Command Pacific
This is a case study of expanding the cross decking options which the Osprey opens up for the Navy as it works its evolving fleet appraoch to blue water expeditionary operations as well. The coming of the CMV-22B to the large deck carriers means that unlike the C2 which it is replacing, this support aircraft can perform fleet functions as well such as this lift for medical purposes, which indeed was exercised in a recent landing onboard the USS Carl Vinson as well
Also, read the following with regard to cross-decking,
Reworking the Sea Base and Cross Decking of Air Combat Assets
Navy aircrew from the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Nine conduct training with U.S. Air Force Special Tactics operators assigned to the 24th Special Operations Wing during Exercise Emerald Warrior-21, Hurlburt Field, Florida, Feb. 18, 2021.
Water operations training is part of training for exercise Emerald Warrior that focuses on U.S partner nation relationships while emphasizing joint force interoperability.
HURLBURT FIELD, FL.
02.18.2021
Video by Senior Airman Michelle Di Ciolli
Air Force Special Operations Command Public Affairs
By William Gourlay
It’s said that politics makes for strange bedfellows. In diplomacy, it would seem that it’s seating arrangements that can be tricky. At a 6 April meeting of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council head Charles Michel with Turkey’sfamously combative President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, von der Leyen was left, for one uncomfortable moment, without a chair.
Footage has emerged of the meeting in Ankara as Erdogan and Michel take up seats while von der Leyen is left to hover awkwardly. She was eventually ushered to a nearby sofa, but according to protocols, she, at equivalent rank to Michel, should have been afforded the same status—in this instance, a chair.
EU–Turkey relations have lately been tetchy, not least due to Turkey’s confrontational foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean. But speaking after meeting with Erdogan in Ankara, von der Leyen applauded Turkey for demonstrating an interest in ‘re-engaging with the European Union in a constructive way’ and highlighted a desire to ‘give our relationship a new momentum’.
There was an outpouring of indignation at von der Leyen’s relegation—accusations flew about who was responsible for the faux pas that led to ‘sofagate’. But this distracts from another controversy: the EU’s decision to engage with Erdogan at a time when Turkey’s authoritarian drift is accelerating. A US State Department report from 2020 outlines a litany of human rights transgressions and restrictions on political freedoms in Turkey. In deciding to visit Ankara, the EU turned a blind eye to democratic backsliding and human rights violations, effectively letting Erdogan get away with it.
The timing of the EU visit was particularly questionable coming only two weeks after Erdogan’s snap decision to withdraw from a Council of Europe accord that protects women’s rights. Turkey signed the treaty in 2011—it’s known as the Istanbul Convention, no less—but Erdogan bent to local critics who claim the accord undermines traditional Turkish values. And he did it at a time of rising violence against women in Turkey, and apparently against the wishes of many Turks. International observers met the decision with dismay: the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, Marija Pejcinovic Buric, called it a ‘huge setback’ and US President Joe Biden said he was ‘deeply disappointed’.
EU officials have long stressed that any resumption of talks with Turkey would be ‘phased, proportionate and reversible’. EU Council President Charles Michel has previously stated, ‘Rule of law and democracy are absolutely key to any dialogue we have with Turkey.’
Erdogan has appeared at times to be playing ball. In March, he announced a new human rights action plan to protect freedom of expression and enshrine the right to a fair trial by 2023, the centenary of the Turkish Republic. The declaration was met with scepticism from some quarters. An obvious question arises: Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has governed Turkey since 2002, so why has it not already been able to protect human rights and the rule of law?
According to a Turkish proverb, it’s easy to make commitments but harder to deliver. Erdogan is big on promises, but doubts remain over his willingness to deliver human rights protections and political freedoms, particularly to his opponents. Recent weeks have seen court proceedings brought to dissolve the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), on allegations that it colludes with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the revocation of the seat of, and subsequent arrest of, HDP parliamentary member Omer Faruk Gergerlioglu.
Accusing pro-Kurdish parties of PKK sympathies and broad-brush allegations of terrorist complicity are tried-and-tested tactics in Turkish politics, but Gergerlioglu, who isn’t even Kurdish and was previously president of a leading human rights organisation, appears to have run afoul of prosecutors for relentlessly highlighting rights abuses.
As with leaving the Istanbul Convention on women’s rights, proceedings against the HDP and the pursuit of Gergerlioglu have attracted a chorus of criticism from international bodies, including the European Parliament.
Turkey and Erdogan, in particular, don’t take kindly to criticism. With disagreements mounting in recent years, Erdogan has increasingly taken Turkey in new foreign policy directions, including military interventions in Syria, northern Iraq, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh. He has overseen resurgent, exclusivist nationalism and fostered the idea that Turkey should reclaim its earlier position as regional leader. As a result, some view Turkey as a troublesome international actor.
Erdogan, however, realises that isolation is not in his or Turkey’s best interests—hence the attempt to resuscitate relations with the EU. For its part, the EU understands the vital role Turkey plays in housing enormous numbers of Syria refugees who would otherwise head for European shores. So, for now, rapprochement may be the order of the day—as long as the seating arrangements can be sorted amicably.
William Gourlay is a research associate at the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University and the author of The Kurds in Erdogan’s Turkey (2020).
Featured Image: Murat Kula/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.
This article was published by ASPI on April 20, 2021 under the title “EU engagement gives Turkey a free pass on human rights violations.”
And we learn today from an article by Eszter Zalan published in EUObserver:
EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen on Monday (26 April) blamed sexism for events earlier this month in Ankara, where she was relegated to a sofa during a meeting with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presence of European Council president Charles Michel.
In unusually personal and passionate comments in the European Parliament, von der Leyen said “it happened because I am a woman”.
In her most detailed account of the incident that became known as “Sofagate”, she said she expected to be treated as the president of the European Commission. But she was not.
“I cannot find any justification for how I was treated in the EU treaties, so I have to conclude that it happened because I am a woman. Would this have happened if I had worn a suit and a tie?,” she said.
By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake
In working on our book for USNI press, we have focused on how the U.S. Navy is reworking its approaches to shape new capabilities for the high-end fight. Obviously, a refocus from a two-decade primary role in supporting land wars to a return to blue water expeditionary operations is a significant one. And clearly one which affects the Navy’s reserve forces as well.
Recently, we had the privilege to talk with Vice Admiral John Mustin, Chief of Navy Reserve, N095, to find out how he was working the way ahead to make sure the reserves integrate into full spectrum crisis management which if deterrence fails will lead to a high-end US and Allied Air/Sea combat campaign.
The key point which he made in the guidance he released last Fall on the way ahead for the Navy reserves is visionary: “… the changing geopolitical environment forces us to modernize our thinking, our force structure, our training and our operations to address the realities of a future conflict. Simply said, we cannot assume tomorrow’s war will look like yesterdays. Hence my Theory of the Fight includes accelerating our transformation to ensure we get, and remain, ‘future-ready.”
Vice Admiral Mustin went on insightfully to state: “The reserve force today is optimized perfectly to support the global war on terror. Many of our processes, our unit structures, billets, training procedures, even the way that we mobilize sailors do a fantastic job meeting the specific requirements of a counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, non-maritime, land-based conflict, particularly in CENTCOM and the horn of Africa.
“My comment in my commander’s guidance was that is not likely to be effective to address the next conflict, and if I am reading the tea leaves properly in this era of great power competition, we’re going to need very different skills.
“The Navy has recognized this, and the Navy is transforming. And I did not feel that the reserve force was working quickly enough to reflect that transformation in our reserve-specific force structure, processes, and procedures.
“We are working very closely with the fleet commanders. We are focusing on answering their needs. ‘What is it that you need and value?” And equally important; “What does the reserve team do for you today that you don’t value?
“My job has been to take fleet feedback and then shape the future structure of the reserve force, to address those specific needs. For the numbered Fleets there are several capabilities that leap to the fore, specifically emphasis on their maritime operations centers, both capacity and capability. Related but not explicitly tied to the maritime ops center is expeditionary logistics that are explicitly tied to our distributed maritime concept of operations. And one echelon down is a focus on expeditionary advanced base operations.
“Everything I just described is ripe for reserve force contribution. We’ve begun the process now to determine where we have elements of the reserve force that are relatively low value as it relates to CNO and fleet priorities. How can I harvest some of the current existing units and billets to meet priority needs, and how can I take our sailors out of low value jobs and create new high value jobs given the strategic shift to the high-end fight?
“That’s an initiative underway right now, and I’m happy to report there’s a number of things that I’m able to do in this fiscal year. There are also certainly things that are on the roadmap for fiscal year 22 and some for 23 and 24 and beyond. But I want to move out now because I just don’t know that we’re going to have a lot of time to make those changes when the shooting starts.”
In World War II a well-respected historian Max Hastings in a seminal work, “Inferno” determined that after a difficult start the US Navy was at the end of the war the most effective fighting force of all combatant forces of all nations. Admiral Mustin took pride in that historical example but correctly observed that today the U.S. Sea Services may not have the luxury of time. They must be trained and equipped to win the fight and get it right, right now.
Question: We are focused on the strategic shift and how that demands significant change in warfighting and escalation dominance.
A different set of skill sets are clearly required.
Clearly, we have seen at Second Fleet, that a key priority is C2 for a distributed integrated fleet.
This requires different skill sets as well.
There is a whole new generation of digital warriors in our society as well.
How are you focusing on re-shaping the reserves to harvest the opportunities in civil society and to focus on the critical skill sets for the “new” Navy, so to speak?
Vice Admiral Mustin: “That’s a perfect scene setter. I completely agree that what made us successful over the last 20 years, post 9/11 is not what’s going to make us successful into the next few decades.
“Working with Vice Admiral Lewis has been important as well. As Second Fleet Commander, he clearly understands that we need to shape a new approach. When I was in High School in the 80’s, my father was Second Fleet Commander, so I can legitimately say that “The new Second Fleet is not your father’s Second Fleet.
“What he wants and what we are offering started with a clean sheet of paper as it relates to the design of the reserve force for C2F.
“I’ve looked at every other numbered fleet to determine which model works best for us. And then, perhaps not surprisingly, I recognized the reserve design supporting each fleet was different. What that tells me is that there is a need for us to establish a template where we can get at 80% of the core competencies, the missions, functions, andtasks associated with the C2 in the maritime element. And then there’s certainly some peripheral amount, call it 20% hypothetically, tailored to the region, the AOR, the theater. Shaping a template for C2 is a key element around which we can shape fleet design going forward, as well as shaping the skills required to support that design.
“If you go on the second fleet watch floor right now, there will be a handful of reserve officers and sailors that are standing watch. And early in my tenure I mentioned to Vice Admiral Lewis, that rather than build a team that shows up a weekend a month, two weeks a year during exercise support requirements, why don’t we build a team that’s fully integrated so that they work with their chiefs of staff, their division directors, their N codes as we call them, their department heads by function. And let’s have them plugged in every day, not just on weekends.
“And I don’t mean 365 days, but if an average sailor can do roughly 38 days a year — that’s just the sum of a weekend a month, and two weeks a year. There’s nothing that says it has to be a weekend a month and two weeks a year, I could do 30 days consecutively and then not see them again for six months, or we could do groups of five days or 10 days., We can be as flexible as we want.
“If we invest time upfront to training them to their watch station, then we get production time out of them by having them show up and actually stand the watch. And that’s good for second fleet as well as for the reserve sailors, because they earn a credential that is permeable and enduring. So they can then take a billet at their next job at another fleet. That means that the skills that we’ve invested in them are permeable and they can plug in immediately to another fleet.
“Admiral Lewis was very receptive to the idea and frankly, after hearing it said, “Okay, this isn’t a course of action. This is your tasking, make it happen.” He has been very receptive to saying, let’s build full integration. I don’t want there to be a distinction. And I told him if we do this right, no one will ever know the difference between a reserve and an active sailor. You’re just a sailor. And you’re a sailor that’s contributing to the requirements of second fleet, whether that’s at an expeditionary environment or operating at the headquarters building.”
Question: The reserves bring significant experience to the active-duty force.
This has been a key to navy success in the past, how do you see this going forward?
Vice Admiral Mustin: “The focus on fleet ops is critically important to me. I just had a conversation with CNO today about the strategic imperative to restore seagoing ratings to the reserve force. Right now, we do a fine job in staff headquarters, but when it comes to getting folks on the waterfront, it’s more of a challenge. For every sailor that says I’ve got the time and the inclination, we can get them afloat, so that’s a goal of mine.
“A key problem we face is not having a lot of time to mobilize in the face of significant conflict. With regard to our reserve component, there are two kinds of readiness. There is mobilization readiness, and there’s warfighting readiness. Mobilization readiness is the cost of being a reserve sailor. You need to maintain your readiness to mobilize when asked. And that means you’ve done your dental checks and your medical checks, and you’ve done your physical fitness assessments and your general military training. That’s kind of the standard stuff that title 10 pays for in the number of days, the weekend a month and the two weeks a year, and that’s up to you.
“You don’t get a Navy Achievement Medal for being mobilization ready. In fact, if our sailors can’t maintain mobilization readiness, I will ask them to leave the service because it’s a privilege to serve, not a jobs program.
“The more challenging side is the warfighting readiness piece. And that’s where I’m investing a lot of time and effort to understand the training pipelines, the timelines, the costs, the billets, the units, et cetera, because my assumption is we need to be ready on day one of a conflict. I’m also working very diligently to improve the processes to mass mobilize our people.
“And I’ve committed to the CNO that in January of 2022, we will be able to mobilize 49,000 sailors in 30 days, which is about 15 times the throughput capacity we had when I took office here.
“We need to be ready to go because we’re not going to have five years to ramp up, to get good at our jobs like we did in World War Two. We have to be good at our jobs now. I want to use every penny of training dollars and every iota of time when we have our precious sailors in uniform, and get them training to be good at their billets, because I just don’t feel like we’ve got the luxury frankly, of waiting.
“And that said, I will tell you, I’m thrilled that we just celebrated our hundred- and six-year anniversary as a reserve force. And though we have contributed in every significant conflict in our nation’s history, post-World War I, we’ve never been caught by surprise in mobilizing the reserve force.
“What does that mean? Well, I told you, we have to be ready because it’s likely to be short notice. This means having the reserves as a key contributor to the active-duty force, particularly as its builds out for conflict, and that means having the kind of experienced reserve sailors that you referred to as key players in the process.”
Question: Do you see the transition of the technological revolution embodied by people being involved with the Navy as reserves as having value added?
Vice Admiral Mustin: “I absolutely do. And you hit the nail on the head. I can write a book on the countless stories of folks who have a unique set of civilian skills, that are ready to serve the nation in uniform.
“There are a wide variety of critical skills that the reserve force brings to bear: think big data and analytics, data visualization, predictive analytics, 3D manufacturing, space, cyber, unmanned and autonomous systems. We’ve got folks who work in all of those program areas as civilians, and also in units that support the operations or the concepts of employment.
“We’ve got Silicon Valley folks, we’ve got venture capitalists, private equity players who understand what’s happening in the technology sector and areas where we can take advantage and apply their skills and insights to what we do in uniform. The challenge I wrestle with frankly, is how do you scale that?”
In short, we focus in our forthcoming book on the evolution of the Navy as it is reshaped into a distributed, integrated force, which we see operating through kill web. What we learned from Vice Admiral Mustin is that the reserve force that he is involved in building will give the Navy a unique capability to staff out such a force. What we learned is that the reserve force that is being shaped going forward, we’ll be able to empower the fleet to operate that way.
Vice Admiral John Mustin is a native of Alexandria, Virginia. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, where he earned a Bachelor of Science in Weapons and Systems Engineering and was commissioned in 1990. He holds a Master of Science in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and a Master of Business Administration (cum laude) in Finance and Management from the F. W. Olin Graduate School of Business at Babson College. He earned his Joint Professional Military Education from the Air University’s Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base.
Mustin’s sea duty assignments include command of Expeditionary Strike Group 2/Task Force 29; commissioning operations officer on USS Donald Cook (DDG 75), and aboard USS Vincennes (CG 49), where he served as combat information center officer, navigator and the air warfare commander of the Independence (CV 62) Battle Group.
Affiliating with the Navy Reserve in 2001, Mustin served at Navy Reserve (NR) Carrier Strike Group 2 / USS George Washington (CVN 73) Strike Group during Operation Enduring Freedom. Other staff assignments include NR Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3N5) at the Pentagon Navy Command Center; Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 14; NR Carrier Strike Group 10 / USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) Strike Group; and Personnel Mobilization Team 101. Additionally, he served as the inaugural Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Navy Reserve Enterprise Director, responsible for the reserve manning, training and equipping of the 1000-billet LCS surface reserve force.
Other command tours include NR Joint Staff South; NR U.S. Fleet Forces Command Maritime Operations Center, Greensboro; NR Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 6; and Inshore Boat Unit 22, including a mobilization to Kuwait during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. His other flag assignments include deputy commander of Naval Surface Forces, spanning the Surface Type Commanders of the U.S. Pacific and Atlantic fleets; as a plankowner and the deputy commander of the re-established U.S. Second Fleet; and as vice commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command.
Mustin became the 15th Chief of Navy Reserve on 7 August 2020. As Commander, Navy Reserve Force, he leads approximately 59,000 Reserve Component personnel who support the Navy, Marine Corps and joint forces.
His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy Achievement Medal, Navy Battle Efficiency ‘E’, Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal and various service, expeditionary, unit and campaign awards.
The featured photo: WASHINGTON (Aug. 7, 2020) Vice Adm. John Mustin is administered the oath of office by Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday upon his promotion to vice admiral before assuming the office the Chief of Navy Reserve. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Class Mathew J. Diendorf/Released)