Re-shaping North Atlantic Defense: JFC Norfolk as a Startup Command

04/07/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

There has been public discussion of the state and fate of NATO over the past few years. One European leader energized the discussion by referring to NATO as “brain dead.” But underlying the political exchanges of the past few years, there has been real progress in shaping a new approach to North Atlantic defense.

But because the new approaches do not fit the Cold War images of what North Atlantic defense look like, in many ways the changes are not fully grasped, and the new approaches fully appreciated.

Certainly, a key driver of change has been the dynamic growth in Nordic defense cooperation and the commitment of NATO members as well as EU members Sweden and Finland in strengthening their capabilities to work together.

In the book authored by Laird with Delaporte, a significant part of the analysis on the reworking of European direct defense focuses on the impact of this Nordic dynamic on reworking how collaboration of the “coalition of the willing” or the “relevant nations” working together with key NATO partners is reshaping European defense.

As we put it in that book: “Europe and its defense are not one narrative but several. The Russians face an increasingly unified Nordic Northern Flank with enhanced UK focus on the region, backed by reach into North America.

“The central part of Europe is a mosaic of former Warsaw Pact states with varying degrees of concern about the Russian challenge, backed by a German French alliance with the nuclear-armed France in this key area.

“And the southern zone of Europe in which Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Italy have about as much solidarity today as they have had historically, which means that aggregation management is crucial to deal with any alliance-wide challenges.”

And the Nordic Northern flank and the redesign of direct defense is highlighted in that book as follows: “A key part of shaping a new approach to direct defense in Europe is winning the fourth battle of the Atlantic. (which rests on dealing with) a key aspect of the Russian challenge, which is crucial for the Nordics, namely, the need to hold the Russian Kola bastion at risk.

“For the United States and Canada, it is about reinforcing Europe and holding the Russians at bay, notably with Putin threatening a nuclear strike via his projected new hypersonic missile to be launched via a submarine. But for the Nordics, it is about homeland defense, and not letting the Russians have a free ride to use the Kola Peninsula and its extended perimeter defense without a significant capability by the West to attrite and destroy the Russian bastion.

“When you come out from the land into the air and sea corridors, is where the West for sure needs to be able to operate its own anti-access and area denial capability. Two can play at this game.”

What one sees in Norfolk is reshaping how the startup command called Second Fleet has been launched interactively under Vice Admiral Lewis’s leadership with the NATO startup command called JFC Norfolk to shape new ways of combing national efforts into a more integrated and effective defense effort.

And that effort is reinforced by another trend line which we have examined over the past decade, namely, the standup of the F-35 global enterprise, whereby U.S. allies are often leading the way in the acquisition, development, and use of their aircraft in advance of what the United States itself is providing for regional defense efforts.

All of this can be seen in the dynamics of change unleashed by the integrated efforts being generated by the two commands working together. Recently, the Vice Admiral returned from a visit to SHAPE and to Europe and upon his return we had a chance to talk with his political advisor, a senior Icelandic diplomat.

And it is hard to miss the point of why having a senior Icelandic diplomat as the political advisor to the U.S. Admiral is significant. Given that the United States shifted its attention to the Middle East and withdrew from its engagement in Iceland in the George W. Bush Administration, and policy which continued under the Obama Administration, which shuttered 2nd Fleet in 2011.

But with the Crimean crisis wakeup call, the U.S. Navy reached out to Iceland and there was return to maritime patrol activities, but this time with a new MPA asset, namely the P-8.

But for the Icelandic government, their strategic importance was never in doubt, notably with the growing impact of High North defense issues, but for the United States has been for a considerable period of time a “reluctant” Arctic power.

But for Iceland, it was clear that the strategic focus of the famous Greenland-Iceland-UK gap was no longer simply an East-West transit point but a North-South one as well. And it was clear that when Admiral Richardson sought to establish the new second fleet, that it was going to need to build to the new strategic reality and not simply replicate the past Cold War-generated command.

We had a chance during our visit to Norfolk to talk with the Vice Admiral’s political advisor located in JFC Norfolk. Snorri Matthiasson, is a senior Icelandic diplomat, who had just returned from the European visit of Vice Admiral Lewis. We conducted the interview by phone because of COVID-19 restrictions, but his insights were very significant about the “startup” command.

Matthiasson noted that he first met Vice Admiral Lewis on a visit with the Icelandic Chief of Defense to Norfolk, shortly after C2F had been stood up. This was going to be Lewis’s first NATO command, and he sought out a political advisor to assist in his efforts. He was the first foreigner to join the NATO command, just prior to the arrival of Rear Admiral Betton.

He underscored how the standup very much felt like a startup which allowed them to think through how best to work the efforts for U.S.- European collaboration. He underscored that a number of key Nordic states were engaged in defense and security activities in the region, and as they worked coordination efforts, there was a clear need to better coordinate with U.S. and other allied efforts, such as the United Kingdom, France, and German forces operating in the region as well.

As Matthiasson put it: “Vice Admiral Lewis looks at the area from the East Coast of North America to Finnmark as a continuous battlespace, but there was an opportunity to do a much better job coordinating national efforts in the area to shape enhanced coalition capabilities.

For example, the Danes have been working for decades in Greenland and working maritime situational awareness.

How to better leverage what they are doing, and how best to bring the capabilities of new maritime domain awareness systems into their operations?”

As working crisis situations entails whole of government responses., doing a better job of bringing together military operational concepts of operations with tactical or strategic diplomatic options is an important challenge to be met in North Atlantic defense. And that is clearly one thrust of the startup commands rethinking process for the evolving approaches to North Atlantic defense.

It is clear that the commands are not engaged in recreating the Cold War infrastructure but are engaged in shaping a very different approach. And the F-35 enterprise is part of that new approach as an information and C2 asset.

With regard to Iceland, first the Italians and currently the Norwegians are operating F-35s from Iceland as part of the NATO air policing missions. The Brits will operate F-35s from their base in Mahram or at sea off of their new Queen Elizabeth carriers. And this is prior to the U.S. Navy operating their F-35s in the region, but, of course, the U.S. Navy has an ability to work with those allied fifth generation aircraft. And this is true whether they come from Danish, or Norwegian, or British or potentially Finnish air bases in the future.

The impact on interoperability of U.S. with European forces is clearly enhanced by operating a common combat aircraft.

This is how Matthiasson put it: “The Norwegians we met in Iceland emphasized that the F35 is an incredible capability, but it also allows them to jointly train with U.S. forces which creates a new opportunity for joint and coalition warfighting approach as well.”

As we wrapped up our discussion,  NATO innovation was a key focus of attention. Obviously, the direct NATO missions and operations are tasked by SHAPE and SACEUR, after a NAC decision. But under that broader remit, JFC Norfolk provides a flexible umbrella organization to allow for cross-learning and cross-sharing of national efforts which can be combined to provide for enhanced coalition capabilities.

As Matthiasson put it: “The nations have been very keen on working with us from the very beginning with the vision that we had of being an umbrella or nexus for the North Atlantic, because there is so much national activity that is ongoing with some very advanced equipment. How best to shape collaboration and coordination in such a situation.?

“Much of the activity in the region is under national rather than NATO mandates. But for the Russians, any NATO members national activity is interpreted as being a NATO activity, so why not do a better job coordinating national efforts to get the right kind of coalition effect?”

It seems that this kind of approach suggests that NATO is not brain dead after all.

The featured graphic provides a view of the High North seen from the Norwegian perspective.

Training with French Forces

U.S. Army Infantrymen assigned to the East African Response Force (EARF) perform a sniper exercise with French servicemen Feb. 02, 2021 at an indisclosed location in Djibouti, Africa.

The EARF is a rapid deployment force with the ability to protect U.S. citizens and diplomatic facilities, provide non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, on the African continent.

CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

02.02.2021

Video by Senior Airman Hannah Strobel

1st Combat Camera Squadron

The Way Ahead for the CMV-22B: The Integratable Air Wing and the USS Carl Vinson

04/06/2021

By Robbin Laird

The CMV-22B is an essential part of the evolving air wing on the large deck carriers. The process of shaping this new capability is part of the overall transformation of the large deck carrier and its role in the evolving capabilities of the U.S. Navy and its transformation of fighting as a fleet.

New platforms should never be understood as in and of themselves but as part of the evolution of a force, and when significant change is underway, the transformation of the force. This is certainly the case with the CMV-22B.

The Navy has a huge advantage in bringing the lift-focused Osprey to its flight decks. For it builds on the significant operational experience of the USMC in operating this aircraft globally. This means that the Navy is drawing upon the ecosystem associated with the Osprey and taking that platform and its ecosystem onto its evolving large deck carrier fleet.

In a story published by the USS Carl Vinson on February 26, 2021, the operation of the first CMV-22B squadron in delivering an F-35C power module onboard the ship was highlighted.

The “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30 and members of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 2 successfully delivered an F-35C power module aboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) in the U. S. Navy’s first, at-sea replenishment for this component.

This success follows a November 2020 milestone, during which VRM-30, CVW-2 and Vinson conducted the Navy’s first landings, take-offs, and refueling of a Navy CMV-22B Osprey from an aircraft carrier.

The at-sea power module replenishment evolution consisted of loading, transporting and unloading the F135 power module from a shore-based location to the carrier by way of a CMV-22B.  The power module is an engine component used by all three F-35 Lightning II variants. 

The CMV-22B is the U.S. Navy version of the V-22 Osprey, a multi-engine, dual-piloted, self-deployable, medium lift, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) tilt-rotor aircraft.  The CMV-22B can transport cargo and passengers as far as 1,150 nautical miles; provides enhanced survivability and beyond-line-of-sight communications; and has the required cargo capacity and fast cargo loading/unloading.  Coupled with its ability to transport the F-35 power module inside its cargo bay, CMV-22B is the ideal choice to provide required carrier on-board delivery capabilities for F-35C operations at sea. The delivery marks a milestone in the integration of CMV-22B to the Carrier Air Wing, validates the F135 modular maintenance concept at sea, and most importantly supports future carrier air wing deployments with next-generation platforms.  

“The CMV-22B is a great addition to the carrier air wing,” said Capt. Matt Thrasher, commander, CVW-2. “The Osprey is a robust logistical platform that not only supports the F-35C but also gives the entire air wing increased range and transport capacity. Its addition to our team ensures that CVW-2 remains ready to perform as-advertised while on deployment.”

CVW-2 is currently embarked aboard Vinson under the command of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 1.

 CVW-2 is leading the charge in introducing and integrating the next generation of aircraft and capabilities in the Fleet as the U.S. Navy’s first Carrier Air Wing to deploy with the F-35C Lightning II, E-2D Hawkeye and the CMV-22B Osprey. The Navy’s next iteration of the Carrier Air Wing will be more lethal and survivable through the integration of organic fourth-generation kinematics and fifth-generation information and survivability, increased command and control and airborne electronic attack capacity, all sustained with a reliable logistical support platform.

“With the addition of the newest fifth-generation aircraft, the Navy has delivered the world’s most capable, lethal and ready air wing to our strike group,” said Rear Adm. Timothy J. Kott, commander, CSG-1. “Delivering the right balance of presence and power, including airpower supremacy, strike groups continue to be one of our nation’s primary on-call assets in times of need.  By maintaining a lethal, ready strike group, manned by the world’s most skilled Sailors and outfitted with the best equipment, fifth generation aircraft will help America maintain our advantage at sea and protect our nation for years to come.”

Capable of embarking both the F-35C and the CMV-22B, Vinson is the first aircraft carrier equipped to support fifth-generation aircraft.  With its recent modifications, no other weapons system has the responsiveness, endurance, multi-dimensional might, inherent battlespace awareness or command and control capabilities of the Vinson and CVW-2.   

Upgrades included enhanced jet blast deflectors able to take the increased heat generated by the F-35C and the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), the new computer network that supports the unique maintenance and tactical operations functions of the advanced aircraft. 

“Our crews and staffs have done a fantastic job during integrated operations with the new aircraft and associated upgrades,” said Capt. P. Scott Miller, Vinson’s commanding officer.  “We are truly a team.  The successful replenishment of the power module is another testament to that team and our Sailors, who are the most dedicated, best trained and well educated in the world.  The continued professionalism and warfighter spirit they demonstrate each and every day is the number one key to our success time and time again.”

Vinson is currently completing a series of “work ups” and certifications in preparation for future operational tasking.

But the image of the CMV-22B delivering the engine module for the F-35C onboard the Vinson does not reflect the effort to get to this point in preparing the air wing of the future or my preferred term the integratable air wing for the arrival of both the F-35 and the Osprey onboard the next phase of the large deck carrier’s transformation.

The coming of the F-35 to the carrier is part of the enhanced reach of the carrier; the coming of the Navy’s version of the Osprey is part of reshaping the logistics capabilities which the DMO logistics support for the fleet entails. Cross-decking will be a key part of both re-imaging how the large deck carrier and the amphibious fleet can provide for the evolution of sea-basing.[1]

The Navy’s logistics air arm which the CMV-22B is transforming will certainly be able to work across decks in the fleet. This is clearly not something which the legacy aircraft for the logistics mission, the C-2A, could not do.

For example, in the Black Widow exercise last Fall held by Second Fleet, the USS Wasp was part of the USW force. It operated Romeos off of its deck. If did so in a combat situation, those helicopters could be joined with the Link-16 and full motion capable Viper attack helicopter to provide for ship defense. Those aircraft – the Romeos and Vipers – when getting low on the appropriate weapons could be resupplied by an MSC ship, but if not available or not able to provide the appropriate weapons in a timely fashion – could have a CMV-22B land onboard to provide such a capability from a North Atlantic base, from a large deck carrier, or from some other capable ship. The point is rather simple – the CMV-22B could land and load from all of those decks or locations; the C-2A cannot.[2]

Recently, I had a chance to discuss the training and preparation for the effort seen in the above photo with Captain Dewon “Chainsaw” Chaney, the Commander of COMVRMWING (or Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing). We last met at North Island Air Station in San Diego early last summer. Since that time the original squadron VRM-30 has been joined by the second squadron, VRM-50. The squadrons now have six CMV-22Bs.

The command has stood up a training facility for the load ins and load outs onto the CMV-22Bs. According to Captain Chaney: “We were loaned some cargo containers from HMX-1 to do load outs from both a C-130 and a C-40 to train for maximum operational flexibility for the detachments. We did not want to work simply with the cargo containers for the C-130 but with the C-40 as well to ensure that we have greater flexibility. Instead of ISU-90s which work with C-130s, we have the ISU-50s which work with the C-40s and C-130s. We have three dets worth of ISU-50s at the base so we can work with both aircraft.”

Captain Chaney had shown me the MV-22 fuselage at the base during my June 2020 visit which they used as a cargo trainer. They have since moved that fuselage from the VRM-30 hangar to a temporary tent facility where they do the training. This allows the operators to train without having to do so on an operational aircraft which reduces the risk which training poses to such an aircraft.  The tent facility is being replaced by a permanent building to house the cargo load trainer. This project is already funded.

According to Captain Chaney: “With the power module mockup, we have a dummy slide for that mockup, as well as cargo containers which we can use to train the aircrewmen to load the aircraft without the threat of damaging an actual CMV.  This allows the squadrons to work through the crawl/walk/run aspects of training for the load out process both in terms of putting the power module and cargo onto the aircraft and taking it off that aircraft.”

Because there are not many non-RFI power modules available to use for training, the team built a module that is the same shape and weight of an actual power module. An RFI part means that it is ready for issue. It is working; you can take it out of a box and use. A non-RFI means that it is not ready for issue, or it is not ready to be used. Eventually, they were able to obtain a non-RFI power module as well.

This meant that with their mock-up or with the non-RFI power module, they could shape a training cycle to learn how best to load in and load out the F-35 power module onto the aircraft in support of the mission. In my words, the team was shaping the kind of muscle memory crucial to be able to do that when they would fly to the USS Carl Vinson.

Members of the Vinson logistics team have worked with the team at North Island San Diego to prepare for the February 2021 engagement of VRM-30 onboard the ship as well. As the deployment of the F-35 detachment onboard the USS Carl Vinson is scheduled for this year, obviously, the CMV-22B team needs to be ready to support the new aircraft onboard the first large deck carrier which will deploy it. Next up is the USS Abraham Lincoln. There is a demand side of CMV-22B squadron preparation driven by the arrival of modified large deck carriers operating the F-35C.

The flight simulator will be coming soon to North Island as well. This will obviously provide a significant boost to shaping Navy core competencies to operate the new aircraft in support of Navy logistical operations as well.

This means that the large deck carrier will be operating two new aircraft which are working together to deliver a new combat capability for the fleet. Much like the F-35s onboard large deck carriers are expanding the reach of the carrier air wings operating within the fleet, the CMV-22Bs can do so by the potential of providing logistical support for DMO operations as well.

[1] For example, see several of the interviews which I conducted last year and are highlighted in my book Training for the High-End Fight (2021).

[2] For a discussion of the role of the USS WASP in the 2020 Black Widow exercise, see the following: Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, “21st Century USW: A Kill Web Team Sport,” Second Line of Defense (March 28, 2021).

Also, please read the following U.S. Navy story:

USS Carl Vinson Conducts First CMV-22B Osprey Medevac Exercise

Sailors assigned to Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) Two conducted the Navy’s first medical evacuation (medevac) exercise utilizing the CMV-22B Osprey, Feb. 22.

During the evolution, a simulated patient was transported by the ship’s medical team to a CMV-22B Osprey from the “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30.

Lt. Andrew Nop, Vinson’s nurse, supervised the medevac exercise and said the event further highlighted the CMV-22B’s capabilities in support of mission readiness. He said the aircraft affords providers additional options to care for patients.

“It was very exciting,” said Nop. “Being the first carrier to perform an Osprey [CMV-22B] medevac exercise came with many lessons learned and a new way forward in carrier medicine. We can only get better from here.”

Ospreys have been flown by the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force since 2007. Medevac operations and exercises have been flown over land with Ospreys before, but this marks the first medevac exercise of a Navy CMV-22B on an aircraft carrier.

Medevacs ensure fast and efficient movement of patients while also enabling medical personnel to simultaneously care for patients en route. Seconds can make all the difference in a patient’s condition while transporting them from sea to shore for additional medical assistance.

Lt. Damico R. Hill, CVW-2 aerospace physician’s assistant, participated in the exercise and said the Osprey can transport more patients at one time, an advantage over helicopters if the ship should ever encounter multiple patients who need simultaneous evacuation.

“This is a huge game-changer and will allow for better transport of patients if there is a mass casualty,” said Hill. “I’d say it was a huge success.”

Hospitalman Camryn Scott, assigned to Vinson’s medical department, said the exercise provided medical personnel the opportunity to learn about the Osprey’s capabilities.

“I was extremely lucky to be included in this exercise,” said Scott. “Hopefully we never need to do this for real, but if we do, I know our team will be ready.”

The CMV-22B Osprey is a tiltrotor aircraft with vertical takeoff and landing capabilities designed to combine the adaptability of a helicopter with the range and speed of fixed-wing aircraft. This allows it to reach farther distances than the average helicopter while also taking off and landing in more restrictive zones than the previous method of carrier onboard delivery with the C-2 Greyhound.

03.29.2021

Story by Petty Officer 3rd Class Aaron Smith 

USS Carl Vinson

Training with Romanian Forces

04/05/2021

Sgt. 1st Class Derek Baker, combat medic, 432 Civil Affairs Battalion and Spc. Logan Rutledge, combat medic, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division reflect on a combat lifesaver course given to Romanian Armed Forces here Feb 4.

Exchanging lifesaving knowledge and skills enhances interoperability between the two allies and increases readiness within combat environments.

BUCHAREST, ROMANIA

02.04.2021

Video by Spc. Jabari Clyburn

319th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

The Alliance Aspect of Shaping the New Second Fleet: The Role of CJOS COE

04/04/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

When 2nd Fleet was stood up in 2018, it was not the case of it being re-established. It was an older name but was being stood up in a new historical and military context. It was being stood up in the context of the rise of 21st century authoritarian challengers, an Alliance being reworked in the wake of the Crimean events in 2014, and in the context of shift from the land wars to reshaping the force to deal with those challengers.

It was also being shaped as new military capabilities were being generated both on the blue and red sides of the equation. It is a command which can leverage the practical capabilities which fifth generation aircraft operating in the UK and the Nordics can deliver as well.

It is an incubator of change with VADM Lewis as the dual hatted commander of 2nd Fleet and Allied Joint Forces Command Norfolk. But there is a third key element of the effort as well, and the three taken together are operating as an incubator for change in reworking a distributed integrated maritime command shaping 360-degree combat capabilities from the sea.

According to the Centre’s website:

The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) was established in May 2006. Representing 13 nations, CJOS is the only Centre of Excellence in the United States, and one of 27 NATO accredited Centres worldwide, representing a collective wealth of international experience, expertise, and best practices.

Independent of the NATO Command structure, CJOS COE draws on the knowledge and capabilities of sponsoring nations, United States Fleet Forces, United States SECOND Fleet, and neighboring U.S. commands to promote “best practices” within the Alliance. CJOS COE also plays a key role in aiding NATO’s transformational goals, specifically those focused on maritime-based joint operations. We enjoy close cooperation with Allied Command Transformation (ACT), Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), other NATO commands, maritime COEs, and national commands.

Comprised of 30 permanent staff and 20 U.S. Navy reservists, CJOS COE is highly flexible and responsive to its customers’ needs. The Centre cooperates, whenever possible, with industry and academia to ensure a comprehensive approach to the development of concept and doctrine.

But the story is even more interesting than this description provides. For the Centre continued to exist while 2nd Fleet did not. And in that period of time between its stand down in 2011 and its standup again in 2018. The Centre worked hard to shape the reworking of how maritime operations NATO wide contribute to Atlantic defense and, in the wake of the events of 2014, focused on the coming reset of North Atlantic maritime operations. When Admiral Lewis came, he understood how important what the Centre was doing was to the core operations of 2nd Fleet itself, not just in terms of managing a NATO effort, but the kind of distributed integrated force which needs to be shaped to deal with the new strategic environment.

The importance of shaping the kind of C2 that could fully leverage new capabilities like fifth generation aircraft where the allies are key players. Combining the new Queen Elizabeth carriers, the P-8 enterprise operating with the ever-improving F-35 enterprise while preparing for the coming of the new Ford class carriers, all are in synergistic support of the U.S. Navy’s shift to fighting as a fleet and is a huge strategic move for U.S. and Allies to fight and win at sea.

This is a significant shift, and one which requires leveraging all assets because it is clear that the Sea Centre of Excellence indeed provides a significant strategic contribution filtered through leadership with extensive well-earned tactical sea service.

Ed Timperlake had a chance to interview the Deputy Director of the Centre, Commodore Tom Guy from the Royal Navy on March 5, 2021.  Guy comes from the Surface Warfare Community and has significant experience with the Royal Navy and in operating in coalition operations as well.

During the interview, he underscored that 2nd Fleet was focused on its role as a coalition and joint command and control force; Vice Admiral Lewis has focused from the outset on distributed command and control and shaping the command as a warfighting instrument. This was simply not going to happen unless the U.S. Navy becomes much more part of the European NATO navies, and to work more effectively as an integrated force.

As Commodore Guy put it throughout the discussion, they were supporting the 2nd Fleet’s mission of being able to more effectively fight tonight. To do so means, finding ways for the U.S. and the allies to integrate the current capabilities more effectively. And this requires in many cases, relatively low technology solutions, but requires ensuring that NATO C2 systems are compatible with U.S. ships and for U.S. Navy training exercises to encompass C2 with European NATO navies.

As Commodore Guy put it: “In Second Fleet terms, we very focused on the practical C2 aspects, notably making sure that US Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups are familiar with NATO tactics. We are focused, for example, on working with CSG-4 to ensure that NATO familiarity is built into their training approach. And we work on the reverse as well with European NATO navies ensuringfamiliarity with U.S. Navy procedures.”

He added: “We are far from being alliance navies being completely integrated, and we are focused on the low hanging fruit. Some of this is about technology; some of it is about different operational cultures. Vice Admiral Lewis has been focused on having NATO C2 installed on U.S. Navy ships and upon shaping exercises and training whereby the operational cultural differences are attenuated. We must ensure that Second Fleet has what it needs to be the most effective multinational maritime component command it can be, on Day Zero.”

To make a very important point on a Fight Tonight Command Fleet attitude,- the Center of Excellence effort is near to mid-term. In other words, it is very much “the art of the possible,”  leveraging the practical near-term can greatly inform discussions for insightful longer-range planning for future maritime operations.

Commodore Guy underscored that getting that paradigm right allows for future iterations of combat technology to be worked in a more integrated manner going forward.  Here the Centre plays a key supporting role to Allied Command Transformation, which is also located in the Norfolk area.

Because the foreign military community in Norfolk is very up close and in a practical sense a place where folks know one another and thus allows for a significant cross fertilization between the Centre’s role in support of 2nd Fleet with ACT’s longer term thinking as well As Commodore Guy put it: “We need the second fleet staff to innately to have the understanding about what it takes to integrate with a UK or French or Italian carrier strike group.

Clearly, this is a work in progress. This one where culture and technology need to be worked interactively to shape a more effective inter-allied force. The recent experience of the Marines operating with the Brits of the Queen Elizabeth in the Atlantic certainly is photo op of a keyway ahead in shaping such a force.  As one British naval officer involved in the effort put it to us: “The Marines and Brits using the same aircraft thinking as a wolfpack is a significant step forward towards advanced integration.”

Appendix

This story by C2F published on October 1, 2020 highlighted the transfer of directorship of Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) to C2F.

Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE), a NATO-accredited, multi-national military think tank, transferred directorship from the deputy commander of U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) Command to commander, U.S.  2ndFleet (C2F), Oct. 1.

The transition from Vice Adm. Dave Kriete, deputy commander, USFF, to Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, who is commander, C2F, and dual-hatted as commander, Joint Forces Command Norfolk, will strengthen the relationship between CJOS COE and C2F, and build upon previously established networks at USFF.

Established in May 2006, CJOS COE represents 13 nations and is the only COE in the U.S. As one of 26 NATO-accredited centers worldwide, they represent a collective wealth of international experience, expertise, and best practices, critical to operations in the North Atlantic.

“By linking C2F, JFC Norfolk, and now CJOS COE, national and NATO commands will further align, catalyzing the development of modern warfighting capabilities in the North Atlantic, and increasing readiness across the joint force,” said Lewis. “We must be postured to respond to existing multi-domain threats tonight, yet make urgent efforts to adapt now to the new challenges of the security environment of tomorrow.”

The realignment comes shortly after Joint Force Command Norfolk’s initial operational capability ceremony on Sep. 17.

“The important partnership between the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) and the United States Fleet Forces Command has been superb,” said Kriete. “This key relationship will continue between CJOS COE and C2F and help ensure maritime security in the Atlantic.”

U.S. 2nd Fleet, reestablished in 2018 in response to the changing global security environment, develops and employs maritime forces ready to fight across multiple domains in the Atlantic and Arctic in order to ensure access, deter aggression and defend U.S., allied, and partner interests.

“This more direct relationship between CJOS and C2F will enhance allied interoperability and further expand on CJOS COE’s connections with U.S. commands assigned to train, operate, and deploy with NATO maritime forces, said Commodore Tom Guy, Royal Navy, deputy director of CJOS COE. “It is a logical and really welcome step as we collectively work to maintain our warfighting edge in the North Atlantic.”

In his introduction to the 2021 CJOS COE publication on Cutting the Bow Wave, Vice Admiral Lewis highlighted how he saw the importance of the Centre to his command’s efforts:

2020 has seen sweeping challenges to international relations across the globe. Even to the layman, it is obvious that we are not operating in the same security environment as we were at the start of the 21st century; we now face the reality of multiple near peer competitors operating across multiple spectrums of instruments of power.

The North Atlantic is a more contested and complex space, and more than ever we need to ensure alignment and cohesion within and across NATO’s maritime domains. As NATO continues to evolve to maintain its strategic advantage, there has been an evolution here too, and a subtle shift in emphasis, with the Directorship of CJOS COE being aligned with the Command of US SECOND Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk.

While CJOS will continue providing the support to the Alliance as it always has, under the direction of its Sponsor Nations, this shift helps to better align missions and their interconnectedness. I am really excited about the positive effect this will have on improving allied maritime interoperability across the North Atlantic, while linking the really valuable forward-looking conceptual work that CJOS does with operational and tactical maritime commanders.

CJOS brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise, from providing practical advice and education to support Allies working together effectively in the maritime domain now, to thinking about how we harness unmanned systems and artificial intelligence in the future maritime battle-space.

With our ambitious program of work for 2021, we will continue to drive Alliance maritime warfare development, and specifically support SECOND Fleet and JFC Norfolk in their deterrence and defense missions. This alignment effort must move the yardsticks not only on interoperability but bring more effort on integration, interchangeability and resilience at a level that provides “reflexive responsiveness” to any challenge presented by our adversaries. I am committed to developing these themes through a networked approach.

In his introduction to the same document, Commodore Guy highlighted the importance of working the low hanging fruit with record to integratability across the NATO navies:

As our Director has outlined, security challenges abound, and CJOS COE is firmly focused on supporting NATO in maintaining the edge in the maritime domain.

But whilst our focus is on the maritime domain, ‘multi-domain’ and ‘cross-domain’ thinking is coming increasingly to the force, and the commanders of the future will be ‘domain agnostic’ as they grapple with ever increasing amounts of information, sorted and delivered by rapidly advancing technology.

They will wield weapons with levels of range and precision that stretch the boundaries of areas of interest, both geographically and conceptually. Notwithstanding the increasing porosity of domain boundaries, as Allied Command Transformation (ACT) defines its warfare development priorities for the coming decades, and Allied Command Operations (ACO) refines its deterrence strategy, CJOS COE’s work in support of both of those is focused on those factors affecting operations over, on, under and from the sea.

As SACEUR, General Tod Wolters, notes in his foreword to John Andreas Olsen’s excellent ‘Future NATO’ Whitehall Paper, NATO needs to be challenged, conceptually and intellectually: “We must replace old ideas with new thinking.” You will see in this edition some of our new thinking on the implications of developments in hypersonics, big data and cyber interoperability.

However, our focus is not solely technical; geopolitics, strategy and command and control are also key factors in how warfare develops, and the reader will find thoughts on strategic developments in and beyond NATO’s traditional area of responsibility, from the Black Sea to the Baltic to the High North and the Far East.

From a practical perspective, we have an equally vital discussion on future sea-basing and sustaining maritime operations, and the necessary interoperability basics to keep the Alliance effective at sea and from the sea.

2021-Bow-Wave

For an e-book version of the document, see below:

We also discussed NATO’s Digital Ocean initiative, which will allow expanded capabilities for NATO navies to operate a distributed integrated fleet.

As Keit Pentus-Rosimannus and Michael D. Brasseu wrote in an Atlantic Council article published on August 19, 2020:

NATO is well-positioned to lead this new era of innovation. With its thirty Allies and over one trillion dollars in annual defense expenditures dedicated to the collective defense of their nearly one billion citizens, NATO is the largest and most powerful military alliance on the planet. The Alliance is uniquely situated at this nexus of security and environment. 

Perhaps the best illustration of this nexus is NATO’s maritime domain. The seas remain essential for global trade, with 90 percent of the world’s trade conducted by sea. And additional trade routes are opening in the Artic due to climate change and exposing NATO’s northern flank to Russian and Chinese fleets. Furthermore, the global digital economy runs on cables on the ocean’s floor.  It is the sea that connects us all, powers the global economy, and is primed for innovation. 

NATO could lead this innovation, by bringing together key stakeholders across government, academia, and industry to create a ‘digital ocean’ and exploit enormous swaths of data with artificial intelligence-enhanced tools to predict weather patterns, get early warning of appearing changes and risks, ensure the free flow of trade, and keep a close eye on migration patterns and a potential adversary’s ships and submarines. And it could be done in a sustainable carbon-neutral manner by leveraging the “Blue Tech” revolution currently underway.

Innovators across Europe and North America continue to design and build a diverse array of maritime surface and subsurface drones. Many of these maritime drones are propelled by wind, wave, and solar energy and carry sensors that can collect data critical to unlocking the yet untapped potential of the ocean.  

If NATO Allies could stich these drones together in a secure digital network, it could essentially create an ‘Internet of Things’ for the ocean, a ‘digital ocean’ spanning from seafloor to satellite that stretches across millions of square miles.  It is clear no single nation could undertake such an effort on their own, nor would they achieve the synergistic network effects an alliance like NATO offers, when such an effort is undertaken in a coherent manner.

There are significant fiscal benefits as well, as maritime drones greatly enhance the capabilities of ships, submarines, and other platforms at a fraction of the cost. These savings would be magnified by the fact that the digital ocean would be powered by free and sustainable energy sources like wind, wave, and solar.

The digital ocean will drive the ocean economy which is now $2.5 trillion a year. It has the potential to bring in new solutions and to use the tech change megatrend for the benefit of all—to create a more sustainable planet as well as robust economic driver through applications such as offshore wind, sustainable aquaculture, and carbon sequestration through growing food crops like seaweed.

 Commodore Guy provided a very helpful perspective with regard to the way ahead for maritime autonomous systems for NATO Navies:

“Recently, we have focused more on maritime unmanned systems and their operational integration into NATO navies. These remote sensors can provide for a contribution, but they too need to fit into the shift to mission command. We focus on mission command because the kind of connectivity used in the land wars have allowed for very hierarchical C2; contested operations in the North Atlantic requires a different approach, a mission command approach empowering a distributed force. Maritime autonomous systems can be part of that; they are not a substitute for that.”

For a look at the Maritime Unmanned Systems Innovation and Coordination Cell within NATO, see the following:

https://nato.usmission.gov/press-release-the-maritime-unmanned-systems-innovation-and-coordination-cell-music2-announces-the-formation-of-the-mus-innovation-advisory-board/

Commodore Tom Guy Royal Navy Deputy Director, Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence

Tom Guy is fortunate to have enjoyed a broad range of rewarding operational, staff and command roles ashore and afloat from the UK to the Far East. Early appointments included a wide variety of ships, from patrol craft to mine-hunters, frigates, destroyers and aircraft carriers, ranging from fishery protection to counter-piracy and UN embargo operations as well as training and operating with a broad range of NATO allies. Having trained as a navigator and diving officer early on, Tom specialised as an anti-submarine warfare officer and then a Group Warfare Officer. He then went on to command HMS Shoreham, a new minehunter out of build, and then HMS Northumberland, fresh out of refit as one of the most advanced anti-submarine warfare frigates in the world. His time as Chief of Staff to the UK’s Commander Amphibious Task Group included the formation of the Response Force Task Group and its deployment on Op ELLAMY (Libya) in 2011 and he later had the great privilege of serving as the Captain Surface Ships (Devonport Flotilla).

Shore appointments have included the Strategy area in the MOD, a secondment to the Cabinet Office, Director of the Royal Naval Division of the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and the role of DACOS Force Generation in Navy Command Headquarters. He has held several Operational Staff appointments, including service in the Headquarters of the Multi National Force Iraq (Baghdad) in 2005. Other operational tours have included the Balkans and the Gulf, both ashore and afloat. In 2016-17 he was the Deputy UK Maritime Component Commander in Bahrain, working alongside the US Fifth Fleet Headquarters. He assumed the role of Deputy Director of the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence in Norfolk, VA, in September 2017.

A graduate of the UK’s Advanced Command and Staff Course and the US Capstone Course, with a Master’s Degree from Kings College, Tom is a Younger Brother of Trinity House and a keen yachtsman (qualified as an Offshore Yachtmaster), as well as being a classic car and bike enthusiast. He is married to Katie who is a sailing instructor and they have two grown up children, both of whom are also keen sailors.

An Update on Naval Group: April 2021

04/01/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – An early French order for a third frigate for defense and intervention helped Naval Group boost competitiveness on its offer of the FDI warship to Greece, executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellet said March 30.

“It is good news for the competitiveness of our shipyards,” he said in a video press conference.

Pommellet was referring to the March 29 announcement by the armed forces minister, Florence Parly, that France was bringing forward the delivery of two FDI warships by a year to 2025.

“I have the pleasure to announce that we will speed up the delivery of the FDI 2 and 3, the frigates Admiral Louzeau and Admiral Castex,” she said at Naval Group’s  shipyard at Lorient, western France. “In this way, we will have three intervention frigates a year earlier than planned.”

Earlier production of a third FDI will help a cost cutting drive, with NG seeking to shed €124 million ($145 million) of costs. Competitiveness could always be improved, Pommellet said, declining to give a value on that French order, reflecting Parly’s withholding that information.

Those second and third FDI vessels will be delivered nine months apart in the first and last quarter of 2025, specialist website Mer et Marine reported. Delivery of the remaining FDI 4 and FDI 5 vessels remained 2027 and 2029.

Delivery of the first FDI, the Admiral Ronarc’h ordered in April 2017, was due in 2024, the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office said in a March 29 statement.

That first FDI had been scheduled for delivery in 2023, but NG had temporarily closed shipyards last year due to the pandemic crisis.

The FDI, bearing a brandname of Belharra, is aimed at the highly competitive export market, seen as necessary for the financial health of the company.

A cut in costs was needed, as Greece had last July found NG’s €2.5 billion offer for two frigates too expensive, business website La Tribune reported March 23.

Naval Group made a fresh offer mid-March of four FDI warships, with the first to be built at Lorient and three in a Greek shipyard, a defense source said. Those frigates would be armed with the MBDA naval cruise missile, a weapon absent from the five-strong order for the French navy.

France has also offered Greece two secondhand frigates from the French navy for free, to bridge the gap until delivery of the first FDI, the source said.

Local Content on Australian Submarines

On the plan to build 12 attack submarines, NG has committed to ensure 60 percent of local content from the Australian supply chain, said Pommellet, with that commitment applying from today and respected “by the end of the program.”

There has been media pressure for a pledge on local content, and that topic was high on the agenda when Pommellet flew to Australia last month for high level talks.

The submarine project pointed up the shift of NG from essentially a French company to becoming a global actor with an Australian industrial base.

There would be significant industrial investment and Australia would be part of the global supply for NG, he said.

NG was already working with local partners, including family owned firms and engineers, to build facilities at Adelaide port, he said, with the Thales Australian unit among the partners.

BAE Systems was also at the harbour, he said, working on its Australian navy frigate.

There will be “no worries” for local content on the submarine project, he said, pointing up the significance of Australian sovereignty.

NG was in negotiation for the next stage in the project, which is basic design and likely to last two to three years, followed by detailed design, and then manufacture, he said. Long-term programs were managed in stages, and it was up to the government to decide it had chosen the right partner as each phase came up. That reflected national sovereignty.

NG’s Australian unit has committed to at least 60 percent local content, created almost 300 jobs, and plans to double its local workforce this year, the company said in a March 23 statement. That recruitment was part of preparation for building a hull qualification section in Adelaide in 2023 and building the first submarine pressure hull in the following year.

More than 120 local firms have registered interest to be tier one capability partners, to build major parts for the boat, the company said. That was in response to announcement of the first local manufacturing package worth almost A$900 million.

Next Generation Aircraft Carrier

The DGA awarded March 19 a two-year contract to NG, Chantiers de l’Atlantique, a commercial shipyard, and TechnicAtome, a nuclear engineering company, to conduct further studies on a next generation aircraft carrier, the procurement office said in a March 29 statement.

The study follows previous preliminary studies which led the president, Emmanuel Macron, to opt for a nuclear powered carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle carrier.

When these studies are completed in 2023, a more detailed, three-year study will follow, to allow industry to make an offer for building the carrier, the DGA said. There will also be a safety study for the nuclear engine.

The aim is to start building the ship in 2025, hold sea trials in 2036, and enter service in 2038, to avoid a capability gap before the Charles de Gaulle is retired from service, the DGA said.

NG has formed a joint venture with Chantiers de l’Atlantique to work on the new carrier, with the former to receive 2/3 of revenue and the latter 1/3, Pommellet said.

That joint venture, named MO PA for aircraft carrier prime contractor, will be 65 percent held by NG and 35 percent by Chantiers de l’Atlantique. That JV company name evoked memories of a previous project, named MO PA 2, which worked on studies for a sister ship to the Charles de Gaulle. That MO PA 2 project was cancelled for lack of funds.

The joint venture aims to be clear on management of the program, with each partner clear on what the partners will manage.

NG will be overall architect, and integrator for combat, navigation and aviation systems, catapults and arresting cables, subsystems for the nuclear boilers, and integration of the boilers into the ship.

Chantiers de l’Atlantique will build the ship and manage major systems such as electric propulsion, living quarters and auxiliary systems.

Financial Hit

A speeded up order for a third frigate for the French navy reflected the need for NG to plug a looming gap for work at Lorient and winning state support.

NG had been waiting for that announcement for some time, Pommellet said

The government holds 62.5 percent of NG, while Thales, an electronics company, holds 35 percent.

The shut down of the yards in the first half last year hit 2020 sales and profit, and  hurt the company’s export drive.

That lock down led to 2020 revenue falling to €3.3 billion from €3.7 billion in the previous year, with a profit margin dropping to 2.6 percent compared to 7.6 percent.

The 2021 target for the profit margin was 7.5 percent of sales, the company said.

The pandemic crisis cut down export prospects, hampered by cancellation of the Euronaval trade show last year and the Paris air show this year, Pommellet said. Trade shows were an important means of pitching directly to prospective clients.

Domestic deals accounted for 70 percent of 2020 sales, with 30 percent from  exports, he said. The 2021 target was 60:40 percent, and Australia was a major  factor.

Pommellet said he took note of business magazine L’Usine Nouvelle challenging the company for withholding a press release on 2020 financial results, which were published in a March 24 interview with La Tribune.

The featured  photo shows the recent visit to Lorient of the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, Naval Group received notification of the order for two FDI frigates by the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA). The acceleration of the FDI program will support the activity of the Naval Group site in Lorient where the frigates are designed and built, also ensuring the preservation of skills.

The two frigates – the second and third in a series of five – will both be delivered in 2025, whereas the original plan was to deliver them every 18 months.
The first FDI, for which construction work began in 2020, is scheduled for delivery in 2024.

The video below was released by Naval Group on March 25, 2021 and highlights their approach to innovation.

Also, see the following:

https://defense.info/defense-decisions/2021/03/australia-moves-ahead-on-their-new-attack-submarine/

Enhancing Coalition Combat Capability: The Role of Joint Force Command, Norfolk

03/31/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The standup of both Second Fleet in 2018 and Joint Force Command, Norfolk in 2019 have had very similar goals: how to enhance the combat capability of the entire allied maritime force in the North Atlantic? From this point of view, these are not two commands under Vice Admiral Lewis, to two interactive commands working a more effective distributed integrated force.

Post-2014, in the wake of the Crimean takeover, the United States and a number of core allied nations, reversed course on the Cold War peace dividend and engagement in the Middle East land wars and began to refocus on the challenges posed by the Russians with the return of direct defense challenges in Europe. And with it the need to rebuild North Atlantic 360-degree sea lines of communication was a key challenge.

This is how Rear Admiral Waddell, the Vice Commander of C2F has put the challenge:

“The old 2nd Fleet was interested in sea lines of communication. But the new 2nd Fleet is focused on strategic lines of communication. This is an all-domain perspective, and not just the convoy missions of past battles of the Atlantic.”

He referred to C2F as the maneuver arm in providing for defense, deterrence and warfighting but as part of a whole of government approach to defending the United States, Canada and NATO allies against threats.

What JFC Norfolk facilitates is more effective coordination of the relevant nation’s responses to the new threat environment and to work ways to forge these efforts into a more integrated approach, one which enhances the lethality, survivability and effectiveness of the fleets involved in North Atlantic defense.

During our visit to Norfolk in March 2021, we had a chance to discuss JFC Norfolk with the head of plans in the command, Rear Admiral Hilaire Ducellier.

He is a very experienced naval officer with service in both the Pacific and the Atlantic/Mediterranean regions. He has commanded three ships throughout his career and the Maritime Operational Center for the Atlantic.

The French Navy is a somewhat unique asset within the European region, as it has operated full spectrum maritime operations throughout the Cold War and after, with carriers, boomers, nuclear attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and has a robust maritime strike missile capability as well. It is both a conventional and nuclear navy with its carriers carrying nuclear qualified Rafale pilots onboard as well.

It is also a navy which operates globally, as the recent operations of a nuclear attack submarine in the Pacific clearly demonstrates.

As Murielle Delaporte recently noted: “Because France has been itself a medium-sized Pacific power for more than two centuries, it feels directly threatened by the growing instability impacting its territories and communities, some of them in risk of vanishing because of climate change and consequent water rising. Strengthening strategic autonomy is also a shared concern, hence the well-known Rafale deal with India and submarine ‘’deal of the century’’ with Australia.

“But military ties between France and its main allies in the Pacific go increasingly way beyond industrial partnerships towards more comprehensive operational relations between not only “like-minded” states, but also comparable military formats.”

The planned new nuclear aircraft carrier underscores how closely the U.S. Navy and the French Navy work together to shape integrated capabilities.

And in a French presentation at the International Fighter Conference, 2020, the role of the fleet in nuclear operations was also raised.

“The only mention of the nuclear dimension was during a discussion about the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and its approach to operations.

“Here the readiness in being during deployment to deliver nuclear strike by onboard Rafales was discussed.

“The French indeed have been the clearest among of the Western nuclear powers on the need for tactical air delivered strike and have continued their work, including modernization of weapons to indeed deliver this capability in their neighborhood as part of their deterrent posture.”

As Pierre Tran has put it with regard to the most recent French defense budget and the nuclear weapons commitment: “The draft budget includes €1 billion of studies to develop the nuclear ballistic missile submarine, and a fourth generation nuclear-tipped, air-to-ground missile, the air-sol nucléaire 4ème génération (ASN4G) to replace the present nuclear-armed cruise missile, dubbed air-sol moyenne portée amélioré (ASMPA).”

And one should note that the training to execute an air delivered tactical nuclear mission, provides pilots with an  overall understanding of a complex strike mission which then carried over into the capabilities to excel at non-nuclear strikes as well.

When one discusses defense in the North Atlantic, it is about full spectrum crisis management with three nuclear powers within the Alliance and the Russians who increasingly under President Putin has built up nuclear capabilities.

Shaping a distributed force provides for more effective capabilities across the spectrum of warfare.

But what a JFC Norfolk allows one to do is to more effectively coordinate national efforts into a coalition capability.

This is what Europeans routinely do, given the need to augment the size of national forces through force collaboration.

And by having JFC Norfolk working closely with the next C2F, the U.S. forces can work through how to have a more coordinated force with allies as part of a more integrated force with both European national and U.S. forces more capable of working together.

Rear Admiral Ducellier highlighted that France is focused on coalition operations with its maritime force throughout the Cold War, into the period up to 2014, and into the post-2014 period. And the new JFC is not replicating what is being done in Naples.

“We are a lean command. You are not going to do with a 150 in our command what you can do with 1,000 in Naples.”

It occurred to us that in learning about C2F and the JFC Norfolk, that keeping it lean and focused on coalition warfighting there is a huge opportunity to leverage the modernization efforts of the United States and the relevant nations to sort through how to make best use of one another’s capabilities, through coalition exercises and cross learning, rather than shaping a large top-down bureaucratic effort.

Rear Admiral Ducellier highlighted that the coalition approach through a connected C2 structure provides for significant flexibility on how the key aspects of the force can work creatively together.

“Rather than characterizing platforms as primarily a supporting or supported capability, we are seeing much more flexibility whereby a platform can play a role as either a supporting or supported capability dependent on the mission.”

Distributed modular task forces can provide redundancy, flexibility, and enhanced survivability for the overall combat fleet.

Clearly, the approaches being pioneered by C2F and JFC Norfolk can provide a significant impact to rethinking C2 and distributed combat capability through coalition integration in the period ahead.

Featured Photo: One of the ships commanded by Rear Admiral Ducellier was the French frigate Tourville which is seen in the featured photo.

Tourville is the lead ship of F67 type large high-sea frigates of the French Marine Nationale. The vessel is specialized in anti-submarine warfare, though it also has anti-air and anti-surface capabilities. She is named after the 17th century admiral Count Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin de Tourville. Between 1994 and 1996, Tourville (and sister ship De Grasse) was refitted with the modern SLAMS anti-submarine system, an active Very Low Frequencies sonar.”

The French certainly are no strangers to the Virginia coast with one of their most famous engagements being in support of the Americans in the Battle of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War.

The sister ship is named for French Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse.

French Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse Tilly arrived in the West Indies with a French fleet in April 1781. He sent word to French General Comte de Rochambeau, in Newport, Rhode Island, that he was under orders to sail his fleet north to assist the French and the American armies. General George Washington hoped to use De Grasse’s fleet and Rochambeau’s army to assist the American army in an attack on the British at New York City.Rochambeau and Washington sent word to De Grasse that his fleet was desperately needed and that any troops and money that De Grasse could bring with the fleet would also be of great help.They suggested that De Grasse come to either New York City which Washington favored; or to the Chesapeake Bay to assist General Lafayette’s American army opposing British General Cornwallis and his army that had recently moved into Virginia; a course of action favored by Rochambeau..

De Grasse decided to bring his fleet to the Chesapeake Bay because of the shorter sailing distance to it and it was more navigable than the New York harbor. In Santo Domingo, on the island of Hispaniola, (Dominican Republic), De Grasse loaded 3000 French troops from the Gatinais, Agenois and Touraine infantry regiments aboard his ships. He also raised 1.2 million livres (worth approximately 6 million US dollars today) in Havana, Cuba from the local government, banks and citizens to assist the American and French armies in America. On August 5, De Grasse set sail with his fleet of 37 ships including 28 ships-of-the-line, (large battleships), 7 frigates and 2 cutters, headed to the Chesapeake Bay. De Grasse took a dangerous route through the straits of the Bahamas to avoid the British fleets of Admiral George Rodney and Admiral Samuel Hood, who were protecting British interests and commerce in the West Indies.

When General Washington received news on August 14 that De Grasse was sailing to the Chesapeake Bay instead of New York, he quickly changed his plan.Four days later he began moving the American and French armies to Yorktown, Virginia to surround Cornwallis’s army that had just two weeks earlier begun setting up a British naval base there, but the success of Washington’s daring plan depended on De Grasses’ fleet controlling the Chesapeake Bay.