Exercise Cape Hope 2021

04/19/2021

Air National Guard Capt Travis Carlson, a KC-135 Stratotanker pilot assigned to the 506th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, details that day’s support to the combat air force large force employment exercise during Exercise Cope North 21, February 18, 2021.

The goal of Cope North 21 is to improve combat readiness, develop integrated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and increase interoperability of U.S. Forces, Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or Koku-Jieitai.

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM

02.18.2021

Video by Master Sgt. Larry Reid Jr.

Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs

The Future of Anglo-French Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit

04/15/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – In the bad old days it was talk of perfidious Albion and Britain as a nation of shopkeepers, while in these times there are those in France who see the UK as strategic ally, a prize military partner despite London playing the Brexit card.

The issue of the UK cooperating with France in building weapons arises as the sceptred isle seeks to be an independent actor on the global stage while seeking close ties with the United States.

Britain and France, beset by the coronavirus crisis, marked Nov. 2 a low key 10th anniversary of the Lancaster House defense cooperation treaty and pushed back the annual Anglo-French summit into 2021.

France and the UK proudly point up close relations, share a martial culture of overseas intervention, cooperate in the field, and are the two European nations with nuclear weapons – the Unholy Grail sought by countries aspiring to be top military players.

The two allies also hold prized permanent seats on the UN security council and nurture their arms industry, seeking to boost capability and seal export deals, while in fierce competition.

Defense ministers, senior officers, officials, and top executives attended Nov. 26 a video defense conference held by the Franco-British Council, an independent organization promoting ties between the two nations. Airbus, European missile maker MBDA, and the two defense ministries backed the virtual gathering.

That event pointed up the need for political clarity in industrial cooperation, deploying the hardest hitting of diplomatic terms: “the relationship is not without challenges.”

Cultural Affairs

On the cultural front, the long awaited March 16 integrated review of British security, defense, development and foreign policy pointed up the value of the BBC as a “soft power” asset. There were raised eyebrows on that positive appraisal as the administration of Boris Johnson, a former journalist, had signalled clear intent to slash funding for the broadcaster.

The review, titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age, refers to France 11 times, Germany   gets seven references, while the UK views the US as its leading strategic ally, said a March 24 report from Institut Montaigne and Fondation pour la Récherche Stratégique.

An April 5 op ed in the afternoon daily Le Monde admonished the Emmanuel Macron government for issuing a new bilingual identity card in French and English, and called for the French regions to pick one of the languages of the other 26 European Union members in place of the language of the Brexit nation.

In business culture, there is a stronger sense of hierarchy and formality in a French office than a British one, said an executive who has worked in France and the UK.

The cross-Channel alliance is generally seen as a plus on the operational side and a minus on  industrial cooperation.

There is perhaps that fabled glass — half empty, half full.

Half Empty

There have been speeches but the reality is there has been little Anglo-French industrial cooperation in weapons in the last 30-40 years, a French defense specialist said.

“There has been more French development of arms programs and industrial cooperation with Germany and Italy,” the specialist said.

No, it is not about perfidious Albion, just that the UK has a very different approach.

“It is very sovereign, pro-European, and pro-American. There are different axes,” the specialist said. France is also tied to sovereignty and the search for prime contractor status.

The latter can be seen in Dassault Aviation seeking clear prime contractorship in the next generation fighter, a key part in the future combat air system backed by France, Germany and Spain. Airbus is on the other side of the negotiating table.

There has been real progress with interdependence in missiles, with centers of excellence shared by the British and French MBDA units, the specialist said. However, there would be deeper cooperation if those British and French companies built the same missiles accounting for half of MBDA’s production.

French and British requirements differ, a second French source said, with the French view  seen on the MMP anti-tank weapon, and the British on the Brimstone air-to-ground missile.

French rules of engagement require the MMP to have opto-electronics to allow the shooter “to look into the eyes” of the target, the second source said, while Brimstone is guided by radar and laser, and does not offer direct optical confirmation.

There is a project under the Lancaster House treaty for a future cruise/anti-ship weapon to replace respectively the Scalp/Storm Shadow, and Exocet and Harpoon missiles.

MBDA awaits a demonstration contract for the FC/ASW, having completed the €100 million ($119 million) concept phase. The Exocet is important for the French navy.

Almost Three Aircraft Carriers

Industrial cooperation was boosted in 2006 with creation of the high level working group, which had British and French ministerial representation, the first specialist said. Denis Ranque, the then Thales executive chairman and his counterpart at BAE Systems sat on that committee.

The then French president Jacques Chirac and then defense minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie were keen for France to acquire an aircraft carrier with the UK, which planned to build two carriers, the specialist said. That was a UK program, with the vessels to be built in British dockyards, not shared with French shipyards.

France and the UK signed 2006 a memorandum of understanding for a carrier project.

Then French elections brought in president Nicolas Sarkozy, who effectively axed in 2008 the  project for a second carrier to sail with the Charles de Gaulle flagship.

Alliot-Marie, keen to acquire a carrier with the UK, had agreed to pay a hefty sum for access to British design studies, the specialist said, while the French defense procurement office  advised a smaller payment.

The French national audit office said in 2014 Paris had paid €214 million ($252 million) for the British studies, with nothing to show for it other than to help fund the UK carrier project.

Back when it looked like three carriers — two British, one French – were to be built, Thales held a press conference, here, pointing up its role in the UK project, including submitting the winning design. That design came from a UK company, BMT, which has the water tanks used to develop the bouncing bomb flown by the Dambusters in the second world war.

Later, the then prime minister, David Cameron, switched from a catapult deck to a ski-lift design for the Queen Elizabeth carrier, to avoid a fiscal attack on the budget. The ski-lift deck was fine for the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing fighter, but French media highlighted the denial of catapult and arrestor gear for the French Navy’s Rafale jet fighter.

That choice of ski lift deck denied closer ties between the two fleet air arms.

Initially, there was significant cooperation after the Lancaster House agreement, but governments change and commitment ebbs away, the specialist said. Politics is people.

“People matter,” the specialist said.

On the French side and on a smaller scale, Paris opted for a Safran Patroller unmanned aerial vehicle rather than acquire the Watchkeeper from the Thales UK unit. That French order for a French UAV unwound a prospective swap deal for the UK to order a French infantry fighting vehicle, the VBCI, from Nexter and Arquus.

There was higher French content – and French jobs – on the Patroller than the Watchkeeper, and the labor factor was seen as winning votes when elections rolled around.

Enter Brexit

In 2016, Cameron announced the result of a divisive referendum on Britain and its membership of the European Union: leave. National sovereignty won the day.

Cameron, a former public relations executive for a TV company, had held that referendum to buy quiet from a clutch of anti-EU parliamentarians in the Conservative party.

Soon after, Britain put on hold and then cancelled a €2 billion project with France for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed future combat air system demonstration program.

In 2017, president Emmanuel Macron and chancellor Angela Merkel surprised the world with a plan for a new Franco-German fighter jet to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.

Airbus and Dassault teamed up to lead the industrial effort, and Spain joined the partnership

And in 2018, Britain announced at the Farnborough air show its Tempest fighter project, as part of a future combat air system. Italy and Sweden signed on as partners.

Perhaps there were budgetary reasons for the UK baling out of the UCAV project, maybe other priorities, perhaps Brexit, Dassault executive chairman Eric Trappier said back then. Perhaps British documents will show the reasons for dropping the UCAV project when they are declassified under the 30-year ruling.

Back in the 1990s, Dassault and BAE Systems announced plans for a joint venture for a prospective fighter jet, but Britain and France failed to green light that project. The UCAV project revived prospects of cooperation.

But it was not to be.

Cameron had been keen in 2010-11 to pursue the UCAV, which had “morphed” from a concept for a large unmanned aerial vehicle to replace the Reaper, a UK source said. The defense ministries had shown less enthusiasm.

There was back then tension between BAE and Dassault, which were “jealous” to protect  intellectual property and were reluctant to share stealth technology, the UK source said. There had been industrial resistance before the political change of direction.

Cameron resigned after announcing the Brexit leave result. Perhaps government pressure to pursue the UCAV might have continued had he stayed on, the UK source said. But with his departure there was little political support for the project.

Meanwhile, the UK forged ahead as the sole foreign nation on tier 1 partnership on the Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter, holding a 15 percent share of an estimated $100 billion program to build some 3,000 units.

The Dambusters 617 squadron received the first four F-35Bs in 2018.

Half Full

“Basically, nothing has changed,” a third French specialist said, referring to cooperation after Brexit. Britain and France share the same “strategic culture” based on force projection.

Both nations have nuclear capable navies, and France also has an airborne nuclear wing.

Britain also is close to the US, including nuclear weapons, the third specialist said.

France has basically three options on the future combat air system: continue cooperation with Germany, France goes it alone, or France teams up with the UK.

The two FCAS projects were still in the early stages. France and the UK had room for maneuver, and could take a modular approach on the aircraft, the specialist said. France and the UK had cooperated in the past, with the Concorde supersonic airliner and Jaguar fighter.

On the operational front, Britain and France have formed the combined joint expeditionary force for overseas projection, the specialist said, while Germany is essentially a “European power,” although there is German transport support for the French forces in Mali.

The UK seeks to project a presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Britain has boosted its special forces and has a key role on the Nato north flank in the North Sea.

France pursues Indo-Pacific projection and is present in Africa with the Barkhane mission.

“There is a sharing out of roles,” the specialist said.

A French account of the 1982 conflict over the Falkland Islands in the south Atlantic, La Guerre des Malouines (Docavia) by Charles Maisonneuve and Pierre Razoux, noted how the French trained British Harrier pilots on how to deal with the Super Etendard fighter jet and Exocet missile, as the Invincible and Hermes carriers led a task force to take on the Argentine forces. The French had previously trained the Argentine pilots.

The Sunday Times reported in 1982 a Dassault team in Argentina fixed a technical hitch on three of the five Exocets, allowing the missiles to hit the Sheffield destroyer and Atlantic Conveyor transport ship.

On the operational upside, there is close cooperation between British and French services. The combined joint expeditionary force is fully operational, the UK defense ministry said Nov. 2, with paratroopers of both nations training in the Wessex Storm exercise on Salisbury Plain, southern Britain. The CJEF is capable of deploying 10,000 personnel overseas, and there are plans to increase interoperability of future equipment, logistics, engineering, medical and energy systems.

The Queen Elizabeth carrier will sail with the Charles de Gaulle this year.

The UK defense minister, Ben Wallace, told the Franco-British Council the two carriers fulfilled a Lancaster House ambition of deploying a UK-French integrated strike capability: “proof that, in this more unstable and uncertain world, our nations will continue to keep the flame of freedom burning.”

The British supported the French in Mali with a C-17 heavy transport plane and Chinook transport helicopters, while declining to deploy troops to reinforce the Barkhane mission.

Besides the FC/ASW missile, the other Lancaster House project concerns maritime mine counter measures, a prototype for an underwater autonomous system against mines.

There has been for some years a 40 mm gun from CTA International, a joint venture between BAE and Nexter.

Could Do Better

The military cooperation is noted on both the French and British side, but there is a sense of missed opportunity on the industrial front.

“What is fascinating with Anglo-French collaboration is that the two countries are politically ready for expeditionary action,” said François Lureau of EuroFLconsult and a former head of French arms procurement.

“There is a strong mutual respect between the forces and two large defense industries covering the full spectrum of technologies and systems,” he said. “But the overall outcome does not match the promising potential.”

That sense of underachievement is shared by Peter Ricketts, former UK ambassador to France, who retired in 2016. He is strategic adviser to Lockheed Martin UK.

There has been a real loss of momentum on industrial cooperation since Brexit, with a lack of projects in the pipeline, he told the Anglo-American Press Association in a video discussion on April 7.

“A hit clearly from Brexit,” he said. The enthusiasm from Lancaster House has largely evaporated.

“What I notice is there are no new projects since our (Lancaster House) list in 2010,” he said. “We have not seen a new flagship UK-French project that will take us forward for the next decade. In a way we have seen the reverse.

“We have seen projects falling away, such as the future combat aircraft.”

The economics argue for pooling the two European FCAS projects, he said.

“The development costs of a new generation aircraft – more capable and more advanced than the F-35 – are so huge and the market so small, there will be pressure for Britain and its Italian and Swedish partners to join forces with France, Germany and Spain,” he said.

“I think the pressure over time will probably tie these two projects together,” he said. Development cost would be so high, it made sense to spread expense across a wider group of countries. It was not clear how and when that would happen, and in what industrial consortium.

“Fast jets are symbols of a country’s technical powers and symbols of sovereignty,” he said. The corollary is that when politicians change, priorities change.

Meanwhile, France is pursuing European strategic autonomy and cooperating with Germany.

The budget for the FCAS project backed by France, German and Spain could rise to €80 billion, a July 2020 French senate report said.

Two Positives

On the cooperative side, Britain is working “in one of the most sensitive areas,” namely checking nuclear warheads at the French facilities at Valduc, eastern France, as the UK lacks its own capability, Ricketts said.  The British “pooled their requirements and put faith in French facilities for 50 years, however bad the relationship gets.”

The importance of close operational ties was clear, he said.

“If the French wanted a European country with them in a serious crisis at short notice, there is only one country that could supply serious capacity — that is the Brits through the CJEF,” he said. “That is a success, that is full operational capability.”

“For Paris, two things are important: a large convergence of points of view and the British determination for a close and stable cooperation in foreign policy and security,” the Institut Montaigne and FRS report on the UK integrated review said.

“France also hopes the UK’s international ambitions will not be detrimental to closer cooperation with the European Union’s foreign policy.”

The UK is like France, seeking to be an  enterprising world power, and considers itself a guarantor for European security, the FRS report said.

“France is forever grateful” to Britain, the French ambassador to the UK, Catherine Colonna said Nov. 2 in Revue de la Defense. Macron awarded last year London the Légion d’Honneur, the highest order of merit, as a sign of that gratitude.

Britain gave shelter to the then general Charles de Gaulle and the Free French Forces in the second world war during the Nazis occupation of France.

De Gaulle made his call to arms on June 18 1940, broadcast to France by the BBC.

Also, see the following:

The 10th Anniversary of the Lancaster House Agreements: The Future of the Franco-British Defense Relationship

MV-22B And the ITS Cavour: Shaping a Way Ahead

04/14/2021

The Italians have been key players in the F-35 program.

They build the aircraft in Italy and their Air Force is buying both the A and B models.

In an interview conducted during a visit to Rome in 2013, the then head of the Italian Air Force, Lt General Preziosa, highlighted why he saw the Air Force buying Bs:

“We studied the issue carefully and for the kind of missions we face we needed the flexibility which the B can add to the fleet.  We need to go to the mission not the airfield.  We will operate in many areas where there are only short runways; the B allows us to operate in those conditions.

We can mix the fleet and operate at sea on land, on our own ships or own others.  It is the kind of flexibility, which we see as crucial to a 21st century setting.

I will give you an example of what we don’t want.  We planned to operate with the USMC in Afghanistan.  But we were three months later in the deployment than we intended because our Tornados could not operate in the same conditions as the USMC.  We had to take three months to build out the air base from which we would operate with them.

Time is crucial to many of the missions in which we will be engaged.  The Bs give me a more rapid insertion aircraft.”

The B has come to the Italian Navy’s ITS Cavour as it is finishing up its training and certification missions off of the East Coast of the United States.

The B could provide a powerful integrating capability between the Italian Navy and Air Force but cultural barriers remain which need to be dealt with.

In addition to completing its F-35B integration, the ITS Cavour welcomed MV-22Bs onboard their deck as part of training and certification as well.

As David Cenciotti of The Aviationist put it in an article published April 13, 2021:

The Italian Navy has recently declared the successful completion of the “sea trials” for the operational use of the F-35B, the STOVL (Short Take Off Vertical Landing) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter that will replace the service’s AV-8B+ Harrier II jet.

The “Ready for Operation” campaign included various compatibility tests carried out with two specially-instrumented U.S. F-35Bs belonging to VX-23 (Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23) from Naval Air Station Patuxent River (NAS Pax River), Maryland. The “sea trials” lasted four weeks and ended on Mar. 26, 2021, with the return of the carrier to Norfolk.

Interestingly, the Italian Navy’s flagship was also involved in take-off and landing training with a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft…. The interoperability between the platform and the Italian Navy’s flagship is needed to “increase interoperability between the USMC and the Italian Navy, and increase the operational reach of Naval forces for crisis or contingency response or in the event of conflict.”

A tweet from the Italian Navy commented: “This verified the flight deck with the American tactical transport aircraft as part of the Ready for Operations Campaign in the USA, aimed at expanding and strengthening the interoperability and the historic cooperation between the Italy Navy and the USMC.”

 

 

 

 

USS Somerset in Strait of Hormuz

Amphibious transport dock ship USS Somerset (LPD 25), with embarked 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), transit the Strait of Hormuz, Feb. 5.

Somerset, part of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, and the 15th MEU are deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

02.05.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Brendan Mullin

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Next Generation Autonomous Systems: An Australian Perspective

04/13/2021

On April 8, 2021, the Williams Foundation held its latest seminar, one that was originally scheduled for March 2020.

It was an in person conference for Australians, but we will be highlight the seminar in a report on the conference as well as providing presentations as well as interviews with participants.

This is how the seminar was prologued in the run up to the seminar itself.

Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force.  Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which the integrated force will prepare and operate.  Moreover, they have highlighted the challenges of acting independently at an accelerated tempo and in sustained, high intensity, complex Joint operations. 

While COVID-19 prevented the Foundation from hosting any seminars in 2020 the narrative remains.  The 2021 seminars will therefore continue to develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region. 

Following on from the October 2019 seminar titled ‘The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre’, the 2021 series of seminars and lunches will examine:

  • the emerging requirements associated with trusted autonomous systems, and
  • the growing importance of Space as an operating domain. 

In doing so, they will each address how the Australian Defence Force must equip, organise, connect, and prepare for multi-domain operations.  As ever, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation has identified pre-eminent speakers from across the Australian and international defence communities, as well as invited industry representatives to reflect the integral role they will play in the national framework of future operational capability. 

April 2021 Seminar Outline – Next Generation Autonomous Systems

Building upon the existing foundations of Australian Defence Force capability, the aim of the April seminar is to explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy across the enterprise are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry can and will play a major part in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. The importance of industry is reflected in the design of the seminar program and the speakers identified.      

The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance.  Often described as the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions, unmanned systems have now provided the commander with a far broader range of options for the application of force against even the most challenging target sets.  However, ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as the game changer. 

The narrative is now forming across defence which has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto.  The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’.  Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower. 

This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system.  Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. 

The aim of the April 2021 seminar, therefore, will be to promote discussion about the near and far future implications of autonomous systems, and to build an understanding of the potential and the issues which must be considered in the context of the next Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review.  It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service.

The seminar will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment. And finally the seminar will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants.  Each of which are opening new ways of warfighting and creating opportunities to reconceptualise Joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace. 

Below is the handbook distributed to participants at the seminar which highlighted the goals of the seminar and the major presentations as well:

WFNGAS0421HandbookFINAL5April21

For an e-book version of the handbook, see below:

Shaping a 21st Century U.S. Navy: The Perspective from Second Fleet

04/12/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The advantage of visiting two startup commands – C2F and Allied JFC Norfolk – under one Vice Admiral is that one can see how the 21st century navy is being shaped.  We started our March visit by meeting with VADM Lewis’s Chief of Staff for C2F, CAPT Hallock Mohler, who gave us a tour d’horizon of the challenges of setting up the new command and navigating a way ahead.

Captain Mohler is a four-decade U.S. Navy veteran whose significant experience has been crucial in setting up the command. When we asked him which ship was his favorite one on which to serve, his answer came quickly: The USS Wisconsin. Going from a battleship to shaping the newest command in the Navy is definitely an interesting path.

When we visited his office, he was working from an old desk and with no secretary. The command wishes to be lean, and frankly, everything we saw when visiting it, was that the command clearly is focused on driving innovation from the standpoint of having a lean command structure.

We followed up with the visit on-site with a phone interview this month to discuss the startup approach and to look back at his career, as he is retiring from the Navy this month.  He has very significant leadership management experience at all ranks in the U.S. Navy and his experience has been a key part of what he has brought to the process of standing up the new command. Among those assignments: Director of Management at JFC Norfolk, Department of Defence, Executive Security in the office of OSD, and Director for Training and Quality Assurance, Navy Recruiting command.

We started by asking him, how one went about finding the right talent for a new command.

Captain Mohler: “You start by looking for the right people in terms of having vision, and capabilities to shape something new and innovative. What you don’t do is pigeonhole people in terms of this person is a human resources person, this one is a public affairs person, and so on. You are looking for people who have experienced growth and would nurture it in the command. Not every starting quarterback from a college football team can go to the pros and play quarterback in the pros. Sometimes they’re a wide receiver.

“We were given no blueprints. We were given no resources. We were just told to do it. And it’s all about relationship building, and that’s all it is. And we’re not going to know how good we really are until about 20 years from now.

“We have lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and commanders working alongside of officers and enlisted from foreign nations who will take that experience to their next jobs and will build in a capability for foreign officers to work more effectively with us or vice versa.

“And I think that’s really what’s Admiral Lewis’ vision, namely getting the people that have gumption, the people that don’t mind working hard, the people that don’t mind figuring out how to work together to shape new capabilities for the United States and our allies.”

We then asked him to go back to his long career and highlight what he considered major changes which have energized the Navy as an institution. He had pride in his service that recognizes a constant quest for meritocracy is a touchstone for the future.

Captain Mohler: “That it doesn’t matter what color skin you have. You can do anything you have to. It doesn’t matter that you’re a female, male, or what your gender says, or your deers marker says, you can do a job. It doesn’t matter. Sailors can do anything, and the opportunity’ to do so in the Navy is incredible.

A key lesson of leadership is the saying “if you cannot delegate you are dead.”

“But you have to allow for creativity. We have too much micromanaging because of social media and because of electronics, And I think eventually we’re going to get rid of that, and we’re going to start going back to letting people be leaders. The zero-defect accountability on leadership, I think that’s going to go away eventually.”

“And during my Naval career, every command I’ve ever gone through, it’s been a different chapter in my career life book. It’s about ready to close, but it’s not going to close for good because it continues on because I feel like I’m a recruiter for the United States Navy and for the military until I have no more breath.

“I have seen incredible change during my 41-year career. But one thing has not changed – we need to be the best fighting force, and that means shaping a meritocratic force which draws from our innovative society going forward.”