Formidable Shield 2021

05/29/2021

According to a story published by U.S. Sixth Fleet Public Affairs on May 3, 2021, Formidable Shield 2021 is underway.

FERROL, Spain – The Spanish Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105) is this year’s designated flag ship for the execution of Exercise At-Sea Demonstration/Formidable Shield 2021, scheduled to take place May 15 to June 3.

At-Sea Demo/Formidable Shield is a U.S. Sixth Fleet-led exercise, conducted by Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), in which NATO Allies are the participants.

“It’s a wonderful opportunity to show our relationship with the exercise organization and with this big challenge of the ballistic missile defense in Europe,” said Cristóbal Colón Commanding Officer, Cmdr. Juan Bautista Payá. “It’s a really demanding task to be the flag ship, but the Spanish Navy is prepared for that and we are doing our best to embark [U.S. personnel] and to allow you to perform the command and control for the exercise in the best way.”

STRIKFORNATO will provide a maritime battle Staff Operational Command directly to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), delivering a rapidly deployable and scalable headquarters capable of planning and executing full spectrum joint maritime operations and providing command and control of maritime Ballistic Missile Defense, primarily through integration of U.S. Naval forces.

The Spanish Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105) is the 2021 designated flag ship for the execution of Exercise At-Sea Demonstration/Formidable Shield, scheduled to take place May 15 to June 3, 2021. Exercise At-Sea Demo/Formidable Shield improves Allied interoperability in a joint live-fire, Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) environment, using NATO command and control reporting structures.

Commander, Task Force (CTF) 64, Capt. Jon Lipps will lead this year’s exercise as the Commander, Task Group Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD). Lipps addressed the crew after a brief tour of the Cristobal Colon, April 30.

“Like the namesake of this warship, you will lead an international armada at sea that will make history conducting the world’s most complex joint and combined integrated air and missile defense exercise across the Maritimes,” Lipps said. “From below sea level to low earth orbit, you will reinforce the importance of mission command across all domains in high-end warfare. It is truly an honor and a privilege to join you today as we prepare to set out to sea.”

The exercise is designed to improve allied interoperability in a live-fire joint IAMD environment, using NATO command and control reporting structures. Ten nations will participate by sending ships, aircraft, ground assets, and embarked staff in Task Group IAMD, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

“We are really happy about embarking American staff from Sixth Fleet from the U.S. Navy and from Striking and Support Forces NATO from NATO. For us, of course, it’s a good opportunity to show the Spanish ‘will’ to support NATO and this new and demanding challenge of ballistic missile threat,” Payá said.

There will be 15 ships, more than 10 aircraft, and approximately 3,300 personnel participating this year.

Exercise At-Sea Demo/Formidable Shield receives support from U.S. European Command, Missile Defense Agency, the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum (MTMD-F), and Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO-IWS). The exercise is intended to assure Allies, deter adversaries, and demonstrate the commitment to collective defense for the NATO alliance.

Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO, based in Lisbon, Portugal, is a rapidly deployable, maritime headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of warfare areas.

U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with joint, allied and interagency partners, to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

And a NATO press release highlighted the exercise as follows:

The exercise, which takes place May 15 to June 3, 2021, provides the opportunity to demonstrate the ability to conduct land and sea based defence against simultaneous cruise and ballistic missile threats with coordinated command and control.

According to Royal Marines Colonel Andrew Lock, Assistant Chief of Staff Operations at STRIKFORNATO: “At-Sea-Demo/Formidable Shield allows Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) headquarters command and control of a multinational force to provide capable, credible deterrence against aggression. These types of exercises demonstrate our technical and tactical capabilities to defend the Alliance.”

This year, as the command and control node for NATO forces, STRIKFORNATO is conducting the exercise between the ten participating nations as they work together to respond to integrated air and missile defence threats. Serving as the critical link to integrate the complex sea, land, air, and space systems from multiple nations into a task force, the staff is focused on strengthening their ability to share common tactical pictures, share situational awareness, and conduct NATO-level mission planning and engagement coordination.

According to U.S Navy Cmdr. Brett Lefever, Deputy Integrated Missile Defence branch at STRIKFORNATO:  “Several live-fire and simulated engagements against subsonic, supersonic, and ballistic targets demonstrations will take place during the exercise, including the first defensive live-intercept of a ballistic missile using multinational data systems to track the target. The multinational cooperation for a ballistic missile intercept in outer space is truly remarkable and proves the Alliance’s commitment to interoperability and defence.”

To fully support the complex nature of the exercise, STRIKFORNATO responded by standing up a Joint Operations Centre in Oeiras, Portugal and a forward-deployed staff at-sea onboard the Spanish Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105), which is the designated flagship of the Commander, Task Group Integrated Air and Missile Defence, Capt. Jonathan Lipps. Additional personnel support events taking place at the range control stations in the U.K.

STRIKFORNATO is a rapidly deployable headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of the alliance’s fundamental security tasks. As part of that mission, STRIKFORNATO is responsible for integrating U.S. naval and amphibious forces into NATO operations.

U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners, to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

Featured Photo: Boatswain’s Mate 3rd Class Chance Vaughan, from Houston, Texas, directs an MH-60S Seahawk assigned to the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 22 “Sea Knights” off the flight deck of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Carney (DDG 64) during exercise Formidable Shield 19, May 16, 2019. Formidable Shield is designed to improve allied interoperability in a live-fire integrated air and missile defense environment, using NATO command and control reporting structures. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Fred Gray IV/Released)

A Royal Navy story published on May 15, 2021 highlighted their engagement in the exercise.

Three Royal Navy warships today join NATO allies in the world’s largest test of naval air and missile defences.

Played out off Scotland’s Outer Hebrides and Norway’s Arctic coast, the three-week-long Formidable Shield 2021 will test missile systems, sensors, software – and the hundreds of men and women operating them as they demonstrate their ability to deal with the latest aerial threats.

It will see live missile launches as the NATO allies demonstrate their individual and collective ability to track, identify and ultimately destroy incoming threats in the skies, including testing ballistic missile defence.

HMS Dragon leads the Royal Navy’s participation as a dedicated air defence destroyer designed to shield a task group with her Sea Viper missile system.

Using her Sampson radar – the spinning ‘spiked egg’ atop her main mast – the Portsmouth-based warship has the ability to detect and follow a missile’s progress from launch to ‘splash’ (when it is destroyed).

She’s joined by frigates HMS Lancaster and Argyll, whose Sea Ceptor systems also provide shorter range defence against incoming missiles and aircraft.

Both systems will be tested against supersonic high-diving targets plummeting towards the task group at speeds in excess of 12,000mph – 16 times the speed of sound – as well as sea-skimming drones simulating missiles, weaving at high sub-sonic speeds in a bid to outfox the radars tracking them.

The highlight for the Royal Navy will be one of Dragon’s Sea Viper missiles intercepting a Firejet target drone, racing over the Atlantic at more than 400mph but just 20ft above the waves.

Other missiles in the Sea Viper family will be fired by other participants, alongside US-made Sea Sparrow and Standard Missiles 2, against a mix of sub and supersonic drone targets.

Rigorous safety checks and procedures are in place to ensure the ranges are safe and the risk to surrounding areas and other users are negligible.

In addition to testing the weapon systems and sensors, the British ships are also due to test cutting-edge software which is designed to alleviate the burden on the team in the operations room who pore over the display screens constantly looking out for potential threats.

Ten NATO nations – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the UK and USA – have thrown their hats in the ring, committing ships, aircraft, ground assets, and staff.

Led by the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet and using Spanish frigate ESPS Cristóbal Colón as the flagship, in its 2021 iteration – Formidable Shield is staged every two years – the exercise involves 15 ships, more than ten aircraft and in excess of 3,000 personnel.

The exercise is intended to assure allies, deter adversaries, and demonstrate the commitment of NATO to collective defence.

“Delivering integrated air and missile defence, and specifically ballistic missile defence, is one of STRIKFORNATO’s primary roles on behalf of the Alliance,” said Rear Admiral James Morley, the British Deputy Commander of STRIKFORNATO.

“Formidable Shield 21 is an important opportunity to further develop fighting capability and domain integration against a challenging set of realistic targets – a demonstration of our resolve to counter the threat.”

Australian Anzac-class Frigate Works with French Task Force

05/28/2021

By Leading Seaman Jarrod Mulvihill

HMAS Parramatta has joined French Navy Marine Nationale vessels FS Tonnerre and FS Surcouf — operating as the Jeanne d’Arc Task Group — to complete a cooperative passage through the South China Sea.

The Sydney-based Anzac class frigate had recently completed the Japan-led Exercise Arc21 with Tonnerre and Surcouf also taking part.

The three ships conducted a range of training activities, including communication exercises, replenishment-at-sea approaches, maritime manoeuvers and joint-flying serials using Parramatta’s MH-60R and Tonnerre’s Panther helicopters.

Commanding Officer Parramatta Commander Anita Nemarich said the ship’s time sailing in-company was another great opportunity to practice core skills and maintain a commitment to both nations’ shared values, goals and security interests.

“The Royal Australian Navy and the French Marine Nationale have enjoyed multiple opportunities to work together in the region recently,” Commander Nemarich said.

“It is great to be able to continue on the tremendous work of HMA Ships Anzac and Sirius who worked with the Jeanne d’Arc Task Group recently during Exercise La Perouse building our interoperability as like-minded nations.”

Commander of the Jeanne D’Arc Task Group and Commanding Officer Tonnerre Captain Arnaud Tranchant also found value in both navies working together.

“Operating in-company with the Australian Navy, with whom we share the same commitment to freedom of navigation, means reinforcing our ties and our capability to operate together with the same purpose,” Captain Tranchant said.

“It is also a great occasion for our naval cadets to be working with a partner Navy they will very likely encounter again in their future postings.”

Parramatta is on a two-month deployment to South-East and north-east Asia. Operating as a task group with HMAS Ballarat, the two vessels are conducting a number of navy-to-navy engagements with partner nations across the region.

This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on May 26, 2021.

The featured photo: A French Navy helicopter from FS Tonnerre approaches HMAS Parramatta as the two ships sail together in the South China Sea. Photo: Leading Seaman Jarrod Mulvihill

 

 

Croatia Selects the Rafale Fighter Jet: France Highlights European Sovereignty as Key

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Croatia has opted to order 12 second hand Rafale fighter jets in a deal which points up the significance of European sovereignty, the French armed forces ministry said in a statement.

“Croatia’s choice is a choice of sovereignty, resolutely European,” armed forces minister Florence Parly said in the statement.

The deal for the Rafale F-3R fighter was worth some €1 billion ($1.2 billion) and included Mica NG air-to-air missiles, AASM powered smart bombs, a canon, training of pilots and mechanics, and service, officials in the minister’s private office said.

Croatia has selected the fighter jet, a French official said, and negotiations will be held over the next few months, with a contract due to be signed by the end of the year. This would be a government-to-government deal, with no requirement for offset investment.

The fighters will be drawn from the French air force, which played a key role in the presentations, an official said. A Rafale order will be the biggest French arms deal with Croatia, which joined Nato in 2009 and the European Union in 2013.

The pick by Croatia is the second European victory, following a Greek order in January worth €2.5 billion for 18 Rafale. The French fighter has long lagged behind US rivals in the world export market.

Zagreb picked the Dassault Aviation Rafale F3-R in a competition which attracted rival offers of the Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 from the US, Saab Gripen C/D from Sweden, and the F-16 Block 30 from Israel, Air Force Technology website reported. The Israeli offer of 12 second hand F-16s was worth an estimated $500 million.

Parly visited Croatia twice last year, in March and November, an official said.

France will deliver two batches of Rafale, with the first to be shipped in the third quarter 2023, and a second batch sent some 18 months later, an official said. That 18 months compared to the three years needed for building a new fighter.

There were no details on the financing and it was up to the Croatian authorities to decide the best way to fund the deal, an official said.

Saab said in its pitch of the Gripen that  “cost-effectiveness” was a key factor for Sweden and Croatia, which were small countries. The Gripen package included all the service support Croatia would need to maintain the fighter.

In other tenders, Switzerland is expected to pick a fighter by the end of the first half, an official said, while Finland is due to select by the end of the year. The former is looking to order 30-40 fighters, while the latter seeks a fleet of 50-64 fighters.

In the Swiss tender, France has pitched the Rafale against the Eurofighter Typhoon, Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, and Lockheed Martin F-35A.

The Finnish competition has attracted the same fighters, plus the Saab Gripen.

Indonesia is also looking to acquire a fighter, with the Janes website reporting a contract for 36 Rafale might be delayed due to “lack of clarity over funding sources.”

France has no plans to replace the 12 fighters drawn from the French air force before 2025, an official said, when there will be a fleet of 117 Rafale flying.

France has sold 12 second hand and six new Rafale to Greece, and ordered 12 to replace the former for the air force.

The deal with Croatia is seen as boosting bilateral ties between Paris and Zagreb.

“This choice will considerably strengthen the strategic partnership between France and Croatia,” the defense ministry said. “This export deal illustrates a strengthening of the strategic links between France and Croatia and their common determination to work toward a strong and ambitious European defense.”

The decision by Croatia “reinforces the Rafale’s position in the European air forces, making an active contribution to European defense sovereignty,” Dassault said in a statement.

Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management

By Robbin Laird

In an important paper by Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, the authors address the question of the impact of reduced warning time upon Australian defence and security. This comes from both the nature of the Chinese challenge, and the changing nature of threats, such as cyber attacks.

How best to defend Australia in an environment with reduced warning time?

Although obviously about Australia, the discussion in the report raises a broader set of questions of how to know when an event is setting in motion a chain of events which provide a direct threat to a liberal democratic nation and how to respond.  It also raises the question of shaping capabilities which can be inserted into a crisis early enough to provide confidence in an ability to have effective escalation management tools available as well.

For the United States, for example, the integrated USMC has provided for a long time an insertion force which could anchor a scalable force which can provide time for policy makers to work through next steps.

To the extent to which the USMC remains an integrated crisis management force, it will continue to play such a role in the United States military tool box.

And the question of an ability to move force rapidly to a crisis becomes increasingly significant as escalation control returns as a key element of constraining, managing, and protecting one’s interests in a crisis.

This is why I have preferred to focus on full spectrum crisis management as the challenge facing the liberal democracies in meeting the challenges of 21st century authoritarian powers, rather simply preparing for the high-end fight.

And there is another reason: it is very likely that a high-end fight between the major powers will end up entailing nuclear use.

But for Australia, what the author’s underscore is the importance of deterrence through denial with regard to the Chinese threat.

And to deal with this threat, the government’s emphasis on long-range strike is a key part of what the author’s see as a way ahead.

“Having a deterrent force based on the concept of denial—as distinct from deterrence through the much more demanding concept of deterrence through punishment—should be more affordable. Deterrence through punishment involves attacking the adversary’s territory, whereas deterrence through denial is limited to attacking the adversary’s forces and associated infrastructure directly threatening us. In any case, the idea of Australia being able to inflict unacceptable punishment on a big power such as China would be ridiculous.

“The bottom line for defence policy is that, as confidence in deterrence by denial goes up, our dependence on early response to warnings should go down.”

A key part of expanding the buffer to manage crises entails Australia enhancing self-sufficiency and self-reliance through expanded stockpiling of fuel and key war stocks.

And over time, some new systems will be added through domestic production as well, notably as the autonomous weapons revolution evolves, and accelerates.

As the authors warn: “Australia now needs to implement serious changes to how warning time is considered in defence planning.

“The need to plan for reduced warning time has implications for the Australian intelligence community, defence strategic policy, force structure priorities, readiness and sustainability. Important changes will also be needed with respect to personnel, stockpiles of missiles and munitions, and fuel supplies.

“We can no longer assume that Australia will have time gradually to adjust military capability and preparedness in response to emerging threats. In other words, there must be a new approach in Defence to managing warning, capability and preparedness, and detailed planning for rapid expansion and sustainment.”

The United States remains the indispensable ally for many reasons, but the U.S. will be preoccupied in crises on its own interests as well.

This means that an expanded focus on building out Australian buffer capabilities will be significant to shaping an effective response to reduced warning times.

New digital technologies have altered the question of warning time is all about.

Notably, with regard to the cyber threats, when is there an attack, and what does it mean?

As the authors note: “A campaign of cyberattack and intensified cyber-exploitation against Australia could be launched with little notice, given the right level of motivation, and would have the advantage of having at least a level of plausible deniability while imposing limits to what might be envisaged as a proportional response. Such response options available to Australia would include retaliation, such as a government-sanctioned cyberattack—a capability that the Australian Government has acknowledged that it has. (This capability has already been used against terrorists, but whether it’s been used more widely isn’t publicly known.)

“The warning time for the need to conduct such operations is potentially very short, meaning that there needs to be a high level of preparedness, including the ability quickly to expand the cyber workforce (with a concomitant need for expedited security clearances), and cyberattack campaigns that are thought out well in advance.

“There’s a strong argument that such planning should include within its scope the possibility of causing high levels of damage to the adversary’s infrastructure.”

They end their report with regard to making five policy recommendations.

The first is to establish a National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

The second is to establish a Directorate of Net Assessments.

And the author’s highlight the focus of such a Directorate as follows: “While it’s unlikely that China would directly attack our continent, we must prepare for credible contingencies involving Chinese military coercion in our immediate strategic space. That coercion could involve the threatened use of military force, including from future Chinese military bases located to our north and east. Ignoring such probabilities risks strategic surprise involving our key national security interests.

“If the Directorate of Net Assessments is to have relevance, it will need to simulate high-level political and policy decision-making in real time. Without such time-urgent inputs, it won’t be possible to play other than theoretical war games.”

The third is establishing a priority for long-range missile strike.

Here the reinforce the importance of the commitment the current government has made to this task, but I would add that Australia can work much more effectively with its allies, including the United States in shaping a new generation of strike weapons, rather than simply replicating what the United States is already doing.

The fourth is realistically assessing their U.S. ally.

For the authors this means: “We need to accept in our strategic thinking that America is now a more inward-looking country that will foreseeably give more attention to its domestic social and political challenges. It also needs to be remembered that the US has from time to time–undergone severe bouts of isolationism. 30 We don’t think that’s likely to happen under the Biden administration, but it could recur under a differently motivated presidency.

“We need prudent analysis about how the US will react to its own warning indicators of potential military attack and what it would expect of Australia. In our own broader region, we can’t afford not to be fully informed about US contingencies in Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula, so we need to assess US military capabilities as well as Washington’s intentions.”

I would add my own comments to this judgement.

For me, one of the challenges for either the United States or our allies is to understand what a good ally actually is. It is one which has a realistic understanding of what it can and can not do and an ability to assess realistically the global environment. I would argue that is in shorter supply in both the United States and in many of our allied Departments of Ministries of Defense.

I would note as well that the concerns about paying more attention at home than abroad is true of the United States and all or most of our partners.

The challenge then is how can the liberal democracies realistically work together to deal with global authoritarian states who see global influence and adventurism as a coin of the realm for enhancing their power?

And as for the political comment about the Biden Administration, given the dominance of identity politics in the Administration, one might see considerable inward preoccupation. President Trump for all his tweeting and rhetoric enhanced the capabilities of the U.S. in many ways, although his inability to support multilateralism conceptually was always a limiting factor in his global policy.

And the final factor is increased preparedness and force expansion.

As the authors put this challenge: “For the first time since World War II, Defence needs to also take seriously the conditions under which force expansion and mobilisation would happen. It wouldn’t be acceptable to defer such consideration until Australia were within warning time of a serious military attack against us or our key interests.

“Planning for timely and effective mobilisation doesn’t at this stage require a detailed plan but rather the development of principles that would be applied to the development of the force structure and defence policy for industry. The place to start would be to identify those steps that should be taken now to ensure that force expansion and mobilisation would achieve their goals.”

I would add that in their approach to deterrence through denial a major effort over the next decade could well be working a new defense approach for integrated defense from Western to Northern Australia to the first island chain (the Solomon Islands.).

And in so doing, air and maritime integration, the introduction of new force multipliers through autonomous systems, the ground forces learning how to do expeditionary basing, and working that basing with air-sea integration will be a key part of deterrence through denial.

When that chessboard is established and worked, the question of what the strike force can achieve in terms of longer range becomes an even more formidable consideration than simply having longer range missiles.

And in this context, reworking how to work with the partners and allies in the region, and working new integrated distributed concepts of operations with the United States and Japan will be critical as well.

For a PDF version of the report, see the following:

https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2021-05/Reduced%20warning%20time.pdf?I.oKvvZ9nT15GsOutK4qGWVLApGbC5s7

For an e-book version of the report, see the following:

Also, see the following:

Events, Policy Making and Strategic Imagination

Naval Group Air Defence FREMM for French Navy

The FREMM DA Alsace  was launched April 18, 2019 at the Naval Group shipyard of Lorient thirteen months after its keel laying.

It is the ninth FREMM frigate built by Naval Group and the seventh one for the French Navy.

According to Naval Group: “On April 12, 2021 in Toulon, in the presence of Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Naval Group delivered, in accordance with its calendar commitments and expected performance, the FREMM DA Alsace. “Intended for the French Navy, it is the first of the two air defense frigates of the FREMM program.

“This is the seventh European Multimissions FREMM Frigate ordered by the General Directorate of Armaments (DGA) for the benefit of the French Navy, and whose program management has been entrusted to OCCAR 1.”

Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21: Shaping a Way Ahead

05/27/2021

By Robbin Laird

Recently, 3rd Fleet completed what it called its “Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21” exercise. Here the Navy was able to work with a number of different companies bringing either their maritime remotes or autonomous systems to be seen and tested in a number of mission areas.

To be clear, the overwhelming majority of these systems are remotely piloted rather than operating autonomously. This is an important distinction because this affects the manpower demand side as well as the data management side of the equation, both key considerations when considering how to include these assets within the fleet.

According to Rear Adm. Robert M. Gaucher, director of maritime headquarters at U.S. Pacific Fleet. “By exercising our full range of unmanned capabilities in a Pacific warfighting scenario, UxS IBP21 directly supports U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s warfighting imperative of driving lethality through experimentation.”

“The overall goal is to integrate our unmanned capabilities across all domains to demonstrate how they solve CNO and Fleet Commander Key Operational Problems,” says Gaucher. “To get after these problems, UxS IBP21 will include maneuvering in contested space across all domains; targeting and fires; and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance.”

The challenge is a practical one: how to shape an effective operational way ahead?

The military as an organization is often described as risk averse, but since the military has to be prepared to fight tonight, disruptive change for its own purpose can degrade military capabilities rather than enhancing them.

What the U.S. Navy is clearly working is distributed maritime operations, or maritime kill webs to enable an integrated distributed force.

Maritime remotes and autonomous systems can provide significant inputs to this transition, but in the words of Vice Admiral Barrett, the former head of the Royal Australian Navy: “Trusted autonomous systems are the not the end state we are pursuing they are a means to the end of extending the capabilities of an integrated distributed force.”

With such a template, the role of next generation autonomous systems can enable either enhanced mass to modular task forces, or enhanced decision-making capability either at the tactical edge or at the wider tactical or strategic decision-making levels.

As WGCDR Keirin Joyce, the moderator of the recent Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems put it: “we know that we have to go to war with what we’ve got. When you go to the next big thing in defense, you proceed from what you already have.”

From this perspective, the goal of efforts like “Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21” is to focus on ways to work new capabilities into the fleet and not leap to the scientific fiction world of Ghost Fleets. The quest for remotely piloted or autonomous maritime systems fits into the evolution of the evolution in the art of warfare.

For the U.S. Navy this revolves around shaping the distributed integratable force in which combat clusters can operate at the tactical edge with enough capability to achieve their tasks as allocated by mission command requirements. Distribution is about working multi-domain warfighting packages. Next generation autonomous systems can provide increased mass for each combat cluster notably with ISR payloads already on the way.

To gain some insight with regard to participation in the “Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21,” I recently talked with Bruce Hanson, CEO of Maritime Tactical Systems (‘MARTAC’), a Florida-based unmanned maritime autonomous system company. The company brought their T38E Devil Ray USV maritime autonomous system to the event to work a particular mission set. They also brought along a smaller T8, 8-foot MANTAS craft which can operate off of the larger vessel as well independent on the mission set.

Notably, the video released by the U.S. Navy about the event began with a T38E Devil Ray operating in the water.

The first point which he highlighted was they and other participating companies were able to provide first-hand information to a wide variety of distinguished visitors to the event and during the running of the event could demonstrate their capabilities as well.  This is an important part of the cross-fertilization process to familiarize the broader maritime community about what is really possible now with regard to these systems, and what is really longer term.

The second point he made was that it was very clear the difference with regard to what the unmanned piece could provide. As he described it, for the particular exercise, they included two men on the vessel as part of the effort. Normally, for the mission they performed they would not include men on the ship as they are not needed for the mission execution. But for the San Diego port safety requirements, they manned the vessel.

According to Hanson: “There were relatively high sea states in the exercise area. And these high sea states required us as a manned vessel to operate at 25 knots or below. The vessel unmanned would have been operated at 60-70 knots. This highlights what an unmanned capability can bring to the effort compared to a manned crewing element.  Truly  Beyond Human Capability

The third point he highlighted was that they brought an autonomous system to the event, not a remotely piloted one.  This was illustrated that during the event, the Navy observers of their vessel were shocked when the MANTAC person sitting with them said: “I am going to lunch.” The observers reacted: “Who is going to control the vessel?” The MANTAC person said: “The vessel is autonomous it will take care of itself.”

What this highlighted is the importance of adding an adjective to “autonomous maritime systems.” Namely, unattended so that what MANTAC was operating was an “unattended autonomous maritime system” or “Unattended Autonomy” for short.

In closing, for MARTAC, the event provided an opportunity to highlight what they can do now; for the U.S. Navy the event allowed them to work with a variety of companies and to see what can be done now with these systems and to imagine the mid-term future as well.

See also the following:

The Quest for Next Generation Autonomous Systems: Impact on Reshaping Australian Defence Forces

Shaping a Way Ahead for North Atlantic Defense: The Perspective of VADM Lewis

05/26/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

With the strategic shift from the land wars, and meeting the evolving Russian challenges, Admiral Richardson, then the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), directed the re-establishment of the U.S. 2nd Fleet in 2018. He put VADM Lewis in charge of the command, but it was a new departure not simply a re-establishment of the 2nd Fleet.

Vice Admiral John Mustin, now head of Naval Reserves but former Deputy Commander of the newly established 2nd Fleet, commented: “As the 2nd Fleet Commander, VADM Lewis clearly understands that we need to shape a new approach. When I was in High School in the 80’s, my father was the 2nd Fleet Commander, so I can legitimately say that “The new 2nd Fleet is not your father’s 2nd Fleet.”

We had the chance to meet with the three commands under his leadership, C2F and NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFCNF) and the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE), which has been folded into C2F. That Centre has played an important role in working the kind of allied integration which Lewis has sought and is working to employ.

VADM Lewis provided insights throughout the span of our conversations and meeting with his commands, and we sat down at the end of those engagements to discuss with him in his office on May 10, 2021 how he saw the way ahead.

We started by discussing the original standup of the command in 2018. The CNO had a clear desire to re-establish a command that could address North Atlantic defense, and notably the growing importance of coalition operations in the high north. C2F is not a large command, certainly when compared with other numbered fleets. And VADM Lewis worked the first three months with less than 10 staff members, during which time he worked the foundation of how the fleet should be established and how best to work its concepts of operations.

Question: How did you do the initial launch process?

VADM Lewis: “We had a charter to re-establish the fleet. Using the newly published national defense strategy and national security strategy as the prevailing guidance; we spent a good amount of time defining the problem.

“My team put together an offsite with the Naval Post-Graduate school to think about the way ahead, to take time to define the problem we were established to solve, and determine how best to organize ourselves to solve those challenges. We used the Einstein approach: we spent 55 minutes of the hour defining the problem and five minutes in solving it. Similarly, we spent the first two and a half months of our three-month pre-launch period working to develop our mission statement along with the functions and tasks associated with those missions.

“From the beginning our focus was in developing an all-domain and all-function command. To date, we clearly have focused on the high-end warfighting, but in a way that we can encompass all aspects of warfare from seabed to space as well.”

Question: We are very impressed with the template you and your team have put together in shaping a way ahead. It is clearly an integrated distributed approach encompassing the allies as well. As you mentioned, resources are tight, and clearly effectively organizing U.S. with allied resources in the region provides significantly greater capability than simply focusing on the U.S Navy alone. How would characterize the shift which you and your team are shaping?

VADM Lewis: “Our Allies and partners across the Atlantic and into the Nordic region are also rethinking collective defense. These are both NATO and non-NATO nations that are clearly engaged in enhancing their national and collaborative capabilities.

“With regard to new strategies and policies, they are not simply checklists. It is reworking the art of warfare, innovating, overcoming things that do not work, and leveraging tools and processes that do work in reshaping force capability. We are clearly focused with our Allies on reshaping what we can do now with the forces we have now, in order to ensure a solid foundation for adding new capabilities in the future.

“I think that the challenge with overarching guidance from above is when it is too prescriptive. It is a question of working at the operational force level on new ways of doing things effectively. For example, there is an emphasis on shifting to distributed maritime operations. At C2F we are focused on concrete ways to operate from distributed maritime operations centers as a way to exercise agility at the fleet level.

“Although it is conceptual, our focus is on how to develop the Maritime Operations Center – or MOC – as an effective weapon system. We’re talking about a distributed operation center across the battle space that is able to command and control forces from various locations. This allows for ease of communication or the ability to command more effectively and provide command functions in order to receive timely feedback from the tactical forces.

“I think to do this you have to have some imagination and flexibility in order to put the pieces together. We have exercised this concept through several distributed operations centers to various locations – the USS Mount Whitney for BALTOPS 2019, Iceland, Tampa, Camp Lejeune, New York (with the Comfort), and again on the Mount Whitney this month for Steadfast Defender 2021.”

Question: The template which you and your team have put in place, shaping an integrated distributed force, is well positioned to encompass a number of the new technologies, such as maritime autonomous systems. How do you see the relationship between reworking concepts of operations and technologies?

VADM Lewis: “I’ve become somewhat jaded with technology because technology is just a means to an end. Said another way, it’s just a tool. You have to ask what are we trying to get out of it? What’s the objective? And then, how are we going to use that technology? The key point is that our processes need to be agile enough to absorb new technology without missing a beat. That’s where I think we need to focus our efforts.”

Later in the conversation, VADM Lewis brought together in a very clear way the importance of getting the C2 piece right and leveraging technologies approach to that effort to do so.

According to VADM Lewis: “An operational headquarters or a high-end tactical headquarters is a weapons systems. Normally, when warfighters discuss weapon systems, they refer to their platforms. But the operational or tactical headquarters should be looked at as being a key weapons system, the glue that pulls a multitude of different weapons systems together in a coherent manner – both kinetic and non-kinetic. They can mass fires, mass effects, and maneuver in a coordinated fashion at the fleet level. That’s what operational and tactical headquarters do.

“But we need to get better at being able to craft, shape and leverage operational or tactical headquarters as a weapon system. We have to get a lot better at doing so, and new technologies can be helpful here, which is one of my objectives for working with the Mid-Atlantic Tech Bridge.”

Question: There are other command challenges, such as the division between Second and Sixth fleets in the Atlantic or how C2F will work going forward with II MEF, for example. How do you see the way ahead?

VADM Lewis: “We are working hard on this challenge. My main effort as the Commander of two NATO commands and a U.S. Fleet command is to ensure there are no seams in the Atlantic – seams that our adversaries can exploit. By communicating and working closely with our counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic, we can ensure we are working to close any perceived gaps. As an example, we recently conducted staff talks with Second Fleet, Sixth Fleet and II MEF. We are making progress thanks to the relationships we have spent time developing.

“In terms of C2, we can always be better about how we talk about and exercise command and control. My focus has been on the principles of mission command in which you emphasize trust with your commanders to lead distributed forces. You have to first understand the environment, and then you have to give clear intent. Once you have given this guidance, you let the distributed forces operate in a way that allows them to self-organize in order to meet the mission. This doesn’t involve a whole lot of detailed control from various headquarters, rather it only provides enabling guidance that allows them to take initiative at the right level and to manage risk at the right level.”

“I believe my role with regard to my subordinate commands it to mentor the commanders below me. My goal is to give them the right guidance and then let them command.

“I have two discussions each week with the operational strike group commanders that work for me – the first is focused on man, train and equip issues, and the second is focused on mission command and operational issues. It’s an opportunity for me to hear about various issues and spend time listening. At other times, we’ll bring in a guest speaker and discuss operational dilemmas others have faced to use as case studies for the group. It is truly time well spent with the strike group commanders who make up our waterfront leadership. ”

Question: How do you view the way ahead with integration with the USMC?

VADM Lewis: “We have a fantastic relationship with our USMC counterparts, and because of that relationship we have made great progress with integration. We have a few Marine staff officers working at 2nd Fleet, but I think we would also benefit from an exchange of sorts at the Flag level. I think we could make additional progress if we integrate a Marine as the deputy commander of C2F, and vice versa, a Navy commander as the deputy commander at II MEF. I have such an approach with my NATO JFCNF command, and it works well as we shape very concrete ways ahead to build more effective fleet operations with our NATO counterparts.

For a special report which brings together all of our articles on our visits to Norfolk to talk with members of VADM Lewis’s commands, see the following:

2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: A May 2021 Update

Or it can be downloaded from our defense.info website as well:

The Standup and Evolution of 2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: Shaping A Core Capability for North Atlantic Defense

Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21 (UxS IBP 21)

(April 16, 2021) Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas W. Harker discusses unmanned vessels at Pier 12 on Naval Base San Diego during Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 21 (UxS IBP 21) Distinguished Visitor Day, April 16.

U.S. Pacific Fleet’s UxS IBP 21, April 19-26, integrates manned and unmanned capabilities into the most challenging operational scenarios to generate warfighting advantages.

(U.S. Navy video by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Matthew F. Jackson)