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According to a recent USAF article, the USAF has recently combined two exercises — Orange Flag and Black Flag in order to accelerate change in operating in contested airspace.
EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. (AFNS)
By 2nd Lt. Christine Saunders, Air Force Test Center Public Affairs and 1st Lt. Savanah Bray, 53rd Wing Public Affairs
Orange Flag, the large force test event carried out three times annually by Air Force Test Center’s 412th Test Wing, combined with the 53rd Wing’s Black Flag, brought several firsts for the test community March 2-4.
Both central to achieving Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the two test capabilities combined their mission planning processes and streamlined test objective synthesis. Test execution took place during a Black Flag event and two separate Orange Flag’s.
“The benefits of a combined Orange and Black Flag event include the test of materiel, technical, and tactical solutions in an integrated fashion, lower administrative overhead, and improved understanding of how to use tactics to multiply technical capabilities,” said Maj. Brandon Burfeind, Orange Flag director.
The rationale of combining the planning process is simple: Orange Flag focuses on technical integration and innovation across a breadth of technology readiness levels, while Black Flag focuses on the tactical integration of more mature technologies.
“By combining resources and some objectives with the Orange Flag enterprise, we were able to achieve desired test objectives at minimal cost to the government,” said Capt. Clifford Peterson, mission commander of Black Flag 21-1.
“Due to the combined nature of the events, we were able to get both highly data driven developmental test objectives and more operationally-focused and accurate objectives completed for similar tests.”
This iteration of Orange Flag focused on two primary objectives: kill web integration and advanced survivability.
Kill web integration included Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Space Force sensors and tactical networks, as well as legacy and emerging JADC2 nodes.
“Orange Flag started three years ago with the intent to assess integration of warfighting systems in a dense threat, operationally representative environment,” said Maj. Gen. Christopher Azzano, AFTC commander. “It has been tremendously successful.”
A major Orange Flag success is the testing of F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptor integration with land-based long-range fires, naval fires, and space-based sensors without humans-in-the-loop.
Other successes include tests on multi-national F-35’s, command and control integration, strategic intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance integration through all domains.
This was the first official Black Flag since COMACC Plan 21 was signed in December 2020 to formalize the test event.
Black Flag focuses on testing and validating Tactics Improvement Proposals presented each year at the annual Weapons and Tactics Conference.
TIPs tested at Black Flag 21-1 included HH-60G Pave Hawk air-to-air survivability, F-35 emissions control tactics development, and continued tactics development and evaluation for the F-16 Fighting Falcon APG-83 AESA Radar, among others.
“As a venue for innovation through integration, Black Flag is ultimately a deep-end testing arena to create and discover capabilities utilizing existing and emerging materiel,” said Lt. Col. Mike Benitez, 53rd WG director of staff and Black Flag lead project officer.
“Black Flag’s largest benefit is that it’s a tactical initiative with strategic impact.”
Aligning Orange and Black Flag allows for improved integration and the combining of resources and participants to provide better test data and a more robust operationally-relevant environment.
Orange Flag, Emerald Flag, and Black Flag work in concert as the “test triad” to provide robust test environments geared toward the advancement of Joint All-Domain Operations and the National Defense Strategy.
These premier large force test events support testing of JADC2 and the Advanced Battle Management System and validate new tactics and technologies for warfighting forces.
Orange Flag welcomes event participants from every service, all domains, any organization, and a full range of technical readiness.
Orange Flag is range agnostic and will tailor range use to participant test objectives.
Meanwhile, Black Flag, developed as a venue for tactics development and for joint and coalition fighters, bombers, RPAs, space and more, remains invite-only.
The next iteration of Orange Flag, planned for June 2021, anticipates testing GatewayONE, Skyborg, and several emerging JADC2 capabilities as well as welcoming back our current participants.
The efforts of Orange Flag, Black Flag, and the 53rd WG will be on display this May at Northern Edge 2021.
The Japan-led F-X development program to succeed the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-2 fighter jet has started in Japan’s fiscal year 2020. “Air superiority” which is the basic premise for the JSDF operations, can be regarded as what is called “public goods”, essential for the defense of Japan.
In order to secure this “air superiority” into the future, it is vitally important to develop the next fighter jet with excellent performance, freedom of modification, future upgrade potential, and domestic defense infrastructure for maintenance and repairs, as the successor of the F-2, which is scheduled to start retiring around 2035.
Following the policy that MOD/SDF will “launch a Japan-led development project at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight” as set forth in the Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 – FY 2023), the MOD has made a contract with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and embarked on the F-X development on October 30th, 2020.
In addition, in December 2020, the MOD has released the direction of international collaboration on the F-X development as follows.
In developing the F-X, the MOD has decided to advance this program with necessary support and cooperation from the U.S., such as selecting the U.S. company Lockheed Martin as the candidate for an integration support company, and starting a new project with the U.S. from next fiscal year to ensure interoperability between Japan and the U.S.
Also, the MOD will continue discussions with the U.S. and the UK to pursue possibility of collaboration on the F-X at system level such as engine and avionics in order to reduce development cost and technical risk.
The development of the F-X is an extraordinarily large program compared to the MOD’s previous aircraft development projects. In order to make this grand program a success, the MOD will develop the F-X by making maximum use of technological and human resources possessed by domestic companies and further strengthening collaboration between the government and companies, and between the companies, as well as considering the direction of international collaboration as mentioned above.
‘’Initiated and adopted by several nations in the past years, the concept of an Indo-Pacific theater does not mean the same for each one of them.
For France, which is the very first European nation to have replaced the traditional Asia-Pacific concept with a more assertive Indo-Pacific strategy, the key is the inclusion of India in the equation. The reason is tied to New Delhi’s political dimension which is crucial to counter-balance Beijing’s growing weight in this part of the world’’, explains a French submariner familiar with this region.
Balance is indeed the leit motiv in the current Macron government’s approach to foreign affairs.
Fearing an escalation fueled by increasing military expenditures and growing tensions while dreading a replay of the Cold War – this time between the United States and China – France is once again positioning itself as a ‘’stabilizing power’’ in a zone which ‘’spans from Djibouti to Polynesia’’, as stressed in the 2019 ‘’French Defence Strategy In the Indo-Pacific’’ official document.
The latter followed President Macron’s Australian Garden Island speech, which he made a year earlier on his way to make an official visit to India.
The 2018 statement highlighted the concept of a ‘’Paris-Dehli- Canberra axis,’’which his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian had already promoted in 2016 when he was Minister of Defense in terms of a ‘France-India-Australia trilateral framework.
Sharing the exact same diagnostic as Washington (both under President Trump and President Biden) as far as the serious nature of Chinese aggressive action is concerned, the French government has not been shy in condemning Beijing on multiple grounds, ranging from the Uyghurs’ genocide to the Belt and Road Initiative.
Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, the concerns expressed by French officials are indeed specifically related to Beijing’s ability systematically to ‘’fill the vacuum’’ whenever an opportunity emerges and deny access to other players.
The ways and means progressively to evict other nations’ influence are limitless and include in particular:
The polarization and militarization of international waters with the unilateral extension of territorial waters from 12 to 15 nautical miles (e.g., the Paracel Islands in 2017 in the South China Sea): according to a 2016 DoD estimate, 3,200 acres of land have been artificially created at the time.
Investments in key strategic infrastructure via China’s One Belt One Road Initiative : the deep-water port of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, the development of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka or the operational control of the Gwadar port in Pakistan by the China Overseas Port Holding Company are all part of the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road under way since 2013 designed to enhance connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa.
A growing military presence officially aimed at protecting Chinese communities abroad : the most telling example of such a strategic shift in Chinese military doctrine is the case of Djibouti. Beijing’s footprint – and foothold in the Western Indian Ocean – has been growing since 2008 through various investments in salt, railway, and the port of Doraleh. Its naval military presence has evolved from anti-piracy operations to the inauguration in 2017 of its very first overseas naval base, which currently hosts an estimated 2,000 troops but has a capacity of 10,000. In ten years – from 2008 to 2018 -, China’s 350-ship Navy trained about 100 ships and 26,000 sailors in the Gulf of Aden alone.
Such a trend privileging the policy of ‘’fait accompli’’ has been enhanced by the Covid crisis, during which China has been multiplying its military maneuvers in the straights of Taiwan, Miyako and Bashi, while the very first deadly border clash with India in 45 years occurred last June in the Himalaya.
‘’In a region including seven out of ten of the highest defence budgets in the world (the Unites States, China, Saudi Arabia, India, France, Japan and South Korea), strategic and military imbalances constitute an underlying danger with global consequences.
While several open crises persist and new rivalries emerge, the breakdown of strategic stability, or a lasting deterioration in the regional security environment, would have an immediate impact on France’s political, economic, and sovereign interests’’, states the above-mentioned 2019 “French Defence Strategy In the Indo-Pacific” official document.
Having appointed last November and for the first time an Ambassador for the Indo-Pacific, France is indeed a riparian and sovereign Indo-Pacific nation with clear vested interests starting with the protection of some 1.6 million French citizens leaving in its seven overseas regions, departments and communities (called DROM-COM in French for ‘’Départements ou Régions français d’Outre-Mer’’ and ‘’Collectivités d’Outre-Mer’’).
In the Indian Ocean are Mayotte, Reunion, the French Southern and Antarctic territories (Kerguelen, Amsterdam and Saint-Paul islands, and the Crozet islands). In the Pacific are New Caledonia, Wallis & Futuna, and French Polynesia. In addition, 200.000 French citizens settled in the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean, in Asia and Oceania. Far away and tiny for some of them, these territories nevertheless represent all together 93% of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (9 out of 11 million square kilometers), making it the second in the world after the United States.
Stability, with the defense of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), and, more generally, of the Global Commons at a time when military competition knows no boundary and opens new ones ranging from seabeds to exoatmospheric altitudes, is indeed a main concern shared not only by Paris and Washington, but also and foremost by the regional players in the Indo-Pacific.
How to reduce threats in order to enhance stability and promote the ‘’new Golden age’’ many experts foresee in that part of the world is however where differences of approach compete.
Forging Alliances Among Like-Minded States
‘’The French strategy in the Indo-Pacific region lies on three axes: developing joint crisis management tools, enhancing bilateral relations and fomenting a rule-based multilateral framework’’, describes a French diplomat formerly based in Beijing.
Reviving multilateralism in an inclusive manner as a way to contain a potential ‘’Great Power Competition’’ clash or growing tensions is where France and the United States has till now differed since Washington’s position under President Trump was aiming more towards a policy of isolation against China.
This difference of approach has been highlighted in diplomatic terms, but tends also to translate in the military posture of both countries in the region (all proportion kept of course) : ‘’When the U.S. Navy will choose to deploy an aircraft carrier, the French Navy will show its willingness to defend the freedom of navigation (e.g. in the strait of Taiwan where for the first time a French Frigate – the Vendémiaire – was blocked by the Chinese Navy in April 2019) using a frigate or an amphibious assault helicopter carrier (PHA in French for ‘’porte-hélicoptères amphibie’’) and choosing to sail a straight course rather than demonstrating a more assertive posture’’, notes the French Commander.
Having concluded a strategic partnership with China along with the ones negotiated with India and Australia, France advocates less a policy of containment than a policy of coercion which does not preclude commercial ties.
A form of ‘’Realpolitik’’ or ‘’Pacific coexistence’’ which resonates with many of the states leaving in the region which economies are heavily dependent on good relations with China.
Clearly the more ‘’like-minded’’ states the better to counter Chinese illegal endeavors in the region. ‘’Paris favors a regional multilateralism which is ideal to promote ad hoc structures best suited to address the challenges in this part of the world whether humanitarian, health-related, digital, environmental or else.
Last September, was held for instance the first trilateral meeting between France, India and Australia with the participation of the General secretary of the minister of foreign affairs.
The goal is to include Japan next. More multilateral coordination for a common action to be effective is necessary’’, stresses a French Quai d’Orsay official. Hence Paris’ recent request accepted last September to become a partner to the existing ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), a multilateral framework created in 1967 (two years after France’s withdrawal from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or SEATO – i.e., the equivalent of NATO in Asia – because of disagreements between France and the United States over Vietnam).
In addition, Paris has been developing strong bilateral relationships over the years – in particular with India, Australia (both countries with which Paris has concluded global strategic partnerships) and more recently with Japan – as well as various fora of discussion ranging from commercial and technological exchanges, climate change and natural disaster anticipation, to the fight against transnational threats (illegal traffics, criminality, jihadism, etc.).
France is for instance – in chronological order and in a non-exhaustive way – a member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium since 1988, concluded the FRANZ agreement with New Zealand and Australia for disaster relief in 1992, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) established in 1997, as well as the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Groupe with the United States, Australia and New Zealand since 1998. France is also a founding member of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) established in 2008, belongs to the South Pacific Defence Ministers mechanism since 2013, as well as the Pacific Islands Forum with the participation of both New Caledonia and French Polynesia since 2016.
Because France has been itself a medium-sized Pacific power for more than two centuries, it feels directly threatened by the growing instability impacting its territories and communities, some of them in risk of vanishing because of climate change and consequent water rising.
Strengthening strategic autonomy is also a shared concern, hence the well-known Rafale deal with India and submarine ‘’deal of the century’’ with Australia. But military ties between France and its main allies in the Pacific go increasingly way beyond industrial partnerships towards more comprehensive operational relations between not only “like-minded” states, but also comparable military formats.
Enhancing Joint Indo-Pac Power Projection
Protecting the sovereignty of its territories and the growing number of French citizens leaving in them always required an adequate military force composed of forward-based assets and troops. These ‘’prepositioned’’ forces are called ‘’presence forces’ and include 7 to 8,000 permanent troops, as well as 700 temporary deployed personnel.
They are organized under five commands, three sovereign – in the Indian Ocean in Reunion and Mayotte (FAZSOI) and in the South Pacific in New Caledonia (FANC) and French Polynesia (FAPF) – and two in foreign countries – Djibouti (FFDj) and the United Arab Emirates (FFEAU) – for a ‘’permanent deployment in the Northern Indian Ocean’’, as described by the French Ministry of the Armed Forces.
It is from the latter that the French armed forces participate to Allied operation Inherent Resolve against Daesh, and, before that, to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (till 2012).
Very much like most NATO forces, the overseas sovereign forces were rather neglected in the name of the Peace dividends and a false sense of security. Although ‘’absolutely crucial to defend sovereign interests and participate to ad hoc coalitions’’, as pointed out by the above-quoted French naval officer, it is only in the past few years that they started to be modernized and built back close to their 2008 level, while power projection from the mainland has become increasingly visible and inclusive with more and more allies beyond the traditional four, i.e., the United States, India, Australia and Japan.
‘’As a maritime, air and spatial power, France possesses high level intelligence gathering means and significant force projection platforms. France is therefore able to contribute to each aspect of international security with its allies and partners.
France organizes regular multilateral exercises in the Indian Ocean (Papangue) and in the Pacific (Equateur, Croix du Sud, Marara). These exercises can gather up to several thousand military personnel coming from a dozen partner States.
France participates to many multilateral military exercises in Southeast Asia (Cobra Gold, Komodo, Pitch Black, Tempest Express, Coores, Marixs), in Northeast Asia (Khaan Quest, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve) and in the Pacific (Rimpac, Southern Katipo, Tafakula, Americal, Kakadu, Pacific Partnership). These exercises aim to increase mutual understanding and to create bonds between the different armed forces.
Many bilateral exercises are also organized at each French Navy and Air Force assets visits in the region. The regular high-level bilateral exercises Shakti (Army), Varuna (Navy) and Garuda (Air Force) embody the strategic partnership bonding France and India”, summarizes the 2019 “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific” official report.
In addition to the regular exercises traditionally organized in the Indian Ocean, such as the above-mentioned Varuna with India since 1993, as well as in the Pacific, such as the biannual ‘’Croix du Sud’’ humanitarian and relief exercise held from New Caledonia, what is interesting to highlight is the recent ability of the French armed forces to project faster and further both at sea and in the air from the continent. Strategic depth has become the name of the game for French military planners and the technology makes it possible today in unprecedented ways.
The acquisition of the A330 multirole Tanker Transport (MRTT) Phenix as well as of the A400M has for instance been game-changers for the French Air and Space Force which can now conduct long-range and in-depth raids.
The MRTT is an asset particularly important for the airborne strategic nuclear forces which are the ones conducting these type missions. In 2018 the ‘’Pegase’’ mission occurred in the aftermath to the French participation to the Australian ‘’Pitch Black’’ exercise. Launching a new type of Air diplomacy able to be mixed and matched with the more traditional naval diplomacy, ‘’Pegase’’ gathered three Rafale fighters, one A400M, one C-135 FR tanker and one A310 and 120 aviators and included stops in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and India.
It might be noted as well that the acquisition of the European tanker by the Royal Australian Air Force, in turn, has been a gamechanger as well for the Aussies. It has allowed them to marry up with their C-17s to have global lift and reach.
From January 20th to February 5th, 2021, the French Air and Space Force conducted a long-range mission called Skyros which started in Djibouti to go to India, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Greece and involved four Rafale, one MRTT, one A400M and some 170 aviators. In June another power projection mission called ‘’Heiphara’’, is planned in the Indo-Pacific deploying again 170 personnel, with this time four Rafale, two MRTTs and one A400M straight to Tahiti and back via Norfolk to celebrate the 240th anniversary of the battle of Yorktown in the Fall. As a French Air and Space Force officer stressed, ‘’These kinds of exercises allow to improve our interoperability: with a country like India which traditionally purchases a third of its military equipment from Russia, a third from Israel and a third from NATO countries, it is interesting for Rafale and Sukoi 3 to train as wingmen…’’
The same goes in the maritime theater where the French Navy conducts operations all the time, such as the current deployment of the Frigate ‘’Prairial’’ from Tahiti to monitor the embargo against North Korea in cooperation with Japan after a technical stop in Guam (a remake of the 2019 mission in that area).
The ‘’Marianne mission’’ which deployed for eight months and for the first time since 2002 a nuclear attack submarine, the ‘’Emeraude’’, with a support ship, the ‘’Seine’’, just ended and was aimed at enhancing cooperation with France’s main naval partners, Australia, the United States and Japan.
A few days ago, the yearly training mission ‘’Jeanne d’Arc’’ started and an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) – including the PHA ‘’Tonnerre’’, the Frigate ‘’Surcouf’’, an amphibious task force armed with two ‘’Gazelle’’ helicopters – departed for a five-month deployment period (instead of the usual four) through the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the South China Sea, the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A mix of operational missions – counterterrorism, security, interoperability with NATO’s Combined task Force CFT 150, as well as humanitarian (with a Covid prism) – will be carried out, while conducting several bilateral exercises with some of the visited countries (Egypt twice, Djibouti, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan twice, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka). An amphibious exercise is for instance planned with the US and Japan in the Senkaku Islands in May.
If the defense of French interests in the Indo-Pacific region has been re-affirmed under the Macron presidency, it is done under the umbrella of the same desire to get other European nations to join forces all around the world – whether in Sahel or in the Levant region – in order to weigh more in front of abusive authoritarian powers and/or transnational violence, as well as in the counter-proliferation field given the coexistence of several nuclear powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides the United Kingdom, another traditional Asia-Pacific power, but because of Brexit, France was for a while the only European nation to have a specifically laid-out Indo-Pacific strategy. Not anymore: Germany designed last September its own Indo-Pacific strategic guidelines and sent a ship for a show of presence in what is considered today the world’s economic lung.
There has been increased concern about the rise of joint naval exercises carried by both China and Russia not only in the Western Pacific and South China Sea, but also in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltics. Indeed, the Chinese entered the Baltic Sea for the first time during a Sino-Russian exercise called ‘’Joint Sea 2017’’. Two years later, “Joint Sea 2019” was the theater for the very first joint sea-based live-fire air defense exercise involving the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Russian Navy. And this month, Russia, China and Iran are conducting joint naval exercise in the northern Indian Ocean.
The French government’s observation that a dangerous ‘’contraction of the geopolitical space’’ is taking place due to globalization, the impact of climate change on the maritime roads (e.g., the Chinese goal to link the Baltic sea region to the polar silk region in the Arctic) and new great powers’ military assertiveness is rooted in such drastic evolutions.
A lot more than the eye can meet is therefore at stake and that is what Paris hopes to convey during its next European presidency during which a common European Union Indo-Pacific strategy could be born adding a little extra-weight in a region striving for the right and perennial balance of power.
Featured photo: A French Air Force (Armée de l’Air) Dassault Rafale taxis after landing at RAAF Base Darwin in the lead up to Exercise Pitch Black 2018.
A condensed version of this article was published on Breaking Defense on March 11, 2021.
According to a UK Ministry of Defence story published on February 23, 2021, the UK and Australia have signed a new ‘Space Bridge’ partnership to increase knowledge exchange and investment across the two countries’ space sectors.
The world’s first Space Bridge will unlock improved access to trade, investment and academic research opportunities, better advice to businesses and innovative bilateral collaborations.
The UK and Australia share future ambitions for space and have similar plans to increase the size and job creation potential of the sector. This agreement will further develop the longstanding relationship between the two countries which dates back to the 1970s when the Prospero satellite built in Farnborough, UK, launched from Woomera, South Australia.
The arrangement enhances cooperation between the UK Space Agency, UK Department for International Trade, Australian Trade & Investment Commission, and the Australian Space Agency, coordinating opportunities for the UK and Australian governments and companies to work on space-related activities, including sharing Earth Observation data to collaborating on robotic and artificial intelligence.
UK Science Minister Amanda Solloway said:
“The signing of today’s Space Bridge partnership, a world’s first, with one of our closet international allies, is another step forward in our ambition for the UK to become a globally-competitive space power.
“The bond will allow our most innovative space businesses and universities to collaborate and share best practice more effectively than ever. I’m excited to see how this partnership will unlock new space jobs in both countries while driving forward new ideas that could enrich all of our lives.”
Minister for Exports, Graham Stuart MP said:
“Space exports hit £5.5 billion in 2017 and it is this international demand for our space goods and services which is driving the development of the UK’s vibrant and innovative space industry.
“Like the UK, Australia recognises the enormous potential of space science and recognises that closer partnership and alignment between our two sectors can boost progress and jobs in both countries. I believe that UK exports to Australia could grow by £900 million as a result of a Free-Trade Agreement and the Space Bridge programme can play a critical role in space contributing to this growth, and further strengthening our UK-Australia relationship.”
The UK boasts strong Foreign Direct Investment levels into its space sector and the Australian space sector reports a strong appetite to expand operations into the UK. Leaders for Australia and UK’s space agencies recognise the importance of stronger space ties between both countries, as the UK ramps up plans to become a leading global player in space.
The announcement comes as the UK and Australia begin the fourth round of negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement this week. We have already made good progress in several chapter areas including digital, telecommunications, customs, rules of origin, and procurement in previous rounds.
Australia is influential in the Indo-Pacific and a Free-Trade Agreement will help us pivot towards this dynamic area of the world. This will help diversify our trade, make our supply chains more resilient, and make the UK less vulnerable to political and economic shocks.
Dr Graham Turnock, Chief Executive Officer of the UK Space Agency, said:
“As the UK extends its ambitions in space, it’s only right that we forge new and stronger alliances with new and existing partners all across the globe.
“This agreement has the potential to unleash innovation, promote knowledge exchange and build relationships that will help both the UK and Australia maximise the vast economic and scientific potential that the space sector offers. It will help create better opportunities and greater security for people in both nations.”
Enrico Palermo, Head of the Australian Space Agency.
“The Space Bridge Framework Arrangement will help propel the Australian civil space industry into its next phase of growth, opening doors to build local capability, as well as significantly boost our collaboration with the UK Space Agency.”
The space sector is one of the fastest-growing UK sectors with 30,000 new jobs expected by 2030. The Australian space sector is also growing with up to 20,000 new Australian jobs expected by 2030.
The Space Bridge Framework Arrangement was signed on Tuesday, 23 February 2021 at the British High Commissioner’s residence in Canberra, Australia, and at Westminster, in London, United Kingdom.
The arrangement was signed by the Australian Minister for Industry, Science and Technology Karen Andrews, UK Minister for Science, Research and Innovation Amanda Solloway, in the presence of British High Commissioner to Australia Vicki Treadell CMG MVO, High Commissioner to the UK The Hon George Brandis QC, Australian Space Agency Head Enrico Palermo, UK Space Agency Chief Executive Officer Dr Graham Turnock, UK Space Agency International Director Alice Bunn, Chair of UKSpace Nick Shave and Space Industry Association of Australia Chief Executive Officer James Brown, who joined the signing virtually.
In my recent book, Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s, a major element of the shift focused upon was how command changes with the crafting of a distributed but integrated force. The book started by quoting Rear Admiral Manazir, then head of N-9, in an interview which I did with my colleague Ed Timperlake in 2016:
“The key task is to create decision superiority.
“But what is the best way to achieve that in the fluid battlespace we will continue to operate in?
“What equipment and what systems allow me to ensure decision superiority?
“We are creating a force for distributed fleet operations.
When we say distributed, we mean a fleet that is widely separated geographically capable of extended reach.
“Importantly, if we have a network that shares vast amounts of information and creates decision superiority in various places, but then gets severed, we still need to be able to fight independently without those networks.
“This not only requires significant and persistent training with new technologies but also informs us about the types of technologies we need to develop and acquire in the future. Additionally, we need to have mission orders in place so that our fleet can operate effectively even when networks are disrupted during combat; able to operate in a modular-force approach with decisions being made at the right level of operations for combat success.”
We are continuing our focus on the strategic shift in our forthcoming book to be published by USNI press entitled: Maritime Kill Webs, 21st Century Warfighting and Deterrence.
And in that book, our focus on the kill web is as follows: “Shaping a distributed force which is capable of being integrated with the relevant joint or coalition capabilities through interactive kill webs to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effect. The structure can then enable new innovations and the capability of the fleet to be able to fight at the speed of light in the case of threats which can jeopardize the viability of the fleet as a whole.”
A key element of the technological innovations underlying this strategic shift is in the domain of command and control. Here the shift in the command structure leverages technological developments in connectivity as well as how ISR systems can generate information for decision superiority.
The U.S. Navy is clearly working a new template of command, crafting integrated distributed ops, or shaping the maritime distributed force. By reshaping their command template, they are in a position to tap into the C2.
Combing the shift in operational art with new technological enablers or force generators will allow for better decisions in the distributed operational space, at the right time, to make a timely impact on a crisis, or a combat situation.
Recently, I talked with industrial expert Mike Twyman, who has worked for many years on the evolving C2 technologies. He has worked most recently at Cubic Corporation and previously with Northrop Grumman/Logicon, two leading C2/ISR firms. He now heads the consulting firm Wizard Defense focused on enabling solutions for improved decision making.
We started by discussing how he saw the co-evolution of the command shift with the technological dynamics for enabling technologies in the C2 domain.
Mike Twyman: “I love the concept of co-evolution because, what you’re seeing now with what the Navy’s doing is they’re leading with ideas. And they’re basically developing the plans and the tactics with existing capabilities.
“They’re integrating the F-35. They’re integrating the Triton. They’re integrating the P-8. They’re integrating all these great capabilities and really, in very novel ways, to build this distributed integrated task force. That’s going to be what they go to the fight with today but are positioning themselves for what new technologies can enable down the road.
“At the same time, technology changes can drive operational art, where a technology enables a solution that, when integrated, could change how you conduct your operations. The Navy is clearly work this angle as well as seen in exercises like Resolute Hunter.
“By working exercises and empowering training to encompass development, they can see what the possibilities are and they can then guide those of us in industry on what are the key requirements for change. Our engineers know what it can do, but they don’t know what’s most important. And If we can get that feedback through this exercise loop, then we’ll get things that are meaningful and not just pie in the sky.
“We don’t want to build another JTRS radio. That was not informed really by operational warfighter input. As an acquisition, it failed because the government tried to lead that revolution. Today, software defined radios are essentially a commodity. By having the government try to lead the emergence of software defined radios, they ended up with the same capability in a different box and a big bill for integration.
“It didn’t work. You just can’t invent a new technology because it’s a cooler, neater way to do it. It needs to be aligned with the warfighter.”
Laird: “In other words, it needs to be CONOPS informed.”
Mike Twyman: “That is a great way of putting it. Co-evolution is a key element of how to understand what is happening in the C2 domain.
“In my view, there are three streams of activity shaping the way ahead.
“The first is how the adversaries are working C2 for themselves and shaping tools for disruption and contesting the C2 space.
“Second, there is what our warfighters are doing to shape operational art and innovation.
“Third, there are the dynamics of change in the C2 domain globally, such as the emergence of 5G systems. it’s really the co-evolution of operational art and technology that leads to new solutions to counter the threat, both today and in the future.”
We then discussed what is happening in terms of developments in the C2 and ISR space.
Mike Twyman: “I see three critical areas that are evolving, and offer capabilities which can reinforce and accelerate the shift to the integrated distributed force.
“The first is in the digital domain. Here there is a major shift underway in how the warfighter sees the battlespace and to leverage that vision to deliver decision superiority. I am intrigued by the U.S. Navy establishing MISR officers whose role is to deliver to the maritime force what can be leveraged from the joint and coalition force to get the information to the right place at the right time.
“Another digital example is DARPA’s Adaptive Warfighting Architecture. Here the focus is upon micro-modularity in C2 and the importance of being able to push processing and decision capabilities to the tactical edge. You need the ability to move the command post as needed to provide for the flexibility to commander where the force is operating in an area of influence. You need flexibility in terms who you can integrate at that point of influence.
“I like to call it composing the force for a particular mission or effect that you’re trying to achieve. DARPA’s Adaptive Warfighting Architecture, I think is going to help move that along in the next evolution of capability.
“The second is in the embedded Internet of Things domain. High-performance, secure computing is being brought to the tactical edge. With the evolution of sensor networks, there is a major opportunity to integrate sensor networks into the distributed task force operational approach. With flexible C2 and ISR systems, one can both pass and integrate information, and get it to the right people to achieve the desired effects.
“Additionally, there is the coming of artificial intelligence and machine learning. This is in its infancy for military ISR and C2 decision-making. What AI solutions will be part of is strengthening information processing at the edge? What we’re going to need to do is more processing at the tactical edge.
“And third, with contested environments, driven by the near peer threat, we need the ability to maneuver throughout the spectrum. We’re really seeing the importance of protected communications in both the space and aerial network layers, to allow the force to communicate and make necessary connections. Reducing the need to over manage information in centralized centers of decision making is a key element of change.”
From this perspective, Twyman highlighted the importance of gateways to provide for distributed integrated operations. Rather than ramping up exquisite organic capabilities platform by platform, the use of gateways allows for the distribution of capabilities and does so through a variety of wave forms and interoperable messages. By wave form diversity, greater information security is obtained with greater redundancy.
He also foresees the evolution of capabilities in the electronic warfare SIGINT domains or what he calls Counter-RF solutions which will allow our forces to find the areas in spectrum where they can communicate and conduct their missions.
According to Twyman: “One of the areas that I think is really going to break through in the next few years is the exploitation of free space optical communications. It’s a different region of the spectrum. Traditional optical capabilities suffer from some physics limitations, new solutions are coming out, and recent demonstrations have occurred, where now we have the possibility of having a free space optical backbone for some of these networks to move the information around. This will be especially useful to shape the kind of maritime kill webs you are focused upon as well.”
In short, reworking the command element enabling an integrated distributed force will be reinforced in the next few years by innovations in the C2 and ISR (understood as Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) technologies. Co-evolution is a key driver of change in combat capability.
Mumbai. The Indian Navy’s third stealth Scorpene class Submarine INS Karanj was been commissioned at the Naval Dockyard Mumbai through a formal ceremony on March 10.
Admiral VS Shekhawat former Chief of the Naval Staff, who was part of the commissioning crew of the old Karanjand later the Commanding officer during the 1971 Indo–Pak war, was the Chief Guest for the ceremony.
Six Scorpene Class submarines are being built in India by the Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) Mumbai, under collaboration with M/s Naval Group, France.
INS Karanj would form part of the Western Naval Command’s submarine fleet and would be another potent part of the Command’s arsenal.
Admiral Karambir Singh, Chief of the Naval Staff, and other senior officers from the Indian Navy and MoD were amongst the several dignitaries who witnessed the commissioning ceremony.
The crew of the erstwhile Karanj, a Russian origin Foxtrot Class submarine which was decommissioned in 2003 were also special invitees for the ceremony.
During his address, the CNS said “this impetus to indigenisation and AatmaNirbharBharat is a fundamental tenet of Indian Navy’s growth story and future operational capabilities”.
The Chief Guest, Admiral Shekhawat, also highlighted India’s push towards AatmaNirbharta by saying “we live in an India launching numerous satellites, building nuclear submarines, manufacturing vaccines for the worlds – the new Karanj is another example of it”
This year is being celebrated as the ‘Swarnim Vijay Varsh’ which marks 50 years of 1971 Indo – Pak war. The old Karanj, commissioned on September 4, 1969 at Riga in the erstwhile USSR, also took active part in the conflict under the Command of then Cdr VS Shekhawat. In recognition of the valiant action of her officers and crew, a number of personnel were decorated, including award of Vir Chakra to Cdr VS Shekhawat. Interestingly, the commissioning Commanding Officer of the old Karanj, Cdr MNR Samant, later on became the first Chief of The Naval Staff of the newly formed Bangladesh Navy in 1971.
“The Scorpene submarines are one of the most advanced conventional submarines in the world. These platforms are equipped with the latest technologies in the world. More deadly and stealthier than their predecessors, these submarines are equipped with potent weapons and sensors to neutralise any threat above or below the sea surface,” the Defence Ministry said.
“The induction of Karanj is another step towards the Indian Navy, consolidating its position as a builder’s Navy, as also is a reflection of MDL’s capabilities as a premier ship and submarine building yard of the world. Project – 75 also marks a critical milestone in the Yard’s continued importance in the field of defence production,” the Ministry added.
This article was published by India Strategic on March 10, 2021.
The photos and video have been provided by Naval Group and the press release from Naval Group can be read below:
On Friday 19th February Buckingham Palace announced that the Duke and Duchess of Sussex, would not be returning as working members of the Royal family: “The Queen has confirmed that in stepping away from the work of the royal family it is not possible to continue with the responsibility and duties that come with a life of public service. The honorary military appointments and Royal patronages held by the duke and duchess will therefore be returned to Her Majesty before being redistributed among working members of the Royal family.”
This means that Prince Harry will lose his role as the Captain General of the Royal Marines, a ceremonial position in the Queen’s gift, which was held by his grandfather, the Duke of Edinburgh, from 1953 until 2017.
The Sussex’s (that is Harry and Meghan) had in any case already signed lucrative contracts with Netflix and Spotify, and Megan (and Harry) are scheduled for an “intimate” interview with Oprah Winfrey to be broadcast on CBS on March 7th 2021.
Oprah Winfrey at Harry and Meghan Wedding: Credit: Creative Commons
They were in any case already ensconced in a comfortable mansion in Montecito in Southern California, neighbours to Oprah’s 70 acre estate, living in the favorite retreat of the denizens of Tinseltown. None of this of course is very good timing with the 99 year old Duke of Edinburgh in hospital in London.
The English tabloid press are bound to have a field day. They are already smarting in any case from the libel judgment won by Megan Markle against the “DailyMail on Sunday” for having published parts of her private letter to her father.
Queen Elizabeth ll certainly (and most probably inadvertently) made an inspired choice when she bestowed on Captain Harry Wales (aka Henry Albert David Mountbatten-Windsor) the title of Duke of Sussex on the eve of his marriage to the American actress, Megan Markle, at St. George’s Chapel at Windsor Castle on May 19 2018.
It was a title first held by Prince Augustus Frederick (1773-1843), the ninth child of King George lll. That is the King who lost America.
Duke of Sussex: Credit: Portugal e o Reino Unido A Aliança Revisitada, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1995
If nothing else the Royal Marriage of Harry and Megan achieved one thing: It joined one dysfunctional family to another.
It was the divorced Prince of Wales, the Duke of Cornwall, who walked Megan Markle down the aisle.
His second wife, Camila Parker Bowles, now the Duchess of Cornwall, sat close to the Queen. Megan’s father, Thomas Markle, the 76 year old American retired television lighting director and director of photography had remained at his home in Mexico.
Thomas Markle had been divorced from his first wife, Roslyn Loveless, in 1973. He had married his second wife, Doria Ragland, in 1979, and was divorced again in 1987.
Doria Ragland, however, did attend the wedding of their daughter to Prince Harry in St. George’s Chapel.
Prince Harry’s mother, Diana, the divorced Princess of Wales, had died at the age of 36 in a horrendous car-crash in 1997, in the Pont de l’Alma tunnel in Paris with her boyfriend, the Egyptian film producer, Dodi Fayad (who like Harry Wales had attended the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst).
Dodi was the son of the billionaire, Mohamed Al-Fayad, then the owner of the Ritz Hotel in Paris (where the two were staying), and of Harrod’s in London, as well as of Fulham Football Club.
After the death of Wallis Simpson, the Duchess of Windsor in 1986, Al-Fayad had also taken over the lease of the “Villa Windsor” in Paris, which had been the home of the former King Edward VIII, who after his abdication in 1936 was known as the Duke of Windsor.
The Queen’s father only became George VI because of this abdication.
His eldest daughter, Elizabeth, only became the Queen as a result of these Windsor family contretemps.
Which of course involved a love affair with an American divorcee Wallis Simpson, much like Prince Harry’s infatuation and marriage Megan Markle, another strong willed American divorcee.
Tony Blair, the British prime minister at the time of Princess Diana’s death, had memorably called Diana “The People’s Princess”.
It was an inspired sobriquet.
It prompted the Queen to belatedly acknowledge Diana’s death in a public address from Buckingham Palace.
Diana was immensely popular. Unlike her husband Prince Charles who greatly resented Diana as a result.
Mohamed Al-Fayed established a memorial shrine at Harrods to Diana and Dodi in 1998 with photos of the two behind a pyramid shaped display which held the wine glass still smudged with lipstick from Diana’s last dinner at the Ritz Hotel.
In 2005 he unveiled a bronze statue he had commissioned named the “innocent victims” which portrayed Diana and Dodi dancing on a beach beneath the wings of an albatross. It remained at the bottom of the main staircase at Harrods until Al-Fayed sold the luxury department store to the Qatari Royal Family in 2010 after which the statue was removed.
Photographs of Statues at Harrods: Creative Commons
To the surprise of many Harry and Megan choose the name ”Archie” for their first born son. In 2020 they were already established in Southern California after “Megxit.”
That is what the Rupert Murdoch owed English tabloid newspaper the “Sun” dubbed Megan and Harry’s exit from Royal duties in January 2020. Murdoch is no great fan of British royalty.
And the sons of Princess Diana are no big fans of the British tabloid press. “Megxit” is a clever play on Brexit.
The Sussex couple named their new enterprise “Archiewell Inc”. Curiously neither Harry nor Megan seem to have realized that many “old folk” in Britain will have remembered another “Archie”, Peter Brough’s ventriloquist dummy “Archie Andrews”.
The dummy “Archie” which in the 1950s had 15 million fans was eventually sold at auction in Taunton, Somerset, in 2005 for £35.000. (Peter Brough died in 1999). “Archie Andrews” who was no beauty was the object of many a British child’s nightmares.
Archie Andrews. Credit: Wikimedia
Growing up in Somerset during the 1950s l never found “Archie Andrews” entirely convincing since Peter Brough’s mouth could be seen moving when the “Archie Andrews” show transferred from the radio to television. Archie had originally been a Music Hall stunt where the audience was some distance away. On the radio it did not matter at all if Peter Brough’s mouth moved or not. Television was another matter. The American ventriloquist version was Edgar Bergen’s dummy “Charlie McCarthy” (Edgar Bergen was more famous later-on as the father of Candice Bergen).
I am not sure if “Charlie McCarthy” induced nightmares in sleeping American children. Probably not since “Charlie McCarthy” was very well dressed and behaved.
And after all “he” was an “All-American” dummy.
The irony is that the original Duke of Sussex, Prince Augustus Frederick, born in London on 27th of January 1773, was tall and good looking, and he was highly intelligent, unlike Harry Wales, the current Duke of Sussex, who is by all accounts not the brightest spark.
Prince Harry had taken two A-levels at Eton, receiving a B in Art and a D in geography. He was, however, apparently “a top tier athlete” in Polo and Rugby Union. He also “received help”(it is alleged) on the A-level “expressive” project which he needed to secure his place at the Sandhurst.
He went on to a ten year military career which included two deployments in Afghanistan, the first British Royal, to have been in a combat zone since the Falkland War where his uncle Prince Andrew had served.
The biographer Clive Irving recently observed (when discussing the unsuitability of Prince Charles ever becoming Charles lll), that Prince Andrew’s “libido and brain separated long ago.”
He remains, however, the Queen’s favorite son. Prince Harry has also had his misadventures in the past. From partying in a Nazi uniform, to his escapades in Las Vegas when he was photographed naked and drunk at a party clutching an equally naked young lady.
The photographs were published needless to say in Rupert Murdoch’s tabloid the “Sun” in Britain (but not in the rest of the British press out of deference, though the photographs were published elsewhere outside Britain.
This was much as the British press had avoided any mention of King Edward VIII’s affair with Wallis Simpson despite the fact that it was headline news elsewhere across the world.
But Prince Harry’s behaviour was nothing compared with an antics of his uncle, Prince Andrew, the Duke of York, and his lingering friendship with the convicted child sex trafficker the late Jeffrey Epstein.
Megan Markle seems to have curbed Prince Harry’s tendencies in that direction. Prince Harry’s ten years of military years, and two deployments in Afghanistan were admirable and led him to establish the “Invictus Games” for wounded service personnel, which is a very worthy endeavour, and which he will continue from his Southern California bolthole.
One his great regrets in leaving the royal family was having to step down as Captain General of the Royal Marines. Prince Harry wore his full dress uniform at the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the end of WW2 and of the 80th anniversary of the formation of the British commandos at the Royal Albert Hall on March 7th 2020, during one of his last appearances with the Megan, the Duchess of Sussex, as a “working Royal.”
Harry and Meghan at Royal Albert Hall: Credit: BBC News
He received a warm standing ovation.
Prince Augustus Frederick (1759-1840) like his successor as the Duke of Sussex was a rebel.
He too did not marry in a manner that the British establishment approved. He had studied at the German university of Gottingen in Hanover. He had travelled throughout France and Italy and settled in Rome in where he met and fell in love with Lady Augusta Murray, the daughter of the Count of Dunmore, a Scotsman and a Catholic, who he married in secret in Rome in April 1793 at the Hotel Sarmiento in a Church of England ceremony
. In September 1793 Prince Augustus Frederick returned to London followed by his wife and the marriage ceremony was repeated in December 1793. Lady Augusta was already pregnant with their first child. The Royal Marriage Act of 1772, prohibited marriages of princes without the royal approval. In 1794 Augustus Frederick was forced to leave England settling in Italy and afterwards in 1798 in Berlin. The marriage was annulled in 1794 but Lady Augusta left England in secret and in August 1799 and joined her husband in Berlin.
While in Berlin, on 20 December 1798, Prince Augustus Frederick was initiated into the Berlin Masonic Lodge “Royal York zur Freundschaft.” His initiation into freemasonry was to have a profound influence on his later life. During May 1800 Prince Augustus Frederick returned to England and after separation from Lady Augusta (although she had a second child by him, Augusta Ema, born in August 1801), he was granted the title of Duke of Sussex, a seat in the House of Lords, and an annual income of £12,000, later increased to £18,000 and finally to £20,000.
The new Duke of Sussex then left for Lisbon without Lady Augusta, where he established his residence in the Palácio das Necessidades (which is today the elegant seat of the Portuguese foreign ministry.).
Palácio das necessidades: Credit: Portugal e o Reino Unido A Aliança Revistada, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian 1995
He collected a small court around him of young aristocrats, intellectuals, and military officers, many of them freemasons. In 1802 he was visited in Lisbon by the Prince Edward, Duke of Kent, (1767-1820), then the governor of Gibraltar, who was the father of the future Queen Victoria.
The Duke of Kent went to North America and from Canada visited New York, the first British Royal to do so. In Portugal the Duke of Sussex sponsored the consolidation and recognition of Portuguese freemasonry and the birth of the Grand Lusitania Orient (1802) and its recognition by English freemasonry.
These Masonic connections in Portugal were to play a very important role in his own future and that of Brazil.
In 1796 D. Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho who was the godson of the Marques de Pombal (1699-1782), the de-facto prime minister of Portugal between 1750 and 1777, and the radical reformer of the University of Coimbra, had been recalled to Lisbon from Turin where he was the Portuguese ambassador, and had joined the government in Lisbon as the Minister of the Navy and the Overseas Dominions. D. José, the heir apparent had died of smallpox at the age of 27 in 1788.
The Portuguese monarch, Queen Maria l, had been showing increasing signs of old mental instability and was officially constrained in February 1792. In 1799 D. João assumed the title of Prince Regent. In Britain between 1788-1789 King George lll had suffered his first spell of madness.
And in 1811 in the face of George lll’s continuing ravings, his son was eventually declared by parliament to be the Prince Regent. Both Britain and Portugal each therefore had mad rulers, both the King of England and the Queen of Portugal safely tucked away from public view. In Lisbon D. Rodrigo found a major subliminal conflict for influence between the pro-English and pro-French factions at court, reflecting the broader European conflict between the two nations, and the balance of influence between the two factions in Lisbon was always fluid and precarious.
Rodrigo’s main focus was on reforming the colonial system. He employed many of the young graduates of the reformed university of Coimbra, including the 24 year old Brazilian born graduate, Hipólito José da Costa Pereira Furtado de Mendonça, who he sent on an official mission to the United States to examine the new agricultural and manufacturing techniques being developed there, especially in tobacco and cânhamo, a plant from which a coarse fibre is obtained used to make ropes, bags, sails as well as cannabis (hashish or marijuana), and to also visit Mexico to obtain cochineal beetles with the objective of developing the cochineal industry in Brazil.
Hipólito da Costa had been born in 1774 in Colônia do Sacramento, at the time a fortified Portuguese outpost on the northern bank of the Rio da la Plata opposite Buenos Aires.
Hipólito da Costa: Credit: Wikidata
Hypolito da Costa arrived in Philadelphia in late December 1798, which was then the capital of the United States. He found the county in the midst of a crisis over the Alien and Sedition Acts introduced by President John Adams. Resolutions passed in 1798 and 1799 by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures opposed the Acts. Thomas Jefferson held that the federal government had no right to exercise powers not delegated to it by the Constitution.
The Sedition Act passed on July 14th 1798, declared any “treasonable activity”, including the publication of “any false, scandalous and malicious writing” was a high misdemeanour, punishable by fine and imprisonments. Twenty-five men most of them editors of Republican newspapers were arrested and their newspapers forced to shut down.
One of those arrested charged with libelling President Adams was Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of the Philadelphia Democrat-Republican “Aurora.”
The young Bach had accompanied his grandfather Benjamin Franklin to Paris at the age of seven has been educated in France and was a fervent Francophile. He had returned to Philadelphia in 1785. He was a critic of George Washington and supporter of the Jeffersonian-Republican faction and had run the “Aurora” from the time of his grandfather’s death in 1790 until his own death in 1798 from yellow fever.
After Thomas Jefferson’s election to the presidency in 1800 once in office Jefferson pardoned all those convicted under the Sedition Act and Congress restored all fines paid with interest.
Hypolito da Costa remained in the US until 1800 reporting to D. Rodrigo and keeping in a dairy of his activities. In Philadelphia he joined the Masonic lodge.
He met President John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, attended the House of Representatives and the Senate and the Supreme Court. He subscribed to the “Aurora” which published detailed political and economic intelligence and diplomatic cables as well as economic, political and social news. He visited the churches and meeting houses of the various religious denominations, and the synagogue, and he observed the Quakers. In 1799 he travelled through the northern states, attending the commencement exercises at Columbia College in New York City, and visiting the Niagara Falls and Canada. Then he went south to Virginia and the Carolinas.
He eventually gained a passport from the Spanish minister to go to Mexico. The delay was Hipólito observed because “he supposed l was a kind of political spy.” Which indeed to some degree he was. His visit to Mexico was brief. But he did collect cochineal beetles which unfortunately died on their arrival in Philadelphia.
On his return to Lisbon in 1801 he was appointed as the literary director of the Royal Press and in 1801 and made an official visit to England. But on his return he was imprisoned for three years by the inquisition accused of disseminating Masonic materials. Escaping he fled Portugal via Spain and Gibraltar and from there took ships to London where he was protected the Duke of Sussex and become his private Secretary.
In 1808 began began the publication in Portuguese in London of the “Correio Brasiliense” which was to be the first Brazilian newspaper very much in the model of Philadelphia “Aurora.” And he published a stinging account of his imprisonment by the Portuguese inquisition.
The first edition of the monthly “Correio Braziliense” was published on June 1st 1808 and it continued without interruption until 1st of December in 1822. Hypolito Costa attacked his old patron, D. Rodrigo de Souza, now the count of Linhares, who was then the chief minister of the Portuguese government which had been established in Rio de Janeiro where it had fled to escape Napoleon’s invading army in 1807. The “Correio Brasiliense” was sent clandestinely to Brazil and espoused liberal ideals, supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy, covered the Pernambuco revolution of 1817, and supported the independence of Brazil.
The “Correio” advocated the liberty of the press, security of property, trial by jury, public accountability of public accounts, access to all to public offices, the abolition of the inquisition, the moving of the capital to the interior, and the gradual abolition of slavery, and the encouragement of immigration to Brazil from Germany, Scotland, Ireland, Holland and Italy. Hypolito da Costa was appointed to be the Brazilian Representative in London after the declaration of Brazilian Independence in 1822. But he was to die at the age of 49 in Kensington on September 11, 1823, soon after he had received the news of his nomination.
Prince Augustus Frederick, the first Duke of Sussex, after his return to England in 1804 had taken up his seat in House of Lords and for many years stood in opposition to Tory governments, defending religious emancipation of catholics, non-conformists, and Jews, and fighting for the abolition of slavery.
In 1812 he became the assistant Grand Master and in 1813 the Grand Master of the Great Lodge of England, a faction known as the Moderns. In December 1813 the Duke of Sussex united the two factions of the freemasons, the moderns and the ancients, and was elected as Grand Master of the United English Lodge. He was elected president of the Royal society in 1835.
The only public visit of the current Duke and Duchess of Sussex to the country of Sussex took place in 2018 when they visited Chichester and at Edes House, were shown a rare copy of America’s Declaration of Independence.
Duke and Duchess of Sussex in Sussex: Credit: AFP
Discovered by two Harvard University researchers in 2017 the parchment manuscript copy was folded away in the West Sussex Record Office in Chichester, and belonged to the Third Duke of Richmond, known as “Radical Dick” who supported the American colonists.
The only other copy is in the National Archives in Washington. DC.
Unlike his father George lll who opposed American independence, his son the first Duke of Sussex, and his private Secretary, Hypolito da Costa, supported the independence of Brazil.
After the death of Lady Augusta in 1830, the Prince Augusto Frederick, Duke of Sussex, remarried Lady Cecilia Underwood, once again violating the Royal Marriage Act. But this was accepted by the Court and by pubic opinion, and unlike the (now) old Queen Elizabeth ll, the (then) young Queen Victoria, much appreciated and accommodated her uncle.
Grave of the Duke of Sussex: Kendal Green Cemetery
The first Duke of Sussex died in 1843 a rebel to the end.
He was not buried at Windsor Castle in St. George’s Chaple, but was laid to rest instead in the public cemetery at Kensal Green, where his modest tomb remains to this day (next to that of Lady Cecilia), though, like the first Duke of Sussex, his grave is largely forgotten.
The pathway for the U.S. Navy to integrate unmanned surface vessels into its fleet operations is for these vehicles to be able to effectively and efficiently support real-world tasks that fit into maritime concepts of operations, rather than being disruptive technology to mission operations and undercutting combat capability.
A key path to do so is for industry to work with the maritime forces in order to demonstrate their performance, and in the process also evolve their platforms and tailor them to more effectively deliver desired combat capability.
In my first interview with Jack Rowley, the Chief Technology Officer and Senior Naval Architect and Ocean Engineer with Maritime Tactical Systems (MARTAC), we discussed how the U.S. Navy was addressing the challenge of operating maritime autonomous systems.
We discussed the key importance of getting USVs into the workflow in order to shape a way ahead for maritime remotes to operate within a combat force.
Maritime unmanned systems are simply that until they fit into the mission and warfare workflow and become a key part of the evolving concepts of operations of the fleet.
In Rowley’s view, the U.S. Navy has the opportunity to do so now.
According to Rowley: “The Navy has, in the past year, shown excellent initiative on the need for both USVs and UUVs within the Maritime Environment.
“To the point that they have set up a UUVRON-1 in Keyport, WA and the SURFDEVRON-1 in San Diego to start using them with fleet assets, not only in scheduled exercises, but to also begin looking at using them to visualize what they can do as a key player with manned fleet units.”
In other words, the U.S. Navy is moving closer to the opportunity to incorporate unmanned maritime surface vessels as part of its modular task force approach to operating the force as a kill web.
And these USVs can be fitted to do a variety of mission tasks going forward.
In this interview, we focused on the interaction between exercises with the users and how MARTAC is shaping the kind of capability which industry can then offer to the end user.
Or put in other words, exercises drive development; development provides new capabilities which then can be inserted into a new exercise regime, taking the U.S. Navy closer to being able to acquire the kind of operational capability which will fit into the fighting force, rather than disrupting it.
As Rowley described the process, the various exercises MARTAC has engaged in since he came to the company in 2015, have led to the shaping of a scalable fleet of ships ranging in size from a six foot to a fifty-foot USV, which allows the operation of a variety of payloads, with high performance speed and extended range of operation for the fleet of maritime autonomous systems.
In Rowley’s view, the exercises they have involved in have been part of the process whereby the U.S. Navy is looking more seriously at what, and how, USVs can contribute to the fleet.
ISR-Focused Exercises
The first exercise we discussed was the S2ME2 ANTX Exercise held by the USMC at Camp Pendleton in California in September 2016.
At this exercise, there was a focus on the potential operational impact of using USVs for an amphibious ship-to-shore mission. MARTAC brought an eight-foot version of its MANTAS USV to perform two missions: (1) Sail into the Del Mar Boat Basin and from that location relay video to the amphibious force command center and (2) just outside of the immediate surf zone, the T8 scanned and provided ISR data on an obstacle location, beach gradient, water conditions and a visual of the shoreline. In other words, the T-8 performed an ISR mission to support the assault force.
Effectively, the function of the 8-footer was to go in and survey the beach prior to an assault.
As Rowley highlighted: “It was strictly a nightime ISR mission. The T8 sailed in autonomously, looked around, got some video and then brought it back out again without being detected.”
The next exercise we discussed was one with which I have gone to in the past, namely, Bold Alligator.
This BA exercise was BA-17 held in October 2017. They operated from Camp Lejeune and the task was again an ISR tasking. Rowley highlighted the USV mission in this exercise as follows: “Camp Lejeune was to be basically a long range USV environment with a reconnaissance mission to go up the inter-coastal waterway and be able to scan both sides of the waterway looking for anything that’s out of the ordinary. Also, there was an additional ISR task to look at the bottom of the waterway with a small sonar for detection of any anomalies.”
The operators at Naval Station, Norfolk, Va., controlled a T6 (6-foot MANTAS) and a T12 (12-foot MANTAS) USV. They operated the vehicles in the inter-coastal waterway at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, using and EO/IR camera to stream live, hi-res video and sonar images to the command center. In addition, the craft also operating offshore and used a single beam sonar to perform bottom imaging to determine landing craft hazards and examination of shoreline defense structures.
Both of these exercises supported ISR missions for an amphibious assault force.
The focus was upon expanding the scope of ISR that could be available to the command element either prior to the assault or following the assault. They used 6-foot, 8-foot and 12-foot variants of the modular MANTAS configuration.
Scalability was being demonstrated as well as payload flexibility in terms of what each of the different sized USVs could be integrated with during the exercise. In other words, what was demonstrated was that a common operating system on these three different sizes of USVs with variant payloads could deliver a desired combat capability.
The Bold Alligator Exercise highlighted the importance of an exercise for evolving capabilities as well.
As Rowley put it: “The exercise underscored the shortfall of the smaller sensors that could be placed onboard the 6-foot variant. The T6 only had a small omnidirectional camera on itresulting in its inability to see the shore very well in its constant motion scenario. Whereas the 12-footer had a SeaFLIR 230 high-resolution gyro-stabilized EO/IR camera
“Another aspect highlighted during the exercise is the key significance of reliability for USVs. Reliability and functional performance are required for any success for USVs because, unlike a Navy ship that’s manned or a small boat that’s manned, if something goes wrong, sailors can be sent to repair it. On the USV, if something goes wrong you better be able to bring it home because you can’t fix it during its operation at sea.”
Rowley underscored the importance of the scalability and modularity aspect of a USV.
“It is important to be able to change out the sensors without having to build a new boat. USVs have generally been built to support a particular mission and both the boat and payload are designed and built as a “single solution” to a mission.
“Our focus is different. We want to deliver mission flexibility into a scalable fleet so that the operational and logistics support capabilities mean that you can carry our USVs on a larger vessel and have a wide variety of modifiable payload options for the use of that USV during the complete operational cycle of the larger naval vessel operating within a variable task force concept of operations.”
Logistical Support Exercises
We next discussed a very different type of exercise, one which highlights a key area where USVs can play a key role in supporting maritime logistics support.
Valiant Shield 2018 was held at Guam. It was a major Navy-Marine Corps exercise, and at that exercise, one focus was upon how USVs could help conduct a combat resupply mission.
The INDOPACOM Joint Exercise was conducted on the Marianas Island Range complex in Guam. MARTAC provided two MANTAS T12 craft deployed from the MSC ship, USNS Curtiss (T-AVB4) to support rapid ship-to-short logistics sustainment via USVs. The T-12 provided proof of concept of the ability to provide resupply via a USV from ship to shore.
The size of the T12 limited the payload to only 120 pounds of cargo, but the proof of concept has paved the way for MARTAC to develop and test a new ”Expeditionary Class” T38 (38ft) USV to perform this combat resupply mission by carrying up to 4500 pounds in a single load. The potential impact of such a capability is significant for this logistics mission.
According to Rowley, the T38 in its anticipated mission profile could, with a four USV craft fleet be able to deliver a buildup of over 400,000 pounds of material in a single day, and to do so by using an all-maritime autonomous force.
This figure is based on two assumptions: a four craft fleet of T38s supporting an amphibious ship stand off at 20 nautical miles. The USV craft would travel at a cruise speed of 25kts to the beach with a full load of 18,000 pounds per sortie. Return speed to the MSC ship, without load would be at 70kts. In this manner, the four-craft USV fleet could deliver 18,000 pounds of material to the beach each hour.
The T38 can fit into a standard 11-meter rib slot on an MSC or Naval ship. For example, there would only need to be minor modifications on the Curtiss to be able to hold six to eight of the T38s, thereby providing this very necessary ship to shore logistics support capability.
The advantages of such a capability are clear.
And Rowley underscored just how significant such a capability could be in terms of work flow as well. “Using either the T38 or T50, one can move material with one or two supervisory controllers on the mother ship. This frees up significant manpower to do other tasks on either the support ships or ashore.”
Another key advantage is that such a logistics support mission using a USV which can fit into a standard 11-meter RIB means it can operate across the fleet to provide a connectivity mission set. In effect, one can use Ships-of-Opportunity to provide the linkage function rather than a specialized support ship.
As Rowley highlighted: “It doesn’t have to be a MSC ship that’s fully opted in for the MSC purpose and that’s controlled by the government. It can be any type of a cargo ship that has cranes. Such a ship can be configured to be able to handle multiple unmanned surface vessels so they can get the equipment in the theater. And then be able to launch it and send material to shore.”
In other words, one can enhance significantly the distributed logistics function to a maritime distributed fleet.
Counter-Mine Exercise
The final exercise we discussed was Trident Warrior 2020 which was held in San Diego and which I briefly attended prior to visiting the Navy Air Boss.
I described that exercise in some detail in an earlier article, but the focus of this effort was to use the T38 which is now part of the new MARTAC “Expeditionary Class – DEVIL RAY” to work with Teledyne Brown engineering to deliver a new payload, namely, a counter-mine payload. What was demonstrated was that the craft is one which is very flexible in terms of payloads which it can carry.
The payload in this case was a high-speed multi-sensor, single-sortie detect-to-engage mine-counter-mine capability. The graphic below, summarizes what was demonstrated in Trident Warrior 2020.
Through these exercises, not only are the maritime services learning what USVs can do, but also, industry is getting closer to having operational capabilities to support the fleet.
With the next major exercise coming up in April in which MARTAC will participate, Rowley estimates that the craft they are bringing will be close to being 90% fully operational.
Through routine exercise, test, and then redesign/rework, the craft continue to learn from each exercise and the Navy gets closer to having operational USVs that support operations rather than disrupting them.
That’s what true disruptive technology is all about – supporting a more lethal and survivable force, rather than making it more vulnerable.
Always remember the lessons from how useful having radar in the force was at Pearl Harbor on December 7 or December 8th (dependent on what side of the time line you were on) 1941.
The featured photo: T12 at sea operating from the MSC ship delivering cargo to the port in Guam during Valiant Shield
For an e-book version of a background paper for this interview, see the following:
