By Robbin Laird

A year ago, I visited Pax River and had a chance to discuss the progress of the CH-53K with  Colonel Jack Perrin Program Manager, PMA-261 H53 Heavy Lift Helicopters, US Naval Air Systems Command at Pax River Naval Air Station.

And this week, he provided an update at this week’s International Military Helicopter Conference.

What was especially noteworthy was that Col. Perrin was able after a year of COVID-19 disruptions to report significant progress on the program.

Indeed, when answering a question from the virtual audience, he underscored how the team – government and industry – had adapted to the challenging conditions to continue progress on the program and to continue to close on to the IOC for the program.

He noted that the sea trials held last year were done under challenging conditions but were completed very successfully.

This is a testament to a very good working team supporting the program and hats off to them being able to persist in the face of significant uncertainties.

But then again they are Marines!

My visit to New River during the first week of December 2020 underscored the significant progress underway which Col. Perrin discussed at the conference.

Notably, the training systems are in place, the maintenance regime is working well, and last month, the Marines were able to completely maintain their CH-53Ks at New River on their own without contractor support as they moved down the road to later operational testing this year.

And last month, CH-53K King Stallion took its first fleet flight. Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) at Marine Corps Air Station New River, NC, launched the CH-53K King Stallion on its first fleet flight January 15, 2021.

The aircraft now enters a new phase of testing where it will be used to train Marines as they prepare for Operational Test and Evaluation later this year.

Col. Perrin focused significantly in his presentation on what the only new heavy lift helicopter for the joint force would bring to that force.

“I would tell you the 53K is what I would call the 5 th generation or the leading generation of heavy lift helicopters for all helicopters. It is fly by wire it has the power and speed that you really need in a helicopter and really executes its mission extremely well.”

He put a key point very well which pilots of the CH-53K have emphasized: “The pilots can put the aircraft where they need to in the combat environment.”

This is about the ability to work in degraded environments and with the fly by wire and other digital systems are able to put that aircraft exactly where the optimal location in the combat environment.

When I met with Lt. Col. Frank of VMX-1, the officer in charge of the CH-53K Operational Test Detachment, he underscored the importance of this capability to the warfighter.

“I’ve started in the Ch-53D in 2004, they’re my first love. I’ll always love them.

“They were much harder to fly. And the ease of flying this, the flight control system is probably the biggest game changer for the 53 community.

“We’re not used to anything like this. It’s very intuitive. It can be as hands off as you know, a brand-new Tesla, you can close your eyes, set the autopilot and fly across country.

“Obviously, you wouldn’t do that in a tactical environment, but it does reduce your workload, reduces your stress.

“And in precision hover areas, whether it’s night under low light conditions, under NVGs, in the confines of a tight landing zone, we have the ability to hit position hold in the 53 K and have the aircraft maintain pretty much within one foot of its intended hover point, one foot forward, lateral and AFT, and then one foot of vertical elevation change.

“It will maintain that hover until the end of the time if required. that’s very, very stress relieving for us when landing in degraded visual environments. Our goal at VMX-1 is to create tactics that employ that system effectively.

“Some communities struggle with how they use the automation, do they let the automation do everything? Do they let the pilots do everything? How to work the balance?

“We’re working on a hybrid where the pilots can most effectively leverage automation.

“If you know you’re coming into a brownout situation or degraded visual environment, you engage the automation at a point right before the dust envelops you. And then in the 53-K, you can continue flying with the automation engaged.

“You continue flying with the automation engaged, and you can override it, but as soon as you stop moving the controls, it will take your inputs, estimate what you wanted and keep the aircraft in its position.

“It’s a very intuitive flight control system, and it blends very well with the pilot and the computers. It allows you to override the computer.

“And then the second that you stop overriding it, the computer takes back over without any further pilot input.

“That’s probably the biggest game changer for our community.”

Colonel Perrin also emphasized the importance of enhanced survivability. “It was designed with survivability in mind.

“And what does that mean?

“When we define survivability it is how does the aircraft perform after its been hit and what I mean by that that is after its been shot at or after a missile has been shot at it.

“The 53K was designed to perform extremely well to get those pilots and crew out of that danger area…. Its ability to have survivability and survivability capabilities are extremely good.”

When met last year, we discussed at length a key element of new air systems, namely, being designed from the ground up for digital interoperability and software upgradeability.

Colonel Perrin highlighted that the aircraft was a “smart aircraft” and that it would both draw from and contribute to the integratable combat force working in a digital combat space.

In my words, it is designed to be a kill web contributor as well as engagement asset in the extended combat space.

He was asked a question of how it would work with the Osprey and highlighted how the two working together would help redefine the nature of the assault force.

Some of that change was already presaged in the Deepwater exercise conducted last summer at 2^nd Marine Air Wing.

He concluded: “We’re just going to be able to bring more and farther and faster with the 53K as it integrates and moves forward …. I see this as a backbone of support, logistic support for the Marine Corps.”

Featured Photo: The CH-53K King Stallion successfully plugs into a funnel-shaped drogue towed behind a KC-130J during aerial refueling wake testing over the Chesapeake Bay. Photo by Erik Hildebrandt.

Also, see the following:

Marine Corps Conducting Fleet Flight Tests of CH-53K Ahead of IOT&E This Summer

By Tony McCormack

The world has changed rapidly over the past 18 months and the way Australia’s defence organisation trains its people needs to change with it, or skills and readiness will surely decline.

A combination of the Australian Defence Force’s involvement in responding to natural disasters over the summer of 2019–20 and Covid-19 restrictions throughout 2020 resulted in the cancellation of major military exercises such as Hamel, and the scope of those that did proceed was reduced. Pitch Black 20, initially cancelled, was eventually held as a scaled-down virtual exercise. This pattern was consistent across the Five Eyes, with RIMPAC also drastically reduced in scale and scope.

Despite this reduction in activities, military personnel were still required to retain their individual skills and the ADF to maintain its readiness and preparedness levels. However, the lack of realistic training opportunities no doubt resulted in some atrophy of the ADF’s operational ability.

Despite the availability of a vaccine, Covid restrictions are going to remain with us for a while yet, precluding a return to large-scale training activities and preventing international travel to exercise with allies and partners. Greater investment is needed in alternative approaches that leverage emerging trends in simulation to rectify the deficiencies that the reduction in training will produce.

Live, virtual and constructive training, or LVC, is a taxonomy used mainly for military training, where there’s a mix between real people, simulated capabilities and environments, and computer-generated elements. Imagine a soldier in the field in the Northern Territory, calling in a simulated airstrike from an F-35 pilot seated in a simulator at a Royal Australian Air Force base in New South Wales against a computer-generated threat.

The holy grail of LVC is the ability to integrate all the individual components to conduct complex multidimensional training at varying levels of complexity and security, with widely dispersed personnel and platforms. The ultimate goal is an event that links all components together, giving the participants the maximum training benefit in as realistic an environment as possible.

The ADF conducts LVC to a limited extent. During 2020, the ADF participated in virtual exercises such as Coalition Virtual Flag, Wirra Jaya and Fleet Synthetic Training, to name a few. While all were international, they were constrained to a narrow focus on elements in the air, land and sea environments.

Unfortunately, LVC hasn’t yet reached its potential. The main obstacles are the cost of implementation and of service-specific training systems and, up until last year, the abundance of live training activities and exercises. The changed environment wrought by 2020 has provided the opportunity for a more considered approach to LVC for the ADF.

Covid-19 isn’t the only catalyst for change; the complexities of contemporary military equipment necessitate and complicate the development and implementation of LVC. The combat systems and weapons on high-end platforms such as the F-35 joint strike fighter and air warfare destroyer operate on manufacturers’ proprietary systems at high levels of classification and consume and create massive volumes of data. Stringent security protocols are required to protect both the source codes and the data that is carried, as well as access to a large amount of secure bandwidth.

These weapon systems are also expensive to operate. Combat aircraft cost tens of thousands of dollars per hour to fly, so every hour flown in a simulator means a flying hour saved, a longer period between maintenance cycles and a longer airframe life.

While increasing the scope, quantity and frequency of LVC activities would undoubtedly maximise training opportunities for the ADF and improve the skills and competencies of personnel, it will be difficult to achieve. However, there are some steps that could be taken to improve LVC opportunities.

To begin with, all relevant simulators and computer-based training systems need to be compatible with the LVC network. This will take a change to procurement processes, as current training systems often support only the needs of a particular weapon system, with little thought given to broader interoperability. Where appropriate, new and emerging systems should have LVC compatibility mandated. An extant system should be modified only if it will provide a proven return on investment.

Next, a stand-alone, multi-security, layered IT network should be established. This would remove the added bandwidth demands required to operate LVC from daily operating systems, reduce the chance of data spills and remove any possibility of a simulated scenario being mistaken for an actual event. A robust network may also help to assure manufacturers that their proprietary information won’t be shared with a competitor.

Importantly, an LVC network must be easy to join. A system that’s difficult to get into and navigate will be underutilised and likely provide no training benefit. The system needs to be built for the user and not the IT specialist.

Finally, LVC should not and cannot be pursued by Defence alone. LVC needs a balance of contributors: those who build and maintain the environment, those who provide the training expertise and those who use it. It must be a combination of military and civilian personnel with a broad mixture of qualifications and practical experience.

There’s already a community of Australian companies providing expertise and services in this area. Cubic Australia, for example, currently provides support to all three services across Australia and Milskil, mainly focuses on supporting the fighter force at RAAF Williamtown. Teaming and agreements are already in place and non-defence investments are being made. The North Queensland Simulation Park, or NQ SPARK, is a collaborative activity involving government, industry and academia that’s aimed at providing a multi-user simulation facility.

A more nuanced approach to LVC is needed but it won’t happen unless it is given a higher priority. Resources (particularly budgetary ones) and personnel need to be devoted to building the LVC enterprise. Importantly, LVC needs to be championed at the highest levels to ensure its implementation is promoted and enforced.

While the holy grail will likely never be achieved, circumstances have changed and the requirement to conduct more blended exercises creates opportunities to improve the quality and availability of LVC for the ADF. Training is about people and not just simulators or computers. Any LVC solution needs to be simple to use and provide a training benefit, not a burden.

Tony McCormack joined ASPI’s professional development staff in April 2018 after an extensive career in the Royal Australian Air Force. Image: Department of Defence.

This article was published by ASPI on February 10, 2021.

Also, see our recent book on training for the High-End fight:

In his recent review of the book, Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown had this to say:

For the last 20 years high-end training has continued to be a feature of major USN/USMC and USAF exercises.

However the emphasis and the training has always been modified to take account of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While this was a necessary requirement of the times, it did lead to a stagnation in high-end warfighting concepts as the exercises and training have remained largely unchanged for the last 20 years.

The proliferation of 5th generation technology and the threat posed and encompassed in the cyber and EW domains has continued to evolve rapidly to the point that the latest generation SAMs are not necessarily or even the most significant threats posed to the deployment of Allied Air Power.

The emphasis on operations in the Middle East has meant that the high-end exercises have not evolved as quickly as the technology or the threat.

While the U.S. has continued to develop and deploy leading edge technology for the high-end fight, the training concepts and virtual environments have not necessarily kept pace with the requirements of this new technology.

High quality and realistic training has always been and will continue to be the major determinant in military success.

Training for the High-End Fight is the only recent significant work that looks in detail at this issue.

Robbin Laird uses his significant research over the last seven years and his unprecedented access to USN, USAF and USMC senior warfighters to detail the major shift in thinking that is underway as the U.S. works through the training requirements of Allied Air Power when all the domains are contested by a capable adversary.

By Ed Timperlake

Joint By Design, The Evolution of Australian Strategy is a very important new book by Robbin F.Laird.

As the author sagely points out in his preface that  “this book although focused on Australia, is not just about Australia.”

There is a strategic shift underway as land wars are left behind and alliance forces refocus on the Peoples Republic of China’s  modernization and even mobilization of all aspects of the Peoples Liberation Army.

Please do not let the term “army” lose sight of the growth of a real threat facing Australia, America and other Pacific rim countries and even India.

They put “army” in front of other services, the PLAN or Navy, PLAAF or Air force,  and the  2nd Artillery with ever increasing ICBM and IRBM missile forces all  beginning to sound General Quarters or simply get ready for combat.

The insights in the book, backed by direct evidence of a country and their National Security leaders with typical Australian courage in facing hard truths, is building out military force united in purpose using the most current combat platforms available combined with a  strategic and tactical  communication vision that pulls it all together to become the most platform for platform modern combined fighting force in the world.

Brilliant hard work went into making important acquisition decisions every step of the way and Joint by Design gives full credit to visionary leaders.

In reviewing the book I can make a very personal observation that is so important today about an Australian Navy ship known as the mighty Hobart fighting together with the American 7th Fleet in Vietnam waters in 1968.

I learned a very important lesson that is an echo from history that must always be remembered as a lesson learned in putting together complex military engagements and what is often called “the fog of war.”

HMAS Hobart DDG 39 was a true navy surface action gunfighter.

History reports that on 13 and 14 June 1968 in a running gunfight against NVA costal batteries the HMAS Hobart knocked out one gun while collecting shrapnel from their upper-deck in the exchange.

Now that is truly “guns guns guns” combat.

Sadly soon after that successful dueling gun fight tragedy struck in the dark hours of June 17 when HMAS Hobart’s crew detected incoming air and marked it as friendly.

However, it soon became one of the ugliest “friendly fire” mistakes at sea during the entire Vietnam war.

A section of USAF Phantoms let fly with their Aim-7 Sparrows without doing a visual identification (VID).

The Aim-7 is a semi-active AA missile that requires a lock on until impact.

The surface movement of ship can give a radar lock in the cockpit but without an “eyeball” VID the  missile payload once fired has no idea if it is a ship or low flying attack or recon helicopter.

A failed human operator with bad  intel created this tragedy.

In one respect the HMAS Hobart was fortunate that one of the missile warheads did not explode.

However, the missiles killed and wounded members of the crew.

Showing courage and skill under fire HMAS Hobart managed to get off five rounds of 5in shells as the Phantoms left.

The lesson of this incident rings forward from over half a century ago and is extremely important as the  U.S., Australia and other Allies begin to “train train train” to forge scalable “kill webs” to fight and win any Pacific engagement.

The attack on the HMAS Hobart cannot be written off simply as a ’fog of war” or a tragic friendly fire incident.

It was much more; it was a gross deadly failure of tactical and strategic intelligence.

How do I know because I was present afloat also on the gun line serving as a Naval Academy Midshipman serving on the Fleet Amo ship the USS Great Sitken, AE-17, and after the incident, we also tied up in Subic Bay when the HMAS Hobart made port to assess damage.

Leading up to the attack, all elements of  the 7^th Fleet and 7^th AF were receiving flash traffic that the North Vietnamese were running helicopters up and down their coast at night.

Such important actionable intelligence put all units on extra vigilant air defense combat alert.

What was not known at the time because it was kept highly classified (or even worse simply American cowboy time) that the helicopters were actually CIA missions more than likely flown by their secret AF “Air America.”

It must always be noted there is always a key challenge facing force integration, namely ensuring that the intelligence that is shared provides for a common perspective.

In trying to forge together an effective modern combat force taking full advantage of revolutionary 21^st Century ability to fight at the speed of light for target acquisition and target engagement to have the best payload effectiveness to kill the biggest threats working at cross purposes can defeat the allied force.

I learned this at a very young age; there is something worse than no intelligence and that is bad intelligence.

Australian leaders know this and there is a graceful end that tells me Australia is still such a U.S. special ally.

Years later as a Presidential Appointee Envoy for President Bush (41), I represented America at the dedication of the Australian Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

After Annapolis I qualified as a Naval Aviator and USMC Fighter Pilot and returned to SEA in 1973 serving as a squadron pilot in Task Force Delta trying to stop the Khmer Rouge from overrunning  Cambodia.

With the U.S. Congress ending all combat support on Aug 15 1973, the Cambodian killing fields began.

It was a very dark time, but years later my visit to Australia gave me great hope for the future.

With the never to be forgotten beat of a Huey flying out of the mist while every family who had lost someone during the Vietnam War marched in front of the dedication parade carrying their National Flag while  the band played “Waltzing Matilda,  it was a moment in time never to be forgotten.

I managed to find some of the sailors who served on HMAS Hobart many with families present.

The pride they expressed in serving on HMAS Hobart with the 7^th Fleet was so evident.

The war was over for all and healing had taken place but a tragic mistake had been paid for in blood.

The battle damage of HMAS Hobart after the “friendly fire” incident is seen in the featured photo.

Robbin Laird visited the new HMAS Hobart in Sydney Harbour in 2018.

Visiting HMAS Hobart: A Key Building Block in the Remaking of the Royal Australian Navy

Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy