By Robbin Laird

The terms C2, ISR and training are changing significantly in the shift from the land wars to the high-end fight. C2 is migrating from hierarchical direction to mission command and distributed operations; ISR is moving from intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to INFORMATION to decision making for an integrated distributed force; and training is open ended learning process of how to shape modular task forces that can work together to deliver the desired crisis management and combat effects.

We have written a great deal in the past months about the very significant changes in these domains, and I have recently published a book which highlights some of these changes.

But as the Marines work with the Navy towards more effective integration for the high-end fight, both sides face significant challenges to work with one another. On the one hand, the US Navy has added new ISR capabilities in the form of P-8s and Tritons which have not been designed in any way to support the kind of maneuver operations which the Marines are built to do. On the other hand, the excellent C2 which the Marines have built to operate ashore are not built to work with the at sea maneuver force.

There is no magic technological wand which can be waved over the two forces and create integratability. This must be worked from the ground up on each side and the ultimate purpose of doing so needs to be shaped in very concrete ways and in very clear mission areas. Why are they integrating? For which crisis management or combat effect? Against which adversaries and for what demonstrated positive outcome?

During my visit to II MEF, I had the chance to discuss the way ahead on the Marine Corps side with a very experienced SIGINT officer, who is the head of II MEF G-2 and is the senior intelligence officer for the MEF, Col. William McClane. He joined the Marines towards the end of the Cold War, and as I have seen in both Marine Corps and Navy interviews, there are a smattering of such officers towards the end of the careers who bridge the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new phase of peer competition.

Obviously, the bulk of their careers have been through the land wars period, but these officers understand how very different those wars are from facing an adversary with full spectrum forces able to conduct contested operations across the battlespace, up to and including nuclear weapons.

I have referred to this as the strategic shift, but in many ways, this is more of a strategic shock than a strategic shift. The Navy is shifting from support to land operations to blue water maneuver warfare; the Marines are shifting from being best mates of the U.S. Army to reworking into a maneuver force for full spectrum crisis management. In my own view, the question of being reworked as a maneuver force for full spectrum crisis management is only partly subsumed under an effort for enhanced integration with the Navy. Land-based operations even in the conditions of maneuver warfare is only partly part of the maritime fight.

In effect, what is happening is that as the Navy reworks its locus from the land wars to blue water expeditionary operations, the Marine Corps is reworking how it can assist in such a shift but also, how it can operate from afloat and ashore mobile bases to shape a way ahead in their ability to work with allies in interactively shaping more effective support for allied defense, on the one hand, and more effective allied integration with the Marine Corps and the joint force’s ability to operate across the extended and contested battlespace.

I had a chance to talk with Col. McClane on several issues but will highlight three major ones. The first one is the return of Russia as a definer of North Atlantic defense. The second is the intelligence to information transmutation of ISR. And the third is the challenge of working more convergence between Navy and Marine Corps ISR systems.

But the overview point made by Col. McClane was clearly articulated by him: “We are in a campaign of learning to shift from COIN operations to great power competition.”

Part of that learning is re-focusing on the Russians. When I went to Columbia University for my PhD in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the universities were committed to Russian studies. They certainly are not now. If there is a refocus on dealing with the Russians, the absence of analysts with Russian knowledge, language, and substantive, is a major problem.

This is certainly reflected in refocusing a force like the USMC. What Col. McClane noted was that our Nordic allies certainly have not taken a vacation from dealing with Russians, and that their domain knowledge is a key part of shaping a rethink of how to understand Russian behavior training, and operations. And clearly, it is the Russian military we are dealing with, not the Soviet Union.

This means that there is a double knowledge challenge. The first is that much of the residual U.S. knowledge remains under a Soviet hangover. And second that fresh knowledge of how the Russians operate under President Putin militarily needs to be built out.

The second is the intelligence to information shift in ISR. As Col. McClane put it: “We tend to get too fixated on the cyber piece to the determinant of working the information piece about how Russian decision makers operate and will operate in a crisis. That is a craft which we need to master.”

The information piece is about shortening the cycle from knowing to acting, as well as working information war. Col. McClane noted that “it is crucial we master the process whereby information can be tailored for messaging that affects the adversaries’ cognitive decision making. The messaging is key.”

The third key challenge we discussed is aligning USMC and US Navy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. A key example is that the P-8 which is being operated by the US Navy and our allies in the North Atlantic is not generating data easily usable by the USMC. In fact, in the recent Dynamic Cape 21 exercise, the Marines were able to work much more effectively with USAF unmanned aerial systems than Navy assets in terms of ISR missions.

This means, for Col. McClane: “We need naval capability development not just US Navy, and USMC separate acquisitions in the ISR area. If we are truly going to fight a naval campaign, the Marines will need to be able to tap into U.S. Navy systems useful to a Marine air-ground task force. Fixing and resourcing the Naval ISR enterprise is a key part of shaping the way ahead.”

Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Corps CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters, assigned to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to retrieve U.S. Marines during a simulated air assault as part of exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in Keflavik, Iceland, Oct. 17, 2018. Trident Juncture, a NATO-led exercise, hosted by Norway, will include around 50,000 personnel from NATO countries, as well as Finland and Sweden, and will test NATO’s collective response to an armed attack against one ally, invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Nelson)

By Robbin Laird

The Russian seizure of Crimea set in motion the return of direct defense for both Europe and the United States. With Putin’s Russia reshaping it defense capabilities and concepts of operations, there is a significant reset in terms of how the United States and the allies are working force integration in the North Atlantic. With the Nordics leading the way in terms of European responses to the Northern Flank, the reestablishment of Second Fleet and the standup of a NATO command on U.S. soil, Allied Joint Forces Command, have set in motion a Norfolk led effort for reworking how the United States Navy works with allies in shaping the way ahead in what has been called the “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.”

With the shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management, and with a new focus by the U.S. Navy on fleet combat operations, a new phase in working Marines with the evolving approach to Naval integration is underway.

This clearly affects the North Carolina-based Marines, and no force more so than the 2^nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade within II MEF.

During my visit to II MEF during the last week of April, I had a chance to meet with the acting commander of 2^nd MEB, Colonel David Everly (see biography at the end of the article).

2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade is a very flexible force capability.

As their website highlights:

“The MEB Command Element (CE) provides a Marine Air Ground Task Force /Joint Task Force (MAGTF/JTF)-capable headquarters that can rapidly deploy and when directed composites with naval and / or land-based forward-deployed and/or rapidly deployable forces to form a MAGTF or the core element of a JTF headquarters in order to fulfill Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) operational requirements.”

But that force construct faces significant challenges as the effort to shape new approaches to naval integration unfolds. As Colonel Everly put it in our discussion: “We’re changing our culture. We’re shifting our culture back to align with the naval character of our force.”

He added that “understanding the Navy’s composite warfare concept is not something culturally ingrained in how the USMC has been trained and operates.”

But there is a cultural challenge on the Navy side as well. “Our expertise as a MEB is in composite warfare. How well does the US Navy fighting as a fleet, understand that expertise and how best to leverage that and shape new approaches to integration.”

In other words, a core challenge is co-evolution to create new combat capabilities. On the one hand, as the Navy reworks fleet operations, how best to leverage what the USMC can contribute? How should the USMC reshape to better support fleet operations, and reshape its approach to composite operations?

A key challenge is working two key elements: how to contribute as a task force element and how to be able to deploy as a self-sufficient force in a crisis?

On the one hand, what is being worked are new ways to shape modular task forces within which the Marines bring core competencies and capabilities. On the other hand, how to ensure that the Marines are a survivable force when they deploy as a unit?

For Colonel Everly, a key way ahead is to train and exercise together and to reshape interactively the kind of co-evolution which will lead to mission success. The MEB is clearly pursuing such an approach as seen in the recently completed Dynamic Cape 21 exercise. In this exercise, working how to shape expeditionary logistics as a key part of support to force projection in the North Atlantic was a key part of the effort.

Logistics is crucial as well as shaping the kind of distributed C2 which can be leveraged to craft flexible force integration as well.

That kind of effort was seen earlier this year when 2 MEB completed an Initial Response Team Exercise.

As a story released by the command indicated about this exercise:

U.S. Marines with 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade completed an Initial Response Team exercise, taking place on Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field Bogue, N.C., Jan. 14, 2021. The Initial Response Team exercise simulated a forward theater deployment to establish a command and control communication node for 2nd MEB with support from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263.

“We conducted an Initial Response Team fly away drill that consisted of Marines from core functional areas within the MEB,” said Maj. Jay Montgomery, G-3 future operations planner, 2nd MEB. “The team was given 24 to 96 hours to prepare for a simulated forward deployment and establish a command and control center.”

As 2nd MEB executed the exercise, they were air lifted to Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field Bogue and immediately began set up of their control center. This quick execution not only demonstrates the mobility and flexibility of the MEB, but also ensures proficiency of the Marines involved.

“From the moment we had boots on the ground we were able to set up communications for our staff within 20 minutes,” said Gunnery Sgt. Scott Brown, a network chief with 2nd MEB. “Being that fast to establish communications is essential to being able to enable and control units, anywhere at any given time.”

Being able to establish a command and control station on a short notice is one of the requirements for 2nd MEB’s goal of staying a force in readiness and projecting forward to prepare for an eventual II MEF deployment.

“One of the missions for MEB is to be rapidly deployable; deployments and drills like this help us rehearse the establishment of command and control,” said Col. Garrett Benson, assistant chief of staff, G-3 operations, 2nd MEB. “The Initial Response Team was a way of maintaining 2nd MEB’s proficiency in rapid deployment and getting out the door completely ready to go both administratively and medically.”

Benson said the drill showcased MEB’s ability to be anywhere, anytime. “The purpose of the exercise was to ensure we are ready at a moment’s notice in Europe, Africa or anywhere else in the world,” said Benson. “This training event was a success and it validated our ability to deploy on a short notice, furthered our capacity to incorporate aviation assets into our movement and reinforce our relationship with II Marine Expeditionary Force staff as we look to execute these exercises like these in the future.” 

 The C2 piece and the expeditionary logistics pieces are two key parts of adapting 2 MEB’s composite warfare capabilities to the new focus on integrated operations with the U.S. Navy, but they are a work in progress. A couple of examples of what the MEB can bring in the future to the maritime fight are ashore fires, such as HIMARS or the Naval Strike Missile. Another example is working signature management so that Marines operating in expeditionary base locations can provide ISR and other capabilities to the fleet.

Both face challenges. Col. Everly was part of the team that brought HIMARS to the land wars. When the HIMARS was introduced into the land wars, the focus was not on shaping them for a dynamic employment concept. I have seen at MAWTS-1, the Marines working integration of HIMARS with F-35s which is the kind of dynamic employment concept which makes sense for the way ahead for Marine Corps integration for the maritime fight.

The signature management piece is part of the larger challenge of working information warfare as part of force insertion and engagement which would enhance integratability as well. As Col. Everly put it: “The information domain is still something that both the MEB and the MEF are working to put their arms around.”

Another piece to the Marines working to enhance their ability to contribute to the 4^th Battle of the Atlantic is enhanced integratability with the relevant nations in the areas of interest and operations. Col. Everly underscored that exercising and training in the region is a key part of enhanced integrability which enables the Marines working with allies can bring to the fight. “Our interoperability with the Nordics, the French and the British is a key part of our effort as well. And this is part of the co-evolution which we are experiencing as they are evolving as we are ourselves.”

An example of the kind of co-evolution underway between the Navy and 2nd MEB was highlighted in a recent composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX) lead by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. The IKE CSG Commander is Rear Adm. Scott Robertson who I interviewed last year when he was head of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), located in San Diego, California.

The kind of innovative thinking he was focused on in that command has been carried over in the rethinking of fleet warfare operations.

As Robertson put it in an interview on the COMPTUEX event: “We were able to actually test some of our draft C2 (command and control) elements on how would we actually fold in Marines in an EABO capacity into the [composite warfare commander] construct, which was a big step for us, figuring out how do we sit there and do mutual fire support irrelevant of whether it’s coming from an aircraft, a surface ship or an EAB established ashore somewhere.”

This is the kind of exercise effort which Col. Everly highlighted in our discussion as crucial to shaping the way ahead to deliver a more effective force going forward. But clearly, working co-evolutions of the Marines with the Navy and with the allies is a major strategic challenge, but one ripe with strategic opportunities as well.

Colonel David Everly

Colonel Everly is a native of Inglewood, California. He graduated from the University of Southern California with a BS in Business Administration.

As a company grade officer, his operational assignments were Forward Observer, Guns Platoon Commander, Headquarters Platoon Commander, Assistant Executive Officer, Fire Direction Officer, Artillery Liaison Officer and Battery Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines; Target Information Officer, 26th MEU (OPERATIONS NOBLE ANVIL and SHINING HOPE -Albania, OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN –Kosovo, and OPERATION AVID RESPONSE –Turkey); Assistant Operations Officer, Operations Officer and Battery Commander, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM -Philippines/Thailand, and the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) -Okinawa, Japan.

As a field grade officer, his operational assignments were Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM); Operations Officer, 11th Marine Regiment; Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines; Commanding Officer, The Basic School; AC/S G-5 Plans Officer, II MEF; Chief of Staff and Commanding Officer, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

His supporting establishment assignments include instructor and Staff Platoon Commander (SPC), The Basic School; Faculty Advisor and Expeditionary Operations Instructor, Expeditionary Warfare School; Ground LtCol Assignment Monitor and Ground Colonel Assignment Monitor, Manpower Management Division, HQMC.

His joint duties include Deputy J3 Operations Officer, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force for Former Regime Elements (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM); Operations Directorate (J3), Current Operations (J33), Joint Staff. Junior Military Assistant to the 24th and 25th Secretaries of Defense.

Colonel Everly’s civilian and military education include: US Army Field Artillery Officer Basic Course (with honors), US Army Field Artillery Career Course (with honors), Marine Corps Command and Staff Seminar Program, MS in Management and Leadership from Webster University, MS in Financial Planning from Oklahoma State University and MA in Strategic Security Studies for the National Defense University.

Col Everly’s personal awards and decorations include: Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation with Gold Star, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal with Bronze Star and the Combat Action Ribbon.

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

With the standing up of Second Fleet in 2018, the stand up of Allied Joint Forces Command and the incorporation of the NATO Centre — Combined Joint Operations from the Sea – it is clear that Vice Admiral Lewis, who oversees all of this, has a clear focus on C2. To do distributed maritime operations or to build  an integrated distributed force, one has to build around mission command C2.

This is totally at odds with the last twenty years of war in the Middle East. It is not hierarchical management at the tactical edge; it is about reshaping the force into modular task forces able to function on the basis of mission command and integrated as a coherent fighting unit. And because of the nature of the North Atlantic, this means from the ground up that the U.S. Navy and the sea services must be integratable with allied navies. And this requires training to do so as well as NATO C2 equipment on board.

Because the focus is on the ability to fight tonight, this effort is not about waiting for the optimal 2030 technology solution, which almost certainly will not come in any case. C2F from the beginning of its new life has been focused on how to do distributed C2 with the technology at hand. VADM Lewis has asked a simple but direct question: What can we do now with the technology which exists to deliver enhanced capability for an integrated distributed force?

He has tasked C2F to do this; he has tasked CJOS COE to provide a NATO input to how to do this. And at the same time, Lewis has generated the demand set to find ways to do this better with technology that is already out there or could be coming. He has done this in two ways – one with regard to NATO and the CJOS COE which is plugged into ACT’s efforts to look at future warfighting capabilities and one with regard to the Mid-Atlantic Tech bridge and their working with a variety of technology companies to shape solutions relevant to the evolution of the fleet concept of operations.

During our visit to C2F in March 2021, the Command was working an exercise with a distributed command post deployed to Tampa at MacDill AFB. Vice Admiral Lewis was on a visit to NATO Europe, but as he commented when returning, “exercise ran smoothly with the team in place, which underscores the importance of exercising our ability to do the kind of innovative C2 which a distributed maritime force needs to operate with today.”

The Tampa exercises was simply the latest in a series of ongoing distributed C2 exercises, with earlier ones having been done elsewhere, such as in Iceland or at Camp Lejeune (see stories in the appendix to the article below.)

We had a chance to discuss the expeditionary MOC approach with two members of C2F during our visit.  Our first discussion was with LCDR Sean McDonnell in his office at the command. He has been in the U.S Navy since 1994 and is the Command’s JICO or Joint Interface Control Officer. Among other things, he works with the Fleet’s Global Command and Control System through which the ships and other C2 nodes connect to provide the commander with the most comprehensive picture that he has to command forces.

With the new C2F, Lewis has been focused as mentioned above on distributed C2 which means that LCDR McDonnell when he joined the command focused on how best to support this Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) transition. The command is working expeditionary communications as a core capability or a core enabler of the force.

And by opening the aperture to do so, further innovation is enabled to shape a more interactive and integrated distributed force working with allies as well. A key task which has focused his attention is upon getting the US Navy more capable of working in an integrated manner with NATO European navies. He noted that “we are making significant progress In U.S. Navy assets communicating early and often over NATO networks and we have just installed BICES installed in our office.” BICES is NATO’s version of SIPRNET.

C2F is clearly focused on getting U.S. Navy strike groups much more familiar with NATO procedures as well. He noted that the COMPTUEX exercises (CSG-4) are “now including a NATO vignette where the strike groups have a BICES computer at their battle watch captain station, through which they give updates and communicate regularly with simulated NATO European fleet forces.”

Our next conversation was with Captain Craig Bangor over the phone for he was deployed to Tampa for the C2 exercise. Captain Bangor was one of the very first members of the new C2F and was tasked by VADM Lewis from the outset to work the kind of C2 innovation he was looking for in the fleet.

As Captain Bangor: “C2 has become a bureaucracy unto itself. We focused on the outset on ways to unify the fleet in the Atlantic that could be distributed, work closely with allies, and be very integratable given the demands or the tasks.”

He argued that “expeditionary C2 is a key tool we need in the tool box; it is not just sitting back somewhere and watching the show. We need to have intimate feedback from the commanders who are actually doing the work and expeditionary C2 allows me to have a much more effective force.”

For the C2F team, then doing the C2 piece from the beginning is really a key effort. As Captain Bangor noted: “We need to have the ability to have C2 deployed to where it needs to go; and able to be well positioned to take advantage of adversary actions because the commanders that are doing the fighting can be enabled by the most effective C2 the fleet can provide. Interactive mission command is a key part of working effective distributed C2.”

A third conversation was with CAPT Troy Denison. CAPT Denison is a Surface Warfare Officer and was the XO and then the Commander of the USS Truxtun (DDG 103) for three years from 2016-2018. Denison enlisted in the Navy in 1993 and became a commissioned officer in 1999 after graduating from the Virginia Military Institute.

Captain Denison provided significant insights into how working C2 differently allowed for what we have referred to more flexible modular task force operations. He noted that in 2019, the USS Normandy led a four-ship task force into the High North. This task force did not operate with organic U.S. counter air from a U.S. aircraft carrier, but allies provided such air cover as part of the integration effort.

The tie between a mobile command center and the deployment was evident.

The four vessels, the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Lassen, USS Forrest Sherman, and USS Farragut and a helicopter maritime strike squadron are part of the newly-reactivated U.S. 2nd Fleet intended to counter Russian activity in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

The vessels sailed from their home base in Mayport, Florida earlier this month and on arrival formed a Surface Action Group.

As the 2nd Fleet does not have any permanent operations center in Europe, around 30 of its staff set up a temporary Maritime Operations Center in Keflavik, Iceland, which will coordinate the SAG’s activity…..

“Iceland is a key ally, and its strategic location in the North Atlantic provides a perfect opportunity to test out our expeditionary MOC for the first time,” confirmed Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, the commander of 2nd Fleet. “Operating out of Iceland reinforces our partnership while allowing us to practice operating in an expeditionary manner and test our ability to surge forward.”

Captain Denison noted that the deployment in 2019 was more by accident than design as the Truman was not available. But now they are focused on deliberate ways to design different types of task forces, which of course, works effectively with C2 as a key enabler.

It was clear in discussing the high north experience from this exercise and other developments, that working the High North with core allies or what Rear Admiral Betton calls the “relevant nations” allows for shaping of new paradigm of collaboration. The logistics and communications challenges, just to mention two of those challenges, certainly drives thinking through new ways to collaborate and to operate in the region.

We discussed this more fully with a fourth officer during our visit, CDR Shaun Servaes.  He arrived at the beginning of the standup of C2F and was immediately tasked to work on the BALTOPS Exercise held in 2018.  BALTOPS was the first exercise to be managed by C2F and this put them in the thick of a key part of the North Atlantic region affected by the return of Russia as a direct military threat to Europe. They embarked on the USS Mount Whitney to work the C2 part of the exercise and did so with significant NATO participation. So the first exercise presaged what was to come for C2F. The bulk of the force was provided by NATO, not the United States.

CDR Servaes underscored that the BALTOPS exercise underscored priorities for VADM Lewis in the initial standup of C2F. “Admiral Lewis has said since the beginning, he wants to integrate the Marine Corps with naval forces, basically be one force. He wanted to demonstrate as well that the US command element could command subordinate forces that were offered from other nations, as well as embarking international command elements with us. Our deputy commander was a UK commander of the taskforce.”

We then went on to discuss the challenge of shaping an effective U.S. and Allied high north force. Here the logistics challenges are formidable. As CDR Servaes underscored: “If you look from St. John’s, Canada, which is the last place we can get gas heading north, go touch the Arctic Circle and come back to St. John’s it is a longer transit than from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, which is the longest transit we have in the Pacific.” Obviously, to address these challenges allied has to be built in from the ground up and with it an effective C2 structure.

In other words, the command is a warfighting weapon. Its value is driven by how the fleet can integrate across the combined air-maritime forces operated by NATO nations across the domain of the Atlantic. And this is about 360-degree defense operations, inclusive of undersea assets as well as space assets.  It really is a kill web approach built around a comprehensive focus on C2, mission command, and an open aperture to encompass the best of new C2 technologies and leaving the rest.

By forging C2F as the command element working with Allied JFC, the real-world interaction between national fleets and C2 integration can be worked to ensure the capability to fight to night as well as evolving the template for incorporating new technologies and capabilities into the evolving force.

Appendix

June 2019: Expeditionary Command Post for C2F in Iceland

U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) has temporarily established an expeditionary Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in Keflavik, Iceland, to provide the U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR) commander an additional ability to lead forces from a forward-operating location.

“I welcome C2F back to the European theater for the second time this year,” said Adm. James G. Foggo III, commander, Naval Forces Europe and Africa. “The additive capacity that 2nd Fleet brings to the European theater when operating forward alongside U.S. 6th Fleet (C6F) contributes to the overall success of our naval forces’ ability to address challenges and threats to safety and security in the maritime domain.”

The expeditionary MOC, made up of about 30 members of C2F staff, has the ability to command and control forces, provide basic indicators and warnings for situational awareness, and is able to issue orders while maintaining reach-back capability to C2F’s headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia.

“Iceland is a key ally, and its strategic location in the North Atlantic provides a perfect opportunity to test out our expeditionary MOC for the first time,” said Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet. “Operating out of Iceland reinforces our partnership while allowing us to practice operating in an expeditionary manner and test our ability to surge forward.”

The C2F expeditionary MOC is executing command and control of ships assigned to the recently deployed Surface Action Group (SAG), which is comprised of the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Lassen (DDG 82), USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98), and USS Farragut (DDG 99), as well as embarked aircraft from Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 72.

While in the Atlantic, the SAG is operating in support of naval operations to maintain maritime stability and security, deter aggression, and defend U.S., allied, and partner interests.

C2F’s temporary operations out of Keflavik mark the second time the new fleet has operated at a forward location. C2F first demonstrated this expeditionary capability through command and control of exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) in June 2019, when the majority of its staff embarked USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20).

“Successful operations in the Arctic require practice, and we will take the lessons learned from this deployment to further refine the expeditionary MOC concept for future operations in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions,” said Capt. Chris Slattery, director, C2F expeditionary MOC.

The expeditionary MOC concept is scalable and temporary in nature. While the C2F expeditionary MOC is currently operating out of Iceland, there is no predetermined or permanent operating location in the European theater.

C2F exercises operational and administrative authorities over assigned ships, aircraft, and landing forces on the East Coast and the Atlantic. When directed, C2F conducts exercises and operations within the U.S. European Command AOR as an expeditionary fleet, providing NAVEUR an additional maneuver arm to operate forces dynamically in theater.

U.S. 2nd Fleet Commands Naval Forces from Camp Lejeune

JACKSONVILLE, North Carolina (NNS) — U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) has established an expeditionary Maritime Operations Center (MOC) at Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina.

This expeditionary MOC, made up of approximately 30 members of C2F staff, has the ability to command and control forces, provide basic indicators and warnings for situational awareness, and be able to issue orders with a reach-back capability to C2F’s headquarters in Norfolk, Va.

Participating naval forces include the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group (CSG), which is comprised of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), the guided missile cruisers, USS San Jacinto (CG 56), USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), and the guided-missile destroyers USS Stout (DDG 55), USS James E. Williams (DDG 95), USS Truxton (DDG 103), and more than 6,000 Sailors all stationed a Naval Station Norfolk.

“Camp Lejeune is the ideal location for Navy-Marine Corps integration opportunities,” said Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, commander U.S. Second Fleet. “For the purpose of this expeditionary MOC, our USMC counterparts are providing C2F with the supplies and equipment essential to the successful execution of this exercise.”

In CNO’s Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0, C2F was tasked to be expeditionary— whether from a maritime platform or an austere location. Regularly operating C2F’s expeditionary capability ensures our ability to respond expeditiously and proficiently when called upon.

Maintaining and expanding upon the ability to command and control forces away from headquarters is central to C2F‘s employment of forces in the Atlantic. During this iteration of the expeditionary MOC, II Marine Expeditionary Force assisted with infrastructure development. Both C2F and II MEF will draw lessons learned from this operation to inform future employment of an integrated command and control center in the future.

“We are implementing lessons learned from previous expeditionary MOC operations which will directly influence the way we employ naval forces at the operational level going forward,” said Capt. Craig Bangor, Second Fleet MOC director. “To accomplish our assigned mission this time, we have included intelligence, logistic, cyber, information, and maritime operations and planning capability organic to the expeditionary MOC. While the team in Norfolk is leading and planning for a wide array of operations, our team in Camp Lejeune is solely focusing on the employment of the Eisenhower Strike Group as it crosses the Atlantic utilizing the expeditionary MOC capabilities.”

The expeditionary MOC concept is scalable and temporary in nature, and the iteration in Lejeune marks the third for C2F sing it’s establishment in August, 2018. C2F first demonstrated this expeditionary capability through command and control of Exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) in June 2019 when the majority of staff embarked aboard USS Mount Whitney. Most recently, C2F employed a forward deployed expeditionary MOC in Keflavik Air Base, Iceland.

C2F exercises operational authorities over assigned ships, aircraft, and landing forces on the East Coast and the Atlantic.

02.26.2020

Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet