Step inside the cockpit with U.S. Air Force Maj. Josh ‘Cabo’ Gunderson to experience the F-22 Raptor’s max vertical takeoff and opening maneuvers of the demonstration profile.
JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, AK, UNITED STATES
07.16.2020
Video by 1st Lt. Sam Eckholm
Joint Base Langley-Eustis
With the launch of our defense information website (defense.info) , we introduced a micro-site on defense decisions.
We wrote: “In this new section of the defense.info website, we will address U.S. and allied upcoming procurement choices and decisions.
“We are focused on how platform and system choices affect the evolution of the capabilities, concepts of operations of a particular ally or of U.S. services or the joint force.
“Too often, the focus of the defense press or of analysts is narrowly focused on platforms, rather than placing platform decisions or system decisions into the broader context of the evolution of core capabilities.
“We will focus on such decisions by placing them in a broader context.
“In particular, we are focused on the building, shaping, operating and sustainment of what we have called the integrated distributed force.
“We have built a separate micro site focused on this theme, but here we are focused on procurement, or equipment decisions which play into this strategic shift.”
To further develop a discussion of how to evaluate platforms in the evolving concepts of operations for full spectrum crisis management forces, we will focus on Germany, and key procurement choices which they face in the context of the direct defense of Europe.
We are publishing this Fall our book entitled The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21st Century Authoritarian Challenge. In this book we identify the key trends reshaping the direct defense challenge and the approaches being taken to reshape capabilities for enhanced direct defense
In that book, we focus on how key states in Europe are reshaping their forces and their approach to defense to deal with the new strategic challenges.
Clearly, Germany is a key lynchpin state in how Europe is reshaping its approach, and within that approach key procurement decisions will be taken in the period ahead.
In particular, Germany is currently facing three key procurement choices which illustrate the complexity of choice.
Too often, a simple platform versus platform presentation is made which confuses rather than clarifies what the tactical and strategic implications of particular platform decisions in a key functional area for force development and tactical and strategic evolution of a nation’s defense posture.
With regard to this series, we will address, the following procurement choices facing Germany in three key operational areas:
The first is the face-off between the legacy Chinook medium-lift helicopter versus the new generation CH-53K heavy lift helicopter.
The second is the decision to pursue signals intelligence with a manned aircraft option versus an unmanned option, or the face-off between the Pegasus versus the Global 6000 program.
The third is the question of how Germany will replace the Tornado aircraft in its nuclear role.
In each case, much of the analysis has been to compare platform versus platform: Chinook versus CH-53K; a Triton variant versus a manned Canadian aircraft with both systems delivering signals intelligence but in very different ways and with very different implications for force structure development; how to transform the legacy Tornado into its replacement with no clear lineage from Tornado to what will replace it.
The German case provides an opportunity to address the broader question of how to analyze platform choices in a very different strategic context and with significant changes in how US and allied force structures need to evolve to meet the challenges of full spectrum crisis management.
By Robbin Laird
The remotely piloted solution (Pegasus) versus a manned aircraft solution (Global 6000) for airborne SIGINT should take into account the coming of AGS to NATO.
The NATO Air Ground Surveillance approach is built around a remotely piloted solution which dovetails nicely with such a solution for airborne SIGINT.
With the coming of the Global Hawk-based NATO AGS aircraft to NATO, the teaming of manned and unmanned systems to deliver interoperable data will be driven by working collaboration between NATO’s E-3A and AGS aircraft.
As Major Jay B. Vizcarra noted in a 2017 article published by The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) the collaboration between the manned and unmanned assets delivering core information with regard to the air C2/ISR integration effort requires the further development of networks to manage fully the result of operating such a synergistic manned/unmanned teaming effort.
When combining manned and unmanned capabilities to produce C2ISR combined effects in multiple environments, NATO E-3A and AGS integration possesses the potential to provide the Alliance with an initial vector towards MDC2 operations.
However, to expand on MDC2 capabilities and secure an asymmetric strategic advantage into the 21st century, NATO must gear towards a new enterprise ‘system of systems’ approach, tap into ‘combat clouds’, and leverage the competitive advantages afforded from Joint ISR fusing and rapid information sharing.
Additionally, technocratic ‘stove-pipes’ of proprietary intelligence data must be freed to induce fusion warfare and allow C2 and strike assets to hastily complete the F2T2EA ‘kill-chain’. As General (retired) Herbert J. Carlisle19 stresses, ‘if you don’t have the ability to do something with it [the intelligence data], then you’re missing half the equation’.
Subsequently, smarter network architectures with automatic processes will ensure cyber domain integrity and the fluid transfer of crucial information to the right person, in the right place, at the right time.
While NATO E-3A and AGS may have provided a small glimpse towards a multi-domain operational concept, it is up to the Alliance to ensure a new foundation is set to adopt and nurture an MDC2 capability.
The arrival of the AGS solution set with the fourth aircraft delivered to NATO this past July, sets in motion infrastructure to manage what a remotely piloted aircraft can do.
It also sets in motion a path ahead for shaping the infrastructure and the combat learning curve to manage the how data flowing from AGS into NATO and individual national networks.
For several years, the USAF has operated U.S. Global Hawks from Sigonella Airbase with no major problems within Europe.
That experience laid the foundation for high confidence that AGS could do the same.
That is why it is puzzling that another HALE system, this time Triton/Pegasus would somehow be more of a problem.
In any case, Germany, as the second largest stakeholder in the AGS program, certainly will gain significant operational experience, and will have a large pool of trained personal, with regard to operating a HALE system similar to that of Pegasus.
Indeed, the industry team which worked the airworthiness side of AGS has built up significant data and working experience with the European authorities who have authorized the use of AGS in European air space.
Again, this is a significant down payment on shaping the way ahead for HALE remotely piloted air systems in Europe.
AGS will provide information through various networks, and be exploited on core bases and mobile ground stations to deliver actionable information on a timely basis to the alliance and to its member states.
Obviously, the commitment of different nations will vary in terms of their investments in exploitation capability and this will be translated into how effectively different national militaries will be able to exploit the information generated from the AGS system.
The AGS is a system, not simply a HALE aircraft.
NATO has described the AGS system as follows:
Just as NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) aircraft – also known as AWACS or “NATO’s eyes in the sky” – monitor Alliance airspace, AGS will be able to observe what is happening on the earth’s surface, providing situational awareness before, during and, if needed, after NATO operations.
The AGS core will be an integrated system consisting of an air segment, a ground segment and a support segment.
The air segment consists of five NATO RQ-4D aircraft and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) flight control elements. The aircraft will be equipped with a state-of-the-art, multi-platform radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance radar sensor, as well as an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight, long-range, wideband data links.
The ground segment consists of a number of ground stations in mobile and transportable configurations, able to provide data-link connectivity, data-processing, exploitation capabilities and interfaces for interoperability.
The ground segment will provide an interface between the AGS core system and a wide range of command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems. It will interconnect with multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users, as well as with reach-back facilities away from the surveillance area.
The AGS core support segment will include dedicated mission support facilities at the AGS Main Operating Base in Sigonella.
Interoperable contributions in kind, such as national surveillance systems and data/communications, will also be made available to NATO and will complement AGS with additional surveillance capabilities.
The composition of the AGS core system and national contributions in kind will provide NATO with considerable flexibility in employing its ground surveillance capabilities.
This will be supplemented by additional interoperable national airborne surveillance systems from NATO member countries, tailored to the needs of a specific operation or mission conducted by the Alliance.
A key part of the AGS system clearly is the ground segment and the ability to process information and communicate that information to the forces and the decision-makers.
The ground segment system will be shaped to provide for inputs to national decision-making systems, or work the ISR-C2 dyad to shape ways to come up with more effective technologies, policies and procedures to deliver better and more timely information to national and collective decision making.
This AGS ground system clearly could be a foundation from which the Pegasus HALE system could work was well.
In other words, rather than looking at Pegasus ground system investments as program-specific, they are not; they would be part of a broader exploitation and data delivery system to the German armed forces, and would almost certainly flow through similar or the same data pipes to the German decision making community.
A key factor is that both the AGS and PEGASUS ground systems are or would be provided by Airbus Defence and Space.
When considering whether one would prefer a manned to a remotely piloted one for AGS, the ultimate decision was for a remotely piloted one.
I was a consultant to the USAF in the period of time when the manned option was rejected in favor of the remotely piloted one, and remember very well Secretary Wynne’s thinking with regard to why it was crucial to go ahead with the remotely piloted solution set.
With the coming of the F-35 and the already evident impact of the F-22 on the USAF, it was clear to Wynne that the role of specialized manned aircraft in the ISR and C2 role was going to diminish significantly.
The ability of the remotely piloted aircraft to have much greater endurance, an ability to operate at heights that provide for significant area converge, and the innovations in wave forms, would mean that the role of RPAs in the ISR world would rapidly grow.
And that solution has arrived for NATO in the form of its new AGS aircraft and system.
Its impact on the Pegasus/Global 6000 trade off seems obvious – why turn your back on the future?
Notably, why would you do so, when you have already joined the future in another program area related to the one where you are mimicking the past.
Featured Photo: 21 November 2019, Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy – NATO’s first RQ-4D arrived in Europe.
According to the Australian Department of Defence in a press release dated August 13, 2020: “HMAS Canberra and embarked forces returned to Australia after successfully completing Regional Presence Deployment 2020.
“The Australian Defence Force has embarked on a regional deployment to conduct exercises within Southeast Asia and Hawaii over the coming months.
“The deployment demonstrates Australia’s commitment to sustaining strong and positive defence relationships with regional nations as well as the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.”
With the reworking of Australian defense envisaged in the new Australian strategy, the two amphibious ships could well see the role expand as part of task forces, and expanded use in sea denial missions as well.
This will require changes in capabilities onboard the ship, which are being envisaged with the replacement of the MRH-90 and the Army’s replacement of the Tiger helicopter.
What kind of rotorcraft package the Royal Navy and Australian Army decide to go with –most likely marinized — will have a significant impact on what kind of task force role which the Canberra class can play in future.
The featured photo shows HMAS Canberra pausing for a sunrise memorial near Savo Island, Solomon Islands, to commemorate the sinking of HMAS Canberra (I) at this location. 84 crew lost their lives when the ship sunk on 9 August 1942.
According to an August 21, 2020 release by Naval Air Station Patuxent River, the CH-53K sea trials went extremely well.
A team of pilots and engineers from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (HX) 21 based at Naval Air Station Patuxent River recently completed a crucial series of sea trials of the CH-53K King Stallion that not only provided them with valuable developmental test information about the aircraft, but could change the way the squadron conducts similar tests in the future.
The test team of 96 personnel embarked on the USS Wasp (LHD 1) in early June to conduct an intensive series of tests that were designed to establish the helicopter’s performance envelope for day and night launches and recoveries at a wide range of wind speeds, to test engaging, disengaging, folding, and unfolding the rotors in a variety of wind conditions, and to allow maintenance crews from Sikorsky and Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron (VMX) 1 to practice working on the aircraft in at-sea conditions.
“We went to sea with a robust test plan,” said Maj Joshua “Felon” Foxton, CH-53K sea trials project officer. “Typically you include more test points than you can reasonably expect to accomplish, which gives us greater flexibility in executing the plan. But due largely to the success of the aircraft, we were able to accomplish all of our objectives while we were underway.”
Over the course of the 14-day detachment, the team members who were embarked on Wasp accomplished just over 32 hours of flying, well over a third of which were flown at night. Altogether, the team achieved 364 landings, of which 74 were conducted using night vision devices. The team successfully launched and recovered to all spots, and was able to launch 13 sorties in the first eight days of ship-based maintenance.
Foxton praised the CH-53K’s performance, noting that the responsive and well-tuned fly-by-wire controls make shipboard landings much easier and more precise than is possible with many other helicopters. “It’s a real testament to the stability of the aircraft,” Foxton said.
Lt. Col. Fred “NOVAC” Neubert, department head and government lead test pilot for the CH-53K program, agreed with Foxton’s assessment. “There may be other aircraft out there with similar performance capabilities, but I have not flown a helicopter with the outstanding handling qualities that the 53K provides,” Neubert said.
The aircraft performed so well, in fact, that the test team succeeded in testing nearly all of the aircraft’s launch and recovery envelope expansion — the team’s primary test objective — within the first seven days of the trip, leaving the second week to thoroughly pursue the other objectives. As a result, the test team was able to devote more time to identifying refinements and minor improvements to suggest to the manufacturer than it otherwise would have had. Foxton recalled how, during one post-flight debriefing, one of the team’s veteran flight engineers pointed out, “Do you realize we just spent 15 minutes talking about whether we could improve the windshield wipers?”
“We were able to focus on those little things because the big things took care of themselves,” Foxton said.
Teamwork was another major factor in the detachment’s success. “It can sometimes take weeks or months for a team to coalesce, but we had 14 days underway to forge a team,” Foxton said. “Thanks to the professionalism of the contractors, our Marine counterparts in VMX-1, and our colleagues in the Navy, we were able to accomplish everything so thoroughly that we were actually ably to fly the aircraft off a day earlier than we had planned. That was inspiring.”
Neubert and Foxton also had plenty of praise for the Wasp’s crew. “The crew was amazing,” Foxton said. “They carefully negotiated winds and weather for us in order to get the ship in the exact position with the conditions we needed for every test point. Their true professionalism enabled all of our successes.”
“One of the things that stands out about this detachment was the quality of the ship’s crew from the leadership on down, their commitment to figuring out a way to make it work no matter what we needed,” Neubert said. “I think that reflects the command culture. The ship’s commanding officer, Capt. Greg Baker, likes to get to ‘Yes.’ Every department embodied that mentality.”
The envelope expansion testing that the team accomplished has resulted in the largest fleet envelope for any Navy and Marine Corps helicopter currently in existence, according to the squadron.
“I think this detachment is going to rewrite how we plan a test phase,” Foxton said. “It’s an opportunity for us to find very specific efficiencies in our testing, which will in turn increase our speed to the fleet.”
Neubert agreed. “In flight test, we specialize in risk mitigation and preparing for how we will respond to something that goes wrong,” Neubert explained. “What we discovered in this test is that in the future, we’ll want to spend more time planning how we will we respond if something goes unexpectedly great.”
“Our objective is to provide the fleet Marines with a safer and more effective platform with greater operational capability, and this detachment was a successful example of that,” Neubert said. “This is why we do flight test — because we come from the fleet, and we want to give good products back to the fleet.”
The CH-53K King Stallion lands at the Yuma Proving Ground , Aug. 14, to test the aircraft’s systems and performance under the extreme conditions, high-temperatures and dust.
The CH-53K’s enhanced fly-by-wire technology, composite rotor blades, and specialized engines and gearbox supports missions in some of the world’s most extreme environments.
Posted by NAVAIR.
U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) showcases mission lines of effort in the area of responsibility.
QATAR
07.14.2020
Video by Master Sgt. Brandy Fowler
U.S. Air Forces Central Command Public Affairs
By Robbin Laird
With the US Navy’s FMS Offer to Germany for Triton having expired without being extended, Germany is now pursuing a manned aircraft alternative for the SIGINT mission.
The approach would be to buy three Bombardier G6000 aircraft and equip them as special mission aircraft.
Germany already has Bombardier G6000s in its inventory, as VIP aircraft.
What little press there has been about this alternative suggests, that this will be a lower cost solution and able to make the NATO commitment by 2025 to provide for Germany’s contribution to the SIGINT mission.
An article by Jhon Lake published on January 29, 2020 by AINonline, highlighted the argument for a new alternative:
It has been reported that the Triton plan had grown “significantly more expensive” compared to German planning assumptions, while there were growing concerns that full European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) certification was going to be difficult to achieve within the required timescale.
Experience with the similar Global Hawks used by NATO’s new Alliance Ground Surveillance fleet, stationed in Sigonella, Sicily, led the German Ministry of Defence to conclude that it was unlikely to be able to meet the safety standards required for flying in European airspace by 2025, and would be subject to onerous restrictions that required it to fly only in segregated airspace and dedicated corridors.
Bandwidth constraints—and the growing problem of GPS and datalink jamming and disruption—may also have influenced Berlin and prompted it to look again at a manned platform with onboard analysis capabilities. It may be no coincidence that no major air force has deployed a UAV platform in the strategic Sigint role.
Production of the Global 6000 is drawing to a close, and Berlin will have to move quickly if it is to obtain the aircraft it requires. The Global 6000 already forms the basis of a dedicated Sigint platform for the UAE Air Force (two aircraft having been converted by Marshall Aerospace in the UK), while Turkey is converting another four to Hava SOJ (stand-off jammer) configuration.
But how comparable are the two solution sets?
And are the projected cost savings realistic and is the ability to deliver a manned SIGINT capability by 2025 realistic?
The basic challenge posed by comparing the two systems is rather obvious – these are two very different system solutions, with very different capabilities, which can provide for very different approaches to concepts of operations.
I would like to compare the two platforms from the standpoint of delivering very different systems outcomes and providing very different contributions to concepts of operations.
The table below highlights a number of aspects which I think provide a way to do such a comparison.
I will address in a later article the question of networks, and enablement of German and allied forces able to leverage the data provided by the two very different solution set approaches.
The first element of comparison involves the operational concept of operations.
The Global 6000 is a manned aircraft and will operate within a sortie generation cycle. This means that get continuous coverage in the combat radius area the Bundeswehr deems as necessary will require air crews and planes sufficient enough to keep it airborne continuously in times of crisis.
This will be a clear cost driver beyond the notion of simply buying three initial aircraft and crewing and sustaining those three aircraft.
Any realistic cost projection must take this dynamic into account.
The Pegasus which is a German variant of Triton operates very differently.
Triton’s persistence at long range lends itself to a concept of operations which facilitates a continuous orbit at 3000km, a platform requirement the Bundeswehr set at the initiation of the program.
This year I have had a chance to discuss this orbital con-ops approach with Navy officials and operators.
The point is that operational experience is already being generated which the Bundeswehr are able to leverage.
As I argued in an article on the Triton and its contribution to shaping the kind of ISR which the U.S. and its allies require for the high-end fight:
“For full value to be derived from the Triton fleet, a kill web mentality will have to replace what has been a sortie generation mentality for the carrier fleet. It is about building in an orbit-enabled concept of operations, rather than thinking of the aircraft in sortie-generation concepts of operations.
“What this means is that for the Navy to get full value out of its Triton force… means embracing what a high altitude remotely piloted vehicle with a sensor package which can help build a common operational picture generated by orbits can provide for a kill web strike force, which may well operate within a sortie-generated concept of operations, which the orbiting high altitude asset will provide.
“With a four ship 24/7 coverage of the area where you will operate or wish to operate, the Triton can provide domain knowledge crucial to informing both the threat and opportunity calculus in an area of operations.
“And because the orbit is not about sorting into a specific area, one can sort through where the best advantages might lie for the projection of force without tipping your hand by having to fly to a specific tactical area.
“This is a work in progress, but it is a new capability which if fully embraced provides significant warfighting advantages to the United States and its allies.”
These differences in operating con-ops leads to the second and major difference between the platforms, namely, their area coverage.
Triton’s onboard capabilities, range, altitude and efficient operating cycles will provide significant regional coverage and early warning for German forces of enemy threats and intent in real time.
These vast improvements in situational awareness will allow German armed forces and political leaders to tailor military and diplomatic responses during peacetime and crisis, improve Bundeswehr survivability, while providing critical ISR data to NATO partners.
With limited operational combat assets, it is crucial to be able to ensure, that your force goes to the right place, at the right time, and to deliver the desired combat effect.
Reducing area coverage is hardly a smart move strategically, tactically, or financially.
But that is precisely what a shift from Pegasus to a manned platform would do.
The third difference is with regard to data exploitation.
The Global 6000 is built around data exploitation and operators onboard.
Not only does this put Bundeswehr soldiers in harm’s way, the size of the aircraft is a problem in terms of limiting the number of stations onboard to do data exploitation.
Likewise, the ability to off-board time sensitive ISR data to decision makers and users on the ground is limited in a G6000 Concept of Operations.
In comparison, Triton’s satellite communication architecture allows off-boarding of Pegasus information from anywhere in the world to various ground sites in near real time, facilitating more rapid exploitation and dissemination of data than a manned solution.
And with the advances in big data management and exploitation, the computational power and AI enablement coming to the ground operators will allow for rapid change in how data can be exploited and delivered.
This includes data fusion with other sovereign and NATO ISR assets including Euro-Drone, NATO AGS, and FCAS to develop a richer and more accurate picture of the battlespace.
The recent airworthiness criticisms have always been puzzling because the Chief of Defense approved the Auswahlentscheidung (AWE) for Triton in 2017 based on significant coordination, mutual recognition and Luftfahrtamt der Bundeswehr approval of the USN airworthiness process.
Likewise, Triton flies at altitudes well above manned traffic and includes some of the most capable U.S. technology and safety features for integrating UAS with manned aircraft.
The German PEGASUS variant was planned to have additional capability to meet the European Airspace requirements.
The fourth comparison is the question of where combat will occur and how best to support it.
If this were the Cold War, a manned solution to SIGINT would make sense as it would be about reinforcing the German defensive bulwark.
That bulwark is gone, and the immediate combat threats and requirements will occur in Germany’s neighborhood.
The challenge will be to take the limited German military assets and move them to the point of maximum effect as rapidly as possible.
Regional coverage is the priority, tailorable to the national force and territorial defense.
The fifth aspect really revolves around the kind of combat learning crucial to be effective.
With a unique German solution, the challenge will be to integrate into NATO forces.
With the Pegasus solution, interoperability is assured given the impact already of Triton on the US Navy and the impact of the AGS remotely piloted aircraft on NATO as well.
With a common system, PEGASUS can realize regional basing, training and logistics synergies with NATO AGS, USAF Global Hawk, and USN Triton at Sigonella, IT and other regional deployed sites.
The AGS Mobile General Ground Station (MGGS) built by Airbus is the core component for data dissemination with NATO and Partner Nations.
For the PEGASUS ISIS Mission System, Airbus evaluated elements of the MGGS system that would be utilized for the ISIS Ground Station, resulting in improved interoperability with AGS.
The sixth flows from the fifth.
The Global 6000 solution will be led by Hensoldt, a company which has never previously performed complex aircraft integration work, and a company that is expected to be up for sale in the near future, as its KKR investors seek to recoup its investment.
This means that with little doubt that program and technical risks will increase Global 6000 program costs with the promise of significant cost saving compared to the Pegasus solution very problematic at best.
With a direct commercial contract to Hensoldt, there is no certainty that the final development costs of the G6000 will provide any cost savings, compared to the PEGASUS cost estimates.
As a comparison, the recently announced acquisition of 3 Triton Aircraft, 2 Main Operating Bases (MOB), and one Forward Operating Base (FOB) by Australia, was reportedly contracted at $333M, whereas the German Parliamentary approval for 3 unmodified G6000 aircraft is estimated at $890M.
This G6000 cost does not include the Mission System and Integrations costs.
This brings into question, if the German MoD accurately portrayed the cost differences of these 2 systems.
And as mentioned above with regard to area coverage, there is really no comparison to what Pegasus can deliver and what Global 6000 will deliver.
This means that SIGINT mission requirements must be reduced to what the Global 6000 platform can perform, rather than focusing on the real combat situation facing the Bundeswehr today.
There is a reason the US Navy has selected Triton as the mainstay of its future SIGINT capability, equipping the entire fleet to replace the manned EP-3 in the 2020’s.
In short, these are two radically different solution sets.
Pegasus aligns with the evolving strategic environment and the innovative approaches being taken by the U.S. and its allies with regard to force modernization; Global 6000 does not.
The featured photo: The German Navy’s Breguet 1150 Atlantique.
For some time, the German Ministry of Defence has been seeking its Signals Intelligence replacement for its last platform to play such a role, the modified Breguet 1150 Atlantique.
Platforms, Concepts of Operations and Defense Decisions: The German Case
German Platform Decisions: Selecting an Airborne SIGINT Platform