In this segment of the Hampton Roads Naval Museum’s local history series, Max Lonzanida, the museum’s Public Affairs Officer conducts a video interview with author and historian, Nancy Sheppard regarding the 1922 Airship Roma crash in the City of Norfolk.
Archived imagery, photos and interview footage was used in the course of this segment.
06.24.2020
Video by Max Lonzanida
Hampton Roads Naval Museum
We tracked in some detail of the coming of the new class of LHAs to the fleet.
The flagship is LHA-6, the USS America.
These ships represent a significant break from the past in that it can operate as a flagship of an amphibious task force with unprecedented airpower onboard.
Ironically, it will be based in San Diego where what have been a sister ship, the USS Bonhomme Richard caught fire last month pier side in San Diego.
USS Tripoli is designed for F-35B operations from the git go, whereas other LHAs need to be modified to do so.
As one news story highlighted, the USS Tripoli has the capability of carrying a significant air assault capability onboard.
In addition to its amphibious capabilities, Tripoli is capable of acting as an ad hoc aircraft carrier.
In 2019 sister ship America was photographed in the eastern Pacific with 13 F-35B Lightning IIs on her flight deck, more than twice as many as an amphibious ship typically embarks. In a crunch, the Navy and Marines can disembark most of the Marine tiltrotors and helicopters and transform Americaand Tripoli into temporary “Lightning Carriers.”
Lightning carriers could provide extra carrier-based firepower at the front line until larger, purpose-built carriers arrive in theater to relieve them.
Tripoli is bound for its new home port at San Diego Naval Base, California. An eighth amphibious assault ship, USS Bougainville, began construction in 2019. USS Tripoli is named after the Battle of Derna, when in 1805, a unit of U.S. Marines led an attack on Derna, Libya during the First Barbary War.
With the changing nature of the threat in the Pacific, more capable L-class ships can enhance fleet capabilities.
We have focused this summer on how the coming Viper attack helicopter integration of Link-16 and UAV wave forms can provide a new capability to work with the Romeos onboard as part of an amphibious task force.
When combined with the kind of aviation capability onboard the LHA-6 class, the L-class is transformed from being a greyhound bus to a capability to contribute to sea control and sea-denial freeing up the large deck carriers for expanded reach in performing these tasks as well as others.
In 2014, we published an article which highlighted how the new ship contributed to enhanced capabilities for the fleet.
That article follows:
2014-10-08 By Robbin Laird
The USMC is the only tiltrotar-enabled assault force in the world.
The USS America has been built to facilitate this capability and will be augmented as the F-35B is added to the Ospreys, and helicopters already operating from the ship and as unmanned vehicles become a regular operational element as well.
To set the proper landscape to discuss the changes within aviation and the amphibious fleet, one can go back a decade ago and look at the aviation and ship pairings and their operational reach.
The ARG-MEU a decade ahead operated within the LPD-17, without the T-AKE ship, without the Osprey and was primarily a rotorcraft, landing vehicle and mixture of Harrier fast jets force. And the three ship ARG-MEU would operate largely in a 200-mile box affecting the objective area where it was located.
The Osprey has obviously been a game changer, where today, the ARG-MEU can “disaggregate” and operate over a three-ship distributed 1,000-mile operational area. Having the communications and ISR to operate over a greater area, and to have sustainment for a disaggregated fleet is a major challenge facing the future of the USN-USMC team.
A major change in the ship can be seen below the flight deck, and these changes are what allow the assault force enabled by new USMC aviation capabilities to operate at greater range and ops tempo.
The ship has three synergistic decks, which work together to support flight deck operations. Unlike a traditional large deck amphibious ship where maintenance has to be done topside, maintenance is done in a hangar deck below the flight deck.
And below that deck is the intermediate area, where large workspaces exist to support operations with weapons, logistics and sustainment activities.
In an interview with the ship’s Captain, Robert Hall, just prior to the departure in mid-July from the Ingalls Huntington shipyard in Pascagoula Mississippi, the CO highlighted some of the ship’s capabilities:
The ship has several capabilities, which allow us to stay on station longer than a traditional LHA and to much better support the Ospreys and the F-35Bs which will be the hallmark of USMC aviation to enable long range amphibious assault. These aircraft are larger than their predecessors.
They need more space for maintenance and this ship provides it.
We have two high-hat areas to support the maintenance, one of them located behind the aft flight deck elevator to allow movement through the hangar.
We have significantly greater capacity to store spare parts, ordnance and fuel as well. We can carry more than twice as much JP-5 than a traditional LHA.
The ship has three synergistic decks, which allow for a significant enhancement of the logistical or sustainment punch of the amphibious strike force.
According to Captain Hall:
I like the synergistic description.
The flight deck is about the size of a legacy LHA. But that is where the comparison ends. By removing the well deck, we have a hangar deck with significant capacity to both repair aircraft and to move them to the flight deck to enhance ops tempo.
With the Ospreys, we will be able to get the Marines into an objective area rapidly and at significant distances. And when the F-35B comes the support to the amphibious strike force is significantly enhanced.
And we will be able to operate at much greater range from the objective area.
With the concern about littoral defenses, this ship allows us the option to operate off shore to affect events in the littoral.
This is a major advantage for a 21st century USN-USMC team in meeting the challenges of 21st century littoral operations.
The USS America will provide a significant boost to the ability to both maintain and to provide operational tempo to support the force.
And in an additional interview with Major David Schreiner, the ship integration officer within Headquarters USMC Aviation, the Marine Corps officer highlighted how the ship will do this and how it fits into evolving thinking about the future of the amphibious task force.
According to Major Schreiner, one of the key elements of maintaining the Osprey is the need to open the nacelles and to work on them. On current LHAs, this can only be done topside, but with the new ship, it will be possible to maintain the Ospreys completely in the Hangar deck.
The traditional LHA was sized primarily for rotorcraft operations; the new one is sized for the Osprey and the F-35B.
According to Major Schreiner:
The footprint of the new aviation assets are about 30-40% larger than the rotorcraft and fast jets they are replacing. With the change in operational capabilities and concepts comes the need to provide for a new logistics capability for the force as well.
The logistics demands from the Ospreys on the traditional LHAs required work topside, which affects flight deck operations as well as facing daylight limitations within which the work needed to be done.
What we found with the MV-22 was that it needed some extra space. It needed some space in the hangar for assault maintenance. What we found in the legacy amphibious ships that we were unable to do that efficiently down below, so the workaround for the Marines, the only workaround is to do those modifications topside which are extremely time consuming and it is a delicate balance on doing them during a period of daylight where they could effectively see and then balance it out with flight operations.
To get the needed changes, the ship designers of the USS America look to the hangar deck and the intermediate areas. The hangar deck has no well deck and that provides extra space as well as overhead cranes and storage areas for parts.
The ops tempo for the assault force is enhanced as well.
According to Major Schreiner:
“The idea was is not only to provide enough space to incorporate for the growth in airframes and the logistics footprints but also to provide for operational maneuver space down below as well. We can cycle planes from the hangar to the flight deck to enhance sortie generation rates for the helos, the Ospeys and the F-35Bs in whatever package is appropriate to the mission.”
Working the synergy among the three decks will be crucial to shaping the workflow to support operational tempo.
“Your next aircraft for the flight deck can be positioned down below for a quick elevator run thereby enabling a larger volume of flights off the deck. You could then work into the deck cycle and elevator run to bring up those extra aircraft as a way not only to provide backups but to provide extra sorties for the flight deck.”
Synergy and enhanced workflow are really the two outcomes which come from a ship designed for 21st century assault assets.
Instead of having to do all the maintenance topside you have the spaces down below from the heavy maintenance with the use of upright cranes and the work centers that are collocated right on the hangar bay with the supporting equipment work centers, the control work centers, and just below it on the intermediate deck below.
You have all your supply centers and then you have your intermediate level maintenance as well for that sensitive calibration, for the more complex repairs.
This creates a cycle or synergy where you have supervisors that the work centers are collocated with the maintenance that’s being done on the hangar. You have maintenance actions being produced. They are brought in; they are logged into the system, they are evaluated, they can go downstairs and they can either be fixed on the spot, calibrated, the part could be reworked or the supply system being right there, a new part in the supply could be issued back up, turned. There will be very little waste of time between different parts of the ship all supervised, brought back up, and repaired on the plane.
Clearly, this workflow will be a work in progress as the crew and the Marines shape ways to work the decks to optimize what can come off of the flight deck.
Aircraft maintenance and operations at sea are extremely hard; extremely hard on the actual airframes and they are extremely hard on the maintainers that are doing the work because the reality of it is that in a 24 hour cycle, half the time is spent conducting flight operations topside where there is very little space to do maintenance.
It is just too congested.
It is too busy and so by default you have to wait till flight operations stop which limits you in your maintenance to periods usually in darkness where it is hard or reduce cycle say 12 hours to do the maintenance in order to turn those aircraft around.
By having access to hangar bay, you have a safe space, you have a well-lighted space; you have room to safely move and now you are able to do concurrent maintenance actions.
I’m not saying that you couldn’t do that on a legacy class but you can just do this on a much greater scale and with greater efficiency on the AMERICA so you are able to make the timely inputs, the timely maintenance actions ultimately to keep the available assets up.
For operators and maintainers, the intermediate area below the hangar deck is a major change as well.
Marines will have access to world class or corner space standard test batches for calibration, they can do everything at sea can be done in a corner space or a land environment. From a warship capability is amazing and the goal is to increase the repairable capability on the ship rather than waiting for parts to be sent to the ship.
Transit time loss is a big deal; sometimes we have to go halfway around the world for a part because there is no way to beat the geographic distance.
The only way you can do that with a part is to have a spare in the supply system.
Now you have an aircraft that either has to have a cannibalization of a part to keep it flying or you have to wait and you have your downtime on an aircraft.
The goal of the I level is to be able to actually be able to repair aircraft with parts on board. And with the increased storage capacity this clearly will happen.
The USS America will make a significant contribution to the amphibious strike force, but no platform fights alone.
It will be a key element or even flag ship of evolving approaches.
When one marries the new MSC assets –T-AKE and USNS Montford Point assets – to the LPD-17 and the USS America, the USN-USMC team will have a very flexible assault force, with significant vehicle space, berthing space for embarked Marines and shaping the future mix and match capabilities of the modular force.
To illustrate the impact of such a task force on berthing of embarked Marines, in addition to berthing on the USS America, one could carry 680 Marines aboard an LPD-17, 100 aboard a T-AKE ship and 250 aboard a Montford Point, and that is with current capabilities which be modified as modular capabilities evolve against operational needs, requirements and funding.
In short, the USS America is part of the evolving amphibious strike task force, and will work synergistically with other new or legacy assets in providing capabilities necessary for 21st century operations.
According to a recent news story on the NATO website, “Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG 1) has concluded a historical ordnance disposal operation, enhancing knowledge about the seabed by working in Norwegian waters and contributing to the Norwegian compiled historic ordnance database.
“Conducted between 4-12 August, 2020 in Lofoten and Tromso areas, eight historical mines were identified, among 147 mine-like objects. In total two mine-hunters and the flagship from three different nations were involved in the operation, searching an area of 16 square nautical miles and disposing of three historical mines from previous operations taking all the precautions in to account to preserve the sea life.
“During WWII, Allied forces laid mines off the Norwegian coast from surface vessels, submarines and aircrafts with the purpose of disturbing and stopping the German convoys, troop transport and warships along the coast.
“By disposing of the sea mines the Group made the sea a safer place for fishermen, merchant shipping, underwater operations and civilian installations. Although the mines are no longer active, they still pose a threat if they are accidentally triggered by an anchor, divers or other operations on the seabed.
“SNMCMG1 is one of four standing NATO forces that comprise the maritime component of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is part of the NATO Response Force (NRF).
“SNMCMG1 is currently comprised of four assets: HNoMS Maaloey (Norway), ENS Admiral Cowan (Estonia), FGS Groemitz (Germany) and flagship LNS Jotvingis (Lithuania).”
In 2015, Murielle Delaporte spent time at sea with SNMCMG1.
Here was her interview with the task force’s commander.
2015-06-14
By Murielle Delaporte
After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1986, Commander Peter A.J. Bergen Henegouwen served for six years mainly on minesweepers and minehunters.
This included a deployment for clearing sea mines in the Persian Gulf in 1991 as executive officer on HNLMS Haarlem.
In 1996 Commander Bergen Henegouwen received his first command on board of the minesweeper HNLMS Naarden.
He was then in command of the minehunters HNLMS Delfzijl and HNLMS Hellevoetsluis, which was assigned to the MCM flotilla “MCMFORNORTH” (now SNMCMG1).
In March 2011, his previous assignment was at the Netherlands Maritime Forces (NLMARFOR), Maritime Battle Staff, where Commander Bergen Henegouwen assumed responsibilities on the deployments with other international task groups.
Commander Bergen Henegouwen is the Commanding Officer of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG 1) since January 22nd, 2015, a Group currently composed of German, British, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Norwegian Mine countermeasures vessels, as well as a German Command and Supply ship.
One of the particularity of this Group is the fact that its Commander sails on a ship from another nationality than his, which happens from time to time, but is rather uncommon.
In the interview below done after the first week of sailing as a Group of four ships – the Flagship FGS Donau, the BNS Lobelia, the FGS Auerbach and the HMS Pembroke -, he describes the challenges, but also the excitement, of commanding an international staff on the German Tender Donau.
He also explains his roadmap for the Group leading towards Trident Juncture 2015, the largest NATO exercise organized in decades to take place in the Fall in Southern Europe, which envisions a better integration and synergy of MCM tasks within the overall fleets.
It seems Joint Warrior 2015, which took place in April, off the Scottish shores, already started to fulfil such a wish…
Commander, what are the missions of the SNMCMG1 for the months to come?
We have quite a busy program planned for this upcoming six months period: in addition to doing historic ordnance clearance, HOD for “Historic Ordnance Disposal” as we call it, off the coasts of Estonia, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as France, we are participating to five different exercises.
When we first started to sail together in January, I was very pleased to see that all the ships got out at the same time without incident, as, in my experience commanding similar ABNL deployments over the past three years, breakdowns often occur given the age of most mine-countermeasure vessels.
We always manage to keep them going, but delays for repair as you leave harbor frequently happen.[ref] ABNL stands for « Admiral BENELUX », which is the Common Operational Headquarters for the Netherlands and Belgium Navies. These headquarters are located in Den Helder in the Netherlands.[/ref]
This shows that units and ships were individually well prepared to work in this group.
The initial focus of the first three weeks on board is mostly about “getting used to work together”, because although the ships are individually well trained, they might lack some experience in working together.
It is all about different cultures, different procedures; some nations may allow certain things other nations do not, so we have to get used to each other and see how to manoeuver and do our exercises as safely as possible.
That is basically what we do at the beginning of a deployment: we start with communication exercises, maneuvering exercises, such as replenishment at sea (RAS), which is especially important.
As you come into close quarters, you want to see how the other ships behave in different types of weather.
These are the basics to ensure safety as we do our drills and exercises.
The next focus is to test our operational capabilities, i.e. mine countermeasures (MCM) and be prepared for joint exercises, the two main ones being Joint Warrior in March and Baltops in June.
We also organize our own sets of exercises, such as a two week-training period in the North Sea and an exercise off the Dutch coast.
We also join forces with exercises organized by other navies in the area, such as the Lithuanian Navy.
The command and support staff of the Group are from different nationalities than the ship hosting them: a German ship with a German crew hosting a Command staff composed of Dutch, Belgian and Spanish officers and headed by a Dutch CO.
What are the challenges of operating on such an international ship and commanding a group of ships from Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK?[ref] A Dutch, a Polish and a Norwegian ships joined the group after the interview was concluded.[/ref]
How different is it for you compared with your previous commanding experiences?
The nations provide the ships to the Group and it is their national responsibility to be operationally ready.
In the workup phase, the only thing I am doing is getting the ships to learn how to work together, how to communicate, how to maneuver at the same time, and, of course, keep up their operational readiness to be able to act if “something real world” happens.
Ever since we have been at sea, you might not see it, but I am walking around with a smile on my face twenty-four hours a day.
I am enjoying it as, I believe, do the crews of all these ships, because being in this group means meeting colleagues from other nations and learning from each other.
As for me, personally, the only change is whom I am reporting to. In my previous assignment, I organized deployments for ABNL ships, as well as other ships.
I cooperated for instance with Danish or Norwegian staff, who would augment my staff and vice versa.
I worked with the Danish, German and Belgian MCM fleet and navies.
Because of my own deployments for the ABNL HQ, I hence do have some international experience.
The only change now is, of course, that I am working for NATO and reporting to the UK-based Maritime Command (MARCOM), in addition to my national authorities.
It is indeed a different process of reporting, but I am doing the same kind of work.
The main role of my staff is to act as a tasking authority, and, whether we do that nationally or within NATO, we all use NATO procedures.
You cannot obviously use the latter outside of NATO, as was the case for my staff and me in a recent international exercise last October in the Arabian Gulf, to which participated more than 20 countries.
It then becomes very challenging: you have to find out how to do your procedures, without using confidential procedures, nor NATO ones, which you are used to, and how to talk to each other in technical language.
However, these kinds of new challenges show that we are quite capable of doing this.
Sailors at sea all know what starboard or forward mean.
The language of the sea is universal.
We all know what sailing at sea means, we all go through the same environment, and we all speak English, somehow!…
So we find ways to communicate and, as long as you can communicate, you can work together.
There is always something to do for the staff: whether preparing for the next port visit or planning our exercises.
We are basically using the Donau as a supply ship, so we are trying to get everything for the group such as food or fuel.
This ship could almost go around the world with its fuel supply, but most of the mine-hunters have a two-week fuel autonomy.
Some of them, like the Norwegian mine hunters have an hover-craft capability, which consumes quite a lot of fuel, so they need to refuel every other day.
The need for a supply ship capable of providing fuel, like this German ship, is even more important for these kinds of mine-hunters, as you cannot hunt mines, while having to go back to port every other day.
All NATO ships use the same fuel (F76) and can handle the same naval diesel oil for helicopters.
Such standardization and the ability to take fuel from every supply ship, wherever it is, is one of the good things in NATO.
The billing is done by each nation and it is a very good system.
Two-week autonomy is also a good length as far as the crews are concerned, as they are rather small and need to sustain a high level of concentration in their work.
Our port visits are therefore as much intended to show the NATO flag as to provide the crews with R&R [Rest and Recreation], but if we had to extent our deployments at sea beyond two weeks, we would of course do our job.
The downside of that, as I stated, most of our MCMVs [Mine Counter-Measures Vessels] are getting older and during a period of two weeks of operations, they will have some defects in some way.
If the crews are not capable of repairing their own equipment, we are depending on shore assistance.
Each nation has indeed various levels of readiness, but in this Group, the equipment onboard each ship seems comparable.
Is there an “ideal Group” from your standpoint as far as its composition is concerned and how do you adjust to potential interoperability issues?
Logistically, it would be very nice to have all the same ships, so we could always have a 100% operational readiness.
However – and that is a big “however,” MCM is a very difficult type of warfare, since we are searching for small objects on the sea bottom, while conditions are not always that favorable.
If you have a clear sandy bottom and you put a soda can on top of it, most of our mine hunters will find it.
In 90% of the cases unfortunately, it is not that easy.
There are rocks on the bottom, or, if there is indeed a sandy bottom, it is in constant motion like dunes. In the coastal area, you face a lot of mud in which objects tend to sink.
So finding sea mines is not always easy.
The only way to go around these difficulties is to use different types of equipment, different sonars with different frequencies.
And, in the case of “unhuntable” mines, those who lie between rocks or are buried and are not detectable by sonar, a mine sweeper is required. MCMs of minesweepers consist in triggering a mine by mimicking a ship.
Mine-sweeping and mine-hunting are complementary techniques, since the mines you cannot hunt might possibly be swept and the other way around in the case of sophisticated mines, which can differentiate between sweeping gear or an actual ship.
There are approximately four or five different influences a ship might have in the water and it is all about frequencies: acoustic, i.e. noise coming through the water ; magnetic, i.e. a steel ship influences the earth magnetic field; minor influences, such as the electric current coming from a ship’s propeller ; high and low frequency sounds coming from the water; etc.
A modern mine with enough sensors combining all these influences would be unsweepable.
But right now, by mixing and matching different sonars and frequencies, our means complement each other increasing our chance to find or destroy mines.
So, to answer your question about the ideal composition of a mine-countermeasure group, operationally, having different mine hunters and mine sweepers together in one group is ideal, because you can use different MCM techniques and reduce the risks.
It is a difficult type of warfare, because it is under water and the weather is always influencing us.
It is always a challenge, so nations tend to find the best equipment possible to operate under water.
It used to be the French PAP (Poisson auto-propulsé) developed in the 1960’s.
The German SeaFox, smaller and therefore easier to maœuver, is now used by many nations, because it is an almost autonomous vehicle and one of the best systems available at this time to counter mines.
You can do identification with it, and you can also destroy mines if needed. Each nation however has its own acquisition process and, as an operational commander, I am just very happy to have different options whether in sonars, drones, or else, although logistically speaking, it may not be wise.
The logistic responsibility remains in fact nation-centric.
In case of a breakdown, we will of course check within the Group to see if there are spare parts available, but if something has to be flown in, it is done so under the responsibility of each nation.[ref] The FGS Donau belongs to the Type 404 Elbe class replenishment ships of the German Navy. They were built to support its squadrons of Fast Attack Craft, submarines and minesweeper/hunters and as such are usually referred to as Tenders. They have a deck where Sea Kings or larger helicopter can land, but no hangar.[/ref]
I see our role as supply ship, as a “travel agency,” i.e. organizing the trips and coordinating, so we keep our operational capabilities at the highest level possible.
Every day I find out how much replenishment is needed and we organize what needs to be done.
If something has to be brought in, or if the Commanding Officer of one of the ships needs to go out of the group to port to get some things, we, as a command logistic platform, coordinate all that.
We can also arrange for the MCM mission to continue, while the support platform goes into port to get the spare parts.
We will be eight ships during the course of our deployment, which means more work in coordinating the parts and tasking of the ships.
But it makes the work easier, because the more ships, the more units you have available, the easier the task will be. MCM operations are indeed always about “we don’t have enough time,”
because everybody is always eager to transit somewhere without being stopped by sea mines.
With all the challenges we have with MCM, it takes time to get rid of mines.
So, the more ships we have, the easier the tasking becomes.
Our Netherlands’ MCMVs– which are the same for the Dutch, Belgian and French Navies – were designed jointly by these three nations in the late 70’s and commissioned in the early 80’s.
So they are almost thirty years old.
Our youngest Tripartite-class ship was commissioned in 2000.
When we first build our ships, we are always aiming for twenty- to thirty-year life-cycle, including a mid-life upgrade.
But there is always a part of unpredictability which goes with new equipment.
When the first GRP ships [Glass reinforced polyester] were built in the early 80’s, we did not know whether GRP ships would survive thirty years in salt water.
We are finding out right now that the hulls are still very good.
However, we need to regularly address engineering issues (pipes leaking for instance), as well as system obsolescence, which have sometimes to be fully replaced, as communication and computers for instance become outdated.
These are the challenges we are facing right now, since if something breaks down on the ship, there is no backup and the small ships need to go to port.
We need to ensure that this unit can be safely replaced as we look towards the future.
In that sense, the only recommendation I would have is that all nations try to keep up their level in MCM capacities, whatever it might be, to be prepared to counter mine threats and master such a difficult type of warfare.
What is the current evolution in mines threats precisely as well as in MCMs?
How do you assess innovations regarding the use of unmanned underwater systems?
Our ships are designed to do mine countermeasures, which is not the same as clearing historic ordinance.
Historic ordinance are explosives, which have been lying on the bottom of the sea for a long time.
As long as you do not touch or move them, they are not directly harmful, but the moment you drop your anchor on one of them or try to build a windmill on top of them, then, of course, that is a problem.
To dispose of historic ordinance, however, is not too difficult: you just blow it up and that is what we do on a regular basis: seventy years after WWII, we are still clearing the bottom of the sea with explosives from both WWI and WWII…
Real sea mines on the other hand pose a direct danger to the mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), which must therefore be well protected from external signatures like acoustics or magnetic sensors.
They used to be made of wood, but now they are made of Glass reinforced polyester (GRP), which does not influence the magnetic field of the earth.
Our engines are also put on mountings, so they do not transfer the noise into the water.
MCMVs are therefore quite safe.
Modern mines can cause real problems, if they target a specific ship or are intended to deny access to a port, stop traffic or alter a strategy.
A mine-layer should however have quite generic mines (as was the case during the first Gulf war when an American ship was hit).
These are cheap weapons, which can be deployed from any kind of ships.
That is why they are so dangerous, but we can handle them.
Regular sea mines are not difficult weapons to acquire, as they are like IEDs on shore.
The more modern and sophisticated mines are harder to find, as they can be hidden taking for instance the appearance of a rock.
That is also the purpose of the NATO MCM groups: we are, of course, ready to counter any real threat, terrorist or else.
For budgetary priorities, some nations, such as the Netherlands, stopped their minesweepers program a few years ago, but are maintaining their research capability in order to be able to build the right gear if need be.
Keeping a minesweeping capability is very expensive given the complexity of modern mines, and the fact that simulation does not apply easily.
Simulating an actual ship is indeed very hard (vessels filled with ping-pong balls, or filled with foam, have been tried without much success).
These are the reasons why most nations in the past decade or so have been tending to focus essentially on minehunters.
The same goes with the ability to lay mines: only a few nations have kept this capability, but investment in research has been maintained within NATO.
In case of conflict, sea mines have indeed their value, as they allow to deny the enemy access to ports or specific areas.
As far as drones are concerned, one should remember that the environment at sea with its waves, currents, wind, as well as the underwater environment, are constantly changing.
That renders steering and communicating with any systems which you try to use remotely very difficult.
Using such systems from non-protected vessels as some Navies envision it is not totally feasible at this time.
Of course, everybody is researching for fully autonomous robots going into the water and clearing all the mines, but you will always need dedicated MCMV’s and personnel to oversee the mission.
Another solution, which is the Marine mammal program is a good way and is very impressive.[ref] Mostly undergone by the US Navy ever since the Vietnam war, some sources mention a few other nations, such as Russia, using dolphins for MCMs.[/ref]
It is however very expensive and you need people to make sure the job has been done properly.
Going against explosives in the water is a dangerous type of warfare and you need dedicated personnel to do so.
Compared to your past deployments – you mentioned the Arabian Gulf — how would you describe your current area of responsibility in the Northern and Baltic Seas?
There is of course a political dimension to the Baltic region given current events: it is about reassurance and showing that we are here.
We are a Readiness force demonstrating NATO’s resolve.
In terms of HOD, an immense amount of sea mines has been thrown in the Baltic Sea, especially during the Second World War.
So the moment we start the Open Spirit exercise off the coast of Estonia and the moment we will turn on our sonars, we will find explosives.[ref] Open Spirit is an annual HOD multinational exercise conducted since 1996 and led by one of the three Baltic states on a rotational basis.[/ref]
There is a big difference between the North Sea, which I am more used to, and the Baltic Sea.
In the North Sea, we have been using trawlers for fishery for decades, which have found quite a lot of explosives laying on the bottom of the sea.
In the Baltic Sea, there is hardly any trawl fishery and many mines are still there with their explosives intact.
I am therefore just very keen in contributing to the safety of the area we are deploying in.
How are you positioning the SNMCMG1 for the upcoming largest NATO exercise in decades, i.e. Trident Junction 2015 due to start in the Fall in southern Europe?
Is having a Dutch Commander related to the fact that TJ15 will be under a Dutch Joint Command?
Trident Juncture of course is a very large exercise.
I am currently focusing on the first six months of deployments, because most of my units, most of the ships participating in this Group right now will only be here for three to six months.
In July, both my staff and my ships will be changed and the only ones remaining will be the steward and me.
In the second half, we shall probably go around the same procedures again to get used to each other and do basic exercises.
Then we shall indeed work up towards Trident Juncture.
In 2016, the Netherlands Navy will be in command of the Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and the NMR [Allied Command Operations’ National Military representatives] staff is preparing for it.
Trident Juncture will be a big exercise, during which we will be able to test our capabilities in that respect.
My regular function is being part of the NMR-4 staff working on MCM, a function I have not been relieved from.
Through exercises like Joint Warrior, I can keep my interactions with the NMR-4 staff.
It will also be the case during TJ15, for which an amphibious scenario is planned, so I will try to use the NATO group to fit into this scenario of amphibious warfare.
An amphibious scenario means that you have bigger ships with a lot of troops going through shallow waters which could be mined.
Mine countermeasures is therefore always part of advanced forces operations.
However, because most exercises are limited to one to three weeks, MCM are in practice done in a separate area.
I would like in this case to see a bit more of an operational flow, where you first have MCMs and then continue on with the amphibious landing.
That is something that I would like to train and focus on especially this year.
All this depends on the whole scenario done by the exercise controller.
My staff is called the tasking authority: we order the ships to go to a specific area and do a specific MCM task.
It is our responsibility to organize where the MCM teams are going, and what they are doing in coordination with higher authorities.
That also means doing the calculations about MCM, reporting the percentage clearance or remaining risks for other ships, and then, of course, reporting if we find any mines or not.
What everybody always tends to forget is that MCM is not always to clear the sea mines.
It is also to show whether there are mines or not. Demonstrating the absence of mines is in actual fact perhaps even more important than showing that there are mines.
Being part of advanced forces means that you need to have some intelligence with special forces probably going in.
They are of course well trained to do things unseen.
On the other hand, our ships which go into advanced forces operations are big grey ships which can easily be seen.
These ships are not well equipped for generic warfare: they do not have air warning radars; they do not have heavy weaponry, and are only capable of defending themselves against small attacks (pirates; terrorists…).
We can protect ourselves against individuals coming towards us, not against an air raid or major surface combatants.
We use MCM Protecting Units (MCMPUs), but we would need a frigate or other capable ships to defend the group.
Then we run into the following challenge: how do you get a frigate into a possible minefield?
This is all about strategy and how we are we going to handle these types of scenarios.
That is why I say that it is probably more important to prove the absence of mines than the actual existence of mines.
We have seen it in the early 90’s in the Persian Gulf, where Iraq had laid sea mines.
The initial plan of the Coalition was to conduct a large amphibious operation off the coast of Iraq, but two American ships were hit by sea mines and we knew there were more mines present.
The whole strategy to reach Iraq changed, as we went around the minefield by crossing Kuwait.
This example illustrates how big an influence a sea mine can have on military warfare.
Just one or two sea mines completely altered the strategy underlying that operation.
I believe therefore that, again, showing a way onto the beach, where the mines are absent, is precisely something we have to train more.
Even though we have been discussing this for decades, the short duration of exercises tends to have us focus on the best separate training for MCMVs on the one hand, the frigates on the other hand.
An amphibious operation is about getting all that different types of warfare together and raising many questions.
What are we going to report?
How are we going to talk to each other?
How are we going to defend each other?
How do you get a frigate in a possible minefield?
All these challenges do come up when you put together an amphibious operation.
Amphibious warfare is indeed the most extensive, the most difficult operation you can do.
Trident Juncture will be in that sense a first-rate opportunity for the SNMCMG1 to train and rehearse in this kind of complex context.
Editor’s Note: Murielle Delaporte went to sea with the NATO counter-mine task force and was onboard the German Marine Tender Donau during the exercise.
She is the co-founder of Second Line of Defense and the editor of Operationnels where a complete dossier on the NATO approach to mine warfare is discussed from the standpoint of her time in the Baltic sea operation.
For a recent article which deals with the possible use of unmanned systems in counter-mine operations see the following:
Maritime Remotes and Maritime Kill Webs: The Case of an Integrated Counter Mine Autonomous System
The first Exercise TRIDENT TRAP was conducted in July 2020.
EX TT20 is a joint Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare exercise.
P-8A Poseidon aircrew and maintenance personnel from RAAF Number 11 Squadron together with support staff from Number 92 Wing based at RAAF Base Edinburgh deployed to RAAF Base Learmonth in Western Australia to lead the activity.
A number of key P-8A warfare development milestones were achieved as part of this world-class training opportunity for the joint force.
And in an article by Squadron Leader Melissa Houston published on August 12, 2020, the importance of the training exercise was highlighted.
P-8A Poseidon personnel from No. 11 Squadron along with No. 92 Wing support staff from RAAF Base Edinburgh deployed to RAAF Base Learmonth in July for the first Exercise Trident Trap.
Trident Trap was a No. 92 Wing-led joint training activity, exercising Air Force’s P-8A’s anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities in partnership with Navy.
The deployment also marked the first time No. 92 Wing forward deployed a P-8A Mission System Fly Away Kit (PFAK).
No. 11 Squadron Commanding Officer Wing Commander Simon van der Wijngaart said it was an important milestone in support of operational readiness.
“The PFAK allows a small footprint of detachment staff to download and archive mission data to enable rapid post-flight analysis and intelligence assessments,” Wing Commander van der Wijngaart said.
“Importantly, it also provides support for subsequent missions by enabling aircrew and support staff to update the mission system data for each sortie.”
Another key component of Trident Trap was a two-day multi-static active coherent (MAC) trial.
The P-8A MAC system is an advanced, active-acoustic sensor that uses complex, multi-path sound propagation between sonobuoys to detect submarines at increased ranges.
No. 92 Wing Commanding Officer Group Captain John Grime said this was the wing’s second evolution of MAC trials with the cooperation of an Australian submarine.
“The planning of these MAC activities occurred over a solid three-month period, with the execution phase occurring over just two days,” Group Captain Grime said.
“As a result of this thorough planning we were able to fully exploit all opportunities presented by the exercise, gaining valuable experience with the new MAC capability while also generating a significant amount of data for post mission analysis by 92WG and Defence Science and Technology Group support staff.
“On review, the first iteration of Exercise Trident Trap was a highly successful activity, providing No. 11 Squadron crews and No. 92 Wing staff with excellent integration and ‘proof of concept’ training in conjunction with the RAN.
“I would like to congratulate 11SQN and 92WG personnel for their commitment and dedication to delivering a number of key P-8A warfare development milestones as part of this world-class training opportunity for the joint force.”
Exercises such as Trident Trap demonstrate how in an increasingly complex strategic environment, Air Force’s STEM-qualified personnel are critical to maintaining a capability edge and ensuring Air Force achieves its air and space missions.
During National Science Week (August 15 to 23) Defence is celebrating its STEM workforce and how STEM is used in the air and on the ground across a wide range of professions from aviation and engineering to logistics and healthcare.
Featured Photo: A No. 11 Squadron P-8A Poseidon conducts a landing at sunset at RAAF Base Learmonth. Photo: Flight Lieutenant Michael Hawkins
By Robbin Laird
Next generation air platforms encompass several changes as compared to the predecessors which are at least thirty years old or older, notably in terms of design.
Next generation air platforms are designed from the ground up with the digital age as a key reality.
This means that such systems are focused on being able:
Such is the case with the CH-53K compared to its legacy ancestor, the CH-53E or with the venerable but legacy Chinook medium lift helicopter.
Comparing the legacy with the next generation is really about comparing historically designed aircraft to 21st century designed and manufactured aircraft.
As elegant as the automobiles of the 1950s clearly are, from a systems point of view, they pale in comparison to 2020s automobiles in terms of sustainability and effective performance parameters.
I have followed the progress of the CH-53K much like I have with the F-35 and the Osprey, three innovative new combat systems.
As I have argued earlier,
With peer adversaries emphasizing technological change and force modernization, focusing on strategic advantage for US and allied forces is a key element for combat success. At the heart of such an approach, clearly will be the ability to operate more effective distributed forces and to leverage the capability of US and allied forces to operate flexibly and not relying on a rigid centralized system with a core emphasis on combat mass.
Working ways to distributed force but concentrate fires is at the heart of the transformation necessary to prevail in the strategic shift. For the MAGTF, this means taking the core approach around which a MAGTF has been created and extending its reach with integrated fires, as is conceived of with regard to F-35-HIMARS integration or the use of the new G/ATOR system, and building effective force packages that can operate in an integrated but flexibly deployed distributed force.
The CH-53K comes at a time when this transition is being worked.
As the heavy lift member of the MAGTF team, the CH-53K will provide a key element of being able to carry equipment and/or personnel to the objective area. And with its ability to carry three times the external load of the CH-53E and to be able to deliver the external load to different operating bases, the aircraft will contribute significantly to distributed operations.
But the digital nature of the aircraft, and the configuration of the cockpit is a key part of its ability to contribute as well. The aircraft is a fly-by-wire system with digital interoperability built in.
And with multiple screens in the cockpit able to manage data in a variety of ways, the aircraft can operate as a lead element, a supporting element or a distributed integrated support node to the insertion force.
A key change associated with the new digital aircraft, whether they are P-8s or Cyclone ASW helicopters, is a different kind of workflow. The screens in the aircraft can be configured to the task and data moved throughout the aircraft to facilitate a mission task-oriented work flow.
In the case of the CH-53K, the aircraft could operate as a Local Area Network for an insertion task force, or simply as a node pushing data back into the back where the Marines are operating MAGTBs.
Marines carrying MAGTB tablets onboard the CH-53K will be able to engage with the task force to understand their role at the point of insertion. The K as a digital aircraft combined with the digital transformation of the Marines create a very different ground force insertion capability.
From an operational standpoint, the K versus the E or the legacy Chinook for that matter, offers new capabilities for the combat force.
What is more difficult to grasp is how the new generation of aircraft also change how sustainability is managed and how the new aircraft provide a ramp launching a new way to manage the aircraft, and to provide for enhanced reliability for those digitally managed aircraft.
Recently, I had a chance to talk with Pierre Garant, now a program director with Sikorsky, but whom I met many years ago when he was the aviation sustainment director at Headquarters Marine Corps.
In an article which Murielle Delaporte and I wrote for Military Logistics International in 2007, we interviewed Garant with regard to how the Marines were working expeditionary logistics to support what was the disruptive impact of the Osprey.
Garant himself provided his perspective on the transformation of Marine Aviation logistics in a 2004 Marine Gazette piece.1
The simple point is that Garant has been at this for a long time.
What he brings to the CH-53E and CH-53K is years of credible experience in working 21st century transformation regarding combat logistics.
In a later article, I will focus on our discussion about the evolution of the Performance Based Logistics (PBL) framework as the approach within which digital capabilities can be wrapped to provide for significant advancements in effective maintainability and weapons system reliability.
Here I want to simply highlight some key parameters to understand what a 21st century digital next generation aircraft provides for a new sustainment approach.
What Garant argued was that by establishing an effective PBL process in place, which Sikorsky has with both the Seahawk and now with the CH-53E, they can now with the new digital aircraft embed those tools into a PBL framework.
With the PBL framework there is solid working relationship between the government and Sikorsky to better manage the supply chain and to shape more accurate data with regard to parts performance while already setting the foundation for a CH-53K PBL.
They can then take that data and rework how the supply chain can deliver a more effective outcome to reliability and effectiveness in operations.
With the data generated by the CH-53K, the “smart” aircraft becomes a participant in providing inputs to a more effective situational awareness to the real performance of the aircraft in operational conditions.
Then that data then seamlessly flows into the sustainment management system to provide a much more realistic understanding of parts performance.
This then allows the maintenance technicians and managers to provide higher levels of performance and readiness than without the data flowing from the aircraft itself.
Put in other terms, the data which the aircraft generates makes the aircraft itself an “intellectual” participant in the sustainment eco system.
The question then is how best to operate such an ecosystem?
This is a different question than the legacy aircraft and its sustainment system poses.
There the question is determining laws of averages for parts performance from collecting data, and then shaping ways to make sure parts are available at the right time and the right place.
With the aircraft as a participant in the fully-integrated eco system, much more performance is being provided in a much more timely fashion and the question then is how to work the suppliers into the eco system so that they can be informed significantly earlier about what they need to do to contribute more effectively to the fleet.
Another dimension of how the aircraft contributes to its own enhanced reliability is its ability to provide information with regard to fault isolation.
With the digital systems onboard the CH-53K, the aircraft not only generates fault detection, but can precisely isolate where that fault is to be found with accuracy.
This can eliminate false replacements, a problem which the Osprey had for many years in its initial operations.
High reliability of fault detection and fault isolation is a significant game changer for maintenance, and it is the aircraft that will generate the information for this more effective process.
Furthermore, the digital aircraft delivers a tenfold increase of actionable information that fully enables condition-based maintenance as a future reality.
Garant noted the nature of the shift as follows: “The shift is from reactive maintenance to predictive maintenance.”
And the data flows will enable a continuous learning process which can be shaped for the global fleet of the aircraft, rather than being simply being done well at one base and only word of mouth spreading the message on a new way to maintain the aircraft.
As Garant put it: “It’s almost like virtual surgeon, where his knowledge comes to the point of need.”
With all the noise about autonomous systems and AI, what one can overlook is how digital aircraft are now participants in their own maintainability.
Try that with a legacy Chinook or CH‑53E.
In short, the CH-53K is a smart aircraft birthed in a digital age that is doing support and manufacturing differently.
In other words, it’s symmetrical with a significant strategic change, rather than being a legacy system struggling to adapt to the new age.
The featured photos are from the Log Demo team at New River.
With regard to that team, see the following:
Preparing for Effective Fleet Support: The CH-53K Log Demo at New River
The Coming of the CH-53K: Preparing for Its Long-Term Supportability
Murielle Delaporte and Robbin Laird, “Re-crafting Expeditionary Logistics: USMC Aviation Prepares for the Future.” Military Logistics International 2, issue 6 (2007) 4-7, which can be read below:
MLI Garrant
This video highlights the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense command’s unique global air and missile defense capabilities and the amenities Fort Bliss and El Paso, Texas, offer to those assigned to the organization.
06.01.2020
Video by Staff Sgt. Mark A Moore II
32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command
By Robbin Laird
Clearly, the shift to joint warfare encompassing all domains, the impact of COVID-19 on the economy and work approaches and styles, and the growing impact of commercial investments in 5G communications or artificial intelligence in managing data are all having a significant impact on the way ahead for the U.S. military, its allies and its partners.
In the view of Mike Twyman, President of Cubic Mission Solutions, we are seeing a tsunami of change that is influencing battlespace composition, ISR solutions, protected communications and 5G.
Since he has come to Cubic, Mr. Twyman has focused on ways to build out the sector to evolve as the strategic environment changes and to shape the kind of C2/ISR capabilities the military needs both now and in the future.
In a recent interview with Twyman in his office in San Diego, he highlighted the focus of his mission solutions group and how they are contributing to the capabilities needed for the new strategic environment.
He argued that “we are focused on mission solutions, not systems. Our goal is to deliver solutions that enable future warfighting concepts.
“For example, our solutions empower C2, fueled by intelligent data, to create and close joint effect webs at machine-to-machine speeds.”
Twyman underscored that the focus has been upon shaping what he labelled “a mission chain strategy.”
“We have acquired and will continue to do so capabilities to address the entire subset of tools necessary to deliver mission chain solutions.”
Here he is referring to being able to integrate core computational, C2, ISR and other services necessary to deliver entire solutions to the military customer.
Twyman characterized the future fight as one which the combat force needs a core capability to maneuver in the communications spectrum and to have an ability to discover and share ISR and C2 information in interactive kill webs.
“The challenge is to get that relevant ISR and C2 data to where you need it and at the time you need it.”
He highlighted as well the importance of being able to work in both the commercial as well as military domains because increasingly the military is a user group, and less the definer of what the cutting-edge technology is going to be.
A key case in point is 5G.
Clearly, 5G is a significant commercial technology which will affect military networks and redefine them. Cubic is working in both the commercial and military space which Twyman thinks is critical given how significant the commercial impact of 5G has on 21st century societies.
Commercial 5G operating through millimeter wave bands will generate more bandwidth and more freedom of spectrum maneuver. It will allow for the flow through of more data at lower latencies; and there will be greater capability to protect the information being sent.
Obviously, such capabilities are both relevant and affect military communications; more as a user group than as the core definer of 5G systems themselves.
This is clearly similar to what is happening with regard to artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and decision-making aids; whereby commercial sectors are and will far outspend what the military sector will do; and it will be about leveraging commercial technologies as a user group for the military in this sector as well.
Twyman believes that the future fight will require empowering warfighters at the edge with precise access to data and shared battlespace awareness to speed decision cycles. There is enhanced computational power and services at the edge which can support more timely decisions across the warfighting domains.
He also believes that the U.S. and allied militaries are looking for non-stove piped C2 capabilities as well. He underscored that is why Cubic has built a protected wave form and made it available for the U.S. government to use as a basic standard.
“We are focused on continually innovating and seeking to deliver best-value to the government, rather than locking the government into proprietary wave forms that make stove piping inevitable.”
Twyman argued that the internet of things was a key driver as well for new C2 and ISR solutions.
And as nations seek to build trusted supply chains and shape new approaches to domestic manufacturing, being able to manage the internet of things will be enhanced in importance going ahead as well.
Cubic Mission Solutions is focused on the evolution of commercial and military space, notably in the LEO constellation world. Here they are working with a number of commercial satellite providers with regard to Cubic’s phased array communications antennas on satellites.
They are focused as well on evolving payloads and they have their own UAV as a flying battle lab to work on relevant payloads which fight into their concept of C2 decision making at the edge and kill web connectivity.
Twyman underscored that with C2 at the tactical edge becoming so critical, they are focused on ways to move away from traditional cloud-based computing to solutions which enable all warfighters at the edge to get the ISR they need at the point of attack or defense.
“We are focused on building resilient content dissemination strategies which can allow the warfighter at the edge to gain access to quality information at the relevant time.”
In short, Twyman laid out a vision and practical solutions to shaping a way ahead for the evolving infrastructure for the C2/ISR enabled integrated distributed force.
Editor’s Note: According to Cubic Mission Solutions, this is how the sector has been built over the past few years.
Cubic Datalinks (the legacy Cubic group) was the starting piece.
Cubic was a niche player in the CDL and Personnel Locator System market.
Then the sector was built with these acquisitions:
Protected Comms & ISR (air, land, sea, cyber and space)
Rugged Internet of Things
Digital Intelligence (C2ISR)
Cubic Mission Solutions Evolution:
In his CMS role, Twyman oversees the C4ISR businesses and strategy, including DTECH Labs, GATR Technologies, TeraLogics, XD Solutions and Cubic’s Communications & Electronics offerings.
Twyman joined Cubic in June 2014 as senior vice president of air training and secure communications, and served most recently as executive vice president, training and communications systems.
In this role, he led the development of Cubic’s C4ISR strategy as well as growth strategies for air training and secure communications, including common datalink, avionics, communication products, restricted communications and optical solutions.
Prior to Cubic, Twyman held a variety of executive leadership positions spanning more than 30 years at Northrop Grumman including sector vice president and general manager of the defense systems division, vice president of integrated C3I systems, vice president of joint network systems and vice president of communication and information systems.
Twyman graduated from California State University Long Beach with a Bachelor of Science degree in Applied Mechanics. He also holds a Master of Business Administration from George Mason University.
https://www.cubic.com/about/people/michael-twyman
More than 150 Royal Australian Air Force personnel have travelled to the United States’ Anderson Air Force Base in Guam to participate in the Regional Presence Deployment from July 21 – August 2.
Along with strike and surveillance aircraft, the air task unit is part of a series of routine operations in South-East Asia announced by Defence Minister Linda Reynolds in early July, to strengthen longstanding security partnerships in the region.
These relationships are based on mutual respect, trust and a shared vision for a secure, open, prosperous and resilient Indo-Pacific.
The deployment will encompass a wide range of activities, including bilateral and multilateral naval manoeuvres, as well as the capacity to contribute to regional contingencies and humanitarian assistance missions that may arise.
Air task unit Commander, Wing Commander Jason Easthope, said interoperability with international partners and maritime integration were key training objectives in Guam.
“Training serials will include a RAAF E-7A Wedgetail working alongside the Royal Australian Navy air warfare destroyer HMAS Hobart to generate the overall air and sea picture,” Wing Commander Easthope said.
“Valuable raise, train and sustain exercises will also be conducted by our F/A-18A Classic Hornets, EA-18G Growlers and KC-30A multi-role tanker transport.”
The RAAF personnel deployed are primarily from RAAF Base Amberley in Queensland and RAAF Base Williamtown in NSW, and include medical and communications professionals, as well as security forces.
This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on July 24, 2020.
