The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 2

11/29/2020

By Robbin Laird

I am in the throes of finishing up my book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy over the past several years, from 2014 until now.

With the announcement of the new government defence strategy by Prime Minister Morrison on July 1, 2020, it seemed a good time to draw together the work I have done over the past several years in Australia.

The book provides a detailed narrative of the evolution over the past few years of how Australia got to the point where it currently is with regard to national defense.

Hopefully, the book will provide a helpful summary of that evolution. It is based on the Williams Foundation Seminars over this period, and highlights the insights provided by the practitioners of military art and strategy who have presented and participated in those seminars.

In that sense, this book provides a detailed look at the strategic trajectory from 2014 through 2020.

During my visits to Australia during this time, one of my interlocutors in discussing Australian and global developments has been Jim Molan, retired senior Australian Army officer and now a Senator.

I have included in the book, the interviews I did with Senator Molan in the appendix to the book as a good look into the dynamics of change being undergone over the past few years.

Recently, Senator Molan has launched a podcast series looking at the way ahead and how Australia might address the challenges which its faces.

This is the second podcast in his series.

Major Wars are a Thing of the Past?

We should never forget that in World War I, 15 million people died. And in World War II 60 to 80 million people died. In the Korean War, 5 million people died. In Vietnam, at least 2 million people died. In the Iran-Iraq War of the 70s and 80s, 1 million people died. In Syria, recently, about 500,000 people have died.

And in Iraq, 150,000 people died in the invasion and the stability operations that I was involved in before, of course, ISIS came into the equation.

Who knows how many people have died in Yemen, in African wars and in parts of the old USSR? And most of that was in the 20th century.

The 21st century has started similarly war hasn’t touched Australia recently for 75 years, except personally, for those that went away to fight distant wars.

We’re a long way from Australia and we’re considered by the Australian military that it was their wars, not societies’ wars, the military’s wars. Australian society didn’t play much of a role in it.

It was hardly noticeable to most Australians, a bit of terrorism here and there, a bit of nation building such as in each team war.

A bit of police actions such as in the Solomon Islands. Really the only exception where society became involved was firstly paying for it.

But secondly, protesting wars or national service and most people within involved.

Every war that we fought as Australian, certainly in my lifetime, but also since 1945, has been, as I said before, this idea of a War of Choice where you choose everything, when you go and, particularly, when you come home.

In those kinds of wars, we haven’t been committed to victory just to participate. That’s why we went to Iraq and Afghanistan, not to win the war, but to participate. This is 75 years of military experience.

And as I said in the last episode, the opposite of wars of commitment, where there are big issues at stake, we have to win, and we not have not fought one of those since 1945.

Where does Australia find itself today?

We just haven’t seen a major war for 75 years. And this is really an extraordinary achievement of the last 75 years in national security is that across the world, I should say, we have avoided major hot wars, world wars, wars between major coalitions or major nations. The Cold War was an example of avoiding the hot wars.

The reason that we’ve done this really comes down to U.S. dominance and mainly by the fact that strength deters. If you can be big and ugly enough and strong enough, you can stop people acting in a way which is aggressive. It’s not just actual regional wars or major wars that will impact terribly on Australia. It’s also that high-level of tension that normally occurs short of a major war. and this could drastically impact Australia.

I remember one example of this is that in the early 2000s, in Israel, Hezbollah fired two Iranian anti-ship missiles at an Israeli patrol craft off the coast of Lebanon. One of them hit the patrol craft.

The other one was diverted by the electronic warfare on the patrol craft. It went over the horizon and hit a cargo ship, which had just left the port of Haifa. Now, as a result of that, not one single ship moved in and out of Israel for over a month.

Why?

Not because of the missiles, but because those ships could no longer get insurance.

Should there be a problem in our part of the world, then immediately everything that’s coming from other parts of the world, our pharmaceuticals, our fertilizer, our crude, or our refined petroleum products would stop.

Funding the ADF is Not Enough

The ADF, as I cannot stress enough, is not responsible for national security. The whole nation is responsible for national security.

It’s an important point to make, and I need to make it as often as I can because we in Australia tend to think that if you fund the ADF, then the ADF will take care of national security.

We might still have to participate in the small wars that we have been participating for years, but the probability of a major war is increasing significantly, and we must prepare.

The Challenge of Modern Warfare

The digital aspect of this is very, very important. Everything that we use cyberspace for enables us to live the modern life, to transfer money between banks and to organize our nation in an incredible way.

It also allows us to fight better, to have greater information and pass data from one organization to another. But cyberwar is never an alternative to what we call Kinetic War. Kinetic War is fundamentally blowing things up. It’s not an alternative.

I just need to make that point first up because a lot of people say, “Well, wars nowadays will be cyberwars. There’ll be digital wars, and we’re not going to go around killing people.”

Well, as I say often, nothing could be further from the truth.

But the digital side of conflict is simply an aspect of the current situation.

No war between the United States and China, which is what I focus on, will be clean. It will also not be limited to only those two countries. It might be limited to battlefields politely away from civilian centers.

It will be massively violent and destructive and may even go nuclear. It will involve massive cyber-attacks that will close down modern nations. We’ve seen examples of that, particularly in the Baltics out of Russia. It will involve attacks in space.. And perhaps it will involve attacks on targets on the Earth from space.

I think that the war may be short and sharp, and someone may win and someone may lose. There may be a high technology fight, which is won or lost, or combatants, after maybe a month of very high technology warfare, may back off in a stalemate, both participants in the war would suffer a great loss and great height for each other for the next indefinite period of time, for 50 years or more, it would be appalling.

Such a war may involve one cataclysmic battle or might be a series of lesser battles and attacks.

And the fighting may be extended, but with breaks to recover and re-equip and move forces.

All of these options, this is why I say that what we face is a terribly uncertain future.

And if you have an uncertain future, you must prepare as much as you can for what you do know. Such a war might just be between China and the U.S. It may be between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea on one side.

And on the other side, it might be the U.S. and its allies, perhaps what we call the IBCA nations, America, Britain, Canada, and Australia, and New Zealand. Plus, perhaps, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and who really knows who else?

And as I said before, it may even be a massive nuclear war. Such as might have occurred between the United States and Russia for 50 years after 1945. It might involve the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the local level, even without a massive, mutual nuclear attack. It’s appalling circumstances.

He added comments regarding the warning period so to speak.

We might be in the middle of a buildup for war now. And it’s not just open war, as I said before, that will impact on Australia. This kind of period of tension leading up to wars will really make COVID look like a picnic and, how depressing, again, is that to even think of that?

What I reckon is likely to happen in a period of tension short of open warfare is nations that might normally export critical items to Australia, might cease to send them to us because of their perception of their own uncertain domestic need, exactly what happened during COVID. In this period of tension, there might be limited local aggression, even conflicts, such as border incidents or the settling of old scores.

We’ve seen changes in the nature in Hong Kong and Taiwan, pressure on Taiwan, incredible pressure on Japan. The Indian border dispute and minor disputes against between China and Bhutan.

There is a characteristic in this period of tension of nations ignoring the rule of law. Examples of that, we’ve seen intimidation and violence against neighbors in sea border disputes over what the Chinese call their Nine-Dash Line justification. We also see in this period of tension attempts to influence internal politics, we saw a New South Wales Upper House member, Mr. Moselmane, in New South Wales being investigated by ASIO and IFP raids and it’s alleged that he may have been the subject of influence, and we’ll let that run its course. We’ve seen the Belt and Road Initiative in Victoria used by a state government.

And all of this diminishes trust in our national institutions because of the fear of foreign influence.

We will see in this period of tension trade used as a weapon and we’ve seen that towards Australia now in relation to beef, wine, and barley. We will also see incredibly in this 21st Century period of tension, the maneuvering of offensive devices in space with a view to later destroying enemy satellites, or even at some stage attacks on us from space.

We’ve seen diplomatic hostage-taking Australian citizens in Iran and in China. We’ve seen very aggressive language, not quite diplomatic by the Wolf Warriors calling us white trash and that’s not unusual, of course, as we all know.

We’ve seen in this period, the forming of threatening alliances, I speak often about the American assessment of the threats to liberal democracy being four nations and an ideology. And those four nations could, for convenience, come together in some way.

We’re seeing China and Russia work together with Iran, for example, to overcome United Nations embargoes on arms shipments to Iran. And that is very, very worrying. We’ll see gathering of information, intellectual property theft, such as we’ve seen with the Thousand Talents Program.

And we’ll see espionage. Most people in Australia don’t know that the FBI are currently investigating 2000 active counter-intelligence cases involving Chinese espionage in the United States now. And they’ve even closed down Chinese consulates for spying.

We will see the gaining of control of United Nations body. I spoke before about how coalitions of nations have stopped U.S. attempts to extend the arms embargo to Iran and then supplying around with those arms.

And finally, there’ll be an increase indirect threats and building up force capability.

And we’ve seen that against the U.S. incredible threats only in the immediate past against the United States saying that if you locate U.S. troops on Taiwan, then China will go to war with you.

We’ve seen continuous threats against Taiwan and military maneuvering all around. Threats against Japan. Conflict against India and Chinese nuclear capability is being increased.

Deterrence is Crucial

What our priority should be is to increase the level of resilience of this nation and to defend the homeland against what I call a collateral attack, a collateral attack from China, in a war between the United States and China.

Collateral really means a secondary attack, not the main attack.

We’re unlikely to ever face the might of China by ourselves, but we may have to prepare for attacks into our nation and the impacts of total trade breakdown caused by war without considering a major war, a major invasion, they are big enough.

The question we’ve got to ask ourselves is, “Are we self-reliant enough?”

The answer is, “No”.

And that is what a nationwide strategy should concentrate on….

In my view, it will take us, in Australia, 5 to 10 years to get past COVID, restart the economy, and then start building resilience in this nation. Even if we started the intellectual parts of it, that is the deciding on what our strategy is going to be.

Even if we started that tomorrow, it would still take us five years best, 10 years probable.

We are well behind where we should be.

 

 

 

What it takes to be a Marine helicopter pilot

11/27/2020

U.S. Marine Col. Ian R. Clark, the chief of staff for Marine Corps Installations West, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, describes his life as a helicopter pilot and what it takes to become one during an interview on Camp Pendleton, California, Oct. 16, 2020.

Clark is an experienced pilot who wants to help others pursue their dreams of becoming Marines and pilots.

10.16.2020

Video by Cpl. Stephen Beard

Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton

A Media Visit to CVN-78 at Sea: USS Gerald R. Ford Working Cyclic Air Operations

11/26/2020

By Robbin Laird

On November 17, 2020, a small number of journalists, most from the local Norfolk based media, flew from Norfolk Air Station to the USS Gerald R. Ford at sea, less than 100 miles off of the Virginia cost.

We flew on the venerable C-2 Greyhound, but this was the first time I had done a carrier landing with the advanced arresting gear and the new EMALS launch gear engaged.

It was clearly different.

Notably, when we launched it was much smoother and much quicker than a steam catapult experience.

Last month, I had spent two days with the senior leadership of USS Gerald R. Ford and talked with many members of the crew.

What I had a chance to see and discuss during that visit was the new combat architecture built into the ship which allows for a very different workflow than a Nimitz class carrier, which facilitates significant advances in sortie generation rates, as well as new ways to manage the deck space in empowering air operations from the very formidable warship.

One of the key changes is with regard to the weapons workflow.

On a Nimitz class carrier, there is a “weapons farm” on the ship’s flight deck from which weapons are worked for assembly and worked with components brought from various levels of the ship and then transported by a hydraulic system which pulls the elevator up with wires and ropes.

The weapons need to be moved through one of the two mess decks before being transported on deck. And prior to loading the weapons onto the aircraft, there is the challenge of finishing the weapons preparation prior to weapons loading.

This process changes onboard the USS Gerald R. Ford.

Below the flight deck are two very large weapons assembly and loading areas, where the weapons are prepared to be transported to the flight deck for loading onto the aircraft. These two large areas allow the ordinance team to prepare weapons of various complexity out of the weather, which makes the process much more rapid and safer.

It is also clear, that the new carrier will be able to operate with significant capabilities to support multi-mission operations. There is enhanced capability for the crew to build diverse weapons packages below deck and then to transport them rapidly to the flight deck for loading.

This will give the ship the ability to mix and match flight strike packages or even ISR packages much more rapidly.

As Rear Adm. Clapperton, Commander Strike Group 12, put it: “We can move more weapons in a safer way, a faster way to a flight deck that is larger and more flexible. And that all contributes to the kind of agility, lethality, and flexibility the Ford brings to the fight.”

The flight deck of the USS Gerald R. Ford is quite different from the Nimitz class carriers.

The island on the USS Gerald R. Ford has been moved 140 feet aft and is 30% smaller.

What this allows is significant additional space for aircraft refueling and weapons loading operations, with the area forward of the island able to accommodate more combat aircraft.

During flight operations, Ford’s design increases the amount of usable space forward of the island and reduces the amount unusable space aft.

There is more operational space on the USS Gerald R. Ford’s flight deck and the new launch and landing systems as well as a significant redesign of how refueling is done on the flight deck provide key tools for a significant reshaping of the operational tempo for the large deck carrier.

The new launch system allows for a wider range of aircraft to operate from the carrier; the new arresting gear system can recover them.

The ability to mix and match the current air fleet and the future one is significantly enhanced with EMALS. The launch system has a larger aircraft weight envelope that exceeds what is available with steam, so EMALS can launch very light aircraft or heavy aircraft which means this system can accommodate future manned or unmanned aircraft.

The same flexibility exists in the Advanced Arresting Gear with larger current operating wind and weight envelopes and the capability to recover future aircraft designs with minimal modifications required.

The refueling system is designed to keep a clear path to the catapult by reducing flight deck obstructions caused by refueling hoses, weapons skids and weapons elevator access points. This highly efficient flight deck flow allows for the FORD to sustain higher launch and recovery rates.

The in deck refueling stations which are unique to the Ford keep refueling hoses out of the taxi paths to the catapult. (refueling stations which can refuel two aircraft at the at those stations.

This has a major impact because on the Nimitz the refueling crew has to carry several, lengthy connected fuel hoses which are heavy from the starboard side of the Nimitz class to do mid-deck refueling.

On the Ford, the hoses are right there beside the in-deck refueling stations and rather than having to have a crew of 5 people to bring the hoses 150 feet to mid-deck and do refueling, you only need two crew to man the in-deck refueling stations.

The speed of launch and recovery was on full display during out visit on November 17, 2020.

Currently, the Ford has 2/3 of its airwings on board, with two air wings and four squadrons operating from the deck. The carrier is at sea currently working what the US Navy calls cyclic operations, this is where strike packages are launched in clusters, and then operate in the combat space to provide for the various missions done by the Navy at sea.

Normally, at this stage in the certification of a new carrier, cyclic operations would not be performed, but clearly that is not the case with the Ford.

A crucial aspect of the Ford are the C2 capabilities and roles of the carrier, which I visited in October but not on this visit.

The mission operations areas are much larger than on the Nimitz and are being configured for the kinds of information warfare as well maritime distributed operations which the new carrier will execute at greater distance in blue water maneuver warfare operations.

But what was on the ship at sea, and not visible during the October visit, were the full complement of warfare officers, bringing the various warfare competencies to the command deck.

One notable member was the commander of an Aegis destroyer, as Aegis will have a combat officer onboard the Ford working the various ways Aegis and the carrier will work together in the blue water maneuver space.

One marvelous moment in the visit, after having traversed the cavernous ship for several hours, was sitting down in the briefing room to be briefed by one of the squadron commanders.

This commander gave a rapid-fire brief bristling with information and enthusiasm and one might have missed the historic developments he referred along the way.

For example, I had to ask a question to slow this cutting-edge aviator down to highlight this little gem. On November 9, 2020, the Ford air wings operated with ACC in a counter-air defense exercise with F-22s, and F-15s to shape a joint warfighting package. This obviously would carry with it the C2 collaboration from land to sea in a warfighting training exercise. And again, this is not the kind of exercise one would be expecting for the work up of a new carrier.

But that is really the point.

This is not just a replacement for the Nimitz class carrier this is a whole re-imaging of the large deck carrier being introduced into the new strategic situation and shaping new combat capabilities with the fleet, the joint services, notably the USAF and with coalition partners.

The ecosystem being shaped within which the USS Gerald R. Ford is a key element is so different that Ed Timperlake and I are writing a book for USNI Press entitled the Maritime Kill Web, 21st Century Warfighting and Deterrence.

The photos in the slideshow highlighted the time on deck on the USS Gerald R. Ford on November 17, 2020 with the invited media.

An earlier version of this article appeared on Breaking Defense on November 25, 2020

The featured photo: An F/A-18E Super Hornet attached to the “Gladiators” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 approaches USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) flight deck Nov. 1, 2020.

Ford is underway in the Atlantic Ocean conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Sarah Mead)

Media Stories Focused on Media Visit November 17, 2020

Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Gerald R. Ford Making Steady Progress Ahead of Deployment,” USNI News (November 24, 2020).

While the current testing period is largely focused on obtaining various accreditations – like Carrier Air Traffic Control Center (CATCC) Certification and Flight Deck Certification (FDC) – Navy officials have emphasized that incorporating strike group operation drills into the PDT&T phase is helping prepare the carrier for operations down the road.

During a press conference in Ford’s foc’sle, Clapperton said warfare commanders within the CSG are all currently operating aboard Ford now.

“We’ve got all four of the major warfare commanders – plus the commanding officer of the carrier and the strike group commander – all out here together. And we’ve really stepped up the level of complexity and integration for the Ford strike group. We are no longer just doing the required test in intervals for the PDT&T session. We are now doing integrated strike group operations very similar to what you would see an aircraft carrier in work-ups doing,” Clapperton said.

“And really this week – last week was a little bit more of the basic phase stuff – this week they’re starting to see a little bit of increase in complexity and full-spectrum operations: air defense exercise, maritime strike exercises, strait transit exercises, [anti] submarine warfare exercises, and combat search and rescue exercises. All that going on essentially simultaneously with this test and evaluation period for the carrier as well,” he added.

Downey said the strike group commander would not typically be onboard the ship during PDT&T and therefore his presence and the ship’s drive to start conducting these strike group operations have changed the order of events in this testing period.

While in the testing stage, the crew uniquely has the chance to experiment with potential changes to how they conduct strike group operations. For example, during USNI News’ time aboard Ford, the strike group’s air defense commander was operating in the Tactical Flag Command Center, where the CSG sits, while Ford practiced a strait transit.

Capt. Corey Keniston, the commanding officer of guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG-64), would typically perform his duties while onboard the cruiser, not the carrier. But during this developmental testing, the crew is seeking to learn how Keniston physically operating from the carrier could affect CSG operations.

Dave Ress, Daily Press (November 22, 2020).

But, down in the strike group commander’s dimly lit tactical command and control room, one of the large, glowing bloom screens on the wall displayed the virtual, dog-legged transit the strike group was to pass through, after deploying helicopters to keep the careful watch they’d be making if the Ford were eventually to go through the straits of Hormuz or Malacca. Green blips showed where the strike group ships and other vessels were. The strike group was inside the lines.

Watching was air and missile combat commander Capt. Corey Keniston, normally stationed on the strike group cruiser he commands, USS Gettyburg, stationing this missile command officers on the carrier. He’d be running a missile defense operation once the transit exercise was cover.

Part of what the Ford has been testing over the past few weeks is the idea of having onboard combat control officers from Keniston’s operation as well as the separate information warfare command, responsible for electronic warfare and cyber security operations, Clapperton said.

“We’re flattening the battle space,” Clapperton said, pointing to Keniston, also known as the whiskey commander.

Chris Cavas, “Primed for a Busy Year Ahead, Carrier Gerald R. Ford Will be at Sea More Than Ever,” Defense and Aerospace Report.

In late November the shroud lifted just a bit more, and a small group of reporters was allowed on board for a few hours as the Ford was headed back to Norfolk from 20 days of underway tests. It was the first occasion where media got a chance to visit the carrier while at sea and watch and talk with her crew as they operated and tested their ship.

And it seemed – at least from the few hours we had on board – that a genuinely new spirit is around the ship and the program. In Washington the Ford class effort is often characterized as doom and gloom, rife with concerns and intense oversight. But on the Ford herself folks seemed  determined to make it work.

 Hope Hodge Seck, “Here’s Why Sailors on the Carrier Ford Will Eat Better Than Anyone Else in the Fleet,” Miliary.Com.

Regarding food, one of the most significant changes on the Ford is the ship’s two galleys, compared with the Nimitz’s five. According to Navy officials, these include a centralized galley to the aft of the aircraft and a forward galley that will be manned only when the carrier’s air wing is aboard. While this means the ship’s food service crew will be more centralized and the mess they dish up more consistent, it also means that officers, chiefs and enlisted sailors will be eating the exact same food — even though they still eat on different mess decks.

Alex Littlehales (WVEC), “For the first time since the pandemic, an inside-look at the progress of USS Gerald R. Ford,” 13NewsNow.


For the October 2020 report, see below:

Integration of Air Defense Command Elements onboard the USS Gerald R. Ford

11/25/2020

By MC1 Jeff Troutman

Off the Coast of Virginia, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) and its embarked Carrier Air Wing 8 are conducting the first-ever fully integrated carrier strike group operations for a Ford-class carrier, under the leadership and operational control of Carrier Strike Group 12.

The operation also includes Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 2; CSG-12’s air and missile defense commander, the commanding officer of the USS Gettysburg (CG 64); and CSG-12’s information warfare commander.

While underway, Air and Missile Defense Warfare Commander Capt. Corey Keniston and his staff are making the most of the first-of-its-kind opportunity to integrate with the Ford crew and embarked staff during the ship’s independent steaming event (ISE) 13—a key milestone more than halfway through Ford’s 18-month Post-Delivery Test and Trials phase of operations.

“During typical strike group operations, the air defense commander remains on the cruiser escort and is the only warfare commander who is not on the carrier,” said Keniston, a native of Brenham, Texas.

“This ISE is providing a unique opportunity to be physically onboard the carrier and see all the other things that go on within the strike group.

“It’s been interesting to learn what amazing capabilities the Ford-class ship brings to the fight,” he added.

“I’m particularly impressed with the radar system that’s on board, and I think it’s a game-changer for the surveillance and identification challenge that the air defense commander faces because now I have even more credible sensors that I can use to build the entire air picture for the strike group commander to make decisions from.”

Keniston’s embarked staff includes Lt. Samuel Fikes, Gettysburg’s systems test officer, from Lubbock, Texas, who was previously stationed onboard Ford from 2013-2016. Fikes said he relished the opportunity to return to his former platform and to see the operational side of the ship from an entirely different perspective.

“I was here for three years during the pre-commissioning phase of Ford, and I never had the chance to get underway with her the first time I was here,” said Fikes. “Getting to come back as part of the air defense team and supporting the carrier and getting underway and seeing the operational side of the ship has been an outstanding experience.”

Gettysburg serves as an air defense platform for CSG-12, and its’ role is to coordinate air defense assets across the strike group to ensure no manned aircraft or cruise missile can harm the carrier.

The unique experience of having all major facets of the strike group in one place, at the same time, has provided the air and missile defense cell operators a wealth of knowledge and learning opportunities they normally wouldn’t get when working from their respective platforms, Fikes said.

“Being embarked on Ford for this ISE, we’re getting to have face-to-face conversations with the people responsible for the other warfare domains, as opposed to just hearing a voice on a radio,” said Fikes.

“We’re having some very detailed, in-depth conversations with pilots and others involved in executing air defense; it’s good for us to develop relationships with the squadrons, and it’s good for them because they’re able to talk to us face-to-face, and they normally would not have that opportunity. This integration is a fantastic way to build that foundation in a real-time environment.”

The integration has helped the entire strike group team come together as a single combat unit for the very first time, something the air and missile defense cell has seized upon as a positive learning experience, Keniston said.

“The hardest thing about strike group operations is there are a finite number of resources, and there could be an infinite number of threats that you need to consider and plan for,” said Keniston.

“You have to learn to work with the other warfare commanders to manage that finite amount of resources while meeting the priorities of the strike group commander. Between air defense, strike missions, undersea warfare, surface warfare and other warfare commander’s requirements, you have to balance the resources to employ them in the best way possible to meet the strike group’s mission.”

Seeing all the different facets of strike group operations in one place has provided other members of the air and missile defense cell an opportunity to see a side of the planning and development phase during which they would never otherwise be present.

“This is my first tour on a cruiser, so it’s been a great opportunity for me to see the integration piece, especially being on a platform that is a warfare commander,” said Lt. Veronica Hoecherl, Gettysburg’s navigator, from Del Ray Beach, Florida.

“Seeing all the planning and coordination that has to occur to make an event like this happen has been incredibly helpful and has been a rewarding experience for me.”

“It’s been interesting to develop this all from scratch for a new class of carrier like Ford. This is all different from how we would strategize and execute on a Nimitz-class carrier, as far as capabilities are concerned, because the systems are different on this platform and ISE 13 is giving us a chance to prove some of the concepts we’ve been discussing,” said Fikes.

During ISE 13, CSG-12 assets are conducting unit-level training, maritime strike exercises, an air defense exercise, and other larger force exercises.

Published on November 19, 2020.

 

 

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Receives its Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Certification

11/24/2020

By Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Riley McDowell

USS Gerald R. Ford Public Affairs

ATLANTIC OCEAN — Combat Systems divisions assigned to USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) have helped the ship earn its Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) certification November 17 while underway in the Atlantic Ocean.

The certification, ensures that the shipboard electromagnetic compatibility improvement program (SEMCIP) has been implemented post- Chief of Naval operations (CNO) availability.

Information Systems Technician Second Class Ryan St. John, from Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, assigned to Ford’s combat systems department, works out of the radio transmission room and was an integral member of the certification team.

“This was an initial exercise,” said St. John. “Enabling a series of further exercises to qualify [the Ford] to compete for the “Battle E”. The “Battle E” is an award given to ships that surpass a maintenance standard in nine functioning categories.

The Ford had to meet optimal EMC posture in-port and underway, by verifying that EMC control measures are installed and to ensure that the ship is not deploying with systems that may be degraded due to fixable Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) occurrences.

While in-port and at sea the crew verified that all available EMI patches were installed, all unresolved EMI occurrences to include degraded EMI were identified and reported to Capt. J. J. Cummings, the ship’s commanding officer. The crew also had to verify that the High Frequency (HF) intermodulation interference did not exceed certification requirements.

“[Ford] radio passed the initial exercise which ensures the frequencies are free from distortion,” said St. John. “Allowing [Ford] to communicate effectively.”

Published on November 19, 2020.

Featured photo:  ATLANTIC OCEAN (Jan. 19, 2020) An F/A-18F Super Hornet, assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23, lands on USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) flight deck. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Riley McDowell)

The Way Ahead for the Large Deck Carrier: The Perspective of Rear Admiral Meier, Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic

By Robbin Laird

The day before we flew to the USS Gerald R. Ford, I sat down with Rear Admiral Meier, Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic, in his Norfolk office, to discuss the way ahead for Naval Air Force, and the next generation large deck carrier.

I would call it that rather than simply a large deck aircraft carrier, because of the warfighting ecosystem which is being crafted by the U.S. Navy and the joint and coalition force to shape a kill web ecosystem.

This is one in which each core platform works with its appropriate mates to shape interactive strike and defense combat clusters operating across the extended battlespace.

I had just returned from Resolute Hunter being held at NAWDC at Fallon Naval Air Station, so we started with this aspect of the evolving ecosystem.

Question: There is the venerable Red Flag which is hosted by the USAF and in which participants are working the kill chain, and the metrics of success are either kill or be killed.

The Navy is now launching Resolute Hunter which is about the sensor networks and decision making to determine how to deliver strike to the appropriate targets at the required speed of delivery.

 How would you characterize Resolute Hunter?

Rear Admiral Meier: The origins of Red Flag and of TOP GUN were largely tactically focused.

Resolute Hunter is focused on shaping an evolving operational approach leveraging the sensor networks in order to best shape and determine the operational employment of our forces and the delivery of the desired combat effect.

The USS Gerald R. Ford is entering the Resolute Hunter environment.

How Ford plugs into the data transfer and data fusion environment is enormously important to its operations and how it contributes to the overall force effectiveness.

The dual band radar onboard is a big part of that along with the mission systems and its entire approach to C2 within the fleet.

Question: Having visited Ford with Ed Timperlake when you were the CO and it was being built and then going back last month to see the maturing ship, I would argue that the Ford is the most formidable warship ever built.

But then again Bismarck was the most powerful battleship ever built. It failed because of being an odd man out, whereas obviously with the Ford you are focused on how it anchors, leverages and contributes to the evolving maritime kill web approach.

Is this a fair way to put it?

Rear Admiral Meier: It is. I think it’s a very fair look at it.

The comparison between the Bismarck is interesting too, because the Bismarck was designed as an open ocean battleship and was never able to get to the point where they had the freedom of action and they didn’t have the air cover and support and were ultimately destroyed because they didn’t have the capacity or capability for a  defense in depth concept of operations.

From the very beginning, defense in depth has been foundational to the carrier fleet.

You can maneuver in space with your mobile defense in depth network of the strike group itself, the air wing and all of the other surface assets, that’s a robust capability to operate really at a time and place of our choosing, not of our adversaries choosing.

And with regard to the maneuver space, we are working with the joint and coalition force to expand the capabilities of that force as well.

For example, with the Marines working naval integration and expeditionary basing, they can contribute significant ISR and fires support for the fleet.

We are working new ways to integrate with the USAF, as seen in the Resolute Hunter exercise as well.

We are working on ways to enhance a truly joint war fighting force able to synchronize limited precious resources on high value targets.

And to do that in a way that optimizes the effects on those targets and makes the weapons magazines last longer.

Question: The shift from the land wars to shaping approaches to deal with peer competitors, for the U.S. Navy is significantly about the return to blue water operations, including blue water expeditionary operations.

How would characterize the way ahead?

Rear Admiral Meier: In some ways, it is back to the future, and remembering what we did in World War II in the Pacific but significantly updating it with our new technologies, connectivity, distributed maritime operations and understanding the nature of the adversaries we are dealing with.

It is more of a maneuver and raid concept where we pick the time and choose the place and location to be.

Fundamental to that is the capability to do that in a manner that our adversary doesn’t track, detect, target us.

And that does get a little bit harder as technology advances in terms of overhead sensors, space, long range, ISR, those sorts of things as well as emissions control.

We are working to minimize the likelihood of our detection or operating in ways unanticipated by the adversary.

Question: There seems to be an assumption by some of adversaries that they can sit back in territory, launch strikes and get effects without receiving a response.

Clearly, we need to update our weapons enterprise and with the withdrawal from the INF treaty, the opportunity to shape longer range strike seems a key one.

 How do you view this challenge?

Rear Admiral Meier: Our force is not designed nor intended to be an offensive force, yet if deterrence fails, we certainly have that capability.

That capability is enhanced with range and speed.

Range and speed can refer to the platform, the shooter or the weapon itself.

I will tell you after really a generation of Naval service where we have focused on land wars in Asia, we’ve really woken up to the need for longer range strike.

It will not be long before we have maritime strike Tomahawk, and hypersonics will be here before we know it.

We’re making great advances in those areas.

We’re talking about a very fluid battlespace, where both blue and red are maneuvering within that battlespace.

The next war we expect to be a maritime fight at extreme ranges.

From a “fighting Navy” perspective, I think it’s imperative that we maintain our tactical and operational edge that includes forward presence, lethality, but, just as we discussed earlier, increasing lethality at range and at speed, which are things that quite frankly we have not focused upon during the land wars.

But when you talk about the maneuver capability of a Ford-class Aircraft carrier, with the air wing range beyond that and the weapons that the aircraft carry, we are delivering significant reach into the battlespace.

We’re engaging in training drills exercises and operating at some ranges that we have not ever done off of the decks of aircraft carriers; it’s really impressive.

Question: You spoke of enhanced ranges.

I think that comes from how the sensor networks interact with C2 at the tactical edge as well as shaping more effective and rapid fleet wide operational decision making.

It is also focusing on the carrier wing, as the carrier wing of the future becomes incorporated on the decks of the carriers, an integratable air wing, with reach beyond their range.

And with the kind of third party targeting which kill webs enable, the operational reach of any particular platform in the maritime force is significantly enhanced as a kill web asset.

Notably, it will be important to leverage the significant numbers of F-35s operating in the Pacific conceived as enablers of a kill web and not just in terms of legacy fighters.

 Does this make sense to you?

Rear Admiral Meier: It does on several levels.

The F-35 is a key element of making the air wing integratable in the sense you have described.

The MADL data links in the Pacific fleet of F-35s can provide the kind of significant reach we need in the Pacific.

Obviously, we will need to work the handoffs among aircraft and the security dynamics as well.

But the technical foundation is clearly there.

It can be forgotten by those not close to Naval aviation, that we have essentially had the same air wing for 20 years.

This is certainly not true for the decade ahead, where we have accelerated change with the introduction not just of replacement platforms, but significantly different ones and shaping new concepts of operations for the air wing, with the carriers in the distributed maritime operating space.

And we tend to have an iterative process that continues to build on itself.

From my time at Navy Warfare Development Command, it is clear that we’ve got a robust process of fleet experimentation and gaming both from theory or conceptual gaming to doing demonstrations at sea.

I think we’re on a pretty tight turning path with that process.

We continued our discussion the next day, November 17, 2020, onboard the USS Gerald R. Ford.

He had not returned to the Ford since he had relinquished command, and was onboard with the other senior commanders, and all of the warfighting command elements

What we saw onboard was cyclic operations by the squadrons onboard the Ford.

The speed of launch and recovery was on full display during out visit on November 17, 2020.

Currently, the Ford has 2/3 of its airwings on board, with elements of two air wings and four squadrons operating from the deck.

The carrier is at sea currently working what the U.S. Navy calls cyclic operations, this is where strike packages are launched in clusters, and then operate in the combat space to provide for the various missions done by the Navy at sea.

Normally, at this stage in the certification of a new carrier, cyclic operations would not be performed, but clearly that is not the case with the Ford.

A crucial aspect of the Ford are the C2 capabilities and roles of the carrier, which I visited in October but not on this visit.

The mission operations areas are much larger than on the Nimitz and are being configured for the kinds of information warfare as well maritime distributed operations which the new carrier will execute at greater distance in blue water maneuver warfare operations.

But what was on the ship at sea, and not visible during the October visit, were the full complement of warfare officers, bringing the various warfare competencies to the command deck.

One notable member was the commander of an Aegis destroyer, as Aegis will have a combat officer onboard the Ford working the various ways Aegis and the carrier will work together in the blue water maneuver space.

One marvelous moment in the visit, after having traversed the cavernous ship for several hours, was sitting down in the briefing room to be briefed by one of the squadron commanders.

This commander gave a rapid-fire brief bristling with information and enthusiasm and one might have missed the historic developments he referred along the way.

For example, I had to ask a question to slow this cutting-edge aviator down to highlight this little gem.

On November 9, 2020, the Ford air wings operated with ACC in a counter-air defense exercise with F-22s, and F-15s to shape a joint warfighting package.

This obviously would carry with it the C2 collaboration from land to sea in a warfighting training exercise.

And again, this is not the kind of exercise one would be expecting for the work up of a new carrier.

But that is really the point.

This is not a new version of a legacy carrier; this is a whole re-imaging of the large deck carrier being introduced into the new strategic situation and shaping new combat capabilities with the fleet, the joint services, notably the USAF and with coalition partners.

The eco-system being shaped within which the USS Gerald R. Ford is a key element is so different that Ed Timperlake and I are writing a book for USNI Press entitled the Maritime Kill Web, 21st Century Warfighting and Deterrence.

Towards the end of the visit, in a discussion with Rear Admiral Meier, he underscored that the standup of the Ford was occurring in a way that involved training for evolving warfighting operations, and not just doing trap and cat training onboard the ship.

As one viewed the squadrons operating off of the Ford that morning, it was the legacy airwing of the past twenty years landing and operating with the new combat infrastructure of the next generation carrier.

But as Rear Admiral Meier put it: “It is not difficult to see the air wing of the future operating off of this deck with much greater speed, agility and reach than the legacy air wing.

“But without the new infrastructure, just adding the new platforms, would not get the maximum effect from the integratable air wing.”

Note: One example of the new combat infrastructure on the Ford deck is in the in deck refueling capability.

The in deck refueling stations which are unique to the Ford keep refueling hoses out of the taxi paths to the catapult. (refueling stations which can refuel two aircraft at the at those stations.

This has a major impact because on the Nimitz the refueling crew has to carry several, lengthy connected fuel hoses which are heavy from the starboard side of the Nimitz class to do mid-deck refueling.

On the Ford, the hoses are right there beside the in-deck refueling stations and rather than having to have a crew of 5 people to bring the hoses 150 feet to mid-deck and do refueling, you only need two crew to man the in-deck refueling stations.