USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) The House of Wolverine virtual tour series.
12.10.2020
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class William Spears
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
The Osprey as a Cross-Deck Combat Capability: The Case of USNS Mercy
04/20/2021PACIFIC OCEAN (Apr. 14, 2021)
An MV-22B Osprey assigned to Air Test and Evaluation (HX) Squadron 21 of Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, Md., landing aboard Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy’s (T-AH 19) flight deck for the first time Apr. 14.
Mercy is underway off the coast of Southern California completing Dynamic Interface testing, where the ship’s aviation facilities will be evaluated for compatibility with the V-22 Osprey and MH-60 Seahawk, and establish launch and recovery windows in adverse weather conditions.
Mercy recently returned to its homeport in San Diego from a regular overhaul in Portland, Ore., where improvements were made to its flight deck to support multiple aircraft platforms.
Mercy must be in a five-day-activation status in order to support missions over the horizon, and be ready, reliable and resilient to support mission commanders. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Luke Cunningham)
This is a case of the flexibility which the Osprey brings to fleet as it focuses on blue water expeditionary operations.
As noted in an article we published on April 13, 2021:
Carrier Strike Group 4, or CSG-4, runs Carrier Strike and Amphibious Readiness Groups through the final phases of their inter-deployment training cycles to prepare these units for their future deployments.
According to the U.S Navy:
“Carrier Strike Group 4 trains and delivers combat–ready naval forces to U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) and U.S. Fleet Forces Command capable of conducting full-spectrum integrated Maritime, Joint, and Combined Operations in support of U.S. National interests. CSG-4 conducts training through exercises that create a realistic training environment and includes academic, synthetic and live training. Groups trained include Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units, independent deployers and Forward Deployed Naval Forces – Europe (FDNF-E).”
But as the Navy rethinks how to use its aircraft carriers, how to use its amphibious forces and how to use the whole gamut of its surface and subsurface forces to fight as a fleet, an opportunity for change is clear: why not rework how air assets move across the sea bases to provide the Fleet a wider variety of combat capabilities tailored to specific combat scenarios?
Notably, moving helicopters and tiltrotor assets across the Fleet provide for a wider variety of options than simply having a set piece of equipment onboard each class of ship.
To determine how best to do so, Naval Aviation Leaders must begin to focus focus on exercises, fleet battle experiments, and lessons learned during training and real-world operations.
A key enabler for cross-decking is to ensure that all aircraft operating throughout the maritime battlespace have the digital interoperability commanders must have and rely on to ensure mission success.
With the potential to refocus the amphibious fleet operations on sea control and denial missions such as was evident in last year’s Black Widow exercise with the USS WASP, exercising an integrated carrier and expeditionary strike force with a cross-decking capability would make a great deal of sense towards driving increased innovation as well.
For example, with the Viper attack helicopter becoming Link-16 and Full Motion Video capable, its ability to work with the SH-60R provide ships at sea with a significant self-defense capabilities.
Not only could the Vipers function with a wide array of weapons which they can carry in both anti-air and anti-surface roles, but new roles could be invented for the Ospreys operating throughout the fleet.
With roll on roll off capabilities being used to enhance various mission sets for the Ospreys, new capabilities could be added to this aircraft as well, including both surface and subsurface strike.
The coming of the CMV-22B could provide the Fleet a significant cross deck logistic capability to to deliver mission critical cargo and supplies throughout the fleet.
Put another way, thinking of the deployed sea-bases as a chessboard rather than as scripted task forces built around specific platforms, can expand the capabilities of the Navy in fighting as a fleet.
And with the kind of allied collaboration being pursued by the U.S. Navy worldwide, the redesign of the chessboard by rethinking how new platforms in naval aviation can be mated to a wider variety of at sea platforms would significantly the Navy’s operational reach and capability.
In short, we are at the cusp of a significant redesign of how the fleet can operate and the future of naval aviation, which will be further enabled as additional capabilities come to the force with teaming of manned and unmanned systems, will play a leading role in how the fleet operate in the future.
By reworking the template now, it will facilitate a more intelligent and synchronized use of unmanned systems as they mature, become available to the fleet, and provide for an effective family of systems with future and innovative manned aircraft.
Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Naval Exercise
From December 15 to 17, the JMSDF conducted a trilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy and the French Navy around Okinotorishima Island.
JS Hyuga from the JMSDF participated in this anti-submarine warfare exercise alongside the U.S. Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain and P-8A aircraft as well as the French Navy’s submarine FS Émeraude.
Through the training, the JMSDF has improved its tactical skills and mutual understanding with the U.S. Navy and the French Navy, and the cooperation and unity among the three countries under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” were demonstrated.
Story from MoD Japan
Israel and the CH-53K Decision: Re-Baselining Heavy Lift Helicopters for Strategic Uncertainty
By Robbin Laird
Recently, the IDF selected the CH-53K to replace its legacy CH-53s.
In my last article on this subject, I highlighted one key factor in the decision, namely, the importance of having a new aircraft which reduced pilot training and operational load for reserve pilots.
As I concluded: “If you rely on reserves as a key part of force structure capabilities and rely on mobilization as part of your force augmentation strategy, it is crucial to have platforms which can be re-learned rapidly prior to operating them in an operational situation.
“Even more important, if you have a man-machine capability such as fly by wire, then the capabilities of those pilots who do not regularly operate the aircraft, their own safety, reliability and performance standards go up. And with regard to a heavy lift helicopter, many lives are at stake.”
Another important factor when the IDF looks at its strategic environment today is to build for strategic uncertainty.
The recent Abraham accords have reshaped the Israel strategic environment; but how will that environment evolve and what is next?
In other words, Israel faces a very uncertain strategic environment; what is today’s threat might be part of tomorrow’s solution to yet a very different threat environment.
That is why when looking at an air platform, growthability, and flexibility are key considerations.
What the CH-53K as a software upgradeable platform with new baseline for a heavy lift platform provides is a new baseline from which to shape capabilities for an uncertain strategic future.
Put bluntly, defining operational requirements for a replacement platform based on the past thirty years of experience or the current threat environment is simply inadequate.
What is necessary is to introduce a platform which works seamlessly with today’s IDF, fits into the current concept of operations, but can change over time to anchor changes in those concepts of operations and to deliver capability for tomorrow’s strategic environment.
And the CH-53K is a very different type of heavy lift helicopter, one built with a new baseline for upgradeability.
For example, as I wrote with regard to the CH-53K and its digital cockpit:
The CH-53K is shaping a new paradigm for heavy lift but it is doing so in the context of a new paradigm of warfare as well, or in the context, of a shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management.
Crisis management is evolving significantly.
And the Marines as the US’s premier crisis management force is evolving along with the changing demand set.
The Marines are reshaping their force structure to enable it to operate as an effective modular force with scalable force capabilities, which can be tailored to a particular crisis.
The CH-53K is a key part of this modular force.
The aircraft brings new capabilities to the force which are in no way the same as the CH-53E.
One of those capabilities is the new cockpit in the aircraft and how digital interoperability and integration with the evolution of the MAGTF more broadly is facilitated by the operation of a 21st century cockpit.
The cockpits are very different and fit in with a general trend for 21stcentury aircraft of having digital cockpits with combat flexibility management built in.
Because the flight crew is operating a digital aircraft, many of the functions which have to be done manually in the E, are done by the aircraft itself.
This allows the cockpit crew to focus on combat management and force insertion tasks.
And the systems within the cockpit allow for the crew to play this function.
This means that the K and its onboard Marines and cargo can be integrated into a digitally interoperable force.
This means as well that the K could provide a lead role for the insertion package, or provide for a variety of support roles beyond simply bringing Marines and cargo to the fight.
They are bringing information as well which can be distributed to the combat force in the area of interest.
This kind of re-baselining of a heavy lift helicopter was a key part of the Israel decision to buy the CH-53K and to prepare to introduce it into a dynamically changing IDF, one which the CH-53K can make a major contribution to in terms of the dynamics of change for the force as well.
HMAS Adelaide and the Sydney Harbour Bridge: A Tight Fit
By Lieutenant Commander Christopher Thornton
Families of the crew of HMAS Adelaide were treated to a day on board to thank them for their support during a busy year for the ship’s company.
A highlight of the April 9 family day on Sydney Harbour was when the landing helicopter dock – one of Navy’s largest warships – sailed under the Sydney Harbour Bridge.
This was a tight navigational feat requiring extensive planning.
The flight deck was full of onlookers as the ship’s mast passed under the iconic bridge with only a few metres to spare.
Sub Lieutenant James Tomlinson’s family and partner were on the ship for the day.
“My family were amazed at the size of Adelaide and were thrilled to be on board for the day,” Sub Lieutenant Tomlinson said.
“We were treated to an awesome lunch and the chefs and support operation sailors provided outstanding hospitality that my family will not soon forget.”
Last year was a busy one for Adelaide’s ship’s company, beginning with support to Operation Bushfire Assist, then COVID-19 Assist and ending with deployment on Operation Fiji Assist after Tropical Cyclone Yasa.
Adelaide returned to Australia from Fiji in February.
The Sydney Harbour cruise was a way of thanking families for their support, particularly over the Christmas period when the ship was deployed.
Families also were treated to an embarkation via landing craft into the well dock, firefighting demonstrations and fantastic views of the harbour.
Adelaide will soon depart Fleet Base East to conduct training operations before going into a maintenance period for a few months.
This story was published by the Australian Department of Defence on April 16, 2021.
Featured Photo: HMAS Adelaide sails under the Sydney Harbour Bridge. Credit: Tara Morrison
The Latest Norwegian Building Block for European Direct Defense
04/19/2021
The build out of the re-established Second Fleet and the standup of Allied Joint Forces Command combined with the key efforts of the Nordic allies is a reshaping North Atlantic defense.
In our book on The Return of Direct Defense in Europe, we focused upon the key role which key European states were playing in shaping a way ahead for the direct defense of Europe in the presence of the challenge posed by the authoritarian powers. We looked at the U.S. role as complimentary to this effort, and not understood in the old Soviet deterrent terms.
The Nordics have certainly been key drivers of change and in the reshaping of direct defense capabilities.
As we put it in that book: “Europe and its defense are not one narrative but several. The Russians face an increasingly unified Nordic Northern Flank with enhanced UK focus on the region, backed by reach into North America.
“The central part of Europe is a mosaic of former Warsaw Pact states with varying degrees of concern about the Russian challenge, backed by a German French alliance with the nuclear-armed France in this key area.
“And the southern zone of Europe in which Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Italy have about as much solidarity today as they have had historically, which means that aggregation management is crucial to deal with any alliance-wide challenges.”
And the Nordic Northern flank and the redesign of direct defense is highlighted in that book as follows: “A key part of shaping a new approach to direct defense in Europe is winning the fourth battle of the Atlantic. (which rests on dealing with) a key aspect of the Russian challenge, which is crucial for the Nordics, namely, the need to hold the Russian Kola bastion at risk.
“For the United States and Canada, it is about reinforcing Europe and holding the Russians at bay, notably with Putin threatening a nuclear strike via his projected new hypersonic missile to be launched via a submarine. But for the Nordics, it is about homeland defense, and not letting the Russians have a free ride to use the Kola Peninsula and its extended perimeter defense without a significant capability by the West to attrite and destroy the Russian bastion.
“When you come out from the land into the air and sea corridors, is where the West for sure needs to be able to operate its own anti-access and area denial capability. Two can play at this game.”
Recently, Norway signed an agreement with the United States which enhances the ability of U.S. and allied air and naval forces to reinforce Norway for both training and crisis support.
“Under the Agreement, Agreed Facilities and Areas will be established at Rygge Military Air Station and Airfield, Sola Military Air Station and Airfield, Evenes Military Air Station and Airfield and Ramsund Naval Station.
These locations have been selected with the aim of strengthening cooperation with the U.S. in the air defence and maritime domains in years to come.
Infrastructure investments may be made at all four locations.
Projects within Agreed Facilities and Areas will be developed in consultation with the U.S., but funding must be allocated under the U.S. defence budget before projects can be initiated.
As a result, it will take some time before any planned projects are completed. Additional Agreed Facilities and Areas may be established at a later date if Norway and the U.S. agree. This will also require the approval of the Norwegian Government and the consent of the Storting.”
According to a story published on the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website on April 16, 2021:
“The United States of America is Norway’s most important ally, and we have shared more than 70 years of close, constructive defence cooperation. The Agreement both updates and further develops the agreements and cooperation already in place between Norway and the U. S. The Agreement will play a vital role in ensuring Norwegian security within the framework of NATO”, said Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen.
The Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) updates and regulates practical aspects of U.S. military activity in Norway, and supplements existing agreements between Norway and the U.S. The Agreement was signed today by Norway’s Minister of Defence. The Agreement must be submitted to the Storting (Norwegian parliament) for consent before it can enter into force.
‘Our cooperation with our Allies is under continuous development. The Agreement reaffirms Norway’s close relationship with the U.S. and confirms Norway’s key position on the northern flank of NATO. To ensure that Norway and our Allies can operate together in a crisis situation under difficult conditions, we must be able to hold exercises and train regularly here in Norway. The Agreement does not entail any changes to key Norwegian security policy principles. Our policies regarding the stationing of foreign forces on Norwegian territory, the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons and port visits remain unchanged,’ said Minister of Foreign Affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide.
‘Norway’s defence rests on three main elements: the national defence capability, collective defence through NATO, and bilateral reinforcement plans with close allies. The ongoing development of defence cooperation with the US complements our own efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Norwegian Armed Forces,’ said Mr Bakke-Jensen.
The U.S. has entered into similar agreements with several Allied countries in Europe, to promote more predictable development of defence cooperation and ensure a robust and practical framework for providing reinforcements in the event of war or crisis.
The Agreement establishes and regulates Agreed Facilities and Areas, which are specified locations that may be used for military purposes. Under the Agreement, US forces will have unimpeded access to and use of these facilities and areas. All U.S. activities shall be conducted with full respect for the sovereignty, laws, and international legal obligations of Norway. This is how the Allied presence in Norway has been organised since the end of the Second World War. Any US military activity carried out in Norway will continue to be subject to close coordination between Norway and the US.
Under the Agreement, Agreed Facilities and Areas will be established at Rygge Military Air Station and Airfield, Sola Military Air Station and Airfield, Evenes Military Air Station and Airfield and Ramsund Naval Station. These locations have been selected with the aim of strengthening cooperation with the U.S. in the air defence and maritime domains in years to come. Infrastructure investments may be made at all four locations. Projects within Agreed Facilities and Areas will be developed in consultation with the U.S., but funding must be allocated under the U.S. defence budget before projects can be initiated. As a result, it will take some time before any planned projects are completed. Additional Agreed Facilities and Areas may be established at a later date if Norway and the U.S. agree. This will also require the approval of the Norwegian Government and the consent of the Storting.
The Agreement will be presented to the Storting in two propositions: one to request consent to ratify the Agreement and the other to propose necessary legislation to implement it in Norwegian law. Both propositions will be submitted to the Storting during the autumn 2021 session. The draft legislation and the Agreement will be circulated to the public in spring 2021, with a three-month deadline.
Facts about the Agreement:
The SDCA provides the basis for further developing Norway’s longstanding defence cooperation with the U.S. The Agreement supplements existing bilateral agreements with the U.S., as well as NATO’s Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA).
The Agreement regulates and facilitates U.S. presence, training and exercises in Norway, thus facilitating rapid U.S. reinforcement of Norway in the event of crisis or war.
The Agreement covers a wide range of rules that are important for regulating practical aspects of the activities of U.S. forces, such as entry and exit, jurisdiction, exemptions from taxes and duties, the use of contractors and welfare services, and prospective investments in infrastructure.
The Agreement provides a framework for close cooperation and consultations between Norwegian and U.S. authorities regarding activities and operational and security issues. The text explicitly states that ‘nothing in this Agreement alters Norwegian policies with regard to the stationing of foreign forces on Norwegian territory, and the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory.’
The Agreement introduces the concept of Agreed Facilities and Areas, which are defined as locations that are central to the development of practical defence cooperation. Agreed Facilities and Areas will be established at Rygge Military Air Station and Airfield, Sola Military Air Station and Airfield, Evenes Military Air Station and Airfield and Ramsund Naval Station. This primarily encompasses military areas, with the addition of airfield facilities such as runways and taxiways. These areas will be used jointly by Norwegian, U.S. and other Allied forces, and the U.S. may decide to provide infrastructure investments at these locations.
An extensive dialogue will be conducted with the U.S. regarding the use of Agreed Facilities and Areas, and prospective activities to be carried out there. Buildings and other infrastructure constructed and financed by the U.S. at these locations in the future will become the property of Norway, while the U.S. will have right of unimpeded access and use. It is too early to predict the costs that the Agreement will entail for Norway, but these may include costs for security measures and the hire of private land for exercises. If activities under the Agreement lead to an increase in Norwegian expenditure, this will be dealt with as part of the normal budget process.
In principle, the Agreement is open-ended, but after an initial term of ten years, it may be terminated with one year’s notice.
Also, see our story on the 2018 agreement between Norway and the United States.
2018 Security of Defense Supply Agreement Between Norway and the United States
Exercise Cape Hope 2021
Air National Guard Capt Travis Carlson, a KC-135 Stratotanker pilot assigned to the 506th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, details that day’s support to the combat air force large force employment exercise during Exercise Cope North 21, February 18, 2021.
The goal of Cope North 21 is to improve combat readiness, develop integrated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and increase interoperability of U.S. Forces, Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or Koku-Jieitai.
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM
02.18.2021
Video by Master Sgt. Larry Reid Jr.
Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs
Virtual Tour USS Gerald R. Ford: Crew Support
04/16/2021USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) virtual tour series The House of Wolverine, Season 2, Episode 4.
02.20.2021
Video by Seaman Apprentice Zachary Guth
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)