The RAAF and the F-35: Declaring IOC

01/24/2021

By the Australian Defence Business Review

The Royal Australian Air Force has declared an initial operational capability (IOC) of its Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighter capability.

Just two years after the first two F-35As arrived in Australia, the RAAF now has 30 F-35As in service with 3SQN and 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU) at Williamtown, and an additional three aircraft at Luke AFB in Arizona preparing to be ferried across the Pacific.

The IOC milestone recognises the service’s ability to conduct type-conversion courses for pilots and maintainers in Australia, that Australia can produce its own mission data files (MDF), and that a sufficiently deep level of spares and sovereign industry support has been established. The RAAF now has more than 40 qualified F-35A pilots and 220 maintainers trained on the F-35A.

The aircraft has been subjected to a detailed verification and validation (V&V) process over the past two years, a process that has proven the F-35A can operate with other ADF capabilities such as the E-7A Wedgetail and KC-30A MRTT, can be deployed to forward bases such as Townsville or Tindal, and can integrate with the ADF’s command and control system.

“For the last two years, Defence has rigorously tested the F-35A fleet to assess aircraft and system performance, and declare this important milestone,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in a December 28 statement.

“I would like to thank everyone that has worked so hard to get us to this point; to have accomplished all the required testing and materiel delivery is remarkable. The (ADF) now has an F-35A squadron ready to conduct technologically advanced strike and air combat roles, and another squadron dedicated to providing world-class training here in Australia.”

Some 590 F-35s of all models have been delivered worldwide. The RAAF is the ninth service to declare IOC with its F-35s, and follows the US Marine Corps, USAF, US Navy, the UK, Italy, Israel, Japan, and Norway.

The F-35A’s IOC declaration follows the end of operations of the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A/B classic Hornet from Williamtown, with the withdrawal of the type from service with 77SQN. The RAAF’s final F/A-18A/B Hornet unit is 75SQN based at Tindal in the Northern Territory, and it will retire its Hornets at the end of 2021.

77SQN will commence its conversion to the F-35A in early 2021, and 75SQN will follow in 2022. Ferry flights of RAAF F-35As will continue through 2021 and 2022 with at least 15 aircraft due to be delivered to the RAAF in each of those years, and the type is expected to achieve a Final Operational Capability (FOC) in 2022/23. Australia currently has 72 F-35As on order under Project AIR 6000 Phase 2A/2B, and will consider an order for up 30 more aircraft for service entry from 2030 under Project AIR 6000 Phase 7.

To date, Australian industry has won a total of $2.7 billion worth of work on manufacturing and sustainment phases of the global JSF program, mainly on sub-contract to Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, and Pratt & Whitney.

This article was written by Andrew McLaughlin  and published by ADBR on December 28, 2020.

For our new book on the ADF building a fifth generation force, see the following:

Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy

My 10 Years Flying Sally B

01/22/2021

By Captain Peter Kuypers

My involvement with Sally B began at the end of the 2009 season when Elly Sallingboe asked me if I was interested in flying Sally B (actually she told me that I had to and she was not taking no for an answer).

Of course, I was not going to let this unique opportunity pass me by, especially as my previous warbird experience meant that I fitted the pilot’s profile well. I had been flying the Netherlands Air Force Historic Flight B25 Mitchell bomber and also DC3 transports for almost 20 years, and had even flown formation in a B25 with Sally B during a VE day flypast over Buckingham Palace.

Training Began Not long after, I had my first flight in a B-17, this was as an observer on a flight to the Bournemouth Air Festival, where I saw what flying this aircraft was all about.

My training began in May 2010 with Andrew Dixon as my instructor, and after a thorough review of the aircraft’s systems and of normal and emergency procedures, I strapped into the righthand co-pilots seat and we started all four engines. On the B-17 the captain always sits on the left and the co-pilot or student sits on the right. I do not know where this comes from, but, this custom has been carried forward to all modern aircraft like Boeing and Airbus, only helicopters are the other way around.

Captain Peter Kuypers

We fly the B-17 as a team with the captain, co-pilot, and engineer, each having his own tasks. During engine starting the co-pilot activates the engine starters whilst the captain introduces the fuel. The engineer watches out for failures and fires. During initial take-off, the captain handles the outboard engines and the co-pilot the inboard engines. The whole choreography of how we fly this aircraft is written down in our handling notes.

We went to Cambridge airport for our training flight for safety reasons as the runway there is a bit longer than at Duxford, and soon after I was flying around the circuit at Cambridge to practice landing and take-offs, this is called touch and go training. The next step was engine failure procedures where we simulate an engine failure by retarding the power on one engine followed by the emergency drills. The single-engine failure (in pilot’s speak called a N-1) is a simple failure on the B-17, as a pilot you can feel that this aircraft was designed to take a lot of (battle) damage. The double engine failure (called a N-2) even with the affected engines on the same side felt a bit like flying a DC3 on one engine, meaning controllable and slow climbing but safe.

After being given my CAA B-17 type rating exemption I was ready to start my first B-17 season. My very first flight after training was to the Danish Airforce air show at Skrydstrup in 2010. Roger Mills was captain, and I was the co-pilot. The crowds waiting for us at various places were amazing, and Roger and Sally B won the prize for best display.

The following year in 2011, I was given the chance to become captain on the B-17. The training was again at Cambridge, but this time I was in the left seat and my instructor Andrew Dixon in the right seat. Andrew did give me a lot more engine failure training this time!

My memorable flights

Many more flights followed, some do stand out more than others. The first that comes to mind is the “Eagle Flight” on Memorial Day in May 2013 which was a formation flight over several 8th Airforce bases in East Anglia.

The flight was to commemorate the American Airforce’s entry into WWII in 1943. I was leading the big formation in Sally B and had with me four little friends (P51 Mustang, P47 Thunderbolt, Spitfire and Hurricane). We began by overflying the Madingley Cemetery at low level before continuing. A small course correction at the last minute dislodged the P47 slightly but American Steve Hinton is a brilliant pilot and no-one hopefully noticed, but I almost missed Madingley.

The Eagle Flight over Madingley in May 2013.

Another memorable flight was to Payerne, Switzerland in 2014 with Daryl Taplin as co-pilot.

The show commemorated 100 years of the Swiss Airforce, and it stands out due to the extravagant and well organised displays and because we re-enacted a WWII scenario where the B-17 was being forced to land after being shot at by a Swiss Morane fighter.

We used our smoke system to simulate this but also had the wheels down to land, probably the only picture where we have smoke on and wheels down.

Re-enacting being shot at by a Morane Saulnier Fighter in Payerne 2014.

In June 2017 I was Captain for the RAF Cosford air show with fellow captain Roger Mills when suddenly during my display a large B52 USAF bomber showed up for its display too early. Because the Americans were on another frequency, they could not be warned off as they entered my display arena smoking on all eight jet engines.

Luckily, we were in a position where I could give chase safely and Roger remembered to switch on our own smoke systems. It made a great story during my next presentation at the Roll of Honour later the same year.

Then it was back to Denmark, this time to Roskilde in 2019, with our new co-pilot Jon Corley. It was now nine years after a similar flight to Denmark as co-pilot. Jon wrote an excellent story on this flight in the last Sally B News, so I will not bore you too much but believe me it was an extraordinary flight. Flying a B-17 over Bremerhafen where the real Memphis Belle flew her missions does give food for thought.

B-17 – a most reliable aircraft

The B-17 has been a very reliable aircraft, and in my 10 years with Sally B, I only had two semi serious technical problems. One was in 2016 whilst landing at RNAS Yeovilton: the electrical hydraulic pump failed and after landing we lost control for a short while before we could use the emergency hydraulic hand pump. Unfortunately, I took out some runway lights but the Royal Navy did not hold a grudge – Thanks guys! Another great story which you may have read in Sally B News.

One year later during the first test flight of the year and with Andrew in the right hand seat the brand-new propeller governor, just installed, failed. Something had gone wrong during the overhaul of this component in the United States. The end result was that engine number 1 (left outer) started overspeeding after take-off and we had to stop the engine and feather the propeller. We landed back with only three engines running (N-1!). Andrew had given me the training to deal with this situation seven years before, and now I was the lucky pilot allowed to do it for real – we were both smiling!

The governor was quickly replaced by the old unit and next day the B-17 was serviceable again. One year later I was allowed to do it again, this time on a KLM Airbus A330 which developed an oil leak but that is another story…

All in all, the B-17 has proven to be a most reliable aircraft, thanks to Peter Brown and our excellent maintenance team!

At the end of the 2019 season, Elly appointed me as training captain on the B-17.

2020 and Covid

2020 should have been my 10th year flying Sally B, but Covid put a stop to that…!

However, I did get to fly a little representing Sally B during IWM Duxford showcase days where I flew a Russian Yak 50 aerobatic display and also a vintage Bell 47 helicopter – callsign Tinkerbell. Not quite the same but still – it was flying.

Andrew Dixon, Jon Corley and I have also this year flown DC3 Dakotas which the CAA regards as a similar type to the B-17, making it easier for us to familiarise ourselves with the B-17 when we hopefully again in spring 2021. But, we will still have to do training flights at Cambridge where it all started for me way back in 2010.

Editor’s Note: For a chance to contribute to support the Sally B, please see the following:

https://www.sallyb.org.uk

Indian Air Force to Add 83 New Light Attack Aircraft

01/20/2021

By India Strategic

New Delhi. The Government has cleared production and acquisition of 83 indigenous HAL-made Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas for Indian Air Force (IAF).

The cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the apex authority on Defence, approved the deal January 13 for these aircraft with the state-run HAL in a major step forward towards enhancing IAF’s capability on the one hand and HAL’s industrial strength in military aviation on the other.

The deal is worth Rs 48000 cr ($6.5 billion), and includes production of 73 Tejas Mk 1A fighter aircraft and 10 Mk 1 Trainers. The cost covers Rs 45696 cr ($6.34 billion) for the aircraft and Rs 1202 cr ($160 million) for Design and development of Infrastructure sanctions.

This is the largest defence deal for any indigenous system in India.

“Success of LCA Tejas programme is a collaborative effort of ADA as lead design agency, HAL as lead production agency, many DRDO labs, IAF, NFTC, CEMILAC, DGQA, CSIR, eminent national academic institutions like IITs, NITs, IISC etc, private sector industries and few hundred MSMEs,” the Defence and Research Department (DRDO) tweeted.

The cabinet has also approved infrastructure development by IAF to enable it repair or service aircraft at its base depots so that the turnaround time would get reduced for mission critical systems and would lead to increased availability of aircraft for operational exploitation. “This would enable IAF to sustain the fleet more efficiently and effectively due to availability of repair infrastructure at respective bases,” the Defence Ministry said.

The IAF currently operates two Tejas squadrons. The first, 45 Squadron – Flying Daggers – was formed on July 1, 2016 with two aircraft. Initially stationed at Bengaluru, 45 Squadron was later relocated to its home base at Sulur, Tamil Nadu.

The second, 18 Squadron – Flying Bullets – also stationed at Sulur, was formed on May 27, 2020.

As of 2019, the Indian Air Force has planned for a total of 324 Tejas in several variants. The first batch of 40 Mark 1 aircraft consists of 16 Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) standard that were delivered in early 2019.

The delivery of the second batch of 16 Full Operational Clearance (FOC) standard aircraft commenced in late 2019.

The IAF will also go on to receive eight twin-seat trainers.[4] The 83 now being procured are of the Mk-1A standard. By the time these 123 are delivered, the Tejas Mark 2 is expected to be ready for series production by 2025–26.

The LCA Mk-1A variant is equipped with critical operational capabilities of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar, Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Missile, Electronic Warfare (EW) Suite and Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) would be a potent platform to meet the operational requirements of Indian Air Force, IAF.

It is the first “Buy (Indian-Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured)” category procurement of combat aircraft with an indigenous content of 50 per cent which will progressively reach 60 per cent by the end of the programme.

“Under the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan, India is continuously growing in its power to indigenously design, develop and manufacture advanced cutting edge technologies and systems in the Defence Sector.

The manufacturing of Light Combat Aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, HAL will give a further push to Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative and boost indigenisation of defence production and the defence industry in the country.

About 500 Indian companies including MSMEs in the design and manufacturing sectors will be working with HAL in this procurement. The programme would act as a catalyst for transforming the Indian aerospace manufacturing ecosystem into a vibrant Atmanirbhar-self-sustaining ecosystem,” the Defence Ministry said.

This article was published by our partner India Strategic on January 13, 2021.

Mirage F-1s Arrive at Tyndall Air Force Base

01/18/2021

By defenceWeb

The Airborne Tactical Advantage Company (ATAC) has started flying its fleet of Mirage F1 fighters, refurbished with assistance from Paramount Group company Paramount Aerospace, at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida.

Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB) made history on 14 December as a unit of Mirage F1 aircraft arrived at the base in support of an Air Combat Command mass training effort in partnership with ATAC, the US Air Force said.

For the next year or two, Tyndall AFB will house and support the contracted unit of about six aircraft, five pilots and 30 maintenance personnel.

“At Tyndall, we have all the right requirements in place so we could operate on time and not have to wait,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jason White, 325th Operations Support Squadron Director of Operations. “Tyndall’s recent Environmental Impact Study allowed us to support the additional aircraft without a waiting period, unlike our brothers and sisters at Eglin.”

ATAC was awarded a government procurement contract under Combat Air Forces to deliver an alternative airframe, the Mirage F1, which is projected to replace Tyndall’s current fleet of T-38 Talon aircraft.

This new partnership will enable F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning pilots to engage in tactical airborne training, adversary air live training at Tyndall and other US Air Force bases such as Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico and Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, the US Air Force said.

“Adversary air is the most efficient training aide and this is something that (Air Combat Command) has been working toward for a couple of years now,” said White. “The aircraft will use non-live munitions, launch, and meet in the air space for simulated training including radio and radar operations for the purpose of training. The pilot would acquire the target, or the adversary, simulate engaging the adversary and then simulate firing missiles at the aircraft.”

Pilots are expected to begin training in January 2021 utilising Tyndall’s air space.

“Tyndall’s shared air space is just South of Tyndall and extends all the way to almost Tampa and West to about the Alabama border out over the water and some land,” said White. “The Gulf of Mexico is one of the largest air spaces used for air-to-air training and live fire missiles. It is a national resource; having this training air space of this size and dimension which allows us to host an entire, simulated air war.”

ATAC’s Mirage training programme is anticipated to fly more than 1 100 sorties over the next several years to provide adversary air support to the 43rd Fighter Squadron, which is the schoolhouse for the F-22s, and the schoolhouse for the F-35s, the 58th Fighter Squadron.

“Generally speaking, fighter (units) have to use their flying hours to practice, which takes away from training,” said White.

According to White, that means fighter units typically have to use their allotted flying hours to be both the good guy and the bad guy in the air.

“Tyndall’s airspace is the best place to fight air-to-air either over water or over land because of the un-obstruction,” said Lieutenant Colonel Erik Gratteau, 325th OSS assistant director of operations. “We have 1 000 to 60 000 feet of space to fly and there are no mountains to have to navigate or encroachment issues.”

Air Force Special Operations Command Joint Terminal Air Controllers will also benefit from the programme.

ATAC provides live air-to-air, air-to-ship and air-to-surface training for multiple branches of service across the Department of Defence.

“ATAC is excited to have been selected to provide adversary training… and we stand ready to serve additional future operating locations and customer as their needs evolve,” said Scott Stacy, ATAC general manager.

In July 2020 ATAC said it had been selected to provide two US Air Force bases with adversary air live training under the Combat Air Forces (CAF) Contracted Air Support (CAS) programme, worth up to a combined $240 million.

ATAC’s first refurbished Mirage F1 performed its initial flight in the United States on 22 August 2019. The company acquired 63 ex-French Air Force Mirage F1s – of these, 32 of these are in good condition and can be restored to flying status with little effort. The other 31 need major work to be restored to flight, or are suitable for spare parts.

ATAC acquired the F1s specifically for the US Air Force’s adversary air training programme. The company was assisted by Paramount in providing Mirage F1 training. ATAC’s Mirages received several upgrades for US operations, including a new GPS, air-to-air TACAN, new radios, and a new attitude indicator. They will be able to carry an electronic warfare training pod, captive air-to-air missiles, chaff and flares.

Paramount Group in October 2017 announced it had acquired four ex-French Air Force Mirage F1Bs from the French government “to enhance its pilot training capabilities”. The company said its subsidiary Paramount Aerospace Systems would use the twin-seat aircraft as part of its pilot and maintenance technician training services.

Paramount said it has extensive capability on the Mirage F1 with full airframe and engine overhaul capability, as well as the ability to upgrade, modernise avionics and mission systems.

Paramount has also assisted Draken International get its ex-Spanish Air Force Mirage F1Ms airworthy. They will also be used for adversary air training by the US Air Force. Draken International also acquired 12 ex-South African Air Force Cheetah jets for training in the United States.

Published by defenceWeb on January 7, 2020.

Australia and the Chinese Challenge: The Perspective of Brendan Sargeant

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I continued my discussion with Brendan Sargeant, the well-known and well-regarded Australian strategist about how best to understand the challenge posed by the regime of President Xi to Australia and the Indo-Pacific region. We focused on how he would characterize the nature and focus of the strategy of the Xi regime as a Communist Authoritarian state and then focused on how Australia was responding to this strategy. This raised the question then of how the allies of Australia, notably the United States, and Europe and most significantly the states of the Indo-Pacific were responding to the Xi regime policies and strategy.

It became clear in the discussion that Europe and the United States have a golden opportunity to work with the Indo-Pacific states and to take advantage of Australian initiatives to provide a clear counterstrategy to Xi and his authoritarian regime. Europe otherwise known as the European Commission wishes for a geopolitical role. It is difficult to see how embracing an authoritarian regime with global reach and ambitions as Xi’s China provides more than legitimization and support to Chinese policy, rather than seizing the opportunity to work with the Indo-Pacific states working to counter the Chinese strategy as shaped and executed by Xi’s government.

We started by discussing Chinese strategy and how Sargeant viewed that strategy as formulated and executed by Xi’s regime.

“What is China’s strategy? What are they seeking to achieve? What do the actions that they are taking actually mean?

“I think that China’s fundamental goals are straightforward. They don’t try and hide them. The first key element is the role and dominance of the Communist Party. The Communist Party is the foundation of the contemporary Chinese state, and the legitimacy and political survival of the Communist Party is the overriding strategic priority for the current leadership. This perspective drives much of China’s internal and external policy.

“With regard to how they present themselves to the world, Taiwan is a challenge to the legitimacy of the governing model that the Chinese Communists have developed. It is quite a significant challenge, as was Hong Kong, because it presents an alternative Chinese model to that of Communist Party dominance. It is an alternative that is more powerful in the context of the Communist Party’s refusal to acknowledge its own history and to deal with some of the  terrible things that they have been responsible for.

“To be clear we are not friends with Xi’s China. We are not partners. These are not useful terms to characterize the relationship. We must deal with China, but we always need to deal with a recognition that we are in a situation of long-term political conflict. If you look at strategic policy, most policy in relation to China is concerned with challenging China’s legitimacy in terms of its actions in areas that bump up against Western or regional interests. The South China Sea is a good example,  but the really significant area is in relation to Taiwan.

“The second driver of their strategy is that China is resource-hungry. It needs resources, because it has to sustain levels of growth to deliver economically to its people; in a sense, sustaining economic growth is one foundation for the current legitimacy of the Communist Party.

“The third element is because they are hungry for resources, they are looking at ways of guaranteeing supply. Belt and Road; the relationship with the countries that are close to them, in Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Laos, and so on; their alignment with Russia at the moment; all can be seen as an attempt to guarantee resource flows into China, and to give China diversity of supply.

“I think one of the issues for Australia is that we have been complacent about being a monopoly provider to China in certain areas. In my view the Chinese don’t like that. It represents risk. They will wear some pain in order to reduce their risk in relation to countries like Australia. Of course, we have created strategic risk for ourselves by having so much of the economy dependent on a narrow range of exports to China.

“The fourth key element is that they work to create buffers. The Xi regime wants to maximize the distance between China and potential threats. China is a country with many land borders with other countries. They are trying to push outwards and increase their strategic space.

“They do that in two ways. One is what you see in the South China Sea; a much more aggressive extension of boundaries with their territorial claims, island-building and occupation and militarization of claimed areas. Another is to try to bring close countries within a Chinese sphere of influence or, in the case of India, establish primacy.

“The final element of their strategy which affects Australia quite significantly is to break alliances. They seek to make themselves the center of the Indo-Pacific regional order. They don’t want to face any form of alliance or coalition of the willing that is going to, in a sense, reduce their capacity to control the agenda and to establish patterns of behavior across the strategic system in ways that support China’s interests. In this respect, the QUAD is an important strategic intervention because it signals that China’s cannot unilaterally establish the future strategic order. It must take account of other countries in the Indo Pacific.”

With regard to China’s approach to the United States, a key element of Xi’s strategy is to “raise the cost of the United States operating in the Indo-Pacific region.

“They do that in two ways. One is through diplomacy to make it harder for the United States to operate here. The other way is to push the U.S., and everyone else, out beyond the First Island Chain. And that means that if they control the South China Sea, and they control Taiwan, they have unimpeded access to the Pacific, and they can establish a more capable future deterrent capability against the United States.”

How then did Sargeant see Australia and its allies and partners countering this strategy with one of their own?

He started by underscoring the importance of recognizing that the Xi regime is not the equivalent of China itself. “We talk about the friendship with China, but that confuses China with the Chinese government. The Chinese government is not our friend. It is as simple as that. We should not assume that it is.”

Sargeant argued that Australia along with its ally and partners need to expand the reach of its defense capabilities to operate within the Indo-Pacific region. The challenge highlighted in COVID-19 of supply chains needs to be met with what John Blackburn has called “smart sovereignty” whereby Australia works with allies and partners to shape supply chains not dependent upon China, and by working “coalitions of the willing” in supply chain areas, one can build up the kind of alternative to reliance on Chinese markets that Xi’s regime needs to remain in control of China itself.

“We clearly will work with China, but we need to do so from the standpoint of understanding that we are dealing with a government with priorities and interests very different to ours. We need to conduct a diplomacy with China that seeks to identify areas of common interest and to work in those areas. We need to establish boundaries in areas where our interests diverge. We need to operate on the pragmatic assumption that the relationship will be limited. To describe the Chinese government using terms like friend or partner is misleading. We work to support common interests and to minimize problems where interests diverge, and it doesn’t mean anything more than that.”

He underscored the importance of setting in motions of a broader partnership and alliance strategy built on providing ways to influence China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.

“What we haven’t seen with policy towards China is a more concerted strategic positioning with coalitions in response.”

“What I see at the moment is a lot of volatility and experiments, as people try to establish a framework, a strategic order, that is capable of solving problems, that allocates roles and power in a way that doesn’t, in a sense, concede everything to China or embody a nostalgia for a U.S. as it might have been, not as it is now.”

“We need to push back against initiatives by China, or any of the other authoritarians, that are going to work against our interests.”

“This is a real challenge for Australia. We’ve always had an approach of separating economics from strategy. Our statecraft has been immature in that respect. In the future, in dealing with China, and with the other authoritarians, we need to understand that how we do all aspects of policy internationally has to be congruent with our strategic interests.

“We can’t separate economics from strategy. We can’t assume that there’s a set of rules in common with the authoritarian powers that we are following as well. I think that that’s what the Europeans have done, and that’s their faith, a faith in the rules-based order being supported by the authoritarians. That world has gone.”

He cautioned that although European nations pursue economic interests, those are not related in any fundamental way towards dealing with China and the Indo-Pacific as a whole.

“European strategy has always seemed to me myopic and concerned with the economic positioning of the significant countries in Europe. It is not global. It doesn’t have a global vision. And when you look at Europe in the Indo-Pacific, everyone is rushing here to talk to India, to talk to China, and to open up branch offices because they think there’s money to be made. It has nothing to do with strategy; it has nothing to do with the defense of liberal democracy.”

“The agreement that they have come to with China, and the rhetoric around it, is just not credible. I agree with the Americans, it is not strategic. They needed to take more time and think more deeply about the implications of it. It is clearly a gift to President Xi.”

He highlighted as well that President Xi might mis-read the actual military situation he faces. With President Trump there was a more realistic assessment of American power and its inability to operate as a global policeman.  As Sargeant put it with regard to the United States: ”I think one of the challenges for the U.S. administration is to actually align its strategic policy in appropriate communication with its actual power.”

But working with the coalition partners in the Indo-Pacific region and the extensive engagement of the U.S. military in the region creates a formidable defense capability. “When I look at the China challenge, what worries me the most about China is that they overestimate their own power, and they underestimate U.S. power. We need to work to correct Xi’s understanding of what he actually faces in the region in response to his regime’s disruption of the region.”

With regard to shaping a way ahead for Australia, what is the key focus?

“We need a strategic policy that connects us with the world, where the instruments of economic power and the instruments of more traditional strategic power are operated in an integrated way to shape effective “coalitions of the willing” to try to shape China’s participation in the regional strategic system in ways that support all participants in that system. A regional strategic system dominated by an authoritarian China is not in Australia’s interests.

“Australia is building the capacity to create those coalitions that sustain the ability to exercise sovereignty, if that’s a term you want to use. We are potentially quite vulnerable, because of the way we have structured our economy, and our defense is probably not big enough to secure all our interests unilaterally. This means that we need to work effectively with other countries, the United States being a key ally, but also to work effectively with like-minded states in the region, in order to enhance our capacity to defend ourselves and exercise Australian sovereignty in ways that support our interests.

“But it’s not about traditional alliances; it’s about building capacity to work together to build and sustain capabilities appropriate to circumstances and to respond to problems when they occur.  It is about working with others to shape the strategic environment in ways that support our interests.”

Also, see the following:

China, Australia and Global Change: Why a European Agreement Now?

For my recent book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy:

Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy

And for a report on Senator Jim Molan’s perspective of the way ahead for shaping an Australian national defence and security strategy, see the following:

Shaping an Australian National Security Strategy: The Perspective of Senator Jim Molan