The U.S. Space Force’s Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation provides unprecedented position and timing accuracy to the warfighter.
Since the inception of GPS, it has become a global utility with commercial use far outweighing military use.
Air traffic control, banking, farming, and cellular networks all depend on uninterrupted GPS coverage.
06.24.2020
Video by Bradley Bowman
Air Force Research Laboratory
An MV-22B Osprey, attached to the Blackjacks of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Two One (HX-21), is spend working with the amphibious transport dock ship USS New York (LPD 21), July 20, 2020.
New York is operating in Atlantic Ocean in support of Naval operations to maintain maritime stability and security in order to ensure access, deter aggression and defend U.S., allied and partner interests.
This Navy Osprey is assigned to the test and evaluation squadron at Pax River.
USMC Ospreys are engaged as well.
The CMV-22B will give the US Navy much greater flexibility in working distributed operations in support of the fleet, then they had with the fixed wing C-2 COD aircraft.
In a recent visit to North Island, we discussed this flexibility with the Commander of the Osprey squadrons in the US Navy.
According to Capt. Dewon “Chainsaw” Chaney, the Commander of COMVRMWING (or Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing),the first squadron VRM-30 was stood up prior to the creation of the Wing and its first aircraft arrived in June 2020. Captain Chaney then noted that this October, the fleet replacement squadron, VRM-50, will be stood up. It will take this squadron two years until they will be able to train new pilots.
The counterpart to VRM-30 will be VRM-40 but all three squadrons will be under the COMVRMWING. The third squadron will be based on the East Coast.
Captain Chaney concluded: “I do believe that the Navy is really going to appreciate the capabilities that the CMV-22 is going to bring to the strike group, and they’re going to want it to do more.”
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Lyle Wilkie/Released)
In the video below, the first CMV-22B Osprey assigned to Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30 prepares to land at Naval Air Station North Island. VRM 30 was established in late 2018 to begin the Navy’s transition from the C-2A Greyhound, which has provided logistics support to aircraft carriers for four decades, to the CMV-22B, which has an increased operational range, greater cargo capacity, faster cargo loading/unloading, increased survivability and enhanced beyond-line-of-sight communications compared to the C-2A.
06.22.2020
By Sophie Pearse
A Melbourne-based Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) component supplier has used a government grant to boost its production.
A.W. Bell is leading the way in global defence competitiveness by investing in a ground-breaking system at its Dandenong South casting facility.
The company has transformed its casting operation through an “Industry 4.0 Smart Factory”, which aims to lift production cycle times and output and provide superior quality control in its manufacturing processes.
The company made the operational change after receiving one of three Defence industry JSF grants in June, under the New Air Combat Capability – Industry Support Program.
The Chief Executive Officer of A.W. Bell, Sam Bell, said the Industry 4.0 Smart Factory integrated new digital and physical technologies to streamline factory operations, while increasing product effectiveness and reducing work health and safety concerns.
“Our Smart Factory has digitised production management across the foundry and production machining operations, from the receipt of raw materials through to delivery of final components,” Mr Bell said.
“In a technological first for an Australian foundry, our world-leading autonomous robotics used for component coating enables full automation of the production line and continuous monitoring of our operations in real-time.
“It embeds the digital monitoring of components at individual steps in the manufacturing chain, creating a serialised record of each part at every processing point, achieving the highest compliance with global aerospace traceability standards.”
Mr Bell said the company’s new production line system captured data to streamline planning and quality control, which ensured a digitally controlled, flexible and responsive operation.
The Director General of Defence’s Joint Strike Fighter Branch, Air Commodore Damien Keddie, said the venture had furthered A.W. Bell’s global competitiveness in the JSF supply chain.
“This leap in production technology has allowed A.W. Bell to expand its capabilities and global cost competitiveness in other aerospace, defence and commercial contracts worldwide and beyond the F-35 Program,” Air Commodore Keddie said.
This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on July 17, 2020.
The featured photo: A.W. Bell’s Steve Bahr and Dan Biddle pour a casting at the company’s Melbourne foundry.
By Robbin Laird
As I suggested in the lead article in this series on how to evaluate platform choices in the context of evolving needs and concepts of operations, too often, a simple platform versus platform presentation is made which confuses rather than clarifies what the tactical and strategic implications of that particular platform choice might be.
Germany is facing a number of such platform choices, and in this second article in the series, I will address the face-off between the CH-53K and the Chinook and what this choice means for the evolution of the German armed forces.
Recently, there have been a number of articles which have directly raised the question of how the Chinook compares with the CH-53K which suggested that the venerable though legacy Chinook is good enough to consider treating the CH-53K as an outlier to both U.S. Army modernization and for the German armed forces.
For example, Loren Thompson wrote a piece published on July 22, 2020 for Forbes which is entitled, “Why Boeing Believes it Will Win the competition to Supply Heavy-Lift Helicopters to Germany and Israel.”
This is a good place to start.
Thompson noted that “Boeing, builder of the rival CH-47F twin-rotor Chinook, has other ideas. It thinks it can displace the CH-53 from both the German and Israeli markets by offering an upgraded version of its own heavy lifter that meets all customer performance requirements at considerably less cost.”
We should note at the outset that the CH-53K is a heavy lift helicopter; the Chinook is not—it is a medium lift helicopter, based on weight that each can carry. But putting aside that point, the argument boils down to the notion that the CH-53K is built to support unique Marine Corps missions which the Germans will not need, and that Chinook is more than adequate for German needs.
“Although King Stallion is a bigger aircraft than Chinook, Boeing notes that the size of their cabins is virtually identical. In fact, it says that due to weight limits on the CH-53K’s wheels, the CH-47F can “oftentimes carry more weight internally than the CH-53K.” Since Germany and Israel do not conduct the kind of ship-to-shore maneuvers practiced by the U.S. Marine Corps, Boeing figures that the greater external lifting power of King Stallion isn’t worth the additional cost to either country.”
Then Thompson highlights that Boeing believes that the “CH-53K is so new that its future reliability and maintainability are not yet proven.” And associated with this is that there is a higher level of risk in buying a new helicopter and in the potential challenges of customization of the aircraft for Israeli and German needs. Boeing ignores that the block upgrade that they offer in thier medium lift Chinook is a development and not production program.
But the core point of comparison highlighted by Boeing is the question of cost. “Boeing contends that the cost of procuring and operating the latest version of Chinook is far below that of King Stallion. In an apples-to-apples comparison, it calculates that ‘CH-47F aircraft cost is about half the CH-53K.’ The higher price-tag for King Stallion could be justified if it were a markedly better fit for German and Israeli performance requirements, or more reliable and maintainable, but Boeing doubts that a case for either claim could be made convincingly.”
This presentation highlights why the legacy aircraft has perceived advantages over a new, 4th generation aircraft, but does not really answer the question of how Chinook fits into the new demands being placed on the German armed forces not how it relates to the overall modernization strategy of German defense.
If this was the Cold War, where the primary focus was really upon moving support around Germany to reinforce the direct defense of Germany, then there might be a compelling case for the legacy Chinook.
But that is not what Germany is facing in terms of the return of direct defense in Europe. In our forthcoming book, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21st Century Authoritarian Challenge, we focus on the major challenges facing the allies in terms of defense against the Russians in terms of the Poland-to Nordic arc. Within this arc, the challenge is to move force rapidly, to reinforce deterrence and to be able to block Russian movement of force.
Germany faces the challenge of reinforcing their Baltic brigade, moving rapidly to reinforce Poland, and to move force where appropriate to its Southern Flank. In the 2018 Trident Juncture exercise, German forces moved far too slowly to be effective in a real crisis, and it is clear that augmenting rapid insertion of force with lift is a key requirement for Germany to play an effective role.
This is where the CH-53K as a next generation heavy lift helicopter fits very nicely into German defense needs and evolving concepts of operations. The CH-53K operates standard 463L pallets which means it can move quickly equipment and supply pallets from the German A400Ms or C‑130Js to the CH-53K or vice versa.
This is not just a nice to have capability but has a significant impact in terms of time to combat support capability; and it is widely understood that time to the operational area against the kind of threat facing Germany and its allies is a crucial requirement.
With an integrated fleet of C-130Js, A400Ms and CH-53Ks, the task force would have the ability to deploy 100s of miles while aerial refueling the CH-53K from the C-130J.
Upon landing at an austere airfield, cargo on a 463L pallet from a A400M or C-130J can transload directly into a CH-53K on the same pallet providing for a quick turnaround and allowing the CH-53K to deliver the combat resupply, humanitarian assistance supplies or disaster relief material to smaller land zones dispersed across the operating area.
Similarly, after aerial refueling from a C-130J, the CH-53K using its single, dual and triple external cargo hook capability could transfer three independent external loads to three separate supported units in three separate landing zones in one single sortie without having to return to the airfield or logistical hub.
The external system can be rapidly reconfigured between dual point, single point loads, and triple hook configurations, to internal cargo carrying configuration, or troop lift configuration in order to best support the ground scheme of maneuver.
If the German Baltic brigade needs enhanced capability, it is not a time you want to discover that your lift fleet really cannot count on your heavy lift helicopter showing up as part of an integrated combat team, fully capable of range, speed, payload and integration with the digital force being built out by the German military.
It should be noted that the CH-53K is air refuelable; the Chinook is not. And the CH-53 K’s air refuelable capability is built in for either day or night scenarios.
A 2019 exercise highlighted the challenge if using the Chinooks to move capability into the corridor. In the Green Dagger exercise held in Germany, the goal was to move a German brigade over a long distance to support an allied engagement. The Dutch Chinooks were used by the German Army to do the job. But it took them six waves of support to get the job done.
Obviously, this is simply too long to get the job done when dealing with an adversary who intends to use time to his advantage. In contrast, if the CH-53K was operating within the German Army, we are talking one or two insertion waves.
And the distributed approach which is inherent in dealing with peer competitors will require distributed basing and an ability to shape airfields in austere locations to provide for distributed strike and reduce the vulnerabilities of operating from a small number of known airbases.
Here the CH-53K becomes combat air’s best friend. In setting up Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), the CH-53K can distribute fuel and ordnance and forward fueling and rearming points for the fighter aircraft operating from the FOBs.
Being a new generation helicopter it fits into the future, not the past of what the Bundeswehr has done in the Cold War. It is not a legacy Cold War relic, but a down payment on the transformation of the Bundeswehr itself into a more reactive, and rapid deployment force to the areas of interest which Germany needs to be engaged to protect its interests and contribute to the operational needs of their European allies.
From an operational standpoint, the K versus the E or the Chinook for that matter, offers new capabilities for the combat force. And from this perspective, the perspective of the two platforms can be looked at somewhat differently than from the perspective presented in the Thompson article.
Next generation air platforms encompass several changes as compared to the predecessors which are at least thirty years old or older, notably in terms of design. Next generation air platforms are designed from the ground up with the digital age as a key reality.
This means that such systems are focused on connectivity with other platforms, upgradeability built in through software enablement and anticipated code rewriting as operational experience is gained, cockpits built to work with new digital ISR and C2 systems onboard or integrateable within the cockpit of the platform, materials technology which leverages the composite revolution, and management systems designed to work with big data to provide for more rapid and cost effective upgradeability and maintainability.
Such is the case with the CH-53K compared to its legacy ancestor, the CH-53E or with the venerable legacy Chinook medium lift helicopter. Comparing the legacy with the next generation is really about comparing historically designed aircraft to 21st century designed and manufactured aircraft. As elegant as the automobiles of the 1950s clearly are, from a systems point of view, they pale in comparison to 2020s automobiles in terms of sustainability and effective performance parameters.
To take two considerations into account, the question of customization of the German and Israeli variants and the question of sustainability both need to be considered with next generation in mind.
With regard to customization and modernization, digital aircraft provide a totally different growth path than do a legacy aircraft like the CH-53E or the CH-47. Software modifications, and reconfigurations can provide for distinctive variants of aircrafts in a way that legacy systems would have to do with hardware mods. And with regard to security levels of information flows, software defined systems have significant advantages over legacy systems as well.
With regard to sustainability, NAVAIR and the USMC have taken unprecedented steps to deliver a sustainable aircraft at the outset. The logistics demo effort at New River has taken the new aircraft and worked through how to best ensure sustainability when the first squadron is deployed.
With the data generated by the CH-53K, the “smart” aircraft becomes a participant in providing inputs to a more effective situational awareness to the real performance of the aircraft in operational conditions, and that data then flows into the management system to provide a much more realistic understanding of parts performance. This then allows the maintenance technicians and managers to provide higher levels of performance and readiness than without the data flowing from the aircraft itself.
Put in other terms, the data which the aircraft generates makes the aircraft itself an “intellectual” participant in the sustainment eco system. This is certainly not the case with legacy aircraft which were not birthed in the digital software upgradeable world.
The next generation system which the CH-53K represents brings capabilities to the challenges which Germany faces in terms of getting force rapidly to the point of attack or defense required by the Bundeswehr. It is no longer about defending against breakthroughs in the Fulda Gap; it is about moving force rapidly to make a difference in a time urgent combat setting on Germany’s periphery and flanks.
As I wrote earlier:
For Germany, the K clearly would be part of how they might adjust flexibility to the strategic shift facing the liberal democracies in dealing with the Russians.
For example, Germany needs to rapidly reinforce their Baltic brigade or move forces forward to reinforce Poland in a crisis.
Compared to Chinook, the K goes further, faster and brings a significantly greater combat load to the fight rapidly.
And flying with the A400 M or the C-130J, the ability to carry standard pallets means a rapid movement of cargo from an airlifter to the K to move support within an area of interest.
And the K is changing as well the meaning of what a support helo really is.
It is in an information or C2 asset through the nature of the cockpit and how information can be managed within the cockpit or delivered to the combat soldiers onboard the aircraft.
This means that for Germany, the K is already FCAS enabled, or able to operate in a combat cloud in a way certainly neither the E nor the Chinook can do.
The FCAS enabled part is also crucial for Germany. The FCAS approach is forward leaning and ultimately rests on shaping the networks which enable an integratable force. It is not about simply building a replacement combat aircraft; it is about building out a system of networks which can able an integratable force to work effectively together. Simply buying legacy systems and leaving networked capabilities to show up in a future FCAS really misses the point; integratability has to be built in which it clearly is with the CH-53K.
It is a down payment on building out the kind of networked force Germany has committed itself too with its FCAS commitment. Put in other terms, platform choices should be considered as well from the vantage point of whether or not that platform choice advances the integratable force able to move rapidly to the point of attack or defense or not.
From this standpoint the choice is clear: The Chinook represents the Cold War past; the CH-53K the future of the integratable force.
With the shaping of a new force structure within the context of the current and projected security context for Germany, it makes sense that each new platform or program be made with regard to where Germany is headed in terms of its 21st century strategic situation, and not be limited by the thinking of the inner-German defense period.
Platforms, Concepts of Operations and Defense Decisions: The German Case
The 49th Wing, located at Holloman Air Force Base, supports national security objectives by deploying worldwide to support peacetime and wartime contingencies.
The wing provides combat-ready Airmen, trains F-16 Fighting Falcon pilots and MQ-9 Reaper pilots and sensor operators.
Additionally, the wing delivers Air Transportable Clinics and Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources while providing support to more than 13,000 military and civilian personnel.
The wing has a proud history of service in World War II, Korea, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and NATO-led Operation Allied Force.
HOLLOMAN AIR FORCE BASE, NM, UNITED STATES
12.18.2019
Video by Tech. Sgt. BreeAnn Sachs
49th Wing Public Affairs
By Robbin Laird
During my visit to Jax Navy and Mayport, I had a chance to meet with the leaders of the Seahawk squadron at Mayport and will highlight those discussions in future articles.
But also had the opportunity to talk via teleconference with CDR Gregory Knutson, the CO of the Helicopter Sea Combat Weapons School Atlantic or HSC Weapons School based in Norfolk.
My host, Lt. Jonathan Gosselin had arranged the discussion for a very good reason – not only is the Sierra and the Firescout working in innovative new ways to deliver the desired operational outcome, but there is an important potential to be unlocked by broadening the P-8s working relationship beyond Triton in terms of working with remotely piloted aircraft.
“Helicopter Sea Combat Weapons School Atlantic, established 10 June 2005, combined Weapons and Tactics Units of COMHSWINGLANT and COMHELTACWINGLANT to form a single shore-based command headquartered in Norfolk, VA.
“In 2016, the MH-53E Weapons and Tactics Unit was combined with HSCWSL. HSCWSL provides tactical training to Commander, Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Atlantic HSC and HM squadrons.”
We discussed a number of issues regarding the Seahawk family of helicopters but I am going to focus primarily on one aspect of the CDR’s experience, namely working the Sierra helicopters with the Fire Scout remotely piloted aircraft. We discussed at some length how the two rotorcraft were working tighter off of Littoral Combat Ships.
For example, he explained that the Sierra’s and the Fire Scouts were operating off of LCS ships in support of security missions in the Caribbean. And in those missions, the force package was working in support of Joint Interagency Task Force South.
This command is a multi-service, multi-agency task force based at Naval Air Station Key West and is under the command of a USCG officer.
The command provides a unified command and control for drug interdiction activities. And its C2 is supported by integrated ISR resources as well, and although focused on security missions provides an interesting model of how integration might proceed in other command areas as well.
In support of JIATF South, Romeos and Fire Scouts work together to prosecute the counter-drug mission. Based on a tasking from JIATF South, a potential counter-drug target is identified.
The Fire Scout is sent out to verify that it is indeed a target which needs to be prosecuted. If confirmed, then the Sierra is sent out with a USCG sniper in the back of the helicopter to prosecute the drug smugglers.
The two rotorcraft operate from the LCS with a joint support crew of maintainers. The Fire Scout is managed from the LCS itself and the two rotorcraft work closely together to pursue and prosecute the identified target.
The Fire Scout can also be used to remote designate targets for other assets. For example, with regard to Sierras working with Fire Scout, they can remote designate targets for the Sierra’s Hellfire missiles or APKWS rockets.
This clearly is an important role in the Pacific and has been used in the past as well in the Mediterranean.
What Fire Scout and Sierras have achieved is an operational demonstration of ways remotes and manned assets can work together to prosecute missions.
Certainly, a key way ahead for the P-8 would be to encompass Fire Scout operations as well as Triton operations as a way for paving a way ahead for the expansion of maritime remotes which can be anticipated in the decade ahead.
This is especially important given the challenge which small ships pose to combat ships as well as masking adversarial combat intentions and operations.
Sorting through the chaff of maritime traffic and understanding how adversaries mask intentions and capabilities by using smaller ships is part of the challenge moving ahead.
By being able to use an evolving capability of remote sensing assets, the C2 capabilities afloat, in the air or ashore can be enhanced to make timely decisions with regard to desired security or combat outcomes.
In other words, enhancing the capability to prevail in full spectrum crisis management.
Commander Greg Knutson, a 2001 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, completed flight training and was designated a Naval Aviator in 2003. His first assignment was with the World Famous Golden Falcons of Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron TWO (HS-2), supporting Operations UNIFIED ASSISTANCE and ENDURING FREEDOM while deployed aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72).
CDR Knutson transferred from HS-2 to Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron TEN (HS-10), serving as the SUPERHAWK NATOPS Program Manager, a NATOPS evaluator and Fleet Replacement Squadron Instructor Pilot. During his tour at HS-10 he was selected as the Instructor Pilot of the Year, completed the Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor course at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, and completed his master’s degree from the University of San Diego.
Following his assignment with the HS-10, he transferred to the staff of Carrier Airwing TWO (CVW-2), supporting Operation NEW DAWN while deployed aboard CVN-72.
After completing his Airwing Staff tour, CDR Knutson joined the “Red Wolves” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron EIGHT FOUR (HSC-84), one of only two US Navy squadrons dedicated to Special Operations support. While assigned to HSC-84, he completed three deployments supporting the Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) Crisis Response Element.
While deployed, he was the Navy Element Commander and Officer-in-Charge for Joint Special Operations Air Component Central, supporting theater Special Operations Forces.
Following his tour with the REDWOLVES, CDR Knutson was assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Deputy Directorate for Nuclear, Homeland Defense and Current Operations (J-33) in the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Division. He was subsequently selected as the Flag Officer’s Executive Assistant for the Deputy Directorate of ISR operations (J-32), providing strategic advice to the Secretary of Defense, Interagency Leadership, the National Security Council and members of Congress.
For our special report on the visit to Jax Navy and Mayport, see the following:
By Robbin Laird
I have followed the coming of the Osprey to the USMC since 2007 and our team has visited several global geographical locations where Marines operate the Osprey.
Observations of how the Osprey has impacted Marine Corps operations can be identified which clearly are relevant to the Indonesian military if they were to acquire the V-22.
With the Indonesians indicating their interest in buying and operating the V-22, I am going back over my own experiences with the Marines as they have introduced, evolved and developed the Osprey and the impacts which the Osprey has had upon their concepts of operations. This includes as well, working new ways to get better use out of their other combat assets.
The Osprey provided a key element for disruptive change.
But the adaptation of other combat assets to the coming of the Osprey and the evolution of Osprey con-ops to those adaptations is a key part of the story as well.
I will deal in this article with two such lessons learned which are clearly relevant to Indonesia, with its geography and topography.
In later pieces I will address additional lessons learned of relevance to the Indonesia case.
The first observation comes from when the Osprey first showed up in Iraq.
Because it was the only vertical lift asset which could cover the entire country, a major challenge for the Marines was ensuring that they could use their aircraft for a combat priority.
The problem: VIPs quickly identified this as the aircraft of choice for moving around the country safely, and quickly.
As we noted in a story highlighting the use of the Osprey in Iraq:
As one Marine commented: “The MV-22 in the AO was like turning the size of the state of Texas into the size of Rhode Island.”
It was the only “helicopter” that could completely cover Iraqi territory. And in this role, the testing of support as well as operational capabilities was somewhat limited as Marines tested out capabilities and dealt with operational challenges. The plane was largely used for passenger and cargo transport in support operations in difficult terrain and operating conditions.
And its impact was immediate.
As Major General (Rtd.) Walsh, then the air boss of Marine Air in Iraq commented:
“With the CH-46s in Iraq, I had to put out Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) to support them. This meant sending convoys, equipment, and Marines out to operate and secure the FARPs. This also required protecting the FARPs after they were in place.
“With the Osprey, I could simply leap past all of that. The Osprey completely changed how we operated. The demand became to use the Ospreys throughout Iraq because it could go through Iraq in one day easily, and just run around the battle space. It changed completely how we used our heliborne assets.”
For Indonesia, the area coverage which Osprey provides compared to traditional rotorcraft or the landing flexibility it provides compared with fixed wing lift aircraft are clearly significant.
Almost certainly, VIPs will find this aircraft, with its speed and range and its ability to land in vertical space, a high demand asset.
Ospreys will provide the Indonesian military with new options.
And these options can be exercised in either VIP transport, or HADAR disaster relief management, or an ability to survey the area of interest and to place the insertion force in the most efficacious location in the area of interest.
The second lesson learned was how the V-22 could be used quite differently from rotorcraft in terms of counter-insurgency operations.
This was evident from its initial use in Afghanistan.
In a telephone interview I did with an Osprey squadron shortly after an engagement with the Taliban, it was clear that the capabilities of the Osprey provided significant advantages over traditional rotorcraft in terms of an ability to prosecute COIN operations.
The interview with Lt. Col. Bianca conducted on February 9, 2010 was conducted by phone with the sound of the Ospreys coming back from an engagement with the Taliban.
This was an early combat experience for the Osprey but was a harbinger of things to come.
I will quote that article at length here for its relevance to Indonesia is palpably obvious.
SLD: As you arrived in Afghanistan, can you tell us about the challenges you generally have had to face as a Marine supporting the ground forces?
Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: The nature of this particular environment is distributed operations, which – frankly – the V-22 excels at. We operate primarily in the Helmand province, but we do fly to the far reaches of the country, which we have done several times, just because we can. Also, because typically the forces and the leadership want to go places where there is no runway, and the V-22 can get you there.
Distributed operations are mostly outlying bases and living with the people out in their village and their township. One of the advantages of the airplane is the fact that it allows us to land literally at dozens of these places in a single day, move mail, food, water, and in some cases, building equipment. We have run the whole gamut of support operations. We’ve done external lift operations. We’ve done deliberate actions for basic assault insert, looking to kick in the door.
But day-to-day, we basically circulate and circumscribe the battlefield. And we do that in concert with the H-53s. Typically, the H-53s or the other aircrafts will work closer to Camp Leatherneck, while the V-22s will range out to the far reaches: that kind of burden-sharing works out pretty well for operational support.
SLD: It seems like one way to look at what the V-22 is doing is providing a very different kind of infrastructure than a classic rotorcraft or a fast jet can provide for the operational commander: would you agree?
Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: I would say that is absolutely correct. And this is true not just for pure military operations, but also in support of the political process closely associated with the military and security operations. For example, when a Shura Tribal Council is to be held, a big issue is getting everyone together in a timely fashion to reduce the security risk to the council from Taliban attacks. The Osprey can uniquely bring folks together and move them after the meeting in a very timely manner.
There have been one or two times where we had to go get a guy literally on the border with Iran and another guy from the other end of the country from the border of Pakistan. And if you didn’t have V-22s, you could not have done that without taking several days to transport these guys.
SLD: So, just to underscore this point, the Marines talk about distributed operations and the role of the V-22 in those operations. But what you are highlighting is how, in addition, it fits the real political context of Afghanistan, as well as the need to bring the dispersed tribal leaders together to support the effort in Afghanistan and to prepare for the transition, is this correct?
Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: Well, that is correct. And again, we are trying to put people, and policy makers, people who can have an impact together in certain places at certain times.
The nature of mobility is characterized by three things; speed, range, and payload. If you need mobility, -“hey, I just got here in Kandahar, and I need to go see this place and this place and this place, so I can get this non-government agency eyes-on” – well then, we are your platform, and I guarantee you, we are going to get that mission.
The same thing with most of the VIPs who come from America, e.g. the undersecretary for agriculture, the various service committee members, representatives, etc . If you need to see a lot of things, then we’re going to put you on a V-22, because you’re going to see everything in this province in a day. We’ll get you there and back in a day. There are no airports; we carry the airport with us.
SLD: A recent press piece focused on the role of the V-22 in Afghanistan as “ferrying around” troops. Given what you are saying and the impact which you have in shaping operational capabilities, it looks like the Osprey’s role is going rather beyond just transporting troops and doing something akin to classic rotorcraft transport: would you agree with such an assessment?
Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: Well, you are absolutely correct. Here is something that no-one ever thinks about until one gets here. It is one thing for me to do an assault support mission where I insert troops to a location. It is quite another to talk about distributed operations.
In other words, if I am here at this airport, the troops I have to move are way over there, and the place I got to get them to is way over that way and if you want to do this in one cycle of darkness, you are going to have to put some speed on it, or you are going to have to make this a two-day evolution to move the troops here, and then get them there, so that you can do the mission.
You cannot lose sight of that either. So, even if it was to be characterized very placidly as “ferrying” of troops, there is that speed component. Football is a game of inches: combat is a game of minutes or even seconds, and that can matter.
From the distributed angle, never forget that the troops just get on the airplane here at Camp Leatherneck: they are not here at Camp Leatherneck; they are always somewhere else.
We have to go there first and then, move them to wherever the operation is going to go. And whatever one’s characterization of the operation – whether it is an assault or a town meeting -, it is time-urgent mobility.
We are moving folks to places in this country that you just cannot get to in a timely manner any other way. You simply cannot. You cannot get in a car and drive there. You can get in a helicopter and fly there, but that is going to take you two and a half or three hours. Your only option is to get into a V-22, because “I got to get to that corner in the open world –- no roads, nothing there -, we got to go do it”, and that, then, becomes our mission.
SLD: So basically, isn’t the V-22 providing a very different understanding of mobility in terms of leveraging operations, timeliness, and ability to create a result that a classic rotorcraft just could not deliver?
Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: That is correct.
That was from 2008.
It is also the case that because rotorcraft operate a certain way and the insurgents prepared their defenses in terms of how rotorcraft operate, the tiltrotor’s ability to fly over the fight and land flexibly meant that in Afghanistan the Osprey became a force multiplier for sure.
In an interview I did with the recently retired Assistant Commander of the USMC after his return from Afghanistan in 2012, General Walters highlighted the Osprey impact:
The beauty of the speed of the Osprey is that you can get the Special Operations forces where they need to be and to augment what the conventional forces were doing and thereby take pressure off of the conventional forces.
And with the SAME assets, you could make multiple trips or make multiple hits, which allowed us to shape what the Taliban was trying to do.
The Taliban has a very rudimentary but effective early warning system for counter-air.
They spaced guys around their area of interest, their headquarters, etc.
Then they would call in on cell or satellite phones to chat or track.
It was very easy for them to track.
They had names for our aircraft, like the CH-53s, which they called “Fat Cows.”
But they did not talk much about the Osprey because they were so quick and lethal.
And because of its speed and range, you did not have to come on the axis that would expect.
You could go around, or behind them and then zip in.
There is more to learn from how the Marines have shaped a way ahead for the Osprey and evolved their integrated combat capabilities and I will discuss further lessons learned in future articles.
But for now, one can highlight a number of characteristics of the Osprey demonstrated by the Marine’s operating experience and clearly of central relevance to Indonesia.
First, the greater speed and operational reach of the Osprey compared to rotorcraft means that the insertion time for the force is significantly reduced.
And the ability to combine speed with vertical landing, means that the Osprey can operate without the landing space of a fixed wing lift aircraft.
Second, the Osprey has been used to provide for tactical surprise in COIN operations.
The long-range infiltration, runway independence, and endurance of the aircraft compared to rotorcraft contributes to the kind of tactical surprise crucial to special mission units.
And the Marines experience in this area can be seen in conjunction with how the USAF has used its aircraft as well.
Third, clearly, the range, speed, landing flexibility of the Osprey allows the Indonesian military to rethink how they can exercise operational influence across the archipelago.
In short, Indonesia faces a significant opportunity to not just buy a new aircraft, but to leverage the USMC experience of leveraging it for disruptive change which enhances force capabilities, rather than undercut them.
The photos from Afghanistan were provided by Lt. Col. Bianco as part of his interview.
Also, see the following:
The Osprey and HADR Missions in the Pacific: The Indonesian Opportunity
By Staff Sgt. Hailey Haux, Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs
JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii (AFNS)
A B-52 Stratofortress bomber from the 96th Bomb Squadron, 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, took off from its home station and participated in a maritime integration exercise with the USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike groups in the South China Sea before landing at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.
The B-52 flew the 28-hour mission to demonstrate U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.
This was part of a bomber task force dynamic force employment used by U.S. Strategic Command to conduct training with and in support of geographic combatant commands efforts to help maintain global stability and security. These types of missions support the National Defense Strategy’s objectives of strategic predictability and operational unpredictability.
“Bomber Task Force demonstrates U.S. capability to rapidly deploy to a forward operating base and execute long-range strike missions,” said Lt. Col. Christopher Duff, 96th Bomb Squadron commander. “This sortie demonstrates our ability to reach out from home station, fly anywhere in the world and execute those missions, rapidly regenerate from a forward operating base and continue operations.”
During the mission, the B-52 aircrew tested and assessed command and control capabilities to inform the development of contested and degraded communication tactics, techniques and procedures to ensure seamless joint interoperability.
“As we operate throughout the Indo-Pacific theater, our fleet units continue to seek out every opportunity to strengthen our capabilities and proficiency at conducting joint, combined, all-domain operations with our partner teams,” said U.S. Navy Cmdr. Joshua Fagan, Task Force 70 air operations officer. “Some of the recent events bringing Air Force B-52s and B-1s, Navy aircraft and our ships at sea together on shared networks in support of integrated missions have been good opportunities for us to exercise the joint mission planning and coordination processes that we depend on to operate safely and effectively out here.”
U.S. Strategic Command’s bomber forces regularly conduct combined theater security cooperation engagements with allies and partners, demonstrating U.S. capability to command, control and conduct bomber missions around the world.
This article was published on July 8, 2020.