The Alliance Aspect of Shaping the New Second Fleet: The Role of CJOS COE

04/04/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

When 2nd Fleet was stood up in 2018, it was not the case of it being re-established. It was an older name but was being stood up in a new historical and military context. It was being stood up in the context of the rise of 21st century authoritarian challengers, an Alliance being reworked in the wake of the Crimean events in 2014, and in the context of shift from the land wars to reshaping the force to deal with those challengers.

It was also being shaped as new military capabilities were being generated both on the blue and red sides of the equation. It is a command which can leverage the practical capabilities which fifth generation aircraft operating in the UK and the Nordics can deliver as well.

It is an incubator of change with VADM Lewis as the dual hatted commander of 2nd Fleet and Allied Joint Forces Command Norfolk. But there is a third key element of the effort as well, and the three taken together are operating as an incubator for change in reworking a distributed integrated maritime command shaping 360-degree combat capabilities from the sea.

According to the Centre’s website:

The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) was established in May 2006. Representing 13 nations, CJOS is the only Centre of Excellence in the United States, and one of 27 NATO accredited Centres worldwide, representing a collective wealth of international experience, expertise, and best practices.

Independent of the NATO Command structure, CJOS COE draws on the knowledge and capabilities of sponsoring nations, United States Fleet Forces, United States SECOND Fleet, and neighboring U.S. commands to promote “best practices” within the Alliance. CJOS COE also plays a key role in aiding NATO’s transformational goals, specifically those focused on maritime-based joint operations. We enjoy close cooperation with Allied Command Transformation (ACT), Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), other NATO commands, maritime COEs, and national commands.

Comprised of 30 permanent staff and 20 U.S. Navy reservists, CJOS COE is highly flexible and responsive to its customers’ needs. The Centre cooperates, whenever possible, with industry and academia to ensure a comprehensive approach to the development of concept and doctrine.

But the story is even more interesting than this description provides. For the Centre continued to exist while 2nd Fleet did not. And in that period of time between its stand down in 2011 and its standup again in 2018. The Centre worked hard to shape the reworking of how maritime operations NATO wide contribute to Atlantic defense and, in the wake of the events of 2014, focused on the coming reset of North Atlantic maritime operations. When Admiral Lewis came, he understood how important what the Centre was doing was to the core operations of 2nd Fleet itself, not just in terms of managing a NATO effort, but the kind of distributed integrated force which needs to be shaped to deal with the new strategic environment.

The importance of shaping the kind of C2 that could fully leverage new capabilities like fifth generation aircraft where the allies are key players. Combining the new Queen Elizabeth carriers, the P-8 enterprise operating with the ever-improving F-35 enterprise while preparing for the coming of the new Ford class carriers, all are in synergistic support of the U.S. Navy’s shift to fighting as a fleet and is a huge strategic move for U.S. and Allies to fight and win at sea.

This is a significant shift, and one which requires leveraging all assets because it is clear that the Sea Centre of Excellence indeed provides a significant strategic contribution filtered through leadership with extensive well-earned tactical sea service.

Ed Timperlake had a chance to interview the Deputy Director of the Centre, Commodore Tom Guy from the Royal Navy on March 5, 2021.  Guy comes from the Surface Warfare Community and has significant experience with the Royal Navy and in operating in coalition operations as well.

During the interview, he underscored that 2nd Fleet was focused on its role as a coalition and joint command and control force; Vice Admiral Lewis has focused from the outset on distributed command and control and shaping the command as a warfighting instrument. This was simply not going to happen unless the U.S. Navy becomes much more part of the European NATO navies, and to work more effectively as an integrated force.

As Commodore Guy put it throughout the discussion, they were supporting the 2nd Fleet’s mission of being able to more effectively fight tonight. To do so means, finding ways for the U.S. and the allies to integrate the current capabilities more effectively. And this requires in many cases, relatively low technology solutions, but requires ensuring that NATO C2 systems are compatible with U.S. ships and for U.S. Navy training exercises to encompass C2 with European NATO navies.

As Commodore Guy put it: “In Second Fleet terms, we very focused on the practical C2 aspects, notably making sure that US Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups are familiar with NATO tactics. We are focused, for example, on working with CSG-4 to ensure that NATO familiarity is built into their training approach. And we work on the reverse as well with European NATO navies ensuringfamiliarity with U.S. Navy procedures.”

He added: “We are far from being alliance navies being completely integrated, and we are focused on the low hanging fruit. Some of this is about technology; some of it is about different operational cultures. Vice Admiral Lewis has been focused on having NATO C2 installed on U.S. Navy ships and upon shaping exercises and training whereby the operational cultural differences are attenuated. We must ensure that Second Fleet has what it needs to be the most effective multinational maritime component command it can be, on Day Zero.”

To make a very important point on a Fight Tonight Command Fleet attitude,- the Center of Excellence effort is near to mid-term. In other words, it is very much “the art of the possible,”  leveraging the practical near-term can greatly inform discussions for insightful longer-range planning for future maritime operations.

Commodore Guy underscored that getting that paradigm right allows for future iterations of combat technology to be worked in a more integrated manner going forward.  Here the Centre plays a key supporting role to Allied Command Transformation, which is also located in the Norfolk area.

Because the foreign military community in Norfolk is very up close and in a practical sense a place where folks know one another and thus allows for a significant cross fertilization between the Centre’s role in support of 2nd Fleet with ACT’s longer term thinking as well As Commodore Guy put it: “We need the second fleet staff to innately to have the understanding about what it takes to integrate with a UK or French or Italian carrier strike group.

Clearly, this is a work in progress. This one where culture and technology need to be worked interactively to shape a more effective inter-allied force. The recent experience of the Marines operating with the Brits of the Queen Elizabeth in the Atlantic certainly is photo op of a keyway ahead in shaping such a force.  As one British naval officer involved in the effort put it to us: “The Marines and Brits using the same aircraft thinking as a wolfpack is a significant step forward towards advanced integration.”

Appendix

This story by C2F published on October 1, 2020 highlighted the transfer of directorship of Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) to C2F.

Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE), a NATO-accredited, multi-national military think tank, transferred directorship from the deputy commander of U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) Command to commander, U.S.  2ndFleet (C2F), Oct. 1.

The transition from Vice Adm. Dave Kriete, deputy commander, USFF, to Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, who is commander, C2F, and dual-hatted as commander, Joint Forces Command Norfolk, will strengthen the relationship between CJOS COE and C2F, and build upon previously established networks at USFF.

Established in May 2006, CJOS COE represents 13 nations and is the only COE in the U.S. As one of 26 NATO-accredited centers worldwide, they represent a collective wealth of international experience, expertise, and best practices, critical to operations in the North Atlantic.

“By linking C2F, JFC Norfolk, and now CJOS COE, national and NATO commands will further align, catalyzing the development of modern warfighting capabilities in the North Atlantic, and increasing readiness across the joint force,” said Lewis. “We must be postured to respond to existing multi-domain threats tonight, yet make urgent efforts to adapt now to the new challenges of the security environment of tomorrow.”

The realignment comes shortly after Joint Force Command Norfolk’s initial operational capability ceremony on Sep. 17.

“The important partnership between the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) and the United States Fleet Forces Command has been superb,” said Kriete. “This key relationship will continue between CJOS COE and C2F and help ensure maritime security in the Atlantic.”

U.S. 2nd Fleet, reestablished in 2018 in response to the changing global security environment, develops and employs maritime forces ready to fight across multiple domains in the Atlantic and Arctic in order to ensure access, deter aggression and defend U.S., allied, and partner interests.

“This more direct relationship between CJOS and C2F will enhance allied interoperability and further expand on CJOS COE’s connections with U.S. commands assigned to train, operate, and deploy with NATO maritime forces, said Commodore Tom Guy, Royal Navy, deputy director of CJOS COE. “It is a logical and really welcome step as we collectively work to maintain our warfighting edge in the North Atlantic.”

In his introduction to the 2021 CJOS COE publication on Cutting the Bow Wave, Vice Admiral Lewis highlighted how he saw the importance of the Centre to his command’s efforts:

2020 has seen sweeping challenges to international relations across the globe. Even to the layman, it is obvious that we are not operating in the same security environment as we were at the start of the 21st century; we now face the reality of multiple near peer competitors operating across multiple spectrums of instruments of power.

The North Atlantic is a more contested and complex space, and more than ever we need to ensure alignment and cohesion within and across NATO’s maritime domains. As NATO continues to evolve to maintain its strategic advantage, there has been an evolution here too, and a subtle shift in emphasis, with the Directorship of CJOS COE being aligned with the Command of US SECOND Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk.

While CJOS will continue providing the support to the Alliance as it always has, under the direction of its Sponsor Nations, this shift helps to better align missions and their interconnectedness. I am really excited about the positive effect this will have on improving allied maritime interoperability across the North Atlantic, while linking the really valuable forward-looking conceptual work that CJOS does with operational and tactical maritime commanders.

CJOS brings a wealth of knowledge and expertise, from providing practical advice and education to support Allies working together effectively in the maritime domain now, to thinking about how we harness unmanned systems and artificial intelligence in the future maritime battle-space.

With our ambitious program of work for 2021, we will continue to drive Alliance maritime warfare development, and specifically support SECOND Fleet and JFC Norfolk in their deterrence and defense missions. This alignment effort must move the yardsticks not only on interoperability but bring more effort on integration, interchangeability and resilience at a level that provides “reflexive responsiveness” to any challenge presented by our adversaries. I am committed to developing these themes through a networked approach.

In his introduction to the same document, Commodore Guy highlighted the importance of working the low hanging fruit with record to integratability across the NATO navies:

As our Director has outlined, security challenges abound, and CJOS COE is firmly focused on supporting NATO in maintaining the edge in the maritime domain.

But whilst our focus is on the maritime domain, ‘multi-domain’ and ‘cross-domain’ thinking is coming increasingly to the force, and the commanders of the future will be ‘domain agnostic’ as they grapple with ever increasing amounts of information, sorted and delivered by rapidly advancing technology.

They will wield weapons with levels of range and precision that stretch the boundaries of areas of interest, both geographically and conceptually. Notwithstanding the increasing porosity of domain boundaries, as Allied Command Transformation (ACT) defines its warfare development priorities for the coming decades, and Allied Command Operations (ACO) refines its deterrence strategy, CJOS COE’s work in support of both of those is focused on those factors affecting operations over, on, under and from the sea.

As SACEUR, General Tod Wolters, notes in his foreword to John Andreas Olsen’s excellent ‘Future NATO’ Whitehall Paper, NATO needs to be challenged, conceptually and intellectually: “We must replace old ideas with new thinking.” You will see in this edition some of our new thinking on the implications of developments in hypersonics, big data and cyber interoperability.

However, our focus is not solely technical; geopolitics, strategy and command and control are also key factors in how warfare develops, and the reader will find thoughts on strategic developments in and beyond NATO’s traditional area of responsibility, from the Black Sea to the Baltic to the High North and the Far East.

From a practical perspective, we have an equally vital discussion on future sea-basing and sustaining maritime operations, and the necessary interoperability basics to keep the Alliance effective at sea and from the sea.

2021-Bow-Wave

For an e-book version of the document, see below:

We also discussed NATO’s Digital Ocean initiative, which will allow expanded capabilities for NATO navies to operate a distributed integrated fleet.

As Keit Pentus-Rosimannus and Michael D. Brasseu wrote in an Atlantic Council article published on August 19, 2020:

NATO is well-positioned to lead this new era of innovation. With its thirty Allies and over one trillion dollars in annual defense expenditures dedicated to the collective defense of their nearly one billion citizens, NATO is the largest and most powerful military alliance on the planet. The Alliance is uniquely situated at this nexus of security and environment. 

Perhaps the best illustration of this nexus is NATO’s maritime domain. The seas remain essential for global trade, with 90 percent of the world’s trade conducted by sea. And additional trade routes are opening in the Artic due to climate change and exposing NATO’s northern flank to Russian and Chinese fleets. Furthermore, the global digital economy runs on cables on the ocean’s floor.  It is the sea that connects us all, powers the global economy, and is primed for innovation. 

NATO could lead this innovation, by bringing together key stakeholders across government, academia, and industry to create a ‘digital ocean’ and exploit enormous swaths of data with artificial intelligence-enhanced tools to predict weather patterns, get early warning of appearing changes and risks, ensure the free flow of trade, and keep a close eye on migration patterns and a potential adversary’s ships and submarines. And it could be done in a sustainable carbon-neutral manner by leveraging the “Blue Tech” revolution currently underway.

Innovators across Europe and North America continue to design and build a diverse array of maritime surface and subsurface drones. Many of these maritime drones are propelled by wind, wave, and solar energy and carry sensors that can collect data critical to unlocking the yet untapped potential of the ocean.  

If NATO Allies could stich these drones together in a secure digital network, it could essentially create an ‘Internet of Things’ for the ocean, a ‘digital ocean’ spanning from seafloor to satellite that stretches across millions of square miles.  It is clear no single nation could undertake such an effort on their own, nor would they achieve the synergistic network effects an alliance like NATO offers, when such an effort is undertaken in a coherent manner.

There are significant fiscal benefits as well, as maritime drones greatly enhance the capabilities of ships, submarines, and other platforms at a fraction of the cost. These savings would be magnified by the fact that the digital ocean would be powered by free and sustainable energy sources like wind, wave, and solar.

The digital ocean will drive the ocean economy which is now $2.5 trillion a year. It has the potential to bring in new solutions and to use the tech change megatrend for the benefit of all—to create a more sustainable planet as well as robust economic driver through applications such as offshore wind, sustainable aquaculture, and carbon sequestration through growing food crops like seaweed.

 Commodore Guy provided a very helpful perspective with regard to the way ahead for maritime autonomous systems for NATO Navies:

“Recently, we have focused more on maritime unmanned systems and their operational integration into NATO navies. These remote sensors can provide for a contribution, but they too need to fit into the shift to mission command. We focus on mission command because the kind of connectivity used in the land wars have allowed for very hierarchical C2; contested operations in the North Atlantic requires a different approach, a mission command approach empowering a distributed force. Maritime autonomous systems can be part of that; they are not a substitute for that.”

For a look at the Maritime Unmanned Systems Innovation and Coordination Cell within NATO, see the following:

https://nato.usmission.gov/press-release-the-maritime-unmanned-systems-innovation-and-coordination-cell-music2-announces-the-formation-of-the-mus-innovation-advisory-board/

Commodore Tom Guy Royal Navy Deputy Director, Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence

Tom Guy is fortunate to have enjoyed a broad range of rewarding operational, staff and command roles ashore and afloat from the UK to the Far East. Early appointments included a wide variety of ships, from patrol craft to mine-hunters, frigates, destroyers and aircraft carriers, ranging from fishery protection to counter-piracy and UN embargo operations as well as training and operating with a broad range of NATO allies. Having trained as a navigator and diving officer early on, Tom specialised as an anti-submarine warfare officer and then a Group Warfare Officer. He then went on to command HMS Shoreham, a new minehunter out of build, and then HMS Northumberland, fresh out of refit as one of the most advanced anti-submarine warfare frigates in the world. His time as Chief of Staff to the UK’s Commander Amphibious Task Group included the formation of the Response Force Task Group and its deployment on Op ELLAMY (Libya) in 2011 and he later had the great privilege of serving as the Captain Surface Ships (Devonport Flotilla).

Shore appointments have included the Strategy area in the MOD, a secondment to the Cabinet Office, Director of the Royal Naval Division of the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and the role of DACOS Force Generation in Navy Command Headquarters. He has held several Operational Staff appointments, including service in the Headquarters of the Multi National Force Iraq (Baghdad) in 2005. Other operational tours have included the Balkans and the Gulf, both ashore and afloat. In 2016-17 he was the Deputy UK Maritime Component Commander in Bahrain, working alongside the US Fifth Fleet Headquarters. He assumed the role of Deputy Director of the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence in Norfolk, VA, in September 2017.

A graduate of the UK’s Advanced Command and Staff Course and the US Capstone Course, with a Master’s Degree from Kings College, Tom is a Younger Brother of Trinity House and a keen yachtsman (qualified as an Offshore Yachtmaster), as well as being a classic car and bike enthusiast. He is married to Katie who is a sailing instructor and they have two grown up children, both of whom are also keen sailors.

An Update on Naval Group: April 2021

04/01/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – An early French order for a third frigate for defense and intervention helped Naval Group boost competitiveness on its offer of the FDI warship to Greece, executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellet said March 30.

“It is good news for the competitiveness of our shipyards,” he said in a video press conference.

Pommellet was referring to the March 29 announcement by the armed forces minister, Florence Parly, that France was bringing forward the delivery of two FDI warships by a year to 2025.

“I have the pleasure to announce that we will speed up the delivery of the FDI 2 and 3, the frigates Admiral Louzeau and Admiral Castex,” she said at Naval Group’s  shipyard at Lorient, western France. “In this way, we will have three intervention frigates a year earlier than planned.”

Earlier production of a third FDI will help a cost cutting drive, with NG seeking to shed €124 million ($145 million) of costs. Competitiveness could always be improved, Pommellet said, declining to give a value on that French order, reflecting Parly’s withholding that information.

Those second and third FDI vessels will be delivered nine months apart in the first and last quarter of 2025, specialist website Mer et Marine reported. Delivery of the remaining FDI 4 and FDI 5 vessels remained 2027 and 2029.

Delivery of the first FDI, the Admiral Ronarc’h ordered in April 2017, was due in 2024, the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office said in a March 29 statement.

That first FDI had been scheduled for delivery in 2023, but NG had temporarily closed shipyards last year due to the pandemic crisis.

The FDI, bearing a brandname of Belharra, is aimed at the highly competitive export market, seen as necessary for the financial health of the company.

A cut in costs was needed, as Greece had last July found NG’s €2.5 billion offer for two frigates too expensive, business website La Tribune reported March 23.

Naval Group made a fresh offer mid-March of four FDI warships, with the first to be built at Lorient and three in a Greek shipyard, a defense source said. Those frigates would be armed with the MBDA naval cruise missile, a weapon absent from the five-strong order for the French navy.

France has also offered Greece two secondhand frigates from the French navy for free, to bridge the gap until delivery of the first FDI, the source said.

Local Content on Australian Submarines

On the plan to build 12 attack submarines, NG has committed to ensure 60 percent of local content from the Australian supply chain, said Pommellet, with that commitment applying from today and respected “by the end of the program.”

There has been media pressure for a pledge on local content, and that topic was high on the agenda when Pommellet flew to Australia last month for high level talks.

The submarine project pointed up the shift of NG from essentially a French company to becoming a global actor with an Australian industrial base.

There would be significant industrial investment and Australia would be part of the global supply for NG, he said.

NG was already working with local partners, including family owned firms and engineers, to build facilities at Adelaide port, he said, with the Thales Australian unit among the partners.

BAE Systems was also at the harbour, he said, working on its Australian navy frigate.

There will be “no worries” for local content on the submarine project, he said, pointing up the significance of Australian sovereignty.

NG was in negotiation for the next stage in the project, which is basic design and likely to last two to three years, followed by detailed design, and then manufacture, he said. Long-term programs were managed in stages, and it was up to the government to decide it had chosen the right partner as each phase came up. That reflected national sovereignty.

NG’s Australian unit has committed to at least 60 percent local content, created almost 300 jobs, and plans to double its local workforce this year, the company said in a March 23 statement. That recruitment was part of preparation for building a hull qualification section in Adelaide in 2023 and building the first submarine pressure hull in the following year.

More than 120 local firms have registered interest to be tier one capability partners, to build major parts for the boat, the company said. That was in response to announcement of the first local manufacturing package worth almost A$900 million.

Next Generation Aircraft Carrier

The DGA awarded March 19 a two-year contract to NG, Chantiers de l’Atlantique, a commercial shipyard, and TechnicAtome, a nuclear engineering company, to conduct further studies on a next generation aircraft carrier, the procurement office said in a March 29 statement.

The study follows previous preliminary studies which led the president, Emmanuel Macron, to opt for a nuclear powered carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle carrier.

When these studies are completed in 2023, a more detailed, three-year study will follow, to allow industry to make an offer for building the carrier, the DGA said. There will also be a safety study for the nuclear engine.

The aim is to start building the ship in 2025, hold sea trials in 2036, and enter service in 2038, to avoid a capability gap before the Charles de Gaulle is retired from service, the DGA said.

NG has formed a joint venture with Chantiers de l’Atlantique to work on the new carrier, with the former to receive 2/3 of revenue and the latter 1/3, Pommellet said.

That joint venture, named MO PA for aircraft carrier prime contractor, will be 65 percent held by NG and 35 percent by Chantiers de l’Atlantique. That JV company name evoked memories of a previous project, named MO PA 2, which worked on studies for a sister ship to the Charles de Gaulle. That MO PA 2 project was cancelled for lack of funds.

The joint venture aims to be clear on management of the program, with each partner clear on what the partners will manage.

NG will be overall architect, and integrator for combat, navigation and aviation systems, catapults and arresting cables, subsystems for the nuclear boilers, and integration of the boilers into the ship.

Chantiers de l’Atlantique will build the ship and manage major systems such as electric propulsion, living quarters and auxiliary systems.

Financial Hit

A speeded up order for a third frigate for the French navy reflected the need for NG to plug a looming gap for work at Lorient and winning state support.

NG had been waiting for that announcement for some time, Pommellet said

The government holds 62.5 percent of NG, while Thales, an electronics company, holds 35 percent.

The shut down of the yards in the first half last year hit 2020 sales and profit, and  hurt the company’s export drive.

That lock down led to 2020 revenue falling to €3.3 billion from €3.7 billion in the previous year, with a profit margin dropping to 2.6 percent compared to 7.6 percent.

The 2021 target for the profit margin was 7.5 percent of sales, the company said.

The pandemic crisis cut down export prospects, hampered by cancellation of the Euronaval trade show last year and the Paris air show this year, Pommellet said. Trade shows were an important means of pitching directly to prospective clients.

Domestic deals accounted for 70 percent of 2020 sales, with 30 percent from  exports, he said. The 2021 target was 60:40 percent, and Australia was a major  factor.

Pommellet said he took note of business magazine L’Usine Nouvelle challenging the company for withholding a press release on 2020 financial results, which were published in a March 24 interview with La Tribune.

The featured  photo shows the recent visit to Lorient of the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, Naval Group received notification of the order for two FDI frigates by the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA). The acceleration of the FDI program will support the activity of the Naval Group site in Lorient where the frigates are designed and built, also ensuring the preservation of skills.

The two frigates – the second and third in a series of five – will both be delivered in 2025, whereas the original plan was to deliver them every 18 months.
The first FDI, for which construction work began in 2020, is scheduled for delivery in 2024.

The video below was released by Naval Group on March 25, 2021 and highlights their approach to innovation.

Also, see the following:

https://defense.info/defense-decisions/2021/03/australia-moves-ahead-on-their-new-attack-submarine/

Enhancing Coalition Combat Capability: The Role of Joint Force Command, Norfolk

03/31/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The standup of both Second Fleet in 2018 and Joint Force Command, Norfolk in 2019 have had very similar goals: how to enhance the combat capability of the entire allied maritime force in the North Atlantic? From this point of view, these are not two commands under Vice Admiral Lewis, to two interactive commands working a more effective distributed integrated force.

Post-2014, in the wake of the Crimean takeover, the United States and a number of core allied nations, reversed course on the Cold War peace dividend and engagement in the Middle East land wars and began to refocus on the challenges posed by the Russians with the return of direct defense challenges in Europe. And with it the need to rebuild North Atlantic 360-degree sea lines of communication was a key challenge.

This is how Rear Admiral Waddell, the Vice Commander of C2F has put the challenge:

“The old 2nd Fleet was interested in sea lines of communication. But the new 2nd Fleet is focused on strategic lines of communication. This is an all-domain perspective, and not just the convoy missions of past battles of the Atlantic.”

He referred to C2F as the maneuver arm in providing for defense, deterrence and warfighting but as part of a whole of government approach to defending the United States, Canada and NATO allies against threats.

What JFC Norfolk facilitates is more effective coordination of the relevant nation’s responses to the new threat environment and to work ways to forge these efforts into a more integrated approach, one which enhances the lethality, survivability and effectiveness of the fleets involved in North Atlantic defense.

During our visit to Norfolk in March 2021, we had a chance to discuss JFC Norfolk with the head of plans in the command, Rear Admiral Hilaire Ducellier.

He is a very experienced naval officer with service in both the Pacific and the Atlantic/Mediterranean regions. He has commanded three ships throughout his career and the Maritime Operational Center for the Atlantic.

The French Navy is a somewhat unique asset within the European region, as it has operated full spectrum maritime operations throughout the Cold War and after, with carriers, boomers, nuclear attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and has a robust maritime strike missile capability as well. It is both a conventional and nuclear navy with its carriers carrying nuclear qualified Rafale pilots onboard as well.

It is also a navy which operates globally, as the recent operations of a nuclear attack submarine in the Pacific clearly demonstrates.

As Murielle Delaporte recently noted: “Because France has been itself a medium-sized Pacific power for more than two centuries, it feels directly threatened by the growing instability impacting its territories and communities, some of them in risk of vanishing because of climate change and consequent water rising. Strengthening strategic autonomy is also a shared concern, hence the well-known Rafale deal with India and submarine ‘’deal of the century’’ with Australia.

“But military ties between France and its main allies in the Pacific go increasingly way beyond industrial partnerships towards more comprehensive operational relations between not only “like-minded” states, but also comparable military formats.”

The planned new nuclear aircraft carrier underscores how closely the U.S. Navy and the French Navy work together to shape integrated capabilities.

And in a French presentation at the International Fighter Conference, 2020, the role of the fleet in nuclear operations was also raised.

“The only mention of the nuclear dimension was during a discussion about the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and its approach to operations.

“Here the readiness in being during deployment to deliver nuclear strike by onboard Rafales was discussed.

“The French indeed have been the clearest among of the Western nuclear powers on the need for tactical air delivered strike and have continued their work, including modernization of weapons to indeed deliver this capability in their neighborhood as part of their deterrent posture.”

As Pierre Tran has put it with regard to the most recent French defense budget and the nuclear weapons commitment: “The draft budget includes €1 billion of studies to develop the nuclear ballistic missile submarine, and a fourth generation nuclear-tipped, air-to-ground missile, the air-sol nucléaire 4ème génération (ASN4G) to replace the present nuclear-armed cruise missile, dubbed air-sol moyenne portée amélioré (ASMPA).”

And one should note that the training to execute an air delivered tactical nuclear mission, provides pilots with an  overall understanding of a complex strike mission which then carried over into the capabilities to excel at non-nuclear strikes as well.

When one discusses defense in the North Atlantic, it is about full spectrum crisis management with three nuclear powers within the Alliance and the Russians who increasingly under President Putin has built up nuclear capabilities.

Shaping a distributed force provides for more effective capabilities across the spectrum of warfare.

But what a JFC Norfolk allows one to do is to more effectively coordinate national efforts into a coalition capability.

This is what Europeans routinely do, given the need to augment the size of national forces through force collaboration.

And by having JFC Norfolk working closely with the next C2F, the U.S. forces can work through how to have a more coordinated force with allies as part of a more integrated force with both European national and U.S. forces more capable of working together.

Rear Admiral Ducellier highlighted that France is focused on coalition operations with its maritime force throughout the Cold War, into the period up to 2014, and into the post-2014 period. And the new JFC is not replicating what is being done in Naples.

“We are a lean command. You are not going to do with a 150 in our command what you can do with 1,000 in Naples.”

It occurred to us that in learning about C2F and the JFC Norfolk, that keeping it lean and focused on coalition warfighting there is a huge opportunity to leverage the modernization efforts of the United States and the relevant nations to sort through how to make best use of one another’s capabilities, through coalition exercises and cross learning, rather than shaping a large top-down bureaucratic effort.

Rear Admiral Ducellier highlighted that the coalition approach through a connected C2 structure provides for significant flexibility on how the key aspects of the force can work creatively together.

“Rather than characterizing platforms as primarily a supporting or supported capability, we are seeing much more flexibility whereby a platform can play a role as either a supporting or supported capability dependent on the mission.”

Distributed modular task forces can provide redundancy, flexibility, and enhanced survivability for the overall combat fleet.

Clearly, the approaches being pioneered by C2F and JFC Norfolk can provide a significant impact to rethinking C2 and distributed combat capability through coalition integration in the period ahead.

Featured Photo: One of the ships commanded by Rear Admiral Ducellier was the French frigate Tourville which is seen in the featured photo.

Tourville is the lead ship of F67 type large high-sea frigates of the French Marine Nationale. The vessel is specialized in anti-submarine warfare, though it also has anti-air and anti-surface capabilities. She is named after the 17th century admiral Count Anne-Hilarion de Cotentin de Tourville. Between 1994 and 1996, Tourville (and sister ship De Grasse) was refitted with the modern SLAMS anti-submarine system, an active Very Low Frequencies sonar.”

The French certainly are no strangers to the Virginia coast with one of their most famous engagements being in support of the Americans in the Battle of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War.

The sister ship is named for French Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse.

French Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse Tilly arrived in the West Indies with a French fleet in April 1781. He sent word to French General Comte de Rochambeau, in Newport, Rhode Island, that he was under orders to sail his fleet north to assist the French and the American armies. General George Washington hoped to use De Grasse’s fleet and Rochambeau’s army to assist the American army in an attack on the British at New York City.Rochambeau and Washington sent word to De Grasse that his fleet was desperately needed and that any troops and money that De Grasse could bring with the fleet would also be of great help.They suggested that De Grasse come to either New York City which Washington favored; or to the Chesapeake Bay to assist General Lafayette’s American army opposing British General Cornwallis and his army that had recently moved into Virginia; a course of action favored by Rochambeau..

De Grasse decided to bring his fleet to the Chesapeake Bay because of the shorter sailing distance to it and it was more navigable than the New York harbor. In Santo Domingo, on the island of Hispaniola, (Dominican Republic), De Grasse loaded 3000 French troops from the Gatinais, Agenois and Touraine infantry regiments aboard his ships. He also raised 1.2 million livres (worth approximately 6 million US dollars today) in Havana, Cuba from the local government, banks and citizens to assist the American and French armies in America. On August 5, De Grasse set sail with his fleet of 37 ships including 28 ships-of-the-line, (large battleships), 7 frigates and 2 cutters, headed to the Chesapeake Bay. De Grasse took a dangerous route through the straits of the Bahamas to avoid the British fleets of Admiral George Rodney and Admiral Samuel Hood, who were protecting British interests and commerce in the West Indies.

When General Washington received news on August 14 that De Grasse was sailing to the Chesapeake Bay instead of New York, he quickly changed his plan.Four days later he began moving the American and French armies to Yorktown, Virginia to surround Cornwallis’s army that had just two weeks earlier begun setting up a British naval base there, but the success of Washington’s daring plan depended on De Grasses’ fleet controlling the Chesapeake Bay.

 

USCG in Strait of Hormuz

Coast Guard patrol boat USCGC Adak (WPB 1333) conducts small boat maneuvering drills in the Strait of Hormuz, Jan. 18.

Adak is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the
Western Indian Ocean and three critical chokepoints to the free flow of global commerce.

01.18.2021

Video by Spc. Evens Milcette

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet

F-35 National Training Takes Off in Australia

03/30/2021

By Flying Officer Bronwyn Marchant

Four Air Force pilots on the first F-35A Lightning II operational conversion course to be run in Australia completed their first flights at RAAF Base Williamtown on February 2.

The pilots began their training in January after graduating from the Introductory Fighter Course at No. 76 Squadron where they trained on the Hawk 127 lead-in fighter.

Commanding Officer of No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit Wing Commander Jordon Sander said the transition to the F-35A wasn’t easy.

“For pilot training, the most notable difference is the transition from a two-seat trainer to a single-seat aircraft,” Wing Commander Sander said.

“In a two-seat trainer, we can correct the techniques of the trainee by taking control of the aircraft, demonstrating how to safely and effectively operate the aircraft.

“The first time a trainee pilot flies the F-35A, they are flying solo.

“Use of the simulator beforehand is very important so we can be confident the trainee can safely and effectively complete a task.”

The challenge of providing instruction while airborne led to the introduction of a ‘chase’ aircraft in the F-35A operational conversion course.

“Conversion phase on the F-35A will see two aircraft operating in pairs, with the trainee in one aircraft followed by a qualified instructor in the second aircraft known as a chase,” Wing Commander Sander said.

“This allows the instructor to fly alongside the trainee in a position that enables them to supervise and provide technique and safety feedback as required.”

No. 21-1 Operation Conversion Course will run for six months, with the pilots expected to graduate in July.

Wing Commander Sander said the delivery of the first F-35A operational conversion course was a significant milestone for Air Force, and commended the four pilots on their first flights.

“We are very excited to be conducting our first F-35A operational conversion course and are looking forward to seeing the pilots graduate in July,” he said.

“The trainee pilots still have much to learn before then, but we congratulate them on their first F-35A flight, a childhood dream.”

No. 2 Operational Conversion Unit completed its final F/A 18A/B Hornet operational conversion at the end of 2019 to make way for the F-35A.

This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on March 11, 2021.

VMM261

03/29/2021

Airmen with the 165th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) conduct a casualty evacuation exercise with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (VMM-261) at Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah, Georgia, Dec. 7-16.

Marines with VMM-261 trained with airmen in shore-based operations in an unfamiliar environment prior to an upcoming deployment in Spring 2021.

VMM-261 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the air combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

SAVANNAH, GA.

12.14.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Yuritzy Gomez

2nd Marine Aircraft Win

21st Century USW: A Kill Web Team Sport

03/28/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

Last Fall, 2nd Fleet hosted the 2020 version of Black Widow, an Atlantic-focused USW  exercise.

But to be completely accurate, although the term ASW is most commonly used, what we are discussing is undersea warfare. USW is an integrated fight against all undersea threats, with submarines being a key, but not the only threat. ASW is part of USW.

As one Naval officer put it: “When we tend to discuss an integrated fight, we try to use the term USW, but when we are specifically hunting for just a submarine, ASW is the correct term.”

This is not classic USW, but one in which new capabilities are being woven into shaping a 21st century version of USW to deal with a 21st century threat posed from the sea. USW is becoming reshaped by the interactive kill web approach of multi-domain assets focused on a core warfighting capability and set of relevant skill sets.

U.S. Navy aircraft, surface ships and submarines will participate in Exercise Black Widow 2020 in the North Atlantic Sept. 12-18.

During Exercise Black Widow our Fleet warfighters employ, hone, and evaluate tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance our readiness for real world operations, with specific focus on advancing our theater undersea warfare advantage in a multi-domain environment. This exercise will allow us to develop new doctrine and innovative tactics that address the capabilities of our near-peer competitors across the range of missions we expect to encounter in major combat operations.

This year’s participants include the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1), the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS McFaul (DDG 74), a Virginia-class fast-attack submarine, a Los-Angeles class fast-attack submarine, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11, and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadrons 46 and 72.

This marks the first time U.S. 2nd Fleet (C2F) and Commander, Submarine Group (SUBGRU) 2 will lead the force. 

“The reestablishment of Submarine Group 2 enables the Navy and our Allies to finely tune our efforts in this resurgent battlespace, and reinforces the critical trans-Atlantic link,” said Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet. “Exercises like Black Widow give the undersea force a venue to showcase how we are agile, persistent, flexible, interoperable, and resilient.” 

Participating units will refine communication techniques between platforms and simulate real-word application to enhance the lethality of the team as one cohesive fighting force. Black Widow also provides a chance for an increased focus on training in anti-submarine warfare on multiple platforms to enhance strategies and heighten the combat readiness of the fleet. 

Vice Adm. Daryl L. Caudle, Commander, Submarine Forces. “We train like we fight, and strive for innovation, development, and improvement across all spectrums of warfare. To maintain superiority, we must be more agile in concepts, geography and technology.”

We had a chance to get further insights into the evolving “team sport,” from Rear Admiral Jim Waters, Commander Submarine Group Two (SUBGRU2) during our visit to Norfolk in March 2021. The Admiral has a distinguished career with significant operational experience in both the Pacific and the Atlantic (see biography at the end of the article.)

When SUBGRU2 celebrated its first anniversary of its establishment in September 2020, the Commander was quoted in a story published by the command on September 30, 2020.

Submarine Group 2 (SUBGRU 2) celebrated its first anniversary after reestablishment on Sept. 30, 2019. SUBGRU 2 was reestablished a little more than a year after the reestablishment of U.S. 2nd Fleet in August 2018, and was aimed at enhancing the Navy’s capacity to command and control its undersea warfare (USW) forces in the Western Atlantic.

Rear Adm. Jim Waters, SUBGRU 2 commander and Ellington, Connecticut native, highlighted the importance of reestablishing the command.

“We are tasked with advancing the art of undersea warfare through the combined efforts of our air, surface, submarine, and other underwater capabilities and to provide exquisitely trained forces to ensure undersea dominance in the Atlantic…I am honored to be a part of developing and leading this command into the future of integrated undersea warfare.”

SUBGRU 2 serves as the Theater Undersea Warfare Commander (TUSWC) for 2nd Fleet and 4th Fleet in response to increasing near-peer competition in the Atlantic. SUBGRU 2 has the authority to command and control air, surface, and undersea forces to execute integrated multi-domain undersea operations in defense of the homeland.

In our discussion, a number of themes emerged  and what clearly was especially hammered home was a significant focus on innovation in working a wide variety of platforms to deliver the desired combat effect.

In fact, the Rear Admiral underscored that for Vice Admiral Lewis, many Navy platforms maybe considered an USW platform  since they all have the ability to see, to communicate, and as necessary provide weapons as contributors to what is now known as the USW Team Sport.

Clearly, the submarine remains the number one sub killer with weapons deployed for this purpose.

But with the expanded capability of surface and air-borne assets to find, track and kill submarines, the role of the underwater U.S. Navy force changes as well.  It can be the cutting-edge stalker or killer or work through the kill web force to get the desired result. In fact, having a wider range of options for prosecution and destruction of adversary submarines than in the past is a key element for 21st century maritime operations and warfare.

Over the past few years in interviews with aviators in the  transformed Maritime Patrol community with  the P-8 and the Triton., along with a more focused integration of the Romeo helicopters  we saw the U.S. Navy  reshape airborne forces working together to deliver a desired kill web combat effect. Along that journey we saw the  establishment of fleet level Maritime ISR (MISR) officers reflect the importance of the Information (note we are calling it “I” for Information vice Intelligence), Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability availability for maritime warfare, including ASW in particular.

Command guidance reflected in what is known as the  “Commanders Intent” side of this effort is the key focus of Vice Admiral Lewis and is clearly seen in the work of Submarine Group 2.  Mission command is crucial and Command guidance intent is clearly distributed to the fleet to shape and task forces that can deliver the desired combat effect.

Obviously, how communications and how ISR is shared between an undersea, surface and airborne force varies in terms of operating theaters and is a challenge; working interactivity across the domains is a key part of exercising an ASW team approach.

Rethinking how to use platforms is an essential part of the process because the U.S. Navy can practice like Black Widow demonstrated, employing amphibious platforms as part of sea control and sea denial. In Black Widow 2020, they did so in the form of the USS WASP.

The WASP was used as an ASW helo platforms, and the Rear Admiral underscored that the seaworthiness of the WASP and its deck space allowed for the team to use the Romeos operating off of the WASP to provide a key capability for the integrated fight.

Another driver for change in USW operations in the Atlantic is clearly new capabilities being operated by our allies, whether they be new diesel submarines or nuclear attack submarines in the case of the French and British, or new USW frigates, or new maritime patrol aircraft capabilities, whether they be the new P-8s as in the case of Britain or Norway, or new capabilities on older aircraft, as in the case of Canada.

As Rear Admiral Garvin, then the MPRA commander, put it last year; “In effect, we are shaping kill web “matesmanship.”

“Our policy frameworks simply need to catch up with our technologies.”

“Our allies understand the fundamental nature of their region better than we do.

“If you have properly maintained these important working relationships, both interpersonal and technological, then you will have access to the cultural knowledge and human geography that might otherwise would not be available to you.

“We clearly have closer relationships with some allies than with others, which shapes policy and data sharing. However, the technology is now out there which can allow us, within the right policy framework, to provide data at appropriate security levels much more rapidly than in the past.

“Those partnerships need to be nurtured and exercised now to help shape our interactive webs into a truly effective strike force over the extended battlespace.”

Rear Admiral Waters certainly reinforced this point, as in the Atlantic, we have a number of key partners who work ASW and anti-surface warfare as a core competence for their national navies, and their domain knowledge is a key part of the equation in shaping enhanced warfighting capabilities and re-enforcing deterrence.

Because of the complexity of the underwater domain, it is necessarily a team sport. There are people that would love to say, “It’s the submarines. And they do ASW and that’s what they do.”

“And certainly, it’s a major mission for the submarine force. But the threat is so complex, and the environment is so challenging, that you can’t rely on one particular platform to do this mission.

“We as a navy have evolved a very robust structure of training and assessing and preparing and innovating. We’re really good at carrier-centric integration.

“But our ability to integrate a non-carrier-centric force, like a theater undersea warfare task force, needs to be enhanced. And that was what Black Widow represented. We operated as a fleet or a task force to deliver the desired combat effect.”

Finally, there is the question of the coming of maritime autonomous systems and how they might fit into the concepts of operations which the Rear Admiral is shaping and executing.

Recently, the Navy released its plan for developing and then integrating maritime autonomous systems into the force.

Clearly, one domain where this may well happen is in the ISR side of providing information for both ASW and anti-surface warfare. The promise is there, but also the question of the readiness of the networks to handle data and where that data will go remains a work in progress.

This is how Rear Admiral Waters put it: “Unmanned systems will play an important role in the future.

“The fact that they can dwell for long periods, and we don’t have to worry about feeding the people on board, will provide an important contribution in the undersea warfare area.

“Unmanned systems have  the ability to stare for a long time and if you could put a platform out there that can either stay in the air a really long time or stay in the environment with acoustic sensors for a really long time, that gives you the ability to sense the environment.

“The challenge comes with regard to how what information you have gathered becomes useful.

“We have to have the place where they plug in, and how to use that information in the area of interest?”

It is clear that the undersea domain which is the focus of attention of Rear Admiral Walters is best understood not only in terms of its own dynamic, but how it interacts with the threats and challenges across the multi-domain theater of operations which C2F and Allied JFC Norfolk focus upon.

As Vice Admiral Lewis noted the change in his March 2021 Proceedings article:

“Both JFCNF and C2F are shifting their mind-sets from predominantly operating from the sea to fighting at sea—which requires mastery of the domains below, on, and above the sea. We are executing high-end maritime operations from seabed to space. Our collective security and interconnected global economy depend on open shipping lanes, unhindered air travel, and uninterrupted flow of data., C2F and JFCNF are natural partners—each advocating for the other and working in unison.

“ Russia has increased its military posture during the past decade, to signal its ability to threaten allied capabilities, infrastructure, and territory. Russia has invested in capability versus capacity—it knows it will never have more ships, aircraft, or submarines than all of NATO—with an eye toward asymmetric capabilities. So, we carefully monitor Russian investments in force multipliers such as hypersonic weapons, submarine quieting, extended-range missile systems, and information warfare.”

“Russia’s activity in the gray zone notably includes its underwater reconnaissance program and information operations. In recent years, Russia intensified its submarine activity around the undersea cables, which are essential for global communications—including the internet. The ability of an American user to access a website in Europe or vice versa largely depends on a network of several hundred fiber-optic communication cables that run across the ocean floor—and Russia has deployed submarines to map out the cables, likely in preparation for nefarious activity.”

In short, the undersea domain is a key field of action, where dominance is best ensured by having a 360-degree operational capability encompassing the surface, air and space domains.

Clearly, Rear Admiral Waters not only understands this, but is leading the way in shaping the kind of innovation crucial for the defense of the homeland and U.S. interests abroad.

Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO

Rear Adm. Waters is a native of Ellington, Connecticut and 1989 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a degree in Systems Engineering.  He completed graduate studies at Oxford University in 1991.

His sea tours include various division officer assignments onboard USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN 730G), engineer officer onboard USS Philadelphia (SSN 690) and executive officer onboard USS Alabama (SSBN 731B).  He commanded USS Virginia (SSN 774) and Submarine Squadron Four.

Rear Admiral James Waters III, Commander, Submarine Group TWO

His staff assignments include operations officer at Submarine Squadron Two, engineer at Submarine Squadron Three, submarine executive officer detailer, deputy commander of Submarine Squadron One, battle watch commander and chief of staff for U.S. Strategic Command’s Director of Global Operations (J3), CNO Strategic Studies Group 35, and as deputy executive director for the Chief of Naval Personnel.  He most recently served as director, Maritime Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Waters assumed his current duties in August 2019 as commander, Submarine Group Two in Norfolk, Virginia.

His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Meritorious Service Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy-Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and various other individual, unit, campaign and service awards.  He is most proud of those awards that reflect the hard work and success of the many teams he has been privileged to serve.