The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 5

12/28/2020

In the release of the new Australian defensce strategy on July 1, 2020, Prime Minister Morrison highlighted the important role which Senator Jim Molan plays in his thinking about defence.. Recently, Senator Molan has launched a podcast series looking at the way ahead and how Australia might address the challenges which its faces.

He starts each podcast with this introduction:

“Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist tells us that strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.

“But tactics without strategy is just noise before defeat.

“My name is Jim Molan and welcome to our Noise Before Defeat podcast.”

This is the fifth podcast in his series.

A regional superpower – economically, militarily, diplomatically

An alliance is not a substitute for Australia being strong itself and being self-reliant. By being self-reliant within an alliance, we can bring strength to that alliance when we stand some hope of deterring conflict. So let’s not hang one by one. We always need to go back to recognize that the threats to our sovereignty are very, very real. We’re not just making this up.

The threat is coming to us initially by way of tensions due to the assertive or aggressive behavior of China. And the threat may then develop, as we discussed, intentionally or accidentally into actual war. The whole basis of this podcast is that Australia must guard its sovereignty by becoming self-reliant across the necessary parts of the nation so that we are for the first time in our history, prepared for what might happen.

And we can do it by ourselves given the right national security strategy and a bit of time. At the moment, we have no national security strategy that covers all aspects of the nation, and we don’t know how much time we have. And it’s not a good start for the most demanding period in our history since 1945….

Before COVID, we had the 12th largest GDP in the world. Here we are a country of 25 million people, the 12th largest GDP in the world, but even more astonishing, Russia had the 13th largest. Russia’s GDP is smaller than Australia’s.

We were prior to COVID, first, second or third in personal wealth in the world, depending on how you measure it. We had made a national decision that prosperity, we made this decision for the last 75 years, we had made a national decision that prosperity is more important than security, and that was a logical decision over that period of time because the U.S. looked after our security, but unfortunately, it’s not a logical decision now.

And as I said, Russia, with a smaller GDP than ours, really impoverishes its people to provide an exorbitant, a really disproportionate size of military and a nuclear capability.

But on the other side, I’d say that Israel is almost a perfect example of a small nation which is self-reliant. It’s democratic, it’s prosperous, and increasingly, it’s becoming much more secure. It’s not just because it has a big military, which it does, but because it has spread security across its entire nation….

My exposure to Israel is extensive working as a consultant to the Israeli government through various organizations.

And I really came to the conclusion that Israel is an example that if you have the will over time, a small nation can defend itself against massive odds. Israel’s got a small population of six to 8 million people. We have 25 million. They have borders with most of the once enemies, and we have a full continent. They are a very high technology country, and so are we. They have the strength of a democratic society, and so are we. We have far better alliances, probably more friends and vast strategic depth. Their country is only at its narrowest, a few kilometers wide….

The strengths that we have to work with are many, but I’ll try to group them as much as I can. And I guess the first is geography. And geography in relation to security is still very, very important, regardless of the advances in technology. We have our own continent, as I said before, and our close border region between us and our neighbors is relatively secure. And by that, I mean, we don’t share land borders with an assertive neighbors. And that’s a real advantage.

At the moment, we tend to dig them up and export them, receive money and buy the things that we need to contribute to our security. If we are to be self-reliant, we need to plan to use more of them ourselves if we are cut off from overseas sources of manufacturing goods.

And of course, we should do that anyhow because that creates prosperity and it creates jobs, and it’s certainly the Morrison government’s policy on coming out of COVID. To use those is a vastly more complex operation than just digging them up and putting them in shifts. And of course, our government, as I said, is moving very impressively to start doing this, and we should peak in that in some way at the start of next year.

Our people are our resource, not just because they might fulfill certain functions, but because a government in a crisis needs the support of its people. So our people are a key strength. Our population is well and truly large enough to defend this nation if we had to. It’s well-educated as a population and we have an education and training system, the envy of the world, so we can adapt if we need to adapt.

We might read about tensions in our newspapers and on our TV every single day, but the degree of social cohesion amongst our people is relatively high. Sometimes we might think otherwise, but I think it is high.

And I guess this is due to the tradition of the rule of law, where our rights as individuals are strongly protected, we have a settlement history which is different from other countries, and of course, we’re a liberal democracy where an individual has great importance.

And our people really know, I reckon, that they have a defined constitution, and their rights are protected by that, although in crisis, we normally surrender some of our rights for the security that we want. And we also have this extraordinary tradition of individuality in Australia. And again, that is something which is very, very valuable in a crisis….

I reckon that our federal system is a strength. People may not think that as we go through tensions between states and federal government related to COVID, but we are used to our constitution and people are becoming more knowledgeable about it.

We’re used to also to the limited places on the federal government, but what we do know is that the kind of powers a federal government might want to use to prepare the nation in a national security sense are either there as formal powers, or we can achieve the aims that we as a federal government want by paying for it as we write most of the taxes.

Our financial ability to pay and to even borrow is very, very high. In a well-governed federal system, that’s a real bonus. And this is really assisted by a highly capable public service. Everyone stands around and knocks the public service, but they are a highly capable public service in most cases. And we have a highly capable diplomatic capability.

And given, as I say, that diplomacy through alliances is our first line of defense, that’s very, very important. And although we don’t see much of it, we also have a very, very capable intelligence community. And I guess that Australians have a deep understanding of alliances. And this is something which many other countries don’t have. We have never fought in a war outside of an alliance. So we know what alliances do, the difficulty of alliances, and how to use alliances to our own benefit….

And I talk about our industrial base, and sometimes it can be a vulnerability, but it’s still relatively broad in its expanse across the skills needed, but it’s just very, very small. And we need scale. We have so much to build on in this country. We’ve got some fabulously advanced elements in our industry.

We’re advanced in setting up a ship building industry, both military and civilian, a commercial ship building industry. We serve as an aviation sector that is very large and we have solid government policies that are moving us forward on manufacturing, and in fact, moving us into outer space as well in a very high technology approach…

pulling it all together is the big challenge. And that’s why I talk about the need for an overall strategy. And we’re seeing from the Morrison government almost every day of the week, new policies, innovative policies, innovative ways of achieving them.

And I must admit that I have never seen anyone better than the prime minister in implementing policies, turning policies into real effects. You’re right, though, we are very competently solving problem after individual problem, not just related to COVID, but looking a long way into the future.

And that’s to our credit as a government. Australia has a Western approach to security and to planning. And that is very, very good. We just need to decide to do it, to focus on it as national security, and then the resource it….

By my assessment, we are a regional superpower now in many aspects of our economy, certainly. And we’re very effective diplomatically while our military is a fine base for expansion. We just need to pull it all together to prepare this nation for the future. And it’s my obligation, I guess, in the final episode of the six-part series, to offer you my solution. I’ll try and do that in the next part, which is titled, interestingly and strangely enough, it’s titled We Stress Test Banks, Why Not National Security?

We have just published our latest book which is entitled, Joint By Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy.

As one senior RAAF officer put it: “The Prime Minister of Australia, the Honorable Scott Morrison, has launched the Defense Strategic Update, which moved Australia’s defense policy away from a globally-balanced approach under our Defense White Paper of 2016, towards a more regionally focused posture, founded in the principles of shape, deter, and respond. The new policy approach places great emphasis on the need for our forces to be well integrated, both internally to Australia, and across our strategic partners. ”

Joint by Design is focused on Australian policy, but it is about preparing liberal democracies around the world for the challenges of the future.

The strategic shift from land wars to full spectrum crisis management requires liberal democracies to have forces lethal enough, survivable enough, and agile enough to support full spectrum crisis management.

The book provides an overview of the evolution of Australian defence modernization over the past seven years, and the strategic shift underway to do precisely that.

Although this is a book about Australia, it is about the significant shift facing the liberal democracies in meeting the challenge of dealing with the 21st century authoritarian powers.

In this sense, the volume is very complimentary to our book the return of direct defense in Europe, a book that concludes with a chapter that highlights the Australian contribution to the rethinking going on in Europe about direct defense.

The book is based on the bi-annual Williams Foundation seminars held since 2014, and include insights and presentations by Australians and several key allies of Australia.

In that sense, the book provides an Australian-led allied rethink with regard to how to meet 21st century defense challenges.

The two books read together provide a good overview of where key allies are with regard to rethinking defense certa 2020.

As Anne Borzycki, Director of the Institute of Integrated Economic Research – Australia, has highlighted:

“Dr Robbin Laird brings a unique perspective to his analysis of the journey the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been on over the last six years.  As an American, and also a European resident, he understands the military and strategic realities of Europe and the United States and is therefore able to place Australia, as a modern middle-power, into the spectrum of Western Liberal Democracies. And importantly, this book highlights the lessons that Europe and the United States could learn from Australia as the first quarter of the 21st century draws to a close.

“This book is a modern history that begins in 2014.  The year 2014 might seem recent – however given the upheavals wrought upon the world by changing global power dynamics, national domestic political challenges, military transformations and finally, the pandemic – it could just as well be 60, not 6, years ago.”

This book was released on Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and Kobo on December 22, 2020 in e book form with the paperback and hardback to be released in two months.

And in Australia on amazon Australia:

Or you can buy it directly through our website for 10% off if you use the code: Joint2020

Book Cover Image

Australians Launch New Naval Sustainment Approach

In a press release on December 1, 2020 by the Australian Department of Defence, a new regional sustainment approach for the Royal Australian Navy was announced.

Defence is looking for an Australian industry partner to deliver a new, innovative approach to the sustainment of Navy’s fleet, which will boost defence industry in the regions through the establishment of Regional Maintenance Centres.

A tender has opened for a Regional Maintenance Provider for Defence’s first Regional Maintenance Centre – Regional Maintenance Centre North East in Cairns.

Regional Maintenance Providers will ensure sustainment capability in strategic Navy homeports and over time will be able to conduct maintenance on a range of vessels.

Head Maritime Systems, Rear Admiral Wendy Malcolm said the new approach will ensure delivery of complex naval capability and will increase opportunities for local small and medium businesses.

“The new approach, as outlined in Defence’s Plan Galileo, is part of the Australian Government’s investment of over $170 billion in naval shipbuilding announced in the 2020 Force Structure Plan.  This will result in the fleet doubling in tonnage and significantly increasing in complexity,” Rear Admiral Malcolm said.

“Regional Maintenance Providers will coordinate the delivery of maintenance and build resilient local and regional supply chains on behalf of the Commonwealth.

“This will provide more stable work packages and remove barriers to entry for local small and medium businesses, enabling the opportunity for increased participation.”

Regional Maintenance Centre North East is the first of four to be set up, and will be in place by the end of 2021 to initially sustain Navy’s new Evolved Cape Class Patrol Boats.

This will be supported by the Australian Government’s Skilling Australia’s Defence Industry Grants program, which provides businesses servicing the defence sector with upskilling and training opportunities

It also aligns with the Australian Government’s recently announced $1.5 billion Modern Manufacturing Strategy which will build resilient supply chains.

The tender opened on 27 November 2020 and will close on 12 March 2021.

This new approach was discussed during the Sydney Naval conference held in October 2019.

Re-setting Sustainment for the Royal Australian Navy Fleet (Updated)

 

 

 

HIMARS Deployment

U.S. Marines with 3rd Transportation Battalion, Combat Logistics Regiment 3, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (MLG), establish a helicopter support team (HST) aerial lift at Landing Zone Dodo, Okinawa, Japan, October 19, 2020.

This training showcased the interoperability between 3rd MLG, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and 3rd Marine Division to integrate in support of rapidly transporting the highly mobile and lethal High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. 3rd MLG provides III Marine Expeditionary force comprehensive logistics and combat service support for operations throughout the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.

OKINAWA, JAPAN

10.19.2020

Video by Cpl. Ryan Harvey

3rd Marine Logistics Group

MAWTS-1 Assault Support Tactics

12/27/2020

U.S. Marines with Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, conduct Assult Support Tactics (AST-3) in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-21, from Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, to Twentynine Palms, California, Oct. 16, 2020.

The WTI course is a seven-week training event hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Juan Dominguez)

10.16.2020

Video by Cpl. Juan Dominguez

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

USS Iwo Jima

12/25/2020

ATLANTIC OCEAN (Oct. 18, 2020) – A rolling airframe missile fires aboard the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) during their Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT), Oct. 18, 2020.

The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group is participating in SWATT off the coast of Virginia to maintain readiness, proficiency and lethality. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class J. E. Veal/Released)

Visiting MAG-29 at 2nd Marine Air Wing: The Perspective of Col. Finneran

12/23/2020

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to 2nd MAW during the first week of December, I had a chance to visit MAG-29, with regard to both the CH-53 and H-1 units. Then I had a chance to discuss the way ahead for the assault force with the Commanding Officer of MAG-29, Col. Robert Finneran.

It would hardly surprise you to learn that the CO was a very experienced combat aviator who had worked on assault operations for a significant period of time, including tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and at MAWTS-1.  He also served at SOCOM where he broadened his experience as well.

His own operational experience is associated with the AH-1W and AH-1Z, but as the CO of MAG-29, he serves as the Naval Aviation Enterprise’s fleet lead for the CH-53. This role includes the transition to the CH-53K. Later in my visit I would have a chance to “fly” the CH-53K in the simulator at New River.

We discussed three major issues: the CH-53K, the H-1 transition with digital interoperability, and the key role which Marine Corps aircraft play in mobile or expeditionary basing, or as he put it: “They are key elements ensuring that a distributed force is integrable, rather than being dispersed and isolated.”

We started by discussing the CH-53K and I asked him a direct question: Why is it so hard to explain how different the K is from the E?  It is indeed so different that I recently wrote an article suggesting if they had named the aircraft the CH-55, people might get the point of how different it is.

Col. Finneran: “It starts with the silhouette of the two aircraft. They are very similar, but that is about it. The Kilo [CH-53K] is a generational leap in technology. It is a completely different airplane as far as capabilities and technology. But because it is for now a Marine Corps-only aircraft, there is no widespread recognition in the joint force of how different the aircraft is and what its impact will be.”

The digital capabilities of the aircraft certainly will enhance the situational awareness of the combat team, and its speed and range provide a significant advantage for force insertion.

“Anything we can do to enhance the situational awareness for the pilots, and take the workload off of them, allows them to focus on their mission. And mastering the aircraft in terms of flying will be fairly easy for the converting CH-53E pilots, but for the CH-53K generation, they will need learn how to manage all of the information that can be worked in that aircraft to enhance situational awareness  and maximize its utility for the mission.”

He also argued that the CH-53K will affect risk calculus for force insertion as well. “With the aerial refueling capability of the CH-53, we can extend range and move a force and needed sustainment quickly and across great distances.  This provides both the Marine Corps and the Joint Force Commander flexibility and complicates the problem for any adversary.”

We also discussed the coming of digital interoperability to the H-1 family and how significant he saw that, notably as the Marines focused on integration with the US Navy.

“We’re in the early stages of talking to the Seahawk Weapons Schools, both the MH-60S and MH-60R, to figure out how we can find complementary ways to employ our airframes.

“We bring a lot to the table for maritime operations, notably in terms of the weapons we carry on the Viper, and we need to figure how best to integrate that capability with the maritime force.”

“Once we’re networked and we can become part of the maritime kill chain, there’s a lot that this airframe can bring to bear in the role of both sea control and sea denial.  I just don’t think we’ve explored it enough, and we’re in the early stages of taking a look at that.

“Because it is significant, what we bring from a weapons standpoint to the maritime domain, I think it’s really on us to explore how we can expand our operational reach in that domain.”

But as the Marine Corps focuses its attention on naval integration, a key part of that effort is upon working mobile, multiple and expeditionary basing, and how to do that with the current force as the force transforms as well. Obviously, a key challenge is having effective logistical connectors.

As Col. Finneran put it: “Logistical connectors are key to expeditionary basing. For example, the CH-53E and then the CH-53K can provide crucial support as they can bring fuel to an expeditionary base directly, rather than having to work through a series of basing locations.

“Fuel is certainly critical to distributed operations and our heavy lift helicopter is a key enabler, and frankly, I only see it increasing in importance to such operations.  I don’t see how the force goes and does any of the new operational concepts without that capability.”

With regard to risk mitigation or being “risk worthy” as it pertains to distributed operations, Col. Finneran argued that the force under his command is clearly suited to that mission challenge or requirement.

With the attack utility team which the Viper and Venom create and with the heavy lift capability of the CH-53 family, the time to maneuver to get the desired combat effect is low compared to slower paced basing enablement methods. And it is sustainable as well with regard to bringing what is need to the mission, rather than depending upon ship-based support in an expeditionary basing maritime environment.

He added, the CH-53K versus the CH-53E provides “a lot more options” for this kind of scenario based on performance improvements in terms of range and payload.

MAG-29, along with MAWTS-1, are working on new Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to maximize their capability to deliver the evolving basing capability and the kind of combat effect desired for sea control and sea denial. My visits to MAWTS-1 and to NAWDC this year certainly underscore this shift as well.

Col. Finneran concluded: “If we really want to be risk worthy, and we really want to challenge the risk calculus for our adversary, we’ve got to outmaneuver them in both time and space, and that is what my command is focused on delivering to the fight.”

Featured Photo: Col. Robert B. Finneran, left, converses with Maj. Gen. Karsten S. Heckl, center, and Sgt. Maj. Jacob M. Reiff, right, at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, March 30, 2020.

The visit to the air station allowed leadership to check-in with Marines and address COVID-19 concerns. Heckl is the commanding general for 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. Reiff is the sergeant major of 2nd MAW. Finneran is the commanding officer of Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd MAW. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Paige Stade).

See also, the following:

The View from 2nd Marine Air Wing: The Perspective of Major General Cederholm

The International Fighter Conference 2020: An Overview and Report

12/22/2020

Two recent DefenceiQ conferences provided unique insights into the way ahead for air and sea power. The first conference with the International Fighter Conference 2020 and was held (virtually) on November 18 and 19, 2020. The second was held on December 1, 2020 and focused on the evolution of amphibious forces.

Read together, they provide an update on the way ahead for force structure evolution to deal with the challenges posed by peer competitors, notably Russia and China.

The work done by Defence iQ is first rate and encourage any of our readers to sign up for future conferences relevant to their interests.

The International Fighter Conference 2020 addressed a number of new or evolving approaches to shaping combat air platforms, from the Australian loyal wingman program, to the USAF Skyborg program, to the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS program, to the Italian-Swedish-UK Tempest program, to the USAF’s next generation air dominance platform, and to the evolution of U.S. and allied naval aviation.

In addition to, or in parallel to or crossing to the platform discussions was the focus on the changing eco system for integrating platforms and capabilities across an extended battlespace in which peer competitors would contest U.S. and allied operations.

These discussions embraced topics like, human-machine teaming and enabling technologies, combat cloud teaming, the USAF and its JADC2 programmatic efforts, the role of space-based assets in empowering the force, and how to connect the force to prevail in the multi-domain fight and meeting the challenge of countering A2AD in today’s fight.

The Future Amphibious Forces Conference provided as the moderator of the day, a noted former British General, highlighted at the end of the day, “We have had a very good conversation throughout the day about the future of amphibious forces.”

But as he also noted, the key challenge really was to sort through where one wanted to take those forces in terms of “what kinds of wars or conflicts were being prepared for or prioritized.”

His question underscored the core challenge facing any discussion of the way ahead for Maritime special forces or amphibious forces: What is their role in the high-end fight?

What is their role in crisis management?

And how related are the answers to these two questions?

Put another way, focusing on amphibious forces and their future quickly takes one into the realm of warfighting capabilities now, the next five years and the decade ahead.

In turn, the question is posed as well with regard to what capabilities are desired and for which concepts of operations to shape what kind of warfighting outcome?

For an e-book version of the report, see below:

 

The Coming of Australia’s Hunter Class Frigates

By Marcus Hellyer

The Hunter class’s schedule is under pressure. Granted, the government and Defence are confident they will achieve the milestone of prototyping on schedule by the end of 2020, so pretty much right now. Since that’s purely an exercise in checking that the shipyard’s systems work, it doesn’t really say anything about maturity of the Hunter class itself, particularly since the prototyping will start by building blocks of the UK’s Type 26 version of the frigate, not ours.

Defence put the Hunter on its list of projects of interest (that is, not exhibiting symptoms bad enough to make it a project of concern but sending up some red flags requiring high-level attention) earlier this year ‘due to delays in finalising the design documents and weight increases to the Type 26 Frigate design’.

That doesn’t mean the project will miss the key milestone of starting actual construction by the end of 2022, but it may well mean that construction will begin with a design that is less mature than is desirable. As the Naval Shipbuilding Advisory Board noted in last month’s Senate estimates hearings, all shipbuilding projects start construction with an incomplete design. Defence says the Hunter’s final critical design review is planned for mid-2024, around a year and a half after construction starts.

It all comes down to where you’re willing to accept risk. But as bitter experience has shown—for example, with the Collins-class submarines and air warfare destroyers—when a project starts with unresolved risks, redesign and rework increase both the cost and the timeline.

Considering the government picked the most immature of the three participants in the frigate project’s competitive evaluation process and then agreed to five major modifications to the original design, it’s not surprising that schedule risks are mounting. No doubt the pandemic isn’t helping.

We also learned at estimates that the government is considering options to manage the emerging schedule risks, but based on its reiterated commitment to start construction by the end of 2022, moving that date doesn’t appear to be one of them.

Defence has now disclosed the date of a key milestone at the other end of the Hunter schedule (document 26). Considering the government stated in its July defence strategic update that we can no longer rely on 10 years of warning time ahead of a major conflict, it’s cold comfort to know that initial operating capability (the first ship being available for operations) is still 11 years away.

Upgrades and crew numbers will keep the Anzacs afloat

In light of the Hunter class schedule and the two-year delivery drumbeat, it’s vital to keep the Anzacs a relevant capability for another 20 years. So it’s good that the upgrades being performed under the Anzac midlife capability assurance program (AMCAP) appear to be going well, including the new long-range air-search radar.

There’s been some news for those following the long saga of HMAS Perth’s efforts to get back into the water after it was taken out of service in late 2017 because the navy couldn’t crew it. Originally it was due to return to service before January (ANAO audit report, page 39). That’s now shifted to late 2021 after the navy decided to put the ship through the AMCAP since it was already out of the water (page 20).

The good news is that the navy is now confident it will have enough personnel to crew all of its Anzacs as well as the Collins-class submarines, which is quite a turnaround from where it was only a few years ago.

It’s a salutary reminder that it doesn’t matter how much you spend on ships if you don’t have the people to operate them.

How many personnel the navy thinks it will need for its much more substantial future fleet is one of the pieces of this complex puzzle that is still unresolved. The 2020 force structure plan says the government will consider Defence’s long-term personnel requirements next year. With the navy acquiring a larger fleet of much larger ships, that could require a substantial increase.

Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.

This article was published by ASPI on November 26, 2020.

Featured Image: BAE Systems Australia