Franco-German Consolidation: Next Steps at KNDS

12/16/2020

By Pierre Tran

Paris – KNDS, a Franco-German joint venture in land weapons, seeks a more streamlined management with the appointment of Philippe Petitcolin as chairman and Frank Haun as the sole chief executive, the French finance and defense ministries said Dec. 14 in a statement.

The appointment of a single chief executive officer of KNDS replaces the previous agreement of two CEOs, one drawn from France, the other from Germany, with Haun sharing the post with Stéphane Mayer.

Mayer now leaves the joint venture and also steps down as executive chairman of Nexter, the ministries said.

Nexter is the French partner of the 50/50 joint venture KMW and Nexter Defense Systems (KNDS), with privately owned Krauss-Maffei Wegmann its German partner. Setting up the joint holding company was a step toward European industrial consolidation in the land sector.

Meanwhile, KNDS’s projects list includes building a new European main battle tank, to sell into the East European market, a defense executive said. That tank would be all new, distinct from a concept model presented at the 2018 Eurosatory trade show, built from a turret from the French Leclerc and chassis from the German Leopard 2.

On the KNDS appointments, these aimed for “greater efficiency and integration to the benefit of clients,” the ministries said. A French successor to Mayer will be appointed as Nexter CEO in the next few weeks, and that executive will hold the post of operations director at KNDS.

KNDS will also be slimmed down to one board of directors.

“The shareholders have decided to streamline the governance structure by establishing a single board of directors replacing the existing supervisory and management boards,” Nexter said Dec. 14 in a statement.

The chairman and CEO posts will rotate every four years, an industry executive said. The changes marked a milestone, granting more power to KNDS in the pursuit of integration.

There was no great surprise Haun was named as sole CEO, as news had leaked into the press last week, but the “brusque” departure of Mayer was unexpected, a defense official said.

The lack of a named successor to Mayer as Nexter CEO stood in contrast to KMW’s announcement Ralf Ketzel will be its CEO, stepping up from his previous position as chief business development officer.

The slimmed down structure marked the end of a five-year trial period for KNDS.

In 2015, Emmanuel Macron, the then finance minister, told the French parliamentary lower house there would be a five-year trial period to see if the Franco-German alliance worked, and if it did not, the deal could be unwound.

The creation of separate chairman and CEO posts echoed the shakeup at Airbus, which previously, under political pressure, shared its top management between French and German executives based on passport rather than management skill.

The appointment of Haun and Petitcolin will be closely watched as both have strong personalities. The former was seen as the senior partner when the two CEO posts were held.

Petitcolin, who will take up the chairman’s post March 1, is CEO of Safran, the aero-engine builder. Petitcolin has direct experience in working with tough industrial partners.

Safran is prime contractor on the new engine for the next generation fighter in the Future Combat Air System.

German partner MTU was reported to have been keen to share that pole position and it took some time to make clear the prized prime contractorship was reserved for Safran.

MTU finally accepted Safran’s leadership and agreed to be main partner in the phase 1A study for FCAS, and only then the companies agreed to form an engine joint venture.

The main project for KNDS is to build the Main Ground Combat System, which consists of a heavy tank and associated vehicles to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2.

There is a project for new artillery, the Common Indirect Fire System, to replace the Caesar, but there has not been much work on that recently, the executive said.

There is also the project for a new European main battle tank to replace the vast fleets of Russian tanks in Eastern Europe.

That new tank will need to carry a low-price tag, be well armed and well protected. There will be stiff competition from the Israeli Merkava and South Korean K2 Black Panther, the defense official said.

Featured photo of Frank Haun credited to Reuters.

CH-53K Shapes a Way Ahead: The Training Dimension

By Robbin Laird, Marine Corps Air Station, New River.

On December 3, 2020, during my visit to New River, I experienced flying in the cockpit of the Marine Corps’s latest key air capability, the CH-53K.  I was in the cockpit with LtCol Luke “Amber” Frank, the VMX-1 Detachment OIC. He is a very experienced  Marine Corps pilot having flown virtually every type of rotorcraft the Marine Corps has, including being a presidential pilot as well.

He is experienced; obviously I am not.

So where did this flight happen?

In the new flight simulator which has been built and is operating at VMX-1.

The man-machine working relationship is a central part of the flight experience, with new capabilities crucial to mission success built around key man-machine capabilities.

A central one is the ability of the aircraft to hover with the automatic system, which allows pilots to operate in very degraded operating conditions to put down their aircraft at desired locations to deliver their payloads.

During our flight, in spite of the bright clear but cold day outside, we experienced several difficult landings in degraded conditions, dust storms, turbulence, and various challenging situations to land the aircraft.

Why does this matter in terms of concepts of operations?

This means that the crew can deliver the payload, Marines or cargo, to the area which is desired in terms of commander’s intent with regard to the landing zone selected for maximum combat effectiveness.

If one is inserting a force to support an effort to destroy key enemy capabilities, being able to take the right kind of situational awareness and land EXACTLY where the commander has determined the force could have the highest combat effect is a core combat capability with tactical and even potentially strategic effect.

This is how a capability within a new aircraft translates into enhanced probability for combat success.

And if you are an allied military which needs capability to insert force rapidly in special operations environment, the CH-53K could be a game changing capability for force insertion.

After my CH-53K ‘flight,’ I toured the first of the VMX-1 CH-53ks on the flight line. What quickly leaps out at you inside the aircraft, is the configuration to manage standard USAF pallets for rapid load and off-load operations.

In the near future, I will publish my interview with LtCol Frank.

And in an interview with Sean Cattanach, Sikorsky’s senior program manager of the U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K Training System, USNI News reported: “One of the benefits of developing a training system concurrently with the aircraft is that we’re able to utilize the digital designs from the aircraft to make sure the training is accurate.”

Bill Falk, Sikorsky CH-53K program director, added in a statement: “The training devices will ensure a flawless entry into service for the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter.”

 

The View from 2nd Marine Air Wing: The Perspective of Major General Cederholm

12/15/2020

By Robbin Laird

I first visited 2nd MAW in 2007, at the beginning of the Osprey era. There I saw a small number of the aircraft on the tarmac and met with pilots and maintainers at the beginning of a long period of disruptive change, a period of change which delivered new capabilities, and new approaches for the USMC in global operations.

With this visit, I had a chance to follow up on discussions earlier this year with MAWTS-1 and with NAWDC about the dynamics of change with regard to the Marine Corps role in naval operations.

This changing role is being shaped at a time when the U.S. Navy is focused on blue water maneuver warfare, and the Marine Corps part of this might be referred to as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness in support of fleet operations.

But whatever the long-term vision, the future is now.

With the world as it is, and with the rise of 21st century authoritarian powers working skill sets for full spectrum warfare, for 2nd MAW it is about the challenge of being able to fight now and prepare for the future by leveraging current operations and shaping new approaches.

Over the next few weeks, I will generate a series of articles with regard to my visit and the insights I gained from this combat force as they train as they fight, and train as they will need to fight as the threat evolves.

My host for the visit was Major General Cederholm, the CG of 2nd MAW. The CG has flown almost every aircraft in the 2nd MAW inventory, most recently being the F-35. At the end of my visit, we sat down and discussed how he viewed the challenges facing his command and key priorities moving forward.

Without a doubt, the key theme for the CG was readiness to be able to fight with the force he has and to do it on demand.

The readiness theme is one that strategists far from the force can readily forget, but for the operational commanders, and those responsible for the train and equip functions, it is the baseline from which operational realities start.

When I interviewed the U.S. Navy Air Boss earlier this Fall, he underscored how important the challenge of readiness, understood in terms of available fully mission capable aircraft was to the Navy.

Question: What are the biggest challenges you faced when you became the Air Boss?

Vice Admiral Miller: “There were three main things when I came in, and most of them were near term focused.

“Readiness was unacceptable.

“For example, 50% of our FA-18s weren’t flyable. Readiness was clearly the first and the highest priority.

“The second one was to shift our training from counter-terrorism to what we need to fight and win a great power competition.

“The third involved manning challenges. We had gotten ourselves to where we had no bench.

“:We were putting our combat teams together right at the end game and sending them out the door on deployment, and we really weren’t cultivating the expertise we need for the high-end fight.

“We knew that meeting these challenges was not an overnight challenge, but required a sustained effort.”

Major General Cederholm underscored very similar themes.

He started by underscoring that in his view 2nd MAW was “America’s Air Wing.”

“We operate all over the globe. Right now, we have forces all the way from Europe into the Far East, and everywhere in between.

“The sun never sets on 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. We have to have a ready force and generate combat power today as we face the challenges of transformation tomorrow.

“We can never lose our readiness trait, or our ability to respond immediately when called upon.

“We’re looking at efforts right now to increase our readiness and our availability across fully mission capable aircraft, which is basically our no-go criteria when it comes to combat operations. The metric that matters to me is the availability of fully mission capable aircraft, not simply availability of an aircraft.

“When we send aircraft into harms way, we owe the aircrew and the Marine Riflemen, a fully mission capable aircraft.

“In this context, we are focused on increased reliability of parts and weapons systems. I have been focused significantly in my career on training; now I am laser focused on the logistics side as well.

“We are examining reliability across the parts for every type, model, and series of aircraft at 2nd MAW, and working with various institutions to improve reliability.

“Even if there are higher upfront costs to get reliability enhanced, it will be cheaper in the long run for the operation of a more resilient force, which is clearly what one needs when the demand is to fight right now, when the phone rings.”

With regard to the training side, the focus is upon transformation as well.

The shift on the demand side to deal with the pacing threat means that the force needs to be more capable of operating as a distributed but integrated force.

This means as well that the Marines operating the various units in 2nd MAW need to be prepared to work the shift between being a force supporting a command or becoming the lead element in an operation.

This kind of problem-solving flexibility is a key theme at NAWDC and MAWTS-1 and, it is not surprising, to find the same focus upon training for flexibility at 2nd MAW as well.

This is especially true of assault support innovations.

The MV-22B was birthed at 2nd MAW and the disruptive change which Osprey introduced is still driving changes with the force.

The CH-53K is now at VMX-1 as the Marines prepare for it to generate similar processes of change.

“Changes, great changes, in Marine Corps assault support have always originated in 2nd MAW – today is no different.”

The Marines are reworking the maintaining side of the business. “We are revising our table of organization and manpower for logistics.

“We are looking for new balances of working relationships as well between contracted maintenance and uniformed maintainers to free up capability for front line squadrons.

“Our biggest project associated with transformation is in this manpower area.”

With regard to transformation, 2nd MAW as a ready to fight now force works with what they have but are opening the aperture to rethinking about how to use the force elements they have but to operate them in new ways.

I saw a lot of evidence of this point during my stay and will write about them in forthcoming articles.

These changes include new ways to operate the AH-1Zs and UH-1Y with the Ground Combat Element. New training approaches are underway to provide new engagement approaches by operating 2nd MAW with 2nd MEF to deliver new combat approaches to deploying the force.

A recent Deepwater exercise highlighted new ways to leverage assault support and to operate in an extended battlespace. Romeos are starting to train with Vipers to give the fleet better self-defense capabilities. There is a new focus on how Marine Air works with the fleet to contribute to surface and sub surface missions as well.

“We don’t need to wait for force design initiatives to come to fruition to increase our lethality and transform our operating concept.

“We’re doing that through training inside our own formations,  our own platforms and focusing on better ways to deal with the pacing threat.”

The CG highlighted a key way the Marines working with the Navy can enhance combat flexibility within the fleet.

I have argued that the shift from the ARG-MEU to the amphibious task force if appropriately understood can allow that task force to provide significant contributions to sea control and sea denial.

The way the CG put it was as follows: “We are changing our mindset.

“We can swap out the composition on an amphibious deck within two hours to tailor the force to the mission or the threat.

We can configure for HADR operations and swap out with a ship like the USS America into a full up lethal strike asset with F-35s and Ospreys onboard. Mix and match and swapping out assets is a part of working the chess board for 21st century combat operations.”

Another example of the mindset change being worked on the training side can be seen in 2nd MEF/2nd MAW cooperation.

“With the pacing threat, we may not conduct mass regimental lifts.

“I am excited to be working with Second Marine Division with regard to battlefield planning and training on the correlation of what forces they will insert and what assault support is most appropriate to that effort.

“You are taking a smaller element of the GCE, combining it with a smaller element of the ACE, and operating in a chain saw like fashion.

“This means that every seat on the assault aircraft, every pallet being lifted, has to have a design purpose for force inserts. We are changing the way that we think about resupply for the insertion force.”

In short, the challenge is to operate now, but generate change.

As Major General Cederholm put it: “We are generating combat power and transitioning at the same time.”

Maj. Gen. Michael S. Cederholm’s welcome video to 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, July 9th, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Paige C. Stade)

Australia’s China Options

By Peter Jennings

Australia has a brilliant opportunity to shape US President-elect Joe Biden’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific in a way that will secure a major increase in American military power in the region. This will be a test of the Morrison government’s agility to move quickly to secure an advantage.

The United States Navy plans to re-establish ‘an agile, mobile, at-sea command’ known as the 1st Fleet, focused on Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

Recently the secretary of the US Navy, Kenneth Braithwaite, told a congressional committee, ‘This will reassure our allies and partners of our presence and commitment to this region.’

Planned to grow to the scale of the US 7th Fleet based in Japan, the 1st Fleet restores a unit disbanded in 1973 at the lowest point of America’s experience in the Vietnam War.

Characteristically, the Trump administration seems not to have raised the idea with Australia or indeed Singapore, mooted as the potential shore headquarters of the fleet, but don’t write this off as a last-minute Trump flash in the pan.

The US has long realised that it needs to lift its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. When Australia negotiated the US Marine Corps ‘rotational presence’ operating out of Darwin, the plan agreed with Barack Obama in 2010 was ultimately to locate some major US warships at the Australian navy base, HMAS Stirling, near Perth.

That trail went dry for some years because our own Defence Department has never met an opportunity it could not squander by prevaricating. It’s time to restart this conversation. We should propose to Biden that elements of the US First Fleet should operate out of Stirling and from the Port of Darwin. If Singapore is reluctant to host a land-based headquarters, then we should offer to be the host.

The way to overcome any reluctance in Washington from a new administration considering adopting a late Trump announcement would be for Australia to step forward and offer to bear some of the cost of hosting these ships.

Make no mistake that there is substantial deterrence value for us to have the US Navy and Marines on our shores, working with the Australian Defence Force. Any country looking to do us harm would have to factor the US presence into their calculations. Moreover, we could aim to have some vessels arrive in 2021—contrast that to the decade and a half we will wait for our new submarines to be launched.

Readers will quickly point out that Washington won’t be thrilled to base ships at the Port of Darwin, leased to a Chinese company in 2015 for 99 years. The idiocy of that blunder continues to get in the way of urgent strategic business.

The Australian government has the power to take the ownership back and it should now work with the Biden administration to make the Port of Darwin and HMAS Stirling the military and strategic hubs they need to be.

A chorus of Beijing’s local fanboys will cry that such an Australian act will offend the Chinese Communist Party. The tone will be wrong, the time is not right, more nuance is needed, let’s pick up the phone and find a party functionary sympathetic to our plight.

So much of the critique of Australia’s pushback against CCP assertion focuses on tone rather than the underlying strategic trends. What is happening in the bilateral relationship has little to do with diplomacy and everything to do with the fact that China and Australia have irreconcilable strategic aims and interests.

We have just witnessed the angriest week in Australia–China relations. Many seem bewildered that the situation could have got to this point. Does a call for an investigation into the origins of the worst global pandemic and economic crisis in a century really explain why China is now in effect permanently burning its bridges to rapprochement with Canberra?

The CCP’s strategic plan remains opaque, and deliberately so. The 14-point grievance listreleased by the Chinese embassy in late November tells us the issues over which Beijing is unhappy: foreign investment, 5G, anti-interference laws, independent media and noisy think tanks.

None of this explains how China’s leaders think ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy and military sabre-rattling delivers the global leadership they crave and the deference they demand.

For our part, the call is that we must ‘repair’ relations as though we broke the Ming vase in China’s shop. Hold on, weren’t we the ones who were determined to be ‘country neutral’ when cyber spies attacked our national institutions and who cherished (in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s words) our ‘constructive relationship with China, founded on shared interests, mutual benefit and mutual respect’?

At times like this it’s useful to step back to look for the patterns, constraints and opportunities (if any) in the relationship as a way to understand what might happen next.

Economists and strategists use game theory to try to understand individual, company or national decision-making. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ requires two non-communicating parties to choose between cooperating or not cooperating with each other. Over repeated games between trusting parties, cooperation gives both sides the most rewards, but between distrustful parties the short-term pursuit of individual interest, where one side benefits at the other’s expense, usually triumphs.

Applied to Australia–China relations, the prisoner’s dilemma offers some insights but not much hope that things can be fixed.

For much of the past 30 years Australia and China cooperated to mutual benefit. Prime Minister John Howard’s formulation for the relationship was that we could choose to cooperate in areas where we had mutual benefit, principally trade, and agree not to make a fuss where the two countries differed, such as on human rights and on China’s approach to Taiwan.

The prisoner’s dilemma was successful because Beijing mostly chose to cooperate. There were occasional breakdowns: the massacre of protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 should have been read by the world as a sign that the CCP had no intention of relaxing its grip on power.

On balance, though, there was simply too much in it for Australia and China to cease cooperating, but the nature of the Australia–China relationship started to change dramatically in the last decade.

At the same time as our level of economic dependence on China was growing and expanding into areas such as education, tourism and foreign investment, Beijing was also dramatically scaling up its military, turning the People’s Liberation Army into a high-technology force.

A turning point was Beijing’s decision around 2014 to annex and militarise the South China Sea. Between 2014 and 2016—exactly the time it took us to produce a defence white paper—China created three airbases and put enough missiles and aircraft into the region to enable it to shut air and sea traffic any time it pleased.

The CCP’s attempts to buy political influence in our federal and state parliaments and its full-on cyber and human espionage efforts in Australia are becoming more visible.

In the prisoner’s dilemma game, China was defecting from cooperation. It saw that it could make major short-term strategic gains by doing so. For much of the last decade, while China was openly and covertly defecting from cooperation, Australia continued to cooperate. Beijing was more than happy to take advantage of our naivety.

Why were we so gullible?

Partly because many officials and politicians had their careers shaped during the long years of cooperation and were too invested in that world to see it being predated away.

Our intelligence focus was too myopically directed towards combating Islamist extremism and too many businesses, universities and state governments were fixated on making Chinese money without knowing or caring about the military and strategic picture.

My view is that there is little that Australia can do unilaterally to persuade China back towards the mutual-cooperation paradigm. That is because China is more strategically important to us than we are to it. It can afford to defect from cooperation.

But we do have options. Australia has four points of advantage in dealing with China. In order of value they are our alliance with the US, our ability to shape how other democracies deal with China, iron ore and, finally, the things we produce that wealthy Chinese consumers like.

The US alliance is what makes Australia strategically relevant to China and hinders its desire to dominate the Indo-Pacific. That is why China constantly attacks the alliance and its defence industry base. Making the alliance stronger, including by hosting the US 1st Fleet, is the necessary response.

Australia constantly under invests in and underestimates our ability to shape how other democracies deal with China.

Beijing hated our decision on 5G not because of the value of the Australian market but because they judged that our decision to exclude Huawei would have an impact on what other democracies would do. That fear is turning out to be well grounded.

Our best hope to push back against CCP coercion is to internationalise the problem, as has happened with 5G, persuading friends and allies that they will be bullied too if we don’t collectively say to China that their greatness can’t be built on a foundation of contemptuous behaviour.

If China could have found a reliable and plentiful source of iron ore other than Australia, it would have made the switch by now. Brazil is unlikely to replace Australia as a stable, cost-effective and long-term supplier. We have a major leverage point if the government is brave enough to step in and start making controls around price and supply.

Demand for other exports like food, wine, timber, education and tourism comes from Chinese consumers. The CCP might see tactical political advantage from imposing bans or tariffs, but it does so at the risk of annoying its own people, from whom the party seeks legitimacy.

These leverage points give more scope for Australia to secure its interests than is widely understood. Capitulation to Beijing is unthinkable. After years of being lulled into complacency, we need some policy imagination and decisive decision-making to secure our future interests.

Peter Jennings is the executive director of ASPI and a former deputy secretary for strategy in the Department of Defence. A version of this article was published in the Weekend Australian.

This article was published by ASPI on December 5, 2020.

Featured Image: Mark Nolan/Getty Images.

 

 

US Army Airborne Ops

12/14/2020

U.S. Army Col. Kenneth J. Burgess, commander of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, talks about airborne operation with Italian Army Folgore Brigade after exiting a U.S. Air Force 86th Air Wing C-130 Hercules aircraft, under Covid-19 prevention conditions, at Nella Drop Zone, Altopascio, Italy, Oct. 15, 2020.

The purpose of this operation is to improve relationship with host nation, strengthen the alliance and increase NATO interoperability.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade is the U.S. Army Contingency Response Force in Europe, capable of projecting ready forces anywhere in the U.S. European, Africa or Central Commands’ areas of responsibility. (U.S. Army Video by Davide Dalla Massara)

ALTOPASCIO, ITALY

10.15.2020

Video by Davide Dalla Massara

Training Support Activity Europe

Potosí and its Silver: The Beginnings of Globalization

12/13/2020

By Kenneth Maxwell

A decade after the Spanish Conquistadores toppled the Inca Empire (1532-34), an indigenous Andean prospector, Diego Gualpa, in 1545, stumbled onto the richest silver deposit in the world on a high mountain of 4,800 meters (15,750 feet) in the eastern cordillera of the Bolivian Andes.

Here in the shadow of what the Spaniards called the “Cerro Rico” (“Rich Mountain”) at 4,000 meters (13,200 feet) a mining boom town quickly developed. By the end of the sixteenth century, it had become one of the largest and the highest cities in the world, and in 1561, Philip ll of Spain, decreed that it should be known as the “Villa Imperial de Potosí.”

Peru already had a reputation as the source of unfathomable treasures thanks to the ransom in gold and silver gathered for the Inca emperor Atahualpa seized by the conquistador Francisco Pizarro in an ambush at Cajamarca which had amounted to a million pesos of fine gold and silver when melted down. A similar amount was seized from the Inca treasury of Cuzco. Pizzaro ordered Atahualpa executed by garrote in July 1533. When the Inca treasure arrived in Seville in 1534 it was enough precious metal to upset the money markets in Europe and the Mediterranean.

16th Century Potosi and Global Trade

During the sixteenth century the population of Potosi grew to over 200,000 and its silver mine became the source of 60% of the world’s silver. Between 1545 and 1810 Potosi’s silver contributed nearly 20% of all known silver produced in the world across 265 years. It was at the core of the Spanish Empire’s great wealth. The Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, called Potosi “the Treasury of the World.”

He was right. Potosi became the engine of an international network which ended Eurasia’s bullion famine after 1550 and provided the silver flows that reached westwards across the Atlantic Ocean from South America via the isthmus of Panama to Spain and Europe, and to the east from Seville in Spain and Lisbon in Portugal to the Ottoman and Safavid Empires and to Mughal India and to China under the Ming and Qing dynasties.

After 1565 silver from the Americas also crossed the Pacific Ocean to the Spanish entrepôt at Manila in the Philippines (named after King Philip ll of Spain) and on from Manila by Chinese junks to the Fujian in China where the port of Quanzhou was one of the world’s busiest shipbuilding and commercial centers of overseas and coastal trade with more than 100,000 Arab traders living in the area.

From the 1550’s Potosi was at the center of the first explosive development of global intercontinental exchange creating the first true globalized economic and trading network. In effect it created the first global currency of exchange, the “pieces of eight” each with the mark “P” for the Potosi Mint established by the Viceroy of Peru (1569-1581), Francisco Alvares de Toledo, in 1574. The most famous image of the “Cerro Rico” came from the much-copied 1553 woodcut illustration published in the “Crônica del Peru” by Pedro de Cieza de Leon. By 1580 an Ottoman version of the “Cerro Rico” of Potosi was depicted in the Tarih-l Hind-l Garbi. In 1602 the Italian Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci and his assistant Li Zhizou marked the “Potosi Mountain” (Bei Du Xi Shan) on their world map for Wanli, China’s Emperor.

Producing Silver

The great silver (and tin veins) of Bolivia’s Eastern Cordillera are the richest of both metals on the world. The “red mountain” is still producing silver, tin, zinc, lead, and other metals. The silver rich veins of the “Cerro Rico” are about a meter wide on average and the vines dive steeply into the mountain from the surface. Within decades the miners reached the water table at 400 to 500 meters depth.

The rich surface silver ores at Potosí were processed initially by smelting. Using stamp mills, powered by mules or water wheels, the silver ore was crushed to gravel then smelted in blast furnaces with lead and lead oxide. 6000 such furnaces (guayra), set on pedestals to capture the wind, covered the hills around Potosi during the early years burning wood, charcoals, and llama dung. The air blast was provided by sheep or goat skin bellows.

The water came from the warm mineral springs on the road to Oruro, where the “Ojo del Inca” (the Inca’s Baths) at Tarapaya provided the reagents to the dozens of early refineries. The massive salt beds of the Salar de Uyuni, the World’s largest salt flat, was several days walk away.

The silver-gold alloy produced in the early sixteenth century was first shifted to cupulation furnaces where the porous bone-ash-lined interior absorbed the oxidized lead. The pure silver and gold alloy remaining at the bottom of the couple where it was separated by a nitric acid method which had been introduced from Germany, then also part of the vast Habsburg domains.

The rapid introduction of the most modern technology was a characteristic of these early years of European colonial activity in the Americas. The dramatic rise in Spanish American silver production in the 1570’s was the result of the adoption at Potosi of the “patio” process of amalgamation of silver ores with mercury which produced a quadrupling of silver export from Peru in the ten years between 1576-1585.

The introduction of the “patio” method in Mexico about 1554 and is attributed to a merchant from Sevilla, Bartolome de Medina, who developed mercury amalgamation. The great advantage of the amalgamation over smelting was that it made the exploitation of lower grade silver ores profitable and greatly extended the range that could be worked, and salt mixed with mercury was used to extract fine grains from silver from what had before been worthless host rock.

The Silver Production Process

The ore for amalgamation was crushed to a fine powder and mixed with water and mercury, salt, and impure copper sulfate. The muddy composite was spread out over a stone paved courtyard (the “patio” hence the name “patio” process). Here it was agitated by a team of mules, and then heaped into piles where it stood for some weeks while the silver ore was separated chemically and amalgamated with mercury.

The mud was then washed away into troughs or vats (tingas) and the silver amalgam put into canvas bags, any free mercury filtering out. Pressed into bars the residual amalgam was then placed into small conical furnaces where the mercury was vaporized and recovered, though one quarter of the mercury was lost in the processing of silver ore. The silver was then taken to the office assay office for recasting and stamping with weight, fineness, and the royal coat of arms.

The repossessing plants were called “haciendas de minas” and were substantial establishments containing the stamp mill and incorporating the residence of the mine owner, his houses of workers and their families, as well as a chapel, stables for mules and horses, machinery sheds, and store houses. The buildings were constructed near streams whenever possible because water was essential to operate the machinery of the mill.

Since rain was unpredictable at Potosi, the Spanish viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo decided to construct in the nearby Kari mountain full scale reservoirs linked by canals and aqueducts to Potosí, a huge public works projects completed by thousands of Andean indigenous draftees. At Potosi there were 120 processing mills in 1658. The mills were complex and expensive. In 1572 some had machinery 18 feet in diameter and a foot wide connected to an axle to lift and drop six stamp hammers. Others had a 24-foot mill wheel and eight to twelve stamp hammers.

Mercury was essential to the processing of silver ore and was imported from the Almaden mines in La Mancha in Spain. The heavy metal liquid metal was packed in sheepskins and shipped to the Americas where the mercury was transported over the isthmus of Panama and shipped down the Pacific coast, taken by mules and llamas to Arica and then overland to Potosi. In 1563 this situation was transformed when a rich mercury mine was discovered at Huancavelica in central Peru.

Spain and Peru

A city was established there by the fifth viceroy of Peru, Francisco Alvarez de Toledo, in 1572, who called the new settlement “Vila Rica de Oropesa” after his title and his hometown in Castile. But the name Huancavelica (a corruption of the Quechua name for the site which meant “stone idol”) stuck. It is one of the poorest cities in Peru today with a majority population composed of indigenous peoples. The valleys are 1,950 meters above sea level. The snow capped peaks that surround Huancavelica stand at 5,000 meters high. It is a cold and barren landscape.

The Spanish Crown appropriated the mines in 1570 and operated them until Peru’s independence in 1821. Huancavelica became the “greatest jewel in the Crown” and mercury became the basis on which the tax on precious metals, the “quinto,” was levied. Fernandes de Velasco, a Spaniard, who had arrived in Peru from Mexico in 1572, was able to modify the amalgamation process so that the Huancavelica mercury might be applied to the Potosi silver ores.

The consequence in the words of the viceroy Toledo was to consummate “the greatest marriage in the world” between the mountains of Huancavelica and Potosi. Between 1576 and 1600 two-thirds of all mercury consumed in Spanish America came from the Peruvian mine. Work at the Huancavelica mercury mine for much of the sixteenth century was above ground using open cast techniques.

After 1597 it became necessary to mine underground and the deterioration of working conditions was rapid.  Galleries were haphazard, airless, and full of dust, and few miners escaped permanent crippling from mercury poisoning. Labor in the Peruvian mines was almost exclusively provided by the indigenous population.

The Viceroy Francisco Álvares de Toledo who had fought the Ottoman Turks in Tunis and opposed the rise of Protestantism in Germany, and was a close to the court of the (now retired) emperor Charles V, had been sent to Peru by Philip ll. He was the fifth Spanish viceroy and he remained in Peru eleven years and five months and traveled in tours of inspection over five years and 8000 kilometers over its territory.

He was the only viceroy to visit Potosi. He ended the chaotic situation of the first decades of Spanish dominion. He overthrew the neo-Inca state at Vilacabamba and defeated the last neo-Inca ruler, Tupac Amaru (1542-1572), and executed him in Cuzco. He forcibly resettled the Andean population in permanent settlements (reducciones). He established a Pacific fleet based in Callao (Armada del Mer del Sul) and in 1570 he established the Inquisition in Peru.

Above all the viceroy Toledo recast the “Mita” which was an Inca system of obligations in order to provide one-seventh of the able-bodied male indigenous Quechua and Aymara farmers and pastoralists of the highlands for various tasks in the Spanish sector of the colonial economy. Sixteen Andean provinces were designated to provide a labor pool for Potosi at any given time. 13,000 were obligated to work in Potosi where they would be distributed to mines, stamp mills, or to various tasks in the city.

At the Santa Barbara mine in Huancavelica (opened in 1564) 3,280 Mita workers by 1577 were drafted in rotation to labor in the deadly mercury mine. Andean caciques and kurakas (local indigenous head men) served as middlemen, fulfilling the labor quotas, responsible to Spanish magistrates (capitates de la Mita.) These forced labor drafts were only outlawed in 1812 and were declared over by Simon Bolivar in 1825.

The viceroy Toledo also established the mint in Potosi in 1574. The smelting of coin material and the cutting, preparing the coin blanks for stamping was carried out by indigenous draftees and enslaved Africans at the Casa de la Moneda. In 1592, 444,000 lbs. or 200,00 kgs of pure silver was “reported” as processed in Potosi. The annual production being about 300,000 lbs. or 136.000 kgs through the 1640s.

The mint mixed private and public interests. The crown officials included the treasurer, assayer, smelter, master of weights and measures, and the bailiff. These officials were Spanish born and were required to sign an oath to behave honestly and they were bonded by leading Potosi households. The hardest tasks – smelting coin metal, cutting and preparing coin blanks for stamping – was carried out by drafted Andeans and enslaved Africans.

The silver bars were brought to the mint from the Royal treasury office next door where the Royal Fifth was paid.  The coins were made by hand. These were the famous silver “prices of eight” worth eight reales, stamped with the coat of arms of the Habsburg Monarchy and a Greek cross with Lions and Castles, and with the “P” for Potosi.

The geographical mobility brought about by the massive impute of cheap forced indigenous labor in these transactions is hard to imagine much less to quantify.  But they were critical to the production of silver.

It took two months for the 2,000 indigenous people required for the labor draft of Chicuito, on the southwest shore of Lake Titicaca, together with their families, each with ten llamas, to travel the 300 miles to Potosi. Together they composed a small town (7000 people and 30,000 animals) in transit.

The contingent from Chucuito was only part of the 40,000 indigenous peoples encamped at the foot of the Serro Rico or travelling to and from the high plateau to meet their Labor obligations. Luis de Campoche claimed that the roads of Peru were so covered with people that it seemed that the whole kingdom was on the move. The conde de Tepa claimed that without their labor the “America would sink into total ruin.”

Potosi Mining Methods

At Potosi mining methods were primitive.  Adits were dug into the side of the mountain in order to access the veins of silver ore. Conditions underground were harsh. The silver ore was loosened by hammers, picks and crowbars, and carried in hide sacks, weighing 100 pounds a time, to the surface. Access to the mines (Potosi reached a depth of 750 feet by 1600) was by ladders of twisted rawhide with wooden rungs, wide enough to permit two files of workers to climb up and down at the same time.

Elsewhere crude noticed pine logs reaching up to 400 feet from the lower levels were used. Flooding was a constant problem, only partly overcome by such crude methods as hoisting out the water in leather buckets and the use of primitive pumps.  In Potosi miners might remain underground for the entire work week. Silicosis and pneumonia were common in underground workers. The toll of death, disease and flight, meant that not all the miners at Potosi were Mitayos. By 1600 half the mine workers were indigenous self-hired workers receiving wages.

The silver produced in Potosi was carried on the backs of llamas and mules to Pacific coast from whence it was shipped from Arica to the isthmus of Panama where mule trains carried the silver overland to the Caribbean port of Nombre de Dios.

The Trade Routes

The sea connection between Panama and the Peruvian coast was especially difficult. Prevailing southerly winds made it almost impossible to reach Peru from Panama except in January and February. The return voyage was easy and could usually be accomplished in less than a month. Cargoes for Lima were unloaded at Calloa and carried inland by mules or in heavy carts.

By the 1530s some thirty ships a year were involved in the Panama to Callao trade; at the end of the sixteenth century the number ranged from fifty to sixty. Ships for the Pacific coastal trade were built in Nicaragua, Guatemala, or in Mexico, and could be as large as 300 tones. Silver was also carried via the Rio de la Plata (the “silver river”) following the reestablishment of Buenos Aires in 1580. African Slaves were also sent by this route to Potosí until 1622 when the Spanish crown insisted that all African slaves for the Spanish American pacific coast territories be sent via Panama (though the clandestine trade via Buenos Aires continued).

The silver of Potosi thus stimulated the formation of a sophisticated regional and global trading network. Iron from northern Spain was essential to mining.  Spain had some of Europe’s richest iron deposits and Basque ironmongers became essential to Potosi. Hardware had to be imported from Spain: Ironware, nails, horseshoes, machetes, pickaxes, hinges, locks. These revolutionized Andean mining as mine workers were now able to chip away hard rock. The “Imperial Villa of Potosi” was on a barren plateau devoid of everything needed for life and work. All had to be brought from afar.

The growth of Potosi stimulated the regional economy. Luis Capoche writing in 1585 observed that “nothing in the way of food can be produced in Potosi or the surrounding areas except some potatoes (which grow like truffles) and green barley, which does not form grain because the cold is continuous…”

This was an exaggeration. Like so much written about Potosi. Yet it is certainly the case that the Spaniards needed to overcome formidable obstacle in ordered to successfully exploit the mineral resources of the high Andes, overcoming obstacles of labor supply, distance, transportation, capital, and technical expertise. The demands of the mining community for supplies, food and labor were so great that it opened up a whole spectrum of profitable opportunities and provoked a series of regional and international repercussions.

By 1620 the population of Potosi reached between 100,000 and 120,000 people, making it larger than Seville or Lisbon, and half the size of the greatest cities in Europe. Potosi acted as a magnet for produce and manufactured goods from all over South America and beyond.

Agricultural and pastoral activities were stimulated on both sides of the Andes. Coca leaves were obtained from the steaming valleys of the eastern Andes and was consumed in great qualities by mine workers during their weeklong twelve hour per day shifts in the mines. Mate tea, held to be of medicinal value, was brought to Potosi from Paraguay.

African slaves from Angola were imported clandestinely via Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Mules and cattle were raised around Cordoba and Tecuman province (in present day Argentina, literally “the land of silver”). Grapes and dried fish were sent from the Pacific coast. For the richest citizens, fresh fish arrived from the Pacific packed in ice. Textiles came from Cuzco or were imported from Europe via the official route through Panama, or by the clandestine route though Brazil.

No less vital were the bulky raw materials required by the silver mining and processing establishments- iron, salt, lead and litharge, copper sulfate and mercury. A network of communications thus developed which joined the mining centers to the colonial capital, the seaports, and their regional supply zones.

In the viceroyalty of Peru, Huancavelica and Potosi, were over 1000 miles apart. Mercury from Huancavelica was carried by llama and mule to the east at Chincha, shipped by Galleons to Arequipa, and then transported overland to Potosi. From Lima, Arequipa, and Huancavelica, routes linked Cuzco and Potosi, crossed the Andes, Chaco, and Pampas to Buenos Aires. To service their trade routes, daft animals were required in vast numbers, llamas, and oxen, as well as specialized muleteers.

The rise of silver production in Potosí also transformed the shipping in the Spanish Atlantic system. By 1531 silver imports into Seville passed gold by weight and by 1561 silver imports surpassed gold by value. Although precious metals composed the highest percentage of the value of cargoes from the New World. products such as cochineal, silk, tobacco, indigo, and hides became increasing important components of Spanish American trade with Europe.

In return came a diversity of European goods: wines, almost all from the Seville region, Andalucian olive oil and raisins, as well as the cloth of Castile and Flanders, paper and books. In addition, there was a demand for Spanish iron which was shipped in bulk and worked up in Mexico and Peru, above all was mercury which was indispensable to extracting silver. The 1597 fleet for New Spain for example carried 2 2,050 casks of wine, 14,120 arrobas of olive oil,14,101 quintiles of bulk iron. In 1600 the fleet carried 3,393 quintiles of mercury.

The rise of bulky commodity exchange demanded larger ships and the value of the cargoes carried demanded greater security. After 1559 there was a tacit understanding between France and Spain that beyond a line west of the Canaries and south of the Tropic of Cancer the European powers were not held to the standards of conduct that governed their relations in Europe. As the saying went: “No peace beyond the line.” The Spaniards in response instituted a system of armed convoys. In 1565 a fleet system took on a regular form. Routing and timing were governed by prevailing natural conditions. The French and English resorted to privateering attacking the silver laden ships or the ports where the bullion was loaded in the Gulf of Mexico (Vera Cruz) or the Caribbean (Nombre de Dios).

The Spanish ships needed to be out of the Gulf of Mexico before the hurricane season and away from the coast of Cuba by early summer. Between 1550 and 1650 ships from Mexico and the isthmus of Panama converged on Havana where they took on water and supplies for the transatlantic voyage to Spain. The fleet bound for the isthmian Caribbean port of Nombre de Dios, known as Galeones, left San Lucar, the port of Seville, in mid-April. The Atlantic crossing took five to six weeks on average.

The number of vessels arriving in Nombre de Dios, ranged from 27.3 in the decade 1611-1620 to 20.0 in the decade 1681-1690. The size of the ships raising from 240 tons in the 1550s to 400 tons in 1600. Nombre de Dios was a fever ridden location, difficult to defend, and tended to be occupied only at the time of the arrival of the fleets. The ships retired once they had loaded or unloaded their cargoes to the well-fortified port of Cartagena on the northern coast of South America.

The Asian Connection

But above all the sliver of Potosí was desired in Asia, India and above all to China. In 1565 a direct round-trip link was established across the Pacific Ocean from the Americas when the pilot monk, Andres de Urdaneta, found the long-sought return route from the Far East to Mexico.  To get to the Philippines from New Spain (Mexico) was relatively easy and the route was established in the 1540s. Ships needed to sail at a latitude of a least 10 degrees north of the equator in order to catch a favorable wind. The voyage took only eight to ten weeks.

In fact, getting to Manila from New Spain was a far easier and shorter voyage than getting to Peru from New Spain (Mexico). It was returning that posed the difficulties.  Father Andres de Udaneta succeeded in making the connection between Manila and the Mexican coast by sailing north of the 38th parallel north, off the coast of Japan, before catching the eastward blowing “Westerlies” to take the route across the Pacific reaching the west coast of North America before sailing south to Acapulco.

Once discovered this route was followed by the galleons from Manila for over 250 years. The voyage took from four to six months and the loss among the crews was as high as thirty to forty percent. If the voyage lasted more than six months the ships could become floating coffins. In May 1657 the Manila galleon arrived off the Mexican coast under full sail, its treasures intact, but with everyone on board dead.

But a consequence of the establishment of the trans-Pacific round trip route was that one third of the silver produced in Spanish America between 1565 and 1815 went to the Far East by the Manila galleons, complementing the Portuguese dominated route from Europe around Africa and across the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Straits and into the South China Sea to the mouth of the Pearl River to Macao and Canton.

The opening of the trade to the East, and particularly to China, by these two seaborne routes had dramatic consequences. The products of Asia were of far higher quality than anything in Europe at the time. Silver was critical to European trade with the Orient. The Europeans produced nothing in the way of manufactured goods than the Asians did not produce better – weapons excluded.

Silver was in great demand in India and China. Chinese porcelains and silks, damasks and satins, were exchanged for Spanish American silver in Manila which became a great entrepôt because of its fortuitous location at the intersection of two economic systems: The Chinese zone where silver was expensive and the Americas where silver was cheap. Chinese merchants in Manila, mainly from Fujian, lived in an intramuros area known as the Parian, and grew in number some 150 in 1564 to 30,000 in 1603.

The Chinese monetary system was especially responsive to the arrival to Spanish American silver. In the 1570s the Chinese moved from paper money to a silver-based system. China had one quarter of the world’s population and the largest taxing system in the world and silver became the only acceptable currency for paying taxes.

The re-export of silver from Spain to the Middle East, India, and China, and from Acapulco to Manila and on to China, also became profitable for Europeans in comparative terms: Silver-gold ratios (units of gold to one in silver) was 1/6 in China, 1/8 in India, and 1/12 in Europe. The Manila Galleons made the round trip across the Pacific once or twice a year. Philip ll decreed that the ships should be no more than 300 tones.

But in fact, the Manila Galleons, many built in the Philippines, were huge ships that combined the carrying capacity of carracks with the maneuverability and speed of caravels, reaching 2,000 tones, and carrying at times silver to the value of two and a half million silver pesos. The ships in New Spain (Mexico) were known as the “Nao de China”, literally the “Ship of China.”

Production of silver from the “Cerro Rico” grew rapidly peaking in 1592. The flow of Spanish American silver to Asia via Europe was facilitated when in December of 1580 Philip ll of Spain arrived in Lisbon to claim the crown of Portugal as Philip l of Portugal. He remained in Lisbon for three years overseeing the affairs of his vast empire.

Under the terms of approved by the Cortes of Tomar of 1581 which provided legal sanction for Phillip ll’s seizure of the Portuguese crown, the two empires in America were to remain administratively separate. The “union ibérico” of the crowns of Spain and Portugal lasted until 1640. And the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal greatly facilitated the flow of silver from Seville to Lisbon and from Lisbon to India and China and Japan via the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Much of the Spanish American bullion and coin ended up in India and China, and often by way of the ports and caravans of the Near East and Central Asia.  The Mughals like the Ottomans and the Safavids used Potosi silver to finance their wars of conquest. The Potosi “piece of eight” was the world’s first global currency crossing frontiers and financing trade and wars.

The End of the Potosi Era

But the great Potosi silver facilitated global interconnected trade and finance network did not survive the 17th century. Competition to Spanish domination arose from the Protestant Dutch and from the French and from the English in Europe and in Asia and in the Americas.

By the mid-seventeenth century Potosi itself was faltering under the weight of declining mines, broken dams, and a great scandal at its core, in Potosi’s mint, where a colossal debasement scam undermined confidence in the value of the currency.

In the 1630’s debased Potosi silver bars with the Potosi mark were rejected by bankers on the money markets of Genoa and Antwerp. Potosi coins were no longer acceptable in the spice markets of India and South East Asia, and in Mughal India millions of suspect Potosi coins were recycled as rupees.

The Potosi “P” had become a synonym for poison. Portugal regained its independence from Spain in 1640 and with the assistance of the virulently anti-Catholic English Republic of Oliver Cromwell and of the English Fleet under the Parliamentarian Admiral Blake.  English traders of the East India Company were beginning to find another locally produced (and far more destructive) and profitable Indian export that the Chinese loved as much as silver: opium.

By then the great days of Potosi were a thing of the past. Mexico’s silver sustained the Manila galleons until the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the Bourbon monarchs of Spain attempted to revive Potosi in the 1780s.

But in August 1780, the efforts by the Spanish authorities to impose a new Mita regime provoked the “Great Andean Rebellion” which began first at Pocoata, north of Potosi, led by Tomás Katari, an indigenous spokesman who had petitioned for reforms.

During November of the same year, south of Cuzco, a local cacique in the village of Tinta, José  Gabriel Condorcanqui, taking the name Tupac Amaru ll, seized the local Spanish Corregidor, José de Arriaga, and executed him. The rebels rejected their Mita obligations totally.

Tupac Amaru ll knew Potosi well having been a mule train owner transporting coca and mercury to the “Imperial Vila.” Both Katari and Tupac Amaru ll were captured and executed. But the Andean rebellion flared and tens of thousands were  killed.

The siege of La Paz in early 1781 was led by an indigenous rebel who called himself Tupac Katari. He had also been a small coca dealer who knew his way around the Andean mountains. He was captured in October 1781. Like the other rebel leaders he was sentenced to a gruesome death, and like Tupac Amaru ll, he was torn apart by horses and his body part displayed where his “crimes” had been most egregious in Spanish eyes. The Mita system was under challenge as never before.

But in 1825, after 15 years of struggle, Simon Bolivar, marked the end of the Mita, and of the “Vila imperial” of Potosi, and the “Liberator” symbolically proclaimed South American freedom from the summit of the Cerro Rico. The new Republic of Bolivia in the high Andes took his name.

But few recalled the central and pioneering role that Potosi and its silver had played in the sixteenth century in creating and facilitating the first globalized network of world interconnection.

The featured graphic is of a Manila Spanish Galleon.

Manila Galleon (ca. 1590) Boxer Codex, Lilly Library, Indiana University

An Update on the Future Combat Air System: December 2020

12/12/2020

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Five options for the architecture of a planned Future Combat Air System were handed over in September to the authorities, marking a major step toward definition and development of an ambitious European project, Bruno Fichefeux, head of FCAS at Airbus Defence & Space, said Dec. 9.

“We submitted also our selection, after extensive operational and technical assessment of potential FCAS architecture…in September, the five best architectures,” he told journalists in a livestream link up from Airbus DS office at Manching, southern Germany.

Those five options were selected from 10 architectures, and will be reduced to two by summer next year, said a source with knowledge of the project. The final architecture will be  based on continuous analysis of work on the technology demonstrators.

That overall architecture included the combination of a next generation fighter and remote carrier drones, and will be fundamental for the following phases, Fichefeux said. The air chiefs of France, Germany and Spain – partner nations of the FCAS project – recently “validated” the selection of architecture options.

Those architecture options followed 18 months’ work on a joint concept study, and there is a further year’s work, he said. The companies were in intense talks with governments on the next phase, with work next year worth billions compared to the “few millions” so far.

Fichefeux declined to say how just how many billions.

A parliamentary report, titled 2040: The FCAS Odyssey, said there would be work worth an initial €2 billion ($2.4 billion) under the second phase of a demonstrator contract, with a total €4 billion to be won by 2026, when technology demonstrators were due to fly.

Those amounts were close to the official figures, the source said. There will be one demonstrator contract with two phases spanning 2021 to 2026/7.

That compared to a phase 1A contract on the demonstrators, worth €155 million, signed July 12, shared between six companies and lasting 18 months.  Airbus and Dassault began the joint concept study in February 2019. Indra was working on the study, following Spain’s joining the FCAS project.

“It’s a massive step forward we want to initiate next year with support of the governments,” Fichefeux said. “The timeline is very tight. We need to reach this point of commitment and funding…to give perspective to industry and the program.”

There was a “very tough road map,” consisting of definition, development, production, flight test and entry into service in 2040, he said.

Seven Pillars of Wisdom

The European FCAS plan differed from the UK Tempest fighter jet project as the latter sought to fly a prototype in 2035, effectively the first in series, the source said.

That was distinct from a demonstrator of the FCAS next generation fighter due to fly in 2026, along with other elements of the European project.

The official date for the demonstrators was 2026, but there was scope for slipping to early 2027, the source said.

The FCAS plan was to field a network of present and future fighters, and remote carriers, all linked up to ground, air, sea, and space in a system dubbed multi domain combat cloud.

The partners sought to de-risk and to mature technology before inserting it in development of the new fighter, remote carriers, combat cloud, sensors, and engine, Fichefeux said.

The phase 1A was for demonstration in 2026/27 of seven key elements, namely the new fighter, remote carrier, combat cloud, engine, sensors, low observability and simulation.

The latter was effectively a war game to consider the different performance of the architectures. Along with simulation, there was also work on linking up the seven “pillars” under phase 1A.

Indra has joined Airbus and Dassault on the joint concept study. The Spanish partner will also lead work on sensors, working with Dassault and the German FCMS consortium.

Demonstration of first operational capabilities was due in 2030, with full capabilities and entry into service in 2040, said the Airbus DS presentation.

Full capacity of the demonstrators is expected in 2030, with initial operating capabilities in 2040, the source said.

Airbus, Dassault and other partners were applying a digital design, manufacturing and services approach, helped by Dassault Systèmes, Fichefeux said. The aim was to shorten “feedback loops” and speed up the process. The joint concept study looked at how DDMS could “disrupt” the development phase.

Airbus said Feb. 6 2019 the company would install Dassault Systèmes’ 3Dexperience software “to a move from sequential to parallel development processes.” That was intended to accelerate bringing new products to the market and boost customer service.

Ideas from the civil world

Airbus and the German defense ministry looked to the civil sector for bright ideas in a project dubbed Innovations for FCAS, the company said Dec. 9 in a statement. Eighteen partners including start-ups, small and medium companies, and research institutes, applied themselves in the pilot phase to work on 14 FCAS projects, including combat cloud, connectivity, the new fighter and remote carriers. The ministry funded the project.

On interoperability with the British Tempest fighter, there was need for “common European endeavour,” but it was up to governments to decide, Fichefeux said. For industry, it was important not to lose time.

The communications network in the combat cloud would be critical for “collaborative engagement” with Tempest, FCAS, and Nato forces, pointing up the need for standards and connectivity, he said.

Stealth was significant, a core technology in the demonstrator for the new fighter jet, intended to mature, test and prove in flight. There would be stealth in remote carriers, engine heat signature, sensors and communications in the demonstrator phase.

The budget for stealth in the phase 1A study was fairly small, the source said.

“The irreversible path for FCAS development is flight of the demonstrator in 2026, opening way to development,” he said.

“For that we need speed.

“We need funding and we need a strong political commitment, which we see we have today and need to maintain into the future.”

There has been call for a joint timetable for the FCAS project, amid concern over French and German elections holding up decisions and funding over the next couple of years.

“What worries me more than COVID 19 is the sequence of events,” Eric Trappier, executive chairman of Dassault, told May 14 the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly. Dassault is prime contractor for the fighter jet, the critical element in the next generation weapon system.

“We cannot wait for 2022 to start work on the rest of the program,” he said. “It is just not possible.”

 

Viper Venom Close Air support

12/11/2020

U.S Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 provide close air support from a UH-1Y Venom helicopter and AH-1Z Viper helicopter to for ground forces in coordination with Joint Terminal Attack Controllers during Service Level Training Exercise 1-21 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, Oct. 10, 2020.

The training allowed Marines with HLMA-169 to test demonstrate technical proficiency with their weapons systems while operating with other rotary and fixed wing assets. (U.S. Marine Corps video by Lance Cpl. Jackson Dukes)

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA, UNITED STATES

10.09.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Jackson Dukes

3rd Marine Division