The FCAS “Bras de Fer”: A February 2021 Update

02/19/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Dassault Aviation has insisted on protecting intellectual property rights over its fighter jet technology, while Airbus Defence and Space has sought full access to that privileged information, conflicting demands which have weighed on a Franco-German led project for a future combat air system.

French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Angela Merkel called Feb. 5 for a resolution to differences on the FCAS project, pointing up the political significance of the industrial differences.

This was an important milestone, negotiating contracts for phases 1B and 2 of the FCAS project, and it was a “difficult moment to finalize negotiations,” Airbus chief executive Guillaume Faury said Feb. 18 in a video press conference on 2020 financial results.

European sovereignty was at stake, he said, adding that it was “important to get the right structure at the beginning.”

The FCAS is under French leadership, and German partners seek a “satisfactory level” of participation, while holding talks on the sharing of “intellectual property rights, tasks and leadership,” Merkel said at a bilateral defense and security council held by video. Agreement was likely to be reached in the coming weeks, in time for scrutiny by the parliamentary Bundestag budget committee, she added.

Similar differences had to be resolved on the main ground combat system, she said.

The MGCS project consists of a new tank linked up with manned and unmanned vehicles. German industry leads that land project.

Macron said he was confident a deal on FCAS would be reached in 15 days.

It remains to be seen what kind of agreement will be reached, with some French concern political pressure might be brought to bear on French industry to cave in to German demands for access and work share.

What is at stake is a two-phase 1B contract to build a technology demonstrator for a next generation fighter, a key element in the FCAS project. That contract is worth an estimated initial €2 billion ($2.4 billion), rising to a total €4 billion by 2026 when the fighter is due to fly.

In the longer term, there are technology and work on a program estimated to be worth €100 billion over some 20 years, pitched as a political pledge for European sovereignty.

French armed forces minister Florence Parly was holding Feb. 18 a phone meeting with her German counterpart, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.

Dassault and Airbus DS share the FCAS project 50:50 as joint prime contractors, with the French company taking the lead on the fighter, which will replace the Rafale and Eurofighter. Airbus DS is based in Germany, so this is essentially a Franco-German dispute.

The heads of Dassault, Airbus DS, Safran, MTU, and Joël Barre, head of the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, and his German and Spanish counterparts met Feb. 17 in a bid to resolve the dispute, business daily Les Echos reported. That meeting was in the suburbs of the French capital.

Dassault was claiming 34 percent of work share after initially seeking 46 percent, with 20 percent for German, and 23 percent for Spanish partners, the report said. Spain is also an FCAS partner, and as Airbus is the major company there, that boosts the share of the work for the aircraft company.

Dassault seeks that Airbus DS accept that its technology is sealed in “black boxes,” rather than agreeing to full access for the German company.

“This is normal,” said François Lureau, a consultant with EuroFLconsult, and a former procurement chief. In negotiations, a partner will want a little bit more, and the program will be worth billions.

Macron has put on pressure and it will be up to the DGA to broker a deal, he said. That resistance to granting full access is standard practice, as can be seen in the F-35 program where the core technology is “American eyes only.”

The sensitivity over technology transfer could be seen in the denial of UK access to the source code on the F-35, despite that nation’s status as the sole tier one industrial partner. The United Arab Emirates had sought access to source code on the F-16 block 60, when the Gulf state ordered its advanced Desert Falcon version, to no avail.

Deadlines concentrate the mind wonderfully, with budgetary approval by the German parliamentary committee due to meet in April or May, and general election in September.

“When time is tight, a solution has to be found,” Lureau said. “Urgency poses the question: do you want it or not?”

Strong German Industrial Lobby

In France, there is a perception that a powerful German industry lobby has won support from the Bundestag parliament and the chancellor, while it was uncertain the French government would back domestic industry.

“My concern is that there is search for a political solution, and the (French) defense industry will get its arm twisted,” Christian Cambon, chairman of the defense committee of the French senate, told Feb. 16 the defense journalists association in a video briefing. The scale of the FCAS program was some €100 billion, he said.

The stakes are high both in value and in a company’s future know-how.

“Defense programmes like this are all about the development and acquisition of technology – and that is exactly what the Germans are holding out for,” said Sash Tusa, analyst at equity research firm Agency Partners.

“It is clearly important to address these issues as early as possible, but doing so has poisoned the Franco-German relationship at both industrial and political levels, and that is not good for SCAF (Système de Combat Aérien du Futur) as a program.”

To further strain the relations, the French plan to fly a Rafale [fighter jet] as the platform for the technology demonstrator has annoyed the German side, which has countered with a plan for a demonstrator based upon the Eurofighter, he said.

The contract for the demonstrator will set terms for who does what, and also “who knows what,” namely gaining access to the overall technology beyond the work assigned.

There is also the question how to divide the work, which is expected to be based on industrial expertise, rather than ambition to acquire new technology. That reflects the lessons learnt on building the A400M transport plane, which suffered a deadly crash and cost overrun.

In contract negotiations, there will be one subsystem plugging into another, much as there are overlaps in a Venn diagram. The subcontractors will need a certain amount of information, and the amount of information may be part of the contract talks. Airbus is reported to seek the maximum, while Dassault offers the minimum.

The companies must agree the work share on the seven FCAS sectors, or pillars, namely: the new fighter, remote carrier – or drone, combat cloud, engine, sensors, low observability, and simulation.

The Bundestag effectively sets the timetable, as the parliament must vote the budgetary approval for the FCAS contracts.

Editor’s Comment: One might ask the German chancellor to explain how a bargain over a ground platform is in any way similar to working a “system of systems.” FCAS is not an airplane. But this characterization might itself reveal deeper challenges to be met and resolved.

See also, the following: 

https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/02/japanese-uk-cooperation-shaping-new-combat-air-systems/

Re-Setting the Standard for V-22 Overhaul Time: Breaking the 300-Day Mark

When interviewing the CO of 2nd Marine Air Wing, Major General Cederholm underscored the importance of the logs and maintenance side of his command to be “ready to fight tonight.”

We operate all over the globe. Right now, we have forces all the way from Europe into the Far East, and everywhere in between.

“The sun never sets on 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. We have to have a ready force and generate combat power today as we face the challenges of transformation tomorrow.

“We can never lose our readiness trait, or our ability to respond immediately when called upon.

“We’re looking at efforts right now to increase our readiness and our availability across fully mission capable aircraft, which is basically our no-go criteria when it comes to combat operations. The metric that matters to me is the availability of fully mission capable aircraft, not simply availability of an aircraft.

“When we send aircraft into harms way, we owe the aircrew and the Marine Riflemen, a fully mission capable aircraft.

“In this context, we are focused on increased reliability of parts and weapons systems. I have been focused significantly in my career on training; now I am laser focused on the logistics side as well.

“We are examining reliability across the parts for every type, model, and series of aircraft at 2nd MAW, and working with various institutions to improve reliability.

“Even if there are higher upfront costs to get reliability enhanced, it will be cheaper in the long run for the operation of a more resilient force, which is clearly what one needs when the demand is to fight right now, when the phone rings.”

There is little doubt then that the CO is welcoming the news from Fleet Readiness Center East.

As Kimberly Koonce of FRCE wrote recently in an article published January 29, 2021:

Every field of effort has a standard to beat. Track and field had the four-minute mile. For baseball, the bar is 762 career home runs. For the V-22 Osprey production line at Fleet Readiness Center East, there was the 300-day turnaround time for returning the aircraft to their fleet customers.

On January 15, the V-22 line broke that elusive 300-day mark when the team returned its most recently completed aircraft in 297 days, far below the negotiated standard of 420 days.

V-22 production supervisors have credited much of the decreased overhaul time to the line’s recent adoption of a team concept. Under this new way of doing business, one airframes work leader is responsible for each aircraft, with the assistance of subject matter experts in the sheet metal and electrician trades. Together, these three experts make daily decisions on scheduling, parts and staffing needs.

FRCE aircraft mechanics perform final maintenance functions on this V-22 Osprey before it is returned to the fleet. FRCE returned this aircraft in 297 days, 123 days before the negotiated completion date. The V-22 line credits the decreased turnaround time to improvements in staffing the aircraft, acquiring parts and teamwork.

“What it did was give us a driving force, a person who really knows what needs to be done on the aircraft and what is required to complete that task,” said Don McLean, V-22 first-line supervisor. “At our daily morning briefings, the work leader shares the information with the team, and we assign artisans to work based on that day’s needs. It keeps us laser focused on the line’s priorities.”

Parts are getting the same attention as personnel on FRCE’s V-22 line. The team maintains a spreadsheet detailing required parts and when they will be needed in the process. Supervisors say this long-view approach helps the team overcome potential obstacles before they become work stoppages.

“We’re identifying long lead-time parts, and as we achieve our milestones on the aircraft, we can look ahead and say we need this, when can we get it? And if we can’t get it, how can we overcome that obstacle?” said Matt Sinsel, V-22 production control coordinator. “We may have to find an engineering solution, locally manufacture a part, or take the part from another aircraft. We work through our obstacles to keep aircraft on track.”

Program leaders have predicted that turnaround times of less than 300 days will become more common on the V-22 line in the near future, due to improved parts availability and increased staffing of aviation professionals. The line’s ultimate goal is to meet the fleet’s demands for aircraft in 250 days. Andrew Rock, FRCE V-22 branch head, said that goal is attainable by working with the Defense Logistics Agency and the Naval Supply Systems Command, as well as applying more aviation maintenance professionals to each aircraft. 

“Our negotiated turnaround time with Naval Air Systems Command is 420 days, but our target turnaround time to meet fleet demand is 250 days. There’s a huge difference in what the negotiated demand is and what we are now being asked to do,” Rock said. “Obviously, in order to do that, material must be available when it is needed and you have to apply more manpower, so we are currently in a ramp up to get the manpower on board, to get them trained, and then, regardless of the material condition of the aircraft, I think 250 days is attainable for most aircraft.”

The line’s achievements have not gone unnoticed by senior leadership at FRCE. Col. Thomas Atkinson, FRCE executive officer, visited several shop areas to thank the people whose efforts contributed to the milestone.

“The difference between the planned turnaround of 420 days and 300 days is about four months. You’ve done this four months faster than you were expected to,” said Atkinson. “You’ve given one third of an aircraft back to the Marine Corps. We do that three times, that’s like having an extra aircraft that doesn’t have to be purchased and that can be used for training and other missions.”

Supervisors said the new team concept and the success it has produced has energized employees working on the V-22 Osprey, and they predict the team will shatter other milestones in the future.

“This achievement tells me the entire V-22 team has bought in,” said Rock, crediting the artisans, estimators and evaluators, quality assurance, production controllers, and local manufacturing with contributing to the program’s success. “The entire team takes pride in what they do. Everyone is determined to meet all the goals this command throws at them, and so far they have done it.”

FRCE is North Carolina’s largest maintenance, repair, overhaul and technical services provider, with more than 4,000 civilian, military and contract workers. Its annual revenue exceeds $1 billion. The depot generates combat air power for America’s Marines and naval forces while serving as an integral part of the greater U.S. Navy; Naval Air Systems Command; and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers.

Fort Bliss Trainers

Every year, thousands of civilian contractors converge at Ft. Bliss, Texas, to undergo a rigorous training regimen that prepares them to support their military counterparts in critical missions across the globe.

The quality and practicality of their training rest in the hands of select Soldiers who possess the skills and experience to plan, organize and execute dozens of classes, exercises and simulations in two weeks.

The Army Reserve Soldiers of Continental U.S. (CONUS) Replacement 9, B Company, 5th Armored Brigade (a.k.a. Task Force Viper) are part of this elite team of trainers who ensure contractors and service members are physically and mentally prepared to succeed downrange.

FT BLISS, TX,

01.06.2021

Video by Staff Sgt. John Carkeet IV

177th Armored Brigade

UK Defence Co-Operation with Japan

02/18/2021

On February 3, 2021, the UK Ministry of Defence published an article which highlighted the coming deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Pacific and how that deployment fit into a wider strategy.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace and Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab discussed the deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth during the “2+2” virtual meeting with their respective Japanese counterparts, Ministers Nobuo Kishi and Toshimitsu Motegi.

CSG21, led by UK aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, will herald a new era for UK-Japan defence and security cooperation, providing opportunities for the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and their respective Japanese counterparts to operate together and support opportunities for future collaboration, including on the F35 and Amphibious programmes.

Both the Foreign and Defence Secretary reaffirmed the UK’s long-term commitment to working closely with Japan to uphold the security of the Indo-Pacific and demonstrate the value of a unified approach to facing global challenges.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

“Japan and the UK have forged a close defence and security partnership that is being elevated to new heights this year when the UK Carrier Strike Group visits the Indo-Pacific.

“The most significant Royal Navy deployment in a generation demonstrates the UK’s commitment to working with our partners in the region to uphold the rules-based international system and promote our shared security and prosperity.”

Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab said:

“Japan is a key security partner for the UK, and a close, enduring friend. This year will see our two nations working even more closely together with the UK’s Presidency of the G7 and hosting of the UN Climate Conference.

“The UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt, including the visit of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the region, demonstrates our shared priorities and common strategic interests from maritime security to climate change and free trade.”

The four ministers agreed that Japan and the UK are each other’s closest security partners in Asia and Europe respectively, with shared values and common strategic interests. They resolved to further strengthen cooperation on defence, security and trade in order to uphold those values.

A recent Maritime Security Arrangement agreed between the Royal Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) is one example of how the two countries’ Armed Forces are deepening their relationship. The arrangement, signed by JMSDF and the First Sea Lord Tony Radakin – head of the Royal Navy – will see the two countries share maritime domain awareness, helping to create a safe environment for international shipping transiting between the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

In this spirit, the four ministers committed to further cooperation on monitoring illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea.

In recent years, the growing defence partnership between the two countries has seen the British Army become the only army other than the US to train with Japanese forces on Japanese soil. The VIGILANT ISLES training exercise series establishes annual cooperation on training exercises between the British Army and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF).

Policy Paper

1: H.E. Mr. MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and H.E. Mr. KISHI Nobuo, Minister of Defence of Japan, the Rt Hon Dominic Raab, the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and First Secretary of State of the UK and the Rt Hon Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence of the UK held the fourth Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting on 3 February 2021, in the form of a video conference, due to the current situation regarding COVID-19 pandemic.

2: Recognising emerging health, climate and security challenges, the four Ministers reiterated their commitment to advancing security, defence and development cooperation between Japan and the UK. They reconfirmed that Japan and the UK, both maritime nations and actors in the Indo-Pacific, are global strategic partners who share a fundamental commitment to core values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and are each other’s closest security partners in Europe and Asia respectively. They renewed their commitment to further strengthening cooperation towards a free and open Indo-Pacific. In this context, the four Ministers confirmed their commitment to continue to provide leadership in maintaining regional security and upholding the rules-based international order, as well as their opposition to attempts to coerce others in the region including by economic means. The four Ministers expressed high hopes for close collaboration with like-minded partners to achieve peace and stability in the region. As among the strongest champions of free trade, with shared values as open and interconnected economies, the four Ministers welcomed the continued strong economic partnership between Japan and the UK including the Japan-UK Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, and acknowledged their shared ambitions for free trade and prosperity. As innovative and dynamic economies, they stressed the importance of building back better, spreading economic growth and ensuring that the benefits of free trade, technological change and scientific discovery are felt globally.

3: Minister Motegi and Minister Kishi welcomed the progress of the UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy and the UK’s firm commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and to the advancement of Japan-UK cooperation. The four Ministers also renewed their commitment to further advancing their cooperation based on the Joint Action Plan.

Bilateral cooperation

4: The four Ministers reconfirmed the positive development that Japan-UK cooperation in maritime security will continue to be a priority and committed to strengthening it further and taking leadership in maintaining regional security. They welcomed the planned visit by HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and her Carrier Strike Group to the region including East Asia in 2021, which aims to have a significant positive and constructive influence in the region. The four Ministers confirmed to work together on the Carrier Strike Group’s visit to East Asia so that it will be an opportunity to elevate Japan-UK defence cooperation to a new level. They also shared the view that this visit will contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

5: The four Ministers stressed the need for continuing to work on an arrangement that would reciprocally improve administrative, policy and legal procedures for joint operations and exercises, which would contribute to enhancing complex interoperability between Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the British Armed Forces. They welcomed the signing of a Maritime Security Arrangement to further security cooperation between the Royal Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and confirmed their intention to reinforce the already-robust cooperative relationship between them. The four Ministers welcomed such developments to enable more practical cooperation between JSDF and the British Armed Forces.

6: Furthermore, the four Ministers welcomed progress in other domains, including ground, air, cyber, and space, and reaffirmed their intention to make further progress as outlined in the military three-year plan, an annex to the Joint Action Plan. In particular, they welcomed the steady progress made on the bilateral ground exercise VIGILANT ISLES which has taken place both in Japan and in the UK to date. The four Ministers endorsed the progress of the work of the Japan-UK High Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel on defence equipment and technology cooperation. They welcomed the ongoing dialogue on Future Combat Air System (FCAS)/F-X at subsystem level in order to understand mutual requirements and the benefits of cooperation for enhanced technology and improved cost effectiveness. The four Ministers emphasised the importance of the research programme for the demonstration of a joint new air to air missile (JNAAM). They welcomed the successful completion of the Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation in 2020 and progress made on the Project for Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF system (JAGUAR).

7: The four Ministers welcomed the progress of co-ordination of capacity-building in developing countries, including in the Indo-Pacific region. They shared the view that they would continue to use a coordination mechanism for future joint capacity-building in strategic priorities such as maritime security and safety; counterterrorism; cyber security; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; promotion of quality infrastructure; gender mainstreaming; Women, Peace and Security including Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict; peacekeeping operations; and demining.

8: In this context, with the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the four Ministers decided to advance strategic development cooperation to tackle global issues, including Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. In particular, they welcomed the recent round of the Japan-UK Development Policy Dialogue and reaffirmed their commitment to disseminating the “G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment” to developing countries and implementing them in projects in order to strengthen connectivity. Additionally, they reconfirmed support for G7 ambitions on girls’ education. The Ministers signalled support for working together in 2021 to secure G20 action that supports a sustainable inclusive recovery from COVID-19 in low income and developing countries that will allow them to build back better and greener.

9: The four Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace; and to responding to cyberattacks, including by calling out malicious cyber actors and activities. They also committed to working together towards a more diverse, transparent, open, secure and interoperable 5G network architecture in order to strengthen cyber security, including supporting industry initiatives promoting open architecture and through multilateral fora such as the G7. The four Ministers decided to continue to strengthen cooperation to address safety and security challenges in outer space and develop norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour to reduce threats to space systems, through bilateral dialogues and cooperative efforts in international fora.

10: They recognised the need for continuing work to strengthen cooperation to facilitate the secure and timely exchange of information and analysis in support of bilateral security cooperation.

11: The four Ministers confirmed that aviation and maritime security was an important area in which to address the terrorist threat to the shared interests of Japan and the UK and decided to deepen collaboration on these areas with partners across Asia. Recognising that the current global pandemic of COVID-19 affects our security, stability and prosperity, the four Ministers underlined the importance of an ambitious, coordinated and internationally agreed plan to respond to the pandemic. They confirmed the importance of cohesive action to manage risks to peace and security posed by infectious diseases and to better prepare for any future pandemic. They endorsed the Defence Ministers’ proposal in this context to promote Japan-UK defence efforts in areas such as: sharing lessons learned in HA/DR operations; cooperation to help improve resilience in third countries; reinforcing the rules-based international order and working together to counter disinformation.

International cooperation

12: The four Ministers reaffirmed their determination to further strengthen cooperation in international frameworks such as G7 2021, including ensuring that the G7 reacts quickly with collective action to foreign policy crises and demonstrating that open societies are most effective at tackling the major global challenges, building back better from Covid-19, cooperating on protection and promotion of human rights and tackling climate change. Ahead of the UK hosting COP26, Ministers confirmed the importance of working together as net zero partners, as we see climate change continue to impact on the security of people, ecosystems and economies. As international climate leaders, Japan and the UK should work together to lead ambitious sustainable and global climate action, supporting an ambitious and comprehensive negotiated outcome at COP26 in line with the goal of the Paris Agreement.

The UK acknowledged the recent announcement by Prime Minister Suga that Japan will announce an ambitious 2030 target by COP26 and deepen collaboration with other countries to promote global decarbonisation. Japan acknowledged that the UK has set an ambitious NDC target of 68% emission reductions on 1990 levels and will end taxpayer support for fossil fuel projects overseas as soon as possible.

13: The four Ministers reiterated their commitment to realising UN reform including early reform of the UN Security Council. The UK reaffirmed its strong support for Japan’s permanent membership of the UNSC.

14: The four Ministers reiterated their strong commitment to full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; the NPT is the cornerstone which enables the international community to take concrete and realistic measures towards nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the four Ministers reiterated that Japan and the UK would continue to co-operate in order to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime and achieve a meaningful outcome at the next NPT Review Conference. The four Ministers stressed the importance of strategic risk reduction and arms control dialogues among states possessing nuclear weapons, and between states possessing nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states, to increase transparency and mutual understanding and reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation.

The four Ministers noted with concern the continuing use of chemical weapons, including against the Syrian people and Russian politician, Alexei Navalny. They underscored Japan’s and the UK’s commitment to upholding the Chemical Weapons Convention. They expressed their support for and confidence in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. They reiterated that those who have used chemical weapons must be held accountable.

The four Ministers expressed their support for making the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention more effective. Recognising the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Ministers considered that states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention must work together to ensure the success of the Ninth Review Conference. The four Ministers drew attention to the importance of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons.

15: With regards to NATO, of which the UK is a key member, the four Ministers expressed their intention to promote further NATO-Japan co-operation to deepen Japan’s partnership, including strengthened dialogue and exploration of opportunities for further practical cooperation.

Regional affairs

16: The four Ministers expressed serious concerns about the situation in the East China Sea and South China Sea and strongly opposed any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and increase tensions. The four Ministers reaffirmed the importance of upholding freedom of navigation and overflight above the South China Sea and urged all parties to exercise self-restraint and refrain from activities likely to raise tensions, in particular militarisation and coercion. They emphasised the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law as reflected in the UN Convention on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) that sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out and that all maritime claims must be based on the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS. They reiterated that The South China Sea Arbitration Award, which is issued by an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal, is final and legally binding on both parties to the dispute. They called for any Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to be consistent with international law as reflected in the UNCLOS and not prejudice the rights and interests of all stakeholders using the South China Sea.

17: The four Ministers underscored grave concerns over the recent situation surrounding Hong Kong, in particular the National Security Law, which is not in conformity with the Hong Kong Basic Law and its international commitments under the principles of the legally binding, UN-registered Sino-British Joint Declaration. They emphasised the importance of upholding rights and freedoms and Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, as provided for in the Joint Declaration. They also underlined the importance of the postponed Legislative Council elections proceeding in a fair and transparent way later this year. The four Ministers shared their grave concerns about the human rights situation in Xinjiang. They highlighted the increasing number of credible reports of gross human rights violations being perpetrated against Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. They emphasised the importance of working with international partners to call on China to uphold international human rights obligations and building a broad caucus of countries willing to speak out about the reported violations.

18: The four Ministers reiterated their commitment to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. They reiterated their opposition to any provocation including launches that use ballistic missile technology. They emphasised support for diplomacy and international engagement as the best way toward that goal, and underscored the importance of full implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. They committed to further promoting practical cooperation on monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea-related vessels. The Ministers shared the view to continue to cooperate closely toward early resolution of the abductions issue.

19: The four Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN-led regional architecture. They also reaffirmed their full support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

20: The four Ministers confirmed their commitment to ensuring the stability and prosperity of the Middle East. They reaffirmed unchanged support for a two-state solution on the Middle East Peace Process. They underscored the significance of supporting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the nuclear programme of Iran and urged Iran to fully comply with the agreement. They highlighted the global role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verification and monitoring of the nuclear agreement and strongly urged Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency, including on safeguarding issues. They further urged Iran to fully comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions including 2231 and 1540 to maintain international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. They welcomed the launch of Afghanistan peace negotiations in Qatar in September 2020, and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting Afghanistan at this critical juncture as expressed during the Geneva Conference on Afghanistan in November 2020.

21: The four Ministers instructed their respective officials to closely follow up the results of today’s meeting and report to the next Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting.

 

 

Light Carrier Anyone? USS America in Operation

USS America, the lead ship of the America Amphibious Ready Group, along with the 31st MEU, is seen in the slide show below operating in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility to enhance interoperability with allies and partners and serve as a ready response force to defend peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

EAST CHINA SEA

02.11.2021

Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Walter Estrada 

USS America (LHA 6)

Given the focus on Marine Corps-Navy integration, re-imaging the role of the amphbious force in sea controal and sea-denial missions is an obvious way to enhance the reach and capability of the integrated distributed fleet.

For an overview of the light carrier discussion, see the following:

Light Carrier Studies Already Underway As Navy Considers Role for CVLs in Future Fleet

Or the discussions highlighted in our recently published book:

The Kill Web, Payloads, and the Surface Fleet

02/17/2021

As the U.S. Navy and its joint and coalition partners rework their forces to deliver capability through an integrated but distributed operational force, a key element are the payloads which can be leveraged throughout the modular task forces making up such a force.

As Ed Timperlake has argued:  “Payload utility can be a driver for understanding the future development of combat systems. To understand payload/utility (PA/UT) with full honor to John Boyd, it can be noted that Observe/Orient (OO) is essentially target acquisition and Decide/Act (DA) is target engagement. Thus, there is a very simple formula, better and better TA and TE =more effective employment of all payloads available to the battle commander.

“It is the process of understanding the huge complexities in such a simple formula that is the challenge. Understanding the technology and human dynamic through an analytic filter of a Payload Utility function consisting of weapons (kinetic and TRON) and the dual components of Target Acquisition (TA) and Target Effectiveness (TE) effectiveness in a fighting fleet engaged in high intensity combat in the unforgiving cauldron of battle maybe a war winner. Either in one platform or melded into a unified fighting Fleet to bring all different types of appropriate “weapons on” for the kill shot is a powerful concept….”

“A very simple filter to look at platform and weapon development within the integration of current weapon systems and platforms is asking the largest questions possible and pursuing force design and operational answers to these questions:

“What does a weapon or system add to fleet PA/UT? How does this system help in TA? How does this system help in TE? What is the best weapon for the highest Pk against the target? Is the TA, TE and Weapons (kinetic and Tron) carried together organically on a single platform or distributed in the sensor-strike force”[1]

A recent interview by Rick Burgess of Seapower magazine with Rear Admiral Paul Schlise, Director of the Surface Warfare Division, N-96, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations highlights how the cross-cutting evolution of the surface fleet and payloads intersects to create a kill web force.[2]

When asked the question of how the Rear Admiral would compare the fires capability of the fleet when he was first commissioned in the Navy to today, this is what Rear Admiral Schlise said:

“The Navy has progressed in every dimension over the past several decades. Compared to when I commissioned in 1989, the ability to integrate weapons and sensors across a carrier strike group has expanded beyond my wildest dreams.

“Our ships are able to coordinate fires across the spectrum of warfare with combat systems, sensors and missiles that are smarter and better integrated with the platforms that operate them.

“Our Sailors are far more talented and benefit from tremendous virtual multi-domain training capability.

“To put it plainly, when compared to when I first commissioned, our surface fires capability is like comparing an old “brick” phone from the ’90s to a brand-new iPhone 12 today. We’re smarter, faster and more lethal than ever before.”

To get to this point, the Navy has added new capabilities to the surface ship platforms, provided new weapons on those platforms, integrated strike more effectively across those platforms, and is working new weapons as well as new approaches to adding platforms, including projected unmanned platforms, to the fleet.

As the Navy focuses on what distributed maritime operations actually mean for the evolution of the surface Navy and its operations with the joint and coalition force, the payload/utility function introduced by Timperlake is a key element of assessing how modular task forces can operate at the tactical edge.

What capabilities can a task force deliver as an integrated combat node?

What capabilities can that modular task force reachback to in order to enhance its lethality, survivability and lethality?

What capabilities can that modular task force contribute to its operational partners and allies in an area of interest?

According to Schlise: “The Surface Combatant Force is the key enabler for the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept.

“Enhancing lethality across all of our ships at sea operationalizes DMO and ensures the fleet has requisite capability and capacity to fight and win.

“Our efforts to up-gun our combatants are directly in step with the Navy’s Naval Tactical Grid initiatives.

“The Surface Navy is moving out aggressively to improve lethality across the spectrum of warfare. The Naval Strike Missile is in the fleet providing a multi-mission weapon for our littoral combat ships [LCSs] and future frigates. The SM-6 is a multi-domain missile, deployed on ships today, providing surface combatants improved capability and flexibility against advanced threats. As we continue to procure the SM-6, spiral development of the SM-6 family is ongoing to provide greater range and speed. The Maritime Strike Tomahawk provides versatility over long distances against targets at sea or on land.

“In addition to extended missile ranges, we’re also increasing our close-in battlespace lethality. The updated Mk38 Mod 4 Gun Weapon System provides an updated electro-optical sensor system with combat system integration for improved accuracy and close-in engagements against fast-attack craft and fast inland attack craft threats. In the near future, these guns will be paired with other weapon systems for greater lethality against close- in air threats as well.

“The surface fleet is also improving terminal defense weapons with spiral developments to the existing Rolling Airframe Missile and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. A new Vertical-Launch Anti-submarine Rocket Extended Range is proposed to significantly increase the range a ship will be able to engage a submarine target.”

He argued that new weapons are coming to the fleet as the Navy works with the versitility in its vertical launch systems, introduces directed energy weapons, and reconsiders how to reshape the amphibious fleet to be part of the broader surface warfare mission sets.

He discussed new platforms coming to the fleet, such as DDG next, and the new Constellation-class FFG.

He noted as well that the coming of maritime remotes are part of the platform build out and payload delivery capability within the fleet.

“USVs can bring additional capacity and capability to the manned combatant force to support distributed maritime operations. Results from our Future Surface Combatant Force Analysis of Alternatives and Future Navy Force Structure study both show the value in USVs and support continuing investment, prototyping and experimentation to mature this capability for future force integration.

“LUSVs, as a distributed fires platform, can increase the fleet’s missile carrying capacity and MUSVs, as a distributed sensor platform, improve the commander’s battlespace awareness.

“Our Surface Development Squadron (CSDS-1) is involved in testing these concepts using current prototypes in fleet exercises and experimentation.

“The lessons learned from CSDS-1 and results from our continued study and war gaming will help us refine concepts and inform further platform development to provide the fleet with a capability that can and increase lethality and capacity.”

But what is identified in the very good interview by Burgess of the Surface Warfare Director would simply be a laundry list of new weapons, upgraded weapons, or new platforms if not for fully grasping Timperlake’s point about distributed payloads and their utility to a kill web force.

Understanding how the fleet operates across the extended battlespace envisaged as a chessboard and how surface ships can operate beyond what it has onboard organically or in its legacy task force is crucial to grasp what an integrated distributed force warfighting approach can deliver.

The weaponization-platform dynamic interacts to allow for modular task force flexibility and significant reachback to other sensors and shooters accessible to a kill web operating force.

Hence, by understanding the payload-utility function of weapons, sensors, and the diverse impact of multi-domain platforms one can grasp why the US Navy is focused on shaping a maritime distributed force integratable with its joint force partners and allies,

[1] https://sldinfo.com/2017/09/shaping-a-way-ahead-to-prepare-for-21st-century-conflicts-payload-utility-capabilities-and-the-kill-web/. Some slight modifications from the original have been introduced into the text.

[2] https://seapowermagazine.org/qa-rear-adm-paul-schlise-director-surface-warfare-division-n96-office-of-the-chief-of-naval-operations/

Featured Photo: WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2013) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)</p>

The UK Establishes a New Space Command and Names its First Commander

An article published on November 19, 2020 in the UK Defence Journal highlighted the establishment of a new UK Space Command

On 18 November 2020, the UK announced its proposal to establish a new military command dedicated to space, similar to the recent moves taken by allied countries such as France and the US. The proposal of a new Royal Air Force (RAF) space command was part of an announcement by the UK Government of the largest defence budget since the Cold War of £16.5 billion over the next four years.

Boris Johnson announced “a new RAF space command launching British satellites and our first rocket from Scotland in 2022”.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson said:

“The security and intelligence agencies will continue to protect us around the clock from terrorism and new and evolving threats. We will invest another £1.5 billion in military research and development, designed to master the new technologies of warfare. We will establish a new centre dedicated to artificial intelligence, and a new RAF space command, launching British satellites and our first rocket from Scotland in 2022. 

“I can announce that we have established a National Cyber Force, combining our intelligence agencies and service personnel, which is already operating in cyberspace against terrorism, organised crime and hostile state activity. And the RAF will receive a new fighter system, harnessing artificial intelligence and drone technology to defeat any adversary in air-to-air combat.”

A UK Government spokesman said:

“Spaceports offer an exciting route to enhance the future prosperity of the UK and we welcome the progress being made by the UK Space Agency. Spaceports will provide opportunity for a range of customers, especially in the context of improving global communications and data sharing.”

An earlier article in the same journal highlighted that the establishment of a Shetland spaceport would boost significantly UK space launch capabilities.

Shetland Space Centre anticipates that by 2024, the spaceport site could support a total of 605 jobs in Scotland including 140 locally and 210 across the wider Shetland region. A further 150 jobs will also be created through wider manufacturing and support services.

“Following a thorough process of due diligence, the UK Space Agency has confirmed that Lockheed Martin’s plans to move its UK Pathfinder Launch to the Shetland site at Lamba Ness on Unst would continue to deliver long-term value and help establish a sustainable, commercial launch market as part of the UK’s spaceflight programme – LaunchUK.”

Lockheed Martin say it is in discussions with a preferred partner to provide launch services for its UK Pathfinder Launch, which would take place from Shetland Space Centre.

UK Government Amanda Solloway, Science Minister, said:

“We want the UK to be the best place in Europe to launch satellites, attracting innovative businesses from all over the world and creating hundreds of high-skilled jobs. The potential to have multiple spaceports in Scotland demonstrates the scale of our ambition, and I want to support industry by pressing ahead with our plans during this challenging time. This government is committed to backing our growing space sector, developing a comprehensive space strategy and supporting transformative technologies that will benefit people and businesses across the country.”

UK Government Minister for Scotland Iain Stewart said:

“The UK Government is committed to cementing the UK’s position as a global leader in the space sector. The creation of the Shetland Space Centre is incredibly exciting news and a real boost for the local economy. Our investment in Scottish spaceports is creating hundreds of secure and skilled jobs for people in Scotland. The Shetland Space Centre a huge step forward for our ambitious UK Spaceflight programme.”

Just as an airport can handle a range of different airlines and aircraft, ‘Space Hub Sutherland’ has been designed to cater for the needs of multiple launch providers.

“This ensures it will be able to continue to compete for a wide range of exciting vertical launch opportunities.”

The UK Space Agency say it will also continue to fully support Space Hub Sutherland through grant funding to Highlands and Islands Enterprise to develop the spaceport infrastructure and to UK-based launch partner, Orbex, to prepare its innovative Prime rocket to launch from the site in 2022.

And earlier this month, the new commander of the UK Space Force was announced. Air Commodore Paul Godfrey, to become Air Vice-Marshal Godfrey in his new role has a wide range of experience in the evolving capabilities of UK fifth generation warfare as well as significant hands one experience working in Scotland as the base commander at RAF Lossiemouth.

An RAF announcement of the appointment highlighted that “Space Command will be a Joint Command, staffed from all three Services of the Armed Forces, the Civil Service and key members of the commercial sector at RAF High Wycombe.

“Based at RAF High Wycombe, Space Command will be a Joint Command, staffed from all three Services of the Armed Forces, the Civil Service and key members of the commercial sector. It brings together three functions under a single 2-Star military commander: space operations, space workforce generation and space capability.

“Strategic Command leads on developing joint enabling capabilities across the land, sea, air, cyber and space domains. In the space domain these include Satellite Communications, Position, Navigation and Timing as well as Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

“As Defence’s integrator Strategic Command works closely with the Space Directorate in Head Office and Space Command in the RAF to ensure they can collectively deliver the capabilities Defence needs to operate and fight in the Information Age.

General Sir Patrick Sanders, Commander of Strategic Command said: “The benefits we derive from Space are vital to our economy, our way of life and to our national security.  In particular we rely on space for the military command and control systems, cyber capabilities, communications, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that Strategic Command provides with our partners to defend the UK and our allies. I look forward to Strategic Command, working very closely with the new Space Command to deliver the integration of these capabilities to our Armed Forces as they operate in the air, on the land, at sea and in cyberspace.”

According to Air Vice-Marshal Harv Smyth, Director, Space : “Space, and our assured access to it, is fundamental to military operations.

“Loss of, or disruption to, the Space Domain, will impact our ability to undertake the majority of Defence Tasks, and has the potential for significant effect on civilian, commercial and economic activity.

“The threat from adversaries in this rapidly maturing domain is real and it is here now.

“If we fail to understand how to operate successfully in the Space Domain through integrated operations, we lose our battle-winning edge.

“The establishment of a UK Space Command for Defence is a crucial step in our development, and will underpin our ability to understand and operate in Space.”

The announcement then added the following: “Direction from the National Space Council will flow through the Space Directorate in MOD Head Office to Space Command and other relevant elements of Defence. It is envisaged that Space Command will interact with the UK Space Agency, as required, to deliver joint national space capability.”

For some of our earlier interviews with Air Vice-Marshal Godfrey, see the following: