Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Unmanned Air Systems and the USMC: A MAWTS-1 Perspective

Posted on October 22, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/22/2020

By Robbin Laird

Two years ago, I published a chapter on the USMC’s recent experience with unmanned air systems in the book edited by John Jackson, entitled, One Nation Under Drones. I focused on the substantial experience they have accumulated with Scan Eagle and then with the Blackjack system.

The primary use has been in terms of ISR in the land wars, but with the return to the sea and now the focus on how the Marines can best help the US Navy in the maritime fight, the focus has shifted to how to best use UASs in the maritime domain.

With the recent decision to cancel its MUX ship-based UAS to pursue a family of systems, the focus will be upon both land-based and sea-based UASs but not to combine these capabilities into a single air vehicle.

As the then Deputy Commandant of Aviation, Lt. General Rudder put it:

“In the next 10 years, the quickest way – the commandant wants to go quick on this – this quickest way will be some sort of land-based high-endurance that can be based and still be able to provide the surface force, the amphibious force the capabilities that we would call ‘quarterback,’ or some sort of node that can provide 24 hours on station time, it will have all the networking and early warning and electronic warfare capabilities that they require for that type of thing,”

But the path to do this is not an easy one. And it is a path which is not just about the technology, but it is about having the skill sets to use whatever system is developed, the connectivity so that the combat effect can be connected to the maneuver force, and to have communication links which have low latency, notably in the maritime fight.

During my visit to MAWTS-1 in early September 2020, I had a chance to talk with Captain Dean, an experienced UAS officer who is a UAS instructor pilot at MAWTS-1. We discussed a wide range of issues with regard to UAS within the USMC, but one comment he made really gets at the heart of the transition challenge: “What capabilities do we need to continue to bring to the future fight that we currently bring to the fight?”

What this question highlights it there is no combat pause for the Marines – they need to be successful in the current range of combat situations, and to re-shape those capabilities for the combat architecture re-design underway?

But what if this is not as significant and overlapping as one might wish?

This is notably true with regard to UAS systems. In general terms, the UAS systems which have been dominant in the Middle East land wars have required significant manning, lift capability to move them around in the battlespace and are not low-latency communications systems. Although referred to as unmanned, they certainly are not so in terms of support, movement of exploitation systems, or how that data gets exploited.

There clearly is a UAS potential for the blue water and littoral engagement force but crafting very low demand support assets, with low latency communications are not here as of yet.

And in the current fights ashore, UASs, like Blackjack provide important ISR enablement to the Ground Combat Element. And as the Marines have done so, they have gained very useful combat experience and shaping of relevant skill sets to the way ahead for the UAS within the future force.

The goal is to have more flexible payloads for the UAS force going forward, but that means bringing into the UAS world, experienced operators in fields broader than ISR, such as electronic warfare.

But there is clearly a tension between funding and fielding of larger UAS’s for the amphibious task force, and between shaping new systems useable by combat teams. And the challenge here clearly is to manage information and to distribute by communications system. Although the phrase about distributing information at the right time and at the right place sounds good, this is very difficult to do, if the data links simply do not expose the combat force to adversary target identification.

This is yet another key area where contested combat space has not much to do with what can do with UASs in uncontested air space.

Captain Dean underscored that since 2015, “we have been able to normalize unmanned aviation with the USMC. We have been able to bring in a lot of experience into the VMUs and with the sundowning of the Prowlers, have brought in Marines experienced with electronic warfare as well. We continue to prioritize our training on the Blackjacks going to the MEUs.”

He highlighted that this posed a challenge for transition. To get full value out of the Blackjacks operating off the amphibious force, changes need to be made on those ships to get full value from operating these UASs. But if the Blackjack is a short term or mid-term solution, the kind of investment which needs to be made is not likely to happen.

What he highlighted was the crucial importance of the infrastructure afloat to make best use of the UASs which the USMC and US Navy will operate. And given the challenge of managing space onboard the ship, sorting out the nature of the infrastructure and how to manage it is a key aspect of the way ahead for UASs.

Another challenge is who wants what within the combat force. If we are looking at the fleet as a whole, the desire is to have fleet wide ISR, or capabilities to deliver combat effect. If one is focused on the battalion, they are focused on having capabilities organic to the battalion itself.

Again this is a development and investment challenges which as well raises questions of what kind of infrastructure can be developed to deal with each of these different operational level requirements. “What does the MAGTF want? What does the battalion want? These are not the same things.”

In short, a key question facing the Marines with regard to UASs: “What capabilities do we need to continue to bring to the future fight that we currently bring to the fight?”

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marines Corps RQ-21 Blackjack UAS is retrieved during Weapons and Tactics Instructors Course (WTI) 1-18 at Yuma, Ariz., on Oct. 13, 2017. WTI is a seven week training event hosted by Marine Aviation and Weapons Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) cadre which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps Aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force. MAWTS-1 provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine Aviation Training and Readiness and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Rhita Daniel)

The UK Defence Strategy: “Integrated Operating Concept”

Posted on October 21, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/21/2020

The UK is clearly in a period of significant strategic change.

The twin impacts of COVID-19 and BREXIT are enough to assure that.

With the significant impact of the new aircraft carrier driving significant change with regard to air-sea integration, an evolution we have spent considerable time engaged in with the RAF and the Royal Navy over the past few ears, it is not surprising that the Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter recently highlighted the new defence strategy.

In a speech on the Integrated Operating Concept, the Chief of Defence Staff provided some details.

The Prime Minister I think has set a clear vision for the future of Global Britain. One where the UK is considered an outwardly looking, internationalist country, that acts as a burden-sharing and problem-solving nation, making a tangible contribution to tackling diplomatic and security challenges in our neighbourhood and beyond.

To do this though and particularly from our perspective in Defence, we must first understand that the threats to our national security, our values and our prosperity have evolved and diversified markedly. Our authoritarian rivals see the strategic context as a continuous struggle in which non-military and military instruments are used unconstrained by any distinction between peace and war. These regimes believe that they are already engaged in an intense form of conflict that is predominantly political rather than kinetic. Their strategy of ‘political warfare’ is designed to undermine cohesion, to erode economic, political and social resilience, and to compete for strategic advantage in key regions of the world.

Their goal is to win without going to war: to achieve their objectives by breaking our willpower, using attacks below the threshold that would prompt a war-fighting response. These attacks on our way of life from authoritarian rivals and extremist ideologies are remarkably difficult to defeat without undermining the very freedoms we want to protect. We are exposed through our openness.

The pervasiveness of information and rapid technological development have changed the character of warfare and of politics. We now have new tools, techniques and tactics that can be used to undermine political and social cohesion, and the means to make the connection to an audience ever more rapidly. Information is now democratised. It’s available for everyone.

Our adversaries have studied our ‘Western way of war’, identified our vulnerabilities and modernised their own capabilities to target them. The campaigns of the last 30 years have been played out over global media networks. From the first Gulf War in the early 1990s to the air strikes in Bosnia and Kosovo, the response to the terrorist attacks on embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and of course the campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – all have been watched closely by our rivals.

They saw that air power could penetrate deep into hostile territory and learned that we preferred to fight and strike targets from afar. They saw that this enhanced our natural aversion to putting people in harm’s way. They watched how casualties, financial cost and length of time swayed domestic and public opinion and the effect that had on the legitimacy assuring the use of armed force.

So they learned how to improve their own resilience to absorb strikes; they developed anti access denial systems; they improved their maritime undersea capabilities; they developed long range missile systems; they integrated Electronic Warfare, swarms of drones with multiple fires and used these to defeat armour; they invested in space and cyber, recognising the importance we attach to global positioning and digitisation. And in Ukraine and Syria Russia has created battle laboratories from real life events to develop their tactics and battle harden a new generation of soldiers.

The US Department of Defence’s latest annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China highlights that the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the People’s Liberation Army. Including growing the largest maritime surface and sub-surface battle force in the world; an armoury of ground launched cruise and ballistic missiles – some of which have ten times the range of conventional ballistic missiles; one of the world’s largest forces of advanced long range surface-to-air systems; and of course expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint.

They have also harnessed technologies and tactics that have outpaced the evolution of international law to avoid their actions being classified as conflict under the current definitions of international law. Authoritative PLA texts have argued that the ambiguous boundary between peace and war opens up opportunities for the military to achieve its ends, disguising its activities as civilian, and therefore peaceful.

China’s new Strategic Support Force is designed to achieve dominance in the space and cyber domains. It commands satellite information attack and defence forces; electronic assault forces and Internet assault forces; campaign information operations forces, which include conventional electronic warfare forces, anti-radiation assault forces, and battlefield cyber warfare forces. All of this is available in the open domain.

Now, Western states draw legitimacy from respect for the rules, conventions and protocols of war. Where we see morals, ethics and values as a centre of gravity, authoritarian rivals see them as an attractive target. And all of a sudden the idea of ‘lawfare’ becomes a helpful tool in their inventory. The term ‘lawfare’ covers different meanings. In this context though, it entered national security parlance when it appeared in ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ – written on military strategy in the late 1990s by two PLA officers who used the term to refer to a nation’s use of legalized international institutions to achieve strategic ends.

But ‘lawfare’ also applies to the challenge we have encountered in recent campaigns where we need to update our legal, ethical and moral framework to properly hold our forces to account if they break the law, while ensuring they have appropriate freedom of action to seize fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

The COVID crisis has highlighted how the use of propaganda, data misuse, disinformation, and strategic influence is presenting complex and rapidly evolving challenges for researchers, civil society, and of course for policymakers. And our autocratic rivals have utilised these techniques most effectively. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is tracking how a range of actors are manipulating the information environment to exploit the COVID-19 crisis for strategic gain – including pro-Russian vaccine politics whose disinformation narratives are designed to permeate anti-vaccination social media groups.

Russia has used cyber and information attacks against its opponents regularly in the last few years. Notable examples included Ukraine’s financial and energy sectors in 2017 and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2018. Iran and North Korea are following suit. And the online national security forum ‘War on the Rocks’ in their ‘Digital Authoritarianism’ series highlight Russia’s hack-and-leak, ‘kompromat’ operations and the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency troll farm which engages in sowing division abroad.

The WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017 demonstrated how an attacker could rapidly achieve a global effect by spreading a virus through computers operating Microsoft Windows, holding user’s files hostage, and demanding a Bitcoin ransom in return.

This idea of ‘Digital Authoritarianism’ also explores how the Chinese Communist Party is forging a future of mass surveillance and ‘social credit scores’ and is rapidly exporting these tools to other parts of the world. The recent Netflix documentary – A Social Dilemma – describes the way in which online interaction is subliminally influenced leading to the audience becoming unwittingly controlled.

Proxies, private military and security companies (PMCs) and militias are back in fashion as well. The recent report by the US Center for Strategic and International Studies on the expansion of Russian PMCs into security vacuums in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia is worth reflecting on.

Using companies, like the Wagner Group, Moscow can support state and non-state partners, extract resources, influence foreign leaders, and do so with plausible denial. Their military skills and capabilities lend a form of limited power projection, strengthening partners, establishing new military footholds, and altering regional balances to achieve strategic advantage. CSIS estimates that operations like these are underway in 30 countries across some four continents.

Our rivals typically tailor their activities to remain below obvious detection and response thresholds, and they often rely on the speed, volume and ubiquity of digital technology that characterizes the present age. And with an increased emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and amplifying the cognitive elements of war, while dialling down the physical elements. Their way of warfare is strategic, it is synchronized and systematic – and our response must be too.

None of our rivals can afford to go to war as we define it. They want to win below that threshold. However, the stakes are high, the traditional diplomatic instruments that have provided some measure of arms control and counter-proliferation have all but disappeared, with the last arms control treaty, New START potentially ending next February.

The upshot is that the threat of unwarranted escalation and therefore miscalculation between military protagonists is now clear and present. And as the competition for resources, bases and partners intensifies so the risks increase.

The Horn of Africa is a case in point. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute sets out the growth of foreign military bases and a build-up of naval forces in the region since 2001 when the focus was on counterterrorism, counter piracy and of course peace support operations in the wake of 9/11. Currently a wide variety of international security actors operate there — from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia and international networks of military facilities and naval deployments together link the Horn to security developments in the Middle East and the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific, as well as in other parts of Africa. The level of military engagement is matched in the Eastern Mediterranean where the potential for misunderstanding is significant.

And, as we look down the barrel of a global recession it’s worth reflecting on how often financial crises lead to security crises.

So, what should be our response to this ever more complex and dynamic strategic context? My view is that more of the same will not be enough. We must fundamentally change our thinking if we are not to be overwhelmed.

Hence we are launching this Integrated Operating Concept. It has several big ideas:

First of all, it makes a distinction between ‘operating’ and ‘war-fighting’. In an era of persistent competition our deterrent posture needs to be more dynamically managed and modulated. This concept therefore introduces a fifth ‘c’ – that of competition – to the traditional deterrence model of comprehension, credibility, capability and communication. This recognises the need to compete below the threshold of war in order to deter war, and to prevent one’s adversaries from achieving their objectives in fait accompli strategies. As we have seen in the Crimea, Ukraine, Libya and further afield.

Competing involves a campaign posture that includes continuous operating on our terms and in places of our choosing. This requires a mindset that thinks in several dimensions to escalate and deescalate up and down multiple ladders – as if it were a spider’s web. One might actively constrain in the cyber domain to protect critical national infrastructure in the maritime Domain.

This campaign posture must be dynamically managed and there must be a preparedness to allocate consistent means over longer term horizons, while adjusting the ways to anticipate a rival’s response. The ways will include actions being communicated in a manner that may well test the traditional limits of statecraft.

This posture will be engaged and forward deployed – armed forces much more in use rather than dedicated solely for contingency – with training and exercising being delivered as operations. It will involve capacity building and engagement in support of countries that need our support. This could include partnered operations against common threats – particularly violent extremism. And this may involve combat operations.

It will also place a premium on building alliances and improving interoperability to make us more ‘allied by design’ and thus able to burden share more productively.

It is important to emphasise that the willingness to commit decisively hard capability with the credibility to war fight is an essential part of the ability to operate and therefore of deterrence.

The second important idea is that we cannot afford any longer to operate in silos – we have to be integrated: with allies as I have described, across Government, as a national enterprise, but particularly across the military instrument. Effective integration of maritime, land, air, space and cyber achieves a multi-Domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts – recognising – to paraphrase Omar Bradley – that the overall effect is only as powerful as the strength of the weakest Domain.

And third we have to modernise. We must chart a direction of travel from an industrial age of platforms to an information age of systems.

Warfare is increasingly about a competition between hiding and finding. It will be enabled at every level by a digital backbone into which all sensors, effectors and deciders will be plugged. This means that some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for sunrise. The trick is how you find a path through the night. We know this will require us to embrace combinations of information-centric technologies. But predicting these combinations will be challenging.

We will have to take risk, accept some failure and place emphasis on experimentation by allocating resources, force structure, training and exercise activity to stimulate innovation in all lines of development, with a responsive commercial function at the leading edge. This will enable adaptive exploitation as opportunities become clear and allow better financial control.

Throughout we must recognise that the nature of war doesn’t change – it is always visceral, it is always violent, and it always involves interaction between people, in the final analysis one has to go close and personal with one’s enemy. So, while this Integrated Operating Concept places a premium on operating, it also places a premium on adaptability – the ability to adapt to war fight. And this in turn emphasises the importance of our people – who have always been, and always will be, our adaptive edge.

Further details on the new approach was provided by another senior UK official in a discussion with defense specialists. This official noted that

“We must recast defense to focus on integration. Why?

“Well simply put, we remain configured for joint operations in the era of industrial warfare and we haven’t shifted at the pace needed to be an integrated force able to operate and fight in the information age.”

After describing a wide range of threat dynamics, the official focused then on how to navigate the way ahead.

“But we hold a significant advantage. Our ability to work in an integrated joint and fused manner with allies and partners. And that is the case for change.

“Our response must be to pursue integration. Joint is simply no longer enough. We have to be integrated across government with our allies, and across the five operational domains to counter this threat and to protect our interests and national advantage.

“We must focus on delivering an integrated operating concept compatible for structure. One that’s credible to deter above the threshold and more competitive below the threshold with global reach to operate persistently and be prepared to fight when necessary.

“And the other dimension to our response must be to pursue innovation. In order to respond to these threats, we need to match their focus on technology and innovation. We must transform our approach to people, capabilities and procurement to ensure everything we do it’s digital by design. This will drive the integration we need to compete with our adversaries in environments where they may already have the upper hand.”

The question then is how to shape the way ahead.

One key way to do so is to manage the C2/ISR side of force development as a central one. “We must exploit the data we collect and not treat it as effluent like we currently do. This requires a single cloud environment with computing power to handle bulk data and common standards.”

“We must make a quantum shift in our approach to innovation and research and development and pace, creating, if you like, an UK digital defense advanced research project station, so digital DARPA. And agile software development center that it fuses expertise in data analytics, learning and artificial intelligence, autonomy in robotics and aesthetics and digitalization, blockchain, quantum technologies, 5G.

“But improvements in our own cyber resilience are also fundamental. We have to ensure secure digital foundations by building core security technology, designing security into ICT projects from the outset, as well as addressing known gaps and to ensure great clarity in the deployed environment and in the supply chain. All of this underpinning work is geared towards enabling faster and better decision making, rooted in deeper understanding from all sources and aided by data analytics and supporting technologies.

“Industry will have a key part to play in delivering the digital backbone. Above all an enforcing high standards of network security and resilience in IT systems and those are subcontractors and suppliers.

“The extent of network mapping and penetration by hostile states will be higher than many of you think possible and alarms us all. But equally in our approach to collaboration, innovation, and experimentation, we must drive in approach that opens us up to all the benefits that come into living from access to a broad church of military, academia, and industry to deliver the technology and capabilities we need to ensure the UK and our allies’ prosperity and resilience. Innovation and exploitation of the thriving technology industry the UK has to offer can be our competitive advantage in the fight against our adversaries.

The training side of force development is increasingly significant as well.

“The transparent battle space and how we build up our understanding and the use of synthetic and virtual training are all equally high on my list of priorities and with the opportunity for Q&A I’d love to discuss these with you.

“But now I think the case in favor of integration, multi-domain integration is clear. And the digital backbone we need to deliberate is essential, integrating both by instinct and by design or deliver capabilities that can be deployed to, employed in, and exploit multiple domains to deliver temper.

“The greatest value ultimately we’ll offer though is the ability for us to provide our commanders and ministers as many effective capabilities drawn as possible including non-military to apply combinations the adversary does not expect and cannot guard against.”

Wedgetail Nose Art

Posted on October 21, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

Airmen from RAAF No.2 Squadron designed and painted ‘nose- art’ on an E-7A Wedgetail whilst deployed on Operation OKRA in the Middle East.

The art commemorates the 50th anniversary of the downing ofthe No. 2 Squadron Canberra bomber, ‘Magpie 91’, on 3 November 1970 in jungle on the Laotian-Vietnamese boarder during the Vietnam War.

The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail aircraft returned to Australia in September 2020, following a successful year long deployment to the Middle East.

The aircraft was operating as part of Australia’s Air Task Group 630, performing airborne command and control in the skies above Iraq as part of Operation Okra.

Operation Okra is the Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the United States led Global Coalition to combat the Daesh terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria.

Australia’s support to Iraq comes at the request of the Iraqi Government and is closely coordinated with a broad coalition of international partners.

Air Force Sergeant Nathan Bradford with the nose-art design on an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft in the Middle East region.

(l-r) Sergeant Nathan Bradford and Leading Aircraftsman Sam Chan with their nose-art design on an E-7A Wedgetail aircraft in the Middle East region.

Norway Increases Defense Budget to Support Long Term Defense Plan

Posted on October 20, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/20/2020

According to a press release by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence on October 16, 2020, Norway is increasing its defense spending to strengthen its defense capability and military readiness.

A challenging strategic environment constantly reminds us that cannot take our freedom and security for granted. The Government will continue to invest substantially in defence and security, to ensure that Norway remains a reliable, responsible and capable partner on the Northern flank of the Alliance, says Norwegian Minister of Defence, Mr Frank Bakke-Jensen.

The Government presented a new Long Term plan for Defence to Parliament in April 2020. The deliberations were concluded and debated in early summer in Parliament and the majority in the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence asked the Government to come back to Parliament with a revised plan.

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence asked for elaboration and detailing on eight specific topics. The revised plan will respond to the requests of the committee, and is based on the ambition of the plan that was presented in April 2020.

The plan details a budget increase in the coming eight years. In 2024 the defence-expenditure will increase to a level of 8,3 billion NOK above the 2020 budget. I In the2021 defence-budget, the Government proposed a spending increase of more than 3 billion NOK.

“We will also continue the work of identifying cost-effective solutions wherever possible, both when conducting daily operations and when acquiring new equipment,” says Mr Bakke-Jensen.

Personnel and new technology

The highly skilled and dedicated military and civilian personnel of the defence-sector are the backbone of the Norwegian Armed forces. The number of personnel will gradually increase in order to strengthen the readiness and availability of the Armed Forces, and gradually generate enhanced combat power, says the Minister of Defence.

The current focus of personnel reforms is on diversifying the personnel structure in order to strengthen the capability and the readiness of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and on the further restructuring of the training and educational system.

Norway will also strengthen the system for innovation in the defence-sector and adapt a comprehensive approach to technology exploitation.

The development of the Armed Forces is an ongoing and long-term undertaking. In 2016, the Government set out the course towards a more capable and sustainable defence-force, better able to face the changing security environment. This new Long Term Plan further builds on that foundation. The Norwegian government continues to strengthen the capability and readiness of the defence of Norway, says Mr Frank Bakke-Jensen, Norwegian Minister of Defence.

Strengthened allied dimension

The defence of Norway starts outside territorial borders and Norwegian participation in NATO operations and readiness forces is an integral part of the overall defence-effort.

Norway plays an important role in NATO by operating in and monitoring the Arctic region, by providing situational awareness to the transatlantic security community. The strengthening of NATO’s maritime posture is an integral element of the ongoing adaptation of the Alliance and crucial to Norwegian and allied security.

Allied presence, training and exercise in and close to Norway are of fundamental importance. The Norwegian Armed Forces will continue to train and operate with key allies such as the USA, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, and other units. The government will also continue the development of Norwegian host nation facilities.

Army

Norway will continue to develop the army. Brigade North will be developed with four manoeuvre battalions and with tactical and logistical support. The manoeuvre battalions will be equipped with new main battle tanks, mobile air defence systems and long-range precision fire. Increased firepower, higher readiness and increased sustainability will ensure that the Norwegian Armed Forces remain relevant in the new security environment.

In addition, the modernisation of the Home Guard will continue, including an increased capacity to forward stage weapons, ammunition and other supplies.

Navy

Norway will strengthen the Navy with increased personnel volume. The frigates and submarines will undergo necessary upgrades. In addition, three new Coast Guard vessels will be introduced. In order to preserve the maritime operational capability after 2030 the government has started the planning to replace surface vessels. The Government will inform Parliament about the recommended future development of the surface structure in 2022.

– It is our ambition to acquire and implement future Navy capabilities in collaboration with close allies, says the Norwegian Minister of Defence.

Air Force

The introduction of new aircraft systems will have priority for the Air Force in the years leading up to 2025. The implementation of the F-35 Lightning II continues. P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will replace the fleet of P-3 Orion.

To improve air defence capability, the NASAMS II air defence system will be upgraded with modern sensors, as well as the introduction of a complementary capacity with shorter range.

This will contribute to countering threats against bases, and protect allied reception areas, says Mr Bakke-Jensen.

In the long term, it will be assessed how long-range air defence systems can be introduced.

Home Guard

The modernisation of the Home Guard will continue, including an increased capacity to forward stage weapons, ammunition and other supplies.

Special Forces

The ability of the Special Forces to contribute to both national and international operations will improve with increased personnel volume and one additional maritime special operations task group. The Bell 412 transport helicopters will be replaced by a new capacity that is better suited for the Special Forces.

Editor’s Note: Our new book on European defense will be published next month.

HMAS Hobart and the Regional Presence Deployment 2020

Posted on October 20, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

The Australian Aegis ship returns to homeport after the regional presence deployment 2020.

The Royal Australian Navy is conducting a regional deployment across Southeast Asia from July to October 2020 with HMA Ships Hobart, Stuart, Arunta and Sirius.

The deployment demonstrates Australia’s enduring commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific and to sustaining strong and positive defence relationships with regional nations.

The slideshow highlights HMAS Hobart returning to her home port of Fleet Base East in Sydney after the successful completion of Regional Presence Deployment 2020.

Australian Department of Defence

October 9. 2020

The ship's company stand on the upper decks of HMAS Hobart after the successful completion of Regional Presence Deployment 2020.

An Update on Naval Group: Euronaval, 2020

Posted on October 19, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/19/2020

Paris – Naval Group awaits a high-level political decision on the next-generation aircraft carrier, particularly whether the vessel will be nuclear or conventionally powered, the executive chairman of the French shipbuilder said Oct. 19.

A number of “scenarios” have been studied for the carrier, including the propulsion system, Pierre Eric Pommellet said in a telephone news conference ahead of the opening of Euronaval, a trade show being held on a virtual platform.

The burning question is whether the new carrier will be nuclear powered. France and the US are the only nations to sail nuclear carriers, with the French navy’s Charles de Gaulle flagship allowing membership of an exclusive club of two.

A presidential decision on work on the carrier has been awaited for some months but a delay of a few months counted for little in a program would run for more than 15 years, Pommellet said. Naval Group has provided information on architecture and competence, and was waiting for a decision.

“We are ready,” he said.

The carrier is a big budget item

Building and maintaining a carrier are high cost, with a nuclear vessel pushing up the price. There has been unconfirmed talk of €5 billion for a conventionally powered carrier, rising to €6-€7 billion for a nuclear carrier, French senator Olivier Cigoletti has said.

France is reeling from the cost of the COVID 19 virus, with the 2020 national deficit expected to soar to 11.4 percent of gross domestic product compared to 2 percent in December 2019.

Meanwhile, there are civil and social issues such as the health system, which is under pressure, and tackling Islamic fundamentalism.

More detailed carrier studies could be commissioned, and the critical decision to launch the program could be taken in the next presidency, with the burden of production cost falling in the next two multi-year military budgets.

A new carrier is a highly political decision and a costly one but allows France to fly the tricolor flag on a capital ship which sails both as a diplomatic symbol and a warship to project force around the world.

Whether to make that a nuclear vessel is a separate decision and calls for a political decision on nuclear industrial policy.

Studies have been handed in, considered at the highest level, and the naval industry hopes for an announcement on the carrier, which would be “emblematic,” Hervé Guillou, chairman of GICAN, a trade association, said Oct. 14 on a virtual news conference on Euronaval.

Acquisition of a ship of this kind was a “signal of strategic importance and a diplomatic asset of size,” Ametra group, an engineering company, said on its website.

The armed forces minister, Florence Parly, at the Euronaval show two years ago announced an 18-month study, worth some €40 million ($47 million), on the new carrier. The Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, CEA atomic energy agency and the navy led that study, backed by Chantiers de l’Atlantique, Naval Group, Technicatome, Dassault Aviation, MBDA, Thales and other companies.

Parly has said the new ship would be built at Saint-Nazaire shipyard, western France, and would replace the Charles de Gaulle in 2038. First sea trials would be sailed in 2036.

On track for Australian submarines

Naval Group is “on track” and “ramping up resources” in France and Australia on the Australian Future Submarine, Pommellet said. Working at a distance with staff in Australia is “native” to the project, although work has suffered from lack of travel, due to the Covid crisis, he added.

NG is working on a design study on the 12-strong fleet of Attack class submarines, worth A$50 billion.

The next milestone will be a system functional review in January, to assess the first phase of the design study, which began in 2019. A review of the first phase core work scope opens the way for the second phase.

A new batch of staff from the Australian NG subsidiary recently arrived to work at Cherbourg, northwestern France, where some 40 engineers are being trained.

The Australian subsidiary announced Oct. 16 its first call for local contractors to supply equipment in its local manufacturing package, part of a deal expected to be worth almost A$900 million.

That request includes Australian equipment for the steering gear system, weapons handling system, and main shaft line.

The design study is mature enough to make that call for equipment, which seeks to meet the requirement for local content and technology transfer.

Naval Group also officially opened Oct. 16 its third office in Adelaide, with the Australian defense minister attending the event. The Australian unit has recruited 250 staff so far and the total number of personnel is expected to rise to 3,000.

The work on the Australian submarine and the new French carrier offered work for a new generation, bringing in new people in both those countries, Pommellet said. The work in Australia was a “huge transformation.”

Export outlook

Pommellet gave an overview of export prospects around the world.

NG is in talks with Indian companies to sign up as a local partner in the tender for the P75I submarine program, Pommellet said. The French company was “very well positioned,” had capacity to work locally as required by the Make in India policy, and awaited the next phase.

The P75I program would add a further six diesel-electric boats, adding to the six Scorpene submarines supplied by NG and its local partner, Mazagon. France is in competition with submarine builders from Germany, Russia, South Korea and Spain.

In the Philippine procurement for submarines, the French company kept in touch with the Manila authorities during the crisis, he said. Naval Group could transfer production to that country.

NG continues to hold talks with Greece for the sale of two frigates for defense and intervention, he said.

The French company had been in advanced negotiations for the sale of the FDI warships, armed with naval cruise missiles, when Greece said it would order 18 Rafale fighter jets and four frigates, part of a drive to re-equip its armed forces.

That Greek announcement caught NG by surprise, leaving the French company whether that was good or bad news for the prospective sale of FDI warships.

The planned order of 12 Rafale was reported to be worth €2 billion, with €1.7 billion for the fighters, and €300 million for the MBDA missiles, including Exocet, Meteor, Mica, and Scalp cruise missiles.

In the Middle East, Egypt is a “very important client,” and NG is in talks for “future needs,” beyond NG’s sale of a multi-mission frigate and four Gowind corvettes, he said.

NG sold the Gowind warships with options for two more. There have been reports those options may have been sunk as Egypt is poised to buy two multi-mission frigates from Fincantieri, its Italian partner in the Navaris joint venture.

There are also talks on future needs of the United Arab Emirates, which has bought two Gowind corvettes, he said.

NG is also maintaining the Saudi fleet, he said.

The health crisis has hurt the Middle East, but the company needs to go to the region, be active as there would be a search for more capacity, he said.

Managing the future

NG had stayed on the rails on programs, stayed on budget and is an industrial recovery in the second wave of coronavirus, he said. There has been “no impact,” with France due to adopt a 2021 defense budget in line with expectations.

The question was what would the future hold, what were the consequences, he said.

The key message for Naval Group was that the company had stuck to programs and customers, and that client nations “will remember we were there in the crisis in tomorrow’s arbitrage.”

Qatar’s European Allies Reinforce Qatari Defense

Posted on October 19, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

While the new agreements among Israel, Bahrain and the UAE reshape Middle Eastern dynamics, Qatar is enhancing its position working with European allies.

A recent article on the UK’s Ministry of Defence website highlighted a deepening relationship with Qatar.

During a joint visit to RAF Coningsby on October 14, 2020, the defense ministers of Qatar and the UK reinforced the two countries defense working relationships.

During a tour of the base, which is already home to the UK-Qatari joint Typhoon squadron, the two Defence Ministers signed a Statement of Intent setting out how the UK will offer a British base for the Qatari Emiri Air Force’s (QEAF) recently acquired nine Hawk aircraft.

The QEAF’s latest acquisition opens doors for a potential new UK-Qatari Hawk squadron, which would further deepen the UK’s defence relationship with Qatar and contribute to the security and stability of the Middle East.

Qatar and the UK work closely together to protect that stability. The details of the latest strike by RAF Reaper unmanned aircraft against Daesh have also been released today by the Ministry of Defence that were co-ordinated by the RAF’s No.83 Expeditionary Air Group in Al Udeid, Qatar.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:

“Today we mark the start of an exciting new chapter in the longstanding defence relationship between the UK and Qatar, reinforcing and strengthening the bonds our Armed Forces already share.

“Building upon the success of our joint Typhoon squadron, this new era of collaboration will deliver prosperity and security benefits for both our nations.”

The Defence Secretary and His Excellency Dr Khalid bin Mohamed Al Attiyah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs in Qatar, also officially opened the joint Typhoon squadron (12 Squadron) headquarters during their visit to RAF Coningsby today.

12 Squadron is the UK’s first joint squadron since World War Two, and its new headquarters will allow pilots and air crews from both air forces to train together in state-of-the-art facilities.

Built in under 60 weeks by a team of over 30 sub-contractors from both national and local supply chains, it is expected that the basing of a new Hawk squadron will bring similar benefits to the UK.

Since commencing flying as a joint squadron in June 2020, 12 Squadron have achieved several milestones including training with heavy weapons and taking part in an exercise at sea alongside the Royal Navy.

The Statement of Intent will build on this work by providing the RAF with access to increased flying hours, giving the QEAF access to world-class RAF accredited training, and delivering long-term investment in infrastructure and training facilities to the RAF.

This partnership will also enable the two nations to continue discussions to establish a suitable air-to-air refuelling support solution for Qatar, which would see the RAF and QEAF further aligned on Multi Role Tanker Transport capability.

Today’s event builds upon the Defence Secretary’s talks with HE Dr Khalid during his visit to Qatar in September, where he also toured the Combined Air Operations Centre in Al Udeid, where strikes are coordinated from as part of Operation Shader.

The Italian Dimension

A September 18, 2020 article published on the Italian Ministry of Defence website highlighted the launch of the first patrol ship being built in Italy for the Qatari Navy.

Today, at Fincantieri Muggiano Shipyard, Defence Minister Lorenzo Guerini and Qatar Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister for Defence Affairs Khalid bin Mohammad al Attiyah have attended the launch of the first Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV), based on Fincantieri – Qatar procurement agreement.

The ceremony was attended also by Fincantieri Chairman Giampiero Massolo and CEO Giuseppe Bono, and Italian Ambassador to Qatar Alessandro Prunas.

Today’s launch is part of a broader € 4B contract which includes the procurement of 7 new-generation surface vessels: 4 corvettes, 1 amphibious ship and 2 patrol vessels. The 2016 Qatar-Fincantieri contract was signed within the framework of an Italy-Qatar Gov-to-Gov agreement.

This is the largest contract signed by Fincantieri with a foreign Navy, and one of the largest on the surface vessel market recently signed at the global level. The first corvette was already launched, while the second and third are in the making and the he sheet metal cutting of the fourth one has taken place today.

“Italy and Qatar have had very strong relations for quite some time, as shown by today’s launch. Fincantieri confirms to be a top company, an industry with a growing global vocation, that has recently won the contract for the US Navy new generation frigates, besides being the reference partner for the Italian Navy “, Minister Guerini said.

Addressing his Qatari counterpart, he declared:”I hope that Qatar will be fully satisfied with this product of an Italian excellency such as Fincantieri.

Besides the industrial aspect of today’s event, this is a fundamental step for the strategic partnership between Italy and Qatar which, starting from the naval contract, for the last few years has seen an exponential growth in the relationship between our Armed Forces, including important developments in the land and aeronautics sectors.”