By Robbin Laird, Williams Foundation Research Fellow

Recently, the third and final Air Warfare destroyer, appropriately named HMAS Sydney was commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy.

This was a very significant moment on many levels for Australia and for its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

For this is not just about what a single Air Warfare destroyer capable of doing; it is about what it can do when operating as part of the broader maritime kill web, either to defend Australia out to its first island chain, or to contribute to a wider set of defense challenges in the region an beyond.

The Air Warfare destroyer is a key foundation for the new wave of Australian shipbuilding, one in which mission systems and integratable is a key requirement.

It is also about learning from that build process to set in motion a new approach, which I have highlighted in my report on the new build offshore patrol vessel.

In an article which I published in USNI Proceedings in 2012, I highlighted the coming of the kill web in my concept of the long reach of Aegis. The ADF in embracing the fifth-generation revolution and the opportunity to reshape the ADF along the lines of an integratable force, views the coming of the Air Warfare Destroyer not simply in terms of a powerful new platform for the Navy, but as a contribution to the integrated distributed force.

As RAAF Air Vice Marshal Chipman, now the Australian Military Representative to NATO and the European Union put it earlier in an interview:

“We need to have broad enough of a perspective so that we can drive programs towards joint outcomes.

“For example, it will be crucial to bring E-7, with F-35 and air warfare destroyers into a common decision-making space so that we can realise built in capabilities for integrated air and missile defense.”

“And that needs to be informed by shaping a common perspective with the USN and USAF as well.

The commissioning of the final and latest Air Warfare Destroyer was highlighted in a story published on May 19, 2020 by the Australian Department of Defence on May 19, 2020:

The Royal Australian Navy welcomed its newest Air Warfare Destroyer into the fleet yesterday. 

The commissioning ceremony, off the coast of New South Wales, marked the moment the 147-metre-long HMAS Sydney V became one of Her Majesty’s Australian Ships.

It is the first time since World War II that a RAN warship has been commissioned at sea. 

Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mike Noonan and Commander of the Australian Fleet Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead were aboard the guided missile destroyer to officially welcome her into service.

Vice Admiral Noonan told the commissioning crew that Sydney’s history had a legendary pedigree.

“You will all form part of the HMAS Sydney fabric. You are sailors and officers who will all continue the proud Sydneylegacy,” Vice Admiral Noonan said.

“It is a great responsibility – one I know each and every one of you is capable of honouring and carrying forward in to the future.

“HMAS Sydney, welcome home, welcome back to our fleet. Your name once again takes pride and its rightful place in Her Majesty’s fleet.”

During the ceremony the ship received a blessing and Sydney’s Commanding Officer, Commander Edward Seymour, read the ship’s commissioning order before the Australian white ensign was hoisted, signifying completion of the commissioning. 

She brings an outstanding, Australian-built air warfare capability over an exceptional range and gives Navy a surface combat capability like never before.

The crew also watched video messages of congratulations from Governor-General David Hurley,  Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds and the ship’s sponsor, Judy Shalders. 

Commander Seymour said he was proud to lead the ship’s company and carry forward the legacy of previous Australian warships that carried the name.

“It isn’t often in a naval career that you are part of commissioning a brand new warship, but to do so at sea and carrying the significant legacy behind the name Sydney, is a special feeling for the entire ship’s company,” Commander Seymour said.

“A lot of hard teamwork has led us to this moment of bringing a world-class warship into the fleet and we’re eager to now prove what Sydney can do.

“She brings an outstanding, Australian-built air warfare capability over an exceptional range and gives Navy a surface combat capability like never before.”

Sydney is the last of three Hobart-class vessels built for Navy at Osborne in South Australia and is based on the Navantia F100 frigate design.

She is equipped with advanced combat systems, providing the ship with layered offensive and defensive capabilities to counter conventional and asymmetric threats.

Sydney will now undergo her test and evaluation period where she will integrate into the fleet, and Navy personnel will develop their proficiencies with her cutting-edge Aegis combat system.

Sydney’s sister ships, Hobart and Brisbane, commissioned in 2017 and 2018 respectively and all three vessels are home-ported at Fleet Base East in Sydney.

The first RAN vessel to be commissioned at sea was HMAS Matafele. The World War II stores carrier was commissioned on January 1, 1943.

See also, the following:

Visiting HMAS Hobart: A Key Building Block in the Remaking of the Royal Australian Navy

Also, see the ASPI report published in 2018:

By Robbin Laird

Over the past few weeks, I have been discussing with USAF and U.S. Navy officers, how the two services are training to shape greater synergy with regard to the integrated distributed force.

The fusing of multiple sensors via a common interactive self-healing web enhances the ability of the entire force, including key partners and allies, to engage cooperatively enemy targets in a time of conflict.

Interactive webs can be used for a wide range of purposes throughout the spectrum of conflict and are a key foundation for full spectrum crisis management.

To play their critical role when it comes to strike, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, this final layer of the web needs to have the highest standards of protection possible.

From the USAF and US Navy perspective, where does the USMC fit into the evolving kill web approach?

Clearly, one answer which has been given several times can be expressed in terms of one of the Marines key competence – bringing an integrated force to a mobile operational setting whether afloat or ashore.

It is important to consider a base afloat or ashore as part of the chessboard from a basing point of view.

Too often when one mentions basing, the mind goes quickly to a fixed air or ground base, but in the evolving strategic environment, an ability to work across a wide variety of basing options is crucial.

And no force in the world is more focused on how to do this than the USMC.

And with the arrival of the USS America class LHA, the amphibious fleet moves out from its greyhound bus role to being able to contribute fully to sea control in transit or in operations, thereby relieving the U.S. Navy large deck carriers from a primary protection role.

To be clear, when one is talking about a combat cloud, the processing power empowering webs comes from cloud processing power.

With a focus on interactive kill webs, the processing power is distributed.

The capability of the F-35s to hunt as a pack and through its CNI system and data fusion capabilities, the pack can work as one.

The integration of the F-35 into the Marine Corps and its ability to work with joint and coalition F-35s provides significant reach to F-35 empowered mobile bases afloat or ashore 

When I last visited MAWTS-1 at MCAS Yuma, I had a chance to discuss the evolving focus on mobile basing and learned that indeed the US Navy and USAF were visitors to Yuma to discuss mobile basing.

Because the approach to mobile basing is being worked in the context of preparing for conflicts against full spectrum capable adversaries, in effect, the mobile basing approach will be about moving pieces on the kill web chessboard.

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Major Brian “Flubes” Hansell, MAWTS-1 F-35 Division Head, with regard to how the Marines are working the F-35 into their approach or better yet approaches to expeditionary basing.

I have a number of takeaways from my conversation with Major Hansell, which include points that he made, but also extrapolations from our conversation as well.

The first takeaway is that following a significant focus on the land wars in the past twenty years combined with the return to the sea, the Marines are shaping new capabilities to operate at sea and in a way that can have significant combat effects on the expanded battlespace.

And they are doing so from expeditionary bases, afloat and ashore.

According to Major Hansell: “The Marine Corps is a force committed to expeditionary operations. When it comes to F-35, we are focused on how best to operate the F-35 in the evolving expeditionary environment, and I think we are pushing the envelope more than other services and other partners in this regard.

“One of the reasons we are able to do this is because of our organizational culture. If you look at the history of the Marine Corps, that’s what we do.

“We are an expeditionary, forward-leaning service that prides itself in flexibility and adaptability.”

The second takeaway is that the coming of the F-35 to the USMC has expanded their ability to operate within a broader kill web and to both empower their expeditionary bases as well as to contribute to the broader kill web approach.

The Marine’s F-35s are part of the broader joint and coalition force of F-35s, and notably in the Pacific this extends the reach significantly of the Marine’s F-35s and brings greater situational awareness as well as reach to other strike platforms to the force operating from an expeditionary base as well as enhancing the kill web reach for the joint or coalition force.

As Major Hansell put it: “By being an expeditionary, forward-based service, we’re effectively extending the bounds of the kill web for the entire joint and coalition force.”

The third takeaway is how the concepts of operations empowers a kill web approach.

The F-35 is not just another combat asset, but at the heart of empowering an expeditionary kill web-enabled and enabling force.

On the one hand, the F-35 leads the wolfpack.

This was a concept which Secretary Wynne highlighted when I worked for him in DoD.

His perspective then is now reality and one which empowers an expeditionary force.

As Major Hansell put it: “During every course, we are lucky to have one of the lead software design engineers for the F-35 come out as a guest lecturer to teach our students the intricacies of data fusion.

“During one of these lectures, a student asked the engineer to compare the design methodology of the F-35 Lightning II to that of the F-22 Raptor.

“I like this anecdote because it is really insightful into how the F-35 fights.

“To paraphrase, this engineer explained that “the F-22 was designed to be the most lethal single-ship air dominance fighter ever designed.  Period.

“The F-35, however, was able to leverage that experience to create a multi-role fighter designed from its very inception to hunt as a pack.”

Simply put, the F-35 does not tactically operate as a single aircraft.

It hunts as a network-enabled, cooperative four-ship fighting a fused picture, and was designed to do so from the very beginning.

“We hunt as a pack.

“Future upgrades may look to expand the size of the pack.”

The hunt concept and the configuration of the wolfpack is important not just in terms of understanding how the wolfpack can empower the ground insertion force with a mobile kill web capability but also in terms of configuration of aircraft on the sea base working both sea control and support to what then becomes a land base insertion force.

The fourth takeaway focuses on the reach not range point about the F-35 global enterprise.

The F-35 wolfpack has reach through its unique C2 and data fusion links into the joint and coalition force F-35s with which it can link and work.

And given the global enterprise, the coalition and joint partners are working seamlessly because of common TTP or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

As Major Hansell put it: “From the very beginning we write a tactics manual that is distributed to every country that buys the F-35.

“This means that if I need to integrate with a coalition F-35 partner, I know they understand how to employ this aircraft, because they’re studying and practicing and training in the same manner that we are.

“And because we know how to integrate so well, we can distribute well in the extended battlespace as well.

“I’m completely integrated with the allied force into one seamless kill web via the F-35 as a global force enabler.”

The fifth takeaway is the evolving role of the amphibious task force in the sea control mission.

With the changing capabilities of strategic adversaries, sea control cannot be assumed but must be established.

With the coming of the F-35 to the amphibious force, the role of that force in sea control is expanding and when worked with large deck carriers can expand the capabilities of the afloat force’s ability to establish and exercise sea control.

With the coming of the USS America Class LHA, the large deck amphibious ship with its F-35s onboard is no longer a greyhound bus, but a significant contributor to sea control as well.

As Major Hansell noted: “The LHA and LHD can plug and play into the sea control concept. It’s absolutely something you would want if your mission is sea control.

“There is tremendous flexibility to either supplement the traditional Carrier Strike Group capability with that of an Expeditionary Strike Group, or even to combine an ESG alongside a CSG in order to mass combat capability into something like an expeditionary strike force.

“This provides the Navy-Marine Corps team with enhanced flexibility and lethality on the kill web chessboard.”

The sixth takeaway is that MAWTS-1 overall and the F-35 part of MAWTS-1 are clearly focusing on the integrated distributed force and how the Marines can both leverage an overall joint and coalition force able to operate in such a manner as well as how the Marines can maximize their contribution to the integrated distributed force.

Similar to the comments made in my recent interviews at Nellis, Major Hansell highlighted that MAWTS-1 was focusing upon shaping integrated force problem solving as a core aspect of their training.

According to Major Hansell, the CO of MAWTS-1, Colonel Gillette has put a priority on how to integrate as best as we can with the Navy, as well as the joint force.”

And for the F-35 period of instruction during all Weapons Schools, we focus a tremendous amount of effort on integrating with the joint force, more so than I ever did on a legacy platform.

“We really strive to make our graduates joint integrators, as well as naval integrators.

And I give Colonel Gillette (the current CO of MAWtS-1) all the credit in the world for moving us to that mindset and pushing us to learn how to operate in the evolving expeditionary environment.”

In short, the USMC provides a critical piece of the kill web puzzle, as the United States and its allies rework their warfighting and deterrence strategies to deal with peer competitors worldwide.

It is clearly a work in progress but new platforms are coming to the Marines, such as the CH-53K which clearly can support more effectively than the legacy asset, mobile basing, as well as the digital interoperability approach, which I have highlighted in recent interviews, which make the Marines more effectively woven into the kill web approach as well.

Also, see the following:

The Strategic Shift and Dynamic Targeting: Meeting the Challenge

By Robbin Laird

With the strategic shift from the land wars to the more fluid battlespace involving peer competitors engaged in full spectrum crisis management with the United States and its allies, one aspect of the change for military forces is how to use lethal force effectively.

This comes down in part to how to target dynamically in a fluid political and military situation.

And within the dynamics of management of escalation, how do I ensure that I have had the combat effect which provides an effective solution set?

From a strictly military point of view, the strategic shift is from deliberate to dynamic targeting.

As one analyst has put the issue of the shift affecting the maritime domain:

“Perhaps the most acute differences that the maritime theater will present are the target sets.

“Targets that can be categorized as deliberate will now be the exception to the rule. Relatively fixed land targets will yield to highly mobile maritime targets.

“Therefore, targets may be known but not fixed.”¹

How significant the shift is can be seen in a USAF explanation of the difference between deliberate and dynamic targeting.

“Dynamic targeting complements the deliberate planning efforts, as part of an overall operation, but also poses some challenges in the execution of targets designated within the dynamic targeting process.

“Dynamic targets are identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting.”²

The assessment adds that:

“Dynamic targeting is a term that applies to all targeting that is prosecuted outside of a given day’s preplanned air tasking order (ATO) targets (i.e., the unplanned and unanticipated targets).”

“It represents the targeting portion of the “execution” phase of effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). It is essential for commanders and air operations center (AOC) personnel to keep effects-based principles and the JFC’s objectives in mind during dynamic targeting and ATO execution.

“It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle rhythm to become too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives, desired effects, or other aspects of commander’s intent.

“When this happens, execution can devolve into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy, with little or no anticipation of enemy actions.”

But what if dynamic targeting becomes the norm and deliberate targeting the exception?

With specific regard to the Pacific, the strategic shift could well generate a significant targeting shift.

But how to train, plan, and execute a dynamic targeting approach?

That is a challenge being addressed by the NAWDC team, with CDR Joseph Fraser, head of the Information Warfare Directorate, which has been designated the executive agent for targeting for the United States Navy.

I had a chance to discuss the strategic shift and the way ahead for working integrated strike within the maritime kill web with CDR Fraser.

I have a number of takeaways from that conversation, but am not quoting the CDR directly, for those takeaways will include some of my own personal extrapolations.

The first takeaway is simple enough: NAWDC is an integrated warfighting center, not simply the classic Top Gun venue.

With officers from the various elements of Navy warfighting present within NAWDC, as well as enhanced engagement with the other services’ warfighting centers, NAWDC makes perfect sense to work the 360 degree dynamic targeting solutions set for an integrated distributed force.

Obviously, this is both challenging and a work in progress.

But the core point is that Navy has laid the foundation within and at NAWDC to shape such a way ahead.

The second takeaway is that the new combat platforms coming into the force provide the information and data environment to work a dynamic targeting solution set.

Notably, both the F-35 and the Advanced Hawkeye have come to the carrier wing since we were last at Fallon, but it is also the case that the data being generated by these aircraft are being worked across not just the fleet but the joint combat force.

Or put another way, the new platforms coming to the fleet are capable of enabling a kill web maritime force.

Or put yet another way, the quality of the data that’s coming off of these new platforms enables dynamic targeting.

The third takeaway is that with the reliance on a precision weapons stockpile, it is crucial to get best value out of that capability.

It is not World War II weapons stockpiles at work; weapon effectiveness in terms of being able to identify and destroy targets that matter most need to be prioritized and dealt with in a combat situation.

The fourth takeaway is that within a cluttered maritime combat environment, target identification is always challenging, but if one wants to prioritize the most significant targets, clearly effective ISR with time urgent decision making against mobile targets is a key element for mission success.

The fifth takeaway is that by working a new model of dynamic weapons engagement now prior to the coming of directed energy weapons to the fleet, it will be possible to determine how to use these new technologies effectively by which platforms, in which situations and in which combat areas within the fluid and extended battlespace.

This can also be true with regard to future precision weapons as well and can provide a guide for shaping a future weapons inventory.

Which weapons would make a significant difference if added to the fleet to maximize dynamic targeting capabilities against which adversaries and in which situations?

The sixth takeaway is this is an area where expanded work with the other services is clearly crucial.

But if the Pacific is taken as a baseline case, then the question of maritime targets, or targets that operate within that domain become crucial challenges to be dealt with.

And, certainly in my view, these targeting challenges really have little to deal with the legacy targeting solution sets generated in the land wars, and, frankly, the lessons learned will have to be unlearned to some extent.

What this means in blunt terms, is that the Navy plays a key role in this strategic targeting shift.

In short, we are talking about targeting solutions enabled by interactive webs, but not necessarily what passes for joint targeting.

The maritime domain is very different from the land or air-space domain.

While the US Army and USAF can provide key capabilities to provide for dynamic targeting, the domain knowledge of the US Navy will be a central piece of the puzzle.

And much the same could be said with regard to the other domains, and what the role of the US Navy would be in a dynamic targeting solution set.

Much like how words like C2, ISR and training are being changed fundamentally in terms of their meaning with the building of a kill web integrated distributed force, the term joint also is changing, or will need to change if combat effectiveness is to be realized.

There is a tendency to slip into the last twenty years of jointness which has been dominated by the US Army and the land wars.

The Pacific is dramatically different.