By Robbin Laird

In our last interview with Rear Admiral Garvin, we focused on how the P-8 / Triton dyad was reshaping the approach of the airborne element of the anti-submarine network.

We spoke at length about how the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) could be recast into interactive webs that will empower more effective strike at the most critical point of attack.

In effect, what we see coming in the Pacific and in the Atlantic are interactive sensor webs that extend the reach of core platforms and their onboard sensors. 

The fusing of multiple sensors via a common interactive self-healing web enhances the ability of the entire force, including key partners and allies, to cooperatively engage enemy targets in a time of conflict.

Interactive webs can be used for a wide range of purposes throughout the spectrum of conflict and are a key foundation for full spectrum crisis management. To play their critical role when it comes to strike, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, this final layer of the web needs to have the highest standards of protection possible.

As one analyst has put it: “The kill part of the web is crucial.

“However, there are many scenarios where the same web is needed, but for other purposes.

“The point is that the “web” facilitates alignment of sensing, C2, and actionable outcomes (i.e. – shooters of various types).”

The interactive webs enhance the reach of any platform within a task force and thus create synergy amongst non-contiguous assets that are combined against a specific threat.

Interactive webs also provide redundancy and depth for distributed operations and inherent resiliency and survivability that a convergent combat force simply will not have.

We started with a discussion of the reach of the maritime patrol enterprise by focusing on a way to conceptualize the way ahead for shaping an integrated distributed force.

If one conceptualizes the battlespace as layers of visuals placed one on the other, it becomes clear what is different in terms of leveraging the combat force within an interactive web.  The first layer would be the operational geography of the battlespace.

The second layer would be the threat elements most relevant to the blue force.

The third layer in the case of a maritime patrol enterprise would be commercial maritime shipping traffic.  Unlike air traffic, maritime traffic is very diverse, very large, and provides a key masking function for any adversary.

The fourth layer would be the laydown of blue assets, including the geographic distribution of allied forces in the region or area of interest. The fifth layer would then be where the P-8 / Triton dyad operates.

With such a schematic, it is quickly evident that if the U.S. Navy’s P-8 / Triton dyad is integratable with allied maritime patrol capabilities the reach of both the U.S. and allied interactive web capabilities is substantially enhanced.

It is also obvious that if key allies are not engaged then there are holes in the web structure which will either simply be gaps or need to be filled by other means.

In simple terms, it is clear that the United States and its allies must operate within a convergent set of interactive webs to shape a shared and actionable common operating picture.

The results will significantly empower a combined strike force and, even more importantly, inform decision makers about how to prioritize targets in a fluid combat situation.

There is a particular and often intellectually neglected part of this problem–the existence of offensive nuclear capability.  

As an example, in the Pacific there are three nuclear powers. Nuclear deterrence is woven throughout any considerations of conventional operations, so there is a clear need to add a strategic overlay of the battlespace, which considers potential consequences and focuses on making the right target decisions in a fluid battlespace. This “wildcard” should give pause to those who tout AI enabled kill chains.

Decision makers need to step back and consider that while more rapid destruction of targets is important, it must be guided by both tactical and strategic decisions with due regard not just to combat but political effects as well in full spectrum crisis management. Having men in the loop in airborne systems, like the MPRF can certainly contribute to target discrimination efforts.

We also considered the specific challenges of the US Navy working with allies in the maritime patrol enterprise.

For obvious reasons, we first focused on those allies who have already joined the P-8 / Triton dyad effort. 

We then discussed those allies who had not done so but are key partners in working interactive webs with the United States. Prior to highlighting that discussion, let me review who the P-8 / Triton partners are to date.

Australia is the only U.S. ally pursuing both the P-8 and the Triton. As a cooperative partner, similar to the F-35, they participated in the development of P-8A and Triton capabilities from the ground up with the USN.

The British have made a very welcome reentry into the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance arena with the P-8 as well.

During recent visits to RAF Lossiemouth, I saw the program being stood up in Scotland, and they were doing it in such a way that other P-8 partners would be supported as well.

At Lossiemouth I discussed the new infrastructure with key RAF officials responsible for the effort, and that interview will be published later but the key role of standing up new infrastructure to support this effort is crucial to handle the new data rich airplanes, as well as the work with allies in operating the assets.

Having visited Norway earlier this year and having discussed among other things, the coming of the P-8 and the F-35 in Norway, it is clear that what happens on the other side of the North Sea (i.e., the UK) is of keen interest to Norway.

And talking with the RAF and Royal Navy, the changes in Norway are also part of broader UK considerations when it comes to the reshaping of NATO defense capabilities in a dynamic region. The changes on the UK side of the North Sea are experiencing the standup of a P-8 base at Lossie, which will integrate with US P-8 operations from Iceland and with those of Norway as well.

In effect, a Maritime Domain Awareness highway or belt is being constructed from the UK through to Norway.

A key challenge will be establishing ways to share data and enable rapid decision-making in a region where the Russians are modernizing forces and expanded reach into the Arctic.

The Pacific partnership is being expanded as well with the addition of South Korea.

In 2018, the South Korean government announced that would purchase six of the aircraft.  They are thereby joining India, which has its own systems configured on the aircraft. India first P-8I squadron was stood up at Rajali in November 2015.

The Indian Navy operates its entire fleet of eight P-8I maritime patrol aircraft from Rajali and the Indian government announced last year that they intended to buy 10 additional P-8s.

With regard to the P-8 / Triton partners, Rear Admiral Garvin highlighted the opportunities for co-learning, which are generated from common training that occurs at VP-30 and the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Weapons School at NAS Jacksonville, Fl.

He highlighted the famous quote, “You cannot surge trust.”

The working relationships built during high-end tactical training carry over into operations whereby a global community of operators can share operational experience and enrich development of the enterprise.

“My first international visit upon taking command was to Australia, leadership there referred to our working relationship as “mateship.”

“This term accurately describes the collaborative nature of our partnership and demonstrates its importance to ourselves and the rest of the world.”

“We have built similar relationships on varying scales, all around the world.

“These relationships serve as force multipliers, which opens the door to cooperatively leverage technology to deliver networked sensors and a shared understanding of the decisions and options we share across the extended battlespace.”

“Our allies understand the fundamental nature of their region better than we do.

“If you have properly maintained these important working relationships, both interpersonal and technological, then you will have access to the cultural knowledge and human geography that might otherwise would not be available to you.

“We become stronger interactively with our allies by sharing domain knowledge to operate across a wider geographical area.”

“In effect, we are shaping kill web “matesmanship.”

“We clearly have closer relationships with some allies than with others, which shapes policy and data sharing. However, the technology is now out there which can allow us, within the right policy framework, to provide data at appropriate security levels much more rapidly than in the past.

“Our policy frameworks simply need to catch up with our technologies.”

“History has shown us that it is infinitely more difficult to sort out our working relationships in times of intense conflict.

“Those partnerships need to be nurtured and exercised now to help shape our interactive webs into a truly effective strike force over the extended battlespace.”

For Rear Admiral Garvin, working with partner and allied maritime patrol partners is crucial, even when those close partners are operating different platforms.

For example, Japan indigenously developed their own replacement aircraft for its legacy P-3s. He highlighted the healthy sharing arrangements the U.S. Navy has with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in the MDA area.

Similarly, we enjoy a very close relationship with Canada, who operates a significantly modernized P-3, the CP-140 Aurora. He noted that the aperture for increased cooperation with India was opening up as well, a process which he clearly welcomed.

As Rear Admiral Garvin put it: “Put simply, the idea of partners and allies sharing in the web you describe must have, at its core, that underlying, underpinning relationship built upon trust.

“Sometimes buying the same kit does make it easier. But without that relationship it doesn’t matter if you bought the exact same kit.”

Featured Photo: Officer Commanding No. 92 Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, Group Captain Darren Goldie, alongside the ATM-84J Harpoon loaded on the P-8A Poseidon at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, during RIMPAC 2018.

Also, see the following:

Visiting RAAF Edinburgh: An Update on the Aussie P-8 Enterprise

Standing up the P-8/Triton Maritime Domain Strike Enterprise in Australia: Visiting RAAF Edinburgh

The Return of ASW: The Canadian Perspective

Enhancing Northern Tier Defense: The UK and Norway Prepare for the Coming of the P-8

The UK and Norway Shape Enhanced Cooperation for ASW Operations in the North Atlantic

By Robbin Laird

With the strategic shift from the land wars to engaging in higher end conflict situations with peer competitors, electronic warfare and its role is changing as well.

When Ed Timperlake and I visited Fallon in 2017, we met with members of HAVOC, the US Navy’s Airborne Electronic Attack Weapons School. It was clear that much of the experience of the team had been in supporting ground forces in the land wars and played a significant role in so doing.

But it was clear that the team was transitioning as well for the strategic shift, and the expanded role of electronic warfare with peer competitor engagements.  We highlighted in our report about that meeting the following:

“It is clear that the HAVOC leadership looks at their work as providing key tools for the current fight, including embedding Naval aircrews with ground maneuver elements in our current wars.

“However, they are also significantly laying the foundation for the con-ops evolution of many the tactics and training for combat employment of high intensity non-kinetic payloads in the digital battlespace. Significantly in building to the future, they are working their “tron magic” across the joint and coalition force.”

We discussed with the team, the beginnings of the kill web approach in which working closely with the USAF, the US Navy was focused on expanding the platforms engaged in electronic warfare as a function, rather than simply training to what the Navy’s particular platform, in this case, the Growler could do.

Recently, I had a chance to get an update on the work of HAVOC and discussed the focus of their efforts and the way ahead being shaped by the NAWDC team. CDR Brett Stevenson, the Commander of HAVOC, highlighted how HAVOC was addressing the changing combat environment and how the focus on force integration was a key driver in shaping a way ahead.

We discussed a number of issues, and while I will not quote the CDR directly, I will highlight a number of takeaways from our conversation which provide insights into shaping a way ahead for the tron warfare element within the full spectrum crisis management force.

My first takeaway would start right there – it is about full spectrum of warfare, not just the high-end fight.

Being able to operate within and to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is not a nice to have capability but is becoming a core requirement for effective engagement in conflict scenarios across the spectrum of warfare.

The second takeaway is that HAVOC is not focused on the management of a single exquisite platform per se, but upon how that platform operates in the joint force with other joint or coalition force assets to deliver the broad non-kinetic effect required.

In a core mission area, suppression of enemy air defenses, HAVOC is working closely with the USAF Weapons School at Nellis in shaping a variety of capabilities, including but not limited to F-35, Compass Call, space-based assets and cyber-war assets to deliver the best air suppression capability possible. They along with the USAF are looking holistically at the integrated air defense system.

Within their domain, they are working a kill web approach to generate a synergy of effects enabling the force to take down air defense systems in a much more effective and efficient manner than if it was all about the Growler. In this case, it is about sensors and shooters working together through a non-kinetic kill web.  When the CNO put out his FY21 Unfunded Priorities List (which includes Next Generation Jammer), it is interesting to note is that he equated NGJ and EW with increased lethality for the force.

Integrating such capability into the overall strike mission is a virtual redefinition of what lethal strike actually means in a kill web approach.

A third takeaway is that all the hard work being done between HAVOC and Nellis is not just about honing current operational capabilities.

It is in part, shaping how to leverage the sensors and capabilities inherent in Growler which can be used within both kinetic and non-kinetic kill webs. It is also about shaping domain knowledge informing modernization approaches to the kill web EW capability as well.

This would mean it is not just about upgrading a particular platform but looking at the integrated effect and sorting through where major effects could be had by modernize particular tool sets which might be found on different platforms, rather than having to be resident on a particular platform. Not everyone needs to play quarterback.

The fourth takeaway is that HAVOC is preparing for the coming of the next generation jammer pod on the Growler in the relative short term.

Next Gen jammer is the most significant leap in Navy EW since the introduction of Growler. Next Gen jammers will bring a significant increase in both power and capacity to the Growler.

And that preparation process is not simply about HAVOC watching briefings. It is about being engaged in the test process as well. HAVOC is fully embedded within the NGJ test community and their industry partners.

They are engaged in creating and validating tactics and initial employment options which means that when NGJ comes to the force, the learning curve to operational use will be significantly shortened.

One of NAWDC’s main lines of effort is in creating, validating and ultimately teaching advanced Tactics Techniques and Procedures, and at no time is this effort more critical than when new capabilities are first introduced. Their role is to shape the way the force will employ these new technologies so that Carrier Air Wings can train to these standards, come to Air Wing Fallon to prove them on the range, then be ready to consistently and reliably deliver those capabilities in combat.

This is why HAVOC has been involved in the development of NGJ from the start, and will see it through to fleet introduction and beyond.

The fifth takeaway is that preparation by HAVOC for NGJ is not simply about a particular technology.

The HAVOC team is looking beyond their currently defined capabilities to figuring out what technologies are needed and how we would employ those to their benefit in a high-end fight.

The sixth takeaway is one which is true of most of the current training ranges.

They were set up for legacy adversarial warfare, then adjusted to the global war on terror, and now back to the past, or adversarial warfare, but now in a different technological era.

In the case of NAWDC, the EW ranges were conceived in the 1970s and the ’80s as a place where the carrier air-wing could conduct strike warfare training against an air defense system that replicated the capabilities and tactics of the Soviet Union.

There is clearly a challenge to ensure that the NAWDC range is resourced and equipped with the right training systems that will prepare carrier air-wings to be successful in the high-end fight and to do so within the context of rapidly changing technologies on BOTH the red and blue sides.

And clearly, when it comes to EW, training is always going to be challenging because of the question of dealing with frequency restrictions.

Frequency utilization is definitely a challenge that’s inherent in operating and training for electronic warfare. This enhances the importance of the Australians joining the Growler community and building relevant test ranges in Australia as well. But also highlights the importance of live virtual constructive training in this domain as well as cross linking capabilities in this non-lethal domain with the broader strike force.

The seventh takeaway is the coming of Growler Block II.  

The next iteration of the aircraft will provide additional sensor enhancements will expand battle space awareness to the networked force. And with the evolving capabilities of software upgradeability, there is a clear prospect of proliferating EW capabilities as well within the networked force.

The expanded presence of remote assets will play a role as well of expanding the reach of EW capabilities woven into the kill web as well.

An eighth takeaway is about allies and the Growler.

We did discuss the potential German acquisition of the Growler as well. I would like to say, the CDR reminded me, but if you do not know a fact, you can be reminded of it, that the Germans are long standing partners with the US Navy as well in EW.

The CDR noted that there is a long-standing exchange officer program with the Luftwaffe at VAQ-129, the Growler training squadron. This means that UK and German legacy EW training via Tornado plus the Australians would add up to an EW coalition being trained in the evolving and developing 21^st century approach to EW.

I do know from my visit to Finland that the Finns are interested in a possible Growler acquisition as well.

And the final takeaway is one of the most important from the discussion, namely, the addition of non-kinetic targeteers to the air wing.

Certainly, kinetic targeteers have been part of the air wing for a long time, but with the growing importance of the non-kinetic domain and its integration into kill web operations, there is a growing need for targeting knowledge in the non-kinetic domain.

Growler intelligence officers are fully integrated in the mission planning, execution and debriefing process along with the Growler operators. The non-kinetic targeteers are comprised of both Growler Squadron Intel Officers, and their enlisted Intelligence Specialists and Cryptological Technicians.  These subject matter experts integrate into the broader Carrier Air Wing Intel team, applying their non-kinetic targteteering expertise to aid in mission planning and to inform the efforts of intel collection managers for the entire Carrier Strike Group.

What that then provides is a team able to analyze an air defense problem and determine where the Growler capabilities would fit most effectively in the SEAD mission. This means as well that they will need to know what the other platforms relevant to a SEAD mission could contribute to sort through the most effective division of labor in executing the joint mission.

This means as well these officers can help support not only the Growlers but the entire air-wing to understand the evolving threat which means that the understanding of threat envelope is being continuously maintained and refreshed. In other words, the air wing has on board officers who can inform the operational community about the changing nature of the threat being experienced in ongoing operations.

More generally, there is a 14-week course at HAVOC, that is a distinct training process that produces “Growler Intelligence Officers,” which are Intel “patch-wearers” similar to Growler Tactics Instructors (GTI), or TOPGUN graduates. These highly specialized Intel Officers will either remain on the NAWDC staff, serve at the Electronic Attack Weapons School in Whidbey Island, or other billets where specialized knowledge of non-kinetic effects is desired. They are distinct from the intel team on a Carrier Air Wing staff.

In short, HAVOC is working within the Navy, the joint force and the coalition a way ahead with regard to kinetic and non-kinetic kill web capabilities.

Given the growing potential of such systems within the evolving battlespace, there will be no end of opportunities and challenges for this part of Naval Aviation.

In 2017, the Williams Foundation held a conference on the future of electronic warfare, which featured presentations from both Australian and US Navy Growler operators.