Reshaping Combat Architecture and Training: An Evolving Dynamic

10/09/2020

By Robbin Laird

With the shift from the land wars to rebuilding U.S. forces for contested operations with peer competitors, the role of training is changing significantly. There clearly was innovation during the land wars, but the geographical battlespace was well known, and air and maritime power could operate with impunity in support of ground forces, whether for the maneuver force or counter-insurgency forces.

Those skill sets and concepts of operations reshaped U.S. military forces but in so doing created a generation which has not faced adversaries focusing on denying sea and airspace to those U.S. military forces.

As Major James Everett, Head of the Assault Support Department at MAWTS-1 has put it:

“The vast majority of us grew up in a Fleet Marine Force that understood and constantly trained to fight the insurgencies that ripened in these uncertain environments. And we’ve become quite proficient at it. However, over the past fifteen years, threat of another Great Power Competition has grown quietly in the background….

“Now, having been content to watch China’s rise and its concurrent development and maturation of a modern military, we are faced with a force of devastating potential. This problem set is wildly different than anything that we, as planners and operators, have ever faced before.”

So how do you train in such a way that you are able to break old patterns and learn new ones?

Or even more challenging, how do you shape what those new skill sets need to be?

Shaping a transition from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management is a very significant one, but that transition is enabled by the introduction of new platforms, technologies and approaches.

There is much discussion of multi-domain warfare, but what is really happening with the current force, is leveraging new capabilities to allow for force packages or modules to work together in new ways.

And this is built around a number of innovations in the ISR and C2 domains but does not require the entire force to operate as a multi-domain combat capability.

The combat architecture is evolving and being reshaped in operations, and in training.

In fact, training, operations, and development are part of an interactive cycle whereby U.S. military forces are being reshaped in a dynamic and ongoing manner.

During my visit to NAWDC in July 2020, one clear indication of the change could be seen with the focus there on hosting working groups to redesign the tactics, techniques and procedures, with the operators and for the operators.

It is not just about learning the TTPs for the integrated air wing; it is about rethinking, reworking and training the maritime force to work in an integrated, distributed manner, to deliver the desired combat effect.

Put bluntly, this is about force operational redesign driven by the inputs from the fleet planners as well as key military training centers.

What this approach will highlight are the gaps which emerge as integrability is worked and recommendations with regard to acquisition of where best to fill those gaps.

This is an open-ended process, not a closed loop.

During my NAWDC visit, I had a chance to discuss this evolving approach with CDR Jeremy “Shed” Clark, Senior Leader at the Naval Rotary Wing Weapons School (SEAWOLF) at NAWDC, and with CDR Tim Myers, the CO of TOPGUN at NAWDC.

The topic of the working group-led approach to redesign came into the discussion with CDR Clark after we finished our discussion on the Romeos’ ASW mission sets. He argued that they needed to look at where improvements would most benefit the fleet, and then consider the applicable platforms whose upgrades could address those areas most expeditiously and cost effectively.

The goal would be to look for the most advantageous solutions on a particular platform, rather than looking to upgrade the entire force. These solutions could well be provided via changes or upgrades to other (non-aviation) DoD platforms, identifying a need for a holistic approach.

CDR Clark argued that the U.S. Navy’s ASW community pursued something akin to this in the 1980’s and 90’s but moved away from the approach as ASW became of lesser significance. This meant that for the last decade plus, more stove piped views have prevailed.

But NAWDC is leading a new approach. “We have set up a number of working groups to look at the broader mission areas and to rise to the challenge of establishing the larger TTPs for those mission areas.

“For example, we are looking at how we can accomplish defense of the fleet across the joint force, and then identifying any mission gaps we may have. Then the question is how would we close those gaps across our joint force?”

He noted that they are scheduling quarterly working groups, which include the USAF and USMC as well. While COVID-19 has complicated the schedule, the trajectory is clear. “If we are going to do a full maritime strike, what would that look like and who can contribute?” In the first quarter of this year, NAWDC hosted such a working group which lasted for 2 weeks and essentially was focused on functional TTPs vice platform-centric TTPs. This was the first time NAWDC did this.

Such a “training approach” raises key questions about how best to train to fleet-wide TTPs based on joint capabilities. “This will open people’s eyes to optimizing the acquisition process to fill critical needs.”

The first working group was done largely within the Navy weapons schools but with clear intent to broaden the joint participation. In addition, fleet planners are being included as part of the broader effort.  “The approach has been to bound the problem at NAWDC and then take the effort outside for wider fleet and joint force engagement.”

I was able to continue this discussion with the CO of TOPGUN.  He is also the action officer for the working groups.  “We want to shape a process that could deliver a valuable product, rather than just having a set of meetings. We want products that are key parts of the rethinking process.”

Now that they have demonstrated the proof of concept, they are focused on growing the effort. They are framing key questions which allow for interactive working on end-to-end con-ops. Frankly, from my point of view, what is really being discussed is shaping a kill web-enabled force; one in which the area of interest by the assets currently engaged in combat can work together to deliver the kind of combat affects you want to achieve.

For me, a kill web is focused on combat effects, while a kill chain is focused on targeting as its primary outcome. A kill web about creating a foundation to allow strike group commanders to think about how they employ their combat assets in conjunction with relevant joint or coalition assets, rather than just relying on what they organically own.

When we talked, the next working group was scheduled to meet to focus on integrated air defense. According to CDR Myers, who sent an update on that meeting after it concluded:

“The working group included USAF fifth generation pilots, unmanned combat asset operators, suppression of air defense experts, DoD weapons subject matter experts, and Navy undersea warfare and SEAL officers.”

CDR Myers noted: “We have shared the maritime strike concept of operations with the USAF as they are working on how to project power into the maritime domain. A lot of these TTPs translate nicely to USAF operations.”

The teams are working a very different approach to joint operations in the Pacific compared to joint practices used in the Middle East.

Their ultimate vision is to convene quarterly working groups that would focus on developing the right kind of methodology; maritime strike, counter IADS, full-spectrum defense of the fleet, then more classic air interdiction in more permissive environments. The classic Air Wing has lots of capital in this fourth one, but maritime strike, counter IADS and defense of the fleet required a significant rework, applying gap analysis to shape the way ahead.

He added: “The timeline for implementing these tactical changes is aggressive. To accelerate learning, we are providing these new CONOPS to the fleet and asking for feedback. Strike groups are executing our TTPS as a part of their work-up cycles, and we are immediately taking their lessons learned, what worked and what didn’t, and folding them back into the process.”

“Our CONOPS are written generically but can be applied to specific scenarios. We plan to take the counter-IADS product and have the working group apply it to some very specific operational plans. This will serve as an exemplar for the CONOPs, and hopefully provide constructive feedback to the operational planners.”

“Several feedback mechanisms are in play; we receive feedback on our CONOPS from the Fleet, and as a result of our integrated training events; we provide feedback to the fleet operational planners, including asset allocation, missions and target sets, prioritized targeting lists – all of these feedback mechanisms are going through NAWDC.”

“These functions are really not platform-centric and are happening across platforms; some platforms are optimized for specific aspects of the functions which need to be performed, and others for other aspects; and at certain periods of time, in the combat space.”

I would submit this is a very different concept of training than what was inherited from the land wars – one designed to empower the combat force with innovation from within, rather than being designed in a briefing room and enforced by a hierarchical centralized command. In other words, the ops, training, and development cycle is being reworked, and with it the combat force incorporating those changes and driving further change.

As a result, the kind of innovation required for escalation dominance and control is much more likely to be generated.

Featured graphic: Two The F-35 Lightning II and Aegis Weapon System, worked together for the first time during a live fire exercise at White Sands Missile Range on Sept. 12, 2016. The joint Lockheed Martin, (NYSE: LMT) U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps exercise was the first live fire missile event that successfully demonstrated the integration of the F-35 to support Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA).

As harbinger of the future, I wrote this piece in 2011:

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/january/long-reach-aegis

The Long Reach of Aegis

 

Exercise Deepwater 2020: Aerial Assault Support

U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 366 participate in exercise Deep Water 2020 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, July 29, 2020.

The purpose of this exercise is to increase 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing’s interoperability and readiness on a scale that simulates a peer-level threat. (U.S. Marine Corps Video by Lance Cpl. Gavin T. Umboh)

07.29.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Gavin Umboh

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

This was the announcement of the exercise:

Marines with 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, and 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing are conducting Exercise Deep Water at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, US. Army Fort A.P. Hill, VA, and Piney Island and Atlantic Field, N.C., 29 July 2020.

II MEF conducts these training events on an annual basis; this year, Exercise Deep Water will see two battalions from the 2nd Marine Regiment conduct an air assault in order to command and control many of the various capabilities organic to II MEF.

Exercise Deep Water 20 is a great opportunity for 2nd Marine Regiment to work with multiple Marine Aircraft Groups, and Combat Logistics Battalion 8, as well. A third battalion will act as the opposing force that will resist and react to the air assault.

This added realism provides a unique “force on force” training opportunity.

Ready Spartan Prove 2020

10/08/2020

The Royal Australian Air Force deployed C-27J Spartan aircraft and personnel from RAAF Base Amberley to participate in Exercise Ready Spartan Prove (RSP) in Townsville Queensland from 10 – 18 September 2020.

No. 35 Squadron and No. 383 Squadron operated at austere airfields in a simulated uncertain security environment to practice operational integration.

This included flying from RAAF Base Townsville and establishing deployed airbase infrastructure at the Benning and Macrossan Airfields, approximately 100km inland.

The exercise tested both Squadron’s abilities to integrate with the battle rhythm, information structure and planning products typical of a combined air operation.

According to an article published by Australian Defence Business Review on September 24, 2020:

The RAAF’s C-27J Spartan battlefield airlifter capability has recently been put to the test in an exercise as it seeks to recover from a period of low aircraft availability and missed project milestones.

Exercise Ready Spartan Prove (RSP) was conducted from September 10-18. 35SQN deployed to RAAF base Townsville in Queensland and conducted operations at austere inland airstrips to test the unit’s ability to integrate with the battle rhythm, information structure, and planning products typical of a joint operation.

The exercise saw 35SQN operate on what was basically an operational footing, including aircrews wearing body armour, carrying sidearms, and performing realistic pre-mission tactics briefings. It also worked closely with Townsville’s contingency response unit, 383SQN, which provided ‘adversary’ support to exercise the aircrews’ search, evade, resist, and escape (SERE) training through a series of drills.

“The C-27J is well known for its humanitarian aid and disaster relief efforts,” 35SQN B-Flight commander, SQNLDR Justin Della Bosca said in an ADF news release. “RSP is a ‘home-grown’ exercise, planned by 35SQN members with 383SQN to demonstrate that the aircraft, aircrew and support teams are prepared to respond to the full spectrum of government-directed tasks in future.

“The key training objectives for this exercise include testing agile basing operations and C-27J operations in uncertain security environments,” he added. “This week we have seen self-protection countermeasures loaded into the C-27J by 35SQN’s maintenance teams and their subsequent use in the air, the carriage of a G-Wagen and combat offloads conducted to prove deploy ability, and improve interoperability between expeditionary combat support and tactical air mobility elements.”

The exercise is also being used to exercise the C-27J’s immature sustainment system which continues to fall short of providing budgeted aircraft availability.

The C-27J was placed on the government’s projects of interest watchlist – formerly the projects of concern list – in May 2020 after failing to meet key performance, availability, and project schedule milestones.

“At that time, further effort was required to deliver the electronic warfare self-protection (EWSP) system upgrades, a military type certificate (MTC) and to address long lead time spares delivery,” a Defence spokesperson told ADBR in a September 24 response to written questions. “A Military Type Certificate was subsequently issued in June 2020 (and) sustainment to the C-27J is maturing and showing signs of improvement.”

The aircraft’s capability steward Northrop Grumman Australia and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) Leonardo have reportedly had difficulty sourcing line-item spares for the aircraft and in developing a baseline configuration, meaning many of the aircraft have been unavailable while waiting for spares to be delivered or components repaired.

“C-27J availability – that is, aircraft not undergoing planned deeper maintenance – is currently below required targets,” the spokesperson said. “There has been an increased focus on the planning of scheduled servicing and modifications to the aircraft in order to optimise the aircraft availability. Further efficiencies have been achieved through initiatives in the management of maintenance resources. Additionally, there has been an increased emphasis in sourcing Australian industry support to reduce the turn-around times of unserviceable parts. 

Defence has been working with industry and the OEM to improve spares availability in support of the aircraft,” they added. “The greatest impact will likely be achieved through refinement of the maintenance policy, which is currently being reviewed by Defence experts.

The RAAF expects aircraft configuration and availability to improve once all of the 10-strong fleet have undergone their first major service. “Defence has not as yet carried out all the applicable major servicing,” the spokesperson said.

“As these are conducted, Defence learns more about what is required in the support system, and is able to appropriately address any deficiencies as they occur. This in turn matures the sustainment system as we learn more about the aircraft. Concurrently, Defence and industry have implemented a number of initiatives to improve the sustainment system.”

The spokesperson noted that, “The strategic environment has changed significantly since project approval,” and that, “in the context of the 2020 Force Structure Plan, Defence is reviewing the role of the C-27J into the future…[which] will provide clarity on what capabilities need to be achieved for FOC, and subsequently when FOC could be declared.”

This is a not insignificant statement, perhaps hinting that additional capabilities not originally envisaged when the C-27J was selected for Project AIR 8000 Phase 2 in 2012 – such as secure datalink/SATCOM communications or additional sensors or EWSP capabilities such as those fitted to the RAAF’s C-130Js – will be added in order for the C-27J to achieve FOC.

 

 

 

Shaping Allied Strategy to Deal with China

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Dr. Ross Babbage about his most recent work on the nature of the challenge which China poses to the liberal democracies. His work over the past few years has focused on the nature of the comprehensive challenges posed by the 21st century authoritarian powers, and the importance of Australia and its allies shaping the policy tools and responses required to protect our interest.

Recently, he published an article in the Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies which focused on “Ten questionable assumptions about future war in the Indo-Pacific,”[1] and a jointly authored report entitled, Which Way the Dragon? [2]

Our discussion drew upon both of these sources.

He started by underscoring the rapidity of change, which means that there is a need for a range of options for forecasting Chinese behavior. He argued as well that the dynamics of change within China itself are not well understood, which makes forecasting behavior and shaping consensual policy responses in allied countries even more difficult.

“If you are relying on a single scenario to forecast Chinese behavior, you are very likely to get things badly wrong.”

He highlighted that in Which Way the Dragon?, the team constructed four very different scenarios and he argued that as events unfold, you can look at a particular event as falling into one scenario stream or another. They become lead indicators of a particular future rather than isolated events.

This allows for timely strategy and policy planning decisions with the nature of the probable future already known. It makes the most of trend lines rather than making unimodal judgements in response to individual events.

The four core scenarios can be read in detail in the report but break down into four trajectories.

The first one is Xi Jinping’s dream and his policies come to fruition with Chinese dominance. “We find that very unlikely, but if all the events unfolding over the next few years break well for China, then his dream could be realized.”

The second is they muddle through. The party survives to 2035 but does so by means of compromising domestically and globally in various ways to stay in power.

The third is regime change with China becoming primarily a nationalistic regime using international adventures to consolidate its power.

The fourth is Macro Singapore. The regime adopts dramatic liberalizing reforms so that the core problems within China are addressed, not by repression, but by fundamental regime change.

The central goals are to understand the likely future shape of China in a very timely manner: how China will generate conflict and how to get ahead of the game in dealing with it?

Babbage argued that the challenge will be not only to compete with China but also to be well placed to deter and fight an intense kinetic conflict if that is required.

How to manage crisis with a regime in significant flux and with a wide range of alternative futures?

Babbage argued that the Chinese currently view conflict as operating in “four layers.”  Some Chinese see the four layers as a sequence that they anticipate during the course of a future war with the allies. This thinking echoes the strategic approach of the Chinese Communist Party when it has faced technologically superior opponents in the past – the Kuomintang, the Japanese Imperial Army, UN forces in Korea and in supporting Hanoi’s long campaign during the Vietnam War.

The first layer is political warfare. One of the goals of this political warfare is the inclusion of Taiwan into China. The focus is upon extensive intrusion, interference and manipulation within the liberal democracies and their partners. The agencies of the Chinese Communist Party aim to divide and conquer all of its international opponents and especially a fractured “Western alliance.”

The second layer is a more intense kinetic phase. The PLA has deployed significant strike capabilities, especially their large number of theater ballistic and cruise missiles. “A lot of their capability is unlikely to survive for very long. Their intent is to use most of these missiles early and try and destroy as much allied capability as they can in the Indo-Pacific in initial strikes.”

But while many Western military planners think this would be the “war,” the Chinese do not.

The third phase is a long stalemate. “They don’t plan to surrender, even though they will have taken substantial losses. They plan to draw it out foster the “peace movements” in the West, further accelerate their offensive political warfare operations and stimulate as much disruption and division as they can. They repeat Mao’s famous saying about seeking “a monopoly on patience” and forcing a prolonged war on his opponents.

The Chinese Communist Party logic is that so long as they are not defeated, they are winning.” The CCP’s goal will be to induce a collapse of political will in allied capitals in a long war, whereas most allied efforts are directed towards winning a speedy, clinical military victory on a distant battlefield.”

The fourth phase is an evolution of the third that uses various asymmetric means to continue to inflict pain on the West. The goal: “You’re not going to come out of this well, you cannot win and so you must compromise.”

How then should the West respond?

Above all, it is to understand that we are in this competition for the long haul. “There is a clear need for enhanced resilience and endurance to defend our societies.”

“The term I use is “all-threats resilience” It’s all about resilience. There are currently many programs running in Australia to strengthen the resilience to protect the community against viruses, bushfires and other natural disasters.

“But, there is also increasing focus on making sure that Australia is better prepared for other contingencies, including the ones we are focusing on in this discussion. The clear aim of the Australian Government is to build much more resilience than we have had in the recent past.

“We’re focused on how to have enhanced supply chain resilience, certainly with the United States, but also with other friends, like Japan and South Korea.”

He noted that Australia has expanded its discussions with India, Indonesia and our South Pacific and other Southeast Asian friends about how to shape common responses to the challenges. And he noted that there are opportunities to take Australian rare earth resources, other critical minerals and other key capabilities not only for Australia’s benefit but also to assist our friends. He sees a good prospect for developing a new coalition of trusted, democratic partners to shape fresh, approaches to the resilience of the community of “trusted partners.”

This applies as well to the information space. There is a need to address the challenges of the dysfunctional media operating in the United States and not just in the authoritarian states.

He noted that there is a rising tide of unease and even anger in Asia with regard to China, and Australia is working to turn these deepening concerns into practical policy capabilities, trusted supply chains and greater resilience in the region to resist authoritarian coercion.

Babbage believes the next five years are the primary years of danger as Xi appears to see the window closing on his dream scenario of global ascendancy. Growth in the Chinese economy has slowed markedly, debt is at very high levels and the demographic drag driven by a rapidly aging population and a collapsing workforce are all starting to tell.   “The leadership worries that the sort of advantages that they have now, they’re probably not going to have in five-to-ten years.”

He concluded by arguing that “the tide is actually starting to move in our strategic direction. But we have a lot of work to do and we have a long way to go.”

Editor’s Note: The entry describing the “10 questionable assumptions” article follows:

Are the Indo-Pacific allies certain that their defence planning for the coming two decades is built on sound foundations? Many Western security analysts assume that a modernised version of their highly networked, combined arms operations will be able to prevail in any major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. 

But is this right?

If there is to be a major war in the Indo-Pacific, it is likely to involve a struggle between China and a small number of supporters on the one hand and the United States and its allies and partners on the other. The precise sequence of events in such a catastrophe is difficult to predict but it is certain that Beijing will have as much, or even more, say over the shape of the conflict as Washington.

This is a serious problem for the West because the core agencies of the Chinese government bring strategic cultures, strategies, operational concepts and priorities to the Indo-Pacific that are markedly different from our own. When viewed in this context, even an advanced version of conventional Western strategies and operations could prove seriously inadequate.

The Western allies need to ensure they plan to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win a future war, not just a part of a war, or even the wrong war.

There are at least ten reasons for doubting that the West’s perception of future war in the Indo-Pacific is sound.

For the text of the full article see: https://www.defence.gov.au/adc/publications/AJDSS/volume2-number1/ten-questionable-assumptions-about-future-war-in-the-indo-pacific-babbage.asp

[1] Ross Babbage, “Ten questionable assumptions about future war in the Indo-Pacific,” Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies (August 21, 2020),

[2] Ross Babbage, et. al., Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China’s Strategic Trajectory (CSBA, August 2020).

Training for Electronic Warfare in the High-End Fight

10/06/2020

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to NAWDC in July 2020, I had the chance to continue my discussion on the evolution of electronic warfare with Captain Brett Stevenson, the CO of HAVOIC.

During the earlier teleconference, we discussed a number of issues, most notably that being able to operate within and to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is not a nice to have capability but is becoming a core requirement for effective engagement in conflict scenarios across the spectrum of warfare.

During the July visit, we continued our discussion and discussed a wide range of issues, but here I would like to focus on four, the return of EW, the changing nature of EW, the shaping of Growler Block II and the challenge of training for EW in the high end fight.

The first is basic one: electronic warfare for the fleet was largely in support of the land wars, not a core competence practiced as part of the maritime fight. As Captain Stevenson put it: “In the post-cold war environment we have allowed ourselves to not focus so much on EW.  The average strike group commander did not have to worry about this threat. But we have rediscovered that hiding the strike group as you transit is a key part of the maritime battle. We are having to relearn skill sets.”

The second is that it is really about not just relearning but learning as well. The shift is from platform specific EW delivery to working networks of sensors, to shape the kind of combat effect one would want. According to Captain Stevenson: “We envision networks of sensors that will be contributing to the common operating picture. That means quicker, more accurate geo locations with sensors contributing to the picture.”

Recently, I listened to a presentation by a senior USMC General who suggested perhaps another way to think about the synthesis suggested by the common operating procedure. According to this General: “in a contested operational environment, where we know that our adversaries are getting good and perhaps better than us, we know that we have to learn to provide moments of clarity on demand as opposed to that persistent COP.”

The third is the coming of Growler BLOCK 2. What Captain Stevenson highlighted was not so much an aircraft designed to be an exquisite platform to do EW as a platform evolving to become a quarterback within the EW combat environment.

“What is driving Block II is a reassessment of capabilities to enhance our ability to prevail in the battlespace and overcome gaps that we currently have.”

“Growler Block 2 will be a complete redesign of the crew-vehicle interface. We are looking now at questions like: what processes should be automated? We are looking for ways to allow the crew to focus on the higher-level decision making.  How is data presented so that it is easier to make better decisions? We are focused on ways to ensure that the right data is presented to the crew at the right time.”

“The new sensors are really the fundamental change that brings new capabilities.  CVI makes the operator more efficient at employing those capabilities.”

“We need to go beyond the aircraft and leverage connectivity to understand what other sensor nodes can provide. There will be more focus on being EW battle manager rather than being a specialized EW aircraft doing the job by ourselves.”

In effect, Growler Block II is a reimaging of the aircraft and how it fits into the extended battlespace. Reimaging what an EW mothership looks like.  MISR officers will contribute as well by tapping into national technical means as well to input to the EW management process.  This is where multi-domain becomes a credible combat capability in the EW warfare area.

But the fourth area is a very challenging one. How do you train to deliver EW capability in a rapidly changing technological and combat environment?

Simply mastering the Growler as a combat platform is clearly not enough. And this is true not just because of the shift to a kill web enabling and delivery system for electronic warfare; it also about the nature of the signals one is training against. Historically, one would work with a library of threats and train to operate against those threats guided by the intelligence library.

As Captain Stevenson put it: “We need to be able to predict how systems will respond to our capabilities and countermeasures; and we need to shape cognitive EW systems that enable us to look at how a signal behaves in response to certain stimuli and then be able to adapt and have an effective response.”

How do you train to this?

And even more significant, as one trains, one is also guiding the question of the further development of the systems in the EW offensive and defensive combat force as well.

The range issue is an important one as well.

“There are capabilities we would like to train to – being mindful of spectrum constraints, operational security, etc. –that are difficult on a range. How do we balance a high-fidelity live flight experience on a training range with the benefits of training in a connected simulator environment?”

In short, in this critical combat area, innovations in training will be a key part of shaping an effective force going forward.

But what innovations can be shaped to ensure this happens?

Featured Photo: Five U.S. Navy EA-18Gs sit on the flightline during a PACIFIC WEASEL exercise at Misawa Air Base, Japan, June 19, 2020. The objective of this exercise was to integrate U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force assets to simulate the suppression of enemy air defenses and increase interoperability between the two services. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class China M. Shock)

 

Exercise Deepwater 2020

10/05/2020

Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 366 preform assault support for the Marines with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment during Exercise Deep Water 2020 at Marine Corps Air Station, New River, North Carolina, July, 29, 2020.

The purpose of the exercise is to increase 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing’s interoperability and readiness on a scale that simulates peer-level threats.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Corporal Chelsi Woodman)

07.29.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Chelsi Woodman

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

This was the announcement of the exercise:

Marines with 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, and 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing are conducting Exercise Deep Water at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, US. Army Fort A.P. Hill, VA, and Piney Island and Atlantic Field, N.C., 29 July 2020.

II MEF conducts these training events on an annual basis; this year, Exercise Deep Water will see two battalions from the 2nd Marine Regiment conduct an air assault in order to command and control many of the various capabilities organic to II MEF.

Exercise Deep Water 20 is a great opportunity for 2nd Marine Regiment to work with multiple Marine Aircraft Groups, and Combat Logistics Battalion 8, as well. A third battalion will act as the opposing force that will resist and react to the air assault.

This added realism provides a unique “force on force” training opportunity.

MARFOREUR/AF Commander Visits HMS Queen Elizabeth

10/04/2020

Prior to the engagement with the USMC at sea, Maj. General Stephen M. Neary visited HMS Queen Elizabeth at its homeport of Portsmouth.

His visit presaged the historic USMC engagement onboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth.

According to a story by Staff Sgt. Brytani Musick  published on August 27, 2020:

The commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa, Maj. Gen. Stephen M. Neary, visited Royal Navy’s newest aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in Portsmouth, United Kingdom, August 27, 2020.  

During the visit, Neary met with the carrier’s leadership and toured the HMS Queen Elizabeth to increase understanding of the U.S. Marine Corps’ future operations with the UK Carrier Strike Group. U.S. Marines from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211, along with approximately six F-35B aircraft, will support the ship’s inaugural deployment in 2021. VMFA-211 will work alongside the UK’s 617 squadron as Carrier Strike Group-21. 

“This deployment shows the true span of U.S. Marine Corps operations across the theater,” said Neary. “The U.S. Marine Corps has a longstanding special relationship with the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, so having us operate from the Queen Elizabeth is another milestone in the relationship.”

Neary also visited the Commandant General of the Royal Marines, Maj. Gen. Matt Holmes. During their visit they discussed the importance of integrating the U.S. Marines and Royal Marines on this deployment and future partnership opportunities. 

The upcoming deployment of U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs aboard the QNLZ highlights the amphibious application of Joint Strike Fighters from a UK carrier. This deployment demonstrates that U.S. and UK allied forces are more than interoperable – they are integrated.  

“U.S. Forces are postured throughout the European theater, ready to defend the NATO alliance and to deter adversary activities,” Neary added. “It’s not just about us working with one country in one place – it’s about this alliance working across the theater in innovative ways.”