Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

JSDF Participates in Anti-Piracy Operations with the EU Naval Force Somalia

Posted on July 26, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

07/26/2020

According to a story published in July 2020 by the Japanese Ministry of Defence, the Japanese Navy is participating in the EU anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden.

On June 12th and 21st, JS Onami conducted an anti-piracy joint exercise (including communications training, firearms exercises, etc.) with the Spanish Navy Frigates “Numancia” and “Santa Maria” as the EU Naval Force.

JS Onami is currently dispatched as a surface force conducting anti-piracy operations.

To strengthen cooperation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) has been participating in joint Japan-EU anti-piracy exercises with the EU Naval Force Somalia (Operation ATALANTA) since October 2014, through which the EU conducts anti-piracy operations in accordance with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

In the past, Japan has conducted joint anti-piracy exercises with other member states of the EU Naval Force-Somalia Operation ATALANTA such as the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Italian Navy, the German Navy, and the Spanish Navy.

Given the increasingly severe security environment, it is extremely important to deepen Japan-EU defense cooperation and exchanges.

MOD/JSDF will continue to strengthen cooperation on shared issues for peace and stability in the international community and the region.

The Next Phase of Australian Defense Strategy Development: A Discussion with Brendan Sargeant

Posted on July 24, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

07/24/2020

By Robbin Laird

Last month, the Australian government announced its new defense strategy and force development plan for the decade ahead.

It represents both continuity and change from the 2016 strategy, but clearly expresses a recognition of the new strategic environment within which Australia finds itself.

It also expresses both concern and articulates a way ahead for enhanced Australian sovereignty in shaping its defense posture with a clear focus on its neighborhood, and with a focus on enhanced capabilities to defend Australia more effectively up to and including its first island chain.

If one followed closely the Williams Foundation seminars for which I have written the reports over the past few years, this evolution would come as no surprise.

But the strategy and force structure plan do represent a break from the 2016 document with regard to clear recognition that Australia is facing a China more willing to exercise coercion, clear need for a more robust and secure supply chain, more indigenous defense industrial support capability and new capabilities to shape the strategic environment.

Australia also faces challenges in its alliances which requires a clear effort by Australia to steer a path whereby it can provide leadership and not simply followership in the years ahead.

Recently, I had a chance to discuss this strategic shift with Brendan Sargeant, currently Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.

Professor Brendan Sargeant has had wide experience in Defence and has held senior appointments, including as Associate Secretary and prior to that as Deputy Secretary Strategy.

For Sargeant: “The way I see it, the document is a transitional one or the beginning of a rethinking on how we do defense and what we need to do.

“It still reflects a bit of uncertainty in the policy environment about how fundamental the changes are and so there’s a bit of hedging in the document as well.”

It is clear as will with the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy, budgetary options are in flux as well.

But what is striking about the Australian government’s strategic document is that indeed it was issued in the midst of shaping a way ahead in the COVID-19 environment.

Sargeant underscored in a note on the strategy: “It is very clear that we are seeing the development of ADF capability designed to strengthen Australia’s capacity to support its interests in the Indo Pacific and resist potential coercion by other states (China).

“It recognises that many of the trends in the international system are working against Australia’s interests and that we have entered a very different strategic environment to the one that we have been accustomed to.”

He added: “Deterrence has also always been a major element of Australian strategic policy, but this document strengthens it and in a sense is a search of contemporary capabilities that fulfilled the role of the F1 11 in the 80s and 90s. But we haven’t done enough policy thinking on deterrence since the 1990s.

‘The operational focus of the Middle East wars have consumed too much policy energy and made us complacent.

“The document recognises limits, and in that sense overturns the 2016 White Paper and is quite explicit about that.

“It’s repositioning geographically is something that we drifted away from when we put our faith in the continuation of the rules-based order, which underpinned a lot of the thinking in 2016.

“The document recognises that Australia should be capable of leading military operations in the region.

“I think this is important, but it will be a challenge to work through what that means and how this might engage our neighbours and friends.

“I think implicitly we are starting to see the end of the balanced force idea, recognising that we will need to optimise the force against a set of priorities set out in its capability goals.

“The comment that warning time has reduced, that we don’t have the luxury of a decade’s warning that we talked about in the past is I think is the indicator of realism in its assessment of the volatility of our strategic environment.

“But I also think that this brings forward Defence’s biggest challenge which is the extent to which it is able to adapt and respond to a rate of change which seems to be increasing.”

We had a chance to discuss the strategic shift and the shift in strategy in a teleconference earlier this month.

In addition to the issues which Sargeant had already raised in his note on the new strategy, we focused on some specific dynamics of change which are implied or raised specifically in the strategy.

The first is clearly the geographic focus of the strategy. As Sargeant highlighted: “It is a shift from the Middle East to the first island chain for Australia.

It is about having the ability to shape and influence the closer in strategic environment and certainly with a core focus on the Indo-Pacific region.”

The second is the core focus on deterrence, and to do so within the context of new threats, new capabilities, and the rapid evolution of military technologies.

As Sargeant put it: “I think our policy environment has gotten lazy over the last 20 years because most of our strategic energy was consumed by Afghanistan and Iraq, and now we need to engage in a very different type of strategic discourse.

“How do we want to think about deterrence and with which policy tools, and how best to rework relationships with allies and partners?”

The third is the focus on adding new strike capabilities for the ADF.

With the emphasis on an ability both to shape the strategic environment as well as to be able to operate within it, the question of shaping new strike capabilities is an important new emphasis in the strategy.

How Australia will do this is a work in progress, but certainly given the need for Australia’s most significant ally, the United States to come up with a more robust and cost effective weapons mix, any solutions to be worked in Australia could have significant reach into the American force redesign as well.

It is the question of the effect, and not simply the question of a silver bullet.

As Sargeant put it: “For the ADF, I think the focus will be less upon the specific platform than upon the combat effect. What sort of weapons would you use operating within a joint force context to get the effect we will need?”

The fourth is the challenge for the Australian Army to work through their role in the new strategic context, strategy and effort.

According to Sargeant, “As we focus on our region, Army will have a key role, but in terms of the joint force. How best to work their role? What do they need to be able to do in the joint and integrated force context?

“One answer clearly would be for the Army to focus on how their new interest and capabilities in amphibious warfare would work within a regional joint force context?”

The fifth is the evolving role of Australia with allies and partners in operating in the new strategic context.

Clearly, defense diplomacy and key political-military working relationships with partners and allies in the region will be a key part of shaping an effective way ahead for Australia.

A key challenge is shaping the kind of diplomatic outreach which can work as an effective part of the shaping and deterrence effort crucial to a viable Australian defense strategy.

In short, with a new strategic focus highlighting more effective integrated operations within its region, the ADF faces the challenge of shaping more integrated and effective military-political efforts to strengthen a new diplomatic outreach in the region as well.

(l-r) Assistant Defence Minister Alex Hawke, Secretary of Defence Greg Moriarty, Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds, Chief of Defence Force General Angus Campbell prior to the launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

The Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon Scott Morrison, at the launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds, speaking at the launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

Seahawks In the Gulf

Posted on July 24, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

A SH-60S Sea Hawk, attached to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 26, is seen conducting flight operations in the Arabian Gulf.

HSC 26 is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three critical choke points to the free flow of global commerce.

There is a global enterprise of the Seahawk helicopters operating world wide and providing for commonality in training and operations with the US Navy, allies and partners globally.

A Sikorsky SH-60S Sea Hawk, attached to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 26, conducts flight operations during a Photoex. HSC 26 is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three critical choke points to the free flow of global commerce. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Christopher Cameron)

A Sikorsky SH-60S Sea Hawk, attached to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 26, conducts flight operations in the Arabian Gulf. HSC 26 is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three critical choke points to the free flow of global commerce. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Christopher Cameron)

A SH-60S Sea Hawk, attached to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 26, conducts flight operations in the Arabian Gulf. HSC 26 is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three critical choke points to the free flow of global commerce. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Christopher Cameron)

A SH-60S Sea Hawk, attached to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 26, conducts flight operations during a Photoex. HSC 26 is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the Western Indian Ocean and three critical choke points to the free flow of global commerce. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Christopher Cameron)

An Update on the Integratable Air Wing: A Discussion with the US Navy’s Air Boss

Posted on July 23, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

07/23/2020

By Robbin Laird

Last February, I visited San Diego and met with Vice Admiral Miller, the US Navy’s Air Boss.

During that meeting, we discussed a shift from what I call the integrated to the integratable air wing and its impact on innovation for the fleet and the joint force.

During that discussion, I learned about the introduction of the MISR WTIs or the Maritime ISR Weapons and Tactics Instructors (WTIs), who are specially trained officers and enlisted, to the ranks as well as of the coming of the Osprey to the carrier force in the near term and the MQ-25 unmanned air tanker to the fleet in the mid-term.

Our discussion focused on these changes, less in terms of platforms, and more in terms of how the Navy was working to reshape its capabilities as it re-focused on the best ways to operate in high-end warfare environment as well as operating across the full spectrum of conflict.

Since that time, I have travelled to Australia and have written a report on the new Australian offshore patrol vessel.

I also continued discussions about the shaping of a way ahead for the new-build Australian submarine and had wide-ranging discussions with the USMC, the USAF, and with the US Navy.

Last month, I visited Naval Aviation locations in Jacksonville and Mayport, Florida , then had meetings with senior Navy officers in Norfolk, and then this month spent several days in Nevada with NAWDC or the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center.

I have published some of these interviews, with many more to follow.

I should note that I closely adhered to the CDC COVID guidelines during my travels and would note that in both the airports and on the airplanes, the travelling public and the airlines staff clearly were concerned to do so as well.

This is a good sign for the recovery of air travel for sure.

But I would not that with air traffic at around 50% at most of pre-COVID-19 levels, don’t expect some of your favorite direct flights to be available.

For example, to get from Fallon to San Diego, I travelled from Reno to Dallas and then to San Diego.

I did learn that there seem to be some special exceptions to mask wearing on the airplane.

For example, here is one passenger on the flight sequence from Fallon San Diego.

But visiting Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego this month provided me an opportunity to discuss the way ahead being shaped by the operational or fighting Navy which might be missed if I had stayed Inside the Beltwa

Similarly, discussions with the U.S. Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB and with the USMC’s MAWTS-1 squadron, as well as with officers working at Headquarters USMC Aviation, provided an opportunity to understand how the approach to fleet-wide innovation was interacting with changes in other parts of the joint force.

Visits in 2018 by Ed Timperlake and myself to Fort Sill provided insights into how the Air Defense Artillery community was intersecting with kill-web innovations.

A clear takeaway from my discussions in the various parts of Naval Aviation and with fleet officers has been that the current Air Boss, Vice Admiral Miller, who is retiring this Fall, has provided significant leadership to encourage innovation throughout the Naval Aviation Enterprise.

And during my most recent visit to North Island this month, I had a chance to continue the discussion with the Air Boss about shaping a way ahead for innovation that I would like to highlight in this article.

At the meeting with the Air Boss, either in person or in the teleconference, was my host for the NAWDC visit and the CO of NAWDC, Rear Admiral Rich Brophy; the Chief of Staff for the Air Boss, Captain Max McCoy, most recently, head of the Navy’s operational F-35C force; and the head of the N98 requirements division as well as the N98 officer involved with the MQ-25-program.

What was clear from visiting NAWDC, and from my prior discussions with the heads of the weapons training departments at NAWDC, is that the training center is focused on the integratable air wing, and the role of carrier aviation working more broadly with the fleet and the joint force.

Two new warfighting departments have been put in place which represent the shift—namely, the MISR Weapons School and the information warfare department, which is focused on the challenge of dynamic targeting.

At NAWDC, there is a significant shift from a primary focus on Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for platforms and their integration on the carrier to a focus on TTPs for broader functional areas wherein TTPs need to be shaped fleet wide, such as for joint maritime strike.

With regard to MISR WTIs, their core task is to work integratability between organic carrier ISR assets with non-organic ISR assets and sensors to assist in the process of CSG decision making, and in the case of assignment to the fleet level, to do so for the fleet decision makers.

This obviously is a fundamental shift and a work in progress.

The impact of the F-35 is part of the process of change.

Currently at NAWDC, an F-35C squadron is working closely with the Hawkeye community to shape the kind of integratability which could flow nicely into the expanded reach of the fleet to deliver the combat effects necessary for either the high-end fight or full spectrum crisis management.

In thinking about the coming of the MQ-25, clearly the current focus is upon getting the asset developed to the point where it can operate off the carrier by the mid-2020s to perform a core function, tanking, and thereby freeing up manned assets for other mission sets.

It has been designed to carry the sensors that will be most useful to the fleet going forward.

Indeed, a major change is a recognition that the evolution of the sensor network feeding decision-making fleet wide, and for the joint force, is a core focus of attention.

But the sensors which can be envisaged do not need to be under the glass but could be passive sensors carried by new systems like the CMV-22 or the MQ-25.

What is quite impressive is that thinking is already underway with regard to what would make sense to include on these aircraft to enhance fleet lethality and combat effectiveness.

Perhaps a new role for the MISR WTIs might be to provide inputs with regard to the evolution of the fleet sensor network.

But more generally with regard to MISR contributions, clearly the focus has been, as Vice Admiral Miller put it: “Build the capability and they will come” with regard to the recognition of the growing contributions of the sensor network and evolving C2 to fleet innovation.

Another case in point has been the coming of the Triton to Pacific operations.

The Triton brings a whole new layer of situational awareness and targeting capabilities to the fleet, and with the growing awareness of the priority on integration of the US Air Force with Navy fleet operations, the Triton can provide a contribution to the integratability of the two services as well.

Indeed, the USAF and the USN are engaging in a clear effort to better integrate across the board, notably with regard to bombers and the fleet.

The US Navy is hosting an exercise called RESOLUTE HUNTER which is working ways to better integrate ISR, C2, and Battle Management across the forces, with the next iteration to be held this November.

The work on integratability of the various air-maritime elements, can lead as well to rethinking of how the L-class ships or the large deck carrier will operate in the future and thereby shape new capabilities across the crisis management spectrum.

I wrote earlier about rethinking how L-class ships could operate more effectively in a task force as Vipers and Romeos become integratabtle platforms with the focus of the USMC on digital interoperability generating new capabilities for the Viper to integrate.

With Vice Admiral Mille, we discussed how the new Ford class carriers can operate quite differently from the Nimitz class. With three times the onboard power systems, new C2 capabilities, an ability to host directed energy weapons, and to configure C2 cells differently, the USS GERALD R. FORD (CVN 78) conducting blue water operations could operate as a key epicenter for supporting multiple kill webs or reintegrating into a tightly integrated defensive force dependent on the evolving combat situation.

The rethinking of the operations the L-class ships and of the large deck carrier, as part of a wider set of interactive kill webs, are topics to be discussed in future articles, but the work which is unfolding under the Air Boss and in the naval aviation community (remembering that the Marines are key players in that community) clearly is underwriting new ways to work the fleet.

VICE ADMIRAL DEWOLFE MILLER, III

Commander, Naval Air Forces/Commander, Naval Air Force, US Pacific Fleet

Vice Adm. DeWolfe Miller is a native of Annapolis, Maryland, grew up in York, Pennsylvania, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1981. He holds a Master of Science from the National Defense University, is a Syracuse University national security management fellow and is a graduate of the Navy’s Nuclear Power Program.

His operational assignments include Training Squadron (VT) 19 in Meridian, Mississippi; Attack Squadron (VA) 56 aboard USS Midway (CV 41); Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 25 on USS Constellation (CV 64); VFA-131 and VFA-34 both aboard USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69); executive officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70); commanding officer of USS Nashville (LPD 13); commanding officer of USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) and as a flag officer, commander of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 2 participating in combat Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Resolve.

Miller’s shore tours include Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 5; aviation programs analyst Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N80); Strike Fighter Weapons School Atlantic; deputy director of naval operations at the Combined Air Operations Center during Operation Allied Force; Office of Legislative Affairs for the Secretary of Defense; aircraft carrier requirements officer for Commander, Naval Air Forces; and flag officer tours in OPNAV as director for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (N2N6F2); assistant deputy chief of naval operations for Warfare Systems (N9B); and most recently as director, Air Warfare (N98).

Miller became Naval Aviation’s 8th “Air Boss” in January 2018.

He is entitled to wear the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal and other personal, unit and service awards.

The featured graphic highlights a way to think about the process of transformation for the carrier air wing over the next decade.

What is underway is a shift from integrating the air wing around relatively modest and sequential modernization efforts for the core platforms to a robust transformation process in which new assets enter the force and create a swirl of transformation opportunities, challenges, and pressures.

The RAAF Adapts to Covid-19: Exercise Virtual Pitch Black 2020

Posted on July 23, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Flight Lieutenant Bel Scott.

Generated from the Air Warfare Centre’s – Distributed Training Centre (AWC-DTC) at RAAF Base Williamtown, training audiences from Amberley and Williamtown were virtually connected in the Northern Territory airspace and ranges between Darwin and Tindal from June 29 to July 10.

For the first time, the No. 36 Squadron C-17A simulator successfully integrated in the virtual network with 41 Wing, ground-based command and control (C2) of air assets, and No. 2 Squadron, airborne C2 with its E-7A Virtual Wedgetail.

“36 Squadron pilots have gained valuable experience being involved in VPB20, in particular being involved with integrated planning and execution with C2 and fast-jet communities,” C-17 pilot Flight Lieutenant Tim Smith said.

“We have limited opportunities to be involved in this type of integrated exercise, especially now given the ongoing impacts of COVID, so participation in VPB has been a rewarding experience for our crews.

“The ability to conduct these virtual exercises in our simulator will greatly enhance our training, and provide more opportunities to be involved in the integrated planning and execution phases.

“The mission sets and participants [C2, fast jets, ISR] that we can participate with during these virtual exercises are far broader than ones we can generate ourselves and, as such, will enhance our force generation and integration moving forward.

“It’s been a big effort by those involved to get the simulator accredited and connected for this exercise, and we are going to see real benefits in this type of training.”

AWC-DTC provides the software and hardware, and with J7 Joint Collective Training Branch (formerly ADF Simulation Training Centre), the connectivity to enable distributed mission training in the synthetic environment.

AWC-DTC has evolved with improved distributed planning, briefing, execution and debrief over a mix of Defence Training and Experimentation Network (DTEN) and Enterprise DSN UC.

This enables cutting-edge scenario generation and constructive forces through use of ASCOT 7 (Advanced Simulation Combat Operations Trainer), provided by Plexsys Australia.

“When Exercise Pitch Black 20 was cancelled, we seized the opportunity to tailor the virtual exercise to meet training objectives beyond the live exercise,” VBP20 lead planner Squadron Leader Alexander Cave said.

“Traditionally, this exercise provides a training platform as a work up but with no live exercise this year, the virtual space was critical for aircrew learning outcomes.

“Air Force, through the Air Warfare Centre, is investing in the Advanced Training and Test Environment [ATTE].

“The next generation platforms being acquired bring with them advanced capabilities and the ability to create effects across multiple domains.

“ATTE will enable the training, test and experimentation activities that need to occur to maximise the effectiveness of these capabilities in live, synthetic and blended environments.

“Virtual exercises, through the evolved Air Force synthetic environment, will be able to represent multi-domain contested, degraded and operationally limited environments to satisfy the needs of these next generation capabilities.”

Defence Science and Technology Group continue to provide scientific and technical expertise in support of the current and future ATTE capability from the Joint Air Warfare Battle Lab at DSTG Fisherman’s Bend.

A Defence spokesman said Raytheon Australia was contracted to provide the Air Warfare Centre Exercise Control capability, using the services of MilSkil, Nova Systems and Skildare Australia.

“This expert workforce exists to develop, integrate and control live and synthetic large-force employment exercises conducted by the Air Warfare Centre in support of the Air Commander’s operational force generation requirements and the integrated fifth-generation force outlined in the Air Force 2027 Strategy.”

This article was published on July 16, 2020.

Exercise Observer Flight Lieutenant (FLTLT) Joshua Wright monitors pilots FLTLTs Timothy Smith (left) and Matthew Bruton from No. 36 Squadron, as they fly a mission in the C-17A Globemaster III simulator during Exercise Virtual Pitch Black 20 at RAAF Base Amberley.

Flight Lieutenant Timothy Smith, a pilot from No. 36 Squadron, prepares the C-17A Globemaster III simulator for a mission during Exercise Virtual Pitch Black 20 at RAAF Base Amberley.

Participants in Exercise Virtual Pitch Black 20 monitor and control the airspace from RAAF Base Williamtown.

Pilots from No. 36 Squadron, Flight Lieutenants Timothy Smith (left) and Matthew Bruton, flying a mission in the C-17A Globemaster III simulator during Exercise Virtual Pitch Black 20 at RAAF Base Amberley.

Leading Aircraftman Lachlan Jones from No. 3 Control and Reporting Unit monitors the airspace during exercise Virtual Pitch Black 20 from RAAF Base Williamtown.

Shaping a Way Ahead for the Triton: Enabling the Integrated Distributed Force

Posted on July 22, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

07/22/2020

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Jax Navy, I had a chance to talk with several members of the maritime reconnaissance patrol community about Triton.

A particularly insightful discussion was with Joseph Opp, currently the Northrop Grumman Director/Site Lead for Triton at Jacksonville Navy Air Station, who has served in this capacity for the past three years.

Previously Opp served for thirty years in the US Navy and has been involved while in the service for many years with the maritime reconnaissance patrol community.

In this capacity, he has been in Jacksonville for some time, first with VP-30 and now with Northrop Grumman.

Clearly, the US Navy has worked the relationships between Triton and P-8 to provide a comprehensive ISR/Strike solution set.

Triton can provide the long-haul wide-angle view of the battlespace with P-8 and its organic and third-party targeting capabilities playing the focused targeting role.

To work coordinated operations, the Triton and P-8 crews need to understand from the ground up how each platform works independently and together, to shape an integrateable sensor-striker system.

The Triton can have the dwell time to identify a much wider range of targets than P-8; which then enables P-8 to focus their operation on high priority targets.

I would also add, that in the kind of extended battlespace which has and will emerge, knowing where critical choke points are with regard to an adversary’s system or force becomes a priority task.

An integrateable Triton and P-8 working together can provide significantly greater capability to deliver this outcome, rather than simply operating separately.

By having crews which have operated on the P-8 as well as the Triton, they share an ability to do the kind of ISR appropriate for dynamic targeting.

By working on one platform, then on the other, it is not so much cross-learning as shaping and integrated knowledge base and skill sets to operate in the ASW kill web.

Triton can inform the P-8 before it takes off about the threats in the extended battlespace which then the P-8 can prioritize.

Opp noted progress that is being made with regard to software onboard the Triton. He noted that the program is continuing to work on new workload software for the Triton operators.

With the amount of surface targets on the ocean today in certain regions of the world, this new software can work with AIS data and other systems to help the operators identify threats to be further studied, evaluated and potentially targeted.

This is akin to the mission systems library onboard the F-35s but this mission library is prioritizing maritime threats.

And of course, such threats are crucial for both the US Navy and the US Air Force to deal with, as significant threats to the USAF in the Pacific come from the sea.

As I mentioned in an earlier article, the Triton as an orbital concept of operations airplane is challenging the data management systems which the US Navy currently operates.

There clearly needs to be progress on the data infrastructure side to better handle real time data and to deliver it the combat edge to support operations which increasingly face the challenge of fighting at the speed of light.

There is some confusion with regard to EP-3 and Triton. There are those who see Triton as replacing EP-3. Some of the core capabilities of the EP-3 are clearly being brought to the Triton platform, but that platform has a wider range of vision and activities than the EP-3.

In my view, the Triton/P-8 dyad poses a significant challenge to reworking the C2/ISR enabled force.

On the one hand, decisions can be pushed to the tactical edge.

On the other hand, at the fleet command level decisions need to be made rapidly at the strategic level, whereby determinations of what combination of force is appropriate to the crisis at hand, and how best to aggregate that force effectively?

Triton certainly can be a contributor to fleet wide decision making and at the same time channeling P-8s and other ASW assets (such as the Romeo helicopter) to focus their capabilities on the core targets in the extended battlespace.

But there is another challenge facing both industry and the Navy: how to maximize the advantages generated by an orbit concept of operations set of platforms versus a sortie generated set of platforms?

Triton does the first; P-8 does the second; and the US Navy’s legacy is only the second.

It is early days for sorting out how to get the number of aircraft up to do the kind of orbital concepts of operations for which Triton was designed.

But without enhancing the data management network side of the challenge, the ability to leverage the data generated by Triton will not be maximized.

Triton like F-35 is not being used in terms of storage of data coming off of the aircraft, which makes little sense if the ISR/C2 side of the force will indeed drive the way ahead for the combat force.

The data backbone which was assumed to arrive with Triton is not yet there.

And, in my view, if we move towards LEO constellations to work with Triton to add yet another kill web layer, if the backbone infrastructure is not in place, we will have technology deployed without a solution to how to capitalize on that technology for the evolving combat force.

There are significant opportunities to make use of the post-mission data which F-35s and Tritons can deliver.

But an opportunity without a solution is not a capability for the operational force.

The opportunity is clearly there and provided by the new data rich combat assets.

Bomber Task Force Europe Training, May 2020

Posted on July 22, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

Greek F-16s escort two B1B Lancers during a training mission over North Macedonia for Bomber Task Force Europe, May 29, 2020.

Aircrews from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, took off on their long-range, long-duration Bomber Task Force mission to conduct interoperability training throughout Europe and the Black Sea region.

Training with our NATO allies and theater partner nations contribute to enhanced resiliency and interoperability and enables us to build enduring relationships necessary to confront the broad range of global challenges.

NORTH MACEDONIA

05.29.2020

Courtesy Photo

U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Public Affairs

A Greek F-16 escorts two B1B Lancers during a training mission over North Macedonia for Bomber Task Force Europe, May 29, 2020. Aircrews from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, took off on their long-range, long-duration Bomber Task Force mission to conduct interoperability training throughout Europe and the Black Sea region. Training with our NATO allies and theater partner nations contribute to enhanced resiliency and interoperability and enables us to build enduring relationships necessary to confront the broad range of global challenges. (Courtesy photo by Ukrainian Air Force)

Greek F-16s escort two B1B Lancers during a training mission over North Macedonia for Bomber Task Force Europe, May 29, 2020. Aircrews from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, took off on their long-range, long-duration Bomber Task Force mission to conduct interoperability training throughout Europe and the Black Sea region. Training with our NATO allies and theater partner nations contribute to enhanced resiliency and interoperability and enables us to build enduring relationships necessary to confront the broad range of global challenges. (Courtesy photo by Ukrainian Air Force)

Israelis Sell OPVs to African Nation

Posted on July 20, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

07/20/2020

By Guy Martin

An unidentified African country has ordered two OPV 45 offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) from Israel Shipyards.

The company announced the agreement on 9 July, saying the vessels were designed for a wide range of missions including protection against the increasing threat of piracy in the region, but provided little other detail. In September 2019 it said it had sold two OPV 45s but did not announce the customer.

The agreement includes ongoing support and training as well as the creation of a maintenance programme within the framework of the company’s Integration Logistic Support (ILS) services, Israel Shipyards said.

The OPV 45 was launched at the IMDEX show in May 2019 as a cost-effective solution mainly for the export market, especially in the Asia-Pacific, Africa and South America. The design is 45.7 metres long, has a beam of 8.6 metres and displacement of 300 tons. Maximum speed is about 24 knots and range more than 3 500 nautical miles at 12 knots. It can accommodate between 16 and 21 crew, and has additional berth for up to 24 personnel.

The vessel can carry a 7.2 metre rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) in an automated launch-and-recovery system on the aft deck, which can also take 20 foot containerised modules for different missions.

Weapons options include stabilised naval gun systems of up to 30 mm on the foredeck and 12.7 mm machineguns elsewhere on the vessel. Israel Shipyards said the African customer’s vessels will be equipped with day/night observation systems as well as stabilized weapon systems, both Israeli-made.

According to Eitan Zucker, CEO of Israel Shipyards, “Since the launch of the OPV 45 vessel at the IMDEX exhibition in Singapore last year, navies around the world have expressed great interest in this new vessel due to its cost-effectiveness and suitability for a wide range of missions. We believe that this vessel will make a significant contribution to maritime border protection in Africa.”

The OPV 45 has been designed for a wide range of naval, para-military and homeland security missions, including open sea patrol and surveillance, the protection of facilities and exclusive economic zones, anti-terror/smuggling/illegal activity interdiction, intervention force boarding/landing, close-range naval combat operations, and enhanced search and rescue missions. The OPV 45 can also be equipped for minimizing illegal immigration transits, fishing protection and control, and anti-pollution activities.

Israel Shipyards also offers 58 and 62 metre long OPVs as well as Saar class missile corvettes (Saar 4, Saar 4.5 and Saar S-72), fast patrol craft (Shaldag MK II – MK V), commercial ships, tugboats, and multipurpose boats. It has supplied Shaldag vessels to Senegal and Nigeria, amongst others.

This article was published by defenceWeb on July 9, 2020.

The featured photo shows an OPV 45 offshore patrol vessel.