Finnish Defense Exports, 2019

07/15/2020

In 2019, the Ministry of Defence granted a total of 284 permanent export licences for defence materiel (257 in 2018). The total value of the licences was EUR 105 million, which is 40% lower than in 2018; then the figure was EUR 176 million. The value of actual exports decreased by 12% and was around EUR 113 million in 2019.

Most of the permanent export licences, in euros, were granted for fire observing and related alarm and warning devices, sniper rifles and their attachments and software.

In addition, several licences were granted, for example, to export defence materiel for warranty and maintenance purposes and, on a temporary basis, for demonstration and testing purposes.

Europe remained as the most important export destination. While more than two thirds of the licences granted were for exports to Europe, more than 75% of the total exports of defence materiel were to the European area.

As to individual countries where Finland exported defence materiel, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and United Arab Emirates ranked as the most important ones.  The most significant export items were vehicle components, patrol boats and protective materials.

The share of the Middle East in Finland’s defence equipment exports continues to decline both in terms of licences granted and in terms of actual exports. In 2019, only less than five per cent of the licences granted were for the Middle East.

Licence considerations are always made on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration national legislation and international commitments that are binding on Finland. Finland complies with the joint position of the Council of the European Union concerning the basis of licence consideration and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

Licence applications are processed in a cross-sectoral export working group where the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for the foreign and security policy assessment.

This article was published by the Finnish Ministry of Defence on June 18. 2020.

Sustainment at Sea

The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) participates in a replenishment-at-sea with the dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Medgar Evers (T-AKE 13).

The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group (HSTCSG) remains at sea in the Atlantic Ocean as a certified carrier strike group ready for tasking in order to protect the crew from the risks posed by COVID-19, following their successful deployment to the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas of operation.

Keeping HSTCSG at sea in the U.S. 2nd Fleet, in the sustainment phase of OFRP, allows the ship to maintain a high level of readiness during the COVID-19 pandemic.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

05.15.2020

Video by Petty Officer 3rd Class Benjamin Waddell 

USS Harry S Truman

 

Open Skies Treaty Becomes Less Cloudy

07/13/2020

By Richard Weitz

On July 6, the member states of the Open Skies Treaty (OST) met at an online special conference to discuss the treaty’s future in light of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the treaty in November.

At this session, no other party indicated an intention to withdraw, though the Russian government reaffirmed its right to do so later. Meanwhile, there are indications that if Joe Biden wins the U.S. presidential elections, his administration could rejoin the OST next year.

The treaty’s stated purpose is to “contribute to the further development and strengthening of peace, stability and co-operative security” and “improve openness and transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms-control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management.”

In recent months, State Department officials have offered several reinforcing reasons for leaving the treaty.

First, the U.S. government assessed that Russia was not fully compliant with the accord.

A sore point has been Moscow’s perennial practice of limiting overflights at certain times and locations over Russian territory. The treaty does not allow any part of a member state’s territory to be declared off-limits.

More than any specific violation, what seems to have particularly irked officials was the “whack-a-mole” nature of the Russian violations, with a serial sequence of varying violations. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford complained about Moscow’s “shifting kaleidoscope of different violations”, ranging from the overflight limits to not allowing flights on Russian national holidays.

According to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who submitted the U.S. six-month withdrawal notice on May 21, Moscow “acted as if it were free to turn its obligations off and on at will,”

But now the Trump administration decided to hold Russia accountable for its violations.

Yet, Secretary Ford added that the U.S. withdrawal decision had been, in effect, a “totality-of-the-circumstances decision.” He explained that “some of the things that have undermined confidence-building purposes of the treaty are things that are a result of behaviors by the Russian Federation that are not, in fact, violations of the treaty. Other aspects of Russian behavior are very much violations of the treaty. And so, it’s the combination of all those things that has led to this decision.”

In this regard, the second stated reason for the U.S. withdrawal was the concern that Russia was employing OST as a competitive weapon against the United States.

In the realm of lawfare, Russia tries to legitimize its contested territorial claims regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by limiting overflights near these occupied regions of Georgia to compel other countries to accept Moscow’s false narrative that these areas are independent countries.

Similarly, in designating an airfield in Crimea as an OST refueling base, Moscow is trying to secure de facto recognition of its illegal annexation of the Peninsula.

Thirdly, U.S. officials worry that Russian planes been exploited the treaty to collect military-relevant intelligence imagery on critical Western infrastructure to target it more effectively with conventionally armed precision-guided missiles and perhaps cyber weapons.

The logic is that, unlike the United States, Russia has not been able to develop an effective network of spy satellites due to limited funding and other challenges.

However, since the Russian military has recently invested in modernized surveillance planes (a modified Tupolev Tu-154 aircraft upgraded in 2016 with digital electro-optical sensors), Russia can potentially use these flights to obtain some targeting imagery its satellites cannot fully provide.

Interestingly, the U.S. intelligence community had raised concerns about this potential even before Donald Trump was elected president.

In March 2016, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told members, “The things that you can see, the amount of data you can collect, the things you can do with post-processing, allows Russia, in my opinion, to get incredible foundational intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of our facilities… it gives them a significant advantage.”

Fourth, by withdrawing from the OST, the INF, and other accords, the United States intends to demonstrate that it takes arms control compliance extremely seriously and will abandon accords where violation or circumvention occurs.

These steps also aim to enhance Washington’s leverage in the New START extension negotiations, making its demands for greater Russian concessions more credible.

Finally, though the Pentagon has sought to modernize the U.S. long-range surveillance planes, Congress declined to provide the requested funds, while lavishing money on the superior U.S. reconnaissance satellite network–thereby effectively decreasing the value of the OST flights for the United States.

Specifically, the Pentagon has repeatedly tried to upgrade its two OC-135B aircraft, manufactured back in 1961; including giving them digital equipment to replace their wet film photography. However, Congress declined to fund these upgrades, citing the existing advanced (and very expensive) network of surveillance satellites.

The near-term impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the OST will likely prove modest. The July 6 meeting made clear that no other country will withdraw soon. According to the treaty, the United States could conduct or receive only 42 flights each year, which is not many given the large number of satellite overflights.

Admittedly, surveillance planes can collect different kinds of data than the space satellites.

However, the real value of the U.S. participation was to symbolize U.S. cooperation with Russia when relations were good or, as in 2014, U.S. solidarity with countries opposing Russia by means of targeted overflights.

Additionally, Russian-U.S. arms control relations are already so bad that this withdrawal could hardly make them worse.

Meanwhile, the OST participating governments are preoccupied with COVID-19, elections, and other issues. Even in the arms control community, attention remains focused on whether New START will be extended before next February.

Looking ahead, what remains to be seen is whether Russia will remain in the treaty.

Russian officials left this option open at the July 6 meeting. If Moscow leaves, the treaty could collapse since it would make no sense for other states to remain a party, given their focus is primarily on Russian military activities. Russia receives far more OST-related overflights than any other county.

Moscow’s withdrawal would support the Russian government’s narrative that the United States is wrecking yet another arms control regime. Yet, a Russian departure would come at a price since its surveillance planes can then no longer fly over U.S. military bases in Europe.

Russia’s remaining in the OST would also allow the United States to rejoin.

Biden’s team opposed the withdrawal decision but would only be able to rejoin the treaty if it still exists.

It is easier to maintain an existing multinational treaty than to make a new one. Though the Russian government has insists that Washington would need to accept any changes made to the OST following its departure, these will probably be modest in coming months.

The Democrats, however, seem cross-pressured on Russia-related issues.

While they blame Russian interference for their candidate’s loss in the 2016 presidential election, they also criticize the Trump administration for exiting several key arms control treaties.

A final issue concerns Western solidarity.

The Russian government will naturally try to exploit transatlantic differences over the OST issue.

Many NATO members and partners agree that some Russian actions have violated the treaty, but some view these actions as insufficiently grave to warrant withdrawing from the treaty—and regret the U.S. move.

Additionally, unlike in the case of the its Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty withdrawal, where two U.S. administrations devoted years of effort to successfully make their case, there was seemingly less consultation prior to making the U.S. OST decision.

Since Washington did not secure an allied consensus on its withdrawal—and the OST is a multilateral agreement rather than an essentially bilateral one like the INF—the United States should avoid pressing its partners to leave the treaty as well as take further measures to address allied concerns.

For example, Washington should follow through with plans to offer European states additional data to compensate for the intelligence they could lose from the U.S. withdrawal.

Of course, the procedure for sharing highly classified satellite data is more cumbersome

Fortunately, though the proliferation of military relevant technologies can have destructive effects on arms control (as with the spreading of ballistic missile technologies to many countries outside the INF Treaty), in this case improving commercial space technologies could help fill the gap engendered by the U.S. withdrawal.

Commercially available imagery is presently approximately as good as allowed on OST planes and are likely to become better and substantially cheaper, considering the private space sector is taking off.

Currently, it takes longer to change the course of satellites since they are placed into pre-planned orbits, while planes can flexibly maneuver largely at will. However, if satellites were launched more frequently, they could become as flexible as planes in terms of timely re-routing and re-tasking.

The featured photo: A joint Bulgarian-Spanish flight over Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28 March 2007, under the Open Skies Treaty. Photo: OSCE (CC-BY-ND)

 

MAG-24 Training 2

Marine Aircraft Group 24 conducts a maximum readiness and integrated training mission, Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020.

Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, seven MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power.

MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII, KANEOHE BAY, HI, UNITED STATES

05.22.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Jose Angeles

Marine Corps Base Hawaii

The Seahawk in the Extended Battlespace

07/12/2020

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to the maritime patrol reconnaissance community during the week of June 14, 2020, I had a chance to meet with the leadership of the HSM Weapons School, Atlantic based at Mayport.

According to the US Navy’s description of the HSM Weapons School, Atlantic:

To counter small boat threats that began emerging in the early 1990s, the Helicopter Anti-Submarine Light (HSL) community began deploying helicopters armed with crew-served .50 caliber machine guns and AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.

This enhanced lethality required comprehensive weapons and tactical training, so the U.S. Atlantic Fleet HSL Wing Commander established a Weapons and Tactics Unit (WTU) manned by a select handful of highly specialized and trained pilots and aircrewmen. The resounding success of the WTU made it clear to the leaders of the helicopter community that centralized, standard training was the most efficient way to prepare combat detachments for sea.

Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Weapons School Atlantic, was officially established as a new command on 18 May 2005. The HSM Weapons School serves as the Atlantic Fleet’s center of tactical excellence for training and evaluation of Maritime Strike combat helicopter aircrews. It is responsible for developing and maintaining cost-effective, standardized tactical curricula, including academic, simulator, and flight events for the MH-60R Seahawk helicopter.

The squadron is organized into cells that specialize in the three primary HSM mission areas of Surface Warfare, Electronic Warfare, and Anti-Submarine Warfare. The Weapons School also provides training on conventional ordnance handling and loading, crew served and personal weapons, Low-Slow Flyer Intercept, Maritime Interdiction and coordinates a multitude of tactical development and evaluation projects aimed at making a more lethal force.

The Weapons School staff is comprised of dedicated Officers, Enlisted, Department of Defense employees, and specialized contractors. Many of these men and women are designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructors (SWTI), or hand-picked leaders in their areas of expertise chosen for their superior warfighting skills and tactical insight.

All SWTIs are graduates of the “SEAWOLF” course, named after the venerable Helicopter Attack (Light) Three (HAL-3) squadron of Vietnam. SEAWOLF is an intensive 8-week certification process that includes classroom, simulator, and flight events conducted by the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center at Naval Air Station Fallon, NV.

SWTIs administer the Helicopter Advanced Readiness Program along with many other advanced training and certification exercises involving the United States and Allies all over the world. The Weapons School callsign is “MAULER” representing the tenacity and overwhelming power that our community brings to bear.

The squadron’s motto is “Warrior Spirit” underscoring the focus and ferocity required to protect the United States of America from its enemies. HSM Weapons School Atlantic remains committed to elevating the tactical proficiency and lethality of combat aircrews at home and over the horizon.

In my discussion with CDR Nathaniel “Velcro” Velcio, the Commanding Officer of the School, we discussed the evolution of the community as the Navy has shifted from its support role in the land wars to operations in the extended battlespace against peer competitors.

The broad point driven home by the CO was that in the land wars, the carrier strike groups were focused on support for the land forces and as such operated close to land.

This meant that the Romeo version of the Seahawks were clearly focused on the protection of the strike group from close in threats, notably, small boats, and subsurface threats of various kinds.

With the shift to a primary concern for the fight at sea, the strike groups have an increased focus on long range surface warfare in addition to ASW. The Romeo is using its long range detection capability in support of the strike groups and is working as well with interactivity with other assets which can provide the longer range capabilities for the offensive-defensive force which a strike group represents.

This evolution is a work in progress, as the US Navy and its coalition partners and the joint force re-focus on the challenge of dealing with peer competitors.

We discussed a number of the aspects of the strategic shift underway, and I will highlight the takeaways which I brought from the conversation, but am not holding the CO accountable for my conclusions.

But what I would note, is that CDR Velcio (Seahawk) and Lt. Gosselin (P-8), who was my host for the visit, and participated in the discussion, are fully onboard with refocusing on the Navy’s efforts to shape a lethal and effective kill web enabled force, and by so doing, are clearly rethinking how to use their respective platforms to support shaping a more integratabtle set of capabilities for the fleet and the coalition and joint force as well.

The first takeaway is the opportunity which better integration of an asset like the Romeo within the kill web approach can provide for the fleet.

With the legacy platform build approach, the focus has been upon data links from that platform to the force, without focusing on integrability.

The coming of the Minotaur front end to manage data streams into a single common operating picture is a key step forward to enhanced integrability which will then enhance the role of the Romeo in supporting the fleet as well.

As Rear Admiral Garvin put it: “The Minotaur Track Management and Mission Management system was developed in conjunction with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Minotaur was designed to integrate sensors and data into a comprehensive picture which allows multiple aircraft and vessels to share networked information.

“It is basically a data fusion engine and like many software capabilities these days, doesn’t physically have to present on a platform to be of use.

“These capabilities ride on a Minotaur web where, if you are on the right network, you can access data from whatever terminal you happen to be on.”

Bringing the various wave forms into a single screen via Minotaur allows those data streams to come together and to shape a common operating picture. With the Minotaur web everyone has access to the same COP regardless of whether you are airborne or onboard a ship.

The second takeaway is that integrability requires training to achieve a common operating understanding as well.  The P-8 and Romeo communities are now cross learning by putting their operators in each other’s simulators, as well as focusing on more common cross-platform training in Florida as well.

Such cross training is reduced though by the fact that their simulators cannot work together. Clearly, as the US Navy pursues a kill web approach, clusters of platforms that are going to work together to shape a shared targeting solution, need to have their simulators integrate as well.

For example, the P-8, and Seahawk, with the coming of MQ-25 should be able to cross train in the synthetic environment.

And other new options, such as the Viper operating with Seahawk would be facilitated by integration in the synthetic or simulated environment as well.

The third takeaway is that integration of P-8. Triton, Seahawk and Vipers could provide a whole new role for the L class ships.

Rather than being greyhound buses, the new LHA’s could spearhead a whole new sea denial capability. With Romeos onboard then their ability to integrate with Link-16 enabled Vipers could provide for data flowing from the P-8/Triton dyad and sensors on the MQ-25 to shape new capabilities, simply by wave form linkages, cross training, and new kill web enabled concepts of operations.

To be clear, integrated operations with L-16 enabled Vipers has the potential to enhance close in defense which is a key task, which frees up other assets to focus on longer-range surface warfare peer threats.

The fourth takeaway would be that platforms like the Romeo should have a seat at the table determining which passive sensors should go on platforms operating in the extended battlespace.

For example, the Navy is replacing the C-2 with the CMV-22B. But which passive sensors onboard the CMV-22B would be useful to provide data to the Romeo in its extended range EW/SUW role?

CDR Velcio put it: “We tend to focus on the sensors to be put under the glass.

“But what we should also focus on are the sensors that could be added to a platform, that the air crews will not be operating.

“We can get a significant combat effect by having the right sensors on a platform, but which do not require operational control by that platform’s air crew.”

A fifth takeaway is we could make much better use of the global partnerships enabled by a program like the Seahawk.

With regard to the Australians, their Romeos and the US Navy’s are virtually the same and both forces are working common TTPs.

This also means for the Australians as they rethink the role of their amphibious ships, they can work Romeos with Vipers, if they choose to buy them, into a formidable capability flying off of an amphibious ship, now not just a greyhound bus, but a key part of a sea denial mission.

With regard to NATO, there is some commonality in operations. According to CDR Velcio, if the ally in question is operating a dipping sonar system, such as the Canadians do with Cyclone and the Brits do with Merlin.

In short, by shaping a kill web approach, one rethinks how an asset like the Romeo could be used much more effectively in support of the force in the extended battlespace.

And one can also focus on how individual platforms might be modernized more effectively but in terms of the pairings with the other platforms with which they operate and to ensure that they can work in a common synthetic environment as well.

The featured photo shows the Romeo testing its dipping sonar. Photo credit: US Navy.

The video below is from NATO and hihglights NATO ASW Exercise MANTA held last year.

Dynamic Manta 2019 brought together 10 NATO Allies to practice the complex task of anti-submarine warfare.

An Update on Japanese Air Power, July 2020

According to an article on the Japanese Ministry of Defence website:

The JASDF detects and identifies aircraft approaching the Japanese airspace with assets such as warning and control radars, and airborne early warning and control aircraft.

By such means, the JASDF ensures the security of Japan’s airspace. When there is the possibility that aircraft violates the territorial airspace of Japan, the JASDF scrambles its fighter aircraft to gather detailed information of the aircraft, and if necessary, track and monitor it.

The JASDF scrambled 947 times in the FY2019 (April 1st, 2019 – March 31st, 2020). Although this was a decrease by 52 times compared to the FY2018, the record was the third most since Japan first implemented the measures against airspace violations in 1958.

Including estimates, the flag countries of the aircraft, forcing the JASDF to take actions, were China with 675 scrambles (approx. 71%), Russia with 268 scrambles (approx. 28%), and other countries with less than 1%. By regional air defense forces, the Northern Air Defense Force scrambled 198 times, the Central Air Defense Force 35 times, the Western Air Defense Force 133 times, and the Southwestern Air Defense Force 581 times.

The Chinese military flights marked as unusual include the flight of H-6 bomber that flew between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and the new Y-9 surveillance aircraft, which was visually confirmed for the first time.

Unusual flights by Russia include the violations of Japan’s airspace by Tu-95 bomber and A-50 airborne early warning and control; and the first visual confirmation of Su-34 fighter bomber. In the FY2019, all three publicly announced cases of airspace violation were the acts by Russian aircraft.

This was published on the Japanese Ministry of Defence website on June 2020.

Recently, the Japanese government decided to ramp up their airpower capabilities by buying 105 additional F-35s which will make it the second largest operator of the F-35s.

The additional aircraft will replace 100+ pre-MSIP F-15Js

According to the Australian Defence Business Review:

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has announced that the State Department has approved the acquisition of 105 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIs by Japan.

The July 9 announcement says Japan plans to acquire 63 more F-35A conventional take off and landing (CTOL) versions and 42 of the vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) variant. These numbers line up with a December 2018 announcement by Japan of its intention to acquire additional F-35s, including the F-35B for operations from its Izumo class helicopter destroyers. 

The DSCA notice says the 105 F-35s will cost an estimated US$23.11bn ($A33.11bn), and will include five spare P&W F135 engines, and all of the usual US Government and contractor training, logistics, spares, ground support equipment, and delivery support.

Japan already has about 20 F-35As in service of a total of 42 aircraft on order, 40 of which will be built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries at its final assembly and checkout (FACO) facility before Japan’s production switches to US-built aircraft.

The 27,000 tonne Izumo was recently reported as being part-way through its modification cycle to accommodate the F-35Bs, work which will include the installation of heavier deck plating, additional fuel bunkerage, communications, and landing and air traffic control systems.

There is little doubt that the significant buys of F-35s by Japan and Australia will provide then with significant opportunities to enhance their bilateral cooperation and evolution of common concepts of operations, 

New NATO Facility to Support Baltic Defense

A new NATO infrastructure facility has just opened its doors at the Tapa Base in Estonia. The hub is able to receive and facilitate the onward movement of NATO forces, including the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and will be used for exercises and prepositioning of equipment. The majority of the project, worth 20 million EUR, has been funded through the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP

The new infrastructure includes barracks for troop accommodation, storage space for equipment and vehicles, a medical centre and a helipad. The facility will serve as a ready-to-use field camp for short-notice exercises and deployments. It will help ensure the flexibility and rapid movement of NATO forces throughout the territory of Baltic Allies.

“The project in Tapa shows burden-sharing in action. It is also an example of Allies meeting the commitments they made at the Wales Summit in 2014 and the Warsaw Summit in 2016, to enhance NATO’s ability to quickly and effectively reinforce its Eastern Allies,” said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

This is just one of more than 200 projects launched by NATO Allies to enable the Readiness Action Plan. Through common funding, infrastructure to support the prepositioning of military supplies, and of reception, staging and training is currently under construction in eight NATO nations.

This article was published by NATO on July 1, 2020.

MAG 24 Training

07/10/2020

Marine Aircraft Group 24 conducts a maximum readiness and integrated training mission, Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020.

Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, seven MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power.

MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII, KANEOHE BAY, HI, UNITED STATES

05.22.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Jose Angeles

Marine Corps Base Hawaii