USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), and USS Nimitz (CVN 68) continue dual carrier operations.
Ronald Reagan, the flagship of Carrier Strike Group 5, provides a combat-ready force that protects and defends the United States, as well as the collective maritime interests of its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
SOUTH CHINA SEA
07.18.2020
Video by Petty Officer 3rd Class Gabriel Martinez
USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76)
The video shows the arrival of the first CMV-22B at Naval Station North Island.
The first CMV-22B Osprey assigned to Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30 prepares to land at Naval Air Station North Island. VRM 30 was established in late 2018 to begin the Navy’s transition from the C-2A Greyhound, which has provided logistics support to aircraft carriers for four decades, to the CMV-22B, which has an increased operational range, greater cargo capacity, faster cargo loading/unloading, increased survivability and enhanced beyond-line-of-sight communications compared to the C-2A.
The CMV-22B is no more a replacement for the C-2 Greyhound, than the MV-22 was for the CH-46. The MV-22 covered the functions of the CH-46 for the Marine Corps but represented a disruptive change which has transformed the USMC and its operations.
The CMV-22 will provide the functionality of the C-2 for the carrier strike group but is entering the carrier strike group at a time of profound change, and it will contribute to it.
As we noted in an earlier article:
When I met with Vice Admiral Miller, the Navy Air Boss in February of this year, we discussed how the carrier strike group was moving from what might be referred to as the integrated air wing to the integratable air wing. In that interview, Vice Admiral Miller highlighted how the Navy was looking at the coming of the Osprey. It is a different aircraft, and the question will be as it operates effectively in its logistics mission, what other contributions might it make to the fleet?
So how should the Navy operate, modernize, and leverage its Ospreys?
For Miller, the initial task is to get the Osprey onboard the carrier and integrated with CVW operations. But while doing so, it is important to focus on how the Osprey working within the CVW can provide a more integrated force.
“Vice Admiral Miller and his team are looking for the first five-year period in operating the CMV-22 for the Navy to think through the role of the Osprey as a transformative force, rather than simply being a new asset onboard a carrier. Such an approach is embedded in the rethink from operating and training an integrated air wing to an integratable air wing.”
A measure of the change from the C-2 to the CMV-22B is that the Naval Aviation Warfare Development Center at Fallon Naval Air Station is already anticipating the arrival of the CMV-22B within the fleet and are looking within their focus on training the integratable air wing to the coming of the new aircraft. To be clear, the C-2 has never been part of NAWDC or its predecessors.
I had the chance to see the CMV-22B at the reveal ceremony held in Amarillo, Texas on February 7, 2020 where I first met Capt. Dewon “Chainsaw” Chaney, the Commander of COMVRMWING (or Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing), and most recently I visited his command in North Island, San Diego on July 13, 2020.
As Captain Chaney put it in his address to the audience at the reveal ceremony in February 2020: “CMV-22s will operate from all aircraft carriers providing a significant range increase for operations from the Sea Bases enabling Combatant Commanders to exercise increased flexibility and options for warfare dominance.
“If you’re in a fight, it’s always good to have options! Every month following the first initial deployment, there will be a CMV-22 detachment operating with a US aircraft carrier somewhere in the world.”
During my visit to North Island in July 2020, I had a chance to discuss the way ahead with “Chainsaw” for his command in terms of putting the Osprey squadrons in place.
The first squadron VRM-30 was stood up prior to the creation of the Wing and its first aircraft arrived in June 2020. Captain Chaney then noted that this October, the fleet replacement squadron, VRM-50, will be stood up. It will take this squadron two years until they will be able to train new pilots.
The counterpart to VRM-30 will be VRM-40 but all three squadrons will be under the COMVRMWING. The third squadron will be based on the East Coast.
Captain Chaney concluded: “I do believe that the Navy is really going to appreciate the capabilities that the CMV-22 is going to bring to the strike group, and they’re going to want it to do more.”
Video credit:
06.22.2020
Video by Petty Officer 1st Class Timothy Wilson
By Australian Defence Business Review
Following the cancellation of its largest biennial air defence exercise – Exercise Pitch Black 2020 – because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the RAAF recently conducted a Virtual Pitch Black 2020 (VPB20) in order to at least partly meet its training objectives for the year.
The virtual and constructive exercise was a series of tailored and targeted training conducted by the ADF’s Air Warfare Centre’s Distributed Training Centre (AWC-DTC) with the support of key industry players such as PLEXSYS Australia, Raytheon Australia, MilSkil, Nova Systems, and Skildare with a suite of training products and systems to provide realistic scenarios.
A Defence release says the AWC-DTC provides the software, hardware and, with J7 Joint Collective Training Branch (the former ADF Simulation Training Centre), the connectivity to enable distributed mission training in the synthetic environment. It says the AWC-DTC has evolved with improved distributed planning, briefing, execution and debrief over a mix of Defence Training and Experimentation Network (DTEN) and Enterprise DSN UC.
“PLEXSYS is pleased to have been a partner in this important exercise, which helps ensure the RAAF remains ready to respond whenever the Australian Government requires,” PLEXSYS Australia Director, Robert Miller said in a company statement. “Bringing our flagship product – ASCOT-7 – to the warfighter, is both exhilarating and humbling.”
Training audiences were located at both RAAF Bases Williamtown and Amberley, and some of the RAAF’s simulators – including 36SQN’s C-17A simulator at Amberley, and 2SQN’s E-7A simulator and 41WG’s ground-based C2 element at Williamtown – were successfully networked to provide realistic joint-force scenarios.
“36SQN pilots have gained valuable experience being involved in VPB20, in particular being involved with integrated planning and execution with C2 and fast jet communities,” FLTLT Tim Smith, a C-17 pilot said in a Defence release. “We have limited opportunities to be involved in this type of integrated exercise, especially now given the ongoing impacts of COVID, so participation in VPB has been a rewarding experience for our crews.”
VBP20 lead planner SQNLDR Alexander Cave said, ”When Exercise Pitch Black 20 was cancelled, we seized the opportunity to tailor the virtual exercise to meet training objectives beyond the live exercise. Traditionally, this exercise provides a training platform as a work up but with no live exercise this year, the virtual space was critical for aircrew learning outcomes.
“Air Force, through the Air Warfare Centre, is investing in the Advanced Training and Test Environment [ATTE],” SQNLDR Cave added. “The next generation platforms being acquired bring with them advanced capabilities and the ability to create effects across multiple domains. The ATTE will enable the training, test and experimentation activities that need to occur to maximise the effectiveness of these capabilities in live, synthetic and blended environments.”
The AWC Exercise Control capability was provided by Raytheon Australia which utilised the services of MilSkil, Nova Systems, and Skildare – all of which are small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) founded and managed by former RAAF pilots.
This article was published by ADBR on July 30, 2020.
The Japanese are reworking their defense capabilities to provide for enhanced perimeter defense.
We projected this trajectory for Japanese defense policy in our book on Pacific defense published in 2013.
According to the preface to the Japanese Ministry of Defence’s overview of the way ahead for its defense programs:
Japan will steadily improve its defense capabilities as the second year of the “Medium Term Defense Program (JFY2019 – JFY2023)” (MTDP) (approved by the Cabinet on December 18, 2018) based on the “National Defense Program Guidelines for JFY2019 and beyond” (approved by the Cabinet on December 18, 2018) in order to build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force”.
In order to realize cross-domain operations, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology.
In addition, SDF will enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability to effectively respond to various situations during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in new domains.
Furthermore, to be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support will be enhanced.
Moreover, Japan will prioritize reinforcement of human resource base in the face of aging population with declining birth rates and technology base regarding advances in military technology, as well as strengthening Japan- U.S. Alliance and security cooperation with other countries in light of changes in security environment.
In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. Japan will strengthen its defense capability effectively by allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation.
Furthermore, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas, avoid stove-piped approach and optimize their organizations and equipment.
Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, Japan will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining through various measures to streamline procurements while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government.
In our look at the Chinese military challenge and the approaches being taken interactively by Japan, the United States and Australia, the Japanese role was described as follows:
In our 2015 book on Pacific defense, a key part of the analysis revolved around the reshaping of Japan’s defense concept.
The Japanese concept for the dynamics of change was the need for a new “dynamic defense” concept in which the SDF was able to integrate much more effectively with new 21st century capabilities such as acquiring Ospreys, F-35s and rebuilding their Navy to be able to extend the perimeter of their defense beyond a narrow concept of homeland defense.
At the same time, the approach has been clearly constrained due to historical memories and experiences, but it is about shaping greater air land, maritime integration to provide for a “defense bubble” over the nation and one which can interoperate with its closest ally the United States, but also reach out to Australia in their mutually expanding relationship.
One of the key features of our appraoch was and continues to be how to leverage the new systems we are already bringing on line which allows us to expand our deterrence in depth capabilities.
There is way too much emphasis Inside the Beltway on hypothetical wartime futures, rather than taking a hard headed look at the full spectrum crisis management challenges facing us now and into the decade ahead and military capabilities be interlinked with appropriate allied and national political strategies.
To get the world in 2050 without domination by the authoritarian powers, we have to effectively engage in co-opetition with them in the decade ahead, and exercise the kind of military capabilities which empower political engagement and effective crisis management.
We argued in our 2103 book on Pacific strategy, that Japan would work to enhance its perimeter defense and move eventually towards what we called a two anchor appraoch.
We argued that expanded perimeter defense is a key part of what we referred to as the “dynamic defense” phase in Japanese policy.
We argued that “this meant greater reach of Japanese systems., better integration of those systems within the Japanese forces themselves, more investments in C2 and ISR, and a long-term strategy of reworking the U.S.-Japanese military relationship to have much greater reach and presence.
“The dynamic defense phase carries with it the seeds for the next phase — the shaping of a twin-anchor policy of having reach in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.
“Obviously, such reach is beyond the capabilities of the Japanese themselves and requires close integration with the United States and other allies.
“And such reach requires much greater C2, ISR and weapons integration across the Japanese and allied force structure.”
In the graphic below, the box highlights the expanding perimeter of defense in which the defense bubble needs to operate.
But as they build out more effective forces, ones which are capable of integrability, they can enhance as well their capabilities to operate with allies in defending the Northern and Southern reaches of their defense concerns as well.,
Featured Photo: A V-22 Osprey aircraft bound for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force based at Camp Kisarazu prepares to depart Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Japan, July 6, 2020. The ferry flight from MCAS Iwakuni marked the delivery of the first V-22 to the Japan Self-Defense Force. US Marine Corps photo.
Step inside the cockpit with U.S. Air Force Maj. Josh ‘Cabo’ Gunderson to experience the F-22 Raptor’s max vertical takeoff and opening maneuvers of the demonstration profile.
JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON, AK, UNITED STATES
07.16.2020
Video by 1st Lt. Sam Eckholm
Joint Base Langley-Eustis
With the launch of our defense information website (defense.info) , we introduced a micro-site on defense decisions.
We wrote: “In this new section of the defense.info website, we will address U.S. and allied upcoming procurement choices and decisions.
“We are focused on how platform and system choices affect the evolution of the capabilities, concepts of operations of a particular ally or of U.S. services or the joint force.
“Too often, the focus of the defense press or of analysts is narrowly focused on platforms, rather than placing platform decisions or system decisions into the broader context of the evolution of core capabilities.
“We will focus on such decisions by placing them in a broader context.
“In particular, we are focused on the building, shaping, operating and sustainment of what we have called the integrated distributed force.
“We have built a separate micro site focused on this theme, but here we are focused on procurement, or equipment decisions which play into this strategic shift.”
To further develop a discussion of how to evaluate platforms in the evolving concepts of operations for full spectrum crisis management forces, we will focus on Germany, and key procurement choices which they face in the context of the direct defense of Europe.
We are publishing this Fall our book entitled The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21st Century Authoritarian Challenge. In this book we identify the key trends reshaping the direct defense challenge and the approaches being taken to reshape capabilities for enhanced direct defense
In that book, we focus on how key states in Europe are reshaping their forces and their approach to defense to deal with the new strategic challenges.
Clearly, Germany is a key lynchpin state in how Europe is reshaping its approach, and within that approach key procurement decisions will be taken in the period ahead.
In particular, Germany is currently facing three key procurement choices which illustrate the complexity of choice.
Too often, a simple platform versus platform presentation is made which confuses rather than clarifies what the tactical and strategic implications of particular platform decisions in a key functional area for force development and tactical and strategic evolution of a nation’s defense posture.
With regard to this series, we will address, the following procurement choices facing Germany in three key operational areas:
The first is the face-off between the legacy Chinook medium-lift helicopter versus the new generation CH-53K heavy lift helicopter.
The second is the decision to pursue signals intelligence with a manned aircraft option versus an unmanned option, or the face-off between the Pegasus versus the Global 6000 program.
The third is the question of how Germany will replace the Tornado aircraft in its nuclear role.
In each case, much of the analysis has been to compare platform versus platform: Chinook versus CH-53K; a Triton variant versus a manned Canadian aircraft with both systems delivering signals intelligence but in very different ways and with very different implications for force structure development; how to transform the legacy Tornado into its replacement with no clear lineage from Tornado to what will replace it.
The German case provides an opportunity to address the broader question of how to analyze platform choices in a very different strategic context and with significant changes in how US and allied force structures need to evolve to meet the challenges of full spectrum crisis management.
By Robbin Laird
The remotely piloted solution (Pegasus) versus a manned aircraft solution (Global 6000) for airborne SIGINT should take into account the coming of AGS to NATO.
The NATO Air Ground Surveillance approach is built around a remotely piloted solution which dovetails nicely with such a solution for airborne SIGINT.
With the coming of the Global Hawk-based NATO AGS aircraft to NATO, the teaming of manned and unmanned systems to deliver interoperable data will be driven by working collaboration between NATO’s E-3A and AGS aircraft.
As Major Jay B. Vizcarra noted in a 2017 article published by The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) the collaboration between the manned and unmanned assets delivering core information with regard to the air C2/ISR integration effort requires the further development of networks to manage fully the result of operating such a synergistic manned/unmanned teaming effort.
When combining manned and unmanned capabilities to produce C2ISR combined effects in multiple environments, NATO E-3A and AGS integration possesses the potential to provide the Alliance with an initial vector towards MDC2 operations.
However, to expand on MDC2 capabilities and secure an asymmetric strategic advantage into the 21st century, NATO must gear towards a new enterprise ‘system of systems’ approach, tap into ‘combat clouds’, and leverage the competitive advantages afforded from Joint ISR fusing and rapid information sharing.
Additionally, technocratic ‘stove-pipes’ of proprietary intelligence data must be freed to induce fusion warfare and allow C2 and strike assets to hastily complete the F2T2EA ‘kill-chain’. As General (retired) Herbert J. Carlisle19 stresses, ‘if you don’t have the ability to do something with it [the intelligence data], then you’re missing half the equation’.
Subsequently, smarter network architectures with automatic processes will ensure cyber domain integrity and the fluid transfer of crucial information to the right person, in the right place, at the right time.
While NATO E-3A and AGS may have provided a small glimpse towards a multi-domain operational concept, it is up to the Alliance to ensure a new foundation is set to adopt and nurture an MDC2 capability.
The arrival of the AGS solution set with the fourth aircraft delivered to NATO this past July, sets in motion infrastructure to manage what a remotely piloted aircraft can do.
It also sets in motion a path ahead for shaping the infrastructure and the combat learning curve to manage the how data flowing from AGS into NATO and individual national networks.
For several years, the USAF has operated U.S. Global Hawks from Sigonella Airbase with no major problems within Europe.
That experience laid the foundation for high confidence that AGS could do the same.
That is why it is puzzling that another HALE system, this time Triton/Pegasus would somehow be more of a problem.
In any case, Germany, as the second largest stakeholder in the AGS program, certainly will gain significant operational experience, and will have a large pool of trained personal, with regard to operating a HALE system similar to that of Pegasus.
Indeed, the industry team which worked the airworthiness side of AGS has built up significant data and working experience with the European authorities who have authorized the use of AGS in European air space.
Again, this is a significant down payment on shaping the way ahead for HALE remotely piloted air systems in Europe.
AGS will provide information through various networks, and be exploited on core bases and mobile ground stations to deliver actionable information on a timely basis to the alliance and to its member states.
Obviously, the commitment of different nations will vary in terms of their investments in exploitation capability and this will be translated into how effectively different national militaries will be able to exploit the information generated from the AGS system.
The AGS is a system, not simply a HALE aircraft.
NATO has described the AGS system as follows:
Just as NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) aircraft – also known as AWACS or “NATO’s eyes in the sky” – monitor Alliance airspace, AGS will be able to observe what is happening on the earth’s surface, providing situational awareness before, during and, if needed, after NATO operations.
The AGS core will be an integrated system consisting of an air segment, a ground segment and a support segment.
The air segment consists of five NATO RQ-4D aircraft and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) flight control elements. The aircraft will be equipped with a state-of-the-art, multi-platform radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) ground surveillance radar sensor, as well as an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight, long-range, wideband data links.
The ground segment consists of a number of ground stations in mobile and transportable configurations, able to provide data-link connectivity, data-processing, exploitation capabilities and interfaces for interoperability.
The ground segment will provide an interface between the AGS core system and a wide range of command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems. It will interconnect with multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users, as well as with reach-back facilities away from the surveillance area.
The AGS core support segment will include dedicated mission support facilities at the AGS Main Operating Base in Sigonella.
Interoperable contributions in kind, such as national surveillance systems and data/communications, will also be made available to NATO and will complement AGS with additional surveillance capabilities.
The composition of the AGS core system and national contributions in kind will provide NATO with considerable flexibility in employing its ground surveillance capabilities.
This will be supplemented by additional interoperable national airborne surveillance systems from NATO member countries, tailored to the needs of a specific operation or mission conducted by the Alliance.
A key part of the AGS system clearly is the ground segment and the ability to process information and communicate that information to the forces and the decision-makers.
The ground segment system will be shaped to provide for inputs to national decision-making systems, or work the ISR-C2 dyad to shape ways to come up with more effective technologies, policies and procedures to deliver better and more timely information to national and collective decision making.
This AGS ground system clearly could be a foundation from which the Pegasus HALE system could work was well.
In other words, rather than looking at Pegasus ground system investments as program-specific, they are not; they would be part of a broader exploitation and data delivery system to the German armed forces, and would almost certainly flow through similar or the same data pipes to the German decision making community.
A key factor is that both the AGS and PEGASUS ground systems are or would be provided by Airbus Defence and Space.
When considering whether one would prefer a manned to a remotely piloted one for AGS, the ultimate decision was for a remotely piloted one.
I was a consultant to the USAF in the period of time when the manned option was rejected in favor of the remotely piloted one, and remember very well Secretary Wynne’s thinking with regard to why it was crucial to go ahead with the remotely piloted solution set.
With the coming of the F-35 and the already evident impact of the F-22 on the USAF, it was clear to Wynne that the role of specialized manned aircraft in the ISR and C2 role was going to diminish significantly.
The ability of the remotely piloted aircraft to have much greater endurance, an ability to operate at heights that provide for significant area converge, and the innovations in wave forms, would mean that the role of RPAs in the ISR world would rapidly grow.
And that solution has arrived for NATO in the form of its new AGS aircraft and system.
Its impact on the Pegasus/Global 6000 trade off seems obvious – why turn your back on the future?
Notably, why would you do so, when you have already joined the future in another program area related to the one where you are mimicking the past.
Featured Photo: 21 November 2019, Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy – NATO’s first RQ-4D arrived in Europe.
According to the Australian Department of Defence in a press release dated August 13, 2020: “HMAS Canberra and embarked forces returned to Australia after successfully completing Regional Presence Deployment 2020.
“The Australian Defence Force has embarked on a regional deployment to conduct exercises within Southeast Asia and Hawaii over the coming months.
“The deployment demonstrates Australia’s commitment to sustaining strong and positive defence relationships with regional nations as well as the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.”
With the reworking of Australian defense envisaged in the new Australian strategy, the two amphibious ships could well see the role expand as part of task forces, and expanded use in sea denial missions as well.
This will require changes in capabilities onboard the ship, which are being envisaged with the replacement of the MRH-90 and the Army’s replacement of the Tiger helicopter.
What kind of rotorcraft package the Royal Navy and Australian Army decide to go with –most likely marinized — will have a significant impact on what kind of task force role which the Canberra class can play in future.
The featured photo shows HMAS Canberra pausing for a sunrise memorial near Savo Island, Solomon Islands, to commemorate the sinking of HMAS Canberra (I) at this location. 84 crew lost their lives when the ship sunk on 9 August 1942.
