By Robbin Laird

The strategic environment has clearly changed and the level of real world conflict has escalated, whether in terms of major hot wars – in the Middle East and in Europe – or in terms of active gray zone conflicts.

The ready force needs to deal with this real world rather than than just preparing for a future war. The DSR has outlined the future force for the future war; the current ADF needs to deal with the world we have.

The prospect of armed conflict in the first island chain, already underway in the gray zone between China and the Philippines, and the prospect of PRC actions against a sovereign free nation in Taiwan has been constantly threatened by the current leader of China.

How do you respond to the here and now but do so in a way that puts you on the trajectory which the DSR has mandated?

Some answers to this question were provided by three of the speakers at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation.

Their answers were in the form of identifying capabilities crucial to the ADF now which needed to be underscored and enhanced in the years to come.

The first speaker was Lt General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities. The Joint Capabilities Group is defined by the Australian government as follows:

Joint Capabilities Group (JCG) is headed by the Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC), who is responsible to the Chief of Defence Force for the provision of Joint Health, Logistics, Education and Training, Information Warfare and Joint Military Police. CJC will also manage agreed Joint projects, and their sustainment, to support joint capability requirements.

Concomitant with her broad remit, Coyle discussed a range of efforts within the JCG. But the most important for this discussion was what she identified as the “high ground.”

Cyber power is a vital element of national military power. We need to coordinate electronic warfare and cyber information operations in order to gain asymmetric advantage and paralyze our adversary’s decision making. We must be able to continue to defend and exploit capabilities within the electromagnetic spectrum.

And I’ve heard this referred to recently as the next high ground. Doing so will slow adversaries kill chains and increase confusion and degrade their precision. The layering of electronic warfare, cyber and kinetic attacks is similarly vital for us to assuring our own strike capability.

We must protect radios and microwaves that are used for communications and radars, as well as infrared spectrum for our weapons guidance, jamming aircraft, blinding air defence, radars, suppressing military missile systems. All of this is absolutely real and at the forefront of our mind, and so we’re focused on delivering capability that will protect our ability to operate across the electronic magnetic spectrum.

Lt General Coyle put it bluntly:

If we lose the war in the electromagnetic spectrum, we lose the war across all domains.

Hence enabling the force in being to fight, survive and prevail in the current context is crucial and in so doing carves a path to shaping future options as well.

The second speaker weighed in on Coyle’s comments.

The speaker was Phil Winzenberg, the Deputy Director General-Signals Intelligence and Effects from the Australian Signals Directorate. He reinforced Coyle’s emphasis on the role of effective operations in the electromagnetic spectrum and signals intelligence as enablers for an integrated force..

In his presentation he underscored that the integrated force was more than the ADF and its operations.

This what he argued about the ASD and its current relationship with the ADF in creating a more integrated force:

That brings us to the present, where the demands from the ADF have increased ever further. Instead of just the land domain, which was the focus of previous conflicts, we will support the ADF in all domains. We won’t just provide intelligence on adversary capabilities, but also timely indicators and warnings of adversary intent towards the integrated force and also our nation’s critical infrastructure.

We won’t just provide situational awareness of the disposition of adversary platforms and forces, but we’ll do that also to establish and hold custody of them so that they can be used effectively by CJOC, at his or her discretion, and on a scale and with a complexity never encountered before by ASD or indeed the ADF.

 He then highlighted REDSPICE

This programmatic effort is described by the ASD as follows:

REDSPICE is the most significant single investment in the Australian Signals Directorate’s 75 years. It responds to the deteriorating strategic circumstances in our region, characterised by rapid military expansion, growing coercive behaviour and increased cyber attacks.

Through REDSPICE, ASD will deliver forward-looking capabilities essential to maintaining Australia’s strategic advantage and capability edge over the coming decade and beyond.

If you’re the type of person who is curious, motivated by finding a purpose and loves problem-solving, then you’re the type of person we’re looking for.

The REDSPICE Blueprint (PDF) offers some further insights into what REDSPICE will deliver, and a vision of what ASD will look like in the future.

Through REDSPICE, we will expand the range and sophistication of our intelligence, offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and build on our already-strong enabling foundations.

• 3x current offensive cyber capability
• 2x persistent cyber-hunt activities
• Advanced AI, machine learning and cloud technology
• 4x global footprint
• 1900 new analyst, technologist, corporate and enabling roles across Australia and the world
• 40% of staff located outside Canberra 

Winzenberg went on to underscore the following:

I can assure everyone here that delivering REDSPICE is an ASD top priority, and we’re doing all that we can to hold up our end of the bargain in supporting the future integrated force.

REDSPICE is supporting current and future operations from the strategic to the tactical. There is no defensive cyber activity that the integrated force plans or executes that doesn’t draw its threat intelligence or employ tools developed by REDSPICE. There is no information and cyber effects that the integrated force plans or executes that doesn’t happen without REDSPICE targeting intelligence and tools, and there’s no technical intelligence on weapon systems and other capabilities that allow us to develop countermeasures and build electronic attack algorithms that isn’t enhanced by REDSPICE. 

He then underscored that the ADF-ASD partnership was enhanced by the Five Eyes alliance.

I’ll finish by reflecting on the power that comes from ASDs membership of the five eyes. The Five Eyes alliance is the greatest intelligence partnership the world has ever known…

The trust and depth of this partnership is the key differentiator between us and others in the region. The breadth and depth of what we do together is truly staggering.

If we set about trying to achieve that today from the standing start, it would be inconceivable that we would get to where we are now. We have good, good friends everywhere who willingly work with us. They work with us to build our capabilities. They work with us to secure our interests. They work with us to share intelligence so that we can understand the challenges of the world together and in similar ways.

He then concluded with this statement:

So to close, I’m going to leave you with three fun facts.

Number one, ASD is at its core a support to military organizations. We’re now driven to deliver REDSPICE to best support government and defence in our complex strategic environment.

Number two, partnerships are key to the integrated force, and the ADF has no better partner than ASD and our five eyes buddies as we all rise to the shared challenge.

And number three, last but not least, when it comes to actionable intelligence at the speed of relevance in a modern battle space, you only have two options, SIGINT or everything else, much, much, much too late.

The third speaker was the Chief of the RAAF, AIRMSHL Stephen Chappell. He focused on the importance of taking advantage of the geographical situation in which Australia finds itself.

In effect, by shaping the RAAF and the integrated force as a maneuver force, the ADF is able to use geographical depth to defend itself and at the same time able to deploy from various locations on its own continent to gain strategic and tactical advantage.

This is how he concluded his presentation:

We can create the tempo, confuse and complicate adversary targeting and project depth well beyond their shores by working together as a joint and integrated force working closely with interagency, industry partners, allies and partners. We can position and posture to deter and be prepared to respond. 

What he was articulating was defence by maneuver in terms of geographical and operational (meaning an ability to leverage space and extended range ISR and C2 systems) depth.

He highlighted this approach as follows:

Going back to how to generate our depth. We’ve experimented using space and cyber in generating effects to gain advantage. We’ve integrated with the U.S. and Australian fleets and land forces across the primary area of military interest for us to execute multi domain strikes at range in defense of our territory and coalition forces.

Our war games show us how in the Indo Pacific we can effectively integrate capabilities and forces across domains and nationalities, operationally and strategically. They also show us that there is much more to be done, and therefore our services will have to continue to evolve to meet the requirements of multi-domain operations.

He provided further details in a earlier presentation as well. In the 27 September 2023 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar, he made the following comment:

AVM Stephen Chappell, Head of Military Strategic Commitments, focused on the symbiotic relationship between offense and defense with regard to multi-domain strike.

“Integrated air and missile defense and multi-domain strike are two sides of the same coin. By having an ability to protect our strike enterprises we enhance their credibility to strike back which ensures as well our enhanced deterrent capability.”

He underscored: “Passive defense is just as important not only for defending critical assets, but preserving our multi-domain strike capabilities in order to execute those left jabs and those right hooks necessary. The next layer of defense we’re thinking about is counter force. This in effect is multi-domain strike, the ability to reach out and defeat a threat to our homeland or to our forces. Deterrence by denial includes that defensive protection of the chin as we deliver effective left jabs and right hooks.”

It is fine to have long-range force structure planning, but what happens when the operational environment is rapidly changing for your operational force? How to adapt the ready force effectively and adeptly in a timely manner? And what consequences does that have for one’s long-range force structure design?

The presentation by Jennifer Parker, Expert Associate National Security College of the Australian National University, focused on a key challenge which raises such questions. Her presentation was entitled: “The Contested Maritime Domain: Challenges for an Integrated Force?”

What she focused on was the changing nature of littoral maritime operations, the emergence of new technologies and concepts of operations by various actors notably in the Black and Red Seas, and how those shifts in approach affected maritime operations.

The bottom line of her analysis was that the new technologies and approaches had a clear impact on capital naval vessels, and with relevant defence measures, technologies and relevant training, capital ships could still operate effectively in the littorals. But the point can be put bluntly: you need to adapt your ready force to deal with new technologies, new con-ops and technologies.

And a point outside of her presentation was inherent within it: what is the future of capital ships integrating maritime autonomous systems? For defence? For offense?

Or as I would put it, it is not a question of crewed versus uncrewed vessels. It is about how crewed vessels could leverage offboard assets like maritime autonomous systems or air systems for the projection of effect or defence in depth.

Her first case study was of the Black Sea and contested littoral operations there.

She argued that: The range of the littoral is increasing. Ukraine has effectively used uncrewed surface vessels, cruise missiles and UAVs to target ships at greater ranges.

Now we don’t know the exact ranges of some of the uncrewed surface vessels that Ukraine has operated, but certainly they managed to hit the Kursk bridge at about 300 nautical miles from Ukrainian controlled territory.

That is a dramatic change in terms of the range of the littoral. Ukraine has managed to destroy about 30% of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and certainly pushed them back from Ukraine and territorial seas and from Crimea, and that’s no mean feat when you look at the USV engagements,

But what must considered is how the Russian ships have defended themselves. They have no countermeasures whatsoever. They’re barely maneuvering or defending themselves…As offensive capability evolves, we need to be working hard on what the defensive capability is and integrating it into our platforms.

She noted as well that USVs can certainly attack ports and port infrastructure. This means that there need to be countermeasures for this new threat as well.

The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:

• Range of the littoral is increasing
• Sea denial strategy in enclosed seas
• Ship preparedness / posture is key
• Balance between development of offensive / defensive balance (capability / counter capability)
• Maritime trade does not stop during conflict
• Importance of port infrastructure protection

Her second case study was of the Red Sea and the approach of the Houthis to disruption in the littorals.

She argued that: The Houthis have been successful in changing the direction of maritime trade. There have been over 100 attacks now on merchant shipping, and 30 of these attacks have managed to sink a couple of ships. This shows the vulnerability of choke points using the kind of systems and technology available to the Houthis. They have attacked but not damaged surface combatants.

She underscored that prepared surface vessels have successfully defended themselves but two problems have been underscored for the ready force. First, the fleet needs to find ways to be rearmed with missiles while at sea. Second, the fleet needs to find much cheaper ways to defeat the unmanned strike force directed against the fleet.

She argued that it was necessary for the ready force to be “stressed tested” by engaging in such deployments to evolve its combat edge.

The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:

• Vulnerability of chokepoints
• Continuing relevance of surface combatants
• Magazine depth / Replenishment at sea
• Integration of counter-drone capabilities
• Importance of stress testing capabilities
• Continuing relevance of convoy operations
• Strategic depth in maritime fleet
• Defence / maritime industry coordination
• Maritime trade doesn’t stop / it evolves

Her third case study was of the PRC actions against the Philippines.

The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:

• Blurring of civil maritime security threats
• Criticality of maritime domain awareness
• Effective presence operations require quantity of forces
• Integration of information operations into wider campaign strategy

And finally she addressed the active threats to sea laid cables which are critical to the information flows globally. Here she asked the poignant question: “Whose responsibility for such defense is this in Australia? And what are we doing about it?”

This challenge is a key one, which parts of NATO are finally addressing in Europe. For example, in the recent NORDIC WARDEN Exercise, the UK and Northern European nations exercised their forces to shape a con-ops to deal with this, although the exercise indicated important technology and force structure gaps to deal with the challenge.

With regard to operations in the Red Sea, she noted:

A number of the European navies who have gone through their workups and gone through their test and evaluation have sent ships to the Red Sea and learned very quickly that their combat systems and their missile systems were not up for the fight and had to withdraw them.

That is something that we want to learn before we are getting multiple missiles shot at us in the event of a more significant conflict.

Parker underscored the really crucial point that when it comes to naval operations, the military and the civilian aspects are intertwined. Australia depends on maritime trade, which will need to continue in times of conflict, and to do so, the military and civilian parts of the equation need to be clearly working together.

She noted: We’ve learned that defence and maritime industry need to coordinate now. That’s something that we consistently relearn, and that has been a key point of the defence of merchant shipping in the Red Sea, and something that Australia needs to think about as we try and grow our maritime industry with strategic fleet…

Maritime trade does not stop in the event of conflict, so the view that we don’t need to worry about it or that we just need to worry about protecting Australia has not borne itself out in our previous world wars and it is not bearing itself out in the Black Sea or the Red Sea.

And what is happening in the west Philippine Sea is a clear blurring of civil maritime security threats. This is something that we need to pay attention to. We currently have a civil maritime strategy. We have a military maritime strategy, and the two don’t connect. It’s not too far to think that an adversary could try to overwhelm Australia’s maritime domain through using what we would continue consider civil maritime threats.  

And to Parker’s point about “Ship preparedness / posture is key”:

In the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams seminar, we focused on how the force in being can evolve effectively in the near to mid-term as investments are being made in future force capabilities, most notably the new SSNs.

This means that the services have to deal with three challenges simultaneously or what one might call the three R’s: Re-structuring or redesign, readiness and resilience.

I had a chance to discuss how the Australian Army was dealing with these challenges in a meeting in the office of Lt. General Simon Stuart on September 29, 2024.

Lt. General Stuart underscored:

We must do all three simultaneously. That means that we have to change the way we are set up and the way we work.

Previously, we did our force generation, force modernisation and readiness activities separately. They were three different parts of the force. We had a readiness model where we consumed readiness while we were deployed.

We cannot operate that way anymore, as we did in the so-called ‘wars of choice’.

We start with the consideration that time is the key resource. It is insufficient to invest our time in three different activities and then converge on an operation.

We assign land forces to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), and I give him a level of assurance that these forces are ready and at a clearly defined readiness level. CJOPS assigns the mission and tasks for the particular operation, activity or investment. Now – In a new way of working, I will also assign tasks in support of force generation and force modernization objectives.

When we deploy, whether onshore or offshore, bilaterally or multilaterally, we are going to make the best return on investment we possibly can.

For example, the forward deployed forces working in Indonesia as part of Exercise Super Garuda Shield, worked with a partner, had assigned tasks from CJOPS and me. The tasks from me may be individual and/or collective training objectives, or in support of force modernization. There might be an experiment. They may have new kit, and I might task them to figure out what tactics, techniques and procedures we must adopt to employ and integrate this new kit on operations.

In other words, we are flipping the model from one where we consume readiness when we’re deployed to one where we build readiness while we deployed.

If we are doing that consistently across all operations, activities and investments, and we are doing that at scale, then we start to build readiness across the force.

We cannot afford a model where we have one part of the force at a high state of readiness, and the rest of the force at low levels of readiness. It is very expensive and inefficient. We must be disciplined in understanding the difference between training levels and readiness levels.

I noted that the Army was a crucial force for working partnerships across the region, and frankly, I consider a major contribution of the ADF to enhance its operational  capabilities out to the Solomon Islands. The Army can provide the kind of local knowledge and local partnerships crucial for the defence of Australia and for the region.

Lt General Stuart certainly agreed.

Some of the value of land forces is in presence and persistence, and those relationships you need in terms of placement, access and understanding the situation, the micro terrain, understanding the littorals, understanding the ports and the airports, understanding the language, the local culture. What does normal look like? And how do you detect what’s different? How do you characterise threat?

We then return to a discussion of readiness built as well through a change in the training process.

Lt General Stuart underscored this approach as follows:

We have changed markedly since the so-called ‘wars of choice’. Back then a battle group would go the Combat Training Center and be trained for a specific mission and theater. The trainers provided a full mission profile environment for the specific theater of operation. Today the battle group comes to the training center and is provided with a full mission profile for various operational environments and the Commander trains their unit or formation. That is how we are building readiness now.

We then shifted to the discussion of force structure redesign.

Lt General Stuart emphasized the following:

In terms of force structure redesign, it is 18 months last week since the 2023 Defense Strategic Review. The Army has moved very quickly to execute on our mission and tasks, and our transformation.

In that time, we have rewritten the land domain concept, the land operating concept (which translates the joint or the integrated force concept into the land force component), and translated the Chief of Joint Operations plans into force structure and readiness requirements for the Army.

We have rewritten a number of the subordinate concepts, for example, the special operations concept. We have re-organized the Army. We have changed its disposition, and we are getting after the reorganization of units at brigade and at battlegroup level, changed the way we do operational command and control and the physical footprint and disposition of our formation level headquarters.

We have created a dispersed nodal structure. We understand the bandwidth requirements, the data exchange requirements, the data standards and the architecture needed in order to operate in this manner. How does the Army contribute to and draw upon the combined kill web?

We have been exercising and experimenting over the last four years across northern Australia with the first brigade which is our lead unit for littoral operations. We’ve been doing that across the North of Australia and projecting into the Northwest. We’ve been doing that with our teammates in the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, and U.S. Army Pacific and specifically with their composite watercraft company.

We have leased civilian stern landing vessels to practice and to experiment and figure out how we’re going to incorporate new weapons, new watercraft, new digital systems in order to meet our operational mission.

It is experimentation with a focus on ‘learn by doing’ and builds readiness in the process.

We are redesigning the Army in a very practical way. And the way that our soldiers have embraced innovation from the ground up to solve operational problems is just phenomenal.

It’s a work in progress, but it’s moving quickly, and we are working with every partner, whether industry, allies or the other services to get after these problems. In that way, the redesign turns upside down the capability development and delivery process.

We used to start with the major system, let’s say watercraft. We then built some facilities, we trained some people, we did some Operational Test and Evaluation, and then we fielded the system. That process would traditionally take about a decade for a major system.

One of the requirements of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review is to change the way that the Government, Defence and the other agencies do acquisition. While we wait for those changes to occur, we’re doing what we can with what we have and taking that approach already.

For example, the very last thing to be delivered for the littoral maneuver capability will be the watercraft. We’ll have the doctrine, the concepts, the tactics, techniques and procedures already adopted.

We will already have adopted different structures, different ways of working, and different equipment sets to support how our formations fight.

The third piece, which you asked about, was resilience. We are not going to fight alone nor are we going to sustain ourselves on our own. We are working with small and medium enterprises, Australian enterprises notably, as well as the large primes we are associated with, to build the magazine depth and effectors we need for today and tomorrow’s fight, particularly when it comes to long-range strike.

The other aspect to resilience is what I call ‘adaptive reuse’. In other words, what do we have that can be reused in different ways – perhaps with a technical inject? Because you go with the kit you’ve got in a ‘fight tonight’ situation.

How can we use our extant kit in different ways through the application of technology or by integrating it into a human-machine team?

We are building an ecosystem that fosters innovation from the ground up, adding resources to it, and we’re getting some great results.

We have completely changed the mission of our 1st Armored Regiment which was previously a tank regiment, but it is now the lead trace for applied modernisation in our Army. It is the center of a network of industry, military and academia focused on solving today’s problems by putting new kit in the hands of our soldiers and enabling them to figure out how they are going to best use it operationally.

Featured Image: Defence Advisor, Colonel Corey Shillabeer, Malaysian Chief of Army General Datuk Muhammad Hafizuddeain bin Jantan, Chief of Australian Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart AO DSC, and Malaysian Defence Advisor to Australia Colonel Mahammad Fazli pose for a group photo, during the bilateral engagement program as part of the Chief of Army Symposium 2024 in Melbourne, Victoria.

September 12, 2024

Credit: Australian Department of Defence

Also, see the following:

The Perspective of Lt General Stuart Simon: Presentation to Land Forces 24

By Robbin Laird

The panel on combat mass was chaired by the former Air Commander Australia, AIRMSHL (Retd) Darren Goldie who provided an overview to the discussion.

AIRMSHL (Retd) Darren Goldie introduced the panel with a clear overview regarding the challenge.

This is how introduced the subject:

The definition of combat mass is widely agreed as overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. And it’s worth remembering that this is about massing combat effects, rather than massing combat forces.

It’s worth remembering that this concept is not new. To quote Clausewitz On War, the center of gravity is where mass is concentrated. We hear a lot of negativity in Canberra: There’s not enough money, there’s not enough people, there’s not enough strategy, there’s not enough drones, there’s not enough everything.

We need to uplift this conversation and talk about the great things that are happening in the fighting parts of our force. Between the two speakers, they command 40% of the Australian Defence Force, and it’s a rare opportunity to have the two operational commanders in front of you and talking about how they are thinking through the most complex problems facing the operational force.

After the presentation by Admiral Smith, the current Air Commander Australia, AVM Glen Braz, then spoke. Let me start with his presentation and then unpack some of his thoughts to discuss the challenge of ramping up the capabilities of the ready force.

AVM Braz highlighted a number of key themes in his presentation:

Building combat mass is front and center of all of our efforts across Air Command and Air Force at the moment, and I like to think of it across a few layers. And those layers are broadly the technology layer, the human layer, the operational layer, and finally, and perhaps most importantly for us in this context, is the organizational layer.

From a technology layer perspective, there is no doubt we need the enhancements of proliferated UAS and UAV systems that are collaborative in human and machine teaming, and we are working to build the basic steps of bringing that into service as soon as we can, pending the outcomes of the good work across MQ 28 and other similar systems.

I do need off-board weapons systems, and I do need off board sensor systems as part of a mass force.

We need to be able to concentrate massive force at the time and place of our choosing. And it’s going to be a relative measure, one that will be undoubtedly constrained by the physics of our force which remains small.

I absolutely need UAS for combat effects, but I also need them for survivable distributed logistics…

In developing agile operations concepts and to orchestrate the operation of the force, I need to understand what’s going on across the force.  Situational awareness and resilience of communications are fundamental to how we achieve the tactical and operational effects that we need… to be able to synchronize and harmonize the mass effect that we need at the right time and place.

Cost effectiveness in terms of affordable and attritable systems need to be part of that concept.

We are outstanding at building long duration projects with exquisite platforms… But they’re not perfect, and they need ongoing investment. They need ongoing sustainment and upgrade to remain relevant, because even the major systems like F 35 need updates, and they need to be brought up to the latest standard.

It’s no different for the enhanced force in being, where we need to embrace the concept of more consumable capabilities that are more quickly adapted into the battle space and that can give us affordable and rapid mass if and when we need it.

And I’ll talk more to how we get after doing some of that in terms of manufacturing and adaptation, that is going to be key to generating and sustaining mass. And I have already mentioned that the ongoing ability to remain aware of the battle space where our own forces are in the distributed model will be fundamental to what we do.

If I look at the human layer, we have scaled up pilot training and the number of graduates. I’m actually at the point where I have to throttle the number of graduates for air force through the pilot training system at the moment, because I need to be able to absorb them downstream, and I need to sustain and operate them downstream as part of a broader force.

And while I can grow elements of the workforce as directed by the national defense strategy, I need to buy and grow all parts of the system with a degree of proportion or the system will be misshapen and will fail as a result.

So pilot training is a success story for us, but equally, we’ve ramped up our ability to scale initial military training and initial employment training across the air domain. There’s workforce allocations available across the department and in the air domain and I’m confident that we can success. We are attracting more people than ever. People want to come and join our Air Force and the ADF writ large. And I want to leverage that, and I would absolutely welcome the apportionment to the air domain to let me to continue to grow in the right shape and in the right proportion…

We’re working very hard to get better at how we apportion and appropriate relevant or minimum viable skills to the workforce…

The human layer is mindset. For example, with regards to the Combat Support Group, we are changing the mindset of that organization to be one that acknowledges that everyone is in the fight, not one wing over another, not a garrison wing versus a deployable wing, but the whole of Combat Support Group is adapting to the mindset that they will be needed to go forward to generate the mass and the resilience and the depth in the force to operate across the bases and places that we need them to function…

When you’re a small force with outstanding capabilities, you need the absolute most from your people, and you want to generate mass in time and place of your choosing, then having the ability to surge key parts of that workforce will be fundamental…

The design of how we would cluster and disaggregate and reaggregate is something that’s a core activity, mostly led by the Air Warfare Center, and I’ll come back to them in the organizational mindset in a moment, but they are working on the ideas of deception and and dispersal and how to maximize how to be survivable, including hardening and other elements that are very important to us.

Fundamental to all of this will be interoperability with our key allies and partners, and while we can generate interesting agile operations mindsets, unless they are well integrated and nested with our partners then our ability to collaboratively generate mass will suffer. I’m working very closely with Pacific Air Forces as one example, to enhance our interoperability across the c2 and across the weapon system that is the air operations center.

Finally, let me discuss the organizational layer. I want to see a pivot in our defense organization that is underpinned by what has been often mentioned this morning, namely a sense of urgency… I would love to see that permeate more broadly across the department.

The pivot that we need to take is one that moves away from the mindset of long term, very large, long duration, low risk, in some ways, projects to deliver exquisite capabilities, and one that is more adept, structured, organized, and has the risk tolerance to take on short term consumable capabilities that can rapidly and with relevance uplift the force in being.

That might take some time and will take commitment from across the organization to achieve that sense of urgency. [For the RAAF, one way to do so] is to leverage my Air Warfare Center which is a crucible for creativity and ideas and where we can bring new technologies into the force quickly. We can experiment with them. We can apply them to great training scenarios, and we can inform a rapid capability cycle inside the system in ways that will be tangible and meaningful for the enhanced force in being and help us generate mass….

Let me unpack some of these thoughts and make some comments.

As Air Commander Australia, Braz is charged with being ready for the fight tonight. He must be focused on a sense of urgency. One area where a lack of a sense of urgency is evident across the three AUKUS countries is getting at buying and deploying military kit and solution sets that are gap fillers.

Last year I interviewed a senior U.S. Admiral who put this challenge very well:

Rehearsal of operations sheds light on our gaps. if you are rehearsing, you are writing mission orders down to the trigger puller, and the trigger puller will get these orders and go, I don’t know what you want me to do. Where do you want me to be? Who am I supposed to check in with? What do you want me to kill when I get there? What are my left and right limits? Do I have target engagement authority?

This then allows a better process of writing effective mission orders. so that we’re actually telling the joint force what we want them to do and who’s got the lead at a specific operational point. By such an approach, we are learning. We’re driving requirements from the people who are actually out there trying to execute the mission, as opposed to the war gamers who were sitting on the staff trying to figure out what the trigger pullers should do.

We focused in that conversation on the need for the ready forces to be able to order short term capabilities to fill gaps. This will become crucial as we work the payloads on air and maritime autonomous systems to fill gaps.

Or put another, a sense of urgency at this time in history requires an ability for greater acquisition authority to shift to the ready force.

And the interview I did with this Admiral also highlighted that the U.S. and its allies working together could shape a division of labor to fill gaps in addition to acquisition of things, but this required training and operative force redesign among the forces working together.

This is what the Admiral emphasized:

We need to build a centralized planning organization in the Pacific, that has intelligence, future plans, future ops, current ops, ISR, logistics, all of those things included in the discussions. And it’s made up of all of anybody who has desires to participate. This will allow us to understand what allied objectives are, and what their limits are, too, and helps us to identify the barriers such as foreign disclosure, so we can start to break down some of those barriers.

We can recognize weaknesses in our operational forces, the gaps as we have discussed, and we can focus on closing those gaps ourselves or by interchangeability with an ally. There are places where allies have capability that we do not have which can fill the bill.

Another point raised by the AIRMSHL was the need to fund and execute in a timely fashion the upgrades necessary for the core combat programs. This is especially important as air platforms have become software upgradeable, and ways need to found not only to fund but to accelerate where possible software upgradeability.

For the ready force, there is an increasing need to be able to operate with significant software transient advantage, something that has been clearly demonstrated in the battles over electromagnetic spectrum in the Russian-NATO war in Ukraine.

A final point which I will highlight is training. The relationship between training and experimentation and inclusion of the outcomes of this effort INTO the ready force rather than on the conveyer belt of science projects for some future force is central to enabling a sense of urgency to lead actually to enhanced capabilities for the ready force.

Several years ago, I talked with Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn about this challenge.

This is how we discussed the challenge in this 2017 interview:

During my visit to Canberra, I had a chance to discuss with Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn how the training approach could be expanded to encompass and guide development.

“We know that we need to have an integrated force, because of the complexity of the threat environment will will face in the future. The legacy approach is to buy bespoke pieces of equipment, and then use defined data links to connect them and to get as much integration as we can AFTER we have bought the separate pieces of equipment. This is after-market integration, and can take us only so far.”

“This will not give us the level of capability that we need against the complex threat environment we will face. How do we design and build in integration? This is a real challenge, for no one has done so to date?”

Laird: “And the integration you are talking about is not just within the ADF but also with core allies, notably the United States forces. And we could emphasize that integration is necessary given the need to design a force that can go up an adversary’s military choke points, disrupt them, have the ability to understand the impact and continue on the attack.

This requires an ability to put force packages up against a threat, prosecute, learn and continue to put the pressure on.

“Put bluntly, this is pushing SA to the point of attack, combat learning within the operation at the critical nodes of attack and defense and rapidly reorganizing to keep up the speed and lethality of attack.

“To achieve such goals, clearly requires force package integration and strategic direction across the combat force.

“How best to move down this path?”

Blackburn: “We have to think more imaginatively when we design our force. A key way to do this is to move from a headquarters set requirements process by platform, to driving development by demonstration.

“How do you get the operators to drive the integration developmental piece?

“The operational experience of the Wedgetail crews with F-22 pilots has highlighted ways the two platforms might evolve to deliver significantly greater joint effect. But we need to build from their reworking of TTPs to shape development requirements so to speak. We need to develop to an operational outcome; not stay in the world of slow-motion requirements development platform by platform.”

Laird: “Our visit this year to the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center at Fallon highlighted the crucial need to link joint TTP development with training and hopefully beyond that to inform the joint integration piece.

“How best to do that from your point of view”?

Blackburn: “Defence is procuring a Live/Virtual/Constructive (LVC) training capability.

“But the approach is reported to be narrowly focused on training. We need to expand the aperture and include development and demonstration within the LVC world.

“We could use LVC to have the engineers and operators who are building the next generation of systems in a series of laboratories, participate in real-world exercises.

“Let’s bring the developmental systems along, and plug it into the real-world exercise, but without interfering with it.

“With engagement by developers in a distributed laboratory model through LVC, we could be exploring and testing ideas for a project, during development. We would not have to wait until a capability has reached an ‘initial’ or ‘full operating’ capability level; we could learn a lot along the development by such an approach that involves the operators in the field.

“The target event would be a major classified exercise. We could be testing integration in the real-world exercise and concurrently in the labs that are developing the next generation of “integrated” systems.

“That, to my mind, is an integrated way of using LVC to help demonstrate and develop the integrated force. We could accelerate development coming into the operational force and eliminating the classic requirements setting approach.

“We need to set aside some aspects of the traditional acquisition approach in favor of an integrated development approach which would accelerate the realisation of integrated capabilities in the operational force.”

 Let me close by examining more closely the AVM’s comments on off-boarding.

When I worked for Secretary Wynne as a consultant beginning in 2004, I was focused primarily on the challenge of building a F-35 global enterprise. Wynne often made the point that a major problem for fighter pilots with fifth generation was that often they would not be delivering the kill shot, for their role was to identify targets for other shooters.

The off-boarding of weapons and sensors is at the heart of the kill web force, whether manned or inclusive of unmanned or autonomous systems.

This strategic shift to off-boarding is what allows one to consider massing force from different locations, from different platforms, from the joint force or the coalition force.

But how does the emergence of off-boarding affect the future of platform acquisition or the design of “next generation” core manned platforms?

In other words, adding new autonomous systems is not simply additive but goes to the core of weapons design and I would argue will change significantly future force design. That is why I would argue that adding autonomous systems to a ready force which is built around a kill web con-ops of off-boarding is not simply a gap filler but a strategic shift in next generation platform design.

Featured Image: AIRMSHL Braz with Rear Admiral Smith at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar.