SPMAGTF Operating from a FARP

06/05/2020

U.S. Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 352, assigned to the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) 19.2, conduct a Forward Aerial Refueling Point (FARP) operation in the US Central Command area of responsibility, April 30, 2020.

The SPMAGTF-CR-CC is a crisis response force, prepared to deploy a variety of capabilities across the region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Kyle C. Talbot) 04.30.2020

Video by Sgt. Kyle Talbot

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response – Central Command

CVN-71 Returns to Sea

06/04/2020

There is much uncertainty in life. COVID-19 proves that.

When it comes to forecasting, it would great if all the seers of the future would pause to answer this question: How well did we do in forecasting 2020 from the perspective of 2019?

But one certainty is that the press about the return to sea of CVN-71 will not receive anywhere near the amount of press coverage or inside the Beltway chatter as the aircraft carrier becoming the center of the COVID-19 story at sea.

Nonetheless, the US Nayy and its contractors have worked hard and the result can be seen in the Pacific: the USS Theodore Roosevelt is back at sea.

In this story published on May 21, 2020, a DoD story highlighted CVN-71s return.

PHILIPPINE SEA (May 21, 2020) – USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) is underway for the first time since arriving in Guam March 27.

The ship left Naval Base Guam and entered the Philippine Sea May 21 to conduct carrier qualification flights for the embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11.

“It feels great to be back at sea,” said Rear Adm. Stu Baker, commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 9. “Getting Theodore Roosevelt and Carrier Air Wing 11 one step closer to returning to their mission in the Indo-Pacific is a great achievement for the crew.”

Theodore Roosevelt is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. It moored in Guam after some members of the crew displayed symptoms and later tested positive for COVID-19.

After moving nearly 4,000 crewmembers off ship and cleaning the entire ship from bow to stern, the appropriate number of crewmembers to operate the ship underway have returned from quarantine after passing rigorous return-to-work criteria.

Scaled manning allows the ship to bring on board the right makeup of personnel required to safely operate and complete a particular mission requirement.

“We are scaling our manning on board based on our mission requirement,” said Capt. Carlos Sardiello, Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer. “Carrier qualification requires fewer personnel than other missions, and bringing fewer Sailors on board will enable enhanced social distancing while underway.”

In addition to social distancing, Theodore Roosevelt Sailors will execute Navy COVID prevention and mitigation policies, including all required lessons learned from a safety stand down last week and a simulated underway earlier this week. During the simulated underway, the crew walked through routine and emergency procedures while executing COVID-19 mitigation measures, including wearing masks, medical surveillance of 100% of the crew, adjusted meal hours, minimizing in-person meetings, sanitizing spaces and a simulated medevac.

“It was an unprecedented challenge to get to this point and I’m proud of the Rough Rider Team’s tenacity and resiliency in the face of uncertainty,” said Sardiello.

“We are extremely thankful for the dedicated support and hospitality of Gov. Leon Guerrero, her staff and the people Guam. They have been steadfast and proactive partners throughout. We are also thankful for the efforts of our fellow service members on Guam for their resolute support. We owe them all a debt of gratitude that words cannot express.”

Theodore Roosevelt is the nation’s fourth Nimitz-class aircraft carrier with a crew of nearly 5,000 Sailors who support and conduct air operations at sea.

Theodore Roosevelt departed San Diego for a scheduled Indo-Pacific deployment January 17.

And in a story by Sam LaGrone published on June 3, 2020 by USNI News, the return was highlighted as follows:

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and its embarked air wing are ready to go back on deployment after completing carrier qualifications, following a two-month fight against a COVID-19 outbreak on the carrier, U.S. 7th Fleet announced.

Theodore Roosevelt is now pier-side in Guam to pick up the remainder of its crew before rejoining its escorts and resuming the deployment that was interrupted by the outbreak, a Navy official confirmed to USNI News on Wednesday. Last month, the carrier left for the qualifications with a partial crew while the remainder was still dealing with the aftermath of the quarantine…..

While Theodore Roosevelt was at the pier, escorts from the strike group were re-tasked and sent to different missions across the Pacific. Some of the guided-missile destroyers took on Coast Guard law enforcement detachments for anti-drug trafficking missions. The guided-missile cruiser, USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), was part of the operations in the South China Sea.

 

 

The Evolving Amphibious Task Force: New Roles and New Capabilities?

By Robbin Laird

With the return to the sea on which the USMC has been working with the US Navy over the past few years, the role of “amphibiosity” has been in evolution as well.

The Bold Alligator Exercises started in 2011 and re-focused on the importance of the return to the sea,.

The Second Line of Defense team attended Bold Alligator exercises and we have written several articles about those exercises.

In effect, the evolution was crafted around the coming of the Osprey and under the influence of the coming of the F-35.

Put in blunt terms, it was about the Marines moving from a significant focus on the land wars to a “return to the sea.” It is one in which the force would change from a primary role of providing a greyhound bus to insert force to an engagement force able to operate from sea.

It has involved shaping and understanding what an air-mobile force could do when able to operate at greater reach into littoral regions with a rapid insertion  force.

And one empowered by the Ospreys coupled with fifth generation capability.

Under the twin influence of these two assets, the new LHA Class the USS America was introduced and with it, significantly different capabilities for the amphibious force itself.

As the US Navy reworks how it is operating as a distributed maritime force, which is being reshaped around the capability to operate a kill web force, the question of how best to leverage and evolve the amphibious force is a key part of that transition itself.

This is a work in progress, and one in which a determination of various paths to the future are in evolution and will be subject to debate as well.

Part of that evolution are changes in other elements of the amphibious task force which can over time play roles different from how various “legacy” platforms can be reworked to provide for new or expanded capabilities for the US Navy overall.

A case in point is how the Viper attack aircraft can evolve its roles AT SEA with the addition of key elements being generated by the digital interoperability effort, as well as adding a new weapons capability to the Viper, namely, the replacement for the Hellfire missile by the JAGM.

What this means is that the Viper can be a key part of the defense of the fleet while embarked on a variety of ships operating either independently, or as part of an amphibious task force.

Because the Viper can land on and operate from of a wide range of ships, thus enabling operational and logistical flexibility, and with integration of Link 16 and full motion wave forms as part of digital interoperability improvements, the Viper can become a key member of the kill web force at sea.

In discussions with Major Thomas Duff and Mr. Michael Manifor, HQMC Aviation, APW-53, Attack and Utility Helicopter Coordinators, I learned of the evolving mission sets which Viper was capable of performing with the digital interoperability upgrades.

USMC AH1-Z Mission Sets. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

“With the upgrades coming soon via the digital interoperability initiative, the Viper through its Link 16 upgrade along with its Full-Motion video access upgrade, can have access to a much wider situational awareness capability which obviously enhances both its organic targeting capability and its ability to work with a larger swath of integrated combat space.

“This means that the Viper can broaden its ability to support other air platforms for an air-to-air mission set, or the ground combat commander, or in the maritime space….

“Because it is fully marinized, it can land and refuel with virtually any ship operating in the fleet, which means it can contribute to sea control, which in my view, is a mission which the amphibious task force will engage in with the expanded reach of adversarial navies.”

Recently, I had a chance to discuss with Major “IKE” White the AH-1Z Division Head at MAWTS-1, the evolution of Viper enabled by upgrades for fleet operations as well as its well-established role in supporting the ground maneuver force.

In that conversation, there were a number of takeaways which highlighted potential ways ahead.

The first takeaway is that the Marine Corps’ utility and attack helicopters  have been part of integrated operations and escort tasks throughout the land wars and can bring that experience to bear in the return to the sea. 

The Viper and the Venom have provided airborne escorts for numerous Amphibious Ready Groups over the last decade, partnering with destroyers, MH-60 Sierra and MH-60 Romeo to protect amphibious warships as they transited contested waterways.

The second takeaway is the coming of the JAGM, which will provide a significant strike capability for the maritime force in providing for both sea control and sea denial.

This missile provides increased lethality through a dedicated maritime mode, enhanced moving target capability, and selectable fuzing; providing capability against both fast attack craft and small surface combatants.  Millimeter wave (MMW) guidance increases survivability by providing a true fire-and-forget capability, removing the requirement for a terminal laser.

Coupled with the AIM-9 sidewinder, the Viper will be able to engage most threats to naval vessels.  The Viper’s flexibility will provide even the most lightly defended vessels with a complete air and surface defense capability.

The third takeaway is that by working integration of the MH-60 Romeo helicopter with Viper, the fleet would gain a significant defense at sea capability.

Integration of the two helicopters within the amphibious task force would allow them to provide an integrated capability to screen and defend the flanks of the afloat force.

The MH-60 crews are optimized to integrate into the Navy’s command and control architecture, and with onboard sensors can help detect potential targets and direct Vipers to engage threats.

The integration of Link-16 will make this effort even more seemless.

My interviews with NAWDC have underscored how the Navy is working through the question of how the integratable air wing will change when the MQ-25 joins the fleet, and working ways for the Romeo to work with MQ-25 and Advanced Hawkeye will inform Romeo as part of its fleet defense function.

“The Romeo community is already looking at how having sensors onboard the MQ-25 can expand the reach and range of what the Romeo’s onboard sensors can accomplish for the maritime distributed force.

“It is also the case that as sensor demands currently made on the Romeo can be shifted elsewhere.

“The Romeo can refocus its task priorities and enhance its contributions to broader mission sets such as ASW and to focus on contributing capabilities that other platforms within the strike group are not prioritized to perform.”

Clearly, integrating Romeos which fly onboard the amphibious class ships with the Viper would provide a significant enhancement of the flank defense capabilities for the amphibious task force.

And working a Romeo/Viper package would affect as well the evolution of the Romeos that would fly off of the L class ships as well.

And all of this, frees up other surface elements to support other missions at sea, rather than having to focus on defending the amphibs as greyhound buses.

The fourth takeaway is that clearly this new role would have to be accepted and trained for, but I would argue, that in general, the US Navy needs to rethink how amphibious ships can operate in sea control and sea denial functions in any case.

I would argue as well that the enhanced efforts at digital interoperability within the USMC aviation force needs to be accompanied by upgrades of the elements of the amphibious task force with regard to C2/ISR capabilities as well.

We are seeing MISR or Maritime ISR officers placed within the Carrier Strike Groups but they could be proliferated more broadly within the fleet.

And in an interview which I did in 2015, with the Commander of Expeditionary Strike Group Two Rear Adm. Cindy Thebaud, and Capt. Michael M. McMillan then  the Commander of Amphibious Squadron Eight ho had just returned from command of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group off of the waters of Yemen, the importance of C2 upgrades was highlighted.

In short, the evolution of the Viper with digital interoperability and with a new weapons package can clearly contribute to the evolution of the amphibious task force as it embraces sea control and sea denial missions and these missions will be crucial to supporting insertion forces moving to ashore expeditionary bases as well.

Pacific Islands, Regional Cooperation and the Potential Role of Airpower

RAAF Air Commodore Stephen Edgeley spoke recently to the virtual RAAF Airpower Conference on the Indo-Pacific Region. Originally, the conference was to be held in March 2020, but was postponed due to COVID-19.

But the RAAF’s Airpower Development Centre has moved ahead with a virtual conference, consisting of the core presentations which would have been given in person.

In his presentation, Air Commodore Edgeley provided an interesting perspective on how a modern air force can work effectively with partners who do not have equivalent airpower capabilities, but with an effective regional collaborative framework can work more effectively together.

Edgeley noted: “To be blunt, air power for security purposes is simply too expensive for the majority of our Pacific partners, who’s limited resources need to be prioritised on essential areas of national development.

“Even a basic scaled down version of our traditional Air Force model would be beyond the reach of our Pacific partners.

“While they may be able to afford a number of aviation platforms, the cost of building a security capability that includes training, operating, maintenance, safety and logistics very quickly becomes prohibitively expensive, and as our shared international experience shows, you can’t maintain an aviation capability efficiently and safely without ensuring you have the basic building blocks to support it.

“So if the traditional Air Force model doesn’t match the resources available to our Pacific partners, then what other options could they consider to achieve the security effect required?”

Air Commodore Edgeley provides his answer in his presentation which can be viewed in the video below or read in the transcript of his remarks.

His focus was on the Pacific Islands and shaping a role for collaboration in leveraging airpower to provide for enhanced HADR support but could apply as well to other cases of collaboration, such as counter-terrorism or more threatening contingencies as well.

8_Air-Power-and-Policy-Development-for-Enhanced-Pacific-Cooperation-Stephen-Edgeley

Notably, at last year’s International Fighter Conference held in Berlin, the presentation by the Malaysian Air Chief provides an example as well of how enhanced regional collaboration with Australia might be able to operate in ways were a more capable air force could work synergistically with a regional partner without the same range of capability or as advanced in air power terms.

The key point there is working wave forms which provide for integratability can expand the range of operations with which partners can do together.

Taken together the Australian and Malaysian perspectives suggest that when focusing on collaborative crisis management, shaping the tools to work together do not simply depend upon the platforms considered, but the tool sets which are developed prior to any crisis.

See, the following:

Airpower When Directly Faced with the Authoritarian Powers: The International Fighter Conference 2019

 

 

Agile Wolf 3

The 435th Contingency Response Group conduct hot pit refueling operations on two F-16s from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, as part of their exercise Agile Wolf 20-04 at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, RP, GERMANY

05.28.2020

Video by Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer

86th Airlift Wing/Public Affairs

Fighting with the Force You Have: Moving Forward with Mobile Expeditionary Basing

06/03/2020

By Robbin Laird

As noted earlier, a key contribution which the USMC can provide for the joint and coalition force is afloat or ashore is mobile and expeditionary basing.

In an earlier article, built around a discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Barron, ADT&E Department Head at MAWTS-1, we focused on what is required to do mobile basing effectively.

In effect, the discussion highlighted what one might refer to as the three Ss.  An insertion force operating from a variety of mobile bases needs to be able to be sustainable, survivable, and signature manageable.

It is clear that as the joint and coalition force shapes greater capabilities through C2/ISR innovations and integratability of the sensor-strike kill web, that capabilities will be enhanced to operate distributed expeditionary basing for the insertion forces.

But one fights with the force one has and builds forward from there.

So where are the Marines currently with regard to mobile basing capabilities?

In the discussion with Major Brian Hansell, MAWTS-1 F-35 Division Head,  that the coming of the F-35 to the USMC has expanded their ability to operate within a broader kill web and to both empower their expeditionary bases as well as to contribute to the broader kill web approach.

The Marine’s F-35s are part of the broader joint and coalition force of F-35s, and notably in the Pacific this extends the reach significantly of the Marine’s F-35s and brings greater situational awareness as well as reach to other strike platforms to the force operating from an expeditionary base as well as enhancing the kill web reach for the joint or coalition force.

As Major Hansell put it: “By being an expeditionary, forward-based service, we’re effectively extending the bounds of the kill web for the entire joint and coalition force.”

The F-35 brings a unique capability to the Marine Corps as it works mobile basing but reworking the assault force more generally is a work in progress.

The digital interoperability initiative is a crucial one as the assault assets will have integratability they do not currently have, such as the Viper attack helicopter getting Link-16.

And the heavy lift element, which is a bedrock capability for the insertion force, is older, not easily integratable, and is in diminishing numbers.

The CH-53K which is to replace it will provide significant capabilities enhancements for an insertion force operating from afloat or ashore mobile bases, but needs to be ramped up in numbers capable of raising the combat level of the current force.

In a discussion with Major James Everett, head of the Assault Support Department at MAWTS-1, we discussed the force that we have and some ways ahead for enhanced capability in the near to mid-term.

The Assault Support Department includes a number of key divisions: CH-53, MV-22, KC-130, UH-1, and AH-1.

I had a number of takeaways from that conversation, and am not quoting Major Everett directly, as I am highlighting some key elements from our discussion but am also adding my own judgments with regard to what those key elements mean going forward.

The first point is that indeed we need to focus on the force we have now, because we will fight with the force we have now.

The Marines by being in the land wars for the past twenty years, have become part of the joint force, and have relied on elements from the joint force, that they would not necessarily have access to when doing force insertion in the Pacific.

This means that the digital interoperability effort under way within Marine Corps innovation is not just a nice to have effort, but a crucial one to ensure that the insertion force package can work more effectively together and to leverage other key support assets which might be available from the joint or coalition force.

After all, a mobile base is being put on the chessboard for a strategic or tactical objective and survivability is a key requirement.

The second point is about sustainability.

And sustainability is a function of the lift assets which can bring the kit and supplies needed for the duration of the mission.

For the Marines, this is defined by KC-130J, CH-53E, MV-22, and UH-1Y lift support. And it is also defined by air refuellable assets to the assault force as well.

The Marines have limited indigenous assets to provide aerial refueling which, dependent on the mission and the time scale of the force insertion effort, might need to depend on the Navy or Air Force for this capability.

The third point is about C2. With the shift from the land wars, where the Marines were embedded within CENTCOM forces, C2 was very hierarchical.

This clearly is not going to be practicable or efficacious with a distributed insertion force.

Working mission command for a force operating in a degraded environment is a key challenge, but one which will have to be met to deliver the kind of distributed mobile based force which the Marines can provide for the joint and coalition force, and not just only in the Pacific, but would certainly provide a significant capability as well for the fourth battle of the Atlantic.

The fourth point is the clear importance of the coming of the CH-53K to the force.

It is not only a question of a modern lift asset with significantly enhanced capabilities to provide for assault support, it is that it is a digital aircraft which can fully participate in an integrated distributed mission.

The fifth point is that the digital interoperable initiative will not only provide for ways to better integrate assets but will enhance what those assets can do.

A key example is the nature of what a Viper assault asset can do afloat as well ashore when operating with Link-16 and full motion video.

My next interview will highlight this aspect of change in more detail, but the point is that integrability is not simply about connectivity, it is about changing how the force can operate.

The sixth point is that the coming of remotes whether air or maritime can expand the situational awareness of the insertion force, as long as signatures can be managed effectively.

And for the insertion force this can be about remotes transported to a base, operating from an afloat asset, or tapping into various overhead assets, such as Triton.

Or put another way, as digital interoperability is worked there will be expanded effort to find ways to support the insertion force operating from a mobile base.

This will be an interactive process between what C2/ISR assets are available in the kill web, and how the Marines ashore or afloat can best use those resources.

We have seen such a migration with the US Navy as the CSG and fleet is adding MISR or Maritime ISR officers, and this change actually was inspired by the operations of 3rd MEF in Afghanistan.

What we might envisage is simply the next iteration of what was done ashore with now the afloat and insertion forces in the maritime environment.

The seventh point is the key emphasis on timeliness for a mobile basing option.

It is about the insertion force operating within the adversary’s decision cycle and operating to get the desired combat effect prior to that adversary being successful in getting his combat result, namely, eliminating or degrading the insertion force.

This is another way to understand the key significance of how C2/ISR is worked between the insertion force and the wider air-maritime force.

In short, the Marines will fight with the force they have; and as far as near term modernization, ensuring that digital interoperability is built in and accelerated, full use of what an F-35 wolfpack can bring to the insertion force, and the continuing modernization of the assault force staring with the coming of the CH-53K in sufficient numbers, these are all key ways ahead.

And as the C2/ISR kill webs are built out and remotes folded into these kill webs, force insertion via mobile basing will clearly be enhanced as well.

The featured photo: CH-53K, K3, 1st CH-53K Aerial Refueling, NAS Patuxent River, MD 6 Apr 2020

 

Hulburt Field Traffic Circle

Early morning time-lapse of Voas-Lackey traffic circle at Hurlburt Field, Florida, Oct. 18, 2019.

The traffic circle was dedicated to U.S. Air Force Maj. Randell Voas, an evaluator pilot with the 8th Special Operations Squadron and Senior Master Sgt. James Lackey, an evaluator flight engineer with the 8th SOS, who lost their lives in a CV-22 crash in Afghanistan, April 9, 2010.

(U.S. Air Force video by Senior Airman Edward Coddington)

HURLBURT FIELD, FL, UNITED STATES

10.18.2019

Video by Senior Airman Edward Coddington

1st Special Operations Wing Public Affairs