The Manoeuvrist Approach: Past, Present and Future

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11/03/2019

By Robbin Laird

The Williams Foundation Seminar held on October 24, 2019 focused on the requirements of fifth generation manoeuvre.

At this session, the focus was upon the changing nature of the regional context for Australia and how the fifth generation force needed to evolve to operate effectively in the dynamically changing region.

A key question is how best to provide for the continuous change which an evolving integrated distributed force clearly needs to gain the decisive advantage needed in a contested region?

A key focus during the day was to examine how the manoeurvrist approach was morphing into the evolving 21st century combat force for the liberal democracies in dealing with the challenges posed by the 21stcentury authoritarian powers. 

The scene setting presentation for the seminar was provided by WGCDR Joe Brick of the Australian War College. She provided a look back to inform the way ahead for Australia and its allies to position themselves for decisive advantage in 21st century conflict.

Her focus was upon how to gain the strategic advantage by leveraging ADFcapabilities to operate more rapidly in the battlespace and with tools which will allow them to gain phycological as well as physical advantages.  She quoted William S. Lind to highlight that maneuver is “a style of warfare marked by obtaining positional advantage and moving faster than the enemy.”

WGCDR Brick argued that the ADF needs to operate from a “manoeuvre mindset.”

Here the focus is upon obtaining a position of advantage by being able to attack the mind of the adversary.

It is crucial to prepare the battlespace in such a way to gain an advantage even before a battle.

She underscored that the ADF and its allies are shifting from an industrial to an information age concept of maneouver warfare where information is a key source of gaining strategic advantage.

How to shape information dominance is a key part of the evolving approach to maneouver warfare.

WGCDR Brick cited the Australian Army’s doctrine of accelerated warfare: “Accelerated warfare means owning the speed of initiative to outpace, out-manoeuvre and out-think conventional and unconventional threats. It requires excellence in the art and science of decision making….”

A key element of shaping such a capability revolves around the kind of Command and Control which the force can exercise in multi-domain operations. 

This was the topic of the presentation of the Commander of the RAAF’s Air Warfare Centre, AIRCDRE Phil Gordon.

This is how he defined fifth generation manoeuvre:

“The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.”

In his presentation, he started by discussing what is new and what is not in terms of 21st century manoeuvre warfare.

This slide captured how he addressed this issue.

He then addressed how he saw the C2 piece of this as a crucial glue holding together mission success.

The following slide captured how he conceptualized this dynamic.

He argued as did Air Marshal Hupfeld in his presentation later in the day that this was not a static achievement, but fluid and dynamic and required mastering the art of transient advantage against the adversaries we are confronting today.

This is how he highlighted the dynamic learning curve which the force and its technology needs to go through to achieve this outcome or capability:

Michael Shoebridge, Director – Defence, Strategy & National Security, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, then underscored the central salience of shaping force structure design which would enable the further transformation of the ADF.

He addressed how the ADF would be able to execute the kind of mission command which AIRCDRE Phil Gordon and his staff at the Air Warfare Centre were working on for the RAAF and the ADF as its transformation unfolded.

Shoebridge underscored what he sees as key elements for ongoing transformation for the ADF in the period ahead.

He argued that the ADF and its core allies have gone through the past twenty years of warfare that have little to do with the competition with the 21st century authoritarian powers.

This is a very different environment in which preparing for and engaging in direct competition with advanced authoritarian states is quite different from the land wars in the Middle East.

This creates very significant differences for the ADF and its allies from the recent past.

For example, warfare in the electromagnetic spectrum is to be assumed and expected.

C2 for operations will be contested.

The supply chains will be challenged and disrupted in operations.

And the strategic shift entails the enhanced need to provide for the direct defense of Australia as well.

“We have a bubble of fifth generation capability, such as the F-35, but we need to deepen our capabilities more generally.”

He argued that force design needs to underscore the ability of the ADF’s key force elements “to disperse and aggregate rapidly and easily.”

He argued that platforms like the F-35 need to become transformed into “super users” which can distribute not only information but lead distributed operations “which are not allowed under current rules of engagement.”

The coming of autonomous systems needs to be integrated into the disaggregated force as well.

“We will need a new data and information architecture to guide the way ahead.”

“And we will need a system which can works at the tactical edge effectively.”

WGCDR Joe Brick had mentioned the Australian Army’s thinking about “accelerated warfare” which certainly resonates with what Shoebridge highlighted at the seminar.

And during the afternoon session, BRIG Ian Langford, the head of Army’s Land Capability programs, highlighted how he saw the Army adapting to the new environment and contributing to fifth generation manoeuvre.

BRIG Ian Langford argued that the evolving networks of forces enabled by a fifth-generation approach could provide new ways to mix and match forces to allow for more combat flexibility.

He did caution that one challenge the ADF and its allies faced was the telescoping of various forms of warfare and the need to shape an appropriate force mix to be able to tailor the force to the combat challenge.

In this sense, he underscored the need for the ADF to evolve as the Swiss Army Knife of the ADF.

He cited the following as highlighting his own view of the way ahead as well:

‘Manoeuvre warfare acknowledges the chaotic nature of warfare…Implicit in uncertainty is the understanding that conditions are rarely permanent and, more than likely, are temporary in nature, whereby adaptability is critical to success. Additionally, this warfighting philosophy views the enemy as a system – a system, which if its cohesion is shattered then panic and paralysis will ensue and will ultimately result in the enemy no longer possessing the ability to resist’ – USMC Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication One

To concludeL The need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October:

“It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.”

WGCDR Brick Briefing

AIRCDRE Phil Gordon Briefing

BRIG Ian Langford Briefing

SQNLDR Jenna Higgins, Air Force Headquarters, Master of Ceremonies
WGCDR Joe Brick of the Australian War College
Commander of the RAAF’s Air Warfare Centre, AIRCDRE Phil Gordon
Michael Shoebridge, Director - Defence, Strategy & National Security, of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
BRIG Ian Langford, the head of Army’s Land Capability programs

An Update on Franco German Programs: UAVs, FCAS, Tanks and A400M

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11/02/2019

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Tough talks between industry and the French and German authorities on development cost are holding up a program launch of a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, the French procurement chief said.

Joel Barre, head of the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office, gave Oct. 2 an update on the stalled UAV project, along with Franco-German efforts to launch programs for a Future Combat Air System and a new tank in the Main Ground Combat System.

Airbus Defence and Space is prime contractor, working with partner Dassault Aviation on the planned UAV, in a European attempt to enter a key market led by the U.S. and Israel.

“The hold up today lies in differences over development cost,” Barre told the defense committee of the French senate, according to minutes of the meeting. Development is one of  three elements in the prospective contract for the UAV, along with production and service.

“I have every hope of reaching agreement by the end of the year, because we will not build the MALE (UAV) at any price. Discussions are being held, the conversation of the last few days seem to be rather encouraging. To sum up, I have some hope but no guarantees.”

Berlin and Paris called for a revised plan for the European MALE UAV project after industry requested more than €2 billion ($2.2 billion), double an initial estimated budget, La Tribune business website reported.

That funding overspill from industry compares to an initial Franco-German budget of €4 billion by 2025 for development of a new generation fighter jet in the FCAS project, with France contributing €2.5 billion, according to the French armed forces ministry, Reuters reported.

The future European UAV would be armed and equipped for signals intelligence, the Air chief of staff, General Philippe Lavigne, told Oct. 10 the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly.

The UAV budget request reflects twin engines and 10-ton weight, which makes the UAV “too heavy, too expensive and therefore difficult to export,” Christian Cambon, chairman of the Senate defense committee, said in a June 26 parliamentary report. Those specifications reflected German requests, leading to “obesity,”  he said.

That weight could be compared to a Rafale fighter jet, which weighs some 10 tons without fuel and weapons, and Reaper MQ-9, weighing some two tons, without arms and payloads.

The German specification for twin engines reflects a concept of operations centered on flying domestic surveillance and avoiding a crash on a German city, Cambon said.

For the French forces, the UAV is for overseas deployment in Mali and Adrar des Ifoghas, a mountainous range near the Mali border with Algeria.

The recurring cost for service of the UAV is the factor closest to budgetary agreement, Barre said.

“The question of over-specification is no longer an issue,” he said. The twin engines are a “reality.”

Two engines increased weight and cost, but France accepted in 2017 that configuration, he said. What remained to be resolved was reaching agreement with industry on cost-efficiency.

Italy and Spain have signed up for the UAV project. The French 2019-25 military budget law foresees 18 UAVs, on the basis of six UAV systems, with three units per system.

On the FCAS project, Cambon said a new fighter program would cost €25 billion, which called for cooperation as such a budget was outside the reach of France acting on its own.

Barre said there remained two factors to resolve before launching work on a technology demonstrator for the new generation fighter.

“The first element is organizing the entry of Spain into the program,” he said. That required finding a “good compromise” to avoid a delay in the prototype and should be reached before an Oct. 16 Franco-German ministerial council meeting on defense and security.

The Spanish defense minister, Margarita Robles, signed June 17, the opening day of the Paris air show, a framework agreement to bring Spain into the FCAS program, led by France and Dassault, and partnered with Germany and Airbus D&S.

The second, more sensitive, element lay in appointing Safran as prime contractor on the engine program, with MTU Aero Engines as industrial partner, Barre said.

The industrial responsibilities should be clearly set out, in contrast to the engine on the Airbus A400M airlifter, he said. There are talks between Safran and MTU to accord  program leadership to the former to ensure balance in the work assigned to the companies.

There would be a resolution following talks with the companies and between the companies, he said, adding the “highest political level” would resolve the situation if needed. The French and German ministers would meet Oct. 9 to discuss organization of engine production ahead of the bilateral ministerial council meeting the following week, he said.

In France, the DGA, backed by the government, negotiates with industry, and talks to the German counterpart, the junior defense minister, he said. In Germany, industry has “a very powerful role” in decision-making.

The German political side is complex, with the government seeking consensus between three or four parties, and powerful oversight by the Bundestag parliament, two French defense executives said. On the French side, the president holds political power.

Problems on the TP-400 engines were among the key factors in slowing deliveries of the A400M.

The program to build a new powerful turboprop engine was based on work share, reflecting client orders for the aircraft. Germany had ordered the largest number of A400M, opening the way for German industry to learn how to build core engine parts.

That led to costly delays and a French commitment to avoid future large industrial consortiums.

Airbus and Dassault called Oct. 7, ahead of the ministerial council meeting, for launch of the prototype fighter jet, backed by “a reliable funding plan.”

“We call on our political leaders to make every effort to launch these demonstrators at the earliest opportunity in what will be a key step in moving this ambitious project forward,” Eric Trappier, CEO of Dassault and Dirk Hoke, CEO of Airbus DS said in a joint statement.

On the budget for the MGCS project for a new tank, there is government agreement on 50:50 work share split between France and Germany, with Nexter leading the French side, and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall sharing the German stake, a defense source said.

It will be up to the two German partners to negotiate their respective shares of the program, with an equal split seen as the ideal, the source said.

There will also be nine sub-projects for a system architecture study, with each of the three partners taking leadership of three sub projects, the source said.

That architecture study will begin early next year and will launch a technology demonstrator for the tank, the Elysée president’s office said on the Oct. 16 meeting of the Franco-German defense and security council. That meeting was held in Toulouse, southwestern France.

The tank project will be open to other European nations, the Elysée office said. Paris and Berlin would also “examine steps for a further consolidation and evolution of their land systems industries.”

 

The Integrated Distributed Force and Maritime Operations

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By Robbin Laird

During my most recent visit to Australia in October 2019, I have had the chance to visit the Chief of Navy’s Seapower Conference and to attend the latest Williams Foundation seminar.

And along the way have held roundtables at the Australian National University, the RAAF’s Airpower Development Centre and ASPI.

Of course, I have had the opportunity as well to discuss with various Australian strategists, policy makers, military leaders and members of the Australian defense industry as well.

I have been particularly interested in engaging in discussions on the way ahead for what I call the integrated distributed force, the role of C2 and ISR in that evolution as well as the reshaping of the sustainment infrastructure for the ADF and the partners of the ADF.

One of those discussions was with Robert Slaven of L3Harris Technologies, a former member of the Royal Australian Navy, and our discussion focused on the C5/ISR infrastructure for the integrated distributed force.

For Slaven, the shift toward an integrated distributed force marks a significant change from his earlier training as a member of the RAN.

Traditional thinking, such as that developed by Admiral Mahan, has now been supplanted by the necessity to recognize that a step change has taken place and to embrace the fact that emergent technologies have dramatically resculptured the face of maritime warfare.

Previously the main doctrinal focus has been on counter-force operations conducted by Major Fleet units with supporting fleet and air elements.

According to Slaven, “The evolution of the technology over the past thirty years has transformed the way navies will fight going forward.

“So when you refer to the new C5/ISR infrastructure, a key point to keep in mind is that it morphs dependent on the operations you are trying to do and the operations you are engaged in.”

Frankly, the notion of a morphing C5/ISR infrastructure makes a lot of sense when you consider that platforms are shifting from largely dedicated mission designed hulls to becoming multi-mission platforms that can change and flex on a mission by mission/task by task basis, and therein allow integrated Task Forces to be shaped with inherently flexible and resilient C5/ISR infrastructures.

The way Slaven put it was as follows: “every platform is a node within that infrastructure. Their role and importance within that infrastructure changes in accordance with the tasks you are trying to accomplish and how the enemy behaves and reacts as well.”

He underscored that as maritime autonomous systems matured they can play an important role as C5 nodes and ISR platforms in the morphing infrastructure as well.

“The remotes can be distributed throughout the area of interest and be there significantly in advance of when we have to create a kinetic effect. In fact, they could be operating months or years in advance of shaping the decision of what kind of kinetic effect we would need in a crisis situation.

“We need to learn how to work the machines to shape our understanding of the battlespace and to shape the kind of C5 which could direct the kind of kinetic or non-kinetic effect we are trying to achieve.”

He added a very useful insight with regard to the evolving tool sets associated with the non-kinetic domain.

He highlighted that the Bismarck entered the kill zone because of the disabling of its rudder.

This was done with a British torpedo, but what if that same effect could be achieved by non-kinetic actions?

This is the sort of dynamic of change with which modern maritime battles will be fought in part.

In my work on dealing with full spectrum crisis management, I have started with the importance of platforms and persistence, and then scalability and reachback, or in other words shaping tailored force packages appropriate to the mission and to crisis management.

Slaven highlighted the importance of coming maritime autonomous systems to the presence missio

“What we want to do is actually take the mechanics behind what one might call morphing infrastructure to build a persistent capability within the theater.  With autonomous systems, we are not working to force an entry or establish an enduring presence into the area of interest, we are already there.

“What we’re doing by bringing unmanned systems into the AO, is out manoeuvring Gray Zone competitors.

“We’re building a persistent ISR presence in a pre-kinetic mode of operation, with an infrastructure consisting of UAVs, UUVs, USVs, surface and subsurface relay nodes, all of which are already pre-deployed and available for manned units to join the network.

“In addition, we have autonomous patrol assets which can provide an enduring environment assessment to ensure we have full situational awareness.

“This persistent forward deployed presence can be leveraged for kinetic operations within a crisis engagement setting as needed.”

In effect, the situational awareness piece is a prelude and enabler to the kind of full spectrum dominance one would need in a kinetic effort, allowing Commanders to leverage unmanned capabilities and keep humans at a safe distance.

It is clear that this way ahead, which is central to being able to shape, operate and command, an integrated distributed force is building on the legacy platforms we have now, but is also a prologue to any new platforms to be built in the future.

A case in point is the Australian Arafura Class Offshore Patrol Vessel, which is being built with the ability to leverage off-boarded systems as a designed in feature of its own operational capabilities.

In this sense, the coming of the OPV plays a forcing function role within the ADF as its shapes what they call a fifth-generation force.

“The OPV will have a crew of around 40 and be tasked with the normal Patrol and Constabulary tasks the Armidales currently do for the Navy and the Border Command.

“But because of the inbuilt flexibility of the C5/ISR infrastructure onboard, the OPV will become part of the much larger distributed force, with reachback and force-multiplication capabilities way beyond its reach as a single ship.

“It could operate as the mothership for a wide range of autonomous systems; and it can push that information into the wider battlespace.”

In other words, the OPV is being designed from the ground up with off-board systems and the new C5/ISR morphing infrastructure as key building blocks.

And given the modular flexibility associated with the ship and with the autonomous system payloads, the OPV could be an advance force element of an amphibious task force, provide support to a destroyer task force, be a key command element for a gray zone operation, and so on.

Because it is designed to be able to contribute to and to leverage unmanned systems from the outset, it can be task organized beyond its core mission.

From that sense, the future is now.

F-35 Demo Team: Oregon

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Capt. Andrew “Dojo” Olson, F-35 Demonstration Team pilot and commander performs aerial maneuvers during the Oregon International Airshow Sept. 22, 2019 in McMinnville, Oregon.

The F-35 Demo Team co-headlined the show for the Royal Air Force Red Arrows.

MCMINNVILLE, OR, UNITED STATES

09.24.2019

F-35A Demo Team Public Affairs

Capt. Andrew "Dojo" Olson, F-35 Demonstration Team pilot and commander performs aerial maneuvers during the Oregon International Airshow Sept. 22, 2019, in McMinnville, Oregon. The F-35 Demo Team co-headlined the show with the Royal Air Force Red Arrows. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Alexander Cook)
Capt. Andrew "Dojo" Olson, F-35 Demonstration Team pilot and commander flies an F-35A Lightning II during the Oregon International Airshow Sept. 22, 2019, in McMinnville, Oregon. The F-35 Demo Team co-headlined the show with the Royal Air Force Red Arrows. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Alexander Cook)
F-35A Lightning II, Air Combat Command, U.S. Air Force, F-35 Demo Team, Air Education Training Command, F-35 Demonstration Team
Capt. Andrew "Dojo" Olson, F-35 Demonstration Team pilot and commander performs a high-speed pass during the Oregon International Airshow in McMinnville, Oregon. The F-35 Demo Team co-headlined the show with the Royal Air Force Red Arrows. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Alexander Cook)

Rebuilding Base Infrastructure

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Rebuilding Base Infrastructure

As the Army looks towards the future, leaders are increasingly focused on the state of installation infrastructure, and the critical role it plays in sustaining Soldier readiness, force protection, and force projection.

Installations will need be smarter, more resilient, and able to harness the power of technology to streamline operations, combat threats and support the Warfighter.

Researchers at ERDC’s Construction Engineering and Information Technology Laboratories have combined their expertise to develop an innovative tool that will enable the Army to rapidly adapt smart technologies into their installation management workflow – enabling leaders to sustain, protect, and project their troops.

VICKSBURG, MS, UNITED STATES

05.23.2019

Video by Marisa Gaona

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center

The Next Phase of Development for Osprey Nation: From Reach to Working Effectively in an Integrated Distributed Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Next Phase of Development for Osprey Nation: From Reach to Working Effectively in an Integrated Distributed Force
10/31/2019

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I had a chance to visit Naval Air Station Patuxent River and to meet with Col Matthew Kelly, who is in charge of the V-22 Joint Program Office (PMA-275).

I first met “Squirt” when he was an F-35B test pilot and indeed was selected as test pilot of the year in 2011.

Having come from the F-35 world, where the entire command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure is being reworked, is a perfect community for the new head of the V-22 Program to come as that aircraft is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

It is often overlooked that the US Air Force Special Forces Command (AFSOC) and Marine Corps are still the only tiltrotor forces in the world.

And the Osprey from the outset has demonstrated a speed and reach capability which traditional rotorcraft simply have not replicated.

I first saw Ospreys on the tarmac in 2007 at Marine Corps Air Station New River and have followed their evolution ever since.

As Col. Kelly noted in our conversation: “I first flew on an Osprey in Iraq in 2008.

“It was the only assault asset which could cover the entire combat theater in one flight.

“And senior officers, whether from the Army, Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps, soon demanded an Osprey to fly on when touring the battlespace.

“They could move much more rapidly and to see the battlespace in a much shorter period of time.”

The physicality of the Osprey has had a major impact on the Marine Corps and its approach to its assault forces.

The reach of the aircraft in terms of speed and distance which it can cover has revolutionized how the Marines conduct assault operations.

But Col. Kelly has come to the program with a major shift underway for the Marines. 

That shift requires the aircraft not simply to be a robust distance runner but to become smart in the digital battlespace.

This requires major modifications to the aircraft in terms of its ability to work with data, generate data and to work in the evolving C2 and ISR infrastructure which the Marine Corps is building for its approach to building an integrated distributed force.

Coming from the F-35 program provides Kelly with a leg up in terms of understanding what that aircraft can contribute to the Osprey and how, in turn, the V-22 aircraft needs to be modified to a more useful member of the integrated distributed force.

“With the Marine in the back of the Osprey working with his MAG-Tab (tablet), he or she is able to gain access to information flowing in from other platforms in the battlespace.

“And that is one key aspect of what we are focused on as we rework the program.

“Indeed, we have already done exercises at MAWTS-1 and VMX-1 where the Marine in the back of a V-22 can be looking on his MAG-TAB at a video generated from an H-1 or an F-35 operating in the same battlespace.”

And the V-22 working with the F-35 is a key element of being able for the Marine Corps/Navy team to work a Lightening carrier approach whereby an LHD like the USS America can operate a significant number of F-35s with accompanying Ospreys.

And this approach clearly is about changing dramatically the nature of what a Marine Corps assault force looks like as well as the combat effect it can achieve.

Col. Kelly, in language reminiscent of how the ADF describes the impact of the F-35 on its combat transformation, refers to what he calls a fifth-generation assault force.

And that process this means changes need to and are being made to the Osprey itself.

With the coming of the CH-53K, the assault group will be further transformed in terms of the mass and combat force which can be delivered by the evolving capabilities of the assault force.

And the K is taking advantage of the re-crafting of the Osprey to build in from the outset the kind of digital capabilities which the Osprey did not have at birth, but are now being added within the scope of the kind of C2 and ISR infrastructure which can be built into the upgraded Osprey.

Another key aspect of the change facing the V-22 community: the Navy becoming an operator of the Osprey for the carrier resupply mission and the Japanese becoming the first FMS customer for the aircraft.

This means that the original plank holders of the program, AFSOC and the Marine Corps, are being jointed by an expanded set of users.

This places a demand on the program to do a better job with regard to global sustainment but also provides the opportunity to leverage the budgets of additional stakeholders to expand the sustainment infrastructure as well.

“There is no other air platform that has the breadth of aircraft laydown across the world than does the V-22.

“And now that breadth is expanding with the inclusion of the carrier fleet and the Japanese. We currently have a sustainment system which works but we need to make it better in terms of supporting global operations.

“With the US Navy onboard to operate the Osprey as well, we will see greater momentum to improve the supply chain.”

We then discussed the impact of Additive Manufacturing (AM) on the V-22 program.

Kelly noted that the V-22 program was very forward leaning one with regard to finding ways for AM to provide supply chain complementarity on the fly, something very important for ship-based operations for sure.

“Our Marines, including MAWTS-1, have been aggressively pushing ways to use AM to support the aircraft.

“For example, last year at New River, Marines invented a tool in the tire shop to remove interior nuts and bolts off of the wheel hub.

“They designed and produced the tool with AM and after a short turn around this tool is now being used fleet wide.”

“We are doing a test today of a 3-D printed hub strap for a V-22 which is a part which has been a degrader for us in our supply system. We are working on an AM replacement for the strap and we are currently in the process of testing the part to ensure that it is a viable one.”

Col. Kelly noted that with the maturation of the fleet, the program has quite accurate fleet metrics and are using these metrics to shape their Performance Based Logistics contracts going forward.

Rather than tying incentives to piecemeal elements of the aircraft, the shift in focus has been upon decreasing the non-mission capable rates in the fleet.

“If fleet non-mission capable rates go down, Bell and Boeing receive more money.”

He also argued that as manufacturing experience has improved and the quality of the initially produced aircraft are better, providing a boon to fleet performance.

“The aircraft that is coming off of the line today as part of the multi-year three contract is much different than the ones produced in multi-year one or two,” he said.

“You are seeing a much more reliable airplane from the outset which requires much lower maintenance man hours per flight hour as well.”

In short, the V-22 team is making the aircraft smarter to go along with its range and speed physical capabilities.

And the maturing of the manufacturing processes is delivering a reliable aircraft.

But as the Navy becomes a direct user of the aircraft along with the Japanese, there are new challenges facing the program, most notably, how to provide better global sustainment to the global fleet of aircraft.

Put broadly, the aircraft which replaced the CH-46 became a physically wondrous asset that changed how the Marines could operate in the Middle East land wars to now becoming part of the fifth-generation revolution.

For an archive of Osprey articles which we have published over the years, see the following:

https://defense.info/system-type/rotor-and-tiltrotor-systems/the-osprey/

For a recent briefing which I gave to BIDEC 19 in Bahrain on October 30, 2019, see the following:

Or for a recent interview which I did at the Chief of Navy’s Seapower Conference held in Sydney, Australia from October 8-10 2019, and which focused on the building and operating of the integrated distributed force see the following:

And for the impact which the addition of new remotes to the Osprey-F-35-CH 53K enabled amphibious task force, see the following:

The Role of Unmanned Aerial Systems in the Remaking of the Amphibious Task Force: The Perspective of Lt. General (Retired) Trautman

The featured photo shows a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B and a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) V-22 Osprey conducting aerial maneuvers at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, July 9, 2019.

Marines assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron 204 and JGSDF soldiers conducted a confined area landing exercise as part of their integrated training, strengthening relations and interoperability between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elias E. Pimentel III)

Reflections on Recent Syrian War Developments

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10/29/2019

By Richard Weitz

With the death of terrorist leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi at the hands of U.S. Special Forces, the so-called Islamic State has lost critical finances, territory, and now leadership.

These blows have removed several sources of the Islamic State’s attractiveness, both regionally and globally.

Al-Baghdadi had uniquely sinister leadership, recruitment, and combat skills due to his strong jihadist and Islamist credentials, at least in the eyes of his followers, as well as his connections with former Saddam Hussein regime elements and ruthless immorality.

Depriving the Islamic State of its self-proclaimed Caliph and Caliphate should weaken it substantially, at least in the short-term.

There could be some revenge attacks by individual adherents, though these did not occur after Osama bin Laden’s death.

The Islamic State still has substantial assets, but without its senior leader, the group could fractionalize into a regional groupings, especially in Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa and Southeast Asia like the Philippines.

The U.S. raid found Al-Baghdadi in the northern Syrian province of Idlib, an area under predominately al-Qaeda control.

He may have been striving to forge tactical partnerships with other terrorist groups.

Conversely, these groups could act on this opportunity of a decapitated Islamic State to gain its followers and revenue streams.

In the next few years, the Islamic State movement will likely face succession disputes, fractionalization into loosely networked affiliations, and merging with other existing and new terrorist groups, including those associated with al-Qaeda.

The main differences between Islamic State and al-Qaeda has been the former’s possession of physical territory (an “Islamic State”) and a uniquely malevolent leader. These divergences have now largely expired.

The regional groupings could emerge in many locations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, such as the Sahel region, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen.

The United States and its partners will need to redouble their efforts, which have been something of an unheralded success, to weaken the attractiveness of Islamist propaganda in these and other regions.

Al-Baghdadi also appears to have been plotting to exploit the disruptive impact of the Turkish military intervention to advance his group’s interests, perhaps even by moving his base of operations into Turkey.

In this regard, Washington and others need to wean the Turks off their practice of using jihadists to fight Kurds in neighboring countries.

Ankara should be alarmed by how close Al-Baghdadi was found to the Turkish border.

The Trump administration has made understandable efforts to strengthen Turkish-U.S. ties by removing Syria as a source of bilateral irritation.

But Moscow has now offered Ankara a better deal by giving Turkey substantially more Syrian territory than Washington did the previous week.

This Putin-Erdogan deal at Sochi includes unprecedented joint patrols by Turkish and Russian troops (replacing the now defunct Turkish-U.S. joint patrols).

This pact builds on earlier moves by Ankara toward Moscow, notably its purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air defense system despite hearing years of counterarguments by NATO leaders and experts.

This act justifiably led the Pentagon to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program and NATO to curtail various joint activities.

In the short-term, the Putin-Erdogan deal clearly benefits the two signatories most.

Through the arrangement, Turkey consolidates its military position in northern Syria while Russia consolidates its preeminent position in the rest of the country.

The agreement also averts a possible near-term military confrontation between the Turkish army and Syrian regime forces, backed by Iran and Russia.

Yet, in the longer-term, there are still challenges for Russian-Turkish relations regarding Syria.

In particular, Russia does not want Turkey to establish a permanent buffer zone in northern Syria, either through military occupation or the relocation of large numbers of Syrian Arab refugees along the Turkish-Syrian border so as to change the area’s ethnic composition.

Regarding U.S. influence in the Middle East, the successful U.S. operation should help restore regional confidence in U.S. military prowess.

Questions concerning U.S. will and capacity likely have arisen due to the faltering U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the effective Russian military intervention in Syria, and the U.S. restraint from kinetic action against Iran.

The blow against the Islamic State could have a positive impact on Syria’s future security.

For example, it would help reassure Syrian refugees in exile that they can return to their home territories without less angst of feared Islamic State territorial resurgence.

Nonetheless, one should not be too optimistic about the Geneva or Astana peace processes, led respectively by the UN and Moscow, given the wide gaps between the Syrian actors and their foreign backers.

Furthermore, the weakening of their common Islamic State adversary could remove a force binding some of these Syrian and foreign actors together.

The U.S. military drawdown could force other actors to accept more of the burden for promoting security and counterterrorism in Syria.

But preventing an Islamic State resurgence in Syria likely will require the United States to continue employing manned and unmanned aircraft as well as Special Forces against select terrorist targets of opportunity.

As in the past, the United States may need to partner, tacitly and temporarily, with other foreign and local Syrian actors to counter threats from terrorists operating there.

To shape the behavior of both nation states like Turkey and the Syrian regime, as well as terrorist groups in Syria, the United States can employ diplomacy, sanctions, and military power.

Without many boots on the ground, besides select Special Forces missions, the Pentagon will need to rely on air and missile strikes, possibly throughout Syrian territory to prevent further mass atrocities, WMD use, or the reconstitution of terrorist camps.

This is a good task for the F-15, which has shown its value in less contested air environments in deterring asymmetrical threats from both nation states, such as Turkey, and non-state actors, like terrorist groups.

For instance, on October 16, U.S. Special Forces were targeted by Turkish-backed militias as they departed from Kurdish-controlled territory in northern Syria.

The appearance of two F-15 fighter aircraft, along with diplomatic communications and an Apache attack helicopter, coerced those Turkish-backed militias into ceasing their firing on U.S. troops.

The visibility of the F-15s are good for intimidating, and therefore deterring, non-state actors and their state sponsors.

In this regard, there have been proposals for U.S. forces to occupy and exploit Syria’s oil fields.

Besides smelling of 19th century imperialism, these ideas do not make practical sense.

Militarily occupying these oil fields would cost more in terms of money and human resources than they are worth.

The fields do not produce much oil and any occupation is bound to rouse costly Syrian resistance.

The U.S. forces confined to guarding oil fields would be difficult to defend since they would be a stationary target amidst an alienated local population.

Suggestions that U.S. companies like Exxon could develop the oil and sell it are not credible since U.S. private companies will not invest in a warzone when larger fields and better investment climates exist in other countries.

Keeping the oil out of terrorists’ hands can be done best by air strikes to destroy any oil stocks they seize.

Attack helicopters and strike drones would work best for urban operations, where discrimination is needed to limit civilian casualties and other collateral damage.

Meanwhile, the F-35, unmatched in air-to-air combat but limited in numbers due to perennial underfunding of the U.S. defense budget, can focus on deterring great powers like China and Russia as well as preparing for major regional contingencies with Iran and North Korea.

These countries’ growing air power threats, from both other airplanes and air defense systems like the S400, have been evident in recent parades, exercises, and other manifestations.

The F-35s are critical for defeating Chinese and Russian fifth-generation fighters, penetrating their integrated multilayered air defense networks, as well as reassuring U.S. allies and partners facing high-end threats.

If the United States plans to fight wars without a large ground footprint, we will need to adequately resource our air power capabilities.