In 2016, Vice Admiral James Foggo III, currently commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, spoke of the current situation in the North Atlantic as the arrival of the fourth battle of the Atlantic.

“In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and commentary such as Francis Fukuyama’s landmark essay “The End of History?” led us to believe that our strategic rivalry with Russia and our need to stay one step ahead of Russian capabilities had faded. It has not. Once again, an effective, skilled, and technologically advanced Russian submarine force is challenging us. Russian submarines are prowling the Atlantic, testing our defenses, confronting our command of the seas, and preparing the complex underwater battlespace to give them an edge in any future conflict.”¹

In his timely new book, Magnus Nordenman has provided a very comprehensive overview to the fourth battle of the Atlantic.

And in so doing, he does a solid job providing an understanding of how the Russian challenge is both different from and similar to that posed by the Soviet challenge. ²

There are similarities in terms of the importance of the U.S. and Canada being able to project power to reinforce Nordic allies in dealing with the air and naval forces coming from the Kola Peninsula to cut Europe off from its North Atlantic partners. The Kola Peninsula then and now has the highest concentration of military force on the planet. And as such, the priority for both the Soviets and the Russians is the same – provide for anti-access and area denial of the Kola Peninsula.

But the differences are more pronounced. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries joining NATO much of the sea and land support capabilities available to the Soviet navy are now not available.

“Today, Russia’s geostrategic situation has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, but its ambition to be a major maritime power has not. Geographic conditions, however, funnels that maritime ambition toward the north. Post-Soviet Russia has lost much of its littoral territory around the Baltic Sea, with Poland and the Baltic states now fully integrated NATO members. What remains is the outlet at Saint Petersburg through the Gulf of Finland and the Kaliningrad enclave in the southeastern corner of the Baltic Sea.

“The Baltic Sea no longer provides Russia with assured access to the broader maritime domain, given that the other Baltic littoral states are either members of NATO or close partners of the alliance. In a war, the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet would find it impossible to exit the Baltic Sea, but it could, on the other hand, certainly cause NATO and the United States significant frustration if they attempted to reach the Baltic States across the sea.”³

This means that the Kola Peninsula has become even more important, despite an Arctic opening. 

And the latter can be seen from a military standpoint as expanding the perimeter of defense for the Kola Peninsula.

The Russian force is also quite different from the Soviet Union. 

The Russians have built and are modernizing an integrated missile and subsurface and surface fleet, reinforced by airpower, to provide an expand zone of defense for the Kola Peninsula.  They are also shaping more capabilities to ensure that the much reduced port structure, which could receive reinforcements from the U.S. or Canada, could be destroyed in times of severe conflict.

“If a crisis comes, the Russian navy is increasingly well placed and equipped to operate in the far North Atlantic to strike at vital ports, airfields, and command-and-control centers that are needed to bring in U.S. and NATO reinforcements coming across the North Atlantic. If those cross-Atlantic reinforcements were stopped or delayed in coming ashore, NATO and the United States could very well lose a confrontation with Russia in Europe’s east, far away from the shores of the Atlantic.” ⁴

The arrival of the new Russian capabilities – cruise missiles throughout the fleet with higher quality platforms to deliver missile strikes – has come with the procurement holiday and shift of focus by the U.S. and allies to the land wars in the Middle East. Much of the infrastructure built ashore to support maritime power in the North Atlantic has atrophied or simply disappeared.

“The network of bases and sensors that were established throughout the North Atlantic region and beyond to deal with the challenge of the Soviet navy was truly impressive, and by the end of the Cold War these nodes in NATO’s defense of the North Atlantic ranged from Bermuda in the west and Sigonella in Italy, far into the Mediterranean, and from Iceland and Norway in the north to the Azores in the south. Keflavik, however, stood out as a hub among the other spokes for North Atlantic ASW operations.”⁵

This has been accompanied by a dramatic shrinkage of air and naval capabilities available to prosecute a Russian fleet as well.

“In aggregate, twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War the naval picture in the North Atlantic had changed radically. European navies were smaller than ever before, but primed and ready to take on missions and threats far from their European waters. The U.S. naval presence in Europe had been more than halved and reoriented toward the Mediterranean and the turbulent Middle East. Sensor networks, basing infrastructure, and command structures intended for the Atlantic and Europe’s north had been reduced or scrapped during the same period. And ASW training was far from the minds of Western navies. Then, in 2014, great-power competition and the specter of future war returned to Europe and the North Atlantic.”⁶

This state of affairs, the return of the Russian challenge, and the disappearance of the defense systems for the West to deal with a Russian challenge, has led to a a significant challenge for the West. On the one hand, the Nordics have re-focused on their direct defense, and are building out new capabilities to deal with a 21^stcentury Russian challenge.  And on the other hand, the NATO allies not present in continental Europe, the UK, Canada, and the United States, have refocused on the challenge and are starting the process of rebuilding the capabilities.

The challenge will be to ensure that the two efforts, those by the Nordics and those by the offshore powers, converge to create a credible deterrent capability for North Atlantic defense.

Recent Russian exercises have highlighted the exact nature of the military challenge posed by the Russians. In blunt terms, Russia is seeking to expand its ability to deny the sea and air domain to the United States and its allies well into the North Atlantic. The extended bastion system is not a theoretical construct for it is being exercised by the Russians as well.

“In mid-March 2015, Russia launched an unannounced snap exercise that developed into one of the most far-ranging ever put on by the Russian military. All in all, it included some 80,000 personnel with exercise activities from the Baltic Sea region to the Black Sea and the Pacific. The exercise clearly simulated a conflict with NATO, and the first stage of the exercise was concentrated in and around the Kola Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet was deployed to conduct ASW and surface warfare exercises in the Barents Sea.

“At the same time, Russian strategic bombers performed strikes against simulated targets on the Kola Peninsula, while air defense units simulated defense against incoming air threats. Marine infantry assigned to the Northern Fleet were also mobilized and moved into the Arctic.

“During the second and third phase of the exercise, Russian ground, air, and naval units in the Baltic Sea region and around the Black Sea joined in the exercise to conduct live-fire drills in their area of responsibility.34 General interest media outlets called the Russian focus on the Kola Peninsula during the exercise “utterly baffling,” since the territory there is well away from the heart of Europe and with a low NATO presence in the surrounding region.”

“It is not so baffling if one transplants the events in and around the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea in mid-March 2015 into the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea at some future date. The first phase of the exercise was clearly a rehearsal on how to deploy the extended bastion in order to deter and hinder NATO reinforcements coming into Europe across the Atlantic, strike land-based targets that would support NATO operations in the Atlantic (e.g., as ports, command centers, and intelligence nodes), and provide strategic cover for Russian ground, air, and maritime operations elsewhere. The same type of operation in the North Atlantic was rehearsed again during Russia’s major and recurring exercise Zapad in September 2017.”⁷

Nordenman provided some core principles when thinking through how to deter the Russians in the context of the fourth battle of the Atlantic and these principles are important ones not just for the maritime domain but in terms of rethinking how to provide for direct defense of Europe in the new global strategic context.

He argued that the return of the great power competition in the North Atlantic was not so much about the American-Russian rivalry as it was about the Euro-North Atlantic working relationship to put relevant capabilities into play, and ones which could be usefully used in crisis management.

“The United States could also help move along naval coalitions of the willing under the umbrella of NATO. Here America could help encourage regional naval leadership by its European friends and allies by having the United Kingdom take a leadership role in the North Atlantic, while, for example, Germany leads in the Baltic Sea and France or Italy takes on a leading role in the Mediterranean.

“This would allow the navies of Europe to more directly specialize and focus on the maritime domains of greatest concern to them. In the case of the North Atlantic, a maritime framework could be imagined that would include the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and, occasionally, Germany and France.

“This notion of clearer regional responsibility for the maritime domains around Europe is further merited by the many war games that have been played in Washington and elsewhere since 2014, which have all shown that a first response to a crisis with Russia will likely not be a NATO one, but a regional coalition of the willing led by the United States.

“NATO would come into play a short while later as the alliance reaches political consensus that is required for collective action. The North Atlantic Treaty, however, does not bar any one nation or group of nations from coming to the aid of an ally without alliance consensus.”⁸

This is especially necessary given the different character of the fourth battle of the Atlantic.

“The fourth battle of the Atlantic, like the other three earlier contests, will hinge on the ability to bring to bear high-end naval power in the maritime domain. The fourth battle, however, will also include hybrid elements, with potential attacks against the vital submarine cables across the North Atlantic, disinformation campaigns, aggression in cyberspace in peacetime with implications in the maritime domain, and disruptions of GPS and communications gear by electronic means.It may also include the use of nonmilitary vessels for military purposes, including coast guard ships, fishing boats, and merchantman.”

“Hybrid warfare has proven to be a tough challenge to deal with for the United States and NATO, as the alliance is, at heart, an institution focused on traditional military challenges. In the case of hybrid warfare in the maritime domain, NATO must focus on building maritime infrastructure resilience, find ways to clearly identify and attribute attacks and provocations, and help educate senior leaders on robust decision-making during unclear circumstances. The latter can be accomplished by rigorous political-military wargaming, which would confront decision makers with situations and decision points they may face during a real-world crisis.”⁹

In short, a key part of shaping a new approach to direct defense in Europe is winning the fourth battle of the Atlantic.

And here the West, although it has significant challenges to face in doing so, has a clear opportunity to leverage new technologies and its collaborative working relationships to win that battle.

“Change is also coming to ASW sensors and the equipment used to interpret and exploit the data collected by them. Big data analytics, using software to process and systematize the immense amounts of information and data points being generated by everything from everyday gadgets to advanced sensors, is rapidly changing businesses and everyday life. Using big data analytics can help decision makers and analysts pick out previously unknown patterns of behavior or irregularities, help predict coming events, or better organize an industrial process.”¹⁰

This means that if the U.S. and its allies can provide the territory from which to operate, deploy the new data rich platforms like P-8s, Tritons, F-35s, Aegis and various European systems, as well, then the revolution in sensor technologies, C2 and distributed warfare can play to their benefit. But this will not happen if clear focus is not kept on the nature of the challenge.

Nordenman highlights a key aspect of dealing with the Russian challenge, which is crucial for the Nordics, namely the need to hold the Russian bastion at risk. 

For the United States and Canada, it is about reinforcing Europe and holding the Russians at bay, notably with Putin threatening a nuclear strike via his projected new hypersonic missile to be launched via a submarine. But for the Nordics, it is about homeland defense, and not letting the Russians have a free ride to use the Kola peninsula and its extended perimeter defense without a significant capability by the West to attrite and destroy the Russian bastion.  When you come out from the land into the air and sea corridors. That is where the West for sure needs to be able to operate its own anti-access and area denial capability.  Two can play at this game.

“NATO faces an urgent challenge in the Baltic Sea region, where the Baltic states are small, exposed, and difficult to defend against Russian military aggression. One way to deter Russia from ever seizing one or all of the Baltic states would be to hold key territory or capabilities of high value to Russia at risk.

“One such region is the Kola Peninsula, with the Northern Fleet and the submarine-based nuclear deterrent. The United States should give serious thought to a naval strategy in the far North Atlantic that in many ways harks back to the maritime strategy of the 1980s.

“This approach, however, is not without its potential shortcomings. Many NATO allies would be uneasy with this concept, and there is the real risk of pushing Russia into a “use or lose” decision with its submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Still, the concept bears careful consideration and quiet U.S. conversations with key European allies.”¹¹ Magnus Nordenman, New Battle for the Atlantic(Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition, p. 201).

The featured photo:

NORTH SEA (Mar. 11, 2019) The guided-missile destroyer USS Gravely (DDG 107) and the guided-missile frigate ORP General K. Pulaski (FrR 232) conduct a replenishment at sea with the German navy replenishment tanker FGS Spessart (A 1442).

Gravely is underway on a regularly-scheduled deployment as the flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 to conduct maritime operations and provide a continuous maritime capability for NATO in the northern Atlantic.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Mark Andrew Hays/Released)

The WA Indo-Pacific Defence conference is the flagship defence industry and defence issues conference. This year’s conference examined topics such as; ‘Partnership roles’, ‘industry support for the changing operational environment’, ‘New frontiers in Defence including the evolving role of technology and WA’s STEM agenda’, ‘Defence industry applications for WA’s battery minerals and resources expertise’ and ‘Key strategies outlined in the Western Australian Defence and Defence Industry Strategic Plan’.

The speech delivered by the Australian Defence Minister. who is from Western Australia. outlined a number of key objectives with regard to how Western Australia is currently and could in the future play a greater role in Australian defense.

Thank you for the warm introduction.  It’s a pleasure to be here today.

And thank you to those of you who has lasted to the end of a very full and fabulous day’s program, not quite the midnight shift, but as a 16 year member of the Fremantle Football Club, I can cope with being almost last – we are a resilient mob.

I acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land on which we meet — the Noongar people — and pay my respects to their elders past, present and emerging.

I acknowledge my federal colleagues, Governor Beazley, international visitors and senior Defence members.

And – I acknowledge and thank all current and former service men and women here this afternoon.

I’m very pleased to be speaking to you today as a proud Western Australian Minister for Defence Industry, and indeed the second Western Australian federal minister from the Defence portfolio to address the conference today.

How good is WA!

I have long held an interest in defence matters and really noticed the renewed energy in this sector across the State.

As is increasingly self-evident, security is of critical importance.

Earlier today, Defence Minister Linda Reynolds reiterated the increased importance of the Indo-Pacific, along with the Government’s unprecedented $200 billion investment in defence capability.

A key part of delivering on our record investment is my portfolio of Defence Industry.

Two months ago, I took the reins as Minister for Defence Industry — As Prime Minister Morrison has said, my job is to ensure the generational job-creating projects we’re bringing through our investment in defence capability are delivered on time and on budget.

And as an ex-construction Lawyer – I also like to add – “AND on spec”.

On spec includes the requirement for Australian local content in our contracts with major contractors.  To ensure all Australian businesses get opportunities.

And, let me say, I’m thoroughly enjoying getting to know the many fantastic businesses that make up our defence industry and creating the partnerships to deliver on our commitments.

I’ve met with cabinet makers, engineers, scientists, shipbuilders, tradespeople, industrial designers and mechanics – just to name a few.

All of these people and businesses are contributing to our defence industry, and all of them are benefitting from the Morrison Government’s record investment in our sovereign defence capability.

We are setting the pathway to grow the workforce across Australia – creating thousands of long-term jobs in the process.

We are building Australia’s defence industry to be resilient, sustainable and internationally competitive.

And my focus is laser sharp to ensure Australian industry involvement in the acquisition, operation and sustainment of Defence capability – and WA is key to our vision.

Western Australia has a proud and thriving local defence industry. 

As I’ve said, I’m a proud West Australian and I’m very pleased that WA is seizing the opportunity with both hands.

Our State contributes significant capability to safeguarding Australia.

It has a diverse industrial base, and expertise in critical defence skills.

It also has a strong track record in research and innovation.

Our Government is making sure WA has a critical role in the National Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise.

Workers in WA are building:

• Ten of our new 12 Offshore Patrol Vessels
• Twenty-one Pacific Patrol Boats
• One hydrographic vessel, and
• Two Mine Hunter Vessels

Workers in WA are delivering:

• Significant capability upgrades to the Navy’s ANZAC-class frigates, and
• Sustainment and maintenance of the Navy’s Collins-class submarines

This means more jobs for western Australians — more long-term jobs — and a stronger economy.

I can assure you, I want to see more Aussie projects delivered by Aussie workers using Aussie components — with some good old Aussie know- how and ingenuity.

To achieve this, we need more highly-skilled workers and this is why the Morrison Government is investing in upskilling WA’s workforce.

One of the ways we’re achieving this is through the Naval Shipbuilding College, which is building Australia’s future naval shipbuilding workforce.

The Naval Shipbuilding College is finding and training trade-qualified, job-ready workers and apprentices to truly be the workforce behind the Defence Force.

They will make sure locals have the right skills — at the right time — to help industry deliver Australia’s sovereign naval capability.

Together, we are building the skills to be used around Australia, across the Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise.

But the Government’s $200 billion investment in defence capability is more than just Naval shipbuilding.

We are ensuring the Australian Defence Force has the capability it needs – including superior aircraft and new armoured vehicles.

Delivering combat capabilities like the 5 th generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the world-leading Boxer Combat Reconnaissance vehicles.

But also delivering for Australian companies – with more than 50 directly sharing in more than $1.3 billion in F-35 production contracts.

And over 1,450 jobs across Australia by building and supporting the Boxer vehicle with Australian steel and Australian supply chains.

Today – we announced over $3 billion of investment in cutting edge equipment for Australia’s Special Forces.

Key equipment such as body armour, roping and climbing systems, as well as medical search and rescue  – are great opportunities for Australian companies to continue to provide the world’s best equipment to the world’s best Special Forces.

The Morrison Government is investing in the skills of the future.

Earlier this year, we released the Defence Industry Skilling Strategy.

Part of this strategy is establishing the National Defence Industry Skills office.

Together, we are helping industry, government and other stakeholders ensure that defence industry has the skilled workforce it needs in the years ahead to achieve our ambitious plans.

Later this year, I will host a national defence industry skilling and STEM summit to bring together key stakeholders and the Defence Industry Skills Office.

As Minister for Defence Industry it is a key priority of mine to create pathways for Australian students to find and pursue careers in our defence industry.

We must do more to attract more people to defence industry. With a skilled workforce we can grow our small businesses in the defence industry.

Here in Western Australia, through the Schools Pathways Program, we’re encouraging students to develop the science, technology and engineering skills for the future — skills needed in the defence industry and beyond.

We’re highlighting key subjects, with the hope that students will enrol in them at school and, later, pursue a career in Australia’s defence industry.

As well as more students, we also want to see more small Australian businesses in the defence industry, too.

To create and sustain a stronger defence industrial base, we need to maximise the involvement and success of Australian small business.

There are many opportunities here in WA and I encourage you to look at the Government’s broader investment program for opportunities which your business can take advantage of.

Some local success stories so far include:

• Sea to Summit: Providing outdoor equipment, including sleeping bags, hydration packs, sleeping mats and rifle-bags, to State and National security organisations, and exporting to European defence markets.
• Blacktree Technologies: Providing communications solutions to the Australian Defence Force.
• AVI: who are designing, manufacturing and supporting customised equipment for critical communication systems.
• International Maritime Consultants: Who are providing naval architecture advice and design services.
• Total Marine Technology: Who are building Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV), and exporting them to Brazil.

The Morrison Government is also helping small Australian businesses connect with global Primes — and with great success.

Under the Global Supply Chain Program, Australian small businesses have won more than $1 billion in contracts.

Western Australian businesses account for 13 per cent of that — 13 companies have won contracts totalling $131 million.

Local company, Orbital, is a great example.

It’s currently working with Insitu, a Boeing Subsidiary, exporting drones for the Scan Eagle in the US — an unmanned aerial vehicle used for reconnaissance.

And I want to see more Australian businesses exporting overseas – because trade creates jobs.

WA businesses are particularly fortunate in this area.

Not only do they have champions in myself and Defence Minister Reynolds, but also in the Australian Defence Export Advocate — David Johnston.

Since the Australian Defence Export Office opened last year, David has done a tremendous job advocating for Australian defence businesses, both at home and overseas.

Can I say – WA businesses really are well positioned to export their products.

I’m pleased to hear that there are six WA companies who are showcased in this year’s Australian Military Sales Catalogue. That’s a jump from just two last year.

WA is also contributing in the innovation space, and I encourage more WA businesses get involved with the Defence Innovation Hub.

The Defence Innovation Hub is working closely with businesses across the country to turn good ideas into advanced capability for the Australian Defence Force.

So far, it has awarded two contracts to Western Australian companies, totalling $3.1 million.

One of these contracts is with L3 Oceania.

Who is currently developing technology that has the potential to extend and enhance the acoustic surveillance capability of a submarine.

This is particularly useful in contested waters.

It’s also a great example of how WA contributes to national and regional defence.

Another area where WA contributes greatly is research.

Western Australians are, rightly so, incredibly proud of our universities. I’m pleased to say, all publicly funded universities in WA are working with Defence.

They’re working with us to better understand areas such as surveillance, space situational awareness and the undersea environment.

I know WA wants to be the forefront of cutting-edge defence science and innovation.

Here in WA, the Centre for Defence Industry (CDIC) – the ‘front door’ for many companies –

Is helping small businesses improve their capability so they can take advantage of opportunities in the shipbuilding supply chains.

To date, 34 contracts, with a total value of more than $2 million, have been awarded to WA businesses to improve capability – to be defence industry ready.

Defence West complements the work of CDIC, supporting WA’s defence industry and promoting our capabilities both nationally and internationally.

Working with state government agencies like Defence West is important in delivering a stronger, more resilient and internationally competitive defence industrial base.

The new Defence Science Centre, which I helped open in June, is a great step toward achieving it.

I expect big ideas and ground-breaking research to continue to come from this side of the country. In fact, I’m counting on it.

WA is positioning itself to play a critical role in national and regional defence, and I support this 100%

It is a state with so much potential and passion…

… with a strong entrepreneurial and enthusiastic spirit.

I look forward to working with the people, businesses and government in WA, as we continue to deliver the Government’s $200 billion investment in defence capability.

It is your work which contributes to the strength of our economy, and the security of both our nation and the region.

Thank you.

Australian Department of Defence

August 13, 2019.

With the Southern flank of NATO and indeed Southern Europe in a period of significant change even upheaval, one adaptation by NATO to the situation has been to set up what it refers to has NATO Hub South.

In our forthcoming book on The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Russian Challenge, we have focused on the Southern Flank as the most contested part of European defense within which Russia and de facto the Chinese can expand their influence significantly in the years ahead.

In the video below, NATO explains its approach with regard to the hub.

It is crucial for the Alliance to promote stability beyond NATO’s borders and to build an understanding of potential threats which might arise in its vicinity. Stability in neighbouring regions leads to stability for the Alliance. NATO’s ‘Hub for the South’ focuses on concerns such as destabilisation, terrorism, radicalisation, migration and environmental issues, particularly in North Africa and Sahel, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and adjacent areas.

Opened in 2017 under the roof and lead of Allied Joint Force Command Naples, the Hub aims to enhance comprehensive understanding, situational awareness, decision making and information sharing. It communicates and works with other organisations that are tackling various aspects of the security complexities in the region, contributing to the shared goal of promoting peace and stability.

Credit NATO

August 9, 2019